International
Politics

THE DESTINY OF THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM

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PREFACE

LONG books deserve short introductions. This volume is a new version of a text first written sixteen years ago. The three earlier editions found favor with teachers and students. The type of analysis attempted in the versions of 1933, 1937, and 1941, moreover, has been in some measure vindicated by events. A new application of the method and a reformulation of conclusions in the light of the developments of 1941 to 1948 therefore seem warranted. In so complex and confused an arena as that of world politics all evaluations and prognoses are, of necessity, hypothetical and controversial. Truth in these matters can be arrived at only by free and informed debate. The data here offered will have been wasted, and the judgments expressed will have been ventured in vain, if any of the argument is uncritically accepted as gospel. These chapters will serve the quest for truth only in so far as they promote active discussion aimed at more accurate and more adequate conclusions.

“Objectivity” in such affairs is not to be had by avoiding verdicts or shunning expressions of preference. It consists rather of interpreting facts within a frame of reference broader than the facts themselves. In intent at least, the context of the interpretations here set forth comprises two interrelated themes: the development of man through time and space, with emphasis upon the changing patterns of politics in earlier State Systems as well as in our own, and the ethical ideals derived by modern mankind from Israel, Athens, and Rome. Those aspects of the human adventure which are here discussed seem to me meaningless save in terms of these values and these sequences of experience. Whether the subject matter is appropriately ordered and significantly illumined by this mode of treatment is for others to say. I have at any rate tried, as best I could, to follow the advice of Spinoza: “When I have applied my mind to politics so that I might examine what belongs to politics with the same freedom of mind as we use for mathematics, I have taken my best pains not to laugh at the actions of mankind, not to groan over them, not to be angry with them, but to understand them.”

The phenomena of contemporary international relations are here subsumed under two general propositions: (1) all men are brothers by virtue of common ancestry, divine guidance, and shared aspirations toward the good life in the good society; (2) all sovereign States are enemies by virtue
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of the imperatives of power politics in a world of anarchy. Since all States are composed of men and all men are citizens of States, mankind here faces a persisting paradox which, obviously, is by no means resolved in the Western State System of our own time. The specific forms of the paradox are necessarily of the essence of any treatise on international politics which takes cognizance of the current crisis of Western culture.

For reasons set out hereafter, I do not share the currently widespread belief that the crisis can be cured, the unity of the world attained, and the goals of freedom and justice achieved by a clash in arms between the sundered halves of One World. While time remains, the available alternatives are, I trust, still deserving of sober consideration. Such consideration perhaps requires the mitigation of an attitude now common in both camps. It was once well put by the Red Queen—who commented tartly, when Alice confessed she had lost her way: “I don’t know what you mean by your way! All the ways about here belong to me!”

The narrative portions of this study embrace international events up to January, 1948, with the developments of winter and spring surveyed in the final chapter. These closing words are being written on the first day of summer—for here, as in Through the Looking Glass, conclusions are written first and introductions last. The frustrations, confusions, and doubts of a troubled world are exemplified in the curiously mixed record of the 80th Congress of the United States. When the legislators adjourned on June 19, 1948, they had voted selective service but not universal military training; appropriated almost $15,000,000,000 for arms, but nothing for housing; approved $5,055,000,000 for E.R.P. ($245,000,000 less than the Administration had asked), but failed to approve a $65,000,000 loan for the projected U.N. buildings in New York; extended the reciprocal trade agreement act for one year, but limited executive power to reduce tariffs; approved the admission of 205,000 displaced persons as immigrants, but attached conditions which in effect, discriminated against Jews, Catholics, and Slavs and in favor of Germans, Russophobes, and Fascists; and, in general, displayed at one and the same time acute symptoms of militarism, isolationism, interventionism, parsimony, and ambivalent enthusiasm for global crusading against sin.

Decisions and indecisions in other quarters reflected kindred uncertainties. An uneasy truce in Palestine brought a temporary end to bloodshed but no compromise between irreconcilable positions. Preparations proceeded apace for setting up a “Government” in Western Germany, with the French Assembly approving dubiously and with heavy heart. Red Muscovy and its Communist disciples, now firmly in control of Czechoslovakia after a single-list “election,” were alternately aggressive, conciliatory, menacing, and fearful. The exchange of public pleas for peace between Wallace and Stalin
brought the "cold war" no nearer an end. As America prepared to choose a President, all the world waited in vague apprehension, seemingly uncertain as to whether the mission of the Atlantic colossus was to bring peace or a sword. The central question of our time—whether citizens and statesmen in the great centers of our culture will meet the challenge of the atomic age by becoming godlike or reverting to bestiality—still remained unanswered.

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Although I am alone responsible for all that is here said or left unsaid, I am deeply grateful to those who have helped to make this book possible: to President James Phinney Baxter, III, and the Trustees of Williams College for permitting me to spend a term writing rather than teaching; to my colleagues—and particularly to Prof. Joseph E. Johnson—who carried some of the burdens of which I was relieved; to Janet Loper Coye and Ann Wilcox Jones for clerical and stenographic aid; to my wife and both my sons for help in editing and indexing; to all my students over the years at Williams, Cornell, Columbia, and elsewhere, whose comments and criticisms have been invaluable; to my old friend and collaborator, George D. Brodsky of Chicago, who generously and painstakingly prepared the maps which, we hope,
PREFACE

add both utility and beauty to these pages; and, above all, to everyone, living or dead, who helped defeat the assault of Fascism on civilization and thereby earned another opportunity for this generation to save the future.

WILLIAMSTOWN, Mass.
June 21, 1948

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

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PROLOGUE

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1. THE POLITICAL ANIMAL

I have set thee at the world's center, to observe whatever is in the world. I have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that thou mayest with greater freedom of choice and with more honor, as though the maker and moulder of thyself, fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are animal; thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms of life, which are divine.—God at the Creation of Man, Pico della Mirandola, Oratio de hominis dignitate, 1486.

REMEMBRANCE of things past is often dearest to those who are bored or driven to despair by the world around them. To these the contemplation of times gone by brings surcease from current burdens too heavy to bear. "Take not away from me," implored the Emperor Julian, world-weary monarch in another age of disenchantment, "this mad love for that which no longer is. That which has been is more splendidly beautiful than all that is. . . ." To others, concerned as watchers and movers with the challenge of today and the promise or menace of tomorrow, the tale of many yesterdays, reconstructed by the history and the science of living men and women, has another meaning.

By revealing what has gone before, it illumines the act of the human adventure now being played and suggests the pattern of acts to come. The drama of earthborn and earth-bound humanity, despite all its crises and intermissions, is a continuous story. All the characters are prisoners of time. All the problems of the now are forever shaped by the experiences of a then which extends back in unbroken sequence to the origins of life. Each generation has freedom to choose among alternative designs for destiny, and opportunity to win some measure of mastery over its fate, only to the extent of its comprehension of where it stands in the cavalcade of years, decades, centuries, and millennia ticked off by the spinning planet.

Men and women everywhere who are today aware of their world are disturbed by the condition and prospects of humankind in the middle years
of the 20th century of Christian chronometry. Darkly they perceive that
their epoch is a time of tragic troubles, marked by a decline and prospec-
tive disintegration of the Western way of life, by savagely destructive world
wars, and by a reversion of many of their fellows, maddened by the agonies
of an age of decay, to barbarism and bestiality. Since 1914 all the values
inherited by modern civilization from Israel, Athens, and Rome seem in
process of being trampled into the mire by the Horsemen of the Apocalypse
as they ride again over the earth.

Today’s quest for salvation stems from the remembered disasters of the
recent past and from fear of their repetition in even more appalling form.
In an epoch thus afflicted, the view might well be taken that analysis of
world politics should begin with Yalta or Potsdam, or with Stalingrad, El
Alamein, and Midway, or with the rape of Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, or
Poland, or, at the earliest, with Sarajevo and the course and consequences
of World Wars I and II. Reflection will suggest, however, that the past
which has shaped the men and issues of the present is intelligible only in
terms of spans of time much longer than those implicit in a cursory view
of current problems. A résumé of that longer past, albeit brief and inade-
quate, is offered here at the outset in the belief that, even if it be true that
“all our yesterdays have lighted fools the way to dusty death,” the chronicle
is yet something more than “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
signifying nothing.”

In the beginning was not the Word, nor yet the Deed, but only the
fierce heat of atomic disintegration in an incandescent star. From its flamin-
ging gas some wisps and streamers were pulled away, at an inconceivably
remote time, by the drag of another globe of fire passing near as it moved
through the vast emptiness of our galaxy. One of these circling clouds
cooled and shrank, two billion years ago, into the third planet outward
from its parent sun. “And the earth was without form, and void; and dark-
ness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the
face of the waters.”

In the thin film of liquid which ultimately covered most of the surface of
this whirling sphere, there finally appeared, by processes which can only be
guessed at, the strange molecules of an “aperiodic crystal” which is the chief
constituent of the slimy, granular jelly named (for the first time in 1840)
“protoplasm.” Each tiny blob possesses the curious quality of irritability
—i.e., it responds to environmental stimuli. Each microscopic globule moves,
eats, excretes, grows, and reproduces. Each is poised in unstable, metabolic
equilibrium between the deadness of inorganic matter and the promise of

1 See Erwin Schrödinger, What Is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell (New
dreams beyond the firmament. Through this weird alchemy, life began on earth sometime between 500,000,000 and 300,000,000 years ago.

In the eyes of whatever deities preside over suns and satellites, sea slime and sand, the epic of the ages is the tragicomedy of organic evolution wherein single living cells combine into multicellular creatures which, through reproduction and mutation over endless generations, proliferate into scores of thousands of species. That man should regard himself as the culmination of the process is more an evidence of human vanity than of any predetermined design of the cosmos. His life on earth thus far, including the life spans of the semi-men who are long since dust, is but a tiny fraction of the eons during which the planet was successively dominated by trilobites, fish, amphibians, monster reptiles, and giant mammals. If the combined life cycles of prehuman organisms, taken together, were reckoned as one year, man’s lifetime to date would be less than a single day. Man’s origins, as they are revealed by the record of the rocks and by the taxonomy of living species, are equally conducive to humility.

In the zoologist’s terms, man is an animal belonging to the grade of the Metazoa, or multicellular organisms; to the phylum of the Chordata, or vertebrates; to the subphylum of the Craniata (comprising all fish, birds, reptiles, and mammals); to the class of the Mammalia; to the subclass of the Placentalia; to the order of the Primates (embracing all monkeys, apes, and men); to the family of the Hominidae (including sundry extinct species of ape-men); to the genus Homo; and to the species Homo sapiens. The living creature which, in all probability, most closely resembles the ultimate ancestor of man (and of all monkeys and apes) is the Tarsius or insect-eating tree shrew of Malaya and the East Indies, with goggle eyes and absurd feet, suggesting nothing so much as a grotesque synthesis of a rat, a bat, a squirrel, and a tiny monkey.

Some 70,000,000 revolutions of the earth around the sun have elapsed between the emergence of the first primates (i.e., the tarsioids) and the most recent commencement exercises in American universities and colleges. The beneficiaries of these academic rituals bear little resemblance to the small, timid mammals whose forebears lived in trees and ate insects in the early Eocene period. Yet there is much reason to suppose that today’s A.B.’s and Ph.D.’s are biologically related to an age-old tree shrew. From this line branched off the lemurs, the lorises, the tarsius (only surviving tarsioid, apparently little changed in seventy thousand millennia), the new world monkeys, the old world monkeys, and the living anthropoid apes: gibbon, orangutan, chimpanzee, and gorilla. Along the line of mutation there emerged, perhaps 50,000,000 years ago, an apelike monkey (now extinct) dubbed Parapithecus and later (some 35,000,000 years ago) the first true
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ape, named Propliopithecus, a smallish animal whose bones have been found in the Oligocene strata of the upper Nile Valley. Still later, in the Miocene, 20,000,000 years ago, lived such extinct species of larger apes as Dryopithecus and its descendants, Australopithecus and Paranthropus. The first is probably the ancestor of the chimpanzee and gorilla. The other two, whose fossilized remains in South Africa resemble man more closely than any of the living anthropoids, seem nearer to the immediate progenitors of all men.

No biologist would now contend that men are descended from apes, nor did Charles Darwin in The Descent of Man (1871) advance any such thesis. But all biologists would hold that in all likelihood the four living species of anthropoids have a common simian ancestry with man. All apes and monkeys are vegetarians. All apes, and many monkeys, live in groups which tend to be more antagonistic toward one another than toward other species. Led by older males, each group defends its feeding grounds against out-groups, thus exhibiting the pristine pattern of “international relations” which has reappeared in all the State Systems of Homo sapiens.²

All apes, save gorillas, are tree dwellers. All have brains weighing about 1 pound, compared with man’s 3-pound brain. Man’s ancestors evolved into the least specialized, and therefore the most adaptable, of mammals, relying for survival on arched feet, upright posture, primate hands, extraordinary sexual drives, and an enlarged brain. The latter made possible the dawn of “intelligence,” doubtless best defined as the most exaggerated form of protoplasmic irritability.

But man in the dim past was not of one species. His earliest precursors among the now extinct Hominidae were not even of the genus Homo. In 1891, Dr. Eugene Dubois discovered, in early Pleistocene deposits in Java, fragments of an apelike primate that walked erect a million years ago and had a 2-pound brain. He christened it Pithecanthropus erectus, after Ernst Haeckel’s name for the “missing link.” In 1936, Dr. Ralph von Koenigswald unearthed further bits of bone which left no doubt that the Java ape-man belonged in truth to a genus midway between apes and men.³ In 1908, at the other extremity of Eurasia, Charles Dawson dug up, near Piltdown in Sussex, the bones of Eoanthropus Dawsoni, remarkable for apelike jaw

² See Robert Redfield (editor), Levels of Integration in Biological and Social Systems, Biological Symposia, Vol. VIII, especially pp. 177-204, “Societies of Monkeys and Apes” by C. R. Carpenter.
³ In 1946, Koenigswald, back from Java and China, brought to the American Museum of Natural History various teeth and bones of three types of still older giant ape-men, which he named Pithecanthropus robustus, megalanthropus, and gigantopithecus. For a lively account of the earlier evidence on man’s ancestry, see William Howells, Mankind So Far.
and teeth combined with an almost human skull of 2½ pounds capacity. In 1927, in a Pleistocene cave near Peiping (Pekin), Dr. Davidson Black found a tooth, to which Dr. Koenigswald, two years later, was able to add more teeth and sundry skulls and jawbones, comprising parts of 40 skeletons of a species named *Pithecanthropus pekinensis*. In the cave were crude flint instruments, the earliest artifacts of Paleolithic (Old Stone Age) culture, and some evidence of the use of fire. Many skulls and bones were broken and chewed, evidently to get at brains and marrow. The Pekin ape-man was perhaps a cannibal . . .

These super-apes who were almost men were followed by the first true man, though he clearly was also not of our species. His fossil bones, first found in a Gibraltan cave in 1848, were brought to England in 1862 but aroused no interest. In 1855, parts of a skeleton were found in the Neanderthal cave in the Ruhr Valley. Finally, in 1907, Dr. Otto Schoetensach found a jawbone in a sand pit near Heidelberg. Many more bones have since been dug up throughout western Europe and a few in Palestine. This “Heidelberg man,” or *Homo neanderthalensis*, had a brain of more than 3 pounds, incased in a heavy, low-browed skull. He was squat and stooping. Emerging some 250,000 years ago, he struggled for life with the hairy mammoth, the saber-toothed tiger, the cave bear, and the woolly rhinoceros. He seems to have survived for no less than 200 millennia. He used fire and made crude tools of stone. He lived in caves for protection from other carnivores and from the bitter cold of the third and fourth glacial periods of the Pleistocene era. To the rigors of the fourth age of ice he apparently succumbed some 50,000 years ago.

Living man is the child of the postglacial epoch—or, if a fifth is to come, of the current interglacial period. His earliest representative, appearing in Europe 35,000 years ago, was Cromagnon man, named for the cave in Dordogne where his remains were first found in 1868. Here was a human being of our own species, tall, sturdy, and with a large brain, but not identifiable with any existing race. He was a hunter and perhaps a herdsman, skilled in the arts of the Old Stone Age, and given to painting striking pictures of animals on cave walls. His numbers declined as changes in climate and vegetation reduced the herds of reindeer and wild horses. About 12,000 years ago, as our earliest immediate ancestors came into Europe from Asia, Cromagnon man passed from the scene. His successors were men of the New Stone (Neolithic) Age, who used polished flints and arrowheads, kept domestic animals, made pottery, practiced simple agriculture, and ultimately learned to smelt bronze and later iron.

All human beings now alive, and all (including Cromagnon man) who have lived since the melting of the last ice sheet, are members of *Homo*...
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sapiens. Harvard men and Hottentots, Teutons and Eskimos, Chileans and Chinese, Slavs and Amerinds, Baronets and Bushmen, Yale men and Yakuts may, if they choose, interbreed and raise children—a biological fact which is conclusive evidence that all living men are of one species. That species, to be sure, is physically differentiated into “races,” which may be classified in various ways, almost all of them unsatisfactory. The mysticism and sadism of modern racial myths have obscured the truth that all men are human and that the physical resemblances between them far outweigh the differences. Yet all the evidence of biology, anthropology, archeology, and history support the central thesis of all the world’s higher religions—always more honored in the breach than in the observance—that all men are brothers, all have a common origin, and all are children of God, equal in potential virtue or vice and in capacity for self-realization as human beings.

2. CULTURE AND THE STATE

It is evident that the State is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a State is either above humanity or below it; he is the “tribeless, lawless, heartless one,” whom Homer denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone. Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. . . . Man is the only animal with the gift of speech . . . He alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust; and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a State.—ARISTOTLE, Politics, Book I, Chapter 2.

The genealogy of Homo sapiens, interesting as it is by virtue of the charm of things remote, obscure, and doubtful, may seem to some to throw little light on the processes of power politics. Diplomacy, foreign policy, and the whole fabric of interstate relations are concomitants of “civilization.” There is no evidence that any of the early primates, or the ape-men and the sub-men of the Pleistocene, or even the dawn-men of the Paleolithic and Neolithic cultural epochs lived in organized “States” under “governments.” It is plain that Homo sapiens knew nothing of such matters during the first few tens of thousands of years of his existence as a recognizable denizen of the turning earth. There was apparently no “civilization” whatever among human beings prior to a time which began not much more than 7,000 years ago.

But this very circumstance raises questions, for lack of answers to which the present generation is hampered in its efforts to understand itself and its destiny. If it be true that, on an assumed scale of one year for all life on
earth, manlike creatures have thus far enjoyed life for less than a single
day, then it is also true, on the same calendar, that within this day only
the last hour represents the era of *Homo sapiens* and only the last eight
minutes comprise the period of “civilization.” The investigator who seeks
to comprehend any aspect of human activity in terms of these last eight
minutes is like a psychoanalyst who would ignore the ancestry, infancy,
childhood, adolescence, and early adult life of his patient in favor of the
events of last week. Man’s organic inheritance has been of fantastically
greater duration (and therefore, presumably, has enormously greater effects
upon the behavior of the heirs) than all of man’s cultural legacies put to-
gether.

A major unsolved problem of social science is the question of how and
why men, living for ages as “animals” among other animals, finally developed
“cultures” and how and why men, living for many millennia in primitive
cultures, at length arrived at the peculiar cultures called “civilizations.” If
such queries cannot yet be answered with assurance, their content can be
clarified by distinguishing sharply among the three conditions indicated
by the evidence of past experience. The earliest primates suspected of siring
man, along with all their forebears, lived as beasts. That is to say, their
equipment for solving problems consisted primarily of “instincts,” or bio-
logically inherited patterns of response to stimuli, built slowly and solidly
into nerves, glands, and muscles via the genes, through the mysterious
process of organic adaptation over many generations.

These early ancestors possessed as well some talent for individual learn-
ing through trial-and-error “monkeying” or fumbling with strange or dan-
gerous situations. Only those who learned survived. To learn is to change
the patterns of response fixed by instinct or previous habit. Capacity for such
change grew with the gradual expansion, through species after species, of
the cerebral cortex. Such solutions as were stumbled upon, however, could
scarcely be transmitted to kinsmen or children through mere grunts and
howls. Animal sounds reflect emotional states but never symbolize any ex-
ternal reality or any past or anticipated success or failure in meeting prob-
lems. Even today many members of *Homo sapiens*, although equipped with
elaborate vocabularies, find it all but impossible to transfer to the new
generation the wisdom of the old.

Ape-men probably hit upon the use of fire and of simple weapons and
tools before they arrived at words. The apes of today cannot learn to talk,
but they readily learn to use tools and occasionally seem able to invent
them. “Culture” is the totality of learned devices for problem solving, as
distinct from hereditary or instinctual equipment. It began at the point at
which the sub-men of the dawn successfully transmitted to one another, and
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to their children, whatever they were able to learn about fire, clubs, flints, caves, fruits, and roots, and the habits of the animals they feared or killed for food. Culture is impossible without effective communication between individuals and between generations. Communication, in turn, creates community, which means no more or less than the sharing of experiences. To share experience without words to describe it is most difficult. But this achievement, within narrow limits, was doubtless within the capacity of the Java and Pekin ape-men and of Piltdown man and was certainly accomplished by the Neanderthalers, perhaps with the aid of rudimentary speech.

The invention of words was an immense step forward in the possibility of sharing experience and thus of building up a culture—i.e., a store of transmissible skills, artifacts, beliefs, rules of conduct, and guides to safety, comfort, and success. When, where, and by whom words were first used by human tongues and understood by human ears is unknown and, in the nature of the case, can never be known. Cromagnon men almost surely used words, though they are forever lost. So with certainty did “modern” man in the Neolithic phase of his artifacts. But the step between words as sounds and words as written symbols is almost as great as the step between the spoken word and no words at all. The culture of Cromagnon and Neolithic man was a “preliterate” culture—i.e., antedating the invention of writing. In this “prehistoric” condition all human beings remained for many more centuries than have elapsed since the first written languages were devised. And in this condition remain the “primitive” or “preliterate” peoples of today in Africa, Australasia, Polynesia, and elsewhere, who have somehow never hit upon the art of representing meaningful sounds in equally meaningful visual symbols.

Preliterate “folk” cultures, as reconstructed from the past and observed in the present, bear little resemblance to Thomas Hobbes’s concept of primitive anarchy marked by a “war of each against all” or to Rousseau’s idealization of the “noble savage,” enjoying the freedom which civilization allegedly destroys. Peoples without writing typically live lives rigidly circumscribed by the folkways and mores of the group, handed down from father to son, surcharged with superstition and magic, and beyond all questioning and willful change. Unity is assured by universal observance of the “rites of passage” (i.e., the beliefs and rituals surrounding the life crises of birth, puberty, marriage, and death), by fear of ancestral ghosts, and by seasonal propitiation of the spirits that bring the seedtime and the harvest, the solstices and the rain, the warmth of the sun, and good luck in the hunt. Government and politics, as we know them, are nonexistent. Relationships of command and obedience are familial or tribal or are temporary arrangements for particular purposes. Blood feuds are often permissible, and pun-
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ishment of crime is obligatory. But war, as a deliberate organization of the
community for violence against other communities, is a rare event. So lived
all men 10,000 years ago.

How then did this mode of life change to "civilization" at the so-called
"dawn of history"? Nothing is clear here save the nature of the change and
the approximate times and places of its occurrence. Men who came to call
themselves Sumerians began to live in "civilization" some 7,000 years ago
in the then fertile valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, north of the
Persian Gulf. Other men, later called Egyptians, adopted a similar mode
of life along the Nile about the same time, or perhaps earlier. Still later,
men became civilized in Crete, in the Indus and Ganges Valleys, in the
Tarim Valley of Mongolia, and along the shores of the Hwang Ho (Yellow
River) and, presently, along the Yangtze Kiang. Still other men subse-
quently developed comparable designs for living in what are now Yucatán,
Mexico, and Peru, though the respective Maya, Toltec-Aztec, and Inca civi-
lizations never arrived at the use of iron. Nor did the Incas, for all their
great empire, planned economy, and elaborate communal life, develop any
system of writing other than the use of knotted strings (quipus) to keep
accounts and transmit messages.4

This emergence of civilization in widely scattered valleys, islands, and
plateaus followed upon a slow, thin spread of preliterate peoples over much
of the globe. In all likelihood the original center from which the migrants
fanned out comprised the highlands and plains of north central Asia.
Neanderthal man, and after him Cromagnon man, may well have entered
Europe by the steppe road out of Asia. From the same source probably
came, at the end of the last glacial period, successive waves of wanderers,
with the present Negroid peoples moving first and reaching Indonesia,
Australasia, and southern India and, in the end, occupying most of Africa.
Cromagnon man in Europe, or some of his close relatives, may have been
Negroid. Next came the Mongoloid peoples, flowing over China and south-
eastern Asia, with one stream, some 25,000 years ago, crossing Bering Strait
into Alaska, and settling the American continents.5 Most recent of the emi-
grants were the "white," or "Caucasian," peoples, of whom a small segment

4 A few cultural anthropologists, following the lead of Elliott Smith, lean to the
view that civilization first originated in Egypt and spread elsewhere through cultural
diffusion. Most authorities, however, believe that civilization arose in various loci about
the same time, independently of any common origin.

5 It is now generally agreed that all the Amerindians came originally from Asia by
the route here indicated. No fossil remains of sub-men have been found anywhere in the
Americas. The so-called "Folsom man," whose Paleolithic artifacts have been un-
earthed at various points in western United States, apparently flourished some 10,000
years ago and probably represents one of the earliest waves of migration from Asia.

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(the primitive Ainus of northern Japan) moved eastward, while most, in serried ranks, flowed westward over the vast Eurasian prairies and originally peopled all the lands of Europe, North Africa, the Levant, and India.

Although travel is broadening, there is no good reason for believing that the global excursions of our postglacial ancestors promoted the transition from preliteracy to civilization. Those who traveled first and farthest have remained preliterate longest. "Civilization" means life in cities. "Politics" stems from the Greek polis, or town. Civilized living is to be distinguished from savage or barbarian lifeways by (1) urbanism; (2) writing; (3) the advent of the territorial State and the practice of politics; (4) the emergence of a priesthood and a church; (5) the institution of private property in land, possessed by a nobility; and (6) the appearance of social classes or castes.

The causal relationships, if any, among these elements of civilization are obscure. Those who think of cultural change in terms of communication will be most impressed by the invention of writing. Egyptian hieroglyphics, Sumerian cuneiform, and the ideographs first used by the ancient Indians, Chinese, and Mayas all suggest that the advent of picture writing, as the precursor of alphabets, was a major factor in the transition. Written language multiplied greatly the possibility of communicating experience through space and time and thereby made possible the rise of large communities united by shared beliefs, skills, and traditions. The economic challenge of desiccation, stressed by Arnold J. Toynbee, may well have played a role in causing the peoples of the river valleys to invent irrigation and systematic agriculture as a means of survival.

One persuasive hypothesis here merits special mention. This is the war-and-conquest theory of the origin of the State and of private property, slavery, social classes, and "civilized" government. Reduced to its elements, it holds that the crucial event in the shift from barbarism to civilization was the subjugation of primitive farmers by hunters and herdsmen. The nomads somewhere and somewhen learned that wealth was to be had by war as well as by work. This first lesson of politics led to no State so long as the raiders, storming out of the mountains and deserts into the fertile lowlands, were content to rob and kill their victims. But some among them learned that more was to be gained by carrying the vanquished off into captivity than by putting them all to death. This innovation, well documented in the Old Testament, created the institution of slavery. At a still later stage, ex hypothesis, some among the warrior-nomads perceived that maximum benefits were to be derived by settling down upon the lands and necks of the conquered and exploiting them as tillers of the soil.

This third decision, it is argued, gave rise to most of the distinguishing
elements of civilization. The victors built strongholds against internal rebellion and external invasion. Around the walls grew towns. The victors asserted rights of property to the lands of the vanquished, who became slaves or serfs. The masters became a hereditary aristocracy, supplemented by a priesthood and claiming a monopoly of arms and of rule-making power within a defined region. All these are typical features of the earliest literate cultures. Writing and religion, no less than the arts of politics and war, enabled the masters to consolidate their mastery by winning the allegiance of their victims. Through the adroit use of force, fraud, and favors, sanctified by usage and magic, the new arrangements were perpetuated and developed into the first urbanized, stratified societies of the first territorial States.

3. THE RHYTHM OF HISTORY

The State, completely in its genesis, essentially and almost completely during the first stages of its existence, is a social institution forced by a victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole purpose of regulating the dominion of the victorious group, and securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad. Teleologically, this dominion had no other purpose than the economic exploitation of the vanquished by the victors. . . . From war to peace, from the hostile splitting up of the hordes to the peaceful unity of mankind, from brutality to humanity, from the exploiting state of robbery to the Freeman's citizenship—this has been the path of suffering and of salvation of humanity, its Golgotha and its resurrection into an eternal kingdom.

—FRANZ OPPENHEIMER, *The State.*

From the earliest times, men have formed the impression that history repeats itself. Of course, it does not. The dimension of time is not circular, as Nietzsche contended in his doctrine of "eternal recurrence." Cultural events, moreover, exhibit no such similarity or identity as do physical, chemical, astronomical, or biological events. Yet the broad patterns of change in the annals of various civilizations do in fact reveal a striking degree of conformity to what very much looks like (or is mistaken for) a master plan of birth, growth, maturity, senescence, and death which may be as much beyond human control as the life cycle of each individual.

*Der Untergang des Abendlandes* by Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) is the most eloquent recent exposition of the cyclical theory of cultures. Arnold J. Toynbee's *Study of History* is the most learned. England's greatest living

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historian, in the first six volumes (1934 and 1939) of his projected nine-volume work, makes small acknowledgment to the earlier writings of the previously obscure German high-school teacher. He expressly repudiates Spengler’s notion that cultures are organisms. But both treatises contend that the appropriate units of study in perusing the human adventure are not nations or races or languages or religions, but the major literate cultures of mankind. Both reject as absurd the familiar divisions of history into “ancient,” “medieval,” and “modern.” Both present abundant evidence that each distinct culture passes through comparable stages of change, from its entry out of preliterate darkness to its exit into decadence and barbarism. Both writers are persuaded that all phases of each culture—politics, economics, religion, philosophy, science, art—display parallel features of content, style, and direction at “contemporary” periods of evolution. And both are convinced (Spengler more firmly than Toynbee) that our own Western Culture has passed its zenith and is on the eve of or in the midst of a decline and potential disintegration similar to that which brought all its predecessors to the grave.

The Spenglerian thesis, in brief, is that a comparative study of the cultures we know most about (the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the Chinese, the Indian, the Classical, or “Apollinian,” the Arabian, or “Magian,” and the Western, or “Faustian”) makes possible a “morphology of history.” Each culture is unique in spirit, but all are alike in outer forms and in the broad phases of their development. Each has a life span of a thousand years, unless prematurely destroyed by catastrophe or prolonged beyond senescence and death through empty and “historyless” centuries. The four ages of each cultural organism—“Pre-cultural,” “Early Culture,” “Late Culture,” and “Civilization” (Spengler’s special term for the final epoch)—are roughly comparable to Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter.

Spring is the time of myth making, mysticism, nascent art styles, tribes, chieftains, feudalism, and a late transition from feudal to aristocratic States. Summer brings Reformation, Puritanism, Rationalism, urban arts, great masters, monarchical absolutism, social revolution, and Napoleonism. With Autumn come “Enlightenments,” philosophical systems, decay of esthetic styles, political democracy, and ultimate corruption of democracy by money. Winter is marked by materialism, skepticism, the “second religiousness,” sports, fashions, luxury, pretentious and imitative architecture and ornament, world wars, Caesarism, and finally the World State, which sooner or later crumbles to ruin.

The West, located in this schema, is in its late Autumn, approaching Winter. Its future is, therefore, clear: democracy will decay, dictatorships will flourish, men of money and intellect will lose influence to new groups
of ruthless warrior-rulers, global wars of annihilation will succeed one another, and at last will come a world empire as the final political form of a static and increasingly shapeless "civilization" which has lost all creative power. Skeptics should be cautioned that these prophecies, along with others equally striking, were in part written before 1914 and were published in 1918-22. A sample will suggest the flavor of the whole:

World peace—which has often existed in fact— involves the private renunciation of war on the part of the immense majority, but along with this it involves an unavowed readiness to submit to being the booty of others who do not renounce it. It begins with the State-destroying wish for universal reconciliation, and it ends in nobody's moving a finger so long as misfortune only touches his neighbor. . . . On this spiritual premise a second Vikingism develops. The state of being "in form" passes from nations to bands and retinues of adventurers, self-styled Caesars, seceding generals, barbarian kings, and what not—in whose eyes the population becomes in the end merely a part of the landscape. There is a deep relation between the heroes of the Mycenaean primitive age and the soldier-emperors of Rome, and between, say, Menes and Rameses II. In our Germanic world the spirits of Alaric and Theodoric will come again. . . .

With the formed state, high history also lays itself down weary to sleep. Man becomes a plant again, adhering to the soil, dumb and enduring. The timeless village and the "eternal" peasant reappear, begetting children and burying seed in Mother Earth—a busy, not inadequate swarm, over which the tempest of soldier-emperors passingly blows. In the midst of the land lie the old world-cities, empty receptacles of an extinguished soul, in which a historyless mankind slowly nests itself. Men live from hand to mouth, with petty thrifts and petty fortunes, and endure. Masses are trampled on in the conflicts of the conquerors who contend for the power and the spoil of this world, but the survivors fill up the gaps with a primitive fertility and suffer on. And while in high places there is eternal alternance of victory and defeat, those in the depths pray, pray with that mighty piety of the Second Religiousness that has overcome all doubts forever. . . . Only with the end of grand History does holy, still Being reappear. It is a drama noble in its aimlessness, noble and aimless as the course of the stars, the rotation of the earth, and alternance of land and sea, of ice and virgin forest upon its face. We may marvel at it or we may lament it—but it is there.

Toynbee's "science" of history, elaborated with vastly more verbiage and erudition than Spengler's, is at once more precise, more mechanical, and more flexible. He identifies no less than 21 distinct civilizations which have developed to maturity, 3 "abortive" civilizations, and 5 "arrested" civilizations. The genesis of each results from response to a challenge, natural

7 The uncanny accuracy of many of Spengler's predictions is pointed out and commented upon by Edwin Franden Dakin in Today and Destiny, 1940.
9 The full-grown civilizations, according to Toynbee, are (using his own names for them and in rough order of antiquity) the Egyptiac, the Sumeric, the Minoan, the Hittite, the Sinic, the Babylonic, the Indic, the Syrian, the Hellenic, the Mayan, the
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or human, severe enough to demand ingenuity for survival, but not so severe as to absorb all energies in meeting it. Growth is marked by differentiation, fruition, and self-fulfillment and then by “breakdown,” wherein the original “creative minority” becomes merely a “dominant minority” to which the masses no longer give the obeisance of imitation. This schism leads to disintegration in which the dominant minority, after a “time of troubles,” creates a Universal State, while the “internal proletariat” evolves a higher religion and a Universal Church.

But the “Schism in the Soul” of the declining society reflects itself in a Sense of Drift and a Sense of Sin, in promiscuity and vulgarity, in archaism, futurism, and transfiguration. At the close of the drama the Universal State, no longer capable of self-preservation, is destroyed by the “external proletariat”—i.e., barbarian war bands. This hypothetical design for the life and death of literate cultures is chiefly based on the experience of the Hellenic (Greco-Roman) world. The evidence of universality adduced from the records of other cultures, while impressive, is perhaps not altogether conclusive. But the manner of statement is striking:

. . . The ailing civilization pays the penalty for its failing vitality by being disintegrated into a dominant minority, which rules with increasing oppressiveness but no longer leads, and a proletariat (internal and external), which responds to this challenge by becoming conscious that it has a soul of its own and by making up its mind to save its soul alive. The dominant minority’s will to repress evokes in the proletariat a will to secede; and a conflict between these two wills continues while the declining civilization verges towards its fall, until, when it is in articulo mortis, the proletariat at length breaks free from what was once its spiritual home but has now become a prison-house and finally a City of Destruction. In this conflict between a proletariat and a dominant minority, as it works itself out from beginning to end, we can discern one of those dramatic spiritual encounters which renew the work of creation by carrying the life of the Universe out of the stagnation of autumn through the pains of winter into the ferment of spring.

No final judgment can yet be rendered on the full sweep of the challenging generalizations offered by Toynbee and Spengler. A more limited and less controversial task is here in order—viz., that of noting that most, if not

Andean, the Yucatec, the Mexic, the Far Eastern (Main Body), the Far Eastern (Japanese Offshoot), the Hindu, the Orthodox Christian (Main Body), the Orthodox Christian (Russian Offshoot), the Iranic, the Arabic, and the Western. The “abortive” civilizations are the Far Western Christian (Celtic), the Far Eastern Christian (Central Asia), and the Scandinavian. The “arrested” civilizations are the Polynesian, the Eskimo, the Nomadic, the Spartan, and the Osmanli.


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all, past civilizations in their social structure and political fabric have manifested certain uniformities which are quite beyond debate.

All literate human societies of any substantial size in all times and places have been pyramidal or hierarchical in the distribution of indulgences and deprivations among their members. The few enjoy maximum individual shares of wealth, income, prestige, and influence; usually through ownership and/or control of productive property. These elites (i.e., those who get most of what there is to get) have many shapes. They may consist of noble owners of inherited estates, celibate priests, soldier-conquerors, learned administrators, high-caste potentates, managerial bureaucrats, busy businessmen, idle plutocrats, or any possible combination of such groups. But some elite exists in every civilized society so long as it preserves the attributes of civilization. By the same token, every such society displays at the bottom of the social scale a multitude of the poor, each receiving minimum individual shares of available satisfactions. They may be slaves, serfs, peons, sharecroppers, peasants, pariahs, proletarians, or what not. In all ages and climes they have in common their poverty, their humble place, and their relative inability to influence community decisions. Between rich and poor, in many (but by no means in all) societies, is a fluctuating, more or less numerous, moderately prosperous middle class of freemen, burghers, merchants, civil servants, technicians, etc., looking down upon the masses and imitating the classes which stand above them.

Every civilized society, moreover, displays some form of government and some pattern of politics. Since naked power is always ugly and often ineffective, the processes of rulership are invariably dressed in garments so fashioned as to inspire awe, fear, respect, love, loyalty, and obedience. Those who act in the name of the State usually have at their disposal a monopoly of coercive power in the community, a legal right to compel obedience from all inhabitants of the territory, an arsenal of credenda and miranda calculated to impress the public, and a variety of means of dispensing rewards and penalties which are likely to be more decisive for the total allocation of satisfactions than any of the means in the hands of those who wield power outside of government.

Politics has been well defined as the science of who gets what, when and how. It is also the process by which people compete for control of the instrumentalities of favors, fraud, and force that are of the essence of all government. Save in pioneer communities or in times of social revolution, such control ordinarily rests with the wealthy and the wellborn and is shared reluctantly with the middle classes and the poor. To postulate the universality of this pattern is not to embrace a naïve economic determinism, nor yet to
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accept the Marxist view that all history is the history of class struggles. On the contrary, the record suggests that most people in most societies, when not subjected to extreme provocation, accept their inherited stations in life with little question.

These characteristics of all civilized societies are not static. A recognizable sequence of change can be observed. At first, always, the elite consists of nobles and priests, and the masses of slaves or serfs. All live in local city-states, controlling the surrounding countryside and organized to preserve the existing distribution of favors against threats at home or abroad. Where a number of such city-states exist in the same region, they create, through their contacts of trade, travel, and war, a miniature State System, marked by leagues, alliances, balance-of-power diplomacy, and an uneasy equilibrium in which each community is the potential enemy of all. Sooner or later one State subdues the rest and establishes a larger kingdom which is “feudal” in form—i.e., land is held by “lords” (originally “loaf-wards”) in return for military service to a monarch and is tilled by unfree peasants who receive protection for their labors.

When, as has commonly been the case, a number of such feudal kingdoms ultimately establish contacts with one another over a still broader expanse of land or sea, the result is a larger State System, repeating on a larger stage the original drama of interstate politics. This phase of unstable balance among “Great Powers” often persists for some centuries, during which the growth of trade and the industrial arts fosters an urban middle class, promotes the partial displacement of landed aristocrats by businessmen, and frequently engenders the displacement of ancient dynasties by republican state forms and by varying measures of democracy and mass participation in public affairs. The terminal phase of international rivalries for power is a series of “world wars,” involving all the members of the State System and eventuating typically in the subjugation of all by one.

To insist that all civilizations have traversed this road would do violence to the facts. Some have been cut off in their prime by external enemies. Others have merged into neighboring cultures and lost their identity long before journey’s end. Still others have tarried wearily by the wayside for long epochs without reaching the goal. It would be equally fatuous to argue that the itinerary here outlined represents the “inevitable” course of our own Western culture. Contemporary science and technology, which have no true counterparts in earlier civilizations, have opened out prospects of creation or destruction which are new under the sun. Yet if it can be contended in any sense that all civilizations follow common laws of growth and decay, these laws are at any rate suggested in the preceding formulation.
MOTIVES AND MORALS

4. MOTIVES AND MORALS

It is possible that our race may be an accident, in a meaningless universe, living its brief life uncared for, on this dark, cooling star; but even so—and all the more—what marvelous creatures we are! What fairy-story, what tale from the Arabian Nights of the jinns, is a hundredth part as wonderful as this true fairy-story of the simians.... An amoeba on the beach, blind and helpless, a mere bit of pulp—that amoeba has grandsons today who read Kant and play symphonies. Will those grandsons in turn have descendants who will sail through the void, discover the foci of forces, the means to control them, and learn how to marshal the planets and grapple with space? Would it after all be any more startling than our rise from the slime? ... Yet, even if we are permitted to have a long reign, and are not laid away with the failures, are we a success? We need so much spiritual insight, and we have so little. Our airships may someday float over the hills of Arcturus, but how will that help us if we cannot find the soul of the world? ... We have no sure vision. Hopes, guesses, beliefs—that is all. ... We, who crave so much to know, crave so little but knowing. Some of us wish to know Nature most; these are the scientists. Others, the saints and philosophers, wish to know God. Both are alike in their hearts, yes, in spite of their quarrels. Both seek to assuage, to no end, the old simian thirst.—Clarence Day, This Simian World.

The destiny of literate man, as it has revealed itself over and again in the course of past civilizations, is a tragic destiny. Its quality of tragedy does not lie in the fact of death. The inevitable demise of the individual among all the Metazoa is a concomitant of sexual reproduction, but few would exchange, if they could, the loss for the gain. Neither does tragedy lie per se in the decline and disappearance of communities, races, or species. The last of the Java ape-men and the dawn-men of Piltdown doubtless lived and died, as did the last of the mastodons and the dinosaurs before them, in complete obliviousness of the fact that with their final sleep all their kind was gone.

The tragedy of Homo sapiens, once he learned to speak, write, read, think, and thereby evolve, blindly and almost by chance, the great civilizations of historic time, is that he alone among animals knows all his life that he must die. And he alone among the Hominidae knows that his own best social achievements are but appurtenances of mortality. He has always fought his prescience of doom by dreaming of life after death, or by glorifying dying as a dreamless slumber after life's fitful fever, or by imagining Utopias in which endless generations enjoy unending happiness and move forever forward to ever more splendid accomplishments.

But these devices of self-defense seldom deceive the wise. Men must die
by the inexorable imperatives of life. And human societies, apparently, must
traverse a similar course in accordance with laws of cultural evolution which,
though little understood as yet, are perhaps no less inexorable. No sensitive
observer has ever gazed in awe at the massive pyramids of Egypt or at the
fragile wonders of the Athenian Acropolis or yielded to the spell of a Gothic
cathedral, a Florentine painting, a Shakespearian drama, or a Beethoven
concerto without perceiving that the architects of splendor, in the very act
of creation, fulfilled their lives and prepared themselves for departure. The
essence of tragedy is to do what one must do in order to realize one’s destiny
—and thus per chance win immortality in the hearts of later generations and
of civilizations as yet unborn—while at the same time knowing that that
which is done is a song of farewell. None would have it otherwise. Those
who flinch from godlike deeds in quest of brute satisfactions have neither
in the end. “For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: . . .” It is this
eternal paradox that moves us all to joy and pity and exaltation and reon-
ciles us to our fate by making us one with those of times past who trans-
scended life and death alike.

The clue to the mystery as to why, until now, all the great civilizations
of mankind have at long last died, even while some of the preliterate cultures
have endured for ages, is perhaps to be found in the personality structure
of civilized man. That structure first makes possible the creation of vast
and fruitful communities and later makes impossible their preservation from
self-inflicted dissolution. This search cannot here be pursued. But its scope
and nature must be suggested, since the behavior of the political animal is
otherwise incomprehensible. “Human nature” is protean and plastic beyond
most men’s imagining, but the range of change is limited, not infinite. The
uniformities of human conduct through historic time and space are greater
than the differences. It may be true, as some psychologists and anthropol-
gists have begun to suggest, that each culture evolves its own unique “basic
personality type” and that many patterns of motives and acts are intelligible
not in terms of the universal attributes of all men but only in terms of the
specific and local experiences which shape particular men.12 There are none-
theless common motives in all human beings which derive from similar
sources and produce similar results.

The deepest and oldest roots of motivation spring from our common bio-
logical heritage. Men’s ancestors were fish for 200,000,000 years at least,
before sea creatures evolved into reptiles, birds, and mammals. Men’s an-
cestors were small and timid arboreal primates for 50,000,000 years before
they became anything noticeably different. The earliest and simplest multi-

12 See, for example, Abram Kardiner and Associates, The Psychological Frontiers of
Society, 1945.
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cellular organisms had built into their bodies at the outset a simple repertory of responses to stimuli which has persisted in all their progeny: (1) withdrawal from sources of irritation; and (2) approach for purposes of ingestion, destruction, or impregnation. Such tropisms, at first no more than mechanical reflexes, slowly developed into more subtle devices of survival—i.e., "instincts" to flee before danger, to hunt food, to kill enemies, and to seek erotic joy, each with its "emotion" of fear, hunger, rage, and love.

These are still the prime incentives and the major preoccupations of most members of Homo sapiens 2,000 years after Christ, 7,000 years after the first civilizations, 50,000 years after the twilight of the Neanderthalers, and 500,000 years and more after the first ape-men. All such intervals of time are but as a brief day's dawn and dusk compared with the ages during which all ancestral protoplasm was acquiring these drives to action. That such motives are in the most literal sense primary and dominant in the behavior of all men is not strange but inevitable. Through tens of thousands of past generations all creatures, and all species of creatures, unfit in their capacities for fright, appetite, anger, and lust were displaced in grim competition by others better equipped. Here then are the very bowels of human, as of all animal, motivation. And here, largely suppressed into the "unconscious" but all the more formidable in its pressure upon action, is that earliest and lowest level of human personality, designated by Sigmund Freud as the "Id." This he envisaged as the repository of the libido—his term for instinctive, biologically inherited organic energies and impulses, governed by the "pleasure principle."

Even these primitive itchings and urgings were in sundry ways refined, modified, and centered on specific stimuli by the long experience of man's progenitors. The young of all mammals are dependent on their mammas. The duration of dependence constantly increases with the progressive elaboration of mammalian species. Mammals live in families. Simian infants first fix their love on their mothers and their fear and rage, mingled ambivalently with love, on their fathers. The first primates to descend from the trees, moreover, took a step of great daring, fraught with great fear. Fists and teeth and running legs avail nothing against the claws and fangs of the larger beasts of prey. Family solidarity, tribal cooperation, slyness, shrewdness, and trickery were needed for survival. Man's huge propensities for fear, rage, and lust and for affection, collaboration, and cleverness are doubtless attributable to the perils of primate life on the ground. When these primates took to meat eating, they had need for weapons and fire and somehow stumbled upon their use. Since their use must be taught and learned, we are here in the presence of the first rudiments of "culture." Its matrix is less the home and the altar than the chase, the kill, and the feast.
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At this point the emerging human personality had developed, out of intimate contacts with fellows in families, clans, and hordes, the elements of a conscious “self,” perceptive, adaptable, and self-seeking. This realm of motivation, à la Freud, is the “Ego,” governed by the “reality principle.” Men’s motives are those of beasts, first overlaid and modified (but in no sense expunged) by those of ground-walking and meat-eating anthropoids who learned from “you” and “yours” the meaning of “me” and “mine.” They therewith became capable not only of purposeful social effort but of attributes of vanity, greed, and cruelty which would put tigers and hyenas to shame. Forever after, men readily revert, when discouraged or desperate, to mere animalism or egotism. “No beast,” wrote Plutarch, wisely, “is more savage than man, when possessed with power answerable to his rage.” Paul the Apostle wrote truly to Timothy that in times of stress even civilized men “shall be lovers of their own selves, covetous, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, without natural affection, truce-breakers, false accusers, incontinent, fierce, despisers of those that are good, traitors, heady, highminded, lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God; . . .”

But this judgment stems from the most recently acquired component of men’s motives, not from the pristine seeds of passion and egotism. That component, clearly, is conscience: Freud’s “Super-Ego,” ruled by the “morality principle”—into which is built those socially acquired restraints, redirections, and sublimations of impulse without which men are less than human. How did this come about? Concern with virtue is presumably a concomitant of awareness of vice and of a sense of guilt over acts which are “wrong.” The first acts judged wrong were doubtless those which threatened the survival of the group. Perhaps primitive cannibalism first begot such sentiments as men dimly saw that the killing and eating of one another was a road to death for all. The mark of Cain is older than Adam. Perhaps, as Freud himself argued, the “original sin” was that reflected ages later in the legend of Oedipus who unwittingly married his mother, slew his father, and took his own life when he learned what he had done.

Freud’s thesis here is that in the “primal horde,” ruled by an elder male with a plurality of wives and a multiplicity of offspring, the sons as they matured sought to kill the jealous and all-powerful father, to eat his flesh, and to fight to the death among themselves for females. Patricide, incest, and fratricide were thus the first “crimes.” Since they spelled ruin to the group, they were at some point condemned, renounced, and elaborately guarded against through taboos on murder and incest, totemic myths, and rigid rules of exogamy. In many preliterate cultures, men live in clans whose members regard themselves as descendants of a sacred totem animal. They must marry
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outside the clan, never within it. From time to time, in solemn sacrificial feasts often accompanied by temporary sexual license, they kill the totem animal and, in a primitive mass, or "communion," eat its flesh, drink its blood, and thereby acquire its virtues. The totem symbolizes the original father. The blood sacrifice and the rules of exogamy are substitutes for murder, cannibalism, and incest. What was socially self-destructive is transmuted through morals and magic into a bond of unity and a means of survival. Freud thus derived conscience and primitive religion and indeed the genesis of culture itself from these postulated relationships. 13

Without exploring the disputes raised by this startling hypothesis, it may yet be granted that men were truly men, in their psychological as well as in their physical structure, long before the advent of civilization. That is to say, they were (and are) neither beasts nor gods but an unholy mixture of both, infused with devilry and divinity in a weird synthesis which men themselves assess as horrible, ludicrous, pathetic, and sublime. Even in static, preliterate cultures, human personality is at best a delicately balanced and unstable system of motivations, with "instincts," ego motives, and ethical values striving sullenly against one another for predominance. When the balance is tolerably maintained, the self is integrated and effective. When it breaks down in inner conflict, the result is anxiety, guilt, neurosis, and, in the worst cases, madness. Static and stable cultures develop well-integrated personalities. Dynamic and insecure cultures pose to all personalities problems of adjustment which many find incapable of satisfying solution. Most preliterate cultures are in the former category. All civilized cultures are in the latter.

Civilized man is neither more nor less brutish, self-seeking, or immoral than preliterate man. But, by virtue of division of labor and the witchery of writing, he lives at length in a great society rather than in a local community. He faces stresses and strains and dilemmas which have few counterparts in preliterate societies, save when they are in decay or under lethal assault from other cultures. As he grows up, his transfers of fear, rage, and love no longer flow smoothly from self to family to clan to tribal gods and to medicine men and the folkways and mores of his people. In a bewildering, pulsating urban world the age-old passions must perform be transferred in part to abstractions: kings and popes, nobles and priests, castes and classes, sects and factions, provinces and nations, signs and words representing the prevalent conception (or somebody's conception) of truth, beauty, and goodness and of falsehood, ugliness, and sin. In the process, old gods die, and old ways pass. Fresh learning is called for. All learning is painful. Work is to be

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done. All work is grief. Having crossed the threshold of civilization, man finds his mind by losing his soul. In dread and loneliness, he grasps at feeble symbols of self-assurance. These, invariably, are devices which will recapture some sense of identity with the community and the cosmos. These are, most frequently, the signs and portents of State and Church, of mundane power and divine grace, usually mingled in a unity of belief and action which carries over into a new context much of the comforting magic of the lost days of long ago.

Thus equipped with spiritual armor against the threats and blows of a new, strange life, literate man marches forth to win victories in war and statecraft, art and science, religion and business. But in achieving these triumphs each civilization brings into being, willy-nilly, a larger and more complex community, increasingly divided against itself by internal cleavages of needs and creeds and fraught with growing contradictions in all spheres of life between theory and practice, faith and works, ideals and realities. The new unity of sentiment and purpose which gloriously characterizes the coming of the great age proves to be short-lived. The uneasy balance of instinct, egotism, and ethics, woefully lost with the initial transition from preliteracy to civilization and transiently regained in new devotions to tribal gods, human or divine, is again lost as the orbit of civilization moves from tribe and kingdom and nation to the complex and confusing imperium of the great society and the World State. The acids of rationalism and skepticism dissolve old loyalties. The injunctions of morality, even when reinforced by the vision of the monotheistic higher religions, conflict with reason and self-interest. In a time of doubt, the lusts of the flesh call anew for illicit satisfactions. Man is divided against himself. And therefore men become divided against themselves in new cleavages of rich and poor, in-group and out-group, faithful and infidel, orthodox and heterodox, my side and your side.

This fragmentation of societies, and of most of the personalities that compose them, is at first exhilarating. Many find new solace in frenzied efforts to recapture the past or conquer the future by labeling dissidents as devils and waging war upon them. But this apparent reintegration of motives and morals is a deception. No creative mission is possible in a society so hopelessly split that each embattled group fancies that it has a monopoly of truth and virtue. Fanatics (sometimes defined as those who redouble their efforts as they lose sight of their goal) are men and women who give free rein to their sadistic and masochistic impulses, inherited from their simian and primitive past, under the delusion that they are thereby serving the cause of righteousness. This process, even when interrupted by transitory periods of reintegration, is ultimately fatal to the great commonwealth. Human beings incapable of solving their problems, and thus driven toward frustration and
aggression, readily revert to greed and violence, to primitive superstition and satanism, and to debauched and vicious forms of brutishness and irresponsibility.

No civilization thus far, including our own, has found the means of resolving this psychic crisis in any manner conducive to life rather than death. A great society and a global civilization, if they are to endure, call for a transmutation of human nature which no community to date has ever been able to achieve. The children of the ape-men, equipped with intelligence, writing, technology, and high devotion to social purposes, can erect vast and shining mansions of civilized living. But they cannot save these structures from final ruin save through a reintegration of personality and of society at a still higher level, at which a new morality prevails over the legacy of a violent, ignorant, and bestial past.

In all the great cultures, many philosophers and a few statesmen have seen the need of new morals and new men if civilization is to survive. Never yet has mankind proved capable of achieving the transition. Without it, all adventurers in civilized living stumble at last into the dusk. Man's hope is forever vanquished. Man's fate remains a tale of ultimate grief and failure. Whether it must always be so is an inquiry best deferred to the end of this volume.

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Naked and alone we came into exile. In her dark womb we did not know our mother's face; from the prison of her flesh have we come into the unspeakable and incommunicable prison of this earth. Which of us has known his brother? Which of us has looked into his father's heart? ... Which of us has not remained forever a stranger and alone? O waste of loss, in the hot mazes, lost, among bright stars on this most weary un-bright cinder, lost! Remembering speechlessly we seek the great forgotten language, the lost lane-end into heaven, a stone, a leaf, an unfound door. Where? When? O lost, and by the wind grieved, ghost, come back again. —THOMAS WOLFE, 1929.

Book One

THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD
COMMUNITY

The much admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, may be summed up in this one main principle: that all the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities but that we should consider all men to be of one community and one order common to all. ... This Zeno wrote, giving shape to a dream ... but it was Alexander who gave effect to the idea. ... He believed that he came as a heaven-sent governor to all, and as a mediator for the whole world. ... He brought together into one body all men everywhere, uniting and mixing in one great loving-cup, as it were, men's lives, their characters, their marriages, their very habits of life. He bade them all consider as their fatherland the whole inhabited earth, as their stronghold and protection his camp, as akin to them all good men, and as foreigners only the wicked.—PLUTARCH, De fortuna Alexandri.
CHAPTER I
ANCIENT STATE SYSTEMS

1. DE URBE ET ORBE

Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the “art” of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. . . . For by art is created that great “Leviathan” called a “Commonwealth,” or “State,” in Latin civitas, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defense it was intended; and in which the “sovereignty” is an artificial “soul,” as giving life and motion to the whole body.—THOMAS HOBBES, Leviathan.

IN THE long vista of man’s experiment in social life, those aspects of experience which have come to be called “international relations” or “power politics” are of impressive antiquity. They seem, at first glance, to be constant companions of all wayfarers along the human highroad from a lost past to a doubtful future. Closer scrutiny of the journey, however, indicates that this is by no means the case. The phenomena which are here to be examined date only from the first literate cultures, i.e., “civilizations,” of mankind. People lacking writing also lack those patterns of community organization designated by the terms “State,” “government,” “politics,” and “nation.” On the other hand, many past societies have flourished for centuries under regimes which united many nations in a single authority having few or no contacts with other independent Powers. (Interstate relations are coeval with the sunrise of civilization.) But they frequently fade into the State-transcending unity of a great imperium as a civilization attains maturity.

Among the first States of which any records remain were those of the nascent civilization which were cradled in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley about 5000 B.C. These communities were city-states: Eridu, built where the great rivers then entered the Persian Gulf; Nippur, in the upper valley; Ur of the Chaldees; Uruk, Assur, Umma, Sumer, Lagash, Kish, and the rest. Their people were Sumerians, speaking a unique language which they wrote in wedgelike symbols on tablets of clay. Whence they came, and how their culture first began, none can say. Their earliest relics and chronicles are those of people obviously long engaged in irrigation, growing crops, tending
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herds, and building walls and towers of brick. The first Sumerians also practiced astrology, appeased the seven devils sent by the gods to punish sinners, and paid special reverence in their pantheon to Enlil, the earth-god, Innini (Ishtar), the virgin goddess of heaven, and her brother and/or son, Tammuz, who annually sacrificed his life and was divinely resurrected from the dead.

Just as Sumerian mythology is the source of the later Greek cult of Adonis and of the Jewish-Christian drama of the Messiah, so Sumerian “international relations” reveal a design which has repeated itself through the ages wherever a multiplicity of sovereignties has existed in the same area. These city-states comprised a true State System which long endured. That is to say, power to command obedience was not centralized but dispersed among independent localities. Each magician-prince or god-king represented a ruling elite of landlords and priests, governed his subjects within defined boundaries, and competed with other monarchs for land and power through bargaining and violence—i.e., diplomacy and war. These units traded, conducted hostilities, negotiated peace, concluded treaties, exchanged envoys, and developed customs and rules of conduct in their constantly shifting relations. War was normal. “Stranger” meant “enemy” no less among the Sumerian communities than between these and the barbarians beyond the valley. But peace could be made by treaty.

The earliest treaty known to modern archeologists dates from c. 3000 B.C. Since the date is late, the Sumerian State System having already existed for over a thousand years, many others must have preceded it. Here the Kings of Lagash and Umma, involved in a frontier dispute, agree to submit their differences to the arbitration of Mesilim, King of Kish, who, calling upon the gods, arrives at an acceptable settlement. The actual text of a later treaty between the same States is to be found in the Louvre on the “stele of the vultures.” A clay cylinder in Yale University’s collection of antiquities contains the text (c. 2900 B.C.) of a peace treaty which Lagash imposed upon Umma after a successful war. Reparations are exacted. Divine wrath is invoked upon the vanquished, should they dare to violate the new boundary. But then, as now, treaties among independent sovereignties become scraps of paper (in this case, tablets of clay) when political expediency dictates repudiation. A few years after signature, the fighting men of Umma launched a war of revanche and defeated Lagash.

In the fullness of time, however, anarchy gave way to order through the subjection of all by one. The dynasty of Ur-Nina in Lagash, which made extensive conquests, was at length overthrown by the hosts of the high priest of Gis-ukh, Lugal-zaggisi (c. 2677-2653 B.C.), who called himself “King of Kings.” At Uruk, he established the first empire of recorded time, stretching “from the Lower to the Upper Sea.” But the Sumerian State System, like
many to follow in days to come, was destined to attain permanent unification at the hands of alien conquerors rather than from within. Out of the western deserts poured Semitic-speaking barbarians. Among these nomads emerged a leader, Sargon (c. 2637-2581 B.C.), of whom legend says that he was born in secrecy and set adrift in a basket of reeds on the Euphrates, whence he was rescued, reared as a gardener, discovered to be of royal lineage, and crowned King of Babylon. This "Sargon of Akkad" subdued all the Sume-

rians, along with neighboring peoples, and founded the Sumerian-Akkadian Empire, extending from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.

Sargon's people learned Sumerian writing and adopted Sumerian civilization. His grandson, Naram-Sin, "King of the Four Spheres," carried on his work, which endured the assaults of the Elamites from Susa. But this imperium finally fell before the blows of the Semitic Amorites, who settled in Babylon and, under an able ruler and famous lawgiver, Hammurabi (1947-1905 B.C.), established the Babylonian Empire. Be it noted, lest our sense of time be distorted by the rush of tomorrow's headlines, that 32 centuries elapsed between the dawn of urban life in these valleys and the passing of Hammurabi. Of the 38 centuries which have since gone by, only the last 10 span the period of our own civilization.
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Meanwhile there had transpired in the valley of the Nile a sequence of experiences not unlike those already reviewed. Here also, about 5000 B.C., possibly earlier, men somehow learned to build cities of wood, brick, and stone, to smelt bronze, and to use picture writing set down on the first “paper,” or strips of papyrus reeds. Here, too, city-states doubtless made war upon one another until they were consolidated by conquest into the two kingdoms of Upper and Lower Egypt, united in turn about 3200 B.C. by Menes. This half-mythical founder of the “First Dynasty” built a kingdom which endured as a Great Power for many more millennia than any other before or since. This amazing civilization is best symbolized by the huge royal sepulchers of the pyramids of Giza, completed in the Fourth Dynasty, by the timeless Sphinx, by the great temples of Karnak and Luxor, and by multitudes of mummified bodies of kings, priests, and nobles. Egypt’s quest for immortality was not in vain. Her greatest monuments of stone, built a thousand years before Abraham lived, may well outlast the human race.

In Egypt grew also a rich art and architecture and the beginnings of astronomy, mathematics, engineering, and medicine. Conquest by Semitic nomads, who founded the Sixteenth (Hyksos) Dynasty of the “Shepherd Kings,” was followed by revolt and liberation. Under the “New Empire,” Egyptian armies carried the power of the Pharaohs from Ethiopia to the Euphrates. One among them, Amenhotep IV (1375-1358 B.C.), established the first monotheistic religion, the worship of Aton, the sun-god (after whom he renamed himself Ikhnaton), only to have his work undone after his passing by the polytheistic priests of Ammon Ra, whose will he had defied.¹ This youthful genius triumphed even in death. For he was the first leader of men (and for this forever remembered by posterity) who caught the vision of all mankind united as brothers in One World and worthy through righteousness of the blessings of One God.

The kings and captains of mighty Egypt had long since reached out to the north and east and encountered other civilizations, whose early States had also been welded together into great feudal kingdoms. For some centuries the major rival Power was the Kingdom of the Hittites in Asia Minor, semi-Sumerian in its culture, whose soldiery sacked Babylon c. 1750 B.C. Between the two Powers lay the realm of the Mitannis on the Syrian shore. Egyptian-Hittite wars became chronic after Thothmes III (1480-1450 B.C.) invaded Syria. Clay tablets unearthed in the capital of the Mitannis suggest that c.

¹ In his last book, Moses and Monotheism, Sigmund Freud argued that Moses, probable founder of Jewish monotheism, was probably an Egyptian follower of Ikhnaton and, upon the failure of his master’s venture in religious reformation, led an enslaved people out of Egypt and toward the worship of a single God—not Aton, but Yahweh, or Jehovah, originally a volcano-god and tribal deity of the Jews.

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1400 B.C. the three States concluded a pact of nonaggression, mutual aid, and extradition. But more wars followed until Hattushilish III, King of the Hittites, now under attack by the Assyrians, signed a treaty with Rameses II in 1280 B.C.—notable for the fact that its text has survived in three copies in Egyptian and Hittite, with the lost original apparently written in Babylonian, the diplomatic language of the age.

This agreement, “witnessed by the thousand gods,” was a pact of perpetual peace, outlawry of war, and mutual assistance:

There shall be no hostilities between them forever. The great chief of the Hittites shall not pass over into the land of Egypt, forever, to take anything therefrom; Rameses, the great chief of Egypt, shall not pass over into the land of the Hittites to take anything therefrom, forever. . . . If another people (or state) shall come, as an enemy, against the lands of Rameses, the great chief of Egypt, and he shall send to the great chief of the Hittites, saying “Come with me with your army against him,” the great chief of the Hittites shall come, and the great King of the Hittites shall slay his enemy. But if it shall not be the desire of the great chief of the Hittites to come, he shall send his infantry and his chariots, and shall slay his enemy. Or, if Rameses, the great chief of Egypt, be provoked against delinquent subjects, when they have committed some other fault against him, and he shall come to slay them, then the great chief of the Hittites shall act with the lord of Egypt.

These obligations of “collective security” against aggression and revolution were reciprocal, as was also a provision for the extradition of fugitives:

If any of the great men of the land of Egypt shall flee and shall come to the great chief of the Hittites, from either town, or . . . of the lands of Rameses, the great chief of Egypt, and they shall come to the great chief of the Hittites, then the great chief of the Hittites shall not receive them, but the great chief of the Hittites shall cause them to be brought to Rameses, the great chief of Egypt, their lord.

The reference clearly is not to common criminals but to political offenders, who are usually exempted from extradition in modern treaties. In other respects this document of 32 centuries ago reads like a pact of our own time. Then as now, travel and matrimony sometimes serve political purposes: Hattushilish paid a royal visit to the Nile and gave his daughter in marriage to the Pharaoh.

2. ROADS TO EMPIRE

I beheld till the thrones were cast down, and the Ancient of days did sit, whose garment was white as snow, and the hair of his head like the pure wool: his throne was like the fiery flame, and his wheels as

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2 See on the text of this treaty the article by Langdon and Gardiner in the *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, vol. 6, pp. 179ff., 1920.
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burning fire. . . . I saw in the night visions, and, behold, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages, should serve him: his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom which shall not be destroyed.—The Book of Daniel, Chapter 7.

The passing centuries brought vast changes in this early Near Eastern State System. To trace their details would be tedious. But mention must be made of at least two further acts in this drama of politics: the Syriac and the Assyrian.

The early communities on the easternmost shore of the Mediterranean had few prospects of independent development so long as they were pawns and victims of the rivalries between the Egyptian and Hittite kingdoms. In the late 13th century B.C., however, the Hittites were overwhelmed by barbarians from the north and west. Egypt fell upon evil days by virtue of Libyan and Ethiopian incursions and rebellions. Under these conditions new opportunities opened for the mid-Levant peoples. Here the original Canaanites had been set upon by Hebrew invaders from Arabia and by Philistine sea raiders and migrants from the Aegean. The Philistines (for whom Palestine is named) achieved no glory and less prestige. The Hebrews founded two kingdoms, Israel and Judah, sometimes united and sometimes independent, which reached a zenith of power and wealth under Solomon (c. 975-935 B.C.). The Phoenicians, probably descendants of the original Canaanites, established themselves at Tyre and Sidon and became notable navigators and traders.

These Syriac peoples left much to later ages. The Phoenicians probably invented alphabetical writing. In their wide-ranging voyages, they “discovered” the Atlantic Ocean; explored the Spanish, French, and African coasts; settled Marseille; and founded Carthage, which in due course became a “Great Power” in a larger State System. The Hebrews lost their independence in 586 B.C., when Jerusalem was taken, pillaged, and burned by the New Babylonians under Nebuchadnezzar, who dragged most of the survivors off as captives. Palestine has ever since been under foreign rule. The “Babylonian Captivity” ended with the fall of Babylon to Cyrus the Persian. While many of those liberated returned to the Promised Land and rebuilt Solomon’s Temple, others were scattered far and wide. The Diaspora, or dispersion of the Jewish peoples, resumed on a large scale in Roman times and thereafter, had already begun.

But the Hebrews, once the “Chosen People” of a tribal god, had developed out of manifold misfortunes, spiritual agony, and an earnest quest for righteousness the first enduring monotheistic religion. From their faith flowered
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a lofty ideal of human fraternity and universalism and an exalted sense of moral values, which in the Jewish sacred writings were to become the common inspiration of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. No other people has suffered such persecution for its creed or faced, over and again, such systematic efforts at extermination at the hands of others insulted or shamed by the very existence of Israel. And no other people west of China has survived and preserved its identity, its language, and its way to God through the vicissitudes of 3½ millennia.

The Assyrians’ story is the antithesis of that of the Jews, though both were Semitic-speaking peoples. High in the Tigris Valley their early rulers built the stone city of Nineveh and dedicated themselves with singular tenacity to the arts of war. First to use cavalry, war chariots, and sundry devices of early tactics and strategy, they conquered Babylon c. 1100 B.C. in the reign of Tiglath Pileser I. Three and a half centuries later the third monarch of this name began a series of conquests, continued by Sargon II, Sennacherib, and their successors, which have no previous and few later parallels. Philistia, Samaria, Damascus were subjugated. Great Egypt itself was vanquished and precariously held, 675-663. Here emerged the first “world empire,” extending from the Persian Gulf to the Middle Sea and from the Caspian to the first cataract of the Nile. But the obsession of war making led inexorably to impoverishment and depopulation. Egypt expelled the Assyrian garrisons in the 650’s. Babylon revolted, allied itself with Elam (which the Assyrians demolished), and finally joined the Medes in a counterassault which culminated in the destruction of Nineveh in 612 B.C. Two centuries later, when Xenophon visited the ruins, all human life was gone, and the very name of Assyria was lost in an empty tomb.

Yet the political pattern of a “World State,” bringing order out of the chaos of conflicting sovereignties, persisted in the lands which had given birth to civilization four millennia before Assyria’s demise. Another warlike people of the north (Aryan-speaking, or akin in language to the Hittites and to Greeks, Romans, and modern Europeans) presently built a kingdom out of another welter of city-states. These were the Persians, to whose throne in 550 B.C. came Cyrus, reputed to be the grandson of the founder of the royal house, called by the Greeks Achaemenes. After vanquishing Croesus, King of Lydia, Cyrus took Babylon in 538. His son, Cambyses, conquered Egypt. Under Darius I, who took the crown in 521 B.C., the World State of the “Achaemenides” included all the lands from the Danube to the Indus and from the Caucasus and the Aral Sea to Upper Egypt. Having failed to conquer the Scythians in a Balkan expedition, Darius decided to invade Greece. But that is another story.

The design of events recounted above, wherein the small city-states of the
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first literate cultures finally became municipalities of great kingdoms and later of vast empires, is not peculiar to the regions and peoples whose fortunes have here been reviewed. On the contrary, it is repeated in all the civilizations of which we have knowledge. In the remote world of the Americans, lacking all contact with Europe or Asia, other peoples traversed a similar road. In the jungles west of the Caribbean the Mayas developed the arts of urban life sometime before 500 B.C. and, after protracted rivalries among towns and petty kingdoms, arrived at an empire which flourished for four centuries (c. A.D. 300-690). Its successor, the Aztec society and State System, was in process of becoming an empire when it was struck down by Spanish conquerors. To the south, in the high Andes, the Inca Empire of Peru, by the time of its conquest by other Spaniards, had similarly evolved through five centuries from a congeries of rival towns to a far-flung imperium.

In India, which Europeans thought they had reached when they first set foot on American shores, the earliest civilization, that of the dark Dravidian peoples, seems to have taken form in the Indus and Ganges Valleys at a time somewhat later than the appearance of the first cities of Sumeria and Egypt. Some scholars perceive evidence of Sumerian influence in the earliest antiquities of northwestern India. Aryan-speaking nomads from the north began invading and conquering these kingdoms before the time of Hammurabi. The cultural fusion which ensued begot a rich new civilization which, in the 6th century B.C., gave rise to one of the major higher religions of mankind through the life and teachings of Siddhartha Gautama, later hailed as the Buddha. The faith of Buddhism spread over most of Asia, although by the 11th century A.D. it had all but vanished in India itself, where it had never wholly supplanted the more primitive polytheistic creed of Brahmanism, or Hinduism.

The civilization that gave Buddhism to posterity remained a chaos of rival States which arrived at no semblance of unity until Chandragupta Maurya conquered the Punjab and the Ganges Valley c. 320 B.C. and fashioned an empire in the northern plains reaching from sea to sea. His successor, Asoka (264-227 B.C.), was one of the wisest and most beneficent emperors of all time, devoting his energies not to war but to good works and to the propagation of Buddhism in other lands. Confused centuries of invasions, conflicts, and conquests ensued. Apart from the Gupta Empire (c. A.D. 400-500) the hundreds of independent Indian States never attained even the shadow of unification until the Islamic Mongols established the “Mogul” Dynasty, whose greatest emperor was Akbar (1556-1605).

Last, but far from least, in this recurring drama of transition from anarchy to unity is the case of China. In the Tarim Valley of Mongolia, and along the shores of the Yellow River and the Yangtze, another great civilization
emerged out of primal darkness about 3000 B.C., when Egypt and Sumeria were already old with the burdens of 20 centuries. Here, too, city-states evolved into feudal kingdoms, which at length coalesced into a loose empire under priest-kings or “Sons of Heaven.” After a series of semilegendary rulers, the Shang (c. 1766-1122 B.C.) and Chou (1122-250 B.C.) Dynasties consolidated and governed a great realm. But in the first millennium B.C. a multitude of actually independent States, of which Tsi and Ch’in in the north and Chou on the Yangtze were “Great Powers,” inflicted chronic anarchy on all the land by their incessant rivalries. The epoch after 500 B.C. is known as *Chan Kuo*—“the Contending States.” Leagues of nations, disarmament conferences, and appeals to respect “international law” brought no permanent respite, nor can they ever bring peace in a State System of separate sovereignties. But Shih-Huang-Ti (“first universal emperor”) of the Ch’in Dynasty, who organized the building of the Great Wall against the Huns in the 2nd century B.C. and “burned the books” to break the power of tradition, welded the warring States once more into an effective imperium. His work endured under the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 172) and thereafter, until new “times of troubles,” interspersed with periods of unity and order, came to an end through alien conquests. Under the Mongol, Ming, and Manchu Emperors, China remained one polity—until the impact of Western profit seekers and power seekers discredited imperial rule forever, disintegrated the ancient fabric of civilization, and initiated a new epoch of revolution and anarchy, the end of which is not yet.

3. THE LEGACY OF ATHENS

There is no hope of a cessation of evils for the States (of Hellas)—and, in my opinion, none for mankind—except through a personal union between political power and philosophy and a forcible disqualification of those common natures that now follow one of these two pursuits to the exclusion of the other. The union may be achieved in either of two ways. Either the philosophers must become kings in our States or else the people who are now called kings and potentates must take—genuinely and thoroughly—to philosophy.—PLATO, *The Republic.*

North of the coast of Libya and west of Rhodes and Cyprus, at the island-studded mouth of the Aegean Sea, lies the long, narrow land of Crete. Here and all along the near-by coasts flourished another early civilization whose dark-skinned seafaring people carried on trade with Egypt as early as 4000 B.C. Not until 2400 B.C. were the communities of the island united in one kingdom under a ruler whose title was “Minos.” Recent excavations at its capital, Knossos, reveal a race skilled not only in navigation and trade
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but in architecture, bullfighting, gymnastics, sculpture, and ornament. Since their surviving records are few and their language is still undeciphered, little is known of their history. But it is clear that they are heralds of the dawn in the eastern Mediterranean.

After a thousand years of peace and trade, art and sport, the Cretans who were the core of this Aegean, Minoan, or Mycenaean civilization (as it is variously named) encountered disaster. Their long security was at an end when neighboring peoples learned to build and sail ships capable of crossing the blue waters in substantial numbers. Among these strangers were Aryan-speaking barbarians who filtered into the Greek peninsula out of the northern wilderness when Thothmes III ruled Egypt and the Shang Emperors governed China. In terms of their dialects, the order of their coming was: Ionians, Aeolians, Dorians, Macedonians, and Thracians. All called themselves "Hellenes." Their earliest epic poetry, as set down in later centuries in the Iliad and the Odyssey and ascribed to the blind bard Homer, tells of the conquest of Troy, in Asia Minor near the Dardanelles, and of the subsequent adventures of the victors. Their mythology tells how the hero Theseus went to Knossos, entered the labyrinth with the aid of Ariadne, daughter of the Minos, and slew the Minotaur, half bull and half man, who had devoured Athenian youths exacted from Athens by Knossos as tribute and sacrifice. Apart from legend, it is plain that Knossos was first pillaged and burned c. 1400 B.C. and that c. 1000 B.C. it was again demolished beyond recovery. Some of the survivors, e.g., the Philistines, found homes elsewhere. Others vanished in the darkness of refugee migrations, which attend the end of every civilization.

The victors adopted the arts and skills of the vanquished. Out of this heritage they slowly evolved a new culture, which has impressed all posterity as the most splendid and inspiring in all the annals of mankind. Here again the creators of a great age first lived in city-states in which the ruling class of citizen-warriors and landowners consisted of the sons of the conquerors while the vanquished (as in Sparta) were reduced to helots (peasant-serfs) or perioeci (merchants), who had no political rights. In many Greek communities the concept and practice of "democracy" emerged for the first time as an alternative to monarchy and aristocracy, which in their corrupt form easily became tyranny and oligarchy. All these terms are Greek. Indeed it can be argued, as Sir Henry Maine contended, that everything that moves and lives in modern civilization is Greek in its origin. Yet devotion to truth requires cognizance of the fact that even Athenian democracy at its apogee was still based upon a society in which only "citizens," narrowly defined, had voting rights, while all others, including the slaves at the bottom of the social scale, had no voice in community decisions.
THE LEGACY OF ATHENS

Despite these necessary qualifications, few would deny that the citizens of ancient Hellas, with the Athenians most glorious among them, developed drama, poetry, architecture, and sculpture to an acme of beauty never matched before or since. And all would agree that the subtle, curious, skeptical Hellenic mind, as it emancipated itself from tribalism, arrived at conceptions of scientific inquiry, individual dignity, civic duty, and human freedom which, for 25 centuries throughout the Western world, have been the envy and inspiration of all familiar with “the glory that was Greece.” Indeed, many ignorant of this past have yet been moved by it to yeoman service in the cause of the liberty and fraternity of mankind. Those who doubt will have their doubts resolved if they will but visit at sunset the rocky height of the Acropolis in the heart of Athens and reflect upon human destiny as the fading light turns to rose the mellow marble of the Erechtheum and the Parthenon. These temples to the virgin goddess Athena, source of wisdom, virtue, victory, and peace, have shed their radiance on all later generations.

But this alluring theme must yield to the matters here in hand. The Greek city-states, with their rich intellectual and esthetic life, were widely scattered over the peninsula and, with their colonies, spread themselves over the wine-colored sea to innumerable islands and to remote coasts between Sicily and the Crimea. Primitive monarchies gave way to aristocratic republics as merchants gained wealth and influence. These State forms in turn became democracies, oligarchies, or tyrannies as the clash of rich and poor gave power to one side or the other. In 490 B.C. Darius the Persian, with the aid of Phoenicia’s navy, launched by sea his first assault on Hellas. It brought temporary unity to the rival Greek communities. At Marathon the Athenian infantry crushed the invaders and won the praise of the Spartans, who arrived too late to share in victory.

Ten years later Xerxes led a great army across the Dardanelles and through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. At Thermopylae (480 B.C.) Leonidas the Spartan, commanding a force of Spartans, Thespians, and Thebans, held up the foe until all the defenders died at their posts, while the main Greek army retired to the south. With the fall of Athens, Themistocles, long a “big navy” man, persuaded his countrymen to risk a decision at sea. At Salamis the Persian fleet was destroyed before the eyes of Xerxes. In 479 B.C. Persian armies suffered double disaster at Plataea in Thessaly and at Miletus in Asia Minor. Xerxes was later murdered, as his realm decayed. The attempt of the Achaemenides to conquer Greece had failed.

The Golden Age which followed produced deathless masterpieces in all the arts. But the Hellenic States could find no political unity or, if they could, would not. The familiar process of unification through conquest was here arrested. In each city, rich and poor were ever more divided against
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one another. Athens became a capitalist plutocracy enamored of “freedom.” Sparta embraced a totalitarian Communism dedicated to “discipline” and “planning.” The lesser States fell under the influence of the greater. Themistocles built a Delian Confederacy through which Athens dominated its allies and evolved the “Athenian Empire” under Pericles—whose various wars, including a disastrous attempt to wrest Egypt from the Persians (454 B.C.), wasted the strength of his city. Sparta became the leader of the Peloponnesian League, which challenged the ascendancy of Athens.

The uneasy truce between the “Super-Powers” of the Hellenic world was finally broken in 431 B.C. by a life-or-death conflict which brought both contestants to ruin. The details of the Peloponnesian War are irrelevant in view of its results. At the outset Pericles spoke noble words on behalf of “democracy,” even though his State was already ruled by rich merchants and ambitious imperialists. Over the graves of those who first fell by Spartan arms, he declared:

There no hearts grew faint because they loved riches more than honor; none shirked the issue in the poor man’s dreams of wealth. All these they put aside to strike a blow for the city. Counting the quest to avenge her honor as the most
glorious of all ventures, and leaving hope, the uncertain goddess, to send them what she would, they faced the foe as they drew near him in the strength of their own manhood; and when the shock of battle came, they chose rather to suffer the uttermost than to win life by weakness. . . . So they gave their bodies to the commonwealth and received, each for his own memory, praise that will never die, and with it the grandest of all sepulchers, not that in which their mortal bones are laid, but a home in the minds of men where their glory remains fresh to stir to speech or action as the occasion comes by. For the whole earth is the sepulcher of famous men; and their story is not graven only on stone over their native earth, but lives on far away without visible symbol, woven into the stuff of other men’s lives. . . . For you now it remains to rival what they have done and knowing the secret of happiness to be freedom and the secret of freedom a brave heart, not idly to stand aside from the enemy’s onset.

But this immortal eloquence was the voice less of a future to come than of a past beyond recapture. In 429 B.C. Pericles died in a plague. With his passing the light of Athens slowly faded and flickered out. Battles, sieges, blockades, and diplomatic moves and countermoves followed in bewildering succession. Athenian fighting power was much reduced by a calamitous attack upon Syracuse, the Sicilian colony of Corinth. Thucydides, in Book III, Chapter 32, of his history of this melancholy conflict, notes the interrelationship between international and domestic politics in words startingly suggestive of A.D. 1950:

In every country there were struggles between the leaders of the proletariat and the reactionaries in their efforts to procure the intervention of the Athenians and the Spartans respectively. In peace-time they would have had neither the opportunity nor the desire to call in the foreigner; but now there was the war; and it was easy for any revolutionary spirits in either camp to procure an alliance entailing the discomfiture of their opponents and a corresponding reinforcement of their own faction. This access of class-war brought one calamity after another upon the countries of Hellas—calamities that occur and will continue to occur so long as human nature remains what it is, though they may be aggravated or mitigated or modified by successive changes of circumstance. Under the favorable conditions of peace-time both countries and individuals display a sweeter reasonableness, because their hands are not forced by the logic of events; but war eats away the margins of ordinary life and, in most characters, adjusts the temperament to the new environment by its brutal training. So the countries of Hellas became infected with the class-war, and the sensation made by each successive outbreak had a cumulative effect upon the next.

In the end the armies of Lysander of Sparta won “victory” and forced Athens to yield in 404 B.C. The result was not unity but chaos worse confounded. In a new series of domestic and foreign wars Thebes achieved a transient hegemony over Sparta. But the great days were gone. While the Hellenes were yet to cast their spell over vast regions and many civilizations,
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their chance to win political unity, and therewith to lead the world to a new vision of universalism, had been thrown away in internal strife.

Although the most obvious characteristic of this State System was the incessant struggle for power among its members and the constant resort to military coercion and diplomatic trickery to attain the ends of State, it developed certain international practices and institutions for pacific collaboration which were far in advance of their counterparts in earlier State Systems. The Greeks all acknowledged primary allegiance to their local State and were jealous of its sovereignty and power, but they were also aware of themselves as members of one race, with the same gods and a common culture, quite distinct from that of the outer “barbarians.” This circumstance promoted intimate relations between them even when they were not threatened by a common enemy. The network of treaties which the States concluded with one another brought them at times very close to the conception of peace as a normal relationship between them. Treaties were always, in form at least, between equal and independent sovereignties and were sanctioned by Zeus, the guardian of oaths. They established the conditions of peace between the parties, sometimes in perpetuity, sometimes for a term of years. Commercial treaties were common, and a great variety of other subjects was dealt with in the numerous agreements which the city-states entered into. As early as the remote period of the Homeric epics, ceremonial had developed about the making of treaties which are described in the Iliad in the account of the compact between the Trojans and the Achaeans setting forth the conditions of the combat between Menelaus and Alexander for the love of Helen. The divine sanction of treaties was always recognized by solemn oaths and imprecations. Heralds, ambassadors, secretaries, and a technical terminology became a regular part of the proceedings. Negotiations were usually public, though private conferences and even secret treaties were not unknown. Each party retained a copy in its own dialect, duly signed by the negotiators and stamped with the public seal of the signatory States. Treaty texts were often engraved on marble or bronze and kept in the temples. Hostages were frequently exchanged, especially in treaties of alliance, to ensure the execution of the compact. Treaties might legitimately be broken by one of the parties only if an inconsistency existed between two engagements, if enforcement

8 The ceremonial embodied (1) a preliminary announcement by the heralds, (2) an invocation to the gods to bear witness to the transaction, (3) a declaration of oath, (4) a recital of the conditions of the engagement, (5) the offering of a sacrifice, (6) a libation of wine, (7) joining of hands, (8) the utterance of the imprecation: “Zeus, most glorious, most mighty, and ye other immortal gods! Whosoever shall first commit wrong contrary to their pledges, may their brains and their children’s be dispersed on the ground, like this wine, and may their wives prove faithless.” See Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. I, pp. 386-387.
would lead to hostilities with a friendly third State, or if a complete change of circumstances had taken place.

(The principles and procedures governing the exchange of diplomatic representatives also reached a high degree of development in the Greek State System. Though permanent embassies were not exchanged, a hierarchy of diplomatic agents developed in terms of rank and prestige. Only fully independent States had the right to send and receive ambassadors. Refusal to receive an envoy was analogous, in modern terms, to nonrecognition of the sending State or to a rupture of diplomatic relations, foreshadowing war.) Envoys were received and dispatched by the popular assemblies, which likewise drew up their instructions. Only persons of distinction, wisdom, and ripe years were chosen. From an early period, all diplomatic representatives and their attachés enjoyed inviolability and exemption from local authority and were recognized to have the right to come and go as they pleased in the execution of their duties. A rudimentary consular service was likewise developed in the form of the institution of the proxenoi, who were permanent officials appointed to furnish commercial information to their home State and to give advice and assistance to its citizens abroad.

Though Greek scholars, jurists, and writers, including the prolific and versatile Aristotle, never treated in systematic form any body of law and custom comparable with modern international law, the actual practices of the city-states, as has already been suggested, were based upon general recognition of a body of rules and principles binding on the members of the State System. There was assumed to exist a universal "law of nature" or of reason to which all men were bound. Although there was, in regard to many matters, one law for the Greeks and another for the barbarians, the relations among the Greek States themselves were regulated by principles which closely approximate modern international law. The details of this somewhat inchoate system of jurisprudence cannot be dealt with here, but it covered such subjects as personal and property rights as affected by conflicting laws of various States ("private international law" in modern terminology), naturalization, status of aliens, right of asylum, extradition, alliances, treaties, diplomatic privileges and immunities, and the like. The international law of war was no less developed than that of peace.

Another feature of the Greek State System deserving of special mention was the extensive development of arbitration and of permanent institutions and agencies of international cooperation, foreshadowing what has come to be described as "international organization" in the Western State System of the contemporary period.) The pacific settlement of disputes by submission to an impartial third party was a procedure familiar to the Greeks from the
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earliest times. It came to be resorted to so frequently and was developed to a point so far in advance of previous practice that it may well be regarded as one of the most significant contributions of the Greek State System to its successors. Disputes were often submitted to the arbitration of the Delphic oracle, the Amphictyonic Council, a third State, or a tribunal of individuals picked by the litigants. Treaties of alliance frequently contained "compromise clauses" providing for the submission to arbitration of such disputes as might arise between the parties. From an alliance to a confederation was but a step, and the Greek confederations and leagues often served as agencies for the peaceable adjustment of controversies among their members and for the promotion of cooperation in dealing with matters of common interest. The earliest confederations, or amphictyonies, were religious in character and were devoted to worship in common temples and the communal celebration of religious festivals. The antiquity of the Delphian Amphictyony, later called the Amphictyonic League, is attested by the fact that it was an association not of cities but of the 12 kindred tribes of the Greek peoples, each with two votes in the semiannual councils at Delphi and Thermopylae. This organization has sometimes been described, not without reason, as the Greek prototype of the League of Nations. In the course of its long history, it promoted religious unity among the Greeks, diminished the barbarities of war, arbitrated disputes, and subsequently became an instrument of Macedonian, and later of Roman, hegemony over the peninsula. The other Greek leagues and confederacies were true organizations of city-states, though in some cases they were approximations to modern federal governments and in others they were the means through which a powerful State dominated its weaker allies. Such were the first and second Athenian Leagues, the Peloponnesian League, and the Achaean League.

That the Greek State System never attained stability, unity, and peace and finally collapsed before foreign foes was due to the fact that its members, despite their common cultural heritage, were never capable over any long period of time of subordinating the special and particular interests of the local polis to the general interests of the Greek peoples as a whole. Under these circumstances the collectivity of States was incapable of harmonizing rival claims to power on the basis of the general interest. Although the clash of arms and the exaltation of city-state patriotism which accompanied it undoubtedly contributed to the rich profusion and fertility of Greek civilization, they rendered impossible the development of a type of interstate political organization which could assure permanence to the System. In their days of

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decadence and exhaustion, when the bright radiance of the great creative pe-
riod had burned itself out, the city-states fell easy victims to the power of
Philip and Alexander of Macedonia, rulers of a younger and more vigorous
people to the north. Amid all the political changes of the ensuing centuries
in the eastern Mediterranean, they never fully recovered their independence;
and the peace between them was kept by the foreign conqueror.

This transition followed a design, unplanned but inexorable, which has
reproduced itself in other Cultures, most notably in the modern West of
our own age. On the surface the design was a product of the incapacity of
the Greek commonwealths to combine effectively against external aggression.
Below the surface, it was a manifestation of a slow process of change whereby
the once vigorous and equalitarian mercantile democracy of the city-states
was corroded by the complacency of the wealthy and by the unrest and in-
difference of the poor. This cleavage created a market for demagogues and
despots. By destroying internal unity, it rendered the Greek States ripe for
conquest. If Macedonia succeeded in doing what Persia had failed to do, the
cause lay less in superiority of fighting power than in the inner enfeeblement
of Greek democracy itself.

The sequel is more sensational than significant. In 359 B.C. Philip became
King of Macedonia, a peasant land of herdsmen and fighters north of Thess-
saly. The court language, however, was Attic Greek. Philip cultivated
Euripides and Aristotle—who helped to educate young Prince Alexander.
With the aid of disciplined cavalry, a perfected infantry phalanx, and the
use of catapults as artillery, Philip extended his realm to include portions
of Thrace, Illyria, and Epirus and most of Thessaly. He was tormented by
his jealous wife, Olympias, Princess of Epirus, who inflamed Alexander
against him. But he became the most potent monarch of his time. Against
his ambitions and against “appeasement” Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.) sought
to warn the Greeks:

When men overthrow free constitutions and change them to oligarchies, I urge
you to regard them as the common enemies of all who love freedom. Then again,
Athenians, it is right that you, living under a democracy, should show the same
sympathy for democracies in distress as you would expect others to show for
you, if ever—which God forbid!—you were in the same plight. . . . Alliance
and respect are willingly offered by all men to those whom they see ready and
prompt to take action. And you too, men of Athens, if you are willing to adopt
this principle, now if never before, if each citizen is ready to throw off his
diffidence and serve the State as he ought and as he best may, the rich man
paying, the strong man fighting, if, briefly and plainly, you will consent to be-
come your own masters, and if each man will cease to expect that while he does
nothing himself his neighbor will do everything for him, then, God willing, you
will recover your own, you will restore what has been frittered away, and you
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will turn the tables upon Philip. . . . This Philip has not grown great through his own unaided strength so much as through our carelessness. . . .

Such appeals were vain. The city-states could not act in unison even in the face of this formidable menace. Many among their citizens favored a Panhellenic crusade against Persia under Philip's leadership. In 338 B.C. Philip's army crushed the Athenians and their allies at Chaeronea—and Philip then granted a generous peace with an eye to things to come. Two years later he was murdered. His son, Alexander, aged twenty, inherited the kingdom and devoted himself to a mission.

After destroying rebellious Thebes, he led a great army overland against Persia, conquering Asia Minor in 334-333 B.C. A year later he entered Egypt and liberated it from Persian rule. The time was the Thirty-third Dynasty since Menes. Here he allowed himself to be persuaded by the Oracle of Ammon that he was no mere mortal but the son of a god, Ammon Ra—or, perchance, of Zeus. Here also he founded the city of Alexandria. In 331 B.C. he destroyed the Persian Army at Arbela, took Babylon and Susa, and then spent seven years subduing and exploring the vast regions of Turkestan and western India, which he entered by the Khyber Pass. He would have pushed on to the Ganges and perhaps to China, but his troops refused. In 323 B.C. after much hard drinking in Babylon, he died of a fever at the age of thirty-three. His last years were marred by cruelty and vanity. His wife, Roxanna, his sons, and finally his mother, Olympias, all died by murder.

The military and political genius of Alexander the Great created the first approximation of a truly "world empire" of Eurasia. Through his work much of western Asia was Hellenized, even as Hellas itself fell more and more under cultural influences from the Orient. The imposing political structure which he built dissolved at once into a ferment of secession, disorder, and assassination—until the whole again became an anarchy of separate sovereignties, all of which were now the degenerate remnants of realms in full decay. In life Alexander had caught, and carried to partial realization, the shadowy vision of a united world, embracing all men in one great community. In death he became the symbol of a dream.

4. THE HERITAGE OF ROME

"Ours is not the first modern world—there was Rome." Of all I heard Dean Carlyle say at Oxford this I remember. There was Rome (it came

5 These excerpts are taken from the Philippiics and from other orations, all reproduced in Greek and in English in the Loeb Classical Library, Demosthenes, translated by J. H. Vince (New York, Putnam, 1930), passim. See "Isolationism: A Case-History" by Frederick H. Cramer, Journal of the History of Ideas, October, 1940.
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to me long after) and had the men of Rome held the ground that Man had won then for Man, where might not we be now? Had Rome not fallen, would Man have needed two thousand years to step from Aristotle on to Darwin? Had the men of Rome only held this ground—but Rome fell, then fell not only civilized men, but all the barbarians whom they were civilizing, and American Redskins of whose existence they were not aware. When Rome fell, truly you and I and all of us fell down, for then fell down our species. It has not reached today the point it could long since have passed had Rome not fallen.—CLARENCE K. STREIT, Union Now, 1939.

When Alexander, the god-king, died, his imperium did not embrace the remote China of the Chou Emperors, nor did it include the bulk of India, about to attain a measure of unity under the Mauryas. Neither did it extend to the Greek colonies scattered over the central and western shores of the Middle Sea. Midway between the Hellespont and the Pillars of Hercules lay Italy. Here arose slowly a new people and a new Power, destined to complete on a larger stage and in enduring form the work of unification through conquest begun by the Macedonian.

Rome was founded, the Romans believed, in the year we should reckon as 753 B.C. Virgil’s Aeneid is a late rendering in great verse of the legend that its founders were refugees from Troy. Another myth held that Romulus and Remus, sons of Mars and suckled as babes by a wolf, were the first builders of the city. In fact, centuries earlier, barbarians speaking a primitive Latin variant of the Aryan group of languages, had filtered into Italy from the north. Later, from the east by sea, came civilized invaders who imposed their rule on the Aryans north of the Tiber. These were the Etruscans, who may have been refugees from Crete. At a ford in the Tiber, where Etruscans traded with the primitive Latins, a city grew. Its Etruscan Kings were driven out in 510 B.C. Rome became a Latin Republic. Etruscan power was broken by a war with Syracuse and by a devastating invasion of Gauls from the north. The Gallic barbarians took and plundered Rome itself in 390 B.C. But a century later the Romans were masters of all central Italy by virtue of the consolidation of local communities into a “nation” which, by diplomacy and arms, extended its power in all directions.

These early Roman citizens, whose descendants were to build an imperium the like of which has never since been seen, were farmers. They were divided into “patricians” and “plebeians” (rich and poor) with the two classes originally “castes”—i.e., groups between which intermarriage was forbidden. Slaves and aliens were barred from citizenship. Government, as in most of the Greek cities, was republican. Supreme power was vested in a Senate, whose members were appointed by two elected “consuls.” Since the patricians domi-
nated both the Senate and the Consulate, this polity was an aristocracy, mitigated by a Popular Assembly and by a chronic class struggle between patricians and plebeians, with the latter represented by their own Assembly and its "tribunes." In national crises all power was temporarily entrusted to a "dictator." At least in the early centuries, political rivalries were marked by moderation and compromise. In these qualities, coupled with military and administrative skill, lay the secret of the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean world. Allies were conciliated and conquered peoples were admitted to citizenship in such wise as to cause all in the end to prefer the order of the Pax Romana to the dubious benefits of independence and anarchy. Representative government, as we know it, never developed in Rome. The Senate finally became the tool of a wealthy oligarchy. But the forms of popular participation were never wholly lost.

Across the sea in the Phoenician settlement at Carthage grew another Republic, with a Senate, an Assembly, and two elected "Kings." Its power was naval power. Its elite consisted of wealthy merchants. When Pyrrhus, King of Epirus and a kinsman of the great Alexander, successfully attacked Rome in 280 B.C. with his phalanxes, cavalry, and war elephants, Carthage formed an alliance with Rome and contributed to the defeat of the aggressor. In the apportionment of the spoils of victory Rome took southern Italy, and Carthage, most of Sicily. But with the common threat of a third Great Power removed the victors became rivals. Had the other members of the larger Mediterranean State System perceived that the triumph of either over the other would leave the rest helpless, they would have combined against the stronger in accordance with balance-of-power calculations. But their rulers lacked this wisdom. The results were inexorable and momentous.

"Old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago," often decisive for our own destinies, must here be briefly outlined. In 264 B.C., after Carthage had aided the King of Syracuse to suppress a band of pirates at Messina, Rome opened war on the Power of the South on the ground that a Carthaginian garrison on the Sicilian Straits was a menace to Italy. This first "Punic War" was chiefly fought in Sicily. Rome built a navy and evolved a technique of boarding enemy vessels to which the foe found no effective defense. After years of exhausting conflict, Carthage sued for peace (240 B.C.), conceded Sicily to Rome, and paid an indemnity. When Rome later increased the indemnity, seized Sardinia and Corsica, and fixed the Ebro as the farthest line of tolerable Carthaginian expansion in Spain, Hamilcar Barca, father of Hannibal, swore vengeance and deathless hatred. This passion for violence was matched, a generation later, by the incessant injunction of the self-righteous Roman censor, Marcus Cato: "Carthago delenda est!" ("Carthage must be destroyed!")
In 218 B.C. the Second Punic War began. Hannibal, one of the major military geniuses of all time, led a great army, replete with infantry, superb cavalry, and war elephants, from Spain across Gaul over the Alps and into Italy. At Lake Trasimenum he crushed a Roman army. In the south at Cannae (216 B.C.) he destroyed a larger Roman force in what has ever since been regarded in the science of war as the classic battle of outflanking, encirclement, and annihilation. Hannibal conquered most of Italy and won Syracuse and Macedonia. But he dared not risk an attack on the enemy capital. The Roman leaders refused to sue for peace. Under Fabius the "Delayer," they resorted to guerrilla tactics. New armies took Syracuse (despite the inventions of Archimedes, who died in the final assault), occupied Taranto and Capua, invaded Spain, and at Metaurus (207 B.C.) crushed the forces of Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, which had come from Africa to aid the invaders. Hannibal, now isolated, withdrew to Carthage. At Zama (202 B.C.), near the capital, he was for the first and last time defeated by a Roman and Numidian army under Scipio Africanus. A conqueror's peace ensued. Carthage was compelled to surrender Spain, to abandon all her navy save 10 ships, to pay a huge indemnity, to agree never to wage war without Roman consent, and to surrender Hannibal as a "war criminal." But Hannibal fled to Asia.

Having drunk deeply of glory and booty, Rome's rulers turned their victorious soldiery to the East. In 200 B.C. Pergamum, Rhodes, and the Greek leagues, not perceiving whither they were being led, joined Rome in war on Macedonia. The phalanx was crushed by the legion at Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C. Macedonia was subjected to a Roman peace. In alarm the cities of the Aetolian League sought aid from Asia Minor. But Antiochus III, ruler of the post-Alexandrine Kingdom of the Seleucids, was defeated at Magnesia (190 B.C.). He was forced to pay the victors in lands and tribute and agreed to surrender Hannibal to Roman vengeance. The great Carthaginian fled to Bythnia, whose king decided to yield him to Rome. Rather than suffer this indignity, Hannibal committed suicide by poison in 183 B.C.

Rome destroyed Corinth in 146 B.C., reduced Macedonia to a Roman province, dissolved the Greek leagues, and shortly ended the independence of Rhodes and Pergamum. In the same year the Third Punic War, begun in 149 B.C., reached its fearful end. Rome had spurred the Numidians to goad Carthage to war in self-defense—and then, alleging violation of the treaty, threatened hostilities unless the Carthaginians agreed to abandon their capital. Refusal was followed by a Roman siege. Famine and the final butchery took over 400,000 lives. The 50,000 survivors were enslaved. All the city was burned to the ground and its ashes plowed with salt. Anyone who might seek to rebuild it was declared accursed.
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This grim consummation of the wrath of Cato the Censor found Rome already a "World State," although the Pax Romana was still remote. In the last dozen years of the 2nd century, hard fighting was called for to subdue Jugurtha, King of Numidia, and to beat back the first invasion of Italy by Germanic barbarians, the Cimbri and the Teutons. In both crises the savior was Marius (155-86 B.C.), seven times consul of the republic. A later series of wars (88-64 B.C.) against King Mithridates VI of Pontus was prolonged and costly, for this Oriental monarch drove the legions from Asia Minor, ordered the massacre of all Roman citizens, occupied Greece, and set up headquarters at Athens—until Sulla (138-78 B.C.) retook the city in 86 and carried the war back into Asia. These conflicts were marked by intermittent civil strife between the followers of Marius and Sulla, with the supporters of each, as opportunity offered, purging Rome of their rivals through "proscriptions"—i.e., wholesale slaughter of political opponents.

These woeful events reflected a growing cleavage in Roman society and foreshadowed darker things to come. As the rich, consisting chiefly of the equestes, or nobles, who dominated the Senate, grew ever richer through shrewd business enterprise, graft, and the exploitation of subject peoples, the poor became poorer and were more and more dependent on public relief. The sturdy farmers of ancient Rome were gradually dispossessed of their lands and reduced to tenants, slaves, or proletarians as wealthy families, through usury, fraud, and force, acquired great estates, or latifundia. A kind of class war ensued. Tiberius Gracchus, and later his brother Gaius, both plebeians and tribunes of the people, championed the popular cause. Both were slain (133 and 121 B.C.) by mobsters hired by reactionary senators. The Gracchi raised a question hitherto unknown to the ancient world but entirely familiar to modern Europe—that of "agrarian reform." Both strove to break up large holdings into small farms, owned by independent cultivators. The failure resulted in the "Social War" (91-89 B.C.) and then in a formidable uprising (73-71 B.C.) of slaves and gladiators, led by Spartacus. In conformity with the usual rules of class conflict, 6,000 captured followers of Spartacus were crucified along the Appian Way.

This schism in Roman society was accompanied by the transformation of the legions from a levy of citizen-soldiers into a paid professional army and then into an army of mercenaries, loyal to its paymasters rather than to the Republic. Such seeds of democracy as had sprouted in the Rome of old were choked to death by plutocracy and militarism, which march together in decadent cultures until the wealthy are overborne by the war lords. Sulla was the first of the new dictators. Pompey completed his work in the Near East and established the First Triumvirate with Crassus and Julius Caesar. The third member gained political influence through war. Caesar as general
conquered Gaul (59-49 B.C.) and invaded Germany and Britain. Caesar as politician defied Pompey, crossed the Rubicon, and ultimately defeated his rival’s forces, thereupon making himself dictator for 10 years (46 B.C.) and then for life. He played at love with Cleopatra, Queen of Egypt, toyed with the idea of accepting a crown, and listened to flatterers who suggested that he become a god-ruler. These ambitions led to his assassination in 44 B.C. But he was the symbol of the coming time.

Rome now became an Empire in form as well as in fact. Cicero, slain in 43 B.C., was the last great champion of the Republic. Following Caesar’s death, Mark Antony and Octavian disputed the mastery of the realm. After the former’s navy was crushed at Actium (31 B.C.), Antony and his mistress, Cleopatra, died by suicide. Octavian refused the dictatorship and sought to revive the Republic. But the Senate conferred upon him the title “Augustus” and all men called him “Princeps,” or First Citizen. When he died in A.D. 14, he was, despite himself, a god-emperor in the eyes of the people who had found no other solution to their quest for unity.

As a universal State, Rome had no international relations. It had no contacts with the States of the Far East and few with those of India, and its relations with the quasi States of the outer barbarians were never on a basis of equality. During its earlier history, however, before its legions had transformed the Mediterranean State System into a world empire, it had developed certain procedures and practices in its dealings with other States which are worthy of brief notice. Like most ancient peoples the Romans for a long period regarded themselves as being at war with all States with which no treaty of peace had been concluded. From the early days of Rome, decisions of war and peace and the negotiation of treaties were entrusted to the College of Fetials (collegium fetialium). All wars were “just wars,” declared and conducted in accordance with elaborate ceremonial rules and only after efforts at a pacific solution of the controversy had failed. If the pater patratus of the Fetials, acting as negotiator, failed to achieve a peaceful settlement, he so reported to the Senate. In the event of a decision for war, he hurled a bloody spear on the soil of the enemy to the accompaniment of appropriate oaths and invocations to Jupiter and other deities. As Rome expanded, the Fetials were represented by envoys and the ceremony of hurling the spear was performed, in purely symbolic fashion, on the Campus Martius or, later, before the temple of Bellona. The Fetials were also entrusted with the conclusion of treaties, but foreign envoys had audiences with the Senate during the month of February in the Grecostiasis, an open tribunal near the Capitol. In the imperial period, the Emperor took over these functions. Almost all Roman treaties were unequal and in perpetuity in the sense that they imposed upon the other party a permanent status of de-
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pendence. The *jus gentium* of the Romans was not a body of true international law, but a set of legal principles adapted to the problems arising out of the relations of Roman citizens with citizens of other States which were friends or allies of Rome.

(Despite the influence of Greek models upon them, the Romans never developed any conception of international law or relations based upon a system of independent States dealing with one another as equals.) All was judged by Roman standards. The vision of world dominion was at all times, consciously or unconsciously, inherent in the attitudes and practices of the Roman State in its dealings with other peoples. The World Empire in its final form rested upon the extinction of the earlier States and State Systems by Roman military power. Though it was a huge international or cosmopolitan structure made up of very diverse elements, its whole organization and indeed its very existence precluded the possibility of those customs, procedures, and institutions of international intercourse which inevitably develop within a society of equal and independent political entities.

The rest of Rome’s story need not here concern us, save as it created a myth to which all later ages paid homage. Augustus was followed by Tiberius, he by the mad Caligula, and he in turn by his uncle Claudius (A.D. 41-55), raised to “Imperator” by the praetorian or palace guard. Claudius added Mauretania and part of Britain to the Empire and permitted sycophants to make “Caesar” a title of omnipotence and to deify the Emperor. Following the suicide of Nero (A.D. 54-68), four Emperors succeeded one another in a single year until the more secure dynasties of the Flavian and Antonine Caesars restored internal peace and reached their culmination in the reign of the Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 161-180). Under Trajan (A.D. 98-117) the Empire attained its maximum size, with its 44 provinces stretching from mid-Scotland to the Caspian and the Persian Gulf and from the plains of “Romania” to the Sahara. Trajan’s successor, Hadrian, abandoned Armenia, Mesopotamia, and southern Scotland, as his successors abandoned Dacia, north of the lower Danube, the better to defend the frontiers by walls and garrisons against the barbarians. In A.D. 395 the Empire was permanently divided into Eastern and Western halves, each with its own Caesar.

Even in its later days this Universal State was the most impressive and enduring ever reared by the hand of man. Over 100,000,000 people lived within its far-flung borders. Well-built roads united its parts. Imperial architecture graced its cities. Roman law, first codified in 450 B.C. in the “Twelve Tables,” evolved into a magnificent legal system which long afforded justice to all citizens. Races, nations, and cultures were mingled in a cosmopolitan imperium, infused with Hellenic art and learning and with Roman skills in
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governance. The Roman World State, to be sure, was a military despotism
imposed on a corrupt plutocracy. Its masses of slaves, tenant farmers, and
urban proletarians were more interested in “bread and circuses” than in
any loyalty to a cause or any devotion to a mission. Even by its own stand-
ards, its ruling class was dishonest, grasping, and irresponsible. Masses and
classes alike relished the cruelties of gladiatorial combats and savage political,
and religious persecutions to a degree which precluded any real appreciation
of individual dignity. Intellectuals and bureaucrats, though able and crea-
tive, never caught the vision of science, technology, and industry, nor did
they see the need of Romanizing the barbarians before they barbarized
Rome. In the end this enterprise of One World failed. But the effort embodied
in the Pax Romana was nevertheless the most inspiring in all the annals of
the Western peoples.

5. NIGHTFALL

In the fullness of Time the din of battle which has ebbed away
towards the fringes of civilization till it has passed almost out of ear-
shot will come welling back again in the van of barbarian war-bands
that have gained the upper hand over the garrisons of the limes by
learning from them, in the effective school of a perpetual border war-
fare, the winning tricks of the professional soldier’s trade; or, more
terrifying still, the dreadful sound will come welling up again in the
resurgence of an Internal Proletariat that has turned militant once
more—to the consternation of a Dominant Minority which has been
flattering itself that this profanum vulgus has long since been cowed
or cajoled into a settled habit of submissiveness. The spectres of war
and revolution that have latterly passed into legend now once again
stalk abroad, as of old, in the light of day; and a bourgeois which has
never before seen bloodshed now hastily throws up ringwalls round
its open towns out of any materials that come to hand: mutilated
statues and desecrated altars and scattered drums of fallen columns
and inscribed blocks of marble refl from derelict public monuments.
These pacific inscriptions are now anachronisms, for the Indian Sum-
mer is over; the “Time of Troubles” has returned; and this shocking
calamity has descended upon a generation which has been brought up
in the illusory conviction that the bad times of yore have gone for good!
—ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

Edward Gibbon in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire attributed
the demise of the World State of the Caesars to the triumph of barbarism
and religion. A somewhat different formulation is more in accord with cur-
rent judgments. Rome was finally overwhelmed by the barbarians because
the Roman community itself had already been “barbarized,” partly through
a slow infiltration of nomads who were never fully assimilated, and partly
through an incurable cleavage between elite and masses. The powerful lost effective means of perpetuating their way of life. The poor lost effective interest in whether the status quo was preserved or disrupted.

The new religion might have aided its converts to restore unity and strength to a sick society, had they been capable of translating its ethical precepts into social, economic, and political terms. This was beyond their power. But their faith became the means through which something at least of the precious heritage of the old times was rescued from the wreckage and utilized in the coming “Dark Age” to nourish the growth of a new civilization. That new civilization is our own. The religion which helped to give it continuity with the vanished Greco-Roman world is, of course, Christianity—for which Gibbon had small respect.

Little can be said about the divine or human aspects of Christianity which would win the approbation of all Christians or elicit approval from non-Christians, who still today outnumber Christians throughout the world by almost three to one. But it is clear that the mighty dream of a new morality of love, righteousness, and universal brotherhood, as preached by Jesus of Nazareth, had much in common with the ethical insights of Ikhnaton, the Prophets of Israel, Buddha, Confucius, and Lao-Tse. And it is equally clear that, as this gospel was embroidered, and even somewhat obscured, by the earliest Christian weavers of legend, doctrine, and ritual, the materials out of which the design was fashioned were those then available in the Roman world. Mithraism preached rebirth through blood sacrifice. The cult of Serapis-Isis-Horus postulated a trinity of father-mother-child as three deities in one. Other age-old myths and creeds told of the coming of a sacred king, of a holy mother and divine son, of the dying god who gives his life for man, and of grace through partaking of the flesh and blood of godhood. Yet through the network of borrowed symbols still shines the Christian vision of men remade and cleansed of sin through love for one another and for a loving God.

For this the faithful lived and died, including Paul of Tarsus, who was its first great missionary. And in devious disputation over the theology of this faith, men, ever unworthy of their own best wisdom, were to torture and slay one another. Diocletian (A.D. 284-305), who converted Roman government from a mockery of republicanism into a burlesque of Oriental despotism, persecuted Christians because they would not admit the divinity of Caesar. But Constantine the Great (306-37), who moved his capital to the new city of Constantinople (Byzantium) on the Bosporus, followed the sign of the Cross and summoned at Nicaea in 325 the first general council of Christian leaders. A creed was written to put an end to doctrinal dissension. Rigid dogma facilitated the organization of a priesthood, regimented in an
elaborate hierarchy. The Church was inevitably modeled on the Roman imperial pattern, particularly after Theodosius in 392 made Christianity the State religion. The Bishop-Patriarch of Rome became “Pope” and later adopted the title of Pontifex Maximus, earlier claimed by the Caesars. What had first been the humble faith of the poor and lowly was now a Universal (“Catholic”) Church, exercising immense power in its own right. St. Augustine’s City of God was a vision of the Church ruling over all the kings and nations of men. As the barbarians inundated the Empire and embraced the Christian faith, this vision approached realization.

From the time of Marcus Aurelius the Emperors had settled barbarian captives on the land as coloni, had taken them into the army when the Romans themselves had lost enthusiasm for military service, and had entered into alliances with the barbarians on the frontiers. When, in A.D. 376, the Emperor Valens admitted into the territory of the Empire a great horde of Visigoths who had been driven from their lands by the Huns, he was merely following the well-established policy of his predecessors. But the Visigoths rose in revolt, slew the Emperor and his legionaries, and ravaged Macedonia and Thrace to the gates of Constantinople. Theodosius made peace by settling them south of the Danube. Thirty years later, another Visigothic chieftain, Alaric, led his warriors across the Alps, devastated Italy, and sacked Rome (A.D. 410). The elevation of Alaric’s successor, Atolf, to the command of the imperial armies by the Emperor Honorius is indicative of the impotence to which the Roman State had been reduced. Britain was evacuated by the legions. The distant frontiers crumbled before new foes. Barbarian hosts wandered almost unopposed through the provinces. Out of the east came the dreaded Huns under Attila, bent upon the complete destruction of the Empire and the creation of a great barbarian dominion. After Attila’s hordes were beaten at Châlons-sur-Marne in 451, they invaded Italy, only to withdraw again into the eastern wilderness. The Vandals carried fire and sword through Gaul and Spain, occupied North Africa, crossed the sea, and sacked Rome once more in 455. In 476 the little six-year-old Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, the last of the Emperors of the West, was deprived of his throne by Odoacer, chief of the mercenaries, and the imperial insignia were sent to Constantinople with the request that the Emperor Zeno permit Odoacer to administer Italy as a province of the Eastern Empire. This final “fall of Rome” was but an incident in a century of turmoil, but it marked the end of the Western Empire as a political entity.

Yet Rome dead was more powerful than Rome alive. The city itself remained the seat of the Papacy, which asserted and gradually established its spiritual supremacy over the Christianized barbarian kingdoms. The unity of Western Christendom, which had been disrupted by the collapse of the
old Empire, was revived by the growing power of the Church. The memory of the vanished World State lingered on in the minds of the barbarians. The Pax Romana of the lost Golden Age became an ideal ever more desirable in the eyes of medieval mankind as it became ever more impossible of restoration. Catholic Christianity and this vision of order and peace under a Universal State were the two great legacies which Classical civilization left to its heirs. The religious and political history of the long springtime of Western civilization—traditionally misnamed the “Middle Ages”—is largely the story of the Church and the “Empire”—the former a living reality of medieval life, the latter the unreal dream of a vanished past which could never be quite recovered. The new State System which rose on the ruins of Roman power was ever under the spell of the magic of the Popes and the legend of the world-wide imperium of the Caesars.

At the beginning of the “Dark Ages” which followed the fall of the West the Eastern Empire was a beacon in the night. The Emperor Justinian (527-65) codified Roman law in its final form and sent his great general, Belisarius, to recover the Mediterranean world from the barbarians. Belisarius subdued the African Kingdom of the Vandals (533-34), took Sicily and Rome (536), and reconquered Italy from the Gothic Kings. But the rescued provinces were soon inundated once more by hordes from the north. The Byzantine Empire abandoned the West and looked to its own defenses against invaders from the Orient.

In time, however, as the barbarians settled on the land, absorbed the remnants of Roman culture, and embarked upon State building, new kingdoms and principalities emerged and conditions were ripe for the development of a new system of independent territorial States. But the vision of unity persisted and reached partial fulfillment 300 years after the end of the Western Empire. The Kingdom of the Franks, established in what had been Roman Gaul, allied itself with the Papacy and gradually extended its power over its neighbors. The rise of the Frankish Kingdom was contemporaneous with the appearance of a great new civilization in the Near East. When the armed apostles of Islam, having conquered Egypt, North Africa, and Spain with spectacular rapidity, pushed on to the north, it was the Franks who saved Christendom from Moslem conquest by defeating the Saracens at Tours in 732. At the end of the century the greatest of the Frankish Kings, Charlemagne, had so widely extended his control over the pagans that his realm reached from northern Spain to the Baltic and from the Atlantic to the Oder. In 799 he restored Leo III to the Holy See in Rome by frustrating the schemes of the Pope’s rivals and enemies. On Christmas Day, A.D. 800, in the Church of St. Peter at Rome, the grateful Leo placed an imperial crown upon the head of the Frankish monarch, while
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the populace shouted, “To Charles, the Augustus, crowned by God, great and pacific Emperor of the Romans, life and victory!” Thus, with the sanction of the Papacy, the Empire was at length restored by the power of Frankish arms, and one Emperor ruled again over most of Western Christendom.⁶

This restoration was ephemeral, however, and the medieval “Empire” was not finally established until another century and a half had elapsed. The realm of Charles the Great fell to the weakest of his sons, Louis the Pious, in 814 and was promptly divided among the grandsons. Internecine wars and further partitions followed, with the eastern, or German, portion definitely separating itself from the western, or French, portion and with both halves set upon during the 9th century by new invaders—Vikings from the north, Magyars from the east, and Saracens from the south. New rulers were crowned “Emperor” by the Popes, but their authority was feeble. The imperial crown was finally transferred to a German King in the person of Charles the Fat in 881. When Henry the Fowler, Duke of the Saxons (the grave and stately monarch of Wagner’s Lohengrin), was elected King in 919 by the Saxon and Franconian nobles, he renounced imperial ambitions and busied himself with beating back the Magyar invaders and restoring some degree of order in his domains. His son, Otto, continued the work with such success that he was able to extend his power into Italy and in 962 was crowned Emperor by the Pope. The compact between the Roman Bishop and the German King laid the basis for what later came to be called the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” (and still later the “First Reich”)—a curious political structure with a double sovereignty, resting upon the notion that the Empire and the Papacy were, respectively, the temporal and spiritual agencies designated by the divine will for the governance of Christendom.

To trace through the subsequent history of this ramshackle creation of

⁶David Jayne Hill aptly characterizes the significance of this ceremony as follows: “The two figures before the high altar of St. Peter’s on that Christmas Day form a symbolical picture of the whole course of history since the time of the Caesars. The Roman and the German, the overshadowing past and the potential present, the universal and the individual, the majesty of law and the vigor of liberty, the world of the spirit and the world of actuality, imperial right and barbarian energy—all these are present, and all are henceforth to be combined as if swallowed up in one new creation. But it is the German who kneels in pious devotion, the present which humbles itself before the past, the individual who feels the power of the universal, the vigor of liberty which yields to the majesty of law, the actual which seeks strength from the spiritual, and the barbarian who has been conquered by the Empire. It is the Roman who bestows the crown, the Roman who speaks in the name of the divinity, the Roman whose transfigured republic is to profit by Rome’s latest conquest; for after centuries of suffering, toil, tragedy, it is the triumph of Rome’s work which is before us.” (A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, Vol. I, pp. 95-96.)
medieval statesmanship would be of little value here except to reveal the
persistence with which the ideal of imperial unity was adhered to during
many generations. The imperial crown passed to the House of Hohenstaufen
and later to the House of Hapsburg, where it remained until the extinction
of the Empire in 1806. The theory of the Empire as the successor of the
Roman World State was not much modified either by the great conflicts
between Popes and Emperors for supremacy or by the fact that the Empire
had no effective authority outside of the German States and Italy. Even in
these regions the imperial power was constantly flouted by the great dukes,
the unruly principalities, and the turbulent free cities. Such powers as the
Emperor wielded he derived less from his imperial office than from the lands
and subjects which he controlled as a German King among many kings. It
could almost be said of the Empire from the beginning what Voltaire said
of it in the 18th century: that it was neither Holy nor Roman nor an Em-
pire. It existed in the world of theological speculation and political meta-
physics rather than in the world of fact. It was the most perfect expression
of medieval mysticism and scholasticism applied to world politics. It was the
ghost of ancient Rome which would not be laid but insisted upon stalking
ceaselessly across the stage of the middle ages between Classical and mod-
ern civilization. The firm hold which the theory of imperial unity secured
on the hopes and imaginations of men is explicable in terms of a deep yearn-
ing for peace and order in a world of endless war and confusion. But the
political and social structure of Western society in medieval Europe doomed
that yearning to perpetual frustration. The medieval political theorist and
statesman became a new Tantalus, constantly groping for that which lay
beyond his reach, constantly striving to realize an ideal which the conditions
of the time put past all realization.

Nowhere in medieval political literature is this tragedy more poignantly
expressed than in the De monarchia of Dante Alighieri, jurist, statesman,
poet, and author of the immortal Divine Comedy. His great political essay
has accurately been described by Lord Bryce as the “epitaph of the Holy
Roman Empire.” It is indeed a last cry of despair, a last plea for unity in a
world of inescapable diversity. It represents both the culmination and the
close of medieval political theorizing on international relations. A brief
consideration of its message and of the circumstances which produced it
will constitute an appropriate conclusion to this discussion of the medieval
ideal of the world-wide imperium.

The De monarchia was written about 1309, twelve years before Dante’s
death, at the period of the “Babylonian captivity” of the Papacy, when the
Popes were residing at Avignon under the surveillance of the French mon-
archy, when no Emperor had visited Italy for over half a century, and
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when the Italian city-states were waging chronic war upon one another for power and territory. Great hopes were entertained that the newly elected Emperor, Henry VII, would come to Italy for his coronation and would restore peace to the land. Dante, as a practical student of law and government and as one who had served on several Florentine embassies and who was not, therefore, unfamiliar with diplomatic problems, shared this hope and wrote his famous essay as a defense of the Empire and as an appeal for general recognition of its supremacy. In allegorical and scholastic style, he presented the arguments in favor of his ideal:

Whole heaven is regulated by a single ruler—God. It follows that the human race is at its best state when it is ruled by a single prince and one law. So it is evidently necessary for the welfare of the world that there should be a single monarchy or princedom, which men call the Empire. Whenever disputes arise, there must be judgment. Between any two independent princes controversy may arise and then judgment is necessary. Now an equal cannot rule over his equal, so there must be a third prince of wider jurisdiction who is ruler over both, to decide the dispute. This third ruler must be the monarch or Emperor. And so monarchy is necessary for the world. . . . Moreover, the world is ordered best when justice is most powerful, and justice is most powerful under a monarchy or empire.

Dante cited the age of Augustus as the Golden Age of mankind and concluded with a dramatic exhortation, colored by pessimism and a half-confesssed realization of the futility of the poet’s aspirations:

But how the world has fared since that “seamless robe” [the Roman Empire] has suffered rending by the talons of ambition, we may read in books; would that we might not see it with our eyes. Oh, race of mankind! What storms must toss thee, what losses must thou endure, what shipwrecks must buffet thee, as long as thou, a beast of many heads, strivest after contrary things! Thou art sick in both thy faculties of understanding; thou art sick in thy affections. Unanswerable reasons fail to heal thy higher understanding; the very sight of experience convinces not thy lower understanding; not even the sweetness of divine persuasion charms thy affections, when it breathes unto thee through the music of the Holy Spirit: “Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity!”

But the hope was vain. Henry came to Italy and was crowned by agents of the Pope at Rome. He brought not peace, but a sword. Rome itself was torn by the struggles between Guelfs and Ghibellines. The Emperor and Pope, whom Dante had envisaged as two facets of a single perfect entity, quarrelled violently in words and in arms. Henry was placed under the ban of the Church by Clement V at Avignon, who was supported by the King of France in rendering aid to Robert of Naples and the cities of the north, which resisted the imperial power. Henry laid unsuccessful siege to Florence and
died in 1313, carrying with him to the grave all prospects of restoring the prestige of the Empire in Italy. The peninsula, like all Europe, was a welter of warring States, with the Empire but a specter of half-forgotten yesterdays.

Yet the magic which the memory of the Caesars had spun into men’s minds has endured through all the centuries since. The Emperors of Byzantium called themselves “Caesars” as long as their realm survived. The Kings of Bulgaria were “Tsars”—i.e., Caesars. Ivan the Terrible, whose Muscovite Empire was already called the “Third Rome,” also took the title of Tsar. The Emperor of modern Germany was “Kaiser.” The Mongol rulers of India called themselves “Kaisar-i-Hind,” which was still the title of King George VI in 1947. Not without cause is a new period of despots called an “Age of Caesarism.” The work wrought by a vanished Rome lives on in the deeds of posterity. Its ultimate symbol of power and unity and peace will fascinate all rulers and ruled to the end of time.

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THE GROWTH OF THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM

1. CHRISTENDOM AND ISLAM

All nations of the West are of dynastic origin. In the Romanesque and even in Early Gothic architecture the soul of the Carolingian primitives still quivers through. There is no French or German Gothic, but Salian, Rhenish, and Suabian, as there is Visigothic (northern Spain, southern France) and Lombard and Saxon Romanesque. But over it all there spreads soon the minority, composed of men of race, that feels membership in a nation as a great historical vocation. From it proceed the Crusades, and in them there truly were French and German chivalries. It is the hallmark of Faustian peoples that they are conscious of the direction of their history.—OSWALD SPENGLER, The Decline of the West, Vol. II.

The “modern world” in all its aspects, including its State System, has its roots in the new culture of Western Christendom, which slowly struggled toward the light out of barbaric darkness between the 5th and 10th centuries of our era. This half millennium, and much of that which followed it, is widely viewed as a time of unprecedented ignorance, squalor, misery, and brutality—so much so as to set the “medieval” age off sharply from “ancient” grandeur and from the wonders wrought by “modern” man.

Despite the glory of the cathedrals and of monastic art and learning, this judgment is not inaccurate. But it stands in need of two corrections. The first is that the conditions of life here noted prevailed, not throughout the civilized world, but only in Europe—which is but a small peninsula of Asia. During this same period Byzantium was the largest and richest city on earth, while to the south and east other urban cultures flourished and bred works of hand and head and heart incomparably superior, by any fair standard, to anything then done by Europeans. The second flaw in vulgar judgments of the “Middle Ages” is the assumption of an end of the old and a beginning of the new around A.D. 1500. Not only was there no such break, but we and all our works are products of “medieval” civilization, however much it has been transformed by new insights and skills during the last four centuries.

What tends to blind us to these realities is the fact that the culture of
Europe, once equipped with the rudiments of a new science and technology and supplied with increments of power flowing from accumulated wealth, expanding population, and novel weapons of war, spread itself over Asia, Africa, and the Americas with such insistence, tenacity, and invincible might that no other could stand against it. All the peoples of the globe have in varying measure been “Europeanized” in the process. The contemporary State System which covers the planet is, in most of its essentials, European as to origins, practices, and motivations. But its point of departure was early Western Christendom, in whose development the “Dark” and “Middle” Ages were but the sunrise and morning of a day which is now past noon.

The Europe of the dawn (and therefore the world of the afternoon) is unintelligible unless the observer takes note of a unity which has since been lost and of an external threat which is now long forgotten. Despite its feudal confusions, conflicts, and anarchic fragmentation, the Europe of A.D. 800-1400 was nonetheless a unity in a sense inapplicable to the Europe of later times. And this little Europe was repeatedly menaced with conquest and subjugation from without.

(The “unity of Christendom” was more than a phrase in the generations which followed the ascendancy of the Popes of Rome. The Byzantines, to be sure, went their own way. The rift between “Catholic” and “Orthodox,” “Roman” and “Greek” Christianities, already clear in the 5th century, became a final and permanent rupture in 1054. Similarly, the Nestorian and Monophysite Christianities of Central Asia in olden times had little to do with either Byzantium or Rome. But in the West all Christians were Catholics. In all their diversities of emerging vernacular languages and local petty States, all were yet united in a common faith under a common Church. This fact influenced profoundly the early development of “international” law and diplomacy.)

The Pope was not merely the spiritual head of Christendom but exercised temporal powers as well, both as ruler of the Papal States in central Italy and as the Vicar of Christ upon earth with power over emperors, kings, and princes. As kings were crowned by the bishops of the Church, the Emperor was crowned by the Pope himself. He who gives is superior to him who receives. The Papacy not only asserted its authority over temporal rulers in all matters, both lay and ecclesiastical, concerning the administration of their realms, but offered its services as arbitrator to settle disputes between them. Such offers were often coupled with insistence upon acceptance, which gave to papal arbitrations the character of interventions. This arbitral procedure was widely utilized, particularly as between the Princes of the Italian States. The national monarchies of the West likewise resorted to it. Among the more famous of the papal arbitrations were those between Philip
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le Bel and the English King (1298), between Philip le Long and the Flemings (1319), between the Emperor Maximilian and the Doge of Venice in the 15th century, and between Spain and Portugal regarding their claims in the New World in 1494. Nonecclesiastical arbitration was also developed as a means of settling disputes by the Swiss cantons, the cities of the Hanseatic League, the German States, and even by the English and French monarchies; ¹ but the Papacy may properly be regarded as having made the greatest contributions to the institution of international arbitration during the period.

The Church likewise played an important part in the development of diplomatic practices and of the rudimentary international law which gradually came to be recognized by the various European States. From early times the Popes had dispatched envoys (legati) to attend Church councils and had regularly maintained ambassadors (known as apocrisiarii) at the Byzantine court until relations were severed between Constantinople and the Holy See in consequence of religious differences. Similar representatives were exchanged between the Vatican and the exarch at Ravenna. Later the Popes sent special envoys to the Emperor and to the courts of England, France, Naples, Hungary, Aragon, Castile, and other States. Ecclesiastical influence was also of considerable importance in the development of Byzantine diplomacy, which, in turn, greatly influenced the diplomatic practices of the Italian city-states in the 14th century. As regards international law, the Archbishop of Seville, St. Isidore, was writing as early as the 7th century, in his Etymologies, of the jus gentium of the Romans as a body of law having to do with “wars, captivities, enslavements, the recovery of rights of postliminy, treaties of peace and others, the scruple which protects ambassadors from violence, and prohibition of marriage between persons of different nationality.” The efforts of the Church to restrict private warfare and protect noncombatants led to a marked development of what later came to be known as the international law of war and neutrality. In insisting upon the observance of the “Truce of God,” the Church forbade fighting on Sunday. In the 11th century, efforts were made to extend the period of Sabbath peace from Wednesday evening to Monday morning and to apply it to religious holidays and to the whole period of Lent. In 1095, Pope Urban II decreed it for all Christendom in this form. The Pax Ecclesiae forbade fighting in the vicinity of Church buildings or against clerics, pilgrims, merchants, women, or peasants, thus neutralizing certain areas and protecting certain categories of persons from the rigors of war.

If ecclesiastical anathemas and excommunications were not always effec-

¹ See J. H. Ralston, International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno, 1929, pp. 176-178, for types of medieval arbitration treaties.
tive in restraining the pugnacity of the embattled baronage, these efforts were nevertheless of great influence on later thought and practice and, coupled with certain other developments of the period, contributed toward the weaving together of the warp and woof of customs, laws, practices, and institutions which are the fabric of modern diplomacy. As neighborhood warfare declined under the pressure of clerical persuasion and kingly power, towns grew and waxed prosperous through the wider commercial contacts which peace made possible. The Hanseatic trading cities of the north and the city-states of the Mediterranean maritime leagues built up a flourishing commerce which they fostered by exchanging commercial or consular representatives and by concluding numerous commercial treaties with one another. Political representatives followed on the heels of trading agents, and thereby with the modern diplomatic service was established. International maritime law also evolved out of these relationships and received its first clear statement in the Consolato del Mare of the 14th century, which the Italian mercantile States accepted as a guide in their trade relations. Another development contributing to the same result was the launching of the great Crusades to rescue the Holy Land from the infidels. These high adventures brought the rough warriors of western Europe into conflict with Saracen knights who fought like gentlemen. Chivalry was born, and war became no longer a matter of cruel bludgeoning, rapine, and wanton destruction but a science and an art to be practiced in accordance with fixed rules. Travel increased with trading and crusading. Feudal provincialism declined, and governments were brought into closer contact with one another. The dream of imperial unity gradually faded, and the new city-states and national monarchies dealt with one another as equal and independent political entities. Out of these new contacts between larger territorial units emerged a further development of the procedures and institutions of diplomacy, the usages and practices of international law, and the attitudes and values which underlie modern statecraft.

But these are anticipations. Before they are examined, it will be well to review the series of formidable assaults on Christian Europe launched by peoples of other faiths. These incursions had three sources: (1) the Near East; (2) Scandinavia; and (3) the "steppe road" out of Asia, stretching from Mongolia to the Carpathians.

Among the polytheistic Semitic nomads of Arabia, known to Greeks and Romans as "Saracens," was born in the holy city of Mecca, c. A.D. 570, a youth who tended cattle, became servant and then husband of a wealthy widow, and wrestled in the desert with his soul. This Mohammed at length preached a new gospel: God (Allah) is one, not many; after death, hell awaits the wicked and heaven the righteous; Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and
other Semites were divine teachers, but the perfection of their work is the message of the Prophet—Mohammed. This founder of the most recent of the great world religions fled to Medina in 622 (the Hegira) to escape murder by his foes in Mecca. Interurban and tribal wars ensued. When Mohammed died in 632, he was spiritual and political master of a United Arabia. The faith of Islam is rich in the virtues of generosity, brotherhood, and equality. It is devoid of any professional priesthood and singularly free of theological hairsplitting despite the early and persistent schism between

Shiites and Sunnites. Its spread coincided with an astonishing upsurge of military power and of art, literature, and science among the Arab peoples under the Omayyad and Abbasside Caliphs ("successors") of the Prophet.

These events, albeit decisive ever since for a good third of Eurasia, may not here be dwelt upon. It suffices to note that Mohammed's disciples undertook to conquer all the world for Allah. The new Saracen armies, infused with holy fervor, struck north, east, and west, taking Palestine and Syria, Egypt and Mesopotamia, conquering all of Armenia and Persia and most of Turkestan, and sweeping like a tempest along the south shore of the Middle Sea. Spain was invaded in 711 and the Kingdom of the Franks soon afterward. The tide receded to the Pyrenees only when the hosts of Islam were beaten near Tours by Charles Martel in 732. In the East the Saracen siege of Byzantium was broken by Leo the Isaurian in 717. The metropolis on the Bosporus was many times assailed but never taken by the Arabs, who likewise failed to break into the Balkans. Under Haroun-al-Raschid (786-809), immortal Caliph of Bagdad, the new Moslem world reached an
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acme of creative civilization in comparison with which the “Empire” of Charlemagne was a primitive and disorderly community of semibarbarians. Christendom was saved for a different fate.

But the menace from the south was followed by graver threats from the north and east. In the 9th century, swarms of pagan barbarians—variously known as Norsemen, Vikings, and Varangians—poured out of Scandinavia in swift fleets to raid, rob, kill, and at length settle down in England, in northern France (Normandy), and in Novgorod and Kiev, where they founded the first Russian State. Some of these seafarers, after exploring Iceland and Greenland, reached the American continent c. A.D. 1000, but left no settlements. Others took Sicily from the Saracens, attacked Byzantium, conquered England from Normandy in 1066, and sacked Rome in 1084. But these fierce invaders were absorbed by their victims. Danes and Normans embraced Roman Catholicism before 900, while the Varangians at Kiev adopted Greek Catholicism from the Byzantines in 989, as did the Bulgarian invaders of the Balkans. Similarly the Magyars, driven out of southern Russia into the Danube plain by the Patzinaks and long busied with destructive raids against the West, embraced the Roman version of Christianity c. A.D. 1000 and founded the Kingdom of Hungary. Against such assailants, the Cross of Christendom finally prevailed even when the sword had failed. When the Seljuk clan of Turks poured out of Turkestan to reunite and energize the now dormant Arab lands, conquering Asia Minor and menacing the Straits, the Byzantine Caesar called upon the Pope for help. The outcome was the First Crusade (1096-99), with others following. But these romantic counterassaults of Christendom against the infidels, marked as much by crime and folly as by religiosity, won only temporary success in wresting the Holy Land from Islam.

Two centuries later the Christian and Moslem worlds alike were almost overwhelmed by the last of the “barbarian invaders” along the steppe road. These were the Mongols, first politically united on their remote plateaus by Jenghis Khan (1162-1227), who established his capital at Karakorum, city of the black sands. The invincible cavalry of this founder of the largest of all empires made him, almost as much in fact as in symbolism, “Master of Thrones and Crowns” and “Emperor of All Men.” Mongol hosts, never beaten by Christian arms, subjugated Central Asia, destroyed the first Russian State at Kiev (1240), and conquered Poland, Hungary, and all the lands from the Oder to the Adriatic. Only the death of Ogdai Khan in 1242 led to their withdrawal from Central Europe. From 1240 to 1480 they ruled all of Russia. Even Novgorod paid tribute. Other Khans conquered China, Burma, Indo-China, and India. Among all empires of all time this astounding realm most closely approached a truly “World State.” But with the pass-
ing generations the Eastern Mongols became Chinese, while those in the West embraced the faith of Allah.

One final effort to conquer Christendom and build a Eurasian "World State" on its ruins remains to be noted. The Seljuk Turks were gradually replaced as rulers of Islam by the Osmanli, or Ottoman Turks, under Osman (1288-1326) and Orkhan (1326-59). This new realm was sorely stricken but not crushed by the hideous assaults of the armies of Tamerlane (1369-1405), a Mongol conqueror from Samarkand who sought, with no lasting effect, to restore the Empire of Jenghis Khan by covering southwestern Asia with ashes and piles of skulls. The Ottoman Sultans built a great State and a powerful military machine by the extraordinary device of enslaving the male babies of Christian subjects and training them as Janizaries (professional soldiers), administrators, and statesmen. Unlike the Seljuks, the Osmanlis invaded the Balkans and crushed the Christian Serbs at Kosovo in 1389, thereby establishing a rule over most of Balkania which was to last over four centuries. In 1453, Turkish armies stormed the Roman walls of Byzantium, which had withstood all attacks for a thousand years. The im-
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perial city of the Eastern Caesars, whose last ruler, Constantine Paleologus, fell by the sword of Islam, now became the Ottoman capital.

The victor, Sultan Mohammed II, invaded southern Italy and dreamed of taking Rome. His successors conquered Greece, invaded Poland, subdued Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, and made themselves Caliphs of all Islam. Under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66) the Ottoman realm reached its zenith. His armies defeated the Hungarians at Mohács (1526) and almost took Vienna in 1529. France made alliances with the Sultan. Charles V paid him tribute. But Christian Europe, although long since disunited, could yet rally against a common foe. At Lepanto (1571) the fleet of the “Christian League,” led by the Pope, Venice, Austria, and Spain, destroyed the Ottoman Navy. Here, said Cervantes, who lost an arm in the battle, Christendom “broke the pride of the Osmans and undeceived the world which had regarded the Turkish fleet as invincible.” Turkish armies again laid siege to Vienna as late as 1683, but again without success. Thereafter the Turkish wave receded as the imperium of the Sultans slowly decayed. When it experienced its final demise in 1918, it had long ceased to be either a threat to Christendom or even a “Great Power” in the new State System born in western Europe.

The net result of these age-long efforts to subject Europe to Asia was failure. None of these attempts, and none of the successive endeavors at unification from within, united the Continent. Religious unity perished with the corruption of the Universal Church and the ensuing “Reformation.” The memory of Rome, the aspirations of Popes and Emperors, the dream of Dante, and the common hope of those who, through the centuries, abhorred violence and cherished order—all alike came to nothing. Europe, and therefore the larger world community which Europe brought into being, became that which it still remains: a congeries of separate sovereignties, competing with one another for power. The origins of this design for anarchy must next be examined.

2. THE RENASCENCE OF REALPOLITIK

This man manifestly had no belief in any righteousness at all, no belief in a God ruling over the world or in a God in men’s hearts, no understanding of the power of conscience in men. Not for him were Utopian visions of world-wide human order, or attempts to realize the City of God. Such things he did not want. It seemed to him that to get power, to gratify one’s desires and sensibilities and hates, to swagger triumphantly in the world, must be the crown of human desire. Only a prince could fully realize such a life.—H. G. WELLS, The Outline of History.

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THE GROWTH OF THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM

We are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do.—FRANCIS BACON, Proficience and Advancement of Learning.

Modern diplomacy was born in northern Italy. Here there existed from the 12th century onward a microcosmic State System that was in almost all respects a miniature of the larger State System of western Europe as a whole which made its appearance some two centuries later. The Italian city-states of the later Middle Ages created the matrix in which modern statecraft was conceived. They also gave birth to the first “modern” societies. Leonardo Pisano of Florence introduced Arabic numerals to Europe in 1202. Half a century later, double-entry bookkeeping made its appearance, along with the Florentine gold florin, which was soon the monetary standard of most of the Continent. Expanding business promoted the growth of a mercantile middle class, alongside the nobles of old. Both groups, in their passion for art, learning, and politics, engendered the “Renaissance.”

After the 13th century the city-states of Italy were free alike from any effective threat of external control and from any possibility of unification by any one of their number. Under these circumstances they inevitably evolved a complex pattern of relationships with one another and developed the art of diplomacy to a higher level than had ever been known elsewhere in Western Christendom. The Republic of Venice—“school and touchstone of ambassadors”—perhaps contributed most to this development because of its far-flung commercial interests and its contacts with the sophisticated, if decadent, Eastern Roman Empire. At a remote period the Venetian authorities began the practice of registering treaties, keeping diplomatic archives, and maintaining an elaborate system of commissions, written instructions, records, and dispatches in their contacts with diplomatic representatives abroad. By a law of 1268 a Venetian Ambassador was forbidden to take his wife along on missions, lest she divulge his business, but required to take his cook along, lest he be poisoned. The Consolato del Mare, based upon the ancient “Tables of Amalfi,” was solemnly approved by the Venetian representatives in Constantinople in 1255 as the basis of maritime international law and was later adopted by Pisa, Genoa, Naples, Aragon, and the States of northern and western Europe. The ceremonies which the Venetians developed for the reception and dispatch of diplomatic representatives influenced the practice of other States to a great degree. Envoys were carefully selected from the ranks of the nobility, until Venetian Ambassadors became models of honesty, competence, and savoir-faire.

In other States as well, the diplomatic profession attracted to it the service of distinguished and learned men. The diplomatic service of Florence during
the 13th and 14th centuries included such illustrious names as Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, and Guicciardini. (Diplomatic missions were at first limited to two or three months' duration and later extended to several years.) Not until the middle of the 15th century did the practice become prevalent of maintaining permanent and regular diplomatic posts at the seats of foreign governments. The first clear instance of this kind was the establishment of a permanent embassy at Genoa by Milan in 1455. Various ranks of diplomatic agents were recognized, though there was much confusion on this point and no uniformity of practice.

This structure of diplomatic practices and usages was, of course, based upon the existence of a number of independent territorial States, free from external control and able to pursue their own interests by bargaining and fighting with one another. Here, as always in such a State System, each unit pursued such objectives as best served the interests of its ruling class; and these objectives involved in each case a maximum extension of the territory and power of the State at the expense of its rivals. International politics was a competitive struggle for power, a war of each against all, an uneasy equilibrium in which the weak combined against the strong in order
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to maintain a balance of power in which no one State could become so powerful as to threaten the independence of the others) Dante might deplore the resulting chaos and plead for unity. Other reflective souls might call, despairingly, for solidarity, as did an obscure priest of Milan: "And thou, Milan, thou seekest to supplant Cremona, to overthrow Pavia, to destroy Novara. Thy hands are raised against all, and the hands of all against thee. . . . Oh, when shall the day dawn in which the inhabitants of Pavia shall say to the Milanese: 'Thy people are my people,' and the citizen of Novara to the Cremonese: 'Thy city is my city'!" 2 All in vain. Each prince pursued his own interests. Each community was fired with local patriotism and looked upon its neighbor as a potential enemy or as a possible ally against an enemy still more dangerous. Republicanism gave way to princely absolutism as each city, in constant rivalry with its neighbors, perceived the advantages of concentrating diplomatic and military power in a single hand. Diplomacy and war were the means to power. War required money and the services of the condottieri. Diplomacy required secrecy, espionage, plot and counterplot, and a nice sense of the imponderable interrelationships and the fleeting opportunities for the enhancement of the power of the commonwealth. The prestige and power, the glory and aggrandizement of the local State became the supreme concern of government, and all means thereto were justified.

At last a great spokesman emerged who, first among political observers, comprehended the realities of the State System in which he lived. His name has become a symbol, and his work may well be regarded as marking the conscious beginning both of modern diplomacy and of political science. Niccolò Machiavelli was born in Florence, May 5, 1469, into an ancient and honorable family which had long and faithfully served the State under whose authority it resided. He reached manhood near the close of the reign of the magnificent Lorenzo de' Medici. He was a republican and gladly entered the service of the Florentine Republic after the French invaders under Charles VIII had brought about the overthrow of the Medici in 1494. While the Florentines rallied to the puritanical Savonarola, then turned against him and put him to death, and engaged in a fierce and fascinating game of political intrigue among rival factions, young Niccolò turned his talents to defending and promoting the power of the Republic through the arts of diplomacy. He went on missions to Caterina Sforza, to Cesare Borgia, to Louis XII, to Pope Julius II, to the Emperor Maximilian. Little escaped his shrewd eye in the course of his work and his travels. In 1512 the forces of the Papacy drove the French from Italy. Florence was allied with France.

The Renaissance of Realpolitik

In defeat the Republic perished. The Medici were restored. Thus Machiavelli "found himself at the age of 43 a dejected liberal without a job in a world that had come tumbling down about his ears."³

Machiavelli was suspect. An abortive conspiracy of 1513 led to his arrest and torture, though he was innocent. Upon his release from prison, he retired to a small farm near Florence. Since his efforts to return to public life by seeking the favor of the Pope and the Medici were fruitless, he wrote stories, plays, poetry, and several books filled with the distilled political wisdom of his own experience: *The Prince, The Art of War, Discourses on Livy, The History of Florence*. His nostalgia and his interests are aptly suggested by a letter to a friend:

> When the evening comes I return to the house and go into my study; and at the door I take off my country clothes, all caked with mud and slime, and put on court dress; and when I am thus decently re-clad I enter into the ancient mansions of the men of ancient days. And there I am received by my hosts with all loving-kindness, and I feast myself on that food which alone is my true nourishment, and which I was born for.

In 1527, soldiers of Charles V defeated the papal armies and sacked Rome. In Florence the Medici were temporarily ousted by the democratic faction. Despite his serious illness, Machiavelli hastened to the city to regain his post. The Council, however, voted against his reappointment. But death came to him before he learned of this last failure of his hopes. And in death he found a place among the immortals not by the public service which he loved but by the writing with which he had relieved the ennui of his idle and lonely years.

*The Prince* has earned for its author the opprobrium of all right-thinking moralists and has come to be viewed as the most eloquent exhortation to the vices of trickery, treachery, unscrupulousness, and dishonesty to which modern diplomacy has fallen heir. In fact, it was nothing more than a realistic account of the behavior of States toward one another, with a wealth of contemporary and historical illustrations, coupled with a set of maxims for the guidance of rulers seeking power in the type of State System with which Machiavelli was familiar. It contains, in small compass, as he declares in his dedication to Lorenzo, grandson of the Magnificent, "all the experience I have acquired during many years of continual meditation and suffering in the school of adversity." Far from being immoral, it is entirely unconcerned with ethics and regards the State as beyond good and evil—an end in itself for the service of which all means are legitimate. Political expediency is the criterion of State action.

³ Max Lerner, Introduction, p. xxvii, to *The Prince and The Discourses* by Niccolò Machiavelli.
Machiavelli opens his most famous work with a description of different types of States and of the problems involved in State building. A prince may establish firm control over newly conquered lands by colonizing his own people on them, by establishing garrisons, by playing off neighboring princes against one another, and the like. Those who are injured thereby should be disposed of with dispatch, lest they become dangerous enemies—for a man “may revenge a slight injury, but a great one deprives him of his power to avenge.” Desire for aggrandizement is a natural characteristic of rulers. “Nothing is so natural or so common as the thirst for conquest, and when men can satisfy it, they deserve praise rather than censure. But when they are not equal to the enterprise, disgrace is the inevitable consequence.” And the power for which princes strive is a relative quantity. “The prince who contributes toward the advancement of another power, ruins his own.” Monarchies must be conquered by superior force and then can be easily held, since, once the reigning dynasty is disposed of, none remains to oppose the conqueror. Aristocracies can be conquered by intrigue among the nobles, but once in power the conqueror will encounter “an infinity of difficulty, not only from the conquered, but from those who have assisted in the enterprise.” Free States may be subdued only by ruining them, by colonizing them, or by permitting them to remain in the enjoyment of their own laws. The difficulties of rulership which princes encounter vary with the means by which they have acquired power. “The usurper of a State should commit all the cruelties which his safety renders necessary at once, that he may never have cause to repeat them . . . for when time is allowed for resentment, the wound is not so deep; but benefits should be frugally dispensed, and by little at a time, that they may be the better relished.” A wise prince will not only make himself a master of warfare but win over his subjects to him by being liberal, without being prodigal, and merciful without being weak. “It is safer to be feared than be loved, for it may truly be affirmed of mankind in general, that they are ungrateful, fickle, timid, dissembling, and self-interested.” But the prince must avoid earning the hatred of his subjects. This can be achieved by respecting his subjects’ property and the honor of their wives, “for it is certain that men sooner forget the death of their relations than the loss of their patrimony.”

Since force and trickery are twin tools for the acquisition and retention of power, the prince must make the lion and the fox his models. “A prudent prince cannot and ought not to keep his word, except when he can do it without injury to himself, or when the circumstances under which he contracted the engagement still exist.” It is unnecessary that a prince should possess many good qualities but indispensable that he should appear to
have them, “as men in general judge more from appearances than from reality. All men have eyes, but few have the gift of penetration. . . . The vulgar are ever caught by appearances, and judge only by the event. And as the world is chiefly composed of such as are called the vulgar, the voice of the few is seldom or never heard or regarded.” A prince should choose his ministers with care and avoid flatterers. The volume closes with an exhortation to Lorenzo to free Italy of foreigners, meaning the French invaders. “Every war that is necessary is just; and it is humanity to take up arms for the defense of a people to whom no other recourse is left.”

The long shadow which *The Prince* of Machiavelli has cast down the succeeding centuries is attributable less to the influence of the work on the thought of its day or to the pungency of the author’s wisdom than to the fact that his maxims reflected the fundamental nature of the new Western State System which existed in miniature in the Italy of the Renaissance. That State System rested upon the unlimited and uncontrolled sovereignty of the territorial State and upon the principle of the balance of power through which each State checkmated its rivals. The ruler of each unit inevitably strove to protect and further his own interests by force, when force was expedient, by trickery, when force was needless. “To reign is to dissimulate,” declared Louis XI of France. “If they lie to you,” he admonished his ambassadors, “lie still more to them.” The power of the State justified all means necessary for its enhancement. The political relations between States had again become a competitive struggle for power, and the vision of imperial unity receded into the past.

The old pattern, characteristic of all State Systems made up of independent territorial units, had reemerged, first in Italy and later throughout western Europe. The new national monarchies dealt with one another precisely as did the Italian city-states—and neither Pope nor Emperor could say them nay. The Empire was by now a phantom. The Papacy was impotent—in part because the Renaissance Popes were themselves rulers and diplomats who used the same methods for increasing their power as did the lay princes, in part because the forces of revolt against papal Catholicism were already gathering about the person of a German monk, Martin Luther, in preparation for the last great schism of the Reformation, which was to shatter for all time the ecclesiastical unity of the Christian world. The great States of the modern age were in process of being born—and the politics which they practiced toward one another were then, and have ever since been, “Machiavellian politics” in the broadest sense of a much-abused phrase. In this fashion *The Prince* symbolized a new dispensation, and the humble servant of the Florentine Republic became the prophet of a new epoch.
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3. MIGHT AND RIGHT

With regard to the relations of States among themselves, their sovereignty is the basic principle; they are in that respect in the state of nature in relation to one another, and their rights are not realized in a general rule which is so constituted as to have power over them, but their rights are realized only through their particular wills.—GEORGE HEGEL.

The concept of State sovereignty, the principles of international law, the politics of the balance of power may be regarded as the three stones upon which the Western State System has come to rest. The first has been elevated to the dignity of a political theory and later to that of a juristic idea underlying the whole structure of modern international jurisprudence. The second has evolved into a system of public law in the community of nations. The third has become an avowed principle of foreign policy, accepted and acted upon so consistently by all the great States that it may well be viewed as the central theme about which the web of diplomacy is woven.

It was not until powerful aggregations of centralized power had been built up by the Western dynasts that a systematic presentation of the philosophical basis of political authority became possible. The turbulent feudal aristocracy was gradually subordinated to the authority of absolutist kings and princes who preserved the ruling class and protected its interests without permitting it to interfere with an effective central administration. As soon as the new monarchs sought ethical justification for their policies, they found jurists and scholars at hand to supply them with the ideational paraphernalia requisite to make the cause of absolutism intellectually respectable. Though Machiavelli postulated the absolute sovereignty of the territorial State in relation to its neighbors he did not discuss the location of sovereign power within the State, nor was he interested in the problem from a legal and juristic point of view. It fell to the French scholar, Jean Bodin, to formulate the first systematic presentation of the concept of sovereignty in its modern form in his De republica of 1580—a title which must be literally translated as “Concerning Public Affairs,” since its author, far from being a republican, was an apologist of the purest absolutism. Bodin, in fact, devised the political theory upon which the French monarchy was to rest its case for unlimited and autocratic central power. Sovereignty he defined as unlimited power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law. This power, he insisted, is by its nature absolute, unqualified, perpetual, and indivisible and resides not in the whole State but in the body of the
citizenry in a democracy, in the estate of the nobility in an aristocracy, and in the person of the king in a monarchy. Rulers rule by divine right but are subject to the laws of God, of nature, and of nations and also to the “laws of the kingdom”—a vague adumbration of constitutionalism. These limitations upon supreme power, however, are ethical rather than legal or political. The ideal form of government is a kingship in which unlimited sovereign power is exercised personally by the monarch.

Though Bodin’s view of the nature of sovereignty became prevalent everywhere in Europe among the apologists of absolutism, it was not unchallenged. In fact, two conflicting schools of thought battled for supremacy until their differences were in part reconciled in the formulation of the concept suggested by Grotius. The first great challenge to absolutism came from that school of political philosophers known as the Monarchomachs—spokesmen for the most part of the persecuted sects of the period of the wars of religion who were anxious to justify resistance to tyranny and oppression. This group insisted upon the original and inalienable sovereignty of the people and argued that government had come into existence as a result of a written or tacit contract between rulers and ruled for the mutual convenience of both as an escape from the anarchy of a precivil state of nature. In the event of a ruler violating the compact by indulging in outrageous and despotic misgovernment, his subjects are ipso facto released from the obligation of obedience and may engage in revolution, depose the monarch, or even assassinate him under extreme provocation.

Johannes Althusius, one of the leading Monarchomach theorists, defined sovereignty in his Politics Systematically Considered (1609) as “the highest and most general power of administering the affairs which generally concern the safety and welfare of the soul and body of the members of the State.” This power, according to his view, could be neither absolute nor supreme, since it is limited by the laws of God, the laws of nature, and the terms of the contract with the people, who remain the ultimate, original, and permanent source of sovereignty. This conception was obviously sharply at variance with that of Bodin, though Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan (1651) later used the contract theory of the origin of the State as the basis for the most imposing intellectual justification of monarchical absolutism which has ever been presented.

Grotius resolved the issue, so far as international law and relations are concerned, by defining sovereignty as “that power whose acts are not subject to the control of another, so that they may be made void by the act of any other human will.” For the great Dutch jurist, sovereignty was not absolute but limited by divine law, by the law of nature, and by the law of nations and also by agreements between rulers and ruled. It is likewise capable of
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division and resides simultaneously in the government and in the State. Subjects, however, may alienate their portion of sovereignty entirely to their ruler. The important thing to Grotius is the fact that a State is sovereign in relation to other States when it is free from outside control and capable of exercising its will without outside interference. This idea has become the foundation of the whole structure of modern international law.

This conception obviously grew out of the political realities of international contacts in the formative period of modern diplomacy. If carried to its logical extreme, it would result in a situation which can only be described as international anarchy. With the breakdown of the authority of Pope and Emperor, the national monarchies of the West, no less than the city-states and principalities of Italy and Germany, went their sovereign way, each striving against the others for territory, power, and prestige, each employing force, trickery, and bargaining in its quest. The provincial chaos of feudalism was replaced by an international chaos of national States, struggling with one another as the embattled knights and barons had once struggled in an earlier age. In this anarchic jungle of sovereign political communities, each State pursued its own ends in disregard of the interests of others, redressing its wrongs by self-help, acting as prosecutor, judge, jury, and sheriff combined, and hotly resenting any suggestion of allegiance or responsibility to any superior power. Here, indeed, was a precivil state of nature as Hobbes had described it, in which life was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"—in which might makes right—in which power is to the strongest and the devil takes the hindmost.

With the general acceptance of the concept of sovereignty by the States of western Europe, the foundations of the Western State System in its modern form were established. There remains to be noted the emergence of international law out of a confused and unformulated body of customs and usages into a definite system of jurisprudence regulating the relations between States. This development likewise took place in the later 16th and early 17th centuries, though it was foreshadowed by many centuries of preparation during which international law existed and evolved as a practical basis for defining the legal rights and obligations of States long before it attracted the attention of scholars and jurists.

International law as a distinct branch of legal science received almost no recognition among lawyers and jurists before the 15th century, despite the practical development of international customs and usages in the medieval State System. Vittoria (1480-1546) and Ayala (1548-84) made early efforts to integrate these usages into a consistent system of law; and the Spanish Jesuit, Suarez (1548-1617), endeavored to discover the basis for such a system in "natural law," or reason. Gentilis (1552-1608) likewise attempted
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on a more pretentious scale to set forth the principles governing the relations between States. In this period of groping toward a logical basis for an international jurisprudence, two schools of thought were distinguishable: one looked for guidance to international practice and sought to make international law the written customs of States; the other tried to formulate principles on the basis of ethics, theology, reason, and common sense. The former school relied much upon the *jus gentium* of Roman law, while the latter searched for light in the *jus naturae*, or law of nature, which was the current symbolization of what seemed rational and just. These two fountainheads of wisdom have ever since been supplementary sources of international law in its subsequent development.

(The task of reconciling the two schools and of erecting an imposing edifice of legal principles worthy of being called a true “law of nations” was first performed by the same versatile and erratic Dutch genius, Huig de Groot, or Hugo Grotius, who contributed to the development of the concept of sovereignty. So significant was his contribution and so profound has been his influence that later generations of jurists conferred upon him the title of “the father of international law.” Born at Delft, April 10, 1583, son of the Burgomaster of Leiden, he wrote Latin verses at the age of nine, entered the University at twelve, and was a learned editor at fifteen, when he accompanied a Dutch Embassy to Paris. After winning his LL.D. at the University of Leiden, he devoted himself to writing Latin dramas and poems and practicing law. At twenty he was appointed official historiographer by the States-General, in which capacity he began work on his *De jure praedae* (1604), which was the basis of his later treatise. As advocate of the Dutch East India Company, he defended the capture of a Portuguese galleon in the Strait of Malacca by the Dutch captain, Heemskerk, with the argument that the Portuguese claim that all Eastern waters were under Portuguese jurisdiction was unsound and contrary to the accepted practice of nations. His part in this early controversy over freedom of the seas won him further fame, and he embarked upon a promising diplomatic career which was rudely cut off in 1619—fortunately, perhaps, for posterity, for had he continued to occupy himself with the practical work of diplomacy he might never have found leisure to compile his monumental work.

Grotius’ great treatise, *De jure belli ac pacis* (“Concerning the Law of War and Peace”) was in part written in the prison fortress of Louvestein, where the poet-jurist was incarcerated in 1619 on a life sentence because of his unpopular religious views. The bloody Thirty Years’ War had just broken out in Bohemia. It was to mark the culmination of the religious conflicts of the century. Young Hugo was a theologian no less than a lawyer; and, like Erasmus a hundred years before, he pleaded for toleration and
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sought to mediate between the warring sects of Remonstrants and anti-
Remonstrants. He was jailed for his pains and had his property confiscated;
but prison life was not unbearable, for he was permitted to live with his
gifted wife and to continue his studies with the aid of many large chests
of books, which were periodically brought to him by his guards. In 1621
his wife nailed him up in a book chest, and in this appropriate disguise he
escaped from his cell and fled to Antwerp and Paris, where Louis XIII
granted him a small pension. In 1625 his treatise was completed and pub-
lished. It brought him no profits but ensured him immortal fame, for it was
the most adequate and comprehensive statement of the principles of inter-
national law which had yet appeared. He subsequently became Swedish
Ambassador to France and died at Rostock in 1645.

The De jure belli ac pacis was largely inspired by the author’s revulsion
at the horrors and excesses of the wars of religion which were devastating
the Europe of his day. In his Prolegomena he declared:

The civil law, both that of Rome, and that of each nation in particular, has
been treated of, with a view either to illustrate it or to present it in a compendious
form, by many. But international law, that which regards the mutual relations of
several peoples, or rulers of peoples, whether it proceed from nature, or be insti-
tuted by divine command, or introduced by custom and tacit compact, has been
touched on by few, and has been by no one treated as a whole in an orderly
manner. And yet that this be done, concerns the human race. . . .

I, for the reasons which I have stated, holding it to be most certain that there
is among nations a common law of rights which is of force with regard to war,
and in war, saw many and grave causes why I should write a work on that sub-
ject. For I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war
of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed; recourse being had
to arms for slight reasons or no reason; and when arms were once taken up, all
reverence for divine and human law was thrown away, just as if men were thence-
forth authorized to commit all crimes without restraint.

He therefore attempted, with signal success, to compile the principles by
which States are, or ought to be, governed, deriving them from the law of
nature or dictates of right reason, as set forth by philosophers, historians,
poets, and orators, and also from the law of nations, which he sharply dis-
tinguished from the other as consisting of the practices of States and the
resulting principles of law binding upon them by virtue of their having
consented to them.

Grotius here laid the foundations upon which subsequent jurists were to
build. (He combined custom and reason as sources of international law) as
did such notable successors as Bynkershoek, Wolff, Vattel, and Wheaton.
The Naturalist school, represented by Puffendorf, Thomasius, and Ruther-
ford, continued to give precedence to reason or natural law, while the Posi-


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tivist school of Selden, Zouch, Bentham, Martens, and others emphasized the actual customs and practices of States as the best possible criteria of their legal rights and obligations. The Grotian view, which was a synthesis of the two, has now come to prevail and has in turn influenced the practice of States and led to the erection of the imposing structure of modern international jurisprudence, the basic principles of which will be reviewed in a later chapter.

Many observers, particularly in recent years, have been struck by the apparent anomaly presented by a State System in which a great body of legal concepts has developed to define the rights, obligations, and procedures of States in their mutual relations and in which, at the same time, these States continue to be engaged in a competitive struggle for the stakes of diplomacy, involving the maintenance of an unstable equilibrium of power and periodical resorts to armed violence. This anomaly disappears, however, in the light of a fuller appreciation of the peculiar nature of international law. Within national societies, law is a substitute for force in the settlement of disputes. Private law defines the rights and remedies of individuals and groups and provides means for the pacific settlement of differences through litigation and adjudication. Public law defines the structure of the State and the procedures of government and makes of politics, no longer an armed struggle for power as it was in the feudal period, but a peaceable process of competition, discussion, and compromise between parties, factions, classes, and other associations organized for political action. Domestic peace within the State is normally maintained by the coercive power of government, resting upon the acquiescence of the great mass of the governed who are willing to subordinate special interests to general interests and to submit to the result of the process of politics. International law has no such coercive power upon which to rely and it does not rest, except to a very limited degree, upon any willingness on the part of sovereign States to subordinate their interests to the interests of the whole society of States. It is not, therefore, a substitute for force in the relations between States, however much enthusiastic jurists would like to give it this function. Neither does it ensure the pacific settlement of disputes, though it supplies a set of concepts for the legal definition of the subject matter of disputes and it specifies what procedures are permissible, both in pacific and in nonpacific settlement. It consists merely of a set of rules which States have found it useful and expedient to observe.

These rules relate quite as much to the conduct of warfare, i.e., to the application of violence by State against State, as to nonviolent discussion and compromise. Being based upon the actual behavior of sovereign States, they take cognizance of the realities of that behavior. They are not con-
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cerned with the purposes, goals, and objectives of State behavior, but only with its forms. International law, unlike municipal law, does not deprive those to whom it is addressed of the right to protect their interests by their own power, though in recent years unsuccessful efforts have been made to outlaw war and to require States to resort only to pacific means of settlement. International politics, unlike national politics, has not yet been transformed from a violent to a pacific process by virtue of the evolution of a system of jurisprudence governing the relations between the contestants. The international law of the Western State System simply lays down the rules which the contestants are expected to follow. Within the limits of these rules there goes on as before that perpetual struggle for prestige and influence which is the distinguishing pattern of an international politics resting upon State sovereignty and a balance of power.

4. THE BALANCING OF POWER

The balance is a word that has subdued the whole world, by the light in which it was considered of its securing a constant possession; and yet, in truth, this same balance is no more than a bare word, an empty sound; for Europe is a family in which there are too many bad brokers and quarrelsome relations.—FREDERICK THE GREAT, Confessions.

If sovereignty is the mast to which the sails of modern statecraft are attached, the principle of the balance of power is the wind which drives the vessel over the stormy seas of international politics. The one has become the central concept of national political organization and of international law. The other has become the most important single pattern of political action in the international arena. Both existed in latent form in early State Systems (both received their first clear formulation in the 16th century—tentatively at the hands of Machiavelli) and more definitely from his successors.

The principle of the balance of power as an unformulated guide to State action is of great antiquity, as has been suggested in the preceding chapter. It has emerged more or less clearly in every system of States in which the units have engaged with one another in a competitive struggle for power. Apparently all States known to history have at one time or another striven to extend their power over the lands and peoples in their vicinity, for these are sources of additional wealth and power to the ruling class of the State. As such they furnish the basis for a further enhancement of State power which makes possible still greater conquests. It has been said truly that a large empire is the best possible reason for a larger empire. State power tends to spread outward from the central nucleus and to increase as it
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spreads. But power is local. Its efficacy within a given area varies inversely with the distance from the State which is wielding it. A single State, encountering no other obstacles, would normally extend its power over as wide an area as it could conquer and control effectively. But, in practice, obstacles are invariably encountered in the form of other States, similarly striving to expand their power. (A struggle for power consequently arises, in which each State endeavors to overcome its competitors. The power of a State—i.e., its ability to conquer other States or to bend them to its will—is necessarily relative to the power of its rivals. Since State power is a relative quantity, any enhancement in the power of one State automatically produces a diminution in the power of its neighbors.)

It is because of this fact that the pattern of balance-of-power relationships emerges in every State System. Whenever three States are in contact with one another, the prerequisite conditions for its appearance are present. If one postulates a State System composed of the three units A, B, and C, it is obvious that an increase in the power of any one of them involves a decrease in the power of the other two. Should State A conquer State B or deprive it of a portion of its territory, State C would immediately be adversely affected, for A has now enhanced its power at the expense of B and is in a better position than before to impose its will upon C. If the authorities of State C are wise, therefore, they will attempt to forestall this result by coming to B's assistance against A, not because of any sympathy or solicitude for the fate of B, but because considerations of self-interest make any enhancement of the power of A dangerous to C itself. In such a situation, B and C have a community of interests in opposing A, for each realizes that any increase in A's power creates a potential threat to its own independence or existence. By the same token, any attempt by B to increase its power at the expense of C must be resisted by A, and any enhancement of C's power at the expense of either A or B must be resisted by the other. Consequently, each unit in this hypothetical State System will inevitably tend to throw its weight into the balance behind either of the other two States menaced by the third. If the principle is consistently applied by all three, no one State will be able to overcome another and all will preserve their independence.

In its elementary form, therefore, the balance-of-power principle is designed not to preserve peace or to contribute toward international understanding, as later rationalizations would have it, but simply to maintain the independence of each unit of a State System by preventing any one unit from so increasing its power as to threaten the rest.

The wars of the Middle Ages, such as the Hundred Years' War between England and "France," waged while the latter was still an inchoate congeries of principalities, did not exhibit the characteristics of a true State System,
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since the contestants were not well-defined territorial units but feudal structures, linked to one another in complex relationships of vassalage and fealty. But as soon as definite territorial States came into being and competed with one another for power, the balance-of-power pattern reemerged. This took place first, as has been noted, in Italy, where the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Papal States, Milan, Venice, Florence, Genoa, and lesser Powers struggled with one another and against outside invaders, German, French, or Spanish, who were attracted to the peninsula by the wealth of its cities. Each pursued its own interests, for, as Machiavelli observed, "the prince who contributes toward the advancement of another power, ruins his own." Inevitably the weak combined against the strong, and no one Power, whether local State or foreign invader, was able to bring the whole peninsula into subjection. The national monarchies of the West—England, France, and Spain—and the smaller States and principalities of Central Europe were similarly engaged in a competitive struggle for power in which the same principle inevitably operated. When the House of Hapsburg under Charles V attained such vast domains that its power seemed a menace to other States, they combined to check its ascendancy. When Spain under Philip II aspired to hegemony, it was checked in turn by hostile coalitions. Later, France became the most powerful State of Europe—a position which it held for over 200 years. (International politics accordingly assumed the form of coalition after coalition against la Grande Nation, from the time of the League formed by William of Orange to frustrate the ambitions of Louis XIV, to the Quadruple Alliance which humbled Napoleon at Leipzig and Waterloo. Another balance of power, involving Sweden, Russia, Poland, Prussia, and Austria, developed in eastern Europe and became an integral part of the whole European State System in the latter half of the 18th century.)

During the 15th and 16th centuries the States of western Europe pursued balance-of-power policies toward one another, without the principle itself receiving any clear and conscious formulation. In the early 1500's Francis I and Cardinal Wolsey, the great adviser of Henry VIII, both hinted at the principle in their declarations. But not until the time of Louis XIV does the concept emerge in definite form in the statements of diplomats and the literature of international relations. Lord Bolingbroke, who was responsible for English foreign policy during the last years of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13), was one of the first English Ministers to attempt to build his program with the deliberate purpose of preserving the Continental equilibrium. In the negotiations which preceded the signature of the Treaty of Utrecht he was instrumental in arranging the solemn and public declarations of Philip V and the Dukes of Orleans and Berry by which, in the
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interest of maintaining a balance between the Powers of Europe, they renounced all ambitions of attempting to unite France and Spain under a single crown. In the words of one of Bolingbroke’s friends, these renunciations “lay down the balance of power in Europe as their foundation, expressing that Spain ought not to be united either to France or to the House of Austria.” Some years later the French philosopher and political writer, Fénelon, discussed the balance as essential to maintain the liberty, tranquillity, and public safety of Europe. At the opening of the War of the Austrian Succession (1741), Sir Robert Walpole stated the principle with even greater clarity:

The use of alliances . . . has in the last age been too much experienced to be contested; it is by leagues well concerted and strictly observed that the weak are defended against the strong, that bounds are set to the turbulence of ambition, that the torrent of power is restrained, and empires preserved from those inundations of war that, in former times, laid the world in ruins. By alliances . . . the equipoise of power is maintained, and those alarms and apprehensions avoided, which must arise from vicissitudes of empire and the fluctuations of perpetual contest. . . .

The firmest bond of alliances is mutual interest. Men easily unite against him whom they have all reason to fear and to hate, by whom they have been greatly injured, and by whom they suspect that no opportunity will be lost of renewing his encroachments. Such is the state of this nation (England) and of the Austrians. We are equally endangered by the French greatness, and equally animated against it by hereditary animosities, and contests continued from one age to another; we are convinced that, however either may be flattered or caressed, while the other is invaded, every blow is aimed at both and that we are divided only that we may be more easily destroyed.4

Frederick the Great likewise paid lip service to the principle, though his expansionist policies upset the balance and led to new wars to check Prussian power. The English philosopher, David Hume, in his Political Discourses (1751), dwells upon the efficacy of Britain’s balance-of-power policy in checkmating French efforts to establish hegemony on the Continent. The Swiss jurist, Emeric de Vattel, who based his Droit de gens (1758) on the work of Wolff, was one of the first text writers to consider the principle as a problem of international law:

Europe forms a political system in which the nations inhabiting this part of the world are bound together by their relations and various interests into a single body. It is no longer, as in former times, a confused heap of detached parts, each of which had but little concern for the lot of the other, and rarely troubled itself over what did not immediately affect it. The constant attention of sovereigns to all that goes on, the custom of resident ministers, the continual negotiations that take place, make of modern Europe a sort of republic, whose members, each

independent, but all bound together by a common interest, unite for the maintenance of order and the preservation of liberty. This is what has given rise to the well-known principle of the balance of power, by which is meant an arrangement of affairs so that no State shall be in a position to have absolute mastery and dominate over the others.⁵

Vattel argued that the balance of power could best be preserved through alliances and confederations to check the ascendancy of any one Power which seemed likely to upset the equilibrium. He denied that balance-of-power considerations give a State any absolute right of armed action against another, but he conceded that "one is justified in forestalling a danger in direct ratio to the degree of probability attending it and to the seriousness of the evil which is threatened":

If an unknown man takes aim at me in the middle of a forest, I am not yet certain that he wishes to kill me; must I allow him time to fire in order to be sure of his intent? Is there any reasonable casuist who would deny me the right to forestall the act? But presumption becomes almost equal to certitude if the prince who is about to acquire enormous power has already given evidence of an unbridled pride and ambition. In the imaginary case mentioned above, who would have dared counsel the European States to allow Louis XIV to make such a formidable addition to his power? ⁶

Vattel also sought to present the balance of power as a guarantee of the liberty and independence of States. His wide influence led to general acceptance of this view. It is a substantially accurate characterization of the pattern, though it is obvious that the balance may sometimes be preserved by the partition of a weak State among its stronger neighbors, as happened in the extinction of the independence of Poland at the end of the 18th century by Russia, Austria, and Prussia. In any case, the balance-of-power principle has been recognized as an integral feature of the Western State System by Rousseau, Kant, and a host of later writers, as well as by the great majority of diplomats and statesmen.

5. CONCORD AND DISCORD

Although the medieval Christian world possessed the vision of an ideal unity, the interests of the different States were in actual fact severed by difficulties of communication and backwardness of civilization. A community of interests, or a System of States, were still undeveloped. A war might go on for a hundred years between Germans and Italians, quite distinct from a contemporaneous struggle between

⁶ Ibid.
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English and French, without the remaining Powers having any idea of intervening. The idea of a practical comity of States had not yet penetrated into the flesh and blood of the nations. . . . In the 17th century the Congress of the Peace of Westphalia offered the astonishing spectacle of a conference of ambassadors from every State, laying down the frontiers for the individual countries. The Peace of Westphalia came to be looked upon like a ratio scripta of international law: everyone uttered thanksgiving that some sort of status quo had now been established. People began to feel themselves part of an organized European society, and all the sovereign States began, as it were, to form one great family.—TREITSCHKE, Politik.

Those aspects of the European State System already reviewed suggest the nature of the paradox which must, perforce, be the central theme of any treatise on modern “international relations.” (The European (and world) community is a unity and a disunity combined in a contradiction.) Unity flows from common Roman-barbarian origins, from common Christianity, from common defense against external enemies, from a common feudalism followed by a common absolutism and a common democracy—in short, from a community of shared experiences which are as old as Rome and as new as radar. Disunity stems from diversity of tongues and nationalities, from growing cleavages of ideologies and social structures, from increasingly passionate local loyalties, and, most obviously, from the persistent fragmentation of society into sovereign nation-states. None of these as yet has subjugated the rest. None as yet will either acknowledge the supremacy of another or accept in any effective form any cooperative scheme for uniting all in a single polity.

All efforts by agreement to unite Europe or to unite the later and larger Europeanized world have failed, since modern men are more devoted to their particularistic allegiances than to any vision of universalism. All efforts by violence to achieve the same result have also failed by virtue of the operation of the balance-of-power principle. (The history of modern diplomacy is a tale of these alternative attempts at unity—and of their failure.) It is also the story of a compromise which, by its nature, is unworkable. The essence of the compromise is the conception—as old as the Peace of Westphalia and as new as the U.N. Charter—of a peaceful family of sovereigns, respecting the law, living as “good neighbors,” practicing abstinence from ambition and forbearance from violence, and fostering Christian virtues in interstate, no less than in interpersonal, relations. The considerations to be adduced in support of the contention that no such society of sovereigns ever has existed, or ever can exist, without its members playing “power politics” and thereby negating the objective of the compromise, will be discussed in later chapters.

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Here it suffices to suggest, somewhat dismally, that a civilization torn by insoluble paradoxes has meager prospects of survival. The cleavages within the body and soul of the modern world community are by no means limited to the rivalries and clashes of sovereignties, even though these impress most vividly the student of “international” affairs. This adjective was indeed unknown until it was coined by Jeremy Bentham in 1780. Before the end of the 18th century all “good Europeans” assumed that their community was still, somehow, one—if not in the structure of political power, then at least in the basic traditions and purposes of its people. In fact, such unity as had prevailed before the Reformation, under the shadowy authority of the Emperors and the doubtful power of the Popes, had long since waned. Rivalry for power among governments, even though it engenders in every State System a dynamic of its own, is inevitably colored and shaped by diverse definitions of human goals which transcend the lines on maps defining frontiers between States.

The unraveling of the tangled skein of intranational and transnational aims and desires which have contributed to unity and disunity among European peoples during the past four centuries cannot here be attempted. “All history,” wrote Sir Frederick Maitland, “is but a seamless web; and he who endeavors to tell but a piece of it must feel that his first sentence tears the fabric.” It will nevertheless be useful (for those who have forgotten and for those who never knew) to sketch the broad outlines of change in the relations among the Powers—and, as a prelude and a necessary comment on diplomacy, to suggest the major ways in which Europeans have become divided against themselves along lines of cleavage which are at once separate from, and yet inextricably interwoven with, the drama of “power politics.”

(Between 1350 and 1650 the unity which European Christendom had enjoyed since its dawn was irreparably sundered by a series of schisms) entangled with one another and eventuating in violence of such scope and intensity as to threaten the very survival of civilization. While leaving to historians of social change the task of analyzing the complex sources of general insecurity, unrest, and tension, we may note five major conflicts during these centuries: (1) peasant-serfs vs. feudal nobles—e.g., the French “Jacquerie” (1358), the English uprising led by John Ball and Wat Tyler,7

7 John Ball, the “mad priest of Kent,” was one of the first preachers of class war and Christian communism: “Good people, things will never go well in England so long as goods be not in common, and so long as there be villeins and gentlemen. By what right are they whom we call lords greater folk than we? . . . They are clothed in velvet and warm in their furs and ermines, while we go in rags. And yet it is of us and our toil that these men hold their state.” Following the crushing of the peasant
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and a whole series of later revolts and "peasants' wars" in which the lowest stratum of society struck out in blind rage against its exploiters; (2) burghers and artisans in the growing towns vs. feudal nobles whose disorders and exactions led most solid citizens to support the cause of monarchical absolutism; (3) new "national" dynasties vs. Emperor, Pope, and wealthy monastic orders whose lands were tempting to princes; (4) religious reformers and rebels vs. the Papacy; and (5) kingdoms vs. kingdoms, with Protestant Princes fighting Hapsburgs, Hapsburgs fighting Tudors, and Bourbons fighting Hapsburgs in a melee of international and religious strife.

The horrors of this debacle of civilization have few precedents in earlier times and no later parallels until the greater debacle of the 20th century. In passionate pursuit of "truth," "freedom," "unity," "peace," and the eternal salvation of their souls, men tore one another to pieces like wild beasts. Catholics and Protestants, peasants and nobles, tortured and slaughtered in a monstrous saturnalia of cruelty. When German serfs rose up against their masters, Martin Luther, in a mood typical of the times, told the Princes: "Strike with the sword! Kill! Cut their throats! Burn, slay, crush the murderous and rapacious peasants!" In the same spirit Charles V advised the Inquisition to follow his own example in dealing with heretics in the Netherlands, "where all who remained obstinate in their errors were burned alive, and those who were admitted to penitence were beheaded." This orgy of brutality reached its culmination in the Thirty Years' War (1618-48). At its close much of Central Europe was a wilderness of ruins, drenched with the blood of the slain, rent with agonized cries of torment, looted by mercenaries, and traversed by pitiable bands of refugees among whom mass madness and cannibalism were not infrequent.

That the European community somehow survived this self-inflicted paroxysm was scarcely due to belated and reluctant acceptance of peace and toleration through exhaustion. Recovery and new growth were made possible by fresh increments of wealth flowing into the Atlantic communities from overseas and arising from the new science and technology which had gradually undermined feudalism, triumphed over superstition, and laid the basis for rebellion, both Ball and Tyler were put to death in 1381. Similar doctrines were later preached by the Anabaptists and other radical sects of the Reformation.

6 John Wycliffe (1320-84) first translated the Bible into English and assailed orthodox theology. His Czech follower, John Huss, was decoyed to the Council of Constance by a safe-conduct, tried for heresy, and burned alive in 1415. Aside from the hideous "Albigensian Crusade," preached by Innocent III in the 13th century against a sect of heretics in southern France, the first of the "Wars of Religion" were the Hussite Wars (1419-36), in which the Bohemian Hussites defeated successive crusades launched against them by the Papacy. A century later the work of Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, and their successors, inspired by the worldly corruption and irresponsibility into which the Roman Church had fallen, completed the disintegration of Christendom.

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that immense expansion of productivity and urban population which characterize our own age. During the century following the Peace of Westphalia (1648), Europe again attained a semblance of unity, despite the shattering of the Universal Church and the now irrevocable fragmentation of peoples into sovereign nation-states. The dynastic and colonial wars which ensued were limited wars fought for limited objectives by limited professional armies. They were not class conflicts or religious and ideological crusades, which invariably move men to wild outbreaks of self-destructive savagery. Soldiers were hired tradesmen. Officers were gentlemen. Monarchs cherished the ideal of enlightened and benevolent despotism. In the flourishing state of agriculture, industry, and the arts, life was relatively orderly and pleasant—to a far greater degree than is suggested by the chronicles of conflicts among Powers which must here be outlined.

(The Peace of Westphalia was the first of the grand territorial and political settlements which have incorporated the verdict of arms into the public law of Europe after every general war among the Powers.) At the close of the prolonged and tedious Peace Conference which opened in 1642, three treaties were concluded: one signed at Münster, January 30, 1648, between Spain and the Dutch; another signed at Münster, October 24, 1648, between the
Empire, France, and the German Princes; and a third of the same date, signed at Osnabrück, between the Empire and Sweden, mutual toleration between Catholics and Protestants was provided for. The independence of Switzerland and the Netherlands was acknowledged. The boundary was drawn between the Dutch provinces and the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium). Sweden annexed territory in Pomerania; Brandenburg began that process of expansion which was to lead to the creation of the Kingdom of Prussia; France annexed Alsace, with the exception of the city of Strasbourg, and continued the war against Spain until the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) gave to her Artois to the north, Roussillon to the south, and a protectorate over Lorraine on the east. In this fashion, two new States were added to the System, the Empire was reduced to a shadow of its former self, the House of Hapsburg was humbled by the House of Bourbon, and an enlarged France stepped forward into the international arena as arbiter of the destinies of Europe.

Following the death in 1661 of Cardinal Mazarin, successor of the great Richelieu, the young French King, Louis XIV (1643-1715)—le Grand Monarque—assumed personal direction of policy and became the symbol of an epoch. Monarchical absolutism was now the prevalent form of State organization throughout Europe. The period was the great age of French letters. Artists, scientists, poets, and dramatists helped to make the Court at Versailles the envy and the model of the Western world. The able ministers and generals whom Louis XIV gathered about him—Colbert, Louvois, Vauban, Turenne, and Condé—led the French monarchy forward along the paths of power and glory in diplomacy and arms. France was the first State of Europe in peace and in war. The international politics of the age of Louis XIV therefore revolved about the attempts of France to impose its will upon the Continent and the counterefforts of numerous coalitions of weaker States to thwart this ambition and preserve the established equilibrium.

(The development of the Western State System since the 17th century, however, is no longer the story of the States of an isolated Europe. It is constantly complicated by the rivalries of the Powers for control of growing overseas possessions.) The competition for the Eastern trade between the Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese merchants encouraged the search for new sea routes to the Orient. Daring Atlantic captains sailed southward around the huge hulk of the Dark Continent and westward toward the setting sun. These first slender filaments were to link Europe to a vast new world. The rounding of Africa by Vasco da Gama in 1497 and the first circumnavigation of the globe by Magellan shortly afterward opened new seaways to southern Asia. Explorers, colonizers, treasure seekers, and empire builders jostled one.
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another in quest of adventure, gold, and power; and their respective States were not slow to support claims to territory and to quarrel with one another for new dominions.

This clash of imperial aspirations played a major role in the long duel between the English and French which was about to open in Europe. In the middle period of the 17th century, when France was crushing the Hapsburgs and extending her frontiers to the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine, and the Meuse, England was torn by the internal disturbances of the Great Rebellion, the Civil War, the Commonwealth, and the Restoration. But when Louis XIV sought to acquire still more territory and to establish French hegemony over the Continent, England actively joined his enemies both to preserve the balance of power in Europe and to challenge French pretensions in Asia and America. In a series of far-flung combats, culminating in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13), various coalitions thwarted the efforts of the French monarchy to establish its dominion over all of western Europe.

(The Peace Conference at Utrecht (1712-13) drew up another great international settlement, comparable with that of Westphalia in 1648, and destined to endure in its main features for more than a century) Philip of Bourbon, Louis's grandson, was recognized as Spanish King, but it was stipulated that France and Spain were never to unite, since “the most destructive flame of war which is to be extinguished by this peace arose chiefly from hence, that the security and liberties of Europe could by no means bear the union of the Kingdoms of France and Spain under one and the same King” (Article 6 of the Anglo-French treaty of April 11, 1713). The Spanish Netherlands were transferred to Austria, to which Louis was obliged to give up Ypres and Tournai. Austria also acquired Naples, Milan, and Sardinia, and England secured Gibraltar and Minorca from Spain. The Duchy of Savoy (Piedmont) was recognized as a Kingdom and permitted to annex Sicily, which it later exchanged for Sardinia. The Elector of Brandenburg was similarly recognized as King of Prussia. As for America, England acquired Acadia (Nova Scotia), Hudson Bay, and Newfoundland, and trade concessions from Spain. With France checked and Spain stripped of portions of her territory, the other Powers were content to permit Bourbon Kings to reign both at Paris and Madrid. The European equilibrium was preserved, though the contest between England and France for mastery of India and the New World was still undecided. It should be noted that the contemporaneous eastern wars between Charles XII of Sweden, and Russia, Denmark, and Poland were fought and terminated almost without reference to the relations between the Western European States. After Utrecht, however, the European State System became an indissoluble unity,
and all States, east and west, were involved in every contest between any of its members.

The settlement of Utrecht was followed by an interlude, marked by new wars in the east (Austria against Turkey, 1715-18, and Sweden against Russia, 1700-21) which were not ignored by the Western Powers but in which they did not actively intervene. In 1719-20, England and France joined forces to prevent Philip V from upsetting the terms agreed upon at Utrecht. The next general war arose out of international controversy over the election of a King of Poland. In the War of the Polish Succession (1733-38), Austria and Russia, supporting the candidacy of the Elector of Saxony, defeated France, which supported Stanislaus Leszczinski, father-in-law of Louis XV. England remained neutral, and Spain seized the opportunity to wrest the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies from Austria and to place a Bourbon upon the throne of her recovered dependency. These conflicts, however, produced no fundamental changes in power relationships among the States of the European System. The next serious disturbance was a result, on the one hand, of rivalry between England, France, and Spain for colonial dominions and, on the other, of the rise of a new Power to ascendancy in North Germany—the Kingdom of Prussia under the Hohenzollern Dynasty.

Great Britain fought a brief, indecisive, and localized war with Spain in the Caribbean in 1727. In 1739 the struggle was resumed in the "War of Jenkins's Ear," which opened in American waters and led to hostilities on the frontier between the British colony of Georgia and the Spanish colony of Florida. Walpole knew that the conflict could scarcely be localized because of the Bourbon "Family Compact" of 1733, which constituted an alliance between France and Spain. Difficulties were in the offing, moreover, regarding the throne of Austria; for there was little assurance that Great Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia would abide by the arrangement which they had made to guarantee the succession to Maria Theresa, daughter of Charles IV. In December of 1740, following the death of Charles, Frederick II of Prussia, surnamed "the Great," sent his armies into Austrian Silesia to expand Prussian power at Maria Theresa's expense. France, Bavaria, Saxony, and Spain joined Prussia in a league of plunder to despoil the young Queen of her possessions. England, supported by the Netherlands, joined Austria in the combat to preserve the Continental equilibrium and to continue the struggle against France and Spain in the New World. The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), known to the transatlantic colonists as "King George's War," was fought in America and in India as well as in Central Europe. In all the arenas of conflict, it was indecisive. In the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748, Great Britain and France restored the status quo in India and America. Frederick managed to retain Silesia, and
Austria also lost certain Italian dependencies, but Maria Theresa averted the partition of her realm. With Austria determined to check the Prussian menace in Germany and with Great Britain no less bent upon a final reckoning with France, the Peace was but a truce. The great Prussian King perceived that Russia might be drawn into the coalition which Maria Theresa was striving to form against him. He therefore devoted himself to preparing for the inevitable, for, to him,

Politics is the science of acting always by convenient means conformably to one's own interests. To act conformably to one's interests, it is necessary to know what they are; and to arrive at this knowledge requires study, research, and application. The politics of sovereigns have two parts: one, which is concerned with internal government, comprises the interests of the State and the maintenance of its system of government; the other, which embraces all the System of Europe, labors to consolidate the safety of the State and to extend as much as is possible by customary and permitted means the number of its possessions, the power and consideration of the prince.\(^9\)

Frederick likewise perceived that Anglo-French relations dominated the whole European scene:


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Christian Europe is like a republic of sovereigns which is divided into two
great parties. England and France have for a century given the impulse to all
movements. When a warlike prince wishes to undertake anything, if both Powers
are in agreement to keep the peace, they will offer their mediation to him and
compel him to accept it. Once it is established, the political System prevents all
great robberies and makes war unfruitful unless it be urged with greater resources
and extraordinary luck.10

Under these circumstances the stage was prepared for the next general
war, which was to decide whether Austria must permit Prussia to dominate
north Germany and whether Britain or France should rule North America
and India. In 1754, Anglo-French hostilities broke out in the Ohio Valley
in the so-called “French-and-Indian War.” In the “diplomatic revolution”
of 1756, England became the ally of her erstwhile enemy, Prussia, which
was now set upon from all points of the compass by Austria, France, Russia,
and Sweden. The military genius of Frederick enabled him to defeat the
French and Austrians at Rossbach and Leuthen (1757), but the Russians
invaded East Prussia and occupied Berlin in 1760. After initial successes the
French cause fared badly outside of Europe. Wolfe wrested Quebec from
Montcalm in 1759. In India the British forces under Robert Clive outwitted
Dupleix and seized most of the French strongholds. These failures, coupled
with reverses in Brunswick, caused Louis XV to call to his aid the other
Bourbon States, Spain, and the Two Sicilies (1762). The Spanish interven-
tion was overbalanced, however, by the accession to the Russian throne of
the mad Tsar, Peter III, who deserted Austria, joined Prussia, and restored
to Frederick the conquests of his predecessors. He was at once superseded
by his wife, Catherine II, who refused to give active assistance to either
side. Austria now despaired of recovering Silesia and ruining Prussia.

The Treaty of Hubertusburg (1763) put an end to the Seven Years’ War
in Europe, with Austrian acknowledgment of Prussian title to Silesia. Euro-
pean frontiers remained unchanged, but the House of Hohenzollern had suc-
cessfully despoiled and defied the House of Hapsburg. With magnificent
irony, Frederick placed upon the pinnacle of the New Palace at Potsdam
three female figures supporting the Prussian crown—Madame de Pompadour
of France, Maria Theresa of Austria, and Catherine of Russia. The combined
efforts of these ladies to consummate his destruction had left his State and
his dynasty more powerful than ever. The Treaty of Paris, also of 1763,
established peace between Britain and France. The English were masters of
Canada and of the east coast of India. Louis XV was compelled to yield up
to the victor almost the whole of New France in America east of the Missis-
pippi, retaining only a few islands in the West Indies and off Newfoundland

10 Ibid., p. 54.
and French Guiana in South America. Spain was obliged to cede Florida to Britain and received as compensation from her ally all that remained of the French claims on the North American mainland, viz., the wilderness of Louisiana west of the Mississippi. French power in India was similarly broken by the peace terms. By the provisions of these settlements, Prussia attained the position of a new Great Power in the European galaxy, and England definitely triumphed over France in the long contest for commercial, colonial, and naval supremacy in America and the Orient.

Between the Seven Years' War and the great revolutionary upheaval of 1789-1815, which was temporarily to subvert the European State System, two developments took place which produced significant changes in the relationships between the Powers. One was to lead to the creation of a new State in the System on the other side of the Atlantic. The other was to lead to the extinction of an old State in eastern Europe. Such were the results of the American Revolution and the partition of Poland. In the former case the outbreak of rebellion against British rule in 1775 and the declaration of America's independence in the following year offered an opportunity to Britain's Continental enemies to recover some of their lost prestige and to contribute toward the weakening of British power. France concluded a military alliance with the American rebels in 1778 and was soon joined in the war against England by Spain and the Netherlands. The British Government was at length obliged to sue for peace; and by the Treaties of 1783-84 the United States of America became an independent member of the family of nations, Spain recovered Florida, France reacquired minor possessions in the West Indies and Africa, and Holland lost to Britain a portion of her Asiatic empire. The British overseas dominions were thus reduced, but they still constituted an imposing imperial edifice. The United States, despite its vast territory and resources, was still too young and feeble to play a decisive role in the relations among the European Powers.

Meanwhile, Frederick of Prussia connived with the Tsarina Catherine in 1772 to relieve the weak and disorderly Kingdom of Poland of part of its territory. In order to counterbalance this enhancement of Prussian and Russian power, Austria intervened and annexed Polish Galicia. This bargain at Poland's expense was the means of preventing a general war threatened by Austrian resistance to Russian aggrandizement against the Turks in the Balkans. When Austria later made additional claims to Polish territory, Frederick objected. The balance of power was peaceably preserved by the extinction of the Polish State, Prussia and Russia taking fresh slices in 1792 and all three of the Powers dividing up the remainder in 1795.

By the last quarter of the 18th century, then, the Western State System comprised five major Powers on the European Continent, a large number
of minor Powers, and a new State across the Atlantic, born of European colonialism. Of the States which might have been described as Great Powers in 1648, England, France, and Austria retained their former position. Spain had declined in wealth and in diplomatic and military prestige and had fallen to the rank of a second-rate Power, in spite of the vast colonies which she still held in the Americas and the East Indies. Holland and Portugal likewise retained extensive overseas possessions, but they had long since passed the halcyon days when they would cope with other Powers as equals. Following the failure of France to establish her supremacy over the Continent, the new State of Prussia, founded on the Mark of Brandenburg, had emerged in Central Europe as the dynastic creation of a line of able kings. It had successfully withstood an assault by the other Powers upon the newcomer and had asserted its right to be regarded as their equal. In the more remote east, the Tsardom of Muscovy had extended its dominions eastward, southward, and westward. Under Peter the Great (1682-1725), Russia became partly "westernized" and made itself a member of the European System. Under Catherine the Great (1762-96), it became a Great Power. Its expansion pushed the Swedes from the eastern shores of the Baltic and the Turks from the northern shores of the Black Sea. Sweden fell to the rank of a third-rate Power; and the Ottoman Empire, never really a part of the European System, was already in decay. The end of Poland brought the enlarged States of Russia, Prussia, and Austria into closer relations with one another. The petty States of Italy and Germany remained pawns among their greater neighbors. The first great struggle for overseas empire was ended, and the Powers had achieved an equilibrium of power which seemed reasonably permanent and stable.

Under these circumstances, so astute an observer as Edward Gibbon could write in 1780 of prospects of progress to which today's generation looks back with nostalgia:

Europe is one great republic, whose various inhabitants have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation. The balance of power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighboring kingdoms may be alternately exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws and manners, which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of mankind, the Europeans and their colonies. . . . Europe is now divided into twelve powerful, though unequal kingdoms, three respectable commonwealths, and a variety of smaller, though independent, States; the chances of royal and ministerial talents are multiplied. . . . The abuses of tyranny are restrained by the mutual influence of fear and shame; republics have acquired order and stability; monarchies have imbibed the principles of freedom, or, at least, of moderation; and some sense of honor and justice is introduced into the most defective constitutions by the general manners
of the times. In peace, the progress of knowledge and industry is accelerated by the emulation of so many active rivals; in war, the European forces are exercised by temperate and undecisive contests. . . . The experience of four thousand years should enlarge our hopes, and diminish our apprehensions; we cannot determine to what heights the human species may aspire in their advances towards perfection; but it may safely be presumed that no people, unless the face of nature is changed, will relapse into their original barbarism. . . . We may therefore acquiesce in the pleasing conclusion that every age of the world has increased, and still increases, the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of the human race.

6. WORLD POWERS AND WORLD WARS

. I have spilt blood? I had to; I shall perhaps shed more, but without anger, and quite simply, because blood-letting is a component of political medicine. . . . It is necessary one should always talk of liberty, equality, justice and disinterestedness, and never grant any liberties whatever. . . . I am not a man like other men and the laws of morality or custom cannot be applied to me.—NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

In the social production of the means of life, human beings enter into definite and necessary relations which are independent of their will—production relations which correspond to a definite stage of the development of their productive forces. The totality of these production relations constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis upon which a legal and political superstructure arises and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. . . . With the change in the economic foundation, the whole gigantic superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.—KARL MARX.

Despite the high hopes of the thinkers and rulers of the “Enlightenment,” the Western State System at the end of the 1700’s entered upon another age of violence and disorder, opening with a “world war” and culminating a century later in new “world wars” of annihilation and extermination. A long view suggests that the latest time of troubles, in spite of intermissions, is a single sequence from then to now. The long Pax Britannica (1815-1914) was not so much a new epoch as an uneasy interlude between global conflicts for hegemony. These fabulous decades were marked by startling shifts in the distribution of influence among “Great Powers.” After a last bid for European and world domination, France gave way to Britain. New Powers emerged in the shape of Italy, Germany, America, and Japan. British ascendancy was questioned by the U.S.A., resisted by Russia, and at length challenged by a new Reich. The “Armed Peace,” for all its dreams of universal brotherhood in a wondrous new age, was marked (e.g., Cecil Rhodes, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, Poincaré the Lorrainer, and a host of
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others) by such struttirigs and posturings and chest thumpings in the name
of the tribal gods as presaged blood sacrifices on flaming altars.

The harvest of Mars was garnered anew in the fourteenth year of the
20th century after Christ, and for many a year thereafter. The failure of the
first German bid for world domination was accompanied by a substantial
enhancement of the power of America and Japan; Pyrrhic victory for
Britain, France, and Italy; defeat and eclipse for Russia; and fatal disintegra-
tion for Austria-Hungary. Twenty years later, Berlin, now ruled by
madmen and allied with Rome and Tokyo, made a new essay at world con-
quest which came closer to success than any of its predecessors. Terror, tor-
ture, mass murder, and the most grisly bestiality of men toward men, all
thought to have been banished with the end of the wars of religion, reemerged
out of a black past to exercise a new and fearful dominion over mankind.
In the final event the three aspirants to hegemony were scourged with fire
and sword and stricken from the list of Powers. France and Britain were
grievously weakened. Two “Super-Powers” survived the shambles: the U.S.A.,
unscathed and enriched, dedicated to “democracy” and ruled by wealth;
and the U.S.S.R, wounded and wrecked, pledged to “freedom” and governed
by fanaticism. (The two colossi of the new time seemed destined to clash in
fresh conflicts of class and creed for mastery of the planet.)

These vicissitudes of national fortunes may fairly be regarded as con-
comitants of a vast revolution in the lives of men which is still under way
and is all but certain, in its ultimate outcome, to make or break the destiny
of the world society for centuries still unborn. That revolution is not the
work of nobles or priests, captains or kings, plotters or despots. It is the
work of humble searchers after truth and of alert entrepreneurs, investors,
and traders. Disinterested curiosity about nature and creative quest for gain
brought into being a world beyond men’s dreams—and possibly beyond
their power to control or preserve in the face of a slackening of its growth,
followed by breakdown into bitter impoverishment and furious despair.

Our age differs most markedly from all earlier epochs in being the Age
of Science and the Age of the Machine. Its earliest creators were the Greeks
before Socrates, who guessed at atoms, Aristotle, who first organized sci-
cific research, Archimedes the inventor, who cried “Eureka!” and imagined
a fulcrum with which he could move the earth. These seeds fell on stony
soil. Out of Arabia came algebra, spherical trigonometry, and brave be-
ginnings in chemistry, physics, astronomy, and medicine. Amid Europe’s
darkness of the 14th century, Roger Bacon preached experimentation and
predicted steamships, motorcars, and aircraft. Other men shortly hit upon
printing and gun powder. With the great awakening a mighty procession—
Leonardo da Vinci, Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Harvey, and many
others—ushered Science into our civilization. James Watt’s steam engine (1765) opened a new epoch whose puzzling problems moved by rapid stages through the ages of railroads, steel ships, electricity, internal-combustion engines, aviation, and electronics. These problems will doubtless be mended or ended by the newest and most formidable of powers: atomic energy.

The issue of whether our culture is capable of mastering its artifacts or is doomed, like Frankenstein, to be destroyed by the monsters of its own devising may here be deferred. World politics in our own time is a game with rules and goals as ancient as Thebes and Nineveh. But, thanks to science, technology, industry, and commerce, the stage on which an old play now unfolds is like nothing ever seen before on earth or in heaven. The impact of invention on European society and politics is (or ought to be) a familiar tale. The first result was a swift increase in the numbers, wealth, and influence of town dwellers (“bourgeoisie”) who were neither nobles nor serfs. Their initial bids for power found voice in the revolt of the Netherlands against Spain, in the English Civil War and the “Protectorate” of Oliver Cromwell, and in the American Revolution. The explosion of social revolution in France inaugurated half a century of class conflict and ideological warfare throughout the Western world. Further expansion of the new modes of production and distribution led to a growing challenge to the triumphant business classes from the new “proletariat” of wageworkers, culminating in the Russian Revolution and its aftermath.

The flaming hatreds, fears, and loves involved in the devastating combats of our time between “Democracy,” “Fascism,” and “Communism” are but echoes of profound schisms in the body politic of the new world commonwealth. The global society is united as never before by swift travel, swifter communication, and abundant means of wealth and welfare beyond the hopes of a Midas or an Aristotle. But it is also divided as never before by clashes of tribes and classes and creeds which turn all resources to war, all riches to dust, and all dreams of a Golden Age to fire and rubble. Social wars of elites and masses in an epoch of dizzy economic change and rising insecurity are mingled with international wars of “World Powers,” battling one another for control of the minds of men and of the means to mastery over the globe. Many of the chapters to follow will deal with various phases of these contentions and confusions. Here a bare outline of political events must serve to bring to the troubled present this survey of times gone by.

On the Continent the age of democracy, dictatorship, terrorism, military conscription, total war, and new attempts to unite the world by the sword began abruptly in France between 1789 and 1793. The States-General, sum-
moned to bail the monarchy out of the bankruptcy induced by its aid to the American rebels against Britain, became a revolutionary National Assembly. While peasants burned chateaux, burghers defied the King, demanded a democratic Republic, abolished serfdom and titles of nobility, and issued a resounding "Declaration of the Rights of Man." Within three years the bourgeois radicals had abolished the kingship; sent Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and thousands of aristocrats to the guillotine; and, by virtue of foreign intervention in behalf of the old order, involved the Republic in war with Britain, Austria, Prussia, Spain, Holland, and Sardinia—the "First Coalition." The new energies which revolutionary enthusiasm gave to its people made France more than a match for its foes. In 1795, Spain and Prussia withdrew from the contest, while the reign of terror waxed and waned in Paris and a National Convention gave way to a Directory.

In 1796-97 a young commander, Napoleon Bonaparte, swept the Austrians from North Italy, compelled Sardinia to cede Nice and Savoy to France, marched on Vienna, and imposed the Treaty of Campoformio on the Hapsburgs. France annexed the Austrian Netherlands; and Austria, in compensation, received Venice, whose ancient independence was thus extinguished. With England the only remaining enemy of the Republic, Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798 in a wild scheme to sever communications between the British Isles and India. When he returned, he found the Directory bankrupt and its armies hard pressed by the forces of the Second Coalition of Britain, Austria, and Russia. Hailed as savior, he overthrew the Directory in 1799 and made himself First Consul. The French bourgeoisie, with the approval of the masses, sacrificed democracy and parliamentarianism upon the altar of militant national patriotism. Napoleon became the symbol of la patrie and high priest of the new cult of the nation in arms. Under his banner the people's armies of France set forth upon the paths of glory which were to lead to the conquest of Europe.

In the light of the historical evolution of the Western State System, the era of Napoleon represents the most nearly successful effort at the restoration of universal empire ever made by a single State. The power of earlier aspirants toward ascendancy over Europe—Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV—was feeble and ineffective compared with the military might and diplomatic prestige of France under the first Bonaparte. Napoleon had at his back the richest and most populous nation of the Continent, welded into a solid phalanx by the new fire of patriotic fervor. His revolutionary predecessors had already invented military conscription as a means of defending France against Europe. His enemies were likewise obliged to resort to universal conscription, which has ever since been the basis of Continental military
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organization. But the mailed fists of his soldiery were so effectively supplemented by his own military genius and diplomatic astuteness that no State or combination of States could stand against him. The old balance of power was completely disrupted. In 1804, still aping ancient Rome, he made himself Emperor—and his Empire seemed likely to include all of western Europe within its limits.

The temporary triumph and final failure of this imperial adventure throw a flood of light upon the fundamental nature of the State System, which ultimately proved to be more powerful than its conqueror. From 1800 to 1812, French power rose dizzily in an almost uninterrupted ascent. The diplomacy of flattery induced Tsar Paul to withdraw Russia from the Second Coalition. Austria was crushed and obliged to come to terms. At Amiens (1802), England also made peace. But 14 months later the British Government, with the support of the merchant classes, resumed the war in the conviction that British maritime, commercial, and colonial supremacy were dangerously menaced by French ambitions. Napoleon accepted the challenge in the equally firm conviction that the power of England must be broken before France could feel secure on the Continent. With England beaten, he could take up the task of rebuilding the French overseas empire and of winning for the French bourgeoisie a position of mercantile hegemony throughout the world. Pitt countered Napoleon's preparations for the conquest of England by strengthening British sea power and building up another Continental coalition. The allied French and Spanish fleet was destroyed at Trafalgar (1805). Henceforth British naval predominance was assured, and Napoleon had no means at his disposal for the invasion of England. But the Third Coalition was smashed by the French armies. In December, 1805, the Austrian and Russian forces of the Emperor Francis II and Tsar Alexander I were crushed at Austerlitz. By the Treaty of Pressburg, Austria was required to cede Venetia to the newly created French satellite Kingdom of Italy and to surrender much of her territory in Germany to Bavaria and Württemberg, which were also Napoleonic puppet States. Prussia entered the lists, only to be defeated at Jena (1806).

Napoleon, who now entered Berlin, had already abolished the Holy Roman Empire and organized the West German States into the "Confederation of the Rhine" as a French protectorate. The Russians were in turn beaten at Friedland in 1807. At Tilsit, Napoleon met Alexander, and the two Emperors almost literally divided Europe between them. The Third Coalition was destroyed. Austria was reduced to a second-rate Power, and Prussia was humbled to the dust. A truncated Poland was revived in the form of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as a French dependency. Russia seized Finland from Sweden, and the latter State also became a French appanage. By 1808,
Napoleon was Emperor of a France that extended from the Pyrenees and the Alps to the North Sea and the Rhine. He was also King of Italy; and his relatives, friends, or admirers held the thrones of Naples, Spain, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and lesser States. Even England seemed likely to be brought to terms by the Continental System which was to close the European market to British goods and compel the “nation of shopkeepers” to sue for peace.

That Napoleon failed in this purpose and lived to see the destruction of the whole fabric into which he had woven so much blood and treasure was due primarily to the continued ascendancy of British sea power and to the intense national consciousness which foreign conquest evoked among the subject peoples of France. In 1808, Napoleon deposed the Spanish Bourbons and made his brother Joseph King of Spain. But a popular insurrection broke out almost at once against the usurper, which led Great Britain to occupy Portugal and send Wellington to assist the Spanish rebels in harassing the French in the Peninsular War (1808-13). A national uprising took place in Austria in 1809, which Napoleon suppressed with difficulty. The Prussian Government introduced various internal reforms, civil and military,
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and bided its time. Napoleon was still master of Europe, nevertheless, and
might have remained so had he not quarreled with Tsar Alexander and
taken up arms against him in an effort to compel him to enforce the Con-
tinental System against Great Britain. By 1812 the French Emperor had
gathered together an international army of 600,000 troops for the subjug-
ation of Russia. The Russian forces withdrew before him, and he entered
Moscow in September. But the capital was burned under his eyes. As the
Russian winter descended, the enemy soldiers and peasant irregulars assailed
the French communications in the rear. The city was abandoned. The retreat
from Moscow became a catastrophe. Only a ragged remnant of the Grand
Army recrossed the Niemen in December.

Early in 1813, Alexander, now in alliance with Prussia, England, and
Sweden, launched a counterattack which precipitated the German War of
Liberation. Napoleon won further indecisive victories, but his rejection of
mediation proposals from Vienna added Austria to the new coalition. At the
great “Battle of the Nations,” fought near Leipzig in October, 1813, the
Swedish, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian forces closed in on the French,
defeated them, and compelled Napoleon to withdraw to the Rhine. His power
in Central Europe collapsed. France was invaded from the east by the allies
and from the south by Wellington, who had occupied all of Spain. Despite
furious and brilliant resistance, Paris was surrounded in March, 1814.
Napoleon was compelled to abdicate and was exiled to Elba. In the spring
of 1815, he escaped and returned to power in France to play out the tragic
farce of the “Hundred Days” to its dismal end at Waterloo.

The ancien régime had triumphed over the Revolution. The European
State System had proved itself to be more powerful than its most powerful
member. The forces of monarchical absolutism and feudal aristocracy, as
represented by the Powers of the Coalition, had overcome those of bourgeois
democracy and equality as represented by revolutionary and Napoleonic
France. In France itself the old order was reestablished, and the Bourbons
were restored to the throne in the person of Louis XVIII. At the great
international Congress of Vienna (September, 1814-July, 1815) emperors,
kings, princes, and diplomats met in brilliant assemblage to restore dynasties
in the name of legitimacy, to rebuild the Europe of 1789, and to consider
“the disposal of the territories given up by his Most Christian Majesty
(Louis XVIII) . . . and the relations from whence a real and permanent
balance of power is to be derived” (Article I of the Separate and Secret

Under the inspiration of the Austrian statesman, Metternich, the delegates
set to work, only to discover that the old Europe had been smashed beyond
all hope of complete restoration and that Humpty Dumpty could not, after
all, be replaced in his old position on the wall. Bargains and compromises were necessary to adjust conflicting interests and ambitions. France was obliged to renounce her rights of sovereignty and protection over some 32,000,000 people who had been brought under Napoleon's power; but she recovered the boundaries of 1792, with some slight additions. By the second Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815, France was obliged to cede a number of strategic posts to the allies, to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, and to submit to the occupation of 18 fortresses for three to five years. Most of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was given to Russia, which also retained Finland and Bessarabia, conquered, respectively, from the Swedes and the Turks. Prussia received Swedish Pomerania, two-fifths of Saxony, and extensive territories on both banks of the Rhine. In the rest of Germany, it was scarcely feasible to restore either the defunct Holy Roman Empire or the hundreds of petty principalities which Napoleon had abolished. A German Confederation of 38 States was therefore established, with Austria securing the presidency of its Diet. Austria gave up the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium), which were annexed by the Dutch, and also gave up a large part of her territories in Germany proper. In return, she was awarded
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North Italy (Lombardy-Venetia), Illyria, the Tirol, and Salzburg. The Papal States and the Kingdom of Naples were restored, and Italy remained a “geographical expression.” In the north, Norway was taken from Denmark and joined to Sweden, under whose control it remained until it secured independence in 1905. Britain secured Heligoland, Malta and the Ionian Islands, and other fruits of victory overseas from the remnants of the French and Dutch colonial empires: Cape Colony in South Africa, Ceylon, St. Lucia, Tobago, Trinidad, etc.

A final word regarding events in the American Hemisphere during the Napoleonic epoch: The new Republic of the United States embarked upon its spectacular career of territorial expansion by purchasing Louisiana from France in 1803—a region which the First Consul had reacquired from Spain in 1800 but which he was happy to sell when developments in Europe and the West Indies made a restoration of the French colonial empire impossible. American expansionists next turned their attention to Florida and Canada, but the issue was obscured by long and bitter controversies over blockades, impressments, contraband, and neutral trading rights between the United States on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other. In 1812 the U.S.A. declared war on England in the name of “freedom of the seas” and moved at once to occupy Canada and Florida. In spite of Continental preoccupations, England was easily able to defend Canada from American attacks. The United States was invaded, its capital burned, and its commerce swept from the seas. The Treaty of Ghent (1814) restored the status quo. At no time since has Washington resorted to force in its controversies with Britain. Spain, however, was a weaker rival, and a skillful policy of browbeating and bargaining induced Madrid to sell the Floridas in 1819. Meanwhile the Latin-American colonies of Spain had secured their independence, and a whole series of new nations was thus added to the Western State System. The U.S.A., no less than Britain, was opposed to any restoration of these States to European control. Canning “called in the New World to redress the balance of the Old,” as he put it; and the result was the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 by which the U.S.A., with British approval, expressed its intention to resist any further colonization, interposition, or extension of control by European Powers over the American continents. At the very outset of Latin-American independence, therefore, the United States asserted its claim to hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.

The century between Waterloo and Sarajevo will probably always remain, in a peculiar sense, a unique era. The population of the world doubled, and that of Europe quadrupled. The system of technology which had prevailed with few changes for many millennia was completely revolutionized. The bourgeoisie, masters and beneficiaries of the new technology and the
new economy, became the ruling class in almost all the States of the Western world. Fraternité, no less than Liberté and Égalité, was its battle cry. And as nationalism is always bred of war, the impact of people upon people in the great Napoleonic conflicts intensified national consciousness at the very time when the bourgeoisie was rising to grasp power from kings and aristocrats. The revolutions of the mid-century were led and supported by middle-class patriots for whom the achievements of national unity and of democratic constitutionalism were but two facets of the same liberal program. In the era of the triumphant bourgeoisie, nationalism became a creed and a way of life, shaping the attitudes and actions of millions of people and scores of governments throughout the Western world.

The progressive dissolution of the Ottoman Empire presented an opportunity to the Slavic Christians of southeastern Europe to achieve liberation and statehood. The Serbs gained autonomy in 1815. The revolt of the Greeks began in 1821 and culminated a decade later in the attainment of Greek independence through the intervention of Britain, France, and Russia against the Turks. Belgium rose up against Dutch control in 1830, and nine years later her independence as a perpetually neutral and inviolate State was recognized. In the 1830's Russia sought to establish a protectorate over Turkey but was frustrated by British and French opposition. The apprehension of the Western States over the extension of Russian power at the expense of "the sick man of Europe," as Turkey came to be called, led to the Crimean War (1854-56), in which Britain and France, with the aid of little Sardinia, fought Russia to a draw in the Black Sea. Russian domination of Constantinople and the Straits was prevented by admitting the Sublime Porte to "the advantages of the public law and system of Europe" (Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856) and by guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Turkey. In 1877, Russia waged war on Turkey again, now using the Slavic nationalities still under Turkish rule as pawns in her game of imperial expansion. The Powers again intervened, and Russia yielded once more, this time without a trial of armed strength. The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 created Bulgaria as an autonomous principality, and Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania were all recognized as independent and granted additional territory at Turkey's expense. In 1912 the Balkan States waged war upon Turkey and further extended their frontiers, only to fall out among themselves to the detriment of Bulgaria, which was set upon by Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Rumania in the Second Balkan War (1913) and deprived of many of her conquests. Balkan nationalism thus created six new States (Albania was established by the Powers in 1913) and made the Balkans an arena of the conflicting ambitions of the Great Powers.

Nationalism effected even more significant changes in Central Europe
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after 1815. The people of Italy were divided into 7 States and those of Germany into 39. In both spheres, Austrian power was predominant. In both, the impact of the Napoleonic Wars had given rise to a rich growth of national sentiment under the influence of which middle-class patriots strove to attain political unity and nationhood. Since Austria refused to yield pacifically to such a disadvantageous modification of the status quo, war seemed the only road to unification, particularly after 1848, when the German liberals failed miserably in their efforts to create a German nation by peaceful means and when diplomatic efforts to achieve Italian unity proved of no avail. In both regions the new nation was forged in the heat of battle, with the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont) under Cavour playing the same role in Italy as the Kingdom of Prussia under Bismarck was to play in Germany. In 1858 the new Bonaparte Emperor at Paris, Napoleon III, formed an alliance with Sardinia against Austria on condition of the return to France of Nice and Savoy, conquered by the first Napoleon but lost in 1815. War followed in 1859. Sardinia was able to annex Lombardy. Nationalist revolutions in central Italy increased the territory of the new State, and Garibaldi's filibusters added Naples and Sicily in the south. In 1861, King Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia took the title of King of Italy.

Three years later Prussia under the "Iron Chancellor" joined Austria in war against Denmark and promptly proceeded to quarrel with her ally over the spoils—Schleswig-Holstein. In the Seven Weeks' War of 1866 Prussia defeated Austria and assumed the presidency of the new North German Confederation, while Italy took her chance to wrest Venetia from the control of Vienna. This enhancement of Prussian power was viewed with alarm by Napoleon III, who played into Bismarck's hands by precipitating the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. With the withdrawal of French troops from the Papal States, Italy occupied Rome, and the new Italian nation was complete, save for Italia Irredenta ("Italy Unredeemed"), i.e., the provinces of the Tirol and the Trentino, still under Austrian rule. The French armies were meanwhile crushed by the Prussian military machine. Napoleon III lost his throne, and the Third French Republic was compelled to return Alsace-Lorraine to German control. Since the South German States had joined Prussia in the war, the German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles during the siege of Paris, January 18, 1871. Two new Great Powers were thus created at the cost of the defeat and humiliation of France and the exclusion of Austria from German and Italian affairs. Austria and Hungary had already joined themselves together in the Dual Monarchy in 1867; but this political edifice, composed as it was of an incongruous congeries of German, Magyar, Latin, and Slavic peoples, was not a national State but
a composite structure which the rising tides of nationalism threatened to engulf.

The mid-century decades of national emancipation and unification, which completely upset the arrangements established by the Congress of Vienna, were followed by a new era of colonial expansion in which almost all the non-European world was seized upon and partitioned by the Great Powers during a short span of 30 years. The great States of the West, old and new alike, took to the path of empire once more and gained larger territories and more imposing dominions in a single generation than their ancestors had won during the three centuries following the circumnavigation of Africa and the discovery of America. The impact of European culture upon the older civilizations of the East and upon the primitive peoples of the tropics resulted in almost every instance in the loss of political independence and in social and economic disorganization among the societies which were the victims of imperialism. One exception stood out in brilliant contrast. The medieval island empire of Japan was opened to Western influences by an American naval expedition under Admiral Perry in 1854—but, instead of falling prey to the Western Powers as did the other States of Asia, Japan adopted Western technology, Western economics, and Western nationalism and emerged 40 years later as a great nation-state in her own right, the latest addition to the Western State System and the only one of the Great Powers whose population is not of European origin.

The course of empire building between 1881 and 1914 was marked by numerous minor wars between the European States and native African and Asiatic communities and by one open conflict between Great Powers: the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, in which Japan ousted Russia from South Manchuria and the Liaotung Peninsula. The minor wars are almost too numerous to list, but mention may be made of the French War against China of 1884-85, which was inconclusive; the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, in which Japan made her first successful bid for empire; the Italian War against Abyssinia of 1896, which was unsuccessful; the Boer War of 1898-1900, in which Great Britain finally conquered the stubborn Dutch settlers of South Africa in the face of heroic resistance; and the Italian War against Turkey of 1911, which resulted in the Italian annexation of Tripoli. These and innumerable other conflicts were waged by Great Powers against the feeble States of Africa and the Orient. The rival claims of the Powers themselves were usually adjusted by diplomacy and conference.

That the Americas did not also become an arena of imperialistic aggrandizement on the part of the European States was due primarily to the preponderant power of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. After the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, no European State made any
permanent addition to its American possessions. The U.S.A., on the other
hand, annexed Texas in 1845, waged war upon Mexico, took from her almost
half her territory in 1846, and purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867.
Napoleon III had taken advantage of the American Civil War of 1861-65 to
attempt to carve out a French Empire in Mexico, but the venture failed
dismally. In 1898 the U.S.A. resumed its expansion by annexing the
Hawaiian Islands and by relieving Spain of Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the
Philippines after the Spanish-American War. It subsequently converted
Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua into protectorates and
made the Caribbean an American lake, much to the alarm of the Latin-
American Republics, which bitterly resented the hegemony of the “Colossus
of the North.” The U.S.A., no less than Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
and Japan, thus carved out an overseas empire at the expense of weaker
nations. By 1914 the political map of the world had largely become the
map of the colonial possessions, protectorates, and spheres of economic
influence of the great States which dominated the international scene.

These remarkable transformations of the Western State System, which
was now literally a World System, greatly enhanced the power of its mem-
ers, enormously extended their territories and resources, and knit them
together into compact national units. But they did not modify the funda-
mental nature of the System or change the character of the competitive
struggle for power among its members. They rather extended the struggle
over the globe and intensified it to a great degree because the stakes of
diplomacy were larger than ever before. The balance of power now depended
less upon power relationships in Europe than upon developments all over
the earth. The “Concert of Europe” operated fitfully to keep the peace in
the race for empire, but rapid shifts in power relationships as a result of
national unification and colonial expansion were constantly threatening to
upset the equilibrium.

Bismarck’s system of alliances to preserve the status quo of 1871 was
superseded by new arrangements. Italy joined Germany and Austria-Hungary
in the Triple Alliance of 1882 out of pique over the French seizure of Tunis;
but her ambitions in the Near East and her hope of recovering Italia Irre-
denta made her an unreliable member of the combination. France, bent upon
recovering the territory and the prestige lost in the war with Prussia, won
Russia to her side in the Dual Alliance of 1894. After serious friction over
the partition of Africa and Asia, France entered into the Entente Cordiale
with England in 1904, which the Anglo-Russian agreements of 1907 con-
verted into the Triple Entente. Through these arrangements and the alliance
with Japan of 1902, Great Britain sought security from the menace of the
growing commercial and naval power of Germany. France sought the
revanche, and Russia strove to extend her influence in the Near East and the Balkans in competition with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Central Powers in turn similarly hoped to achieve security, expansion, and a place in the sun by close cooperation with one another. The two great military coalitions, cemented by common interests and secret treaties, faced one another across the armed frontiers and competed with one another in a race of armaments and a struggle for colonial possessions. Each diplomatic conflict—the Franco-German controversies over Morocco of 1904-05, 1908, and 1911, the Austro-Russian disputes in the Balkans of 1908, 1912, and 1913, and many lesser frictions—thus became crises between the alliances. An unstable equilibrium between these immense aggregations of power was maintained for some years, only to break down in a gigantic combat of nation-states in 1914.

Pan-Serbian terrorists, with the connivance of Serbian officials, assassinated the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne, at Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, on June 28, 1914. The very existence of Austria-Hungary seemed to be at stake, for irredentist and autonomist agitation, encouraged by Serbia, threatened dissolution to an Empire composed of diverse national elements. Following an unsatisfactory reply to the ultima-

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turn of July 23, Austria-Hungary declared war upon Serbia on July 28. Two days later the Russian Government mobilized its armies against Austria-Hungary and her ally, Germany. To yield now to Russian pressure would destroy Austrian prestige in the Balkans and pave the way for the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy. If Germany refused to support Austria-Hungary, the Triple Alliance would be weakened and Berlin would remain isolated within a circle of enemies. By the secret terms of the Franco-Russian alliance, mobilization was the signal for war. On July 31 the German Government dispatched a 12-hour ultimatum to St. Petersburg, demanding the suspension of all Russian war measures. No reply was received. On August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. The French Government had failed to restrain the Russian mobilization, which transformed the Austro-Serbian War into a general war. France, as a loyal ally, stood as staunchly behind Russia as Germany stood behind Austria-Hungary. War was declared on France on August 3. The German invasion of Belgium as a means of attacking France resolved British hesitancy and led to a declaration of war on Germany on August 4. Italy remained neutral. All German patriots rallied to the sacred cause of the Fatherland, certain that Germany had been attacked by scheming enemies and that their only course was to hack their way to victory through encircling foes.

In the colossal combat which ensued, Germany revealed herself to be the most formidable of all the Powers in military might and more than a match for any three of her major enemies. The defection of Italy left Germany with Austria-Hungary as her only ally. Turkey joined the fray on the German side on November 5, 1914; and Bulgaria followed suit on October 14, 1915. But, in this coalition of the four Central Powers, Germany was not only the keystone of the arch but the supporting pillars and the foundation stones as well. German industry and finance, German science and technology, German efficiency and morale proved equal to what seemed at the outset the impossible task of facing overwhelming odds. But here, as always in the Western State System, the coalition which proved itself the weaker was joined by one neutral State after another, alarmed at the prospect of the conquest of Europe by the most powerful State on the Continent. The blunders of German diplomacy contributed to this fatal result. The prodigious feats of German arms were in the end unable to rectify diplomatic mistakes and to turn the tide of battle against an anti-German coalition which included all the other Great Powers of the world and half the Minor Powers as well. Imperial Germany conquered vaster territories and won a position of military preponderance greater than that enjoyed by the first Napoleon, but in the end this military empire crumbled to pieces even more rapidly and completely than that of Bonaparte.
WORLD POWERS AND WORLD WARS

The major phases of the struggle need only be sketched here. The “Schlieffen Plan” of campaign contemplated a swift and decisive blow at France, which would release the German armies to face the Russian invasion from the east. French resistance was to be broken by a gigantic flank attack through Belgium to the north of the great border fortresses. With crushing efficiency, 53 of the 72 divisions in the German Army poured into Belgium, pulverized the Belgian fortifications with heavy artillery, swept aside the Belgian Army, defeated the French and English, and descended from the northeast upon Paris. At the Marne, however, the German onrush was stopped early in September, 1914, and the spear point of the invasion was deflected. In the race for the Channel ports the Allied armies retained possession of the French coast. The German lines were stabilized along the Aisne, and the conflict on the western front became a long-drawn-out war of attrition characterized by the costly and bloody futility of trench fighting. The decisive blow had failed, but the German armies held Belgium and the coal districts of northern France and could rest on the defensive, pending developments elsewhere.

Meanwhile the Russian invasion of East Prussia was crushed at Tannenberg on August 29, 1914, and the war in the east carried into Russian Poland. On May 24, 1915, Italy joined the Entente against her erstwhile allies, but without any marked effect upon the combat. An Allied attack upon the Dardanelles ended in disaster, and the entrance of Bulgaria into the war enabled Germany and Austria-Hungary to conquer Serbia and establish communication with Turkey. While the German command remained on the defensive in the west, the Russian invaders of Austrian Galicia were driven out, Poland was conquered, and Russia itself was deeply invaded. In the spring of 1916 the German armies resumed the offensive on the western front, with a gigantic but unsuccessful assault upon Verdun, key to the southern half of the Allied lines. In the summer a great Allied offensive on the Somme similarly broke down. The war in the west remained a stalemate. In the east, Rumania joined the Allies by declaring war on Austria, August 27, 1916, but was promptly conquered by the forces of the Central Powers. The German lines were pushed deeper into Russia, and the defeated and discredited Tsarist regime collapsed in revolution in March of 1917. The war in the east went on, but with diminished intensity, for Russian powers of resistance were approaching the vanishing point.

The military ascendency enjoyed by the Central Powers as a result of greater fighting efficiency, a unified command, and interior lines of communication was nullified by the diplomatic consequences of the war on the sea. Only one great naval battle between the British and German grand fleets was fought—off the coast of Jutland, on May 31, 1916. The German Navy
inflicted heavier losses on the enemy than it suffered, but the result was indecisive, and the German fleet remained in port for the balance of the war. Allied naval superiority held the Central Powers in the grip of an unbreakable blockade, to which they responded by submarine blockades of Great Britain and France. The resulting controversies with neutral governments furnished the ground upon which the United States and other countries entered the war on the Allied side in the spring of 1917. Despite this enormous accession to the power of the Allies, German victory still seemed possible. The German armies remained on the defensive in France throughout 1917; but a disastrous defeat was inflicted on Italy at Caporetto in October, and a second revolution in Russia brought peace in the east. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 4, 1918, was a conqueror’s peace, imposed by Berlin and Vienna on a prostrate foe.

If German military might could be concentrated for a decisive assault in the west before American fighting strength could turn the tide, there was still a possibility of success. In March of 1918 a terrific offensive was launched against the British lines in Picardy, which carried the German armies forward 50 miles toward Amiens and the Channel. In April another German attack in Flanders pushed the British back on Ypres. In May a third
The test of the objects of a war is the peace which follows it. Millions of human beings endured for four years the extremes of misery for ends which they believed to be but little tainted with the meager kinds of self-interest. But the historian of the future will consider, not what they thought, but what their statesmen did. He will read the Treaty of Versailles; and he will be merciful if, in its provisions with regard to coal and shipping and enemy property and colonies and indemnities, he does not find written large the Machtpolitik of the Acquisitive Society, the natural if undesired consequence of which is war.—R. H. Tawney, 1927.
capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism, was crushed by force in Central Europe and almost (but not quite) crushed in Soviet Russia by Allied intervention and blockade. Herewith a new schism appeared in the world community. The propertied elites of the West and the Marxist elite of Muscovy henceforth looked askance at one another with eyes of fear and hatred. But in 1919 the deadly fruits of this cleavage were still in the future.

The Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919, humbled Germany to the dust. The Reich lost all its overseas colonies, Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar Valley, Eupen-et-Malmédy, the Polish Corridor, part of Upper Silesia, and a portion of Schleswig. German investments and property abroad were seized. Germany’s coal production was reduced by one-third and her iron supplies by three-fourths. The German Merchant Marine was confiscated by the Allies. The German battle fleet was surrendered. The German Army was limited to 100,000 men and was forbidden to possess tanks, heavy artillery, or airplanes. The new German Navy was restricted to 6 battleships of not more than 10,000 tons, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and no submarines. The left bank of the Rhine and a 50-kilometer zone on the right bank were demilitarized. The left bank and the bridgeheads were subjected to military occupation for 15 years. A Reparation Commission was appointed to fix Germany’s financial obligations to indemnify the victors for civilian damages, pensions, and the Belgian war debt, on the theory that the war was a result of “the aggression of Germany and her allies.” Thanks to the collapse of Russia and the attitude of President Wilson, the terms of the secret inter-Allied Treaties of 1915-17 for the division of the spoils were not literally executed. But Germany was nevertheless crushed to earth and not permitted to join the League of Nations, which Wilson insisted on including in the peace settlement.

The Treaties of St. Germain with Austria, Trianon with Hungary, and Neuilly with Bulgaria furnished the basis for the relations between the victors and Germany’s allies. Among the defeated States was Russia. Despite the final triumph of the Red Army over the White Armies and the Allied forces (1918-21), the Russian State lost sovereignty over Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland and also over Bessarabia, which was annexed by Rumania with Allied approval. The Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary was completely destroyed as a political entity; and the House of Hapsburg, like the Hohenzollern and Romanov Dynasties, passed into the shades.

11 The Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey was repudiated by the Turkish Nationalists, who succeeded in driving the Greeks out of Asia Minor and in playing off the imperial ambitions of Great Britain and France against one another. The final Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 was consequently much more favorable to the new Turkish State than would otherwise have been the case.
publican Austria survived as the severed head of a truncated imperial body and was forbidden to join Germany. Hungary was reduced to the position of a small landlocked State, having lost most of its territory to its neighbors, Jugoslavia (Serbia), Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria was cut off from the Aegean Sea by the expansion of Greece; and Turkey was deprived of control over Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq (Mesopotamia).

A tremendous explosion of nationalism in 1918 and 1919 led to the political fragmentation of Central Europe in the name of self-determination. As a means of further reducing the power of the defeated States, the Allies approved the resurrection of an enlarged Poland, which was granted Austrian Galicia, part of German Upper Silesia, and the Corridor to the sea between East Prussia and the rest of Germany. In 1920, Poland extended her frontiers eastward by waging war upon Russia and by annexing Vilna, the ancient capital of Lithuania. The Allies likewise sanctioned the restoration of the independence of Bohemia in the new State of Czechoslovakia. They acquiesced in the creation of a Greater Serbia, into which Montenegro was incorporated; and they approved the enlargement of Rumania at the expense of Hungary and Russia. To the north of the Succession States of Austria-Hungary appeared the new Russian border States, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, each with a total population smaller than that of the capital cities of the great States of the west, but each intensely jealous of its new sovereignty and independence.

In terms of power relationships, the chief effect of the war and the peace was to upset completely the old equilibrium between the prewar coalitions and to replace it by the imposition upon the Continent of the military and diplomatic hegemony of France and her new allies in the east. The postwar alliances among the beneficiaries of the new distribution of power—France, Belgium, Poland, and the “Little Entente” States of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania—created a new coalition for the preservation of the status quo. Italy became master of the Adriatic by the annexation of territory at the expense of Austria and Jugoslavia and by the imposition of an Italian protectorate on Albania. She became a potential enemy of France and the Little Entente because of still unsatisfied territorial, colonial, and naval aspirations which could be fulfilled only by an alteration of the status quo disadvantageous to her neighbors. But she was incapable of realizing these ambitions unaided. Class conflict, impoverishment, political confusion, and international frustration brought to power in Rome in October, 1922, a new leader, Mussolini, and a new ideology and State form: Fascism, already foreshadowed in the “White Terror” in Hungary under Horthy. Here was devised an ominous formula through which the elites of money and land could protect themselves, so they believed, from proletarian and peasant
unrest by subsidizing gangsters to establish a despotism in the name of ultrapatriotism and salvation from Communism. The Italy of il Duce was driven to aggrandizement by its own internal tensions. It could scarcely challenge France or Britain, however, until powerful allies could be found.

But the hegemony of the French bloc was destined to pass away in the aftermath of world-wide economic and financial collapse—made almost in-

![Map of Europe after Versailles](image_url)

evitable by the progressive disruption of the world market and the world society after 1914. The universal insecurities and tensions engendered by the Great Depression destroyed whatever possibility may have existed during the relatively prosperous postwar years of establishing peace and plenty on firm foundations. The victors of 1919 would yield up few of their gains voluntarily. As years passed and difficulties accumulated, they became less and less disposed to resort to force to preserve the status quo. The vanquished (and the hungry States not among the vanquished) moved shrewdly, by devious diplomacy, by force, and by threats of force, to redress the balance. Japan seized Manchuria in 1931 in defiance of Washington, Geneva,
Nanking, and Moscow. Germany succumbed to Fascism two years later. Under Hitler the Reich threw off the shackles of Versailles and prepared to make a new bid for mastery of the Continent. Fascist Italy conquered an empire in Africa in 1935-36 and defied Great Britain and the League to keep the peace, enforce the law, or say her nay. In fear of Fascist aggression, the Soviet Union joined France and Czechoslovakia in a defensive coalition, but this enhancement of French power did not halt the disintegration of the system of alliances devised by the Quai d’Orsay. A hostile coalition began to take shape. The new balance of power was unstable. It promised wars and rumors of war in ever greater abundance. Less than two decades after Versailles, the work of the Paris Peace Conference was in large part undone. The State System moved fatally toward new conflicts and disasters. The cry for peace remained as empty as Dante’s despairing pleas for unity six centuries earlier.

The genesis and course of World War II of the 20th century will be dealt with in detail in later pages. Here it is enough to note that the new Armageddon was rendered “inevitable” by the restoration of a balance of power between the victors and the vanquished of 1919 and that this result was due to miscalculations and delusions on the part of the Western democratic Powers which had no parallel in the earlier history of diplomacy. The United States failed to become a member of the League and sought peace through disarmament and paper pacts involving no entanglements, no responsibilities, and therefore, in theory, no risks. The unfortunate “National Government” of Britain (1931-40) connived in the rearmament and in the aggressions of the Fascist Powers in the hope that peace could be had through “appeasement” and through the prospect of a Fascist attack on the U.S.S.R. Successive French Cabinets betrayed the League and wrecked France’s eastern alliances in the hope of pleasing Britain, appeasing Italy, placating Hitler, and turning the Third Reich toward the east.

The processes of Fascist aggrandizement and democratic defeatism marched in geometric progression from the plains of Manchuria to the Führerhaus in Munich. The refusal of Britain and the U.S.A. to take any effective measures to protect China from Japanese aggression in 1931 led to correct conclusions in Rome and Berlin. Nazi Germany left the League and the Disarmament Conference in October, 1933, and openly repudiated the military clauses of Versailles in March, 1935. In violation of the Treaty, Britain concluded a naval accord with the Reich in June, 1935, whereby Germany was granted a new navy 35% as large as the British fleet with 100% parity in submarines. Mussolini, with a secret pledge of French acquiescence from Laval, attacked Ethiopia in October, 1935, and made good his conquest in the face of the hypocritical farce of League sanctions. Before
his troops entered Addis Ababa, Hitler sent the Reichswehr into the Rhineland (March, 1936) in violation of Versailles and Locarno. London and Paris contented themselves with paper protests. When Rome and Berlin openly supported Franco’s Fascist rebellion in Spain in July, 1936, London and Paris organized an international “Nonintervention” Committee to deprive the Spanish Republic of arms for its defense. Washington adopted a similar policy. When Japan resumed aggression against China in July, 1937, the Western Powers wrote diplomatic notes and continued to permit their citizens to sell munitions and war supplies to the Japanese military machine. Warnings and appeals for action in resistance to the conquerors fell on ears as deaf as those to which Demosthenes had addressed like appeals 22 centuries previously.

The cooperation of aggressors and appeasers reached its apogee in 1938. Hitler’s seizure of Austria in March was viewed with secret approval by Downing Street and the Quai d’Orsay as foreshadowing the Nazi Drang nach Osten. His designs on Czechoslovakia were looked upon in a similar light. In the name of “self-determination” and “peace for our time,” Chamberlain and Daladier rejected Soviet offers of military aid to Prague and compelled the Czech Republic to surrender the Sudeten areas, containing all the Czech border defenses, to the Reich. The “Peace” of Munich of September 29, 1938, was followed by Polish and Hungarian seizure of other bits of Czech territory and by Anglo-German (September 30) and French-German (December 6) “peace” declarations which were designed to leave the West secure while the Fascist Powers satisfied their appetites at the expense of small countries and the U.S.S.R.

This tragic miscalculation proved fatal. The willingness and ability of the U.S.S.R. to crush ruthlessly all internal traitors and agents of Berlin and Tokyo, to resist Japanese attack on the borders of Manchuria and Mongolia, and to come to the armed aid of Czechoslovakia and the Western Powers (had they been willing to accept Soviet aid) convinced the Fascist Caesars that their path of least resistance lay elsewhere. The entire façade of the “Anti-Comintern” alliance was shrewdly and successfully designed to confuse the Western democracies. Cooperation among its members was directed toward purposes which could be realized only at the expense of France, Britain, and the United States. The original German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, was signed by Italy on November 6, 1937. Manchukuo, Hungary, and Fascist Spain, each a satellite of one of the original signatories, signed later. On September 27, 1940, Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo signed a 10-year alliance which threatened joint war against the United States if it attempted to save Britain or China from conquest.

Meanwhile the bitter fruits of appeasement had ripened. In mid-March,
1939, Hitler liquidated the remnant of Czecho-Slovakia, annexing Bohemia and Moravia, converting Slovakia into a German protectorate, and tossing Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary. This action belatedly convinced Chamberlain and Daladier that the Western Powers, rather than the Soviet Union, were in mortal danger of Fascist attack. Hitler seized Memel from Lithuania and threatened Poland. Mussolini annexed Albania and threatened Greece. London and Paris, having already thrown away the French alliance system and the French-Soviet mutual assistance pact of 1935, now sought to build a “peace front.” During the spring and summer of 1939 the Western Powers guaranteed the “independence” of Poland, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey and ultimately secured reciprocal pledges of common defense from Poland and Turkey. These pledges, however, were strategically unworkable without Soviet cooperation. Chamberlain declined to pay Stalin’s price for an alliance against the Reich—i.e., Soviet military control of the Baltic States and military access to Poland. Moscow accordingly abandoned the Western Powers and concluded a nonaggression pact with Berlin on August 23, 1939.

With its victims thus isolated, the Third Reich struck. Poland was invaded on September 1, conquered in two weeks, and partitioned between Germany and the U.S.S.R. by the Moscow agreement of September 28, 1939. Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. The long winter stalemate, carefully designed by the Nazi leaders to demoralize the Western democracies, was marked by the imposition of Soviet protectorates on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and by a Soviet attack upon Finland which finally compelled Helsingfors to accept peace terms in March, 1940, involving territorial cessions to the Soviet Union. With incredible speed, made possible by a new technique of warfare, German divisions conquered Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940, invaded and overran Luxemburg, Belgium, and the Netherlands on May 10, pierced the French defenses at Sedan on May 14, reached the Channel on May 21, drove the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk on June 3, crushed the French Army south of the Somme on June 5-10, took Paris on June 14, and compelled the French Government to sign an armistice on June 22. The ceremony took place in the same dining car in the Forest of Compiègne where the Second Reich had acknowledged defeat 22 years previously. Italy meanwhile declared war on France and Britain on June 10 and 15 days later signed an armistice with a France already defeated by the Nazi hosts.

The fall of France caused the U.S.S.R. to seek safety by seizing Bessarabia and northern Bucovina from Rumania and incorporating Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Union. The United States was moved by the debacle to give armed aid to Britain “short of war,” to appropriate $13,000,000,000 for armaments within the next four months, and to introduce military con-
scription during “peace” for the first time in the history of the Republic. Nazi plans to invade and subjugate Britain during the summer were frustrated. The Axis nevertheless dominated the Continent. Italian forces occupied Somaliland and invaded Egypt but were driven back into Libya, most of which was lost to the British by February, 1941. They met with equally humiliating defeat when they invaded Greece. Japan occupied French Indo-China and threatened Britain and America in the Far East. While London and other British cities suffered the agonies inflicted earlier on Shanghai, Addis Ababa, Madrid, Warsaw, and Rotterdam, a possibility developed that the conquest of the world by the Fascist Triplace might yet be averted by Soviet and American intervention. Given the temper and perspective of American and Soviet leaders, however, such intervention would never have taken the form of active hostilities had the enemy not forced the issue.

On April 6, 1941, as British forces liberated Addis Ababa and virtually completed the conquest of Mussolini’s East African Empire, Germany struck at Jugoslavia, after failing to win power in Belgrade by bribery and intrigue. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were already in the Fascist camp. In another blitzkrieg the invincible Wehrmacht crushed Jugoslavia in 11 days, invaded Greece, took Athens on April 27, and then seized Crete from its
British defenders through a daring assault by air-borne troops. At the same
time Rommel’s Africa Corps crossed the Mediterranean and drove toward
Egypt, while pro-Nazi elements in Syria, Iraq, and Iran jeopardized the
whole British position in the Middle East. But the German High Command
abandoned its opportunities in the Levant in favor of another plan, “Oper-
ation Barbarossa,” long-since formulated and delayed in execution only by
Jugoslav, Greek, and British resistance in the Balkans.

Hitler on June 22, 1941, like Napoleon on June 23, 1812, invaded Russia
with the largest and most formidable army thus far assembled for any cam-
paign. Having failed to invade England, der Führer followed Bonaparte’s
precedent in deciding to destroy the only remaining Great Power on the
Continent. The risks seemed small, even though mighty America (unlike
the feeble America of 1812, which waged war on England even as Russia
was invaded) extended lend-lease aid to the U.S.S.R. as well as to Britain,
and viewed the new assault as further evidence of Nazi intent to conquer
all the earth. Tokyo, moreover, had concluded a nonaggression pact with
Moscow in mid-April and decided to remain neutral. But the ever-victorious
Wehrmacht, now supported by Italian, Finnish, Rumanian, Hungarian,
Slovak, French, and even Spanish divisions, was expected to crush the Red
Army, take Moscow, and end the war in the east in four months.

Here, as in 1812, miscalculation of Russian fighting power was to prove,
in the end, fatal to the enterprise and to bring the world conqueror to final
defeat. But years of savage combat intervened before the result was con-
summated. In troops engaged, casualties suffered, cities destroyed, provinces
devastated, atrocities committed, and global stakes gambled for, the war in
Russia was the most gigantic and hideous clash of man-made military mon-
sters in all the history of warfare. Irresistible forces of invasion overran
the Baltic, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine during the summer, besieged Lenin-
grad, took Rostov, and opened a vast assault on Moscow in the autumn.
But they had failed to break the Soviet will to resist or to destroy the Red
Army, despite Hitler’s frantic boasts. In the colossal Battle for Moscow
(October 1–December 5, 1941) the Wehrmacht suffered its first major de-
feat and was presently forced to relinquish a fifth of the huge regions it
had overrun.

The next phase of the death struggle of the titans was initiated by the
desperate decision reached in Berlin, Tokyo, and Rome to open war on
the U.S.A. as a means of cutting off American supplies to Britain, Russia,
and China. That such supplies would continue to flow to the peoples still
resisting the Fascist Triplce was clear from definitions of American policy
incorporated in the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, and in the Atlantic
Charter drawn up by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14. Following pro-
THE GROWTH OF THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM

longed Japanese-American negotiations, deadlocked when Washington insisted upon Japanese evacuation of Indo-China and China as the price of economic concessions, the blow fell on December 7, 1941. Japanese carrier-based airplanes put out of action the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor. Japan declared war on America, Britain, and the Netherlands. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the U.S.A. Although Japan and the Soviet Union were still “at peace,” the wars in Europe, Africa, and Asia were now one in a world-wide combat of coalitions. In Washington on January 1, 1942, agents of 26 governments signed the “Declaration of the United Nations,” pledging themselves to joint efforts and to abstention from any separate armistice or peace.

Within the next six months, however, the Triplce reached the zenith of its conquests and came within an ace of global victory. With America and Britain helpless in Asia, Japanese forces swiftly took Guam, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies, threatened India, Australia, and Alaska, and isolated China from access to outside aid. At the same time, Rommel drove into Egypt and reached a point within 75 miles of Alexandria. Meanwhile the main body of the Wehrmacht, now increased to 240 divisions on the Russian front, launched a new assault in the south which carried it to the Caucasus and to Stalingrad and the Volga by August. A junction of Axis forces in the Middle East or of German and Japanese armies in India might well have left the United Nations incapable of further effective resistance, despite their potential superiority of men and arms. For some months in the summer of 1942, seven centuries after the first Mongol conquest of most of Eurasia, it appeared possible that the Triplce would win the world.

The tide of battle turned in three decisive engagements. On June 3-6, 1942, southwest of MIDWAY, a Japanese armada was met by American task forces under Admirals Spruance and Fletcher. In the first major naval battle fought entirely by airplanes, the enemy lost 4 carriers, 1 heavy cruiser, 3 destroyers, and 275 aircraft, compared with 1 carrier, 1 destroyer, and 150 planes for the U.S.A. Henceforth Japanese naval power was largely on the defensive in the western Pacific. At EL ALAMEIN, October 19-November 3, 1942, Montgomery’s Eighth Army defeated Rommel and began a long advance into the western desert. On November 8, Anglo-American forces landed in French Morocco and Algeria and opened the campaign which was to drive the Axis from North Africa by May, 1943. Finally, on November 19, 1942, new Soviet armies came to the aid of the defenders of STALINGRAD, who had clung to bridgeheads in the ruined city during three months of the most ferocious struggle ever waged within the confines of a modern metropolis. The counterattack, in a wide sweep of encirclement, trapped Paulus’s Sixth
INTO THE ABYSS

Army of 330,000 men and finally forced the surrender of the survivors on February 3, 1943.

The balance of the bloody and bitter tale cannot here be told, save in barest terms of grand strategy. Anglo-American leaders decided to concentrate their main effort against Germany and pledged themselves at Casablanca (January, 1943) to "unconditional surrender." Friction among allies, always the bane of coalition warfare, was bred by Soviet suspicion that Anglo-American delay in opening a Second Front in Europe was motivated by a wish to see the U.S.S.R. bled white. Churchill favored an invasion of Nazi "Fortress Europe" through Italy and the Balkans (the "soft underbelly," as he mistakenly called it), partly to forestall Soviet expansion westward. Roosevelt and his aides were convinced that only a cross-channel invasion of France would win victory. Sicily was invaded from North Africa in July, 1943. Mussolini fell on July 25 but was rescued by the Germans while the King and Marshal Badoglio surrendered to the Allies (September 3) and declared war on the Reich on October 14. But Nazi forces seized the country and defended it so stubbornly that Allied armies did not reach Rome until June 4, 1944. Meanwhile, despite American aid in growing volume and increasingly destructive air attacks from Britain on the cities of the Reich, almost the full weight of fighting the Wehrmacht continued to fall on the U.S.S.R.

To the military historians, and to poets capable of telling of infinite agony, unmeasured heroism, horror, misery, and triumph must be left the story of the end: how Soviet armies fought their way westward 40 miles a month for 30 fearful months, until they drove the frenzied foe from their soil, imposed peace on Rumania, Finland, and Bulgaria in August and September, 1944, helped free Jugoslavia, poured over Poland, stormed Budapest and Vienna, and finally took Berlin (May 2, 1945); how Eisenhower's armies at length swarmed onto the beaches of Normandy (June 6, 1944), defeated the defenders in northern France, liberated Paris, suffered a setback in the Belgian "Battle of the Bulge" (December-January, 1944-45), at last reached the Rhine, trapped 400,000 of the foe in the Ruhr, joined the Russians on the Elbe, overwhelmed Bavaria, reached the Czech frontier, and forced surrender on enemy commanders; how the fighting in Europe ended on May 7-8, 1945, with Hitler and Mussolini both gone; how Burma and the Philippines were taken from the Japanese, after bitter struggles for Guadalcanal, New Guinea, the Solomons, Saipan, Guam, and scores of other islands; how a fanatical enemy fought in vain to hold Iwo Jima and Okinawa; how Japan's cities were burned and blasted; how the U.S.S.R. entered the Asiatic war; how Hiroshima and Nagasaki were turned into columns of flame and smoke by atomic bombs; and how Tokyo surrendered
on August 14, 1945. All this and much else can be read in a thousand books and is burned into the souls of the millions who took part.

The diplomacy of Armageddon and its aftermath is dealt with below in most of its aspects, both hopeful and dismal. Here a simple judgment is enough to suggest that the Western State System and the world civilization of which it is a part are still caught in the cleavages and paradoxes which have brought immeasurable tragedy to its peoples in the recent past. That judgment is this: The victory of 1945, purchased at frightful cost in tears and blood, was again being wasted within three years after its attainment, despite the establishment of U.N.O., just as the victory of 1918 was wasted despite the establishment of the League. There can be no peace without government. There can now be no beginnings of world government save through collaboration for common purposes between America and the Soviet Union as the two Super-Powers of the new day. The coalition of victors having dissolved in a welter of new rivalries far more rapidly than happened after 1919 and 1815, common purposes appeared to be lost in mutual fear and hatred—with Americans blaming Russia and Russians blaming America for black villainy and base betrayal of all hopes of concord.

The defeat of the Fascist Powers had saved the world society from the prospect of swift and irreparable descent into barbarism and madness. But the grim disorders from which Fascism had sprung were all uncured: the instability and recurrent breakdowns of capitalism; the schism of rich and poor; the insecurities and neuroses of the middle classes; the loss of faith and purpose in the non-Soviet world (and to some degree in the Communist sphere as well); the march of cynicism, indifference, greed, and despair; the constant temptation confronting elites and masses to achieve full production and an illusion of social unity and direction through vast armaments, rumors of war, appeals to panic and rage, and promotion of bitter intolerances of class and creed and race, all in the name of freedom, peace, and salvation . . .

From this strife could come nothing but more strife and anarchy in a world still wrecked and starving (save in the Americas) from its most recent cataclysm. In feverish preparations for new tests of force, the still, small voice of old was lost. And the new voice of the scientists, who warned that more war in the atomic age meant universal death, was as yet unheeded by politicians and patriots, still dreaming of battles to come, of new “victories” to be gained, of One World to be made by imposing “our” will on “their” will. In the spirit of Richelieu and Machiavelli, in the mood of Cato and Cambyses and Thothmes, with the motives of Neanderthalers or ape-
men, statesmen schemed and plotted, sketched out "empires," imagined new and more glorious annihilations, thumped their chests and bellowed their wrath in the worship of the gods and ghosts of their tribes—all this in a civilization made one by science and faced with a final choice between unity or suicide. In these angry bewilderments and frustrations the old, bright vision of "peace on earth, good will to men" seemed all but certain to be betrayed and lost anew.

But our tale, though broken off, is by no means ended. Homo sapiens, more apt at learning than all other organisms and yet desperately reluctant to learn new ways, filled with self-destructive fury and yet imbued with an indomitable will to survive, may yet somehow find the means to avoid an irreparable collapse of his political and social artifacts into the fires of chaos and the gloom of death. He may yet arrive at the vision of a mankind reoriented in its loyalties, reawakened to its dangers and opportunities, and remotivated and reorganized in its politics. Such a race might be capable of using the wonder-working jinni released by the Aladdin's lamp of science to make all the earth a garden and all its children happy dancers in a new dawn of a civilization brighter than any yet known. Perhaps . . . ? The record of the past admits of hope. But man today must pause anew in the stream of time, as he has so often through many yesterdays, before a fateful question having as yet no answer.

**Suggested Readings**

*General Texts*


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## A. The American Sphere

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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>G. 480,000</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>45,452</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Quito</td>
<td>275,936</td>
<td>3,175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>10,204</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Montevideo</td>
<td>72,153</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>San Salvador</td>
<td>13,176</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Ciudad Trujillo</td>
<td>19,332</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Monrovia</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>G. 1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Tegucigalpa</td>
<td>44,275</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Asuncion</td>
<td>149,770</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Managua</td>
<td>57,143</td>
<td>1,015,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>San José</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>33,667</td>
<td>635,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Reykjavik</td>
<td>39,709</td>
<td>130,000</td>
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</table>

## B. The Soviet Sphere

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Area, square miles</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>8,390,490</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>120,782</td>
<td>23,625,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
<td>91,671</td>
<td>16,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jugoslavia</td>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>95,558</td>
<td>16,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>49,358</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>35,875</td>
<td>8,500,000</td>
</tr>
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## THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM

**SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE WORLD.**—*(Continued)*

January 1, 1948

### D. Western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Area, square miles</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>123,627</td>
<td>66,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>45,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>212,659</td>
<td>40,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>196,607</td>
<td>26,765,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>13,712</td>
<td>9,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>11,775</td>
<td>8,375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>35,490</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>50,257</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>32,369</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>173,347</td>
<td>6,675,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Bern</td>
<td>15,944</td>
<td>4,275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>16,575</td>
<td>4,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>124,556</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
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## D. Western Europe. (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>State</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Area, square miles</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichtenstein</td>
<td>Vaduz</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>5,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vatican City</td>
<td>Vatican City</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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## E. Near and Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Area, square miles</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>296,107</td>
<td>19,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>386,000</td>
<td>17,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Teheran</td>
<td>628,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>C. 350,000</td>
<td>C. 12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>C. 250,000</td>
<td>C. 11,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>5,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Mecca</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>C. 5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Bagdad</td>
<td>116,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>San'a</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>58,456</td>
<td>2,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Beyrouth</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Muscat</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Jordan</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>34,740</td>
<td>C. 400,000</td>
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</table>

## F. Far East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Area, square miles</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Chungking</td>
<td>4,278,352</td>
<td>470,026,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>146,690</td>
<td>73,115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>200,148</td>
<td>18,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Peace through supremacy seems to be one of the more popular peace devices. "We must win the peace by assuring the continuation of America's supremacy in the air," said Col. N. Jay Boots the other day. "Common sense," said Alexander de Seversky, "indicates that we shall require air power superior to that of any potential enemy or group of enemies." In short, be supreme. The advice is offered by a formidable group of thinkers, and it reminds us of that charming bit of Gilbertian advice: "Oh, be Early English, ere it is too late!" The thing we find hard to understand about supremacy is why, if it is right for America, it isn't right for every other nation. If it's sensible for Americans to establish American supremacy, surely it is sensible for, oh, let's say Russians to establish Russian supremacy. Or for Guatemalans to establish Guatemalan supremacy. Yet if Russia were to announce that "common sense indicates" that peace could be attained only through Russian air supremacy, Col. Boots would be fit to be tied. One nation's common sense is another nation's high blood pressure. Our advice for winning the peace is not to establish supremacy in the air but to establish political union on the ground.—The New Yorker, August 12, 1944.

Book Two

IN QUEST OF GOVERNMENT

Peace is a personal thing, and it must be founded on individual persons, not on nations. Freedom is a personal thing, it is a right of individual persons, not of their governments. Union is a personal thing, it is a government of, by, and for individual persons, not a collection of collectivities. And the greatest hope we have today to advance these ancient aspirations is that this war is not what we pretend it is, an impersonal drama played by collective nouns—nations, armies, task forces, assembly lines, but a thing that keeps facing each of us and all of us together with the most personal mysteries of life and death. . . . This war is not less personal when one is far from action, waiting, waiting, in the lonely dread that broke even the mighty warrior who slew Goliath. . . . How many hearts will echo the vain lament of David: "O my son Absalom, my son, my son Absalom! Would God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son!" They are not dying for us. They are dying for our mistakes, for our lack of faith, hope, charity, courage, vision, for our failure to think things through and act in time. The least we can do is to live henceforth for them, live determined to bring now from all this suffering the great good that conscience bids us each to bring.—Clarence K. Streit, 1944.
INTRODUCTION TO BOOK TWO

Looking backward upon the lost unity of Christendom and the memory of the shattered Pax Romana, Western mankind in our own age has been increasingly moved to look forward to some means of recapturing tomorrow the vanished peace of yesterday. The quest is made urgent by growing awareness that today’s designs for world politics is a formula for bloodshed and ruin, threatening the survival of the global society which Western civilization has brought into being.

In the present inquiry a historical résumé of the political experience of the species has been deemed useful as a prelude to an attempted analysis of the contemporary forms and forces of the Western State System. That System is essentially an aggregation of “sovereign” man-made monsters, struggling with one another for ascendancy like a pit of writhing snakes, in which every contestant both inflicts and suffers grievous injury in the striving of each against all. But these reptiles have tongues and consciences as well as fangs, and they speak invariably of “unity,” “justice,” “law,” “brotherhood,” and “peace” as the goals of their efforts, even in their most tortured and tormented combats for supremacy.

While such utterances may be dismissed as hypocrisy—i.e., “the tribute which vice pays to virtue,” as La Rochefoucauld asserted—it will yet be well in these pages, before examining the nature of the struggle for power as such, to describe and evaluate the particular ways in which States and statesmen have sought to give at least some substance to the shadows of their professed aspirations and ideals. The enterprise calls for an examination, seriatim, of such rules of law, practices of diplomacy, procedures of agreement, and agencies of collaboration as the nation-states have evolved as limitations upon anarchy. The record of these endeavors, thus far, has been one of repeated failure. But it is also one of partial success, and of hope. On both counts, it merits exploration in the pages immediately following.
CHAPTER III

LAW AMONG THE LAWLESS

1. SOURCES AND SANCTIONS

Positive (instituted or voluntary) law derives its origin from will and is either human or divine. Human positive law includes civil law, which proceeds from the power of the State, the law of nations, which receives its binding force from the will of all nations or of many, and law which does not emanate from the power of the State though subject to it, such as the commands of a father or a master.—Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625.

The province of international law may be described as a province half-way between the province of morals and the province of positive law. It is law without a forceful sanction. There is no earthly power of which all nations are subject; there is no power, therefore, to enforce obedience to rules of conduct as between nation and nation. International law is, moreover, a law which rests upon those uncodified, unenacted principles of right action, of justice and of consideration which have so universally obtained the assent of men's consciences, which have so universal an acceptance in the moral judgments of men everywhere that they have been styled laws of nature but which have nearer kinship to ethical maxims than to positive law. International law is, therefore, not law at all in the strict sense of the term. It is not, as a whole, the will of any state.—Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1890.

LAWLESSNESS is the son of anarchy and the brother of violence. These unpleasant companions flourish in communities where common purposes, implemented by an effective central power, are insufficient to enforce peace. In this generation the modern community of nations has entered upon a "time of troubles" in which the restraints of law upon brute force appear to be conspicuous by their absence. In an epoch of contending States, with the great aspirants for mastery seeking to crush their rivals, a consideration of "international law" will appear to some to be wholly academic or to have only historical interest. This view, however, is shortsighted. Even in an age of wars of annihilation, the older rules of the law of nations are still widely observed. Here (as elsewhere) respect for law attracts no attention, whereas violations "make the headlines." The painful processes
LAW AMONG THE LAWLESS

of interstate unification, moreover, whether achieved by the sword of tyranny or by the voluntary federation of those who survive the holocaust, will inevitably continue through the building of the world order of the future on foundations derived from the world public law of the present and the past. That law, therefore, cannot be dismissed as obsolete. So long as men and nations find it useful to act in accordance with established rules, international law will remain a living and growing body of legal principles, honored more in the observance than in the breach.

For the past three centuries the States of the Western State System have played the game of international politics in accordance with certain generally recognized rules which have usually been regarded as binding upon all the members of international society. These rules were first systematically formulated and set down as principles of the "Law of Nations" by Hugo Grotius at the beginning of the 17th century. Like many rules of law, however, they had been developing for many centuries before they were reduced to written form. Once put into writing and made the object of scientific study, they developed at a much more rapid rate than before. They became a well-defined and logically integrated set of principles indicating the rights and obligations of States in almost every conceivable international situation. The mere recital of these principles in any complete fashion would fill many hundreds of pages. Since the days of Grotius, innumerable scholars and jurists in all lands have written elaborate textbooks and treatises for the purpose of describing these rules and relating them to one another. Hundreds of judicial tribunals, both national and international, in countless thousands of cases, have developed international law by an endless process of adapting established rules to new situations. Thousands of treaties and conventions between States have made more specific the conceptions of rights and obligations which have grown out of custom and usage. This constant adaptation, reinterpretation, and elaboration of principles have created a vast body of international jurisprudence which could not be described adequately in many volumes, much less in one chapter of a single volume. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that the great textbooks are available in almost every part of the world, makes it unnecessary for the purposes of the present study to undertake more than a brief and simple sketch of the basic concepts underlying the whole structure.

Attention will be devoted only to that portion of international law which applies to States, i.e., "public" international law, as distinct from "private" international law. The former has to do with States as legal and political entities. It consists of the rules and principles which the whole society of States habitually expects its members to observe in their relations with one another. It seeks to deduce from these rules and principles the legal rights
and obligations of States in each particular situation. Private international law, on the other hand, has to do with the rights and obligations of individuals as they are affected by differences in the legislation of States. The name "conflict of laws" is often applied to this body of legal principles, for it deals with situations in which the legal status of persons or property is in doubt because of overlapping jurisdictions and divergencies of national legislation.

Inasmuch as public international law differs in many respects from other types of law, as has been suggested above, it will be useful to consider at the outset the problem of its "sources" and "sanctions." Every statesman, diplomat, and jurist who is confronted with a legal problem concerning the relations among States must know where to look for the principles, precedents, and established rules and procedures which will indicate the rights and obligations of the parties in the particular situation. In dealing with problems of national, or "municipal," law, as it is sometimes called, this problem is comparatively simple; for lawyers and jurists can readily "find the law" in written constitutions, in statutes passed by national or local legislatures, or (in Anglo-Saxon countries) in past judicial decisions which furnish precedents for future cases. Once the law has been determined upon and a decision has been reached, the judgment will be carried out by the court, the sheriff, or, if need be, by the whole force of the State. In criminal cases, the convicted offender is fined, sentenced to jail, or sometimes executed for his crime. In civil cases, the injured party is awarded damages at the expense of him who has committed the injury. In international law, however, the situation is quite different. The law is not usually reduced to statutory form, and there is no judge, jury, sheriff, or police force to ensure its execution. In both its sources and its sanctions, i.e., the means available to ensure its enforcement, it differs markedly from other types of law.

The sources of international law may be divided into four categories in order of their importance: (1) agreement; (2) custom; (3) reason; (4) authority. In every international law case, the best and most conclusive sources of information regarding the rights of the parties are the written agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, and the like, which the States involved have concluded with one another. Such written agreements, if properly signed and ratified, are unqualifiedly binding upon the parties. All modern States have hundreds of treaties with other States, dealing with an enormous variety of matters. The texts of these treaties are usually published by the signatory parties in a national treaty series. There is also available a large number of privately published compilations of treaty agreements. States are always free to make international law between them-
LAW AMONG THE LAWLESS

selves by treaty, provided that they do not violate the rights of third States. In this way, they agree upon the rules and principles which they propose henceforth to follow in dealing with one another. If such agreements cover the case in hand, it is unnecessary to look further for sources of law, for specific agreements supersede all other possible sources.

But if existing agreements do not cover adequately the situation under consideration, the established customs, practices, and usages of States in dealing with analogous problems in the past furnish the next best guide. Differences of opinion are obviously more likely to arise regarding rights based exclusively upon custom than is the case where rights are specifically defined in written agreements. But the great bulk of modern international law is based upon custom and practice. When it can be clearly shown that a particular principle or practice has been generally observed by the majority of States over a long period of time, no question will ordinarily be raised regarding its legal validity. When, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court was obliged to pass upon the legality of the capture of a Spanish fishing smack during the Spanish-American War, it held the capture unlawful on the ground that "at the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent States, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed, and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war" (The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677). The Court further held that a practice which had originally been a matter of custom or comity could readily become an established rule of law through securing the general assent of States. This view has been followed by practically all courts, arbitral tribunals, jurists, and text writers.

When appeals to agreements and to customs both fail to indicate the rights and obligations of States, recourse is had to reason and to authority, i.e., to logical deductions from established general principles, and to arbitral awards, the decision of courts, and the opinions of text writers and jurists. Novel situations are constantly arising in contemporary international relations with regard to which no agreements have been concluded and no customs have developed. These are ordinarily dealt with by seeking to apply to the new facts a line of reasoning resting upon established general rules accepted as a priori premises. If, by this procedure, a definition of rights and obligations can be arrived at which appears to be in harmony with the whole body of international jurisprudence, it is more than likely to be accepted by the parties as a source of law in the novel situation. Similarly,
the judgments of judicial tribunals, national or international, and the views of widely recognized authorities are constantly relied upon as guides to the law, chiefly to support the conclusions to which a consideration of agreements, customs, and reason has already led. Judicial decisions and arbitral awards are binding only upon the parties to the disputes of which they are settlements, but taken as a whole they indicate to all States the prevalent conception of rights and duties accepted in international society. Agreement and authority are written sources of international law. Custom and reason are unwritten only in the sense that they are not incorporated in treaties or decisions. The precedents, practices, and usages out of which they emerge, however, are to be found in the diplomatic correspondence and State papers maintained in governmental archives.

The sanctions of international law may be classified, in order of their importance, as (1) habit, (2) expediency, (3) good faith, and (4) organized force. Those rules and principles which have been habitually observed for the longest period of time are obviously most likely to be observed in the future, since the whole force of inertia lies behind them, and States, no less than individuals, are prone to do things in ways which are easy because traditional. The principle of the immunity and inviolability of diplomatic representatives, for example, has been generally observed by States for more than 2,500 years and is almost never willfully violated at the present time. Considerations of self-interest and political expediency are also influential in securing the observance of established principles, particularly as regards the international law of war. At the outbreak of the American Civil War there was some disposition in Union circles to treat captured members of the Confederate armies not as prisoners, in accordance with the laws of war, but as rebels who might be punished for treason, arson, murder, and other individual acts. Once it was realized, however, that the Confederacy would promptly retaliate on Federal prisoners and that the Union cause would be injured rather than aided by the contemplated departure from established rules, the intention was abandoned and the usual principles governing the conduct of hostilities were observed on both sides during the conflict. A more farsighted view of military and political expediency on the part of the German High Command would similarly have dictated observance of agreements forbidding the use of poison gas in World War I and might have precluded the incredible Nazi atrocities of World War II. In the former case, the Allies retaliated and soon demonstrated that their facilities for the manufacture and use of poison gas were far greater than those of the Central Powers. In the latter case, the rulers of the Third Reich aroused against themselves an irresistible storm of hatred and finally ended up in the dock and on the gallows at Nuremberg.
LAW AMONG THE LAWLESS

Good faith as a sanction of international law has been conspicuous by its absence in the 20th century. The high priests of sovereignty (including those of the Atlantic democracies, despite their self-righteous denunciation of "totalitarian" lawlessness) have increasingly accepted the Machiavellian view that the law should be observed only when it is expedient to do so. As for organized force, there is none—for this term refers, not to violence by State against State, but to coercive authority exercised by the whole community against lawbreakers. Covenants and Charters, solemnly signed by sovereignties, have provided for collective coercion of international aggressors and criminals. But so long as the culprits and the "police" are not individuals but States, and so long as diplomats and patriots act in terms of national self-interest, "collective security" remains at best an empty dream and at worst a rationalization of Realpolitik. Organized force thus remains the least effective sanction of the law of nations.

2. RECOGNITION

Vast stretches of international law are always uncertain and ambiguous and others may be so under certain conditions; for the balance of interests and power to which international law owes its existence as a system of valid legal rules is uncertain and precarious in proportion to the importance of the interests and elements of power at stake. International law is certain only in those areas where the balance of interests and power is relatively stable, as for instance with respect to diplomatic immunities, territorial jurisdiction, extradition, arbitral procedure. It becomes temporarily uncertain even in these areas when the balance of interests and power with respect to them is temporarily disturbed. International law is, however, always and of necessity uncertain when it deals with "political" matters—that is, those which directly affect the power relations of states. The instability of these relations, which is a function of the balance of power as the organizing principle of the international community, is inevitably reflected in the legal rules which try to regulate them. The endeavor to "re-establish the certainty of the law" on the international scene amounts, therefore, to the attempt at reviving in wide areas of international law a fiction with which positivist jurisprudence has blinded itself to the reality of international law.—HANS J. MORGENTHAU, 1946.

Since States are the persons of public international law, it follows that international law is concerned primarily with such sovereign political entities as are generally recognized as "States" within international society. With certain exceptions which will be noted below, no individual or corporation, no community or territorial group can claim rights under international law unless it is regarded by the members of the State System as a State,
RECOGNITION

independent and coequal with other States. It is generally agreed that a State, in order to be worthy of the name, must possess citizens or subjects and a well-defined territory. Since land was the most important form of wealth and power, and sovereignty was associated with territorial property at the time when the foundations of international law were being laid, a territorial basis has always been regarded as a prerequisite to statehood. But the question of whether a particular political entity does or does not constitute a State in fact (de facto) is not, in itself, a problem of international law at all. A "State" may exist for a long period of time as a sovereign political entity, but it does not become a State in the legal sense until it has been received into the family of nations as a recognized member. Switzerland and the Netherlands before 1648, the United States between 1776 and 1778, Japan prior to 1854, and Turkey prior to 1856 all constituted de facto States without being persons of international law, i.e., without being formally admitted as full-fledged members into the Western State System. States are initiated into the society of States only by the process of diplomatic recognition extended to them by other States.

When and under what circumstances established States shall recognize new States is entirely a matter of policy. That is to say, the granting of recognition of new States is entirely discretionary, and not mandatory, on the part of other States already established and recognized. It may be granted at once, it may be delayed, or it may be withheld indefinitely for legal reasons, for political reasons, for good, bad, or indifferent reasons. A new State seeking recognition has no means of compelling other States to grant it. Considerations of convenience and the obvious utility of maintaining diplomatic contacts with a de facto State, however, will usually dictate its recognition by other States as soon as its existence and independence are firmly established. New States may be recognized individually or collectively by other States. Greece was recognized collectively by the Powers at the London Conference of 1830. Belgium was likewise recognized collectively in 1831, Montenegro, Serbia, and Rumania in 1878, and Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1918.

Recognition may be granted in a variety of ways but once granted is irrevocable. When granted, it dates back, so far as legal rights and obligations are concerned, to the date of the establishment of the new State. Normally, one State recognizes another by a formal declaration to this effect, followed by an official exchange of diplomatic agents. Either the dispatch or the reception of a diplomat constitutes recognition. The reception of the consular agents of a new State through the granting to them of "exequaturs" authorizing them to assume their functions is also equivalent to recognition, though the sending of a consular agent to receive an exequatur from the
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authorities of a new State does not necessarily imply recognition on the part of the sending State.\(^1\) The signature of an international agreement, a salute to the flag, or any other similar act authorized by the responsible authorities of the State whose officials take such action likewise constitutes recognition. In the U.S.A., as in all other countries, the power to recognize new States and governments is vested in the executive, i.e., the President and the Secretary of State. Congress has no power to grant, or to compel the granting of, recognition; and the courts never question executive discretion in such matters.\(^2\) The United States has usually recognized new States by official proclamation of the President or Secretary of State.

If an outside State recognizes the independence of a new State during a period of conflict in which the new State’s claim to independence is still being contested by the State formerly having jurisdiction over its territory, the act of recognition takes on the appearance of intervention or unlawful interference in the domestic affairs of another State. The injured party may legitimately regard such premature recognition as a hostile act. France recognized the independence of the United States by signing treaties of alliance and commerce with American representatives at Paris on February 6, 1778, when Great Britain was still making active efforts to subdue her rebellious colonies. Great Britain consequently declared war against France. Had the European Powers recognized the independence of the Confederacy during the American Civil War, this action similarly would have been regarded as a *casus belli* on the part of the Union. The recognition of Mexico and the other Latin-American Republics by the United States in 1822 and 1823 was granted at a time when Spain still asserted claims to her lost empire but when all prospects of her recovering it had vanished. Japan’s recognition of the Manchurian puppet State of Henry Pu-Yi on September 15, 1932, was a violation of the territorial integrity of China and might have been treated as an act of war by China had the latter been in a position to offer resistance. In every such case, the State whose rights are violated by premature recognition has a valid complaint against the recognizing State, which has thus sanctioned the partition of its territory before the alleged new State has in fact established its independence.

Almost all the foregoing observations are also applicable to the recognition of new governments within States already recognized. A revolution within a State normally terminates its diplomatic relations with other States. The State continues to be a person of international law, but in the absence of the recognition of its new government by other governments it has no

\(^1\) See pp. 198-199.

means of communicating with outside States. (Recognition of revolutionary governments, no less than recognition of new States, is a question of policy on the part of other governments.)

During the period from 1793 down to the first Wilson Administration, the United States usually adhered to the so-called de facto theory of recognition, which holds that new governments should be recognized as soon as they are in fact in control of the State, in contrast to the de jure theory, which denies the right of revolution and holds that only legitimate, constitutional governments are entitled to recognition. When Washington’s Cabinet in 1793 granted an official reception to the new French Minister, Citizen Genêt, i.e., extended diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary regime in France, it did so on the basis of Secretary of State Jefferson’s view that the only relevant question was whether the new regime was in effective control of France and therefore in a position to represent the French State and discharge its international obligations. (The de facto theory was followed by the United States quite consistently with respect to the various revolutions in Europe and Latin America during the 19th century.

The Wilson Administration (1913-21) reverted to the de jure theory of recognition in a modified form designed to foster “democracy” in other States and to prevent or penalize the revolutionary overthrow of constitutional governments. This use of diplomatic recognition as a weapon of national policy was effective among the lesser States of the Caribbean but wholly fruitless in dealing with Russia. Washington continued to recognize the Kerenski regime for five years and more after it had been overthrown by the Soviet Revolution and refused to recognize the Soviet Government until November 16, 1933, sixteen years after its establishment. During and after World War II the U.S.A. recognized new governments in accordance with the dictates of political expediency. Washington thus dealt with the Vichy regime in vanquished France as legally identical with the Third Republic; withheld formal recognition of the De Gaulleist regime of National

3 See F. L. Schuman, American Policy toward Russia since 1917, 1928. In 1907, and again in 1923, the United States persuaded the Central American Republics to sign treaties in which they pledged themselves not to recognize governments set up in their territories by revolutionary means. The signatories thus bound themselves to accept the de jure theory of recognition. When a revolution broke out in Salvador in December, 1931, the other States withheld recognition from the new government. In December, 1932, Costa Rica and Salvador denounced the 1923 treaty, but it is still theoretically binding until three States denounce it. In January, 1934, all the Republics, as well as the United States, recognized the new government of Salvador. In dealing with the Latin-American Republics the United States has often recognized governments of which it approves and denied recognition to governments of which it disapproved. Thus Wilson refused to recognize Huerta in Mexico in 1913-15, and Roosevelt refused to recognize the “radical” regime of Grau San Martin in Cuba in 1933.
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Liberation until October 23, 1944; recognized the Badoglio regime in Italy on September 3, 1943; and recognized new governments in Poland (July 5, 1945), Austria (October 20, 1945), and Hungary (November 2, 1945). The U.S.A., on the other hand, withheld recognition of the quasi-Fascist regime of Farrell and Péron established in Argentina in February, 1944, only to reverse itself on April 3, 1945, following a belated Argentine declaration of war on Germany. \(^{(1)}\) On April 19, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes indicated that the U.S.A. would henceforth abide in principle by the *de facto* theory of recognition.

These two divergent “theories” of recognition should not be confused with the two kinds or stages of recognition, *de facto* and *de jure*. The former phrase is applied to diplomatic recognition of a new State or government not followed at once by an exchange of diplomatic representatives. Britain, for example, extended *de facto* recognition to the Soviets by the trade agreement of March, 1921. *De jure* recognition was not granted until February, 1924, when diplomatic agents were exchanged between London and Moscow. Premature recognition granted to a pretended revolutionary government when the lawful authorities are still fighting to suppress the uprising is, of course, a violation of the rights of the legitimate government. Thus the simultaneous German and Italian recognition of the Spanish Fascist Rebels on November 18, 1936, was an act of intervention against the legal government of Spain, as was the earlier recognition extended by Guatemala on November 11, and the later recognition extended by France and Britain on February 27, 1939.

If the premature recognition of a revolutionary government or of a seceding State is a violation of the rights of those still asserting jurisdiction, the refusal of outside States to recognize *de facto* control of territory by those who have successfully asserted jurisdiction may also be deemed an injury. Where such a policy is utilized as a sanction to deter or punish violation of earlier rights, however, it may be regarded as legally justified, whatever judgment may be passed upon its political expediency. \(^{(2)}\) Under the “Stimson Doctrine” of 1932 the United States and many members of the League refused to recognize territorial changes brought about by force in violation of the Nine Power Pact of 1922 and the Pact of Paris of 1928. Washington thus refused to recognize Manchukuo or the Wang Ching-wei puppet regime installed at Nanking in March, 1940, and recognized by Japan as the “Government” of China on November 30. The United States recognized the German annexation of Austria. It granted recognition to the Franco regime in Spain on April 1, 1939. But it declined to recognize the Nazi conquests of Czechoslovakia, Albania, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Jugoslavia, and Greece, preferring to
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maintain relations with the exiled governments of some of these States. Britain followed a similar course. Roosevelt’s reply of June 15, 1940, to Reynaud’s last despairing appeal declared that the United States would “not consider valid any attempts to infringe by force the independence and the territorial integrity of France.”

The granting or withholding of diplomatic recognition is by itself of no particular efficacy in promoting or discouraging revolution and aggression. In an organized community of nations, recognition would of course not be granted to “rights” acquired in violation of the law. But, in such a community, collective measures of prevention and punishment would be applied to prevent continued enjoyment of such alleged rights. In the absence of such measures, the wisdom of ignoring political or military facts and adhering to legal fictions is at best doubtful. In a world of hard and inescapable realities, which the champions of legal rectitude have neither the desire nor the power to change, Jefferson’s de facto theory of recognition has much to commend it.4

In summary, the rights and obligations of international law are in general applicable only to States recognized by the members of the family of nations, and States can deal officially with other States only through recognized governments. In both cases, recognition is a discretionary political act of the executive authorities of other States. There are, nevertheless, certain “persons” of international law which are not true States but which enjoy a certain qualified legal status. Members of confederations and other unions, though not sovereign States, may have their own diplomatic representation

4 A reductio ad absurdum of the nonrecognition doctrine was achieved in Soviet-American relations. From 1917 to 1933 the United States denied recognition to the Soviet Government. From 1917 to 1922 the United States, in the name of preserving the “territorial integrity” of Russia, refused to recognize the independence of the Baltic States, which had been promptly recognized by the unrecognized Soviet Government. In the Anglo-Soviet negotiations of 1939, London refused to meet Moscow’s terms for an alliance at the expense of the “independence” of the Baltic States. By virtue of this refusal, Moscow came to terms with Berlin and later extinguished the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. On July 23, 1940, Sumner Welles, apparently forgetting that the Baltic States had been early targets of the American nonrecognition policy, issued a statement declaring “From the day when the peoples of these Republics first gained their independent and democratic form of government the people of the United States have watched their admirable progress in self-government with deep and sympathetic interest. The policy of this Government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one State, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign State, however weak” (U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, July 27, 1940, p. 48). Britain also declined to recognize Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. An empty legal formula thus became an obstacle to Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration, despite the desperate need of such collaboration to safeguard each of the three Powers from the Nazi threat.

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abroad and may be granted certain customary rights under international law by outside States. Such is the peculiar position of some of the self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth of Nations and of some of the Republics of the U.S.S.R. Neutralized States, protectorates, and suzerainties are sovereign only in part, but they may be recognized as States by third parties. Insurgents and belligerents, i.e., groups of armed individuals conducting hostilities for public purposes, are also entitled to the usual rights of the international law of war, provided that they observe the reciprocal obligations. When outside States recognize a condition of "insurgency" in a particular State, they take cognizance of hostilities in which they are bound to abstain from, and to restrain their nationals from, any interference which might aid the rebels. The local State is not answerable for the acts of insurgents unless it can be shown to have been negligent in protecting foreign lives and property. When a status of "belligerency" is recognized in a State afflicted with civil strife (e.g., U.S.A., 1861-65), outside States are bound to observe all the rules of neutrality in dealing with both sides. In these instances, entities which are not genuine States attain a qualified legal status. With the exception of such special cases, however, public international law is concerned only with recognized States and governments.5

3. RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Nations being free, independent, and equal and having a right to judge according to the dictates of conscience, of what is to be done in order to fulfill its duties; the effect of all this is, the producing, at least externally, and among men, a perfect equality of rights between nations, in the administration of their affairs, and the pursuit of their pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their conduct, of which others have no right to form a definite judgment; so that what is permitted in one, is also permitted in the other, and they ought to be considered in human society as having an equal right.—EMERIC DE VATTÉL, Droit des gens.

In so far as the whole structure of public international law can be deduced from elementary principles, it may be said to rest upon certain broad concepts inherent in the idea of the sovereignty of the State which lies at the basis of the whole Western State System. A State which is sovereign is not

5 The severance of diplomatic relations, like the granting of recognition, is also an act of policy, usually resorted to as a protest or as a prelude to war. War automatically severs diplomatic relations between belligerents. Under the law of peace, a rupture of relations may lead to political retaliation but usually does not create a legal grievance. Contrary to popular impression, recognition, once granted, cannot legally be "withdrawn." To sever relations with a recognized government does not end its "recognition" but expresses displeasure with its policies.

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subject to the will of any other State. It exists as an independent entity, coequal with other sovereignties and with exclusive jurisdiction over its territory. From this elemental fact, it follows that every State possesses certain fundamental rights and obligations with respect to other States. It possesses, for example, a right of “existence,” or self-preservation, and an obligation to recognize that other States enjoy the same right. It possesses a right of “independence” and an obligation to respect the same right in other States. It possesses a right of legal “equality” with other States and a right of exercising its power and enforcing its legislation within its frontiers, i.e., a right of “jurisdiction.” It is sometimes said that States also possess fundamental rights of property and of intercourse. In view of the logical relationship between these fundamental rights and the whole superstructure of rules and principles, it will be legitimate for the purposes of the present survey to suggest the superstructure by an examination of the meaning of the fundamental rights.

The right of existence, or self-preservation, is obviously the most important and elementary. That every sovereign State is free to take any action which may be necessary to preserve itself as a political entity, even to the extent of infringing upon the rights of other States, has long been recognized as axiomatic. This right must be strictly construed, however, for no State can lawfully violate the rights of others on the basis of vague and general allegations that its existence is menaced by acts taking place outside its own frontiers. An attack upon an innocent third party, for example, can never be justified on the plea of self-preservation. The German invasion of Belgium in 1914, in violation of the Neutralization Treaty of 1839, was defended on the ground that it was the only procedure available to Germany for attacking France effectively and thus meeting the threat to Germany represented by the Franco-Russian alliance. But since the existence of Germany was by no conceivable stretching of the imagination jeopardized by any act of Belgium, the invasion was unlawful. The German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, recognized this in his address to the Reichstag of August 4, 1914, in which he declared, “We are in a state of necessity and necessity knows no law.” Ribbentrop sought to justify German destruction of the independence of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, Belgium, and the Netherlands in 1939-40 by alleging that German minorities were persecuted or that the victim of aggression had forfeited his rights by conniving with France and Britain to attack Germany. These formulations, though ideologically interesting, are without juridical significance since none of the States mentioned had in fact, apart from alleged intent, violated German rights. Bethmann-Hollweg’s attitude was more honest. A State can allege self-preservation as a justification for an infringement of
the rights of other States only when it is directly and immediately menaced by some action in the other State which can be thwarted in no other way.

This principle was laid down in its classic form by Secretary of State Daniel Webster. During the Canadian rebellion of 1838 a body of insurgents gathered on the American side of the Niagara River, seized guns from American arsenals, occupied an island in midstream from which they fired shots into Canadian territory, and prepared to recross in the American ship *Caroline* to continue hostilities against the Canadian forces. In this emergency, British troops crossed into New York State, broke up the expedition, sent the *Caroline* over Niagara Falls, and returned to Canada. This violation of the territory of the United States evoked a strong protest from Webster in which he demanded an apology and reparation unless the British Government could “show a necessity for self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show also that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.” In this instance the British Government had no difficulty in justifying its action, since an instant and overwhelming necessity menacing the existence of the established government in Canada did undeniably exist and the action taken was limited to meeting this threat. Under such circumstances the right of self-preservation renders legitimate any reasonable action to safeguard the existence of the State or of its government.

The right of independence entitles a State to formulate its own foreign policy within the limits of the rights of other States and to conduct its domestic affairs as it sees fit, provided that it does not ignore the obligations which international law imposes upon it. “Independence” as to domestic affairs is subject to the qualification that a State is responsible for injury to aliens within its territory, is required to maintain some degree of law and order, and is bound to maintain some authority answerable to foreign governments. A State must exercise due diligence in the protection of aliens, who are entitled to at least the same degree of protection as it affords to its own citizens. It is responsible for any obvious miscarriages of justice in its courts. On March 14, 1891, eleven persons of Italian origin were taken from jail, where they were confined on charges of complicity in the murder of the chief of police, and were lynched by a mob in New Orleans. The local authorities made no effort to afford them protection. The Italian Foreign

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Minister at once instructed the Italian Minister in Washington "to denounce immediately to the United States Government the atrocious deed of New Orleans, requesting immediate and energetic steps . . . to protect the Italian colony endangered, and to punish severely the guilty." Secretary of State Blaine reminded the Governor of Louisiana that the Treaty of 1871 guaranteed reciprocal protection of persons and property; but no action was taken to punish the lynchers, and no indemnity was paid to the relatives of the victims. In protest, the Italian Minister was recalled from Washington, and Blaine intimated that the Federal Government of the United States had no Constitutional authority to compel action by the state officials of Louisiana. The Italian Government denied the relevancy of this allegation; and, on April 12, 1892, Blaine offered an indemnity of 125,000 francs, the acceptance of which was followed by a full resumption of diplomatic relations. Every State must maintain central authorities responsible for the fulfillment of its international obligations. Though the right of independence carries with it the reciprocal obligation of respecting the independence of other States, the Great Powers have frequently violated the independence of small and weak States when conditions of domestic disorder have led to damage to foreign lives and property. The extent to which States are justified in taking such action is much disputed, but the general principles indicated are universally accepted.

The right of equality has reference only to legal rights and obligations and not, of course, to territory, population, power, or political influence. The sovereign States of the world differ enormously among themselves in these characteristics, the Great Powers having power vastly disproportionate to that of the lesser countries. But, before the law, all sovereign States are equal. Nicaragua enjoys the same rights and is bound by the same obligations as the U.S.A. The miniscule Vatican City occupies the same international legal status as the gigantic Soviet Union. All States have equal opportunities to assert their rights and to demand that other States observe their obligations. All have an equal right to make treaties, wage war, maintain or sever diplomatic relations with other States, and the like. From the principle of State equality is deduced the rule of unanimity in international conferences, according to which each State has one vote and no State can be bound without its consent. In practice, however, it has long been conceded that theoretical legal equality is inconsistent with actual political disparity. When controversies over conflicting claims lead to a resort to coercive measures, small, weak States are obviously less capable of protecting their rights than large, powerful States. So long as self-help and coercion are the ulti-

8 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1891, pp. 658-728.
mate means of protecting State rights, equality under international law, in a system of unequal States, will remain almost as tenuous as individual equality in domestic law in societies in which economic power is unequally distributed among the citizenry. Anatole France once marveled at that majestic equality of the law whereby the rich and poor alike were forbidden to steal bread or to sleep under the bridges at night. Similarly, in the Western State System there appear at times to be one law for the Great Powers and another for the lesser nations. The principle of State equality is, nevertheless, a logical corollary of the concepts of sovereignty and independence, and States always resent hotly any suggestion that they are not the equals of their neighbors.

Any act by one State which infringes upon the sovereignty, the existence, the independence, or the equality of another State is an act of intervention and is ipso facto unlawful. Intervention is usually defined as any act of dictatorial interference by a State in the internal or foreign affairs of another State or any effort to coerce another State in its State action. “With the right of independence goes the correlative obligation of nonintervention, i.e., of refraining from all acts that would forcibly limit the freedom of another State.” By its very nature, intervention is a violation of international law, unless it has been authorized by specific treaty agreements, as has sometimes been the case in the relations between the U.S.A. on the one hand and certain Caribbean States on the other—notably Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. In all other cases, intervention is necessarily unlawful, though under peculiar circumstances it may be justified if it is essential to protect the fundamental rights of the intervening State. It is generally agreed that a State may infringe upon the rights of another without incurring liability for paying damages to the victim if its existence or independence is menaced and it is acting, in Webster’s words in the Caroline case, under an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. If an act of intervention in such a situation is limited to meeting the immediate danger, it may be permissible, though the burden of proof is always on the side of the intervening State.

In spite of the indisputable logic of this principle, interventions have frequently been resorted to on a variety of other grounds. The colonial empires of the Great Powers were largely created by intervening in, and extinguishing the independence of, small or weak States incapable of resisting imperialistic aggression. The U.S.A., before the advent of the “good neighbor” policy, intervened repeatedly in the affairs of the States of the Caribbean.

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ventions, individual and collective, have been embarked upon by States in the name of upholding international law, enforcing treaty rights, preserving the balance of power, maintaining humanitarian principles, ensuring the payment of debts, affording protection to the lives and property of citizens abroad, etc. Since international law rests no less upon custom than upon reason, it might be contended that a general right of intervention had been established by these practices. This is scarcely a tenable position, however, since every act of intervention unauthorized by treaty terms is clearly a violation of the rights of the victim and no amount of practice can establish it as a principle of law that States have a right to violate the rights of other States. The doctrine laid down by Webster would appear to indicate the only legitimate grounds upon which intervention is justifiable. If this principle is not always adhered to, it is because States, in the pursuit of the objectives of high politics, do not always limit themselves to actions permitted by the accepted principles of law and because the existing machinery of international government is not yet adequate to ensure protection to the rights of States incapable of defending themselves by self-help.

A powerful State can usually thwart intervention and compel respect for its rights. Small States, like the Latin-American Republics, or weak States, like China, are unable to protect themselves from intervention or to enforce payment of damages for violations of their rights. The rights are the same in both cases, and the interventions in question may be equally unlawful; but since international law is still enforced primarily by State action, the remedy which a State has available in such circumstances is likely to depend on its size and power. Other States may lend it moral support or may refuse to recognize the results of the intervention, as did the United States and the members of the League of Nations on behalf of China in the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1931-32; but the time is not yet when a State can rely exclusively for the protection of its rights upon the organized force of international society.  

10 Under the "Good Neighbor" policy proclaimed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt the United States renounced its former interventionist policy in Latin America. Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, signed at the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo, December 3-26, 1933, declared, "No State has a right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." This principle was reaffirmed at the Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace, held in Buenos Aires in December, 1936. At the Eighth Conference a "Declaration of Lima" (December 24, 1938) asserted that the signatories were resolved to "maintain and defend against all foreign intervention or activity" the principles of continental solidarity, absolute sovereignty, territorial integrity, peace, security, and the "juridical equality" of sovereign States. The "Declaration of American Principles" signed at the same time asserted, "1. The intervention of any State in the internal or external affairs of another is inadmissible. . . . 4. Relations between States should be governed by the precepts of international law."
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4. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD

A thing may become our property by acquisition, original or derivative. Original acquisition formerly, when the human race could meet together and agree, might be made by division; at present it is only made by occupation.—HUGO GROTIUS, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625.

The sovereign State does not acknowledge a central executive authority above itself; it does not recognize a legislation above itself; it owes no obedience to a judge above itself.—H. LAUTERPACHT, 1933.

Jurisdiction—literally, authority to “say the law”—is the right to exercise State authority. It is a corollary of the rights already discussed. States have the right to exercise their jurisdiction, i.e., to legislate and to impose their power, over the territories in which they are recognized as sovereign and over the persons who are their nationals. Conflicting claims put forward in the name of territorial jurisdiction and in the name of personal jurisdiction have been a fruitful source of international controversy in the past; for if States, as was once the case, insist both upon exclusive jurisdiction over their own territory, including all persons within it, and also over all their citizens or subjects, wherever they may be abroad, it is clear that difficulties will result. In the 20th century the principle of the “territorial” basis of jurisdiction has in almost all countries been granted precedence over the idea of “personal” jurisdiction. A State, therefore, has jurisdiction over all persons within its territory, whether they be nationals or aliens, and possesses no general right to claim jurisdiction over its nationals who happen to be in the territory of other States. The two forms of jurisdiction, nevertheless, persist. It will be convenient to consider the various problems of jurisdiction in terms of (1) territorial jurisdiction, (2) personal jurisdiction, and (3) exemptions from jurisdiction.

A State may acquire territorial jurisdiction by “discovery and occupation,” by prescription, by accretion, by cession or leasehold, or by conquest. Discovery of hitherto unknown and unclaimed land is no longer regarded as conveying valid title to the State of the discoverer unless it is followed by effective occupation. In the 16th century the maritime States of Europe laid claim to vast regions of the New World on the basis of discovery alone. England granted “sea-to-sea” charters to the Atlantic seaboard colonists, who occupied only the coastal strip and had no notion whatever as to the location of the other sea or the extent of intervening land. As late as the 19th century, Germany sought, unsuccessfully, to lay down the “hinterland doctrine” with respect to Africa, according to which a State occupying a seacoast could claim all the unexplored interior region drained by its rivers.
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It is now conceded, however, that only effective and continued occupation conveys title to newly discovered lands. This basis of title differs little from "prescription," which refers to a situation in which a State secures title to territory by virtue of long-continued occupation acquiesced in by other States. Similarly, if the natural processes of "accretion" build up deposits on a seacoast or create new land by other means in the immediate vicinity of an adjacent State, the latter has title to the new territory. The normal method of acquiring territorial jurisdiction during the past century, following the exploration and partition of the entire inhabitable globe by the colonial Powers, has been by treaties of cession. Such cessions may take the form of sales or exchanges of territory, with pecuniary or territorial considerations attached; or they may be the result of war and conquest, with the victors relieving the vanquished of their possessions.

The only continent not yet partitioned among sovereignties is Antarctica, a vast wasteland of snow and ice around the South Pole, lacking a native human population and having no permanent settlements from abroad. The Byrd expedition of 1946-47 aroused new interest in the overlapping claims to jurisdiction put forward by various governments. While the U.S.A. had asserted no formal title to any of these territories, Chile, Argentina, and Britain (long in dispute with Argentina over title to the Falkland Islands) all laid claim to areas of Antarctica between the Pole and Cape Horn. Norway, Australia, France, and New Zealand have claimed other regions on the "sector principle" or on the ground of exploration. In the absence of any occupation, however, none of these claims would appear to have legal validity, nor is it likely that any valid titles will be established in Antarctica save as the result of possible treaties among the claimants.

"Conquest," in the form of military occupation so prolonged as to be permanent, may confer title even when not followed by a treaty of cession, though the League of Nations Covenant, in protecting the territorial integrity of all members (Article 10), and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928, in prohibiting recourse to nonpacific means in the settlement of disputes (Article 2), both sought to outlaw military conquest as a means of acquiring territory. In accordance with the new dispensation, the U.S.A. on January 7, 1932, declared to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that "it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto . . . and it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris." On August 6, 1932, nineteen American Republics, including the United States, informed Bolivia and Paraguay that they would "not recognize any territorial arrangement of this controversy [over the Chaco] which has not been obtained by peaceful means nor the validity of territorial
acquisitions which may be obtained through occupation or conquest by force of arms.” The Argentine Anti-War Pact of October 10, 1933, pledged its signatories to similar obligations of nonrecognition of titles secured by conquest, as did the Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Article 11) signed at Montevideo on December 26, 1933. Such efforts to deny recognition to titles secured by force have not thus far been effective in preventing resort to conquest by hungry States. Finally mention may be made of “leaseholds” as a means of acquiring territory. The status of the Panama Canal Zone and of certain ports and “concession” areas in China is based upon agreements by which the territories in question were leased to an outside State by the State originally having jurisdiction.

The next problem deserving of consideration is that of the extent of territorial jurisdiction, particularly with reference to air and water boundaries. The question of aerial jurisdiction has assumed great importance in the period of extensive international air communication, and many treaties have been signed regarding it. All these are now based upon the universally accepted principle that a State has absolute jurisdiction over the air above its territory and its territorial waters, extending into the farthest reaches of space. It is generally recognized, however, that as a matter of comity a State should grant a right of innocent passage through its air to foreign aircraft, subject to such reasonable regulations as are necessary to ensure observance of local laws relating to customs duties, immigration, public safety, national defense, and the like. Jurisdiction over the waters adjacent to a State, on the contrary, does not extend indefinitely but is limited to a zone within 3 miles from the coast line. The 3-mile limit of territorial waters or maritime jurisdiction, established at a time when three miles represented the effective range of coast artillery, is now recognized by almost all States. The waters beyond the 3-mile limit are the “high seas” and are not subject to the jurisdiction of any State, except for purposes of punishing pirates, who may be proceeded against by all States. In accordance with the so-called “doctrine of hot pursuit,” however, coast-guard vessels may pursue foreign ships suspected of violating local laws out into the high seas, provided that the pursuit is begun within territorial waters and is continuous. Within territorial waters, privately owned foreign vessels are subject to local laws, though they are ordinarily granted a right of innocent passage and are exempt from interference by the local authorities except where a violation of local law occurs of such a nature as to disturb the peace of the port. Foreign public vessels, i.e., war vessels and other ships owned by foreign governments and engaged in public business, are exempt from local jurisdiction and may not be boarded for any purposes by local authorities, since
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the foreign sovereign is directly responsible for their conduct, which may, if objectionable, be made a matter of diplomatic representations.

The most notable recent deviations from the 3-mile limit of maritime jurisdiction have been made by the U.S.A. During the regime of “prohibition” of alcoholic beverages (1920-33), Washington negotiated a score of treaties by which American authorities were permitted to exercise jurisdiction, within an hour’s sailing distance from shore, over foreign vessels suspected of “rumrunning” (e.g., Convention between U.S.A. and Chile for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, May 27, 1930, Treaty Series 829). By the Declaration of Panama, October 3, 1939, the American Republics established a “neutrality zone” (dubbed by wits “chastity belt”), extending out to sea 300 to 1,000 miles, within which they asserted “as of inherent right” and “as a measure of continental self-protection” that they were entitled to prevent the commission of any belligerent acts by non-American nations. This astonishing repudiation of “freedom of the seas” was rejected by both sets of European belligerents. The first important naval battle of World War II (the Admiral Graf Spee vs. the Achilles, the Ajax, and the Exeter, December 13, 1939) was fought off Montevideo, well within the zone. London, Paris, and Berlin all denied that nonsignatory States could be bound by an agreement departing from customary international law.

On September 28, 1945, President Truman issued two proclamations and executive orders (followed by similar action by Mexico) asserting the right of the U.S.A. to exploit oil and other mineral resources in the submarine continental shelf outside the 3-mile limit up to a water depth of 600 feet. While no interference with navigation on the “high seas” was contemplated and no international controversies followed this claim, it reflected a growing tendency to regard the traditional 3-mile limit as inadequate under contemporary conditions. By the terms of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Petropolis, Brazil, September 2, 1947, by 19 American Republics (Articles 3, 4), each signatory agreed to regard as an attack against itself any “attack” against any signatory within a vast area of water bounded by the North Pole, the South Pole, and arbitrary lines drawn in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Unlike the Declaration of Panama, this formula did not seek to deprive non-American States of belligerent use of the high seas against one another. Its legal meaning was otherwise unclear, save that here again an attempt was being made to depart from the 3-mile limit. When the imperatives of power politics conflict with well-established rules of jurisprudence, the identity of the victor is seldom in doubt.

Other water boundaries, like land frontiers, are usually defined by treaty. In the absence of treaty arrangements to the contrary, certain general rules
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are applied. River boundaries between two States follow the *thalweg*, or deepest navigation channel of the stream. If a boundary river shifts its bed gradually by accretion, the boundary shifts likewise; but where a sudden change by avulsion takes place, the boundary remains in its old position. Rights of navigation and of water diversion for irrigation or power purposes are always dealt with by treaty provisions. Rivers, lakes, and canals which are entirely surrounded by the territory of one State are completely within its jurisdiction in the absence of treaty arrangements to the contrary. The Boundary Waters Convention of 1909 between the U.S.A. and Britain opens navigation on Lake Michigan to British vessels. Straits less than 6 miles in width are within the jurisdiction of the shore State or States, though the vessels of other States have a right of navigation, subject to reasonable local regulations and duties for safety, the upkeep of lighthouses, and the like. The right of Denmark to levy tolls upon vessels passing through the Danish Sound connecting the North and Baltic Seas was successfully resisted by the U.S.A. and other Powers and abandoned in 1857, though it had been exercised since 1368. The Bosporus and the Dardanelles, surrounded by Turkish territory, were opened to Russian merchant vessels by the Treaty of 1774 and to foreign war vessels by the Treaty of Paris of 1856. The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 made elaborate provision for the neutralization of these waterways and for freedom of navigation through them, but the right of Turkey to fortify the Straits once more and to close them, in certain contingencies, to foreign war vessels was acknowledged by the Powers in the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936. The Suez Canal was partly demilitarized and opened freely to all vessels, public and private, both in war and in peace, by the Convention of 1888. The Panama Canal is similarly open on a basis of equality to vessels of all States by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, though it is controlled and fortified by the U.S.A. Gulfs, bays, and estuaries opening out onto the high seas are within the jurisdiction of the State enclosing them, with the line of maritime jurisdiction parallel to a line drawn from headland to headland, if the mouth is not more than 6 miles wide. Other arrangements have often been made by treaty, however, and more recently a 10-mile limit for width of mouth of territorial bays has been recognized.\(^\text{11}\)

Jurisdiction over persons, as distinct from jurisdiction over land, sea, and air, has been claimed by States under two different theories which are still only partly reconciled. Under the rule of *jus soli* (right of the soil), States have claimed as nationals all persons born within their territorial

\(^{11}\) See the award of the arbitral tribunal in the North Atlantic Fisheries dispute between the United States and Great Britain, 1910, in G. G. Wilson, *Hague Arbitration Cases*, pp. 180ff.
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limits. Amendment 14 to the American Federal Constitution declares, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside." Under the rule of *jus sanguinis* (right of the blood), States have claimed that all children of their nationals, wherever born, are their nationals by virtue of parentage. The legislation of States regarding the bases of nationality varies considerably, and no general international agreement has yet been reached regarding these questions. Most States, however, now adhere to the rule of *jus soli*, with certain qualifications. American legislation, for example, bestows American citizenship on children born abroad of American parents provided that the parents have resided at some time in the United States. Almost all States now permit their citizens to expatriate themselves, *i.e.*, to become nationals of other States, and also provide for the "naturalization" of foreigners who desire to become citizens of the local State. Many States provide that women acquire the nationality of their husbands at marriage, though the American law of 1922 permits an American woman marrying a foreigner to retain her citizenship and does not automatically confer American citizenship on alien women marrying Americans. Foreigners who have resided in the United States for five years may become American citizens by taking out citizenship papers. Collective naturalization is often provided for in annexation treaties. Aliens, in general, are entirely subject to the jurisdiction of the State where they reside. Aliens who are fugitives from justice may be delivered up to the authorities of the State from which they have fled by the process of extradition. This procedure is almost invariably provided for by treaties which specify the crimes for which extradition shall be granted and the categories of persons subject to extradition. Political crimes, short of attempts at assassination, are normally exempted by specific provisions of such treaties.

Because of differences in the nationality laws of various States, it is possible for an individual to be a national of two States simultaneously, or to lose his nationality entirely by taking some action which forfeits his citizenship in one State without entitling him to citizenship in another. Such unfortunate individuals (*heimatlosen*, in the German phrase) have no State to afford them diplomatic protection abroad. Such problems of personal jurisdiction make it desirable that the nationality laws of the various States be made more nearly uniform. Such uniformity can be achieved in this field, as in others, only through the process usually referred to as the "codification of international law," *i.e.*, the conclusion of general international conventions in which States agree upon the principles involved and pledge themselves to put their own national legislation in harmony with the agreement.

Certain common exemptions from local jurisdiction are universally rec-
ognized. Sovereigns traveling abroad in their official capacity are entirely exempt from the jurisdiction of the States through which they pass and may not be arrested, proceeded against, or interfered with on any ground, either as to their own persons, their families, their retinue, or their effects. Diplomatic representatives are similarly exempt from the jurisdiction of the State in which they reside. The buildings and grounds of embassies and legations are regarded as "extraterritorial," i.e., as part of the territory of the foreign State maintaining them rather than of the local State. They may not be taxed or entered by the local police without permission, and local laws may not be enforced within their precincts. Diplomatic agents, along with their families, staffs, and servants, are immune from local laws and enjoy complete exemption from local civil and criminal jurisdiction, local police and administrative regulations, taxes and duties, jury and witness duty, and the like. They may not be arrested, subpoenaed, or otherwise interfered with in the exercise of their functions. Consuls ordinarily enjoy certain limited exemptions from local jurisdiction in order to enable them to carry on their work effectively. Foreign armies granted a right of passage through a State and foreign public vessels within its territorial waters are likewise exempt from local jurisdiction. In certain Oriental States, notably China, special treaty arrangements have been imposed by the Western Powers, whereby Western nationals, when defendants in cases brought by natives, are exempt from local jurisdiction and are usually tried in consular courts maintained by their own governments. The recent efforts of China to terminate extraterritoriality of this type have been largely successful. The Soviet Union voluntarily renounced such rights for its nationals after World War I. Germany was compelled to do so by the Treaty of Versailles. Britain and the U.S.A. belatedly followed suit during World War II.

Most governments of late have granted diplomatic immunity to agents of international organizations and extraterritoriality to their premises. The staff of the League of Nations in Geneva enjoyed a limited measure of exemption from Swiss jurisdiction. The staff of the United Nations enjoys exemption from American jurisdiction when engaged on official business. By act of December 29, 1945, the U.S. Congress authorized the President to extend qualified exemptions from local jurisdiction to organizations of which the U.S.A. was a member. On February 19, 1946, the President granted these privileges to the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, the Pan-American Union, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and UNRRA.12 If agents of other States require exemption from local jurisdiction in order to perform their functions free from pressure, the case for immunity for

12 See "The International Organizations Immunities Act" by Lawrence Preuss, American Journal of International Law, April, 1946, pp. 332ff.
international organizations is even stronger. But the Western State System in our time is still so far from “world government” that immunity is less a right than a privilege—with the international organization as the recipient and the sovereign nation-state as the grantor.

5. TREATY MAKING

In contracts, nature requires equality, and in such a way that, from inequality, he who has the worse share acquires a right. This equality consists partly in the act, partly in the matter concerning which the act is, and in the acts both precedent and principal.—Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625.

The making of treaties between States regarding matters of mutual interest is a practice of great antiquity. It has been resorted to in all State Systems of which any record remains. The practice developed very early in the evolution of the Western State System and has been followed with increasing frequency by all its members during the past few centuries. The States of the world are now bound to one another by thousands of international agreements covering almost every conceivable subject of international interest and assuming a wide variety of forms. Early treaties were almost always bilateral, i.e., between two States. More recently, many treaties are multilateral, i.e., among three or more States.

Since treaties and similar instruments constitute legally binding obligations between the signatory States, a large body of legal principles has developed with regard to their negotiation, conclusion, ratification, interpretation, and termination. The somewhat confusing problem of terminology may be considered first. The word “treaty” is sometimes loosely applied to all types of international engagement, other than executive agreements. The latter are not legally binding compacts between States, but merely arrangements entered into by executive authorities. An executive agreement binds only the administration which had concluded it, though it may be continued in force at the option of the succeeding administrations. The “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1908 between the U.S.A. and Japan remained in force until 1924, when it was abrogated by the immigration act passed in that year by Congress. In the U.S.A., executive agreements are easily distinguishable from treaties by the fact that they are concluded by the President or his agents and are not submitted to the Senate or formally ratified. They thus assume the character of personal promises, rather than of solemn contracts or “treaties” binding upon the State. In a narrower sense, “treaties” are State agreements relating to important political questions. “Conventions” are usually agreements relating to more specific and technical matters,
though there is no uniformity of practice in this regard. A particular agreement may be designated as a treaty or a convention at the discretion of the negotiators. The term “protocol” is applied sometimes to any type of agreement less formal than a treaty or a convention, sometimes to preliminary drafts of agreements signed in anticipation of the preparation of more formal documents, and sometimes to the signed official minutes, or procès-verbaux, of the sessions of an international conference. “Declarations” are multilateral engagements, setting forth a common conception of certain principles of international law, such as the Declaration of Paris of 1856, though the word is likewise applied to formal statements of policy on the part of particular governments. A declaration of the latter type, such as the Monroe Doctrine or the “Truman Doctrine,” is, of course, not an international agreement at all. “Sponsorships” are agreements, subject to subsequent approval, signed by representatives who have not been properly commissioned or who have exceeded their authority. “Cartels” are agreements entered into between belligerents for such purposes as the exchange of prisoners of war. An “armistice” is an agreement between belligerents for the suspension of hostilities. A compromis is an instrument by which two States submit a dispute to arbitration. Letters, memoranda, and exchanges of notes may also under certain circumstances be given the effect of true international obligations.

The making of treaties and other interstate instruments has been elaborately formalized and involves adherence, with minor variations, to a well-established sequence of procedures which must be followed if the resulting agreement is to be valid. The first step is (1) the meeting of the negotiators and the “exchange of full powers” between the plenipotentiaries. Upon meeting, the agents of each State submit documentary credentials to the agents of the other, showing that they have been regularly authorized (given full powers) to negotiate the contemplated agreement. Next follows (2) the actual negotiation and signing of the agreement. Prior to the 19th century, treaty texts usually began with an invocation of the Deity. A preamble ordinarily sets forth the general purposes of the agreement and gives the names of the heads of the signatory States and of the negotiators whom they have appointed to sign. There follow the numbered articles of the compact, the conditions of ratification, the place and date of signature, and the signatures and seals of the agents. Signatures are usually attached in accordance with the principle of the alternat, whereby each State receives a copy of the treaty signed first by its own delegates. Multilateral treaties are often signed by the delegates in alphabetical order of the names of the States, in French. Many treaties are drawn up in French, still the traditional language of diplomacy, as well as in the languages of the signatory States,
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either in separate versions or in parallel columns. The next step is (3) ratification of the signed agreement by the constitutionally designated authorities in the signatory States. Under the American Constitution, all treaties are ratified by the President, acting "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur" (Article II, Section 2, §2). Ratification may be withheld, or amendments and reservations may be attached, if irregularities have taken place in the negotiations or if the agreement is regarded as unsatisfactory. In the latter case, however, friction and misunderstanding are likely to result, since States normally assume that a treaty which has been negotiated and signed by accredited representatives, in accordance with their instructions, ought to be ratified as a matter of course. Amendments and reservations attached by one party are not binding unless accepted by the other. (4) The exchange of ratifications is a formal ceremony whereby the parties indicate to one another that ratification has taken place and solemnly guarantee to one another the execution of the terms of the contract. This ceremony consists in the exchange of the executive acts of ratification and the preparation of a procès-verbal registering this fact. Treaties subsequently ratified are normally binding from the date of signature, unless some other time is specified. (5) The execution of the agreement is the final step whereby the terms agreed upon are carried out by the parties. In the U.S.A., execution is preceded by a formal proclamation of the treaty in the name of the President.

In order that an international agreement may be legally binding upon the signatory States, certain conditions are essential. The parties must first of all be legally competent to contract the engagement; i.e., they must be free under the terms of their constitutions and of earlier treaties to enter into the agreement which has been made. The treaty, moreover, must in form and substance be a proper State agreement on the part of all the signatories. The plenipotentiaries must have been fully accredited and must have acted within the scope of their authority. There must be freedom of consent on the part of the negotiators, with no hint of fraud, bribery, or coercion. Coercion invalidates a treaty if it is applied against the persons of the negotiators, but not if it is applied against a State. Treaties of peace imposed by victors upon vanquished are usually accepted under duress; but so long as the coercion is of the State and not of its representatives, the agreement is binding. Finally, international agreements must be in conformity with international law and must not involve any infringement of the rights of third States. If, in any particular case, it can be shown that at any step in the proceedings these essential conditions have not been complied with, the agreement in question can be regarded as void by either party.

States which are not parties to an international agreement are, of course,
not bound in any way by its terms, since treaties are contracts which specify rights and obligations only for the signatory States. Outside States may protest against a treaty only if it violates their own treaty rights or is contrary to accepted principles of customary international law. States not parties to a treaty may express their "approbation" of the agreement, by which they indicate approval of its terms without in any way becoming a party to them; or they may announce their "adhesion" to it, by which they agree to abide by its principles, also without becoming a party; or, finally, they may announce their "accession" to the engagement, in which case they formally become parties to the engagement.

In the interpretation of treaties the real intention of the parties is usually accepted as a basis for definition of terms, rather than grammatical deductions from the language employed. The intention of the parties may be ascertained through procès-verbaux, notes, memoranda, and other exchanges of communications at the time of the negotiations. If such documents are exchanged and accepted by both sides prior to the exchange of ratifications, they bind the parties to the interpretation of the treaty terms which they set forth. In the controversy over the meaning of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of April 19, 1850, between the U.S.A. and Britain, relating to the rights of the parties in Central America with respect to a proposed interoceanic canal, it appeared that Bulwer on June 29 (five days before the exchange of ratifications) had written Clayton to the effect that the provisions of the agreement for reciprocal renunciation of territorial claims had no application to British Honduras "and its dependencies." The U.S.A. was obliged to accept this interpretation, in spite of its reluctance to do so. The language of treaties is construed in the ordinary sense of the words employed, unless evidence of a contrary intention is adduced. In conflicts between clauses of a single treaty, special clauses prevail over general clauses, and prohibitory clauses prevail over permissive clauses. Cessions of sovereignty are always strictly construed. As between two conflicting treaties between the same States, the later one prevails. In general, treaties are so construed as to be self-consistent and as not to violate international law and the rights of third States.

Treaties may come to an end by the expiration of a specified time limit, by the complete fulfillment of their terms, by an express agreement of the parties, or by renunciation of the rights granted. A new treaty, expressly superseding an earlier one, is the most common and satisfactory form of termination. Treaties are likewise terminated by the disappearance of one of the parties. When the independence of a State is extinguished, all its treaties with other States are terminated unless provision to the contrary is made by the new State acquiring its territory. A declaration of war terminates
political treaties between the belligerents, suspends all agreements of a permanent nature such as commercial and extradition treaties until the close of hostilities, and brings into operation such agreements as may relate to the conduct of war. Nonfulfillment of the terms of a treaty by one party, if persisted in despite diplomatic representations, makes it voidable by the other party. In all other cases, treaties cannot ordinarily be denounced by one party without the consent of the other, unless their terms make provision for such a procedure. Under the American Constitution the President or Congress or both may denounce a treaty without the consent of the other party. The French Treaties of Alliance and Commerce of 1778 and the Commercial Convention with France of 1788 were abrogated by act of Congress of July 7, 1798. The Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1888 and 1892 were in violation of earlier American treaties with China relating to immigration. In 1911, in the face of Congressional demands, President Taft abrogated the Commercial Treaty of 1832 with Russia. Under international law, however, it is doubtful whether one party to a treaty ever has a legal right to terminate it without the consent of the other unless the treaty itself provides for this. Under the principle of *rebus sic stantibus* ("conditions remaining the same"), it has been contended that fundamental changes of conditions authorize one party to a treaty to terminate it by unilateral action. Japan, for example, sought to deny the validity of the Nine Power Pact and other obligations to respect the "Open Door" in China on the ground that conditions had been altered fundamentally since ratification. The alteration referred to had been brought about by Japanese aggression in violation of the obligations which were alleged to have been invalidated by the change of conditions. Even when this is not the case the other party almost invariably protests against such a contention, and it cannot be said that this principle is part of accepted international law.

6. THE RULES OF WAR

There is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end; and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof.—THOMAS HOBBES, *Leviathan*, 1651.

"You will observe the rules of battle, of course?" the White Knight remarked, putting on his helmet too. "I always do," said the Red Knight, and they began banging away at each other with such fury that Alice got behind a tree to be out of the way of the blows.—LEWIS CARROLL, *Through the Looking Glass*.

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Students and laymen are often puzzled by the apparent paradox presented by that large and impressive portion of "international law" which deals with organized violence among nations. If law is a device which civilized men have invented as a substitute for, and a restraint upon, the use of force to settle differences, how, it may well be asked, can any body of law legitimize armed coercion to the extent of prescribing rules for its employment? The answer would appear to be that a society of sovereignties is not, and in the nature of sovereignty cannot be, a true political community in which all members agree to abide by established rules of law for settling legal controversies and to conform, as regards their political controversies, to orderly and pacific procedures for modifying the law. The realms of law and politics are not coterminous. Legal principles suffice to adjust differences in which all the parties accept as more or less "just" the prevailing distribution of influence and satisfactions. They fail at the point where one side or the other challenges the status quo and demands, in the name of "justice," a modification of legal rules. Law is static. Politics is dynamic. Every well-ordered polity provides means, prescribed by law, for changing the law through nonviolent procedures. This is a function of the legislature in every government. The Western State System is not such a polity. It has no legislature and is without government.

It follows that political controversies among sovereigns are inevitably dealt with not through elections, parties, lobbies, and legislation but through bargaining or violence between the disputants. All law without governmental power to enforce it is a feeble thing—and international law is no exception. The deficiency here is a defect, not of the law as such, but of the very nature of international society and of the will and wisdom of its members—who, thus far, have refused to accept anything remotely resembling world government. This having been the case ever since the end of the Pax Romana and the later decay of the Papacy and Empire, international jurists have been forced to take cognizance of the reality of war and have sought, through the elaboration of rules for its conduct, to mitigate its cruel and destructive features. This enterprise tends to be self-defeating. In our own time it is increasingly recognized to be futile. These considerations raise questions to be explored in later chapters. Meanwhile the scope and content of the traditional law of war and neutrality deserve examination.

In the context of international law, war is neither "hell," as General Sherman put it, nor is it "justice, nobility and brotherly pity," as Mussolini once insisted. Apart from specific treaties (of which more anon), war as an instrument of national policy is neither permitted nor forbidden. It is merely a fact, however deplorable. In law it is often defined as "a properly conducted contest of armed public forces"—or, better, as a legal status or
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period of time during which interstate relations are supposed to be governed by the law of war and neutrality rather than by the law of peace.

A state of war involves both an intention on one or both sides to wage war and overt acts of hostility. Hostile acts, unaccompanied by an intention to wage war, create a state of war in the legal sense only if they are regarded as inaugurating war by the victim or by third States. A legal state of war may exist without hostilities if the parties have expressed an intention to deal with one another as belligerents. But hostilities, unaccompanied by the intention and not treated as war either by the contestants or by outside parties, do not in themselves create a state of war. They constitute reprisals, retaliation, or intervention; but the rights and obligations of the parties continue to be determined by the law of peace.

In recent wars, it has been customary for States to issue formal declarations of war, making clear their intentions and specifying the time at which a legal state of war shall be regarded as having commenced. The Hague Convention of 1907 with regard to the opening of hostilities forbade the signatory States to commence hostilities without warning, through either a declaration or an ultimatum. At the opening of World War I the belligerents in every case specified in a formal declaration the exact hour and minute of the commencement of war, a formality particularly useful to prize courts in determining the legality of captures. Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, without a declaration of war and subsequently invaded Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Jugoslavia, and the U.S.S.R. in the same fashion. Britain and France initiated hostilities against the aggressor by formal declarations following preliminary ultimata—the British declaration specifying 11 A.M., September 3, and the French 5 P.M., September 3, as the time of the commencement of belligerency. Italy entered the war by a formal declaration against France and Britain, effective at 12.01 A.M., June 11, 1940. Declarations of war usually require legislative action under democratic constitutions. In the U.S.A., they require the approval of a majority of both houses of Congress; but such approval has never been withheld when the President has recommended war, nor has Congress ever declared war in opposition to the wishes of the Executive. Federal courts have held that war, in the legal sense, began for the U.S.A.

13 "Article 1. The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between them must not commence without a previous and explicit warning, in the form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

"Article 2. The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not be held to affect them until after the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by telegraph. Nevertheless, neutral Powers may not rely on the absence of notification if it be established beyond doubt that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war."
in World War II, not with the action of Congress or with the Triplice declarations, but with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{14}

War suspends all nonhostile intercourse between the belligerent States and their citizens. Diplomatic and consular relations are severed, along with contacts of trade and travel. Political treaties between the belligerents are terminated, other treaties are suspended for the duration of the conflict, and agreements relating to the conduct of hostilities are put into operation. Relations between the belligerents are henceforth subject to the international law of war, and their relations with outside States not participating in the struggle are governed by the international law of neutrality.\textsuperscript{14} From the legal point of view, the purpose of war is to bring about the complete military subjection of the enemy in the shortest possible time with the least possible loss of life and property. This conception of the objective of hostilities is shared by the jurist and the strategist, but under modern conditions differences of opinion necessarily arise as to the implications of such a statement. It is agreed that mere wanton destruction and slaughter, having no reasonable relation to the military subjection of the enemy, is unlawful. The older view of the Continental States of Europe was that war should, as far as possible, be limited in its effects to armed public forces. Britain and, more recently, the U.S.A. have regarded it as permissible to attack the commercial resources and the food supplies of the whole enemy population through naval blockades, a view which has now received general acceptance. During World War I, Germany developed the theory of Schrecklichkeit, or "frightfulness," according to which, in its extreme form, it is legitimate to attack the entire civilian population of the enemy State by all possible means in order to break its will to resist. In spite of the general condemnation of this view at the time, it is the logical corollary of universal military conscription, of the mobilization of industrial resources, and of the decisive importance of civilian morale in a long-drawn-out war of attrition. It therefore continues to be applied.

(This development is tending to break down the well-established legal distinction between soldiers and civilians.) Nevertheless, it is still correct to say that for the purpose of ascertaining the legal rights and obligations of

\textsuperscript{14} See \textit{N.Y. Life Insurance Company v. Louise C. Bennion}, U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit, November 6, 1946, in \textit{American Journal of International Law}, July, 1947, pp. 680ff. Mrs. Bennion was the widow of Capt. Mervyn S. Bennion, commander of the U.S.S. \textit{West Virginia}, who was killed at his post. The Company declined to pay double indemnity for accidental death on the ground that the policy excluded "war or any incident thereto." The Court concurred and rejected the claimant's contention that war did not begin until Congress acted. The decision held that any attack by a sovereign State upon another, with intent to wage war and with resistance by the victim, inaugurates war in the legal sense.
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individuals in wartime they are divided into the two general categories of combatants and noncombatants. Combatants may be fired upon at sight and if taken alive are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. In this category are members of the regularly authorized military, naval, and air forces of the State, officers and crews of merchant vessels resisting capture, and members of levies en masse and of popular civilian uprisings against invaders, provided that they carry arms openly, obey the laws of war, wear emblems or uniforms, and are under a definite command. Noncombatants are all persons not participating in hostilities, not members of fighting forces, and not belonging to any of the special classes mentioned below. Civilian enemy aliens found within a State at the outbreak of war may be expelled, interned, permitted to depart, or permitted to remain unmolested. Since 1914, belligerent States have commonly interned enemy aliens within their jurisdiction, sometimes for their own protection against mob violence. Noncombatants in occupied territory or in the zone of military operations are free from violence, constraint, or injury except what is dictated by military necessity or what may befall them through actual hostilities. Officers and crews of merchant vessels taking offensive action against other merchant vessels may be punished by death for piracy since the abolition of privateering by the Declaration of Paris in 1856. Guerrillas, i.e., individuals not in the armed forces of the State who engage in military operations without State authorization, may likewise be punished for their individual acts. They are not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war but may be tried and sentenced for murder, arson, and other crimes which are not individually punishable when committed by soldiers, sailors, or aviators acting under orders. Similar treatment is accorded to spies, i.e., individuals in disguise who act under false pretenses behind the lines or in occupied territory to secure information for the enemy. They are entitled to a trial and if found guilty are usually executed.

As regards the treatment accorded to property in wartime, the general rules applied are relatively simple, though their specific application in complex situations often involves tangled legal problems. Public real property in an enemy State or in occupied territory, i.e., property owned by a belligerent government within the jurisdiction of an enemy belligerent or in a region under hostile military occupation, may be taken over and administered during the war for the benefit of the State in control but may not be confiscated. Public movable property, with the exception of works of art, science, or education, is subject to confiscation; but enlightened opinion has been increasingly averse to the exercise of this right, except in occupied

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territory. Private property of enemy nationals was formerly considered to be subject to confiscation wherever found. This harsh rule has now been modified in a variety of ways. Private property of enemy aliens found within a State at the outbreak of war is now usually unmolested or held under bond by the local government for the duration of the war to prevent its being used to the advantage of the enemy State. Private enemy property in occupied territory may no longer be taken by the occupying forces without compensation, though if military necessity requires its destruction no compensation need be paid. The Treaty of Versailles, however, required Germany to pay compensation to the victors for all civilian damages, on the theory that World War I was a result of German aggression. Forces of military occupation may levy taxes on the local population for local purposes and may assess fines and penalties on communities where it is clear that the municipal authorities have been negligent in fulfilling their obligations to maintain order and to prevent civilian participation in hostilities. In all other cases, as in the levying of money contributions upon the local citizenry, the requisition of food and other materials needed by the occupying forces, or the sequestration of vessels, vehicles, and the like, a receipt must be given to the owner as a promise of eventual compensation.

Property at sea is dealt with in accordance with principles differing somewhat from those applicable to property on land. Enemy property at sea is, in general, subject to capture and condemnation. Save for ships engaged in humanitarian, educational, or scientific enterprises, there are no exceptions to this rule for public enemy property, i.e., battleships and other vessels and goods owned by the enemy State. With regard to enemy property owned by private individuals, however, various qualifications to the general right of capture have received general acceptance. Enemy merchant vessels in port at the outbreak of hostilities were formerly accorded a specified number of days of grace within which they might escape to sea. Religious, scientific, and philanthropic vessels are exempt from capture, as are hospital ships, fishing vessels, and small coastwise vessels of all types. Under the Declaration of Paris of 1856, it is no longer lawful for belligerents to issue letters of marque and reprisal to private vessels (privateers) authorizing

16 "Article 231: The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

17 "The plenipotentiaries who signed the Treaty of Paris of the thirteenth of March, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, assembled in conference . . . have adopted the following Declaration: (1) privateering is and remains abolished; (2) the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war; (3) neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag;
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them to capture enemy merchant ships. The Declaration likewise specifies that goods of neutral ownership found on enemy ships shall be exempt from capture and that goods of enemy ownership found on neutral ships shall also be exempt, contraband of war being excepted in both cases. The signatory Powers further declared that a proclamation of a blockade cannot give an indiscriminate right of capture of neutral vessels unless it is, in fact, effectively enforced. Enemy vessels are subject to capture wherever found, even in the absence of a blockade. In the exercise of the right of capture, all vessels are regarded as enemy vessels which fly an enemy flag, which have been transferred to a neutral flag to escape capture, which are under convoy of belligerent war vessels, or which resist search. Captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if there is no means of taking them into port for condemnation, but provision must be made for the safety of passengers and crew. The inability of submarines to make such provision led to widespread criticism (from enemy and neutral governments) of their use by Germany. In the great commercial wars of modern times, the naval Powers have usually attempted, in accordance with the general right of capture, to sweep enemy commerce from the seas. The pursuit of this objective has usually led to attacks upon neutral commerce as well.

A large number of well-defined principles have grown up regarding the actual conduct of hostilities. The more important of these were codified in the Hague Conference Conventions in 1899 and 1907 relating to the laws and customs of war on land. They are for the most part designed to mitigate the horrors and cruelties of war as much as possible. They are usually well observed, since considerations of expediency dictate their observance on both sides of the battle line. Wanton and unnecessary destruction of life and property is forbidden, as is the use of poison and dumdum bullets, the refusal of quarter, resort to assassination, deliberate perfidy and treachery, and attacks upon undefended towns. Sick and wounded are to be cared for, and prisoners of war must be humanely treated. Civilian populations are, so far as possible, to be spared from the incidents of war. Hospitals, churches, schools, museums, public buildings, and the like, are to be spared, unless used for military purposes. Naval and aerial bombardment of undefended cities is usually viewed with disapproval. During World War I the established principles dealing with the relations between the armed forces were reasonably well observed, in spite of the introduction of poison gas, liquid fire, and other novel weapons. The rules designed to protect civilians, however, were in many instances ignored, particularly by the Central Powers, which were strategically in a position to strike at enemy centers of popula-

(4) blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. . . . April 16, 1856."
tion through air raids and long-range artillery for the purpose of disorganizing manufacturing and transport and breaking down morale through terrorism. These departures from established rules designed to protect civilians are logically dictated by military necessity under the contemporary economic, social, and psychological conditions attending large-scale combats between national States. In World War II there were intensive and persistent attacks upon civilians by weapons of unprecedented destructiveness. If such catastrophes are to be averted, it will be through the abolition of war itself, rather than through further efforts at limiting weapons or setting up new legal safeguards which are certain to be brushed aside in modern "wars of annihilation."

In most of the wars between members of earlier State Systems and in the early wars in the Western State System as well, the notion that an outside State might refrain from participation in a conflict between its neighbors was an unfamiliar one. What is now known as the international law of neutrality developed very slowly and did not reach its modern form prior to the 19th century. As recently as the War of the American Revolution, it was regarded as legitimate for a "neutral" State to rent out its troops to belligerents without violating its obligations. The Hessian mercenaries of Great Britain were secured in this fashion. In the early period, text writers, from Grotius onward, emphasized the rights of neutral States to be free from interference by belligerents, since such rights were frequently ignored. Later, after neutral rights had been more clearly defined, emphasis was shifted to the obligations of neutral States to refrain from participation in hostilities. In the most recent period the great controversies over neutrality have again centered in neutral rights as related to trading privileges. The American Neutrality Code of 1794 was one of the first clear formulations of the modern conception of neutral obligations. As the first member of the Western State System outside of the Europeon Continent, the U.S.A. could more easily hold itself aloof from European wars than could the States of Europe. It has accordingly played a large role in the subsequent development of the principles of neutrality.

Neutral obligations may be summarized in terms of abstention, impartiality, and prevention. It is now customary for States to declare their neutrality upon the outbreak of war by a formal proclamation issued by the head of the government.\(^1^8\) A State which has declared itself neutral has a

\(^{18}\) On September 5, 1939, President Roosevelt issued a conventional neutrality proclamation under international law and a second proclamation under the Neutrality Act of 1937 imposing an embargo on the exports of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to Germany, Poland, France, Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa (September 5), and Canada (September 10).
right to have its neutrality respected by the belligerents. It is correspondingly obliged to enforce its neutrality by conducting itself impartially toward the belligerents, by abstaining from any participation in the conflict, and by preventing its citizens from engaging in certain acts regarded as breaches of neutral obligations. A neutral State may not permit its territory to be used as a base of hostile operations by either belligerent against the other. It may not permit its armed forces to be employed to the advantage of either belligerent, nor may it officially loan money or sell war supplies to warring governments. It is not obliged, however, to prevent its nationals from lending money or selling war supplies, provided that they are legally free to sell to both sides on equal terms. Between 1914 and 1917, the period of American neutrality in World War I, hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Allied war bonds were sold in the United States, and billions of dollars worth of munitions were sold to the Allied Governments by American manufacturers and exporters. Germany complained that in fact this trade was entirely one-sided, since the Allied blockade prevented American munitions from reaching the Central Powers. In law, however, there was no breach of neutral obligations since the American Government was not responsible for the Allied blockade and Americans were free to sell to both sides on equal terms at their own risk.

(A neutral State must prevent the enlistment of troops for war purposes on its territory, and it must intern belligerent troops and aircraft forced into its jurisdiction.) It may grant a right of innocent passage through its territorial waters, however, to belligerent warships. Neutral governments are likewise obliged to prevent their nationals from fitting out, in neutral ports, vessels designed to take part in the war. The failure of Great Britain to fulfill this obligation during the American Civil War caused the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, created by the Treaty of Washington of 1871, to award $15,500,000 to the United States for damages committed by the Alabama, the Florida, and other Confederate cruisers constructed in British ports. A neutral State may not, in the course of a war, modify its neutrality regulations to the advantage of one belligerent. It must use due diligence to ensure observance of its obligations; and it cannot extend its protection to its citizens who engage in "unneutral service," i.e., who commit hostile acts against belligerents and thereby render themselves liable to treatment as enemy nationals.

During the past century the most acute controversies over neutral rights have arisen as a result of the efforts of belligerent States to cut off commercial contacts between the enemy State and neutral States. A belligerent State is recognized to have a right to intercept such commerce on two grounds. It may proclaim a "blockade" of enemy ports; and if such a blockade is
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effectively enforced, i.e., if it is not merely a “paper blockade,” it entitles war vessels of the blockading State to capture neutral vessels seeking to enter or leave the blockaded ports. At the same time, in the absence of any blockade, belligerent war vessels may capture neutral goods and ships falling in the category of “contraband of war,” i.e., goods of neutral ownership, found on the high seas, of use in war, and destined for the enemy. Neutral vessels may be condemned if more than half the cargo consists of contraband, as measured by volume or by value. All other neutral commerce with States at war is theoretically legitimate and not to be interfered with. Neutral commercial States have usually insisted vehemently upon “freedom of the seas” and neutral trading rights. Belligerent States, on the other hand, have always been disposed to interpret their rights to intercept neutral commerce as broadly as possible, through the extension of the contraband list and the “doctrine of continuous voyage.”

The doctrine of continuous voyage, or “ultimate destination,” was developed by Great Britain at the end of the 13th century, utilized by the Union in the American Civil War, and employed by both the British and American Governments in World Wars I and II. It holds that neutral vessels going from one neutral port to another may be captured if there is presumption of eventual enemy destination of the cargo.19 In 1915 and again in 1939 the British Admiralty applied this doctrine both to contraband and to blockade. It went so far as to allot quotas of foodstuffs and other supplies to the Scandinavian neutrals and to confiscate all neutral cargoes bound for Scandinavian ports in excess of the quotas, on the ground that there was reasonable presumption that the cargoes were destined for transshipment to Germany, either as contraband goods or in violation of the blockade. German retaliation took the form of a submarine blockade of the Allied States. By their very nature, the U-boats were obliged to strike and flee, without regard to the safety of life and property aboard torpedoed vessels. The ensuing controversies with neutrals over the legitimacy of this method of enforcing a blockade furnished the occasion for the American declaration of war in 1917. In addition to devising novel methods of enforcing blockades and applying the doctrine of continuous voyage, belligerent States in recent wars have extended the list of contraband goods to a point where almost all neutral commerce with the enemy is swept from the seas. Originally, only war supplies were regarded as contraband; but the British contraband lists of 1914-15 and 1939 included practically every conceivable commodity. This procedure was defended on the ground that all the industrial and commercial resources of Germany had been mobilized for war purposes. The Allied

19 Cf. The Maria, 5 C. Rob. 365, 368; The Kim, L. R. 215 (1915); The Hart, 3 Wall. 559-560.
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Navies cut off the Reich from almost all commercial contacts with the outside world. Neutral ships and cargoes of every nature, destined either for German ports or for other neutral ports near Germany, were captured and condemned in wholesale fashion. The U.S.A. and other neutrals protested against these practices but resorted to them with even greater enthusiasm after becoming belligerents.

The major controversies between belligerents and neutrals in 1939-40 revolved around such issues. On September 3, 1939, the British liner *Athenia* was sunk without warning with heavy loss of life, including 25 Americans. Germany disclaimed responsibility, however; and in the absence of proof Washington refrained from protest. On October 9, 1939, before American vessels were forbidden to go to belligerent ports, the British-bound American freighter *City of Flint* was captured by the *Deutschland*. The prize crew took the vessel to Norway, then to Murmansk, and then back to a Norwegian port. On the principle that a neutral may not permit a belligerent to bring enemy prizes into its ports except temporarily for fuel, provisions, or repairs, the United States demanded the release of the vessel. Norway complied. Germany protested. Oslo rejected the protest on November 5.

In the same month, German naval forces began sowing magnetic mines in British waters, in violation of the Hague Convention of 1907, allegedly in retaliation for Allied blockade practices and contraband lists, which Berlin held were unlawful. Early in December the Allies, in counterretaliation, ordered the seizure of enemy exports in neutral vessels, contrary to the Declaration of Paris. Washington protested to London at this order and also protested against Allied interference with American mails and undue delay in contraband inspection and control at Gibraltar. The argument, as usual in such cases, was inconclusive.

The Allies subsequently contended that Norway was permitting the abuse of its territorial waters by the Reich. On February 16, 1940, the British destroyer *Cossack* violated Norwegian waters by entering Joensing Fjord, boarding the German naval supply ship *Altmark*, and releasing 300 British seamen who had been captured by the *Graf Spee*. Oslo protested to London. Berlin protested to Oslo. On April 5, London threatened action to close Norwegian waters to German shipping on the ground that Norway was permitting abuse of the right of innocent passage. Three days later, British vessels sowed mines along the Norwegian coast to intercept Swedish ore shipments to Germany via Narvik. The Nazi invasion of Norway, launched April 9, had been prepared long in advance but was "justified" by Berlin on

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the pretext that Norway was not safeguarding its neutrality and was about to be invaded by the Allies and used as a base of operations against the Reich.

The subsequent conduct of neutrals and belligerents in World War II, despite the ex post facto trial of war criminals (discussed in the next section), came close to reducing all of the law of war and neutrality to a mockery. Some seekers after peace sought to attain their ends through a new type of isolationist neutrality, which has always failed of its purpose. Others sought peace by abolishing neutrality and universalizing war on the theory, also fallacious in practice, that no State will go to war if all States are pledged to wage war jointly on an aggressor. The U.S.A. had already helped to "make the world safe for aggression" through policies intended to "keep out of other peoples' wars" but eventuating in fact in major assistance to the Triplce Powers in their attacks on Ethiopia, Spain, and China. In September, 1939, Washington, which had gone to war in 1798, 1805, 1812, and 1917 in the name of "freedom of the seas," was in the preposterous position of forbidding American citizens to send ships, lend money, or sell arms to belligerents, thus aiding Germany and injuring France and Britain. The new "Neutrality" Act of November 4, 1939, retained the embargo on shipping, loans, and travel to all belligerent States but permitted them to buy arms and other goods in the U.S.A. and to transport them in their own vessels in the name of "cash and carry."

By the summer of 1940, however, the U.S.A. was aiding Britain "short of war" by governmental transfers of arms, munitions, and even destroyers—all in flat violation of its neutral duties, despite the absurd casuistry of Att. Gen. Robert Jackson's opinion justifying the naval-base-destroyer bargain of September 2, 1940. The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, carried this policy of "neutral intervention" to its logical conclusion and led to the Triplce attack upon the U.S.A. In law, American policy was indefensible, save on the assumption that the Fascist States, by violating law on all possible occasions, had released neutrals from all their obligations. In fact, American policy was indispensable for American security. When considerations of power conflict with principles of law, the latter suffer the fate predicted by Machiavelli.

The events of 1941-45 were less a demonstration of the fragility of the law, which was already evident, than a nightmare of horror which even Hugo Grotius, familiar as he was with the atrocities of the wars of religion, would have found incredible. Mass murder of prisoners and noncombatants was perpetrated retail by the Japanese and wholesale by the Nazis. Six million European Jews and other millions of Slavs were done to death by
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shooting, torture, starvation, overwork, gas wagons, and poison chambers, the bodies in many cases being converted into fertilizer, fats, and soap. Scores of thousands of airplanes blasted and burned the cities of the Reich and of Japan, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians. Robot bombs rained on England. All distinctions between soldiers and civilians vanished. Prize cases no longer troubled courts, since submarines sank ships on sight. United States submarines destroyed 1,944 Japanese merchant vessels. Enemy action sank 4,770 ships of the United Nations, aggregating 21,140,000 tons. Neutral rights were violated on all sides and in almost all respects. Frightfulness reached its culmination in the atomic vaporization of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—an atrocity justified by a few international lawyers on the ground that, while V-1 and V-2 missiles were indiscriminate, atomic bombs, mirabile dictu, had "specific targets." All these acts, and many others of similar character, were plausibly presented by politicians and hailed by patriots as essential to "save lives," "shorten the war," "win victory," "rescue civilization," or otherwise serve the cause of peace, justice, and righteousness.

"Silent enim leges inter arma," wrote Cicero. ("When arms speak, laws are silent.") Contemporary mankind, at first dazed by the colossal bestialities of World War II, is now indifferent—and takes it for granted, without quite grasping the thought, that in World War III tens of millions of men, women, and children are to be incinerated as a matter of course. Earnest souls seek comfort in new efforts at "outlawing war," banning wicked weapons, prohibiting "genocide," or mass murder—as if war could be vanquished by treaty in an anarchic world of sovereignties, as if governments would refrain from the use of winning weapons in wars of annihilation, as if a world so maladjusted as to breed homicidal maniacs, and so ill-governed as to permit them to seize control of great States, could escape massacre. All such hopes are vain. The future of international law is now one with the future of the great society itself. In the 20th century, war and law among the nations have become antithetical to the same degree that war and civilization on the planet are incompatible. Nevertheless, one other aspect of the problem of the law, not unrelated to the larger issue, remains to be explored.

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In a society the selective principle of which is force the function of law and morality is necessarily limited. In the main, these systems of norms are restricted to spheres irrelevant from the standpoint of power politics. To the extent to which they penetrate into this circle their very weakness condemns them to fulfill functions which in effect amount to a camouflage of the existing rule of force. Not being strong
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enough to command over-riding respect, and not being blatantly ineffective, within the purview of the realm of power politics international law and morality serve as ideologies by which the prevailing international anarchy is conveniently covered up.—GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, Power Politics, 1941.

In the nature of things law cannot be enforced upon sovereign governments or nation-states as units. Power of enforcement must ultimately be exerted upon men individually or collectively. If exerted upon men collectively, that is war. It inevitably involves the destruction of the innocent with the guilty. No matter who wins the contest of force, justice is defeated; not only justice but civilization will be lost, if we do not now establish peace, and peace, as I see it, is a system or order and security under the law which cannot exist without government... Law in the exact sense cannot develop or exist except within the structure of a government of individual citizens.—JUSTICE OWEN I. ROBERTS, 1946.

In all human communities enjoying government, the central principle of criminal justice is that all the power of society, supported by all citizens, shall be brought to bear, within carefully specified safeguards against abuse, upon such erratic individuals as may break the law and violate the peace. The discrepancy of power between the community and the felon is such that peace through law is ordinarily well kept. In the "family of nations," law defines the rights and duties not of individuals but of sovereignties. It is enforced, if at all, by the action of States against States, not by the action of the community against individuals. International society therefore lacks government and consequently lacks the means of enforcing law in the only fashion which has ever been effective in past experience. The problem of government in the Western State System will be explored later in these pages. Here it is fitting to consider the attempts which have recently been made to enforce international law on individuals—without the establishment of any permanent legislative, executive, or judicial authorities in the world community capable of acting on individuals.

Be it recalled to begin with, lest the distinction between tradition and innovation be obscured, that certain categories of individuals have always been regarded as amenable to "international law," even though this law has to do in general not with men as such but with the "legal persons" or juridical fictions called "States." Yet States are men, and act through men and on men, under a law which holds States responsible if they fail to require certain acts, and forbid other acts, on the part of their citizens. For victors to slay or enslave vanquished, including chiefs and kings, was customary in ancient days, though later generations came to regard the practice not as a rule of law but as evidence of lawlessness. Usually the only crime
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of the victims was that of having suffered defeat.\(^{21}\) In recent times, pirates, slave traders, opium peddlers, spies, and violators of the laws of war have all been proceeded against by national governments as offenders against legal rules derived from custom or treaty. In their own legislation, moreover, all States have prescribed penalties to be enforced in their own courts against those within their jurisdiction who violate international law. In the short-lived Central American Court of Justice (1907-17), individual citizens were even permitted to bring suit against States, though this arrangement was altogether exceptional. All governments have striven to afford diplomatic protection to their citizens abroad when jeopardized in their personal or property rights by local disorders or discriminatory legislation. Every State is obliged to afford reasonable protection to citizens of other States. In 1919 the Treaty of Versailles (Article 227) provided for an international tribunal of five members to try the Kaiser “for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” Provision was also made (Articles 228 to 230) for the trial before Allied tribunals of Germans “accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.” A list of over 100 “war criminals” was finally drawn up. But nothing came of these resolves. The Netherlands refused to extradite the former Kaiser. Berlin refused to extradite the other war criminals, of whom a dozen were brought to trial before German courts and either acquitted or given nominal sentences. When one of the “war criminals,” Paul von Hindenburg, was elected President of the German Republic in 1925, the Allies made no protest. When Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor in 1933 and the Nazi persecution of Jews began, other governments made diplomatic protests only with respect to victims of their own nationality. Under traditional conceptions, the right of the Nazi regime to rob and murder German citizens of Jewish origin was sacrosanct, since the matter fell within the category of “domestic jurisdiction.”

Not until World War II was a systematic effort made to hold individuals, including top political and military figures, accountable for violations of international law. An Inter-Allied Conference in London in January, 1942, resolved to “place among their principal war aims the punishment, through the channel of organized justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these

\(^{21}\) “... Joshua called for all the men of Israel, and said unto the captains of the men of war which went with him, Come near, put your feet upon the necks of these kings... And afterward Joshua smote them, and slew them, and hanged them on five trees:... And that day Joshua took Makkedah, and smote it with the edge of the sword, and the king thereof he utterly destroyed, them, and all the souls that were therein; he let none remain: and he did to the king of Makkedah as he did unto the king of Jericho.” *The Book of Joshua*, Chapter 10. This tale of king killing and massacre continues through 14 more verses with repetitious monotony.
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crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them, or participated
in them.” At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October, 1943,
it was agreed, in a statement signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin,
that “German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have
been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities, massacres
and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable
deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished. . . . Ger-
man criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location will
be punished by joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.” Even before
the end of hostilities, some captured Nazis were locally tried. In December,
1943, for example, three German officers and a Russian traitor were hanged
amid the ruins of liberated Kharkov after trial and sentence by a Soviet
military court for having killed sick children, beaten women to death, and
flogged, hanged, gassed, and butchered war prisoners and civilians during
the Nazi occupation. A 16-government United Nations War Crimes Com-
mission, set up in London in October, 1943, advised each participating State
to establish a national “war crimes office” to investigate offenses against its
own citizens.

The sequel of these decisions was a series of several hundred trials be-
fore sundry national and international tribunals in which several thousand
suspects were acquitted or sentenced to imprisonment or execution. Gen.
Masaharu Homma, commander during the Japanese conquest of the Philip-
ines, was found guilty by a U.S. military commission of responsibility for
the “death march of Bataan” and was shot on April 3, 1946, at Los Banos,
Luzon. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, conqueror of Malaya and Singapore and
Japanese commander in the Philippines, 1944-45, was similarly tried by a
commission under the authority of the ultimate victor, Gen. Douglas Mac-
Arthur—and hanged at Los Banos on February 23, 1946.22 Other trials in
the various national jurisdictions of the victorious Powers cannot here be

22 Both Homma and Yamashita appealed in vain to the U.S. Supreme Court. In his
dissent Justice Frank Murphy argued that power under the Constitution to “define
and punish offenses under the law of nations” was limited by the “due process” clause
of the Fifth Amendment: “The immutable rights of the individual . . . belong not
alone to the members of those nations that excel on the battlefield or that subscribe
to the democratic ideology. They belong to every person in the world, victor or van-
quished, whatever may be his race, color or beliefs. They rise above any status of
belligerency or outlawry. They survive any popular passion or frenzy of the mo-
ment. . . .” Justice Wiley Rutledge concluded his separate dissent by quoting Thomas
Paine: “He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from
oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach him-
self.” See 327 U.S. 1. Such views, obviously, did not prevail since modern man is no
more capable of “loving his enemies,” as prescribed by Jesus of Nazareth, than he is
capable of restraining his passions to a point which would make war crimes, and war
itself, impossible.
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reviewed. All involved direct participation in acts deemed crimes under all systems of law—or questions of the responsibility of enemy commanders to restrain their subordinates from committing such acts. Such questions were in most cases decided against the accused.

The two great international trials of enemy political leaders after World War II were those held in the War Ministry Building amid the ruins of Tokyo and in the rebuilt Courthouse amid the ruins of Nuremberg. On the basis of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender, President Truman on November 29, 1945, authorized Joseph B. Keenan “as Chief of Counsel in the preparation and prosecution of charges of war crimes against the major leaders of Japan” to make recommendations for trials. On December 8, 1945, General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers established an International Prosecution Section for this purpose. A Charter established an International Military Tribunal, set up April 26, 1946, consisting of prosecutors and judges from the nine States which had formally accepted the Japanese surrender, plus India and the Philippines. Sir William Webb of Australia was named President by General MacArthur. On April 29, 1946, the 11 associate prosecutors lodged an indictment against 28 accused, charged with “Conventional War Crimes” (i.e., murder, and conspiracy to permit murder, of prisoners and civilians), “Crimes against Peace” (i.e., conspiring to wage aggressive war and plotting to dominate the world), and “Crimes against Humanity” (i.e., atrocities). The period of responsibility was set from September 18, 1931, date of the Mukden incident.

The defendants included four former Premiers (Kiichiro Hiranuma, Koki Hirota, Kuniaiki Koiso, Hideki Tojo), three Foreign Ministers, aside from Hirota (Yosuke Matsuoka, Mamoru Shigemitsu, Shigenori Togo), four War Ministers (Sadao Araki, Shunroku Hata, Seishiro Itagaki, Jiro Minami), and sundry other Cabinet members, ambassadors, and high officers on the Supreme War Council.23 Tojo made an unsuccessful effort to commit suicide before the trial. Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Premier in 1937-38 and 1940-41, took his life by poison, December 16, 1945, after assuming responsibility for the war against China and declaring that he could not endure the disgrace of trial by an enemy court. This process, begun in June, 1946, was not yet completed when this volume went to press. Its legal and moral significance, if any, was already largely vitiated by the fact that Emperor Hirohito, who had sponsored and approved the acts of the accused, was still reigning over Japan with MacArthur’s blessing. Political expediency dictated the trial of subordinate culprits and the implied exoneration, and even glorification, of the supreme war criminal.

23 For details, see the Department of State Bulletin, March 10, 1946, and May 19, 1946.
LAW AMONG THE LAWLESS

The dramatic and widely publicized trial of Nazi leaders at Nuremberg took less time but was productive of more verbiage. On May 2, 1945, President Truman appointed Justice Robert H. Jackson as Chief Counsel to prepare and prosecute charges in cooperation with other governments. A Charter was signed in London, August 8, by representatives of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Britain, and France, setting up an International Military Tribunal and defining its jurisdiction. The signatories, respectively, appointed as prosecutors Robert H. Jackson, Gen. R. A. Rudenko, Hartley Shawcross, and François de Menthon and as judges Francis Biddle, Lord Justice Lawrence (President of the Tribunal), Gen. I. T. Nikitchenko, and Prof. Donnedieu de Fabres. On October 18, the prosecutors presented an indictment against 24 individuals and asked a criminal judgment against the Reich Cabinet, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, the SD, the SA, the Gestapo, and the General Staff and High Command of the Wehrmacht.

Of the defendants, four did not appear. Martin Bormann had vanished in the debacle and, though presumably dead, was tried in absentia. Robert Ley, leader of the Arbeitsfront, committed suicide on October 25, 1945. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was excused because of illness, as was Ernst Kaltenbrunner. (Hitler, Goebbels, and Himmler had all committed suicide at the time of the Nazi collapse.) Of the remainder, 13 had been top leaders of the Party and/or members of the Cabinet: Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Franz von Papen, and Constantine von Neurath. Three were lesser Nazi bureaucrats or propagandists: Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, and Hans Fritzsche. Four were military leaders: Wilhelm Keitel, Karl Doenitz, Erich Raeder, and Alfred Jodl. The indictment contained four counts: (1) the Common Plan or Conspiracy (i.e., a plot to prepare, initiate, and wage wars of aggression); (2) Crimes against Peace (i.e., the actual preparing and waging of such wars); (3) War Crimes (i.e., violations of the laws and customs of war); (4) Crimes against Humanity (i.e., murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution, etc.).

The Nuremberg trials began on November 20, 1945. The Tribunal delivered its verdict on October 1, 1946, in a 300-page opinion, after holding 403 public sessions, hearing 33 prosecution witnesses and 61 defense witnesses (in addition to the defendants), and digesting mountains of documents.24

By any standard of judgment, the testimony was terrifying and conclusive. The Tribunal held that the Leadership Corps, the Gestapo, the SD, and the SS were criminal organizations, but that the SA, the Cabinet, and the General Staff and High Command were not. The individual defendants were all convicted on one or more counts, with the exception of Schacht, Papen, and Fritzsche, who were held “not guilty,” with the Soviet judge dissenting. Hess, Funk, and Raeder received life sentences, Schirach and Speer 20 years, Neurath 15 years, and Doenitz 10 years. All the rest were hanged on October 16, 1946, save Goering, who succeeded in hiding a vial of potassium cyanide on his person during the trial and took his own life on the eve of execution.

That these trials resulted in “justice” was taken for granted by most of a tormented and war-weary generation. Few voices were raised to suggest that Hirohito, Victor Emmanuel, Badoglio, and Horthy were greater war criminals than those sent to the gallows. But the significance of the trials for international law has been a matter of sharp controversy.\textsuperscript{25} The Nuremberg Tribunal rejected the traditional view that individuals are protected by the doctrines of State sovereignty and of superior orders from prosecution for launching war or for perpetrating or permitting abuses during hostilities. “Crimes against international law,” declared the judges, “are committed by men, not by abstract entities.” War crimes and acts of inhumanity have long been subject to punishment, although the thesis that top officials who order or condone such outrages are to be held judicially responsible is novel in the practice of recent centuries. The proposition that the planning and waging of aggressive war is a crime for which individuals can be punished is wholly new. It was based at Nuremberg and elsewhere on the Pact of Paris of 1928 and on other international accords for the renunciation of war.

“If,” said Robert Jackson, August 8, 1945, “we can cultivate in the world the idea that aggressive war-making is the way to the prisoner’s dock rather than the way to honor, we will have accomplished something toward making the peace more secure. . . . We have taken an important step forward in fixing individual responsibility for warmongering, among whatever peoples, as an international crime.” Here, wrote Henry L. Stimson (\textit{Foreign Affairs}, January, 1947), “is affirmed the simple principle of peace—that the man who makes or plans to make aggressive war is a criminal. . . . It is only

\textsuperscript{25} See the divergent views of George A. Finch and Quincy Wright in the \textit{American Journal of International Law}, January, 1947, which also contains the text of the Nuremberg decision.
as this standard is accepted, supported and enforced, that we can move onward to a world of law and peace.” Judge Biddle, in his final report to President Truman, urged the drafting of a code of international criminal law, to be enforced by a permanent international criminal court: “The conclusions of Nuremberg may be ephemeral or significant. That depends on whether we now take the next step...”

Others have doubts. The “next step” has not yet been taken, though something of the kind may emerge from the U.N. draft convention for the prevention and punishment of genocide and from the U.N. Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification.26 The policies of appeasement and/or aggression pursued by the major United Nations (then hopelessly disunited) between 1928 and 1941 lend weight to the view that the waging of war in violation of treaties—a practice at least 5,000 years old—was not in fact a crime during these years and that those who have been punished for it are victims of ex post facto legislation. The “legislation” in question, like all so-called “international legislation,” is a product, not of any legislature, but only of contracts between sovereignties. Here, as in ancient days, victors punish vanquished. Since “justice” presupposes impartial judgment and the organized power of the whole community behind the judge, and since both elements are still lacking in the society of sovereignties, the results achieved to date can be equated with “justice” only by wishful thinking. “Practical” politicians and militarists will draw a different lesson from Tokyo and Nuremberg: in the next war we must win at all costs, for if we lose we shall be hanged by the winners. Only fatuous dreamers can suppose that this reflection, by itself, will serve as an effective deterrent against war.

The “law of nations” is here confronted anew with an old and seemingly insoluble dilemma. Law is enforceable with respect to individuals. In major crises and conflicts, it is seldom, if ever, enforceable in any fashion precluding wholesale violence through the action of States against States—whether that action is directed toward whole national communities, as is inevitable in modern war, or against officials of defeated governments after victory has been won. Law and justice are not to be had in the societies of Homo sapiens without government among men. Through government, men and women collectively make law, change it in organized deliberation, and enforce it promptly and effectively against individual violators. No such arrangements yet prevail in the family of the sovereign nation-states. Unless or until they are brought into being, it is safe to assume that international

26 See the report of Philip C. Jessup, U.S. Representative, Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1947, pp. 121-127.
law will remain a strangely paradoxical set of rules among sovereignties, establishing doubtfully a fragile and transient reign of law among the lawless.

SUGGESTED READINGS


CHAPTER IV

THE ARTS OF DIPLOMACY

1. THE SCIENCE OF FRAUD AND FAVORS

A correct man punctually executes the orders he has received; but to this quality must be joined ability. Now, in order to execute a political commission well, it is necessary to know the character of the prince and those who sway his counsel; to attach himself to those who can procure him ready access to the prince, for there is nothing difficult to an ambassador who has the prince’s ear; but it is above all things necessary to make himself esteemed, which he will do if he so regulates his actions and conversation that he shall be thought a man of honor, liberal and sincere.—Niccolò Machiavelli to Raphael Girolami, Ambassador to the Emperor.

The late Duke of Tuscany, who was a remarkably wise and enlightened prince, once complained to the Venetian Ambassador, who stayed over night with him on his journey to Rome, that the Republic of Venice had sent as resident at his court a person of no value, possessing neither judgment nor knowledge, nor even any attractive personal quality. “I am not surprised,” said the Ambassador in reply; “we have many fools in Venice.” Whereupon the Grand Duke retorted: “We also have fools in Florence, but we take care not to export them.”—M. de Callières, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, 1716.

An efficient ambassador must be a master of ceremonies; at all events, he must be able to work as procurer and forger. The least of all his duties is to be a correct official.—A. Hitler to H. Rauschning, Hitler Speaks, 1939, p. 269.

A n Ambassador,” wrote Sir Henry Wotton in Christopher Fleckamore’s album early in the 17th century, “is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.” This conception of the function of diplomacy is reminiscent of Machiavelli and Louis XI. Though it is now frowned upon by those who urge openness and honesty in international relations, it nevertheless suggests the fundamental nature of the State System in which modern diplomacy has arisen. In a System of independent sovereign units, engaged in a perpetual struggle with one another for territory, power, and prestige in an oftentimes violent if not entirely lawless fashion,
diplomacy and war are inevitably regarded as means to the greater glory of the State. A State may enhance its power at the expense of its rivals through violent coercion or through discussion, compromise, and bargaining which may well involve unscrupulous trickery, deception, and misrepresentation. The end is the same. Which means it is most expedient to use in a given situation depends upon circumstances. But in any case modern diplomacy, like military might, is a weapon for the enhancement of State power quite as much as a means for the orderly discussion of international problems.

In the present chapter, however, attention will be directed to the mechanisms of diplomacy rather than to its purposes. The mechanisms have been created to achieve the purposes, for in the process of political and administrative invention, no less than in technology and organic evolution, structure reflects function. But the purposes of diplomacy are no longer limited to the enhancement of the power of the State at the expense of its neighbors. The functions of diplomats have become varied and multidimensional to the same degree to which the contacts among States in the machine age have become enriched and bewilderingly complicated. Sir Ernest Satow, in his great work, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, defined diplomacy as "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent States" (Vol. I, page 1). In the contemporary period the number of problems which fall within the purview of the official relations among governments is enormously greater than it has ever been before. A correspondingly complex set of diplomatic procedures and institutions has been developed to meet the needs of the international society in the modern age of Western civilization.

Modern diplomacy, invented in Renaissance Italy and embellished and enriched by the practice of the national monarchies in the epoch of the great discoveries and of the Reformation, was first subjected to a crucial test of its efficacy as an instrument of international collaboration at the Peace Congress of Westphalia, which concluded the Thirty Years' War. The circumstances attending this first great gathering of European diplomats revealed clearly the necessity of establishing fixed rules of diplomatic etiquette and ceremonial. The long delay of six years in the conclusion of the peace was due in large part to the absence of such fixed rules in the international practice of the period. A Venetian offer of mediation was ignored because the Republic had addressed Queen Christina of Sweden as "Sérénissime" and had failed to add "Très-Puissante" to her title. The Venetian Ambassador at Paris apologized for this omission to Grotius, then Swedish Ambassador to France, but the war went on. Not until the close of the year 1641 were arrangements made between the belligerents for the summoning of a peace
THE SCIENCE OF FRAUD AND FAVORS

conference. Innumerable procedural difficulties arose at once. The Swedes refused to send delegates to Cologne as the Pope had suggested or to any other place where Sweden’s ally, France, might be regarded as having precedence. The mountain refused to go to Mohammed, and Mohammed refused to go to the mountain. After much wrangling, it was decided that the Swedes would negotiate with the enemy at Osnabrück and the French at Münster, both cities in Westphalia about 30 miles apart and roughly halfway between Paris and Stockholm. While the war continued, the two towns, as well as the route between them, were neutralized by international action to afford security to the delegates. New controversies arose over the forms of the documentary credentials of the plenipotentiaries. The Count d'Avaux, representing France, refused to accord the title of Emperor to Ferdinand III; and Salvius, the Swedish delegate, would not have the King of France named before his Queen. Finally, each delegate in his credentials gave first place to his own rulers. Next the Emperor refused to ratify the preliminary treaty which was concluded. It recognized the rulers of France and Sweden as his equals, he complained; his own name did not appear first in the document; the neutralization of Westphalia was derogatory to his dignity.

Not until July of 1642 were arrangements for the Congress finally completed, and another 13 months elapsed before any of the delegates arrived on the scene. Since the full powers of some of them were questioned, no business was done till June of 1645. "If," wrote Ogier, friend of the French delegate, Abel Servien, "they create in the substance of the business delays proportioned to those hitherto, I do not know that the unborn child Madame Servien is expecting can hope to see the end of a treaty to which our adversaries create such extraordinary obstacles." Long wrangles ensued over titles, places of honor in processions, and seating arrangements at the conference. Most of the States of Europe were represented, except England, Russia, and Turkey. So numerous were the delegates that one observer declared that "one could not look out the door without seeing ten ambassadors." Each delegate stood upon his dignity at all costs. All wanted to be at the head of the conference table. When a round table was at length agreed upon, more quarrels arose over the honor of occupying the place nearest the door. So tedious and complicated were all the details of the negotiations that the records fill many volumes. Eight years elapsed before the terms of peace were finally settled and embodied in the Treaties of 1648.

Each succeeding international conference of European States has accomplished its work in a progressively shorter period of time. The Congress at

Utrecht (1713-14) required only 2 years to complete its task. The Congress of Vienna of 1814-15 lasted only 14 months. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 required less than 6 months to draw up treaties of peace, despite the fact that the problems under consideration were of world-wide significance and the issues were enormously more complex than in earlier negotiations. The expediting of the business of international conferences was made possible by the gradual development of established rules of precedence, etiquette, and ceremonial which may appear needlessly elaborate and even silly to the layman but which are essential to ensure the conduct of diplomatic business with dispatch.

Among the most important of these rules are those relating to the ranks and titles of diplomatic representatives. (During the 15th century, States began the practice of exchanging permanent diplomatic agents with one another. With the appearance of diplomats of lesser rank than ambassadors, such as envoys, ministers resident, and the like, confusion and controversy arose over questions of dignity and precedence, until general agreements could be reached regarding the principles to be applied to such problems. At the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle of 1815 and 1818, respectively, rules were formulated regarding the relative rank of State agents which have since been accepted by all States. Four classes of diplomatic agents are now recognized in order of rank:

1. Ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary and papal legates or nuncios, accredited to sovereigns or heads of States.
2. Envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary, also accredited to sovereigns or heads of States.
3. Ministers resident, likewise accredited to sovereigns.
4. "Chargés d'affaires," ad hoc when the agent so named is the permanent head of a diplomatic mission, ad interim when he is an official left temporarily in charge of an embassy or legation; accredited to the Foreign Minister.

These ranks are significant chiefly for ceremonial purposes and serve to prevent most of the difficulties and embarrassments which hampered the work of the Congress of Westphalia. The third rank has now become of minor importance, since most States now confer the title of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary upon their ministers abroad, whether they are sent on special missions or reside permanently at their posts. In general, only sovereign States may send diplomatic agents. Yet the British Dominions and some of the Soviet Republics exchange diplomatic agents of their own with a considerable number of foreign States. The Papacy from time immemorial has likewise enjoyed the right to send diplomatic agents (nuncios and legates) who have usually been accorded the position of doyen,
or "dean," of the diplomatic corps in States receiving papal representatives. The *doyen* is otherwise the senior diplomat of highest rank. Although the Papacy was not a sovereign State between 1870 and 1928, it again has jurisdiction over territory and subjects (the Vatican City) under the Lateran Treaty with the Italian Government concluded in 1929. President Roosevelt pleased Roman Catholics and displeased many Protestants by appointing Myron C. Taylor on December 23, 1939, as his "personal representative" to the Vatican with the rank of "Ambassador without Portfolio"—a category of diplomatic agent hitherto unknown. President Truman continued this practice.

Before diplomatic agents are appointed, it is customary to ascertain whether the person about to be chosen is personally acceptable to the Sovereign and Foreign Minister to whom he is sent. A diplomatic agent who, for any reason, is displeasing to those with whom he is expected to maintain friendly relations can obviously be of no great utility. All States are free to refuse diplomatic agents of other States on the ground of their being *persona non grata*. No reasons need be given for such refusal; and if trivial or irrelevant reasons are offered, irritation is likely to result. The rule of reciprocity is followed by States in the rank of diplomatic representatives exchanged. Since ambassadors were once regarded as representatives of royalty, the republican government of the United States sent only representatives of lesser rank, *i.e.*, ministers and chargés d'affaires, for over a century after its establishment. In view of the fact that such representatives were literally obliged "to take a back seat" at foreign courts in deference to agents of the first rank, Congress authorized the President to exchange ambassadors with foreign States in 1893.

The old practice whereby Great Powers exchanged ambassadors with one another and ministers with lesser Powers has lapsed to such a degree in recent years that the lower ranks of diplomats are almost in process of disappearing. By 1947 the U.S.A. was exchanging ambassadors with no less than 41 States, including the new Dominion of Pakistan, recognized August 14, 1947. Ministers plenipotentiary and envoys extraordinary were exchanged with only 16 States. No ministers resident or chargés were exchanged, although Foreign Service officers without rank were maintained in Albania and Bulgaria, while U.S. "political advisers" in Berlin and Tokyo had the "personal rank" of ambassador.

2 Afghanistan, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Hungary, Iraq, Eire, Lebanon, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, and South Africa, as of February, 1947. In addition, "ministers" for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were still named on the Diplomatic List, though the governments which these agents "represented" had disappeared in 1940. See *Foreign Service List* (quarterly) and *Diplomatic List* (monthly), U.S. Department of State.
**THE ARTS OF DIPLOMACY**

Every diplomatic agent receives a letter of credence, a special passport, and a set of instructions before starting on his mission. The letter of credence is issued by the head of the State to ambassadors and ministers and by the Foreign Minister (Secretary of State in the U.S.A.) to chargés d'affaires. It authorizes the agent to undertake his duties. A diplomatic mission is commenced with the formal ceremony of the presentation and acceptance of the letter of credence. The agent is received for this purpose by the head of the local State, if he is an ambassador or minister, and by the Foreign Minister if he is a chargé d'affaires. Diplomats of the first and second rank are usually received in a solemn public audience. They present their letters and make a short address, to which a formal reply is given. Deviations from established ceremonial are frowned upon.

A diplomatic mission may be terminated in various ways, as by the expiration of the period for which the letter of credence or full power is granted, the change of grade of the representative, or the fulfillment of the purposes of a special mission. In all these conjunctures, as well as in the case of the death of a diplomat, his resignation, or his recall or dismissal for personal reasons, a new letter of credence is required by his successor. Diplomatic missions are also terminated by a declaration of war or by recall or dismissal for political reasons in a situation of strained relations leading to a rupture. Such a severance of diplomatic contacts is not always followed by war, but war is invariably preceded or accompanied by a diplomatic rupture. On August 3, 1914, Ambassador von Schoen, German representative in Paris, appeared at the Quai d'Orsay for the last time to inform Foreign Minister Viviani of the declaration of war against France by Germany and to ask for his passports. On February 3, 1917, Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in Washington, was handed his passports by President Wilson as a protest against the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on the part of Germany four days previously. At the same time, James W. Gerard, American Ambassador in Berlin, was recalled to Washington. On April 6, 1917, the American Congress declared war on Germany in accordance with the President's recommendations. At 1 P.M., September 1, 1939, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Josef Lipski, sent Chargé Prince Lubomirski to Wilhelmstrasse to ask for his passport. At 9 A.M., Sunday, September 3, Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador to the Reich, delivered a two-hour ultimatum to the German Foreign Office. No reply was received by 11; but at 11.30 Ribbentrop delivered to Henderson a long memorandum rejecting the ultimatum. At 12.30 Robert Coulondre, the French Ambassador, saw Ribbentrop, who told him of the rejection of the British note. The British and French declarations of war took effect, respec-
tively, at 11 A.M. and 5 P.M. On Monday the two Allied Ambassadors asked for their passports and took their leave.

The outbreak of a successful revolution, either in the home State of a diplomat or in the State where he is serving, also terminates his mission under ordinary circumstances and raises the question of the diplomatic recognition of the new government as a prerequisite to the resumption of relations between the States. Sometimes, however, this principle is not observed. On March 17, 1917, David R. Francis, American Ambassador to Russia, reported to the State Department the overthrow of the Imperial Government and the abdication of the Tsar. His request that he be authorized to recognize the new Provisional Government was granted by Secretary of State Lansing two days later. On March 22, Francis called on Miliukov and the new Council of Ministers and presented his new credentials. Shortly afterward, George Bakhmetiev, Tsarist Ambassador in Washington, resigned his post and was replaced by Boris Bakhmetiev (no relation to his predecessor), whose credentials were received by Lansing on June 19. On November 7, 1917, however, the Provisional Government was overturned by the Bolshevist coup d'état, which set up the present Soviet regime in Russia. In this instance, recognition of the new government was withheld. Francis received no new credentials to the Soviet authorities, and his mission was presumably terminated, though he remained in Russia and continued to enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities until his departure on July 25, 1918, from Vologda to Archangel, already held by forces hostile to the Soviet Government. The new revolution would normally have been regarded as terminating the diplomatic missions of the agents of the defunct Provisional Government abroad, but the State Department in Washington continued until 1922 to deal with Boris Bakhmetiev as the accredited and official representative of the State of Russia, though he represented no authority in Russia save, for a time, that of the counterrevolutionary White Guard leader, Admiral Kolchak, who was executed after the destruction of his regime in Siberia by the Red Army. Bakhmetiev's financial attaché, Serge Ughet, appeared on the rolls of the State Department as Russian diplomatic representative until 1933. This situation is anomalous and contrary to general practice. When, in 1919, Mr. Martens, the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to the United States, sought to present his credentials to the State Department, they were refused and he was arrested and deported.

A diplomatic representative who is officially received is entitled to the benefit of the usual privileges and immunities during his entire mission. As a matter of general practice and comity, he is usually accorded the same privileges during the interval between his departure from his own State and his arrival in the foreign capital and likewise, in the event of his return,
dismissal, or recall to his own State, during the interval between his departure from his post and his safe arrival home. Diplomatic ceremonial at the present time has been somewhat simplified as compared with the practice in the 18th century. No diplomat can claim honors above other diplomats of the same rank. As among diplomats of the same rank, the one who has served longest at his post receives precedence. At diplomatic dinners, the host sits at the head of the table. The first place on his right is the place of honor accorded to the ambassador who has served longest; the next ambassador in order of service occupies the first place on the left, the third the second place on the right, and so on. When all the ambassadors are thus placed, the ministers plenipotentiary are seated in the same order, followed by the ministers resident and the chargés d’affaires. In processions the place of honor is sometimes the first place and sometimes the last. Diplomats of the first rank are entitled to be addressed as “Your Excellency,” to remain covered in the presence of the Sovereign or head of the State, to use a coat of arms over the door of the embassy, to receive military and naval honors, to be invited to all court functions, and the like. Ambassadors traditionally receive salutes of 19 guns, ministers plenipotentiary of 15, ministers resident of 13, and chargés d’affaires of 11.

The legal privileges of diplomatic agents comprise inviolability of person, family, suite, and residence, extraterritoriality and exemption from local civil and criminal jurisdiction, freedom from personal and general property taxes, and liberty of worship. Diplomatic premises are seldom invaded by local authorities, even when political refugees seek safety in them. This “right of asylum,” comparable to that accorded to the Church in the Middle Ages, is widely recognized and has been insisted upon emphatically by Latin-American States. Every diplomatic representative is entitled to bring with him to the capital to which he is sent a suite, the members of which share his privileges and immunities. The official suite of an ambassador or minister usually comprises a counselor, various secretaries, military, naval, and commercial attachés, interpreters and dragomans, clerks and accountants, a chaplain, a physician, etc. The unofficial suite includes the family, servants, private secretaries, etc., of the head of the mission.

The broader question of the actual or ideal political functions of diplomats has exercised the fancy of scholars, publicists, and diplomats themselves for many centuries. The late Ambassador John G. Winant put the diplomatic function quite modestly: “One of the tasks of an ambassador is to interpret correctly statements and decisions made by his government to those officially responsible in the country to which he is assigned and to do a like service in transmitting messages from that government to his
own.” 3 Among the more exalted definitions is that provided by the U.S. Department of State, 4 which avers that the efficient Foreign Service officer

Creates good will and common understanding, and, with restrained and critical leadership born of mature experience and profound knowledge of men and affairs, uses these as instruments for enhancing international confidence and cooperation among governments and people.

Promotes and protects the interests of the United States and of its citizens. Negotiates, with tact, sound judgment, and intimate knowledge of conditions at home and abroad, protocols, conventions, and treaties, especially regarding international intercourse, tariffs, shipping, commerce, preservation of peace, etc., in strict conformity to Government instructions.

Establishes and effectively utilizes personal contacts in farsighted ways for the benefit of his Government and of American citizens.

Analyzes and reports on political and economic conditions and trends of significance to the United States.

Exercises skill in following prescribed form and routine procedure when possible; and displays discriminating judgment, as may be necessary in more complicated situations requiring investigations, careful accumulation of information, or professional understanding of laws, customs, conditions, etc.

Administers an office in a business-like and efficient manner.

In reality, the matter is at once simpler and more complex. Diplomatic agents are no longer called upon to make important decisions of policy as they were often obliged to do in the days before telegraph, radio, and telephone. Benjamin Franklin in Paris (1777-78) could get no answers to questions sent home in less than three months. His successors, even in the remotest capitals, can secure answers in three hours or less. An ambassador, as Mr. Dooley once put it, has thus become “merely a highly paid messenger boy, and not always a very efficient one at that!” His policy-determining duties have been reduced to negligible proportions not only by the speed of communication but also by the disposition of Foreign Ministers and heads of States to confer directly with one another and by the propensity of many governments to trust delicate negotiations to special agents.

Ambassadors and ministers, however, are still responsible for gathering and transmitting relevant information, carrying out instructions, and setting the tone of intergovernmental relations. Aside from the U.S.S.R., Great Powers typically fill top diplomatic posts with men of independent means who spend most of their time entertaining, and being entertained by, other men of means in the capitals where they reside. This social liaison of elites through conspicuous waste and pecuniary emulation (to use Veblen’s terms) doubtless promotes solidarity among national aristocracies and plutocracies.

3 Letters from Grosvenor Square (Boston, Houghton, 1947).
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—or would tend at least to have this effect if the communities in question were not “sovereign” and were not therefore dominated by the exigencies of international anarchy and power politics. In any case the day-to-day business of top-ranking diplomats consists largely of such activities. Walter Hines Page, U.S. Ambassador in London, put the matter sharply in a much-quoted letter of December 22, 1913:

If you think it’s all play, you fool yourself; I mean this job. There’s no end of the work. It consists of these parts: Receiving people for two hours every day, some on some sort of business, some merely to “pay respects”; attending to a large (and exceedingly miscellaneous) mail; going to the Foreign Office on all sorts of errands; looking up the oddest sort of information that you ever heard of; making reports to Washington on all sorts of things; then the so-called social duties—giving dinners, receptions, etc., and attending them. I hear the most important news I get at so-called social functions. Then the court functions; and the meetings and speeches! The American Ambassador must go all over England and explain every American thing. You’d never recover from the shock if you could hear me speak about education, agriculture, the observance of Christmas, the Navy, the Anglo-Saxon, Mexico, the Monroe Doctrine, co-education, woman suffrage, medicine, law, radio-activity, flying, the Supreme Court, the President as a man of letters, the hookworm, the Negro—just get down the encyclopaedia and continue the list! I’ve done this every week-night for a month, hand running, with a few afternoon performances thrown in. I have missed only one engagement in these seven months; and that was merely a private luncheon. I have been late only once. I have the best chauffeur in the world—he deserves credit for much of that. Of course, I don’t get time to read a book. In fact, I can’t get time to keep up with what goes on at home. To read a newspaper eight or ten days old, when they come in bundles of three or four—is impossible. What isn’t telegraphed here, I miss! and that means I miss most things.5

That the “social significance” of diplomacy has not much changed in the past generation is suggested by the random comments of other U.S. Ambassadors abroad. Thus, Ambassador William E. Dodd (a professor, a Jeffersonian Democrat, not a man of means, and, therefore, not a typical ambassador) wrote in Berlin, February 26, 1934:

Another dinner! At nine o’clock we sat down in the Herren Klub on the Hermann Goeringstrasse, as guests of Vice-Chancellor and Frau von Papen . . . there were more than fifty people present. My wife sat on von Papen’s right, and on both sides of the great semi-quadrilateral table there were counts and countesses, generals, Cabinet officers galore. Of course the conversation could not be general, just the small talk of each man between two women and each woman between two men. . . . November 13, 1935: I have not talked with Hitler since February 6, 1934, or Goering since June of the same year. Goebels had us to dinner in early June, 1934. It is rather difficult to remain in my position here and never

5 See The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page for other interesting comments on the diplomatic function.

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have any of the triumvirate with us socially. They are the governors of Germany and I represent the United States here. But it is so humiliating for me to shake hands with known and confessed murderers. . . ."

Joseph E. Davies, Ambassador in Moscow (1936-38), found "society" in the proletarian paradise not wholly different from its counterpart in bourgeois capitals:

January 25, 1937. According to the Protocol, the entire official staff of the Embassy were required to and did accompany me to the Kremlin on the occasion of the presentation of my credentials. They were all formally presented to the President (Kalinin) before we retired into his office for our conversation. After the ceremony the staff returned with me for a very good luncheon. . . . Caviar, caviar everywhere and not an egg to eat, except at the table of the Commissars!! We simply could not get it! At least so we were told—when it was brought up at lunch. (The subject, not the caviar.) . . . February 5, 1937: Protocol requires that a great deal of time be spent in an interchange of calls with the Ambassadors and Ministers. It might be a bore but as a matter of fact I have found it valuable and most interesting. From these visits I have obtained a very great deal of information of value. . . . Of course I have listened more than I have talked, except in generalities.\(^{(7)}\)

A concluding example is relevant, from the diary of Joseph C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo (1932-41):

March 23, 1933: Alice, Elsie and I started out in a dismal downpour of rain for the Imperial Duck Hunt. These hunts occur at regular intervals throughout the winter and every embassy and legation is invited to one of them, including the chief of mission, the counselors, and the military, naval and commercial attaches with wives and daughters. One of the Imperial princes also attends, and we were delighted when we found that the Chichibus had chosen to come today because they liked the crowd. . . . The real amusement was in the minor sports which were carried on in front of the lodge—a baby golf course, a clock putting green, ping-pong, quoits, battledore and shuttlecock—and a delicious luncheon. . . . Elsie had a grand time. . . . The Chichibus say that they enjoyed the dinner and movie at our Embassy so much that they want us to ask them soon again; I think the truth is that it is the only way in which they can see a good movie, and we shall arrange it after Easter. . . .\(^{(8)}\)

Such trivia provide every ambassador with ways of spending his time—and also furnish insight (when the ambassador has vision) into the attitudes and intentions of the elite in the country in which he serves. An able ambassador may even make useful reports on "public opinion" in general, although his necessarily limited contacts and his vocational obtuseness toward disturbing phenomena among the social substrata militate against this

\(^{(6)}\) *Ambassador Dodd’s Diary*, pp. 82, 276.


\(^{(8)}\) *Ten Years in Japan* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1944), pp. 82-83.
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possibility. The obverse side of this function has to do with influencing opinion toward his own country among the local populace. Here he competes or cooperates, as best he can, with radiobroadcasters, cultural attachés, press agents, journalists, businessmen, lecturers, etc., in “winning friends and influencing people” through the manipulation of significant social symbols.

Other things being equal, the perfect modern model of diplomatic finesse will strive to inspire love, to elicit respect (sometimes akin to fear), and to minimize hatred toward his own State among those in whose land he works. But other things are seldom equal. If “my” State is the actual or potential ally of “your” State, the problem of influencing attitudes is wholly different from that which arises when “my” State is the rival or prospective enemy of “yours.” If its status is doubtful, a just mean between extremes is devoutly to be wished, since ardent affection and violent dislike go ill with diplomatic duties. A diplomat passionately devoted to the country to which he is sent (e.g., Walter Hines Page) is of doubtful utility even if the country is a possible ally and of no utility whatever if the country is envisaged by his superiors as a probable enemy. A diplomat who cordially hates his host is equally useless—completely so if the country is an ally of his own State, and scarcely less so if it is a prospective antagonist.

United States Ambassadors in Moscow, for example, have included lovers turned haters (William C. Bullitt), sympathetic millionaires (Davies), unsympathetic millionaires (W. Averell Harriman), career men (Laurence Steinhardt), admirals (William H. Standley), and Roman Catholic generals (Walter Bedell Smith). If the American spokesman in the Soviet capital were to be judged during the years since 1933 in terms of his contribution to collaboration between the two Powers, then Davies and, for a time, Harriman would take the prize. But if the proper purpose of an American diplomat in Muscovy is to promote a maximum degree of mutual distrust, then top honors would go to Bullitt. In an epoch of world wars, the practical test of how a diplomat should conduct himself, shape his utterances, and “slant” his reports depends on the decision of his superiors as to whether those who receive him are deemed future friends or foes.

Among friends (as Machiavelli might have said), the responses to be striven for are those of loyalty, trust, unity of purpose, and assurance of support in anticipated crises. Among prospective enemies, the objective is to inspire awe, doubt, fear, and, if possible, compliance with demands, lest rejection provoke wrath and effective pressure via force or threats. In all cases the perfect diplomat will offer quid pro quo and so conduct himself as to secure large gains at small price. He should also persuade his hosts to view every concession on their part, however onerous, as a “victory” for them and every advantage on his part, however obvious, as a “defeat” for
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him. The astute ambassador will also remember that allies are to be treated as if they might someday be enemies and enemies as if they might someday be allies. Since the qualities of mind and spirit which make for success in this difficult and ambiguous enterprise are rare, the number of truly great diplomats is quite small.

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Direct intercourse with the authorities was not particularly difficult, for well-organized as they might be, all they did was to guard the distant and invisible interests of distant and invisible masters, while K. fought for something vitally near to him, for himself, and moreover, at least at the very beginning, on his own initiative, for he was the attacker; and besides he fought not only for himself, but clearly for other powers as well which he did not know, but in which, without infringing the regulations of the authorities, he was permitted to believe. But now by the fact that they had at once amply met his wishes in all unimportant matters—and hitherto only unimportant matters had come up—they had robbed him of the possibility of light and easy victories, and with that of the satisfaction which must accompany them and the well-grounded confidence for further and greater struggles, which must result from them. Instead, they let K. go anywhere he liked—of course only within the village—and thus pampered and enervated him, ruled out all possibility of conflict, and transposed him to an unofficial, totally unrecognized, troubled and alien existence. In this life it might easily happen, if he were not always on his guard, that one day or other, in spite of the amiability of the authorities and the scrupulous fulfillment of all his exaggeratedly light duties, he might—deceived by the apparent favour shown him—conduct himself so imprudently that he might get a fall; and the authorities, still ever mild and friendly, and as it were against their will, but in the name of some public regulation unknown to him, might have to come and clear him out of the way.—FRANZ KAFCKA, The Castle.

Every sovereign member of the Western State System maintains a small army of officials and employees to spy upon, report about, and talk to all the other sovereignties of the System. The broader purposes of these agents, already hinted at above, may best be considered in more detail below in relationship to the global game of “power politics.” Here it will be useful to view these public servants in their capacity as “bureaucrats.” This term has become more invidious than honorific, thanks in part to the quasi-anarchistic disposition of most Americans at least to regard all public employees as drones, imbeciles, or thieves, and thanks in larger part to the capacity of all people everywhere to recognize that those who work for the State are often condemned to anonymity, indignity, and dehumanization.
Problems of structure, function, recruitment, promotion, tenure, budgeting, auditing, etc., are best left to specialists in public administration. Here a few observations regarding diplomatic and consular bureaucracies must serve to suggest the larger problems of human relations involved in the conduct of foreign affairs.

If diplomats no longer enjoy the discretion, prestige, and occasional glory attaching to the profession in former times, they nevertheless confront problems of administration of ever-increasing complexity. A "Chief of Mission" of a Great Power in a major foreign capital often has scores or even hundreds of subordinates working under his direction, including secretaries, counselors, attachés (with various and constantly expanding functions), consuls, interpreters, clerks, communication experts, statisticians, etc.—to say nothing of chauffeurs, doormen, janitors, flunkies, and lesser fry. He must divide the work among them with neatness, dispatch, and economy. He must keep records and archives, report regularly to his government, and aid his fellow nationals, who expect his help in getting out of jail, obtaining access to local potentates, securing entry to official functions, acquiring passports, visas, and other documents needed for travel or business, and the like. Apart from eating, drinking, and indulging in polite discourse with colleagues and dignitaries, he must spend most of his time, not in advising on the formulation of policy, but in doing favors for fellow citizens with business in the local State and for aliens with business in his own State.

If the role of diplomats has of late become less influential and less glamorous, the work of consuls has become more arduous and more important. The traditional distinction between these two branches of foreign services is increasingly blurred. The States of the Western State System exchanged consular representatives before they exchanged diplomatic agents, for merchants had contacts with one another across political boundaries before governments entered into negotiations with one another regarding high affairs of State. Here, as in so many other respects, politics was the handmaiden of economics. The first consuls of the medieval period were apparently chosen by communities of merchants residing abroad to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over them and to represent their interests in dealing with the State where they resided. The office of consul was fully established by A.D. 1200. The Hanseatic city-states and the Mediterranean trading States exchanged consuls at an early period, the national monarchies of western Europe presently following their example. The political functions of consuls were gradually diminished, however, with the development of a diplomatic service; and they have lost their extraterritorial jurisdiction except in a few Oriental countries. On the other hand, the constant growth of com-
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Commercial contacts among States has increased the duties of consular officers and led to a great multiplication of their numbers.

The duties of consuls are determined by custom, treaty stipulations, and the provisions of exequaturs, or consular credentials. A consular officer, unlike a diplomatic agent, does not act as the spokesman of his government to a foreign government, though he may sometimes exercise quasi-diplomatic functions. He labors primarily to serve the business interests of his own State abroad and to perform incidental services for his fellow citizens. His concern is with markets, sales opportunities, and profits for traders and investors. In the epoch of economic nationalism and keen competition among rival merchant groups, each enlisting governmental support in its quest for the elusive dollar, pound, franc, or mark, even diplomatic agents must keep a sharp eye open for bargains. But this has been consuls’ work for centuries. A consul makes detailed reports to his home government on economic opportunities, tendencies of trade, transportation, navigation, price trends, conditions of competition, etc. These reports are published for the information and guidance of exporters and investors who may be interested in foreign markets. The consul is expected to exert himself to ensure the observance of commercial treaties and to make certain that invoices of shipments going to his own State are properly submitted and that shipments are made in accordance with the laws and regulations of his own State. He has also such supervision over merchant vessels of his own State in the port where he is serving as custom and the laws of his State grant to him. The papers of such ships are deposited in his office while the ship remains in port. He usually has authority to supervise the transportation, wages, relief, and discharge of seamen, the recovery of deserting seamen, the care of the effects of deceased seamen, and sometimes the adjustment of disputes among masters, officers, and crews. The function of protecting citizens abroad is shared by consular and diplomatic agents, though in situations not involving political questions the problems which arise are handled by consular representatives. Consuls arbitrate private disputes voluntarily submitted to them, intercede with local authorities on behalf of citizens, administer property of deceased citizens of their own nationality, assist in the enforcement of the immigration laws of their own States, and perform sundry minor services for such of their fellow citizens as solicit them. In certain Oriental States, consuls also have extensive civil and criminal jurisdiction in cases involving fellow citizens under the provisions of extraterritoriality treaties.

Consular agents enter upon their duties when they have been granted an exequatur by the authorities of the State to which they are sent. These documents correspond to the credentials of diplomatic representatives, except that they are issued by the State receiving the consul instead of by the send-
When a consul is appointed, his commission or patent is transmitted to the diplomatic representative of the appointing State, who applies to the Foreign Office for an exequatur for the consul. The issue of an exequatur may be refused for cause. It may subsequently be revoked, though it is more usual to request the recall of the consul who gives offense. Exequaturs are usually issued in the name of the head of the State.

The granting of a consular exequatur usually signifies diplomatic recognition of the State or government of the recipient by the granting State, but the reception of a consular exequatur does not have this effect. A severance of diplomatic relations between States, either through a rupture or through revolution followed by nonrecognition of the new regime, usually terminates consular as well as diplomatic missions. Both are normally terminated by war. Consular missions may likewise be terminated by the recall of the agent by the sending State or by the revocation of the exequatur by the receiving State.

Consular privileges and immunities are less extensive than those of diplomatic agents, particularly when, as is still sometimes the case, the consular officer is a citizen of the State where he exercises his functions. Certain immunities, however, are well defined by custom and are frequently extended by treaty. These include the inviolability of the archives and other official property, exemption from arrest save on criminal charges, exemption from witness duty, taxation, military charges and service, etc. In general, consuls are entitled to those privileges and immunities which will enable them to perform their duties without personal inconvenience. In Oriental States where extraterritoriality prevails, consuls usually enjoy the same privileges and exemptions from local jurisdiction as diplomatic representatives.

To describe the organization of diplomatic and consular services in an epoch of world-wide war and revolution is an impossible task. An outline of the Foreign Service of the United States, however, will prove useful by way of suggesting how a Great Power organizes the work of its agents abroad. At the close of the year 1940 the United States maintained 53 active diplomatic posts abroad, 20 being headed by ambassadors and 33 by ministers. The total number of diplomatic and consular officials and employees maintained abroad by the U.S.A. was over 4,000, including 840 career officers, 221 noncareer vice-consuls, 1,670 clerks, and 1,250 miscellaneous employees. Foreign governments maintained 670 diplomatic agents in Washington, apart from consuls scattered over the country. By 1947 the U.S.A. had 41 ambassadors and 16 ministers abroad in a Foreign Service comprising over 10,000 members in all categories. Within the U.S. were 57 heads of foreign diplomatic missions and over 1,200 consular officers and
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employees. The number of ranking diplomatic and consular officers (not counting subordinate employees) maintained by the U.S.A. abroad ranged from 1 in El Salvador and 2 each in Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia to 16 in China, 17 in Brazil, 20 in France and its possessions, 23 in Mexico, 24 in Canada, and 48 in Britain and the Empire.

Recent American practice in the administration of this bureaucracy is more or less typical of that of other States—most of which, however, antedated the U.S.A. in the adoption of rules of recruitment and promotion designed to achieve a professionalized Foreign Service. During the 19th century the U.S.A. filled top diplomatic posts with men of wealth who had contributed generously to the campaign funds of the party in power and filled lesser posts with local politicians in accordance with the "spoil system." The low level of competence and probity thereby achieved gave pause to Presidents and Congressmen as foreign affairs became increasingly important. All Foreign Service officials are in theory appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In fact, the President now names appointees only to the top posts—whose incumbents should in principle be political nominees reflecting the views of the Administration in office, rather than permanent professional specialists. In 1906, by executive order of the President, the consular service was put under civil service rules, as were the lower posts in the diplomatic service in 1909. This slow and belated dawn of the idea that Foreign Service officers should be chosen, not on the basis of political preference and personal friendship, but on the basis of knowledge of the business to be done was followed by the gradual "professionalization" of more and more categories of officials.

The Rogers Act of May 24, 1924, was designed to replace the spoils system by the merit system and to lay down principles of personnel administration which would enable the American Government to have at its disposal diplomats and consuls who might compare favorably in competence, experience, and professional savoir-faire with those of other Great Powers. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the Act was the amalgamation of the diplomatic and consular services into a single "Foreign Service of the United States," within which capable individuals may achieve a life career and may transfer from consular to diplomatic posts, and vice versa, as their own inclinations and the needs of the service dictate.

Under the terms of the Rogers Act and of supplementary executive orders, all "classified" Foreign Service officers (i.e., all officers below the heads of embassies and legations, who are still political appointees, and above the grade of vice-consuls, who are unclassified) were selected on the basis of competitive civil service examinations. Since ambassadors and ministers are expected to represent the views of the Administration in power, there is
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much to be said for having them appointed on a political basis. But the lesser officials perform administrative duties of a routine nature and have no policy-determining functions. It is more important, therefore, that they be professionally competent than that they be sympathetic with the political party in office at Washington. Considerations of professional efficiency have led to an increasing tendency to fill even the higher posts by promotion from the lower ranks. The lower posts are filled, in order of merit, by those who pass competitive examinations designed to test the applicants' knowledge of international, maritime, and commercial law, arithmetic, modern languages, history, economics, and economic geography. Above 70% of the present Foreign Service officers of the United States are college graduates. Less than 7% have had no college training. The examinations are given periodically (usually once a year) in the principal cities of the United States and are open to all persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five who have been American citizens for at least 15 years. As for salaries, ambassadors were granted $17,500 annually and ministers $10,000, though the heads of missions at important foreign capitals are likely to spend a good deal more than they receive and must usually be persons of independent means. The Foreign Service officers proper were divided into nine classes, with salaries ranging from $2,500 to $10,000. The senior clerks are divided into five classes, with salaries of $3,000 to $4,000, and the junior clerks into three classes, with salaries of less than $2,500 to $2,750. Compensation is increased with years of service, and allowances are granted for travel and living quarters. Retirement is obligatory at sixty-five, with a variable pension paid out of a retirement fund. Promotions from one class to another are based upon efficiency ratings. Appointments are made not to particular posts or positions but to one or another of the designated classes, the members of which are assigned their posts at the discretion of the President and the Department of State.

Despite these improvements, the Director of the Office of the Foreign Service asserted in January, 1946, that the Service was "undermanned, clogged with deadwood, insufficiently trained, underpaid, inadequately housed, and clumsily administered." Some of these attributes were due to recent expansion to meet the needs of the lend-lease program, economic warfare and propaganda activities abroad. In 1945, the State Department absorbed the Office of War Information, the Office of Inter-American Af-

9 The rules and regulations governing admission to the Foreign Service, as well as copies of sample examination questions, are contained in the pamphlet, "The American Foreign Service," which is mailed out to applicants by the U.S. State Department upon request.

fairs, the Foreign Economic Administration, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Surplus Property Administration. In 1941, a "Foreign Service Auxiliary" had been created to facilitate the emergency appointment of desperately needed specialists and advisers without formal examinations. Many of the new recruits were economic analysts whose services were required because of the merging into the State Department in 1939 of commercial and agricultural attachés previously sent abroad by the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture. Others became cultural and labor attachés, researchers, consultants, etc. The ambiguous and not altogether harmonious relationships between the new recruits and the older career men contributed, among other considerations, to the preparation of new legislation.

The Kee-Connally Foreign Service Act of August 13, 1946, abolished the Foreign Service Auxiliary but provided for the continuing needs it had met through a new category of "Foreign Service reserve officers." An Office of the Foreign Service, already set up May 6, 1944, was entrusted with recruitment and personnel administration under new orders and statutes laying down rules for admission to the career service. The Act of 1946, superseding the Rogers Act and codifying previous legislation, also established a "Director General of the Foreign Service," to be appointed by the Secretary of State, and a "Board of the Foreign Service," consisting of the Director General, Assistant Secretaries of State, and officers of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor. Salaries of ambassadors and ministers were increased to $15,000 in Class IV (e.g., Managua) and $25,000 in Class I (e.g., London), plus increased residence and expense allowances. Career officers were granted a salary range of $3,300 to $13,500, plus allowances. The salary classes of officers were reduced from 11 to 7, including a new class of "career minister." Promotion rules were modified to require (as in the Navy and most college faculties) "promotion up or selection out" after a prescribed number of years. A Foreign Service Institute was set up to provide in-service training for Foreign Service and State Department personnel.11

While these reforms have contributed to increased efficiency in the U.S. Foreign Service, only an ignorant optimist would contend that American diplomats and consuls abroad at the mid-point of the 20th century had reached the zenith of competence, imagination, wisdom, and statesmanship. Neither could it be plausibly argued that the Foreign Service was representative of the various segments of American society. The new Foreign Service Reserve Corps permits of appointments to high career posts on the basis of partisanship and patronage. In the recruitment of regular officers,

11 For a detailed analysis see "The American Foreign Service since 1939," by Elton Atwater, American Journal of International Law, January, 1947, pp. 73ff.
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liberals, women, and Negroes are discriminated against while graduates of Harvard and of the Foreign Service School of (Roman Catholic) Georgetown University are represented out of all proportion to their numbers in the ranks of qualified persons. Many chiefs of mission, moreover, are still financial magnates. W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador in London (1946-47), is said to have spent a year’s entertainment allowance on one afternoon party.\textsuperscript{12} While it would be clearly undemocratic to bar multimillionaires from top diplomatic appointments, the established practice in the U.S.A. of picking such officers almost exclusively from this class can be justified only on the premise that the American Republic is less a democracy than a plutocracy. Not yet realized is the hope expressed by James F. Byrnes: “As a result of this Act, salaries can be raised so that no longer will it be necessary to appoint men of wealth as our ambassadors.”\textsuperscript{13}

Morale in the Service and the Department, and therefore efficiency and enthusiasm for the work in hand, suffered after World War II from the efforts of Congress, the White House, and the Secretary of State to weed out “subversives” and assure the “loyalty” of all employees. Considerations of secrecy and security unquestionably require safeguards against those hostile toward the U.S.A. and sympathetic toward rival Powers. But a corps of robot patriots is ill-designed to perform effectively the functions required of civil servants in a democracy. President Truman’s order of March, 1947, calling for a “loyalty investigation” of all federal employees, seemed to critics likely to produce this result. Under the “security principles” enunciated by General Marshall on October 7, 1947, the Secretary of State may “immediately terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Department of State or the Foreign Service who is deemed to constitute a security risk.” This term was defined to include, \textit{inter alia}, all perpetrators or advocates of “treason, subversion or sedition”; all “affiliated with” or “in sympathetic association with” Communist, Nazi, or Fascist Parties or other groups seeking to “alter the form of government of the U.S. by unconstitutional means”; all in “habitual or close association” with such persons to a degree suggesting that they might divulge classified information; all holding “political, economic or social views” presumably indicative of “subversive” affiliation; and all addicted to “habitual drunkenness, sexual perversion, moral turpitude, [or] financial irresponsibility” or having a “criminal record.”

Those charged with such offenses (many of which admit of no possible definition acceptable in a court of law) were to be granted a hearing before the Personnel Security Board. But the accused were not to be told the

\textsuperscript{12} See \textit{Congressional Record}, May 13, 1947, p. 5432.
charges, if "security considerations" forbade, and could not "be permitted to hear or examine" evidence against them presented by the State Department. Findings were to be secret. Those dismissed on such grounds were barred from all other public employment and plainly condemned to grave difficulty in finding private employment. Various employees were thus dishonorably discharged in 1947-48 without notice and hearing and with no knowledge of the anonymous accusations made against them—a practice which some found strange in an Administration dedicated to fighting "totalitarianism" and denouncing "police States." 14

If long-continued, the net result of this typical application of the military mind to problems of public personnel administration must inevitably be the resignation of all employees with any self-respect, any capacity for independent thinking, and any vocational alternatives, with the Department and Foreign Service reduced to a regiment of automata, having no souls to call their own. Only the naïve could suppose that the interests abroad of the world's leading democracy and most potent Great Power could be well served by such a body of faceless and hollow men.

The extent to which other Powers have similarly improved or debased their Foreign Services cannot here be explored. Britain's top diplomats, even under Labor Governments, tend also to be plutocrats, though every effort is made in the lower ranks to foster intelligence, initiative, and professional skill. The lesser Powers in the Anglo-American sphere exhibit variants of this pattern. Soviet diplomats obviously cannot be men with private fortunes, but all are held to a degree of ideological orthodoxy surpassing anything yet attempted in Washington. But the conformity expected of them is of a positive, rather than of a negative, character—and is, therefore, probably less destructive of talent and originality than its American counterpart. On the other hand, some Soviet diplomats and agents abroad (e.g., Alexander Barmine and Victor Kravchenko) have turned traitor to their masters out of a devotion to freedom or an interest in the fleshpots of capitalism. Anti-Soviet propaganda on the part of such renegades is invariably lucrative in the bourgeois States and affords easy entry into the highest social circles. The Kremlin has as yet found no final solution to this problem.

14 Commented the conservative New York Times, Oct. 10, 1947: [Under the] "Security, Principles" [announced by the State Department] "an American citizen can be tried without a jury, without a bill of particulars being rendered, without being given an opportunity to confront his accusers. Then he can be found guilty, without an explanation, of about as serious a charge as we can think of at this moment. . . . This seems to us to substitute a rule of men for a rule of law. . . . We do not think it necessary to place in the hands of the State Department means of violating fundamental constitutional protection."
So long as some semblance remained of the unity of Western civilization, as in the 18th and 19th centuries, the diplomats and consuls of all Powers, even in an anarchic State System, often could (and sometimes did) give voice in word and deed to the ancient ideal of the unity of mankind. But in an epoch of ideological crusades, unlimited power politics, and total wars, Foreign Service officers can be little more than adjuncts of military machines and agents of doctrinal conformity and intolerance. They thus become, despite themselves, the instruments of disintegration and chaos—in the absence of effective public demand for the abstention of the world society from suicide.

3. FOREIGN OFFICES

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient.—Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America.

Consuls and diplomats of all States perform their work under the direction of the department of their own government charged with the administration of foreign affairs. They may be assisted and supplemented by agents maintained abroad by other departments of the national administration. But it still remains true that each State maintains a single department or ministry which is primarily answerable for the conduct of the State’s relations with other sovereignties. This department or ministry is under the control of the head of the State—President, Premier, King, or Emperor—and is directed by a Minister or Secretary who always occupies first place in the Cabinet in terms of honor and prestige. Into the Foreign Offices, State Departments, or Ministries of Foreign Affairs, as they are variously designated, go all the diplomatic and consular reports from abroad; out of them go the instructions to the hundreds of field agents in scores of foreign cities. Within the Foreign Offices are formulated the foreign policies of the States of the world. Between them the great game of international politics is played. Here again, for illustrative purposes, it will be sufficient to deal with the American Department of State as an example, for the functions performed and even the administrative pattern of divisions, boards, and bureaus is much the same in all States.

The Department of State of the United States is headed by the Secretary of State, who is appointed by the President, with the confirmation of the Senate. He is first in rank among the members of the Cabinet. His political role depends largely on his personal and political relations with the President. Franklin D. Roosevelt, like Woodrow Wilson, was to a great degree
his own Secretary of State, despite the fact that Cordell Hull held the post (1933-44) longer than any of his predecessors. Following Hull's resignation for reasons of health, the Secretaryship of State passed through three hands in two years, those of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (December 1, 1944-June 27, 1945), James F. Byrnes (July 3, 1945-January 7, 1947), and Gen. George C. Marshall (January 7, 1947ff.). Several recent episodes demonstrate the extent to which the Secretary is dependent upon Presidential support in his relations with his Cabinet colleagues and even his principal subordinates. In August, 1943, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles resigned over the issue of relations with the U.S.S.R., after Hull had told Roosevelt that he would himself quit his post unless Welles were dismissed. In the sequel, Hull went to Moscow and did substantially what Welles had urged. When Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace delivered an address in New York (September 12, 1946) on "The Way to Peace" (previously cleared with, and publicly approved by, President Truman), in which he criticized the State Department and made a plea for American-Soviet understanding, Byrnes, then in Paris, demanded Wallace's dismissal from the Cabinet under threat of his own resignation. President Truman yielded and thereafter endorsed with increasing fervor the views of the "get-tough-with-Russia" advocates as against the Wallace line of conciliation.

The Department which the Secretary administers has grown in recent years from a small group of experts and amateurs to a vast, sprawling aggregation of specialists, career men, political appointees, and bureaucrats from other agencies—so much so that it is no longer feasible to present any meaningful chart of its structure smaller than a bed sheet.\(^{15}\) Established by Congress in 1789, the Department of State long had so many extraneous functions (e.g., census, coinage, territorial records, pardons, patents, and copyrights) that President Jackson asserted in 1829: "I am impressed with the importance of so organizing the Department that its Secretary may devote more of his time to our foreign relations." A reorganization in 1833 established three geographical clerks, one for the major European Powers (then defined as England, France, Russia, and the Netherlands), another for the rest of Europe, and a third for North and South America. By 1870, the Department had 13 bureaus (geographical and functional) and two Assistant Secretaries. By separating the Foreign Service from the Departmental Staff, the Rogers Act of 1924 promoted a cleavage between home officers and agents abroad which has few counterparts in other Foreign Offices. The Department had 8 employees in Washington in 1790, 52 in 1870, 209 in 1909, 631 in 1922, and 963 in 1938. By 1943 it had expanded to


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2,750 employees and by March, 1947, to 7,300, not counting the Foreign Service. The 500 employees of the London Embassy alone (1947) outnumbered the total of State Department officialdom in 1914.

The administrative organization of this imposing army of fact gatherers, advisers, and clerks has become so protean and cumbersome in recent years that any effort at detailed description would be baffling rather than illuminating. At the time of writing there were 18 offices and 82 divisions. The top officials were the Secretary of State, the Undersecretary of State, the Counselor, the Chairman of Policy Planning, six Assistant Secretaries of State, the Legal Adviser, the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, and sundry others who shift in personnel and title with each new head of the Department. The substructure, despite many confusions, can still be envisaged in terms of geographical and functional divisions. In 1948 there were 19 of the former, grouped under the Offices of American Republic, European, Far Eastern, and Near Eastern and African affairs. The functional units include numerous administrative divisions, the Office of Special Political Affairs, various research and public relations divisions, and a host of economic divisions, many of them for particular areas, the whole having "grow’d" like Topsy rather than reflecting any clear legislative or executive conception of relationships between structure and duties. The annual appropriation of the Department rose from $17,122,301 in 1931 to $232,724,703 in 1948. Congressional interest in its activities, as reflected in the Congressional Record, tended in 1946-48 to center in criticisms of "Voice of America" broadcasts and demands for dismissal of alleged "Communists."

During the Truman Administration, top posts gravitated increasingly to professional military men and investment bankers—e.g., Gen. George C. Marshall, Undersecretary Robert A. Lovett (a partner in Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co.), Assistant Secretary Charles E. Saltzman (West Pointer, brigadier general, Rhodes scholar, and Vice-President of the New York Stock Exchange), et al. Control of the Department by "brass" and "big money" facilitated smooth cooperation with such important executive colleagues as James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense and former President of Dillon, Read & Co.; W. Averell Harriman, Secretary of Commerce and a founder of Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co.; William L. Draper, Undersecretary of the Army and former Vice-President of Dillon, Read & Co.; John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, a St. Louis banker; Archibald Wiggins, Undersecretary of the Treasury and former President of the American Bankers Association; etc. The question of whether such a combination of pecuniary and military skills in key posts was well calculated to serve the

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interests of the nation as a whole is always a matter of controversy and will be answered, as always, by future experience.

This general pattern of organization is found, with minor variations, in other Foreign Offices. The British Foreign Office is headed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is assisted by a permanent Undersecretary of State, 2 parliamentary Undersecretaries of State (both members of the House of Commons), a deputy Undersecretary of State, 2 Assistant Undersecretaries of State, 3 Legal Advisers, a Finance Officer, a Press Officer, 12 Counselors, and sundry other high assistants and secretaries. The British Foreign Office is headed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is assisted by a permanent Undersecretary of State, 2 parliamentary Undersecretaries of State (both members of the House of Commons), a deputy Undersecretary of State, 2 Assistant Undersecretaries of State, 3 Legal Advisers, a Finance Officer, a Press Officer, 12 Counselors, and sundry other high assistants and secretaries. The British Foreign Office is headed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is assisted by a permanent Undersecretary of State, 2 parliamentary Undersecretaries of State (both members of the House of Commons), a deputy Undersecretary of State, 2 Assistant Undersecretaries of State, 3 Legal Advisers, a Finance Officer, a Press Officer, 12 Counselors, and sundry other high assistants and secretaries. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, located on the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, was similarly headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who brought into office with him a secretarial staff, or "Cabinet," charged with the direction of the Cabinet Service, the information and press service, the dispatch and receipt of correspondence, and the telegraphic and telephonic service. He always had at his right hand a permanent Secretary-General (in 1939-40 M. Alexis Leger) who supervised the administration of the Ministry. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. (called, prior to March, 1946, the "People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs" or Narkomindel, for short) is set up in similar fashion. In addition to the usual functions of a Foreign Office, it directs and coordinates the activities of such of the Union Republics (e.g., the Ukraine and Byelorussia) as maintain Ministries of Foreign Affairs of their own under the constitutional amendments of February, 1944.

Every Foreign Office is in the first place a liaison agency between the executive branch of the government and the diplomatic and consular agents in the field. As such, it dispatches instructions, receives reports, keeps files and archives, and furnishes the Secretary or Minister with authoritative information and advice on developments in all parts of the world affecting the interests of the State. It likewise does what is necessary to facilitate communication with agents abroad, and it acts as a recruiting, examining, and training agency for the Foreign Service. In the second place, it is a liaison agency between the Secretary or Minister, on the one hand, and the public and the press on the other. Parliamentary undersecretaries, press officers, and sections of current information all function in this capacity. In the third place, it serves as an expert staff through which the Secretary or Minister may secure such information and advice regarding the conduct of foreign affairs and the formulation of policy as does not come directly from the Foreign Service officers abroad. Legal, economic, and historical advisers perform these services. Finally, it performs certain functions for citizens of the State: the issuance of passports, the publication of consular reports, the protection of nationals abroad, and the promotion of the economic interests
of citizens in all parts of the world. Practically all the functions of every
Foreign Office fall into one or another of these broad categories.

A Secretary of State or a Minister of Foreign Affairs in most governments
adhering to the forms of democracy is likely to be an amateur who may
have had no diplomatic experience. He secures his position in the Cabinet
by virtue of political services rendered to the party or parties in power.
In all the technical duties of his office (and his duties are increasingly of a
highly technical nature), he is, therefore, dependent upon the information
and advice supplied by his professional expert subordinates, who will in
most cases have had extensive diplomatic experience and who will have
become the custodians of tradition and the keepers of precedents. Since in
most governments (though less so in the United States than elsewhere) there
is an interchangeability of personnel between the Foreign Office and the
Foreign Service, and since both are increasingly professionalized, the officials
in the capital and the officials in the field are likely to see eye to eye on
most important questions. The Secretary or Minister is usually constrained
to accept the advice offered to him or to run the risk of making blunders
or of creating friction between himself and his subordinates. The heads of
important divisions often change with changes of administration, just as do
ambassadors and ministers abroad; but the constant and insidious pressure
of the permanent bureaucracy upon the formulation of policy can scarcely
be overestimated. Those who are nominally charged with the formulation
of foreign policy are thus hedged about on all sides by those who are in
theory simple administrators. It is not astonishing then that the Secretaries
or Ministers frequently become rubber stamps and that the permanent bu-
reaucrats, acting behind the scenes, really determine policies. Here is one
among many sources of power and pressure lying beneath the surface of
foreign affairs which must be borne in mind constantly by all who would
understand the dynamics of international politics.

In almost all democratic States, the national legislature is given a con-
siderable measure of control over foreign relations. In the period of mo-
archial absolutism, the handling of foreign affairs was normally an exclu-
sive prerogative of the Executive, i.e., of the King and his ministers. In the
period of bourgeois democracy, the Executive has been made responsible
either to the legislature or to the voters and has been obliged to share this,
as well as other functions, with representative, popularly elected assemblies.
The American Constitution of 1787 was one of the first of modern constitu-
tional documents to give large powers over foreign relations to the national
legislature. Under its provisions, Congress has power over diplomatic ap-
pointments, treaties, and declarations of war. The President "shall nomi-
nate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
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ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls” (Article II, Section 2, §2). Diplomatic and consular appointments are thus subject to the confirmation of a majority of the upper chamber of Congress, except where Congress, by statute, has vested this power in the President alone or in the Secretary of State, as has been done with regard to all the subordinate positions in the Foreign Service. The President has power “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur” (Article II, Section 2, §2). In practice, the President and his agents in the Department of State and the Foreign Service negotiate treaties without legislative participation in the process, but he may not constitutionally ratify treaties without the approval of two-thirds of the Senators. The President is Commander in Chief of the Army, the Navy, and the Militia; but Congress has power to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy, and to declare war by a majority vote of both houses (Article I, Sections 8, 11, 12, 13). In all these respects, Congress is given express power over foreign affairs by the Constitution. Its general powers of legislation and appropriation have also been used to influence foreign relations. General Congressional resolutions on foreign policy may be ignored by the President; but Congress may grant or withhold money for diplomatic missions and for the enforcement of treaties, and it may, by legislation, carry out treaties, refuse to carry them out, or abrogate them.

It is now well established as a matter of general constitutional practice that all powers over foreign affairs not expressly granted to the legislature by the Constitution are exercised by the Executive. The diplomatic recognition of new States or governments and the issuance of neutrality proclamations, for example, are both functions performed by the President and Secretary of State without Congressional participation. Even with regard to those powers which the President must share with Congress, the course of developments has tended to place more and more power in the President’s hands. President Washington, taking the Constitution very literally, en-

17 The Supreme Court has held that the Government of the United States is not a government of “limited powers” in the field of foreign affairs and that Congress may confer a large degree of discretion on the Executive in this field without unconstitutionally delegating its legislative authority to the President. Thus the familiar “separation of powers” principle and the rule that grants of power to federal authorities are restricted to specific constitutional authorizations do not apply to foreign affairs in the same sense in which they apply to domestic affairs. “Not only . . . is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as the representative of the nation.” The United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
deavored to collaborate with the Senate in the negotiation of treaties as well as in their ratification. But when, in 1796, the Senators manifested a desire to have him withdraw his imposing presence from the chamber in order that they might consider by themselves the negotiation of an Indian treaty, he walked out and said he'd be damned if he ever came before them again on such business. None of his successors has ever consulted the Senate as a body during the course of treaty negotiations. Prior to 1815 the President submitted to the Senate for confirmation the names of special diplomatic representatives named to negotiate important treaties. But ever since the Senators embarrassed President Madison by refusing to confirm the appointment of Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin as one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Ghent, the President has ordinarily made such appointments without consulting the Senate. Treaties are now submitted to the Senate only after they have been signed. As Secretary of State Hay once observed, they are like bulls going into the arena, with no assurance that they will emerge alive. Friction between the President and the Senate over treaties has been chronic in the conduct of American foreign affairs, for two-thirds of the Senators are never of the President's party. But if an international engagement does not require legislation or appropriations, the President can escape the constitutional requirement of senatorial ratification by concluding an "executive agreement" which may achieve the same purpose. Similarly, the power of Congress over declarations of war means less in practice than in theory; for the President, as spokesman of the nation and as commander of the armed forces, can easily create diplomatic or military situations which leave Congress no genuine freedom of choice. In scores of instances, American forces have engaged in hostilities abroad without Congressional authorization of any kind. All the formally declared wars in which the United States has engaged, with the possible exception of the Spanish-American War, were embarked upon at the initiative of the executive branch of the government. In practice, therefore, the conduct of American foreign affairs is in the hands of the President, subject to constitutional checks which often lead to friction between the Executive and legislature but which give Congress no real authority to initiate and direct diplomatic action.

Much the same situation prevails in Parliamentary governments, though the responsibility of the Executive to the legislature leaves less room for friction than is possible under the American check-and-balance system and the legislature is nowhere given such extensive control as in the United States. In Great Britain, the Cabinet has full authority over foreign affairs, though the House of Commons may, of course, vote it out of office if it is dissatisfied with its foreign policies. This is true of all Parliamentary governments, but this power of the legislature is obviously not a very effective or subtle weapon
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for controlling foreign relations. Diplomatic appointments in Great Britain are not confirmed by the legislature. Treaties are made and ratified by the Cabinet in the name of the King, but important political treaties are sometimes submitted to Parliament for discussion and approval before the act of ratification takes place. Parliamentary objections to the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of 1924 led to the fall of the first Labor Cabinet in the autumn of that year. Decisions of war and peace are also made by the Cabinet. As a matter of well-established convention, Parliament is always consulted before a formal declaration of war is issued, though hostilities are frequently embarked upon in the absence of a formal declaration without parliamentary authorization. The French Constitution of 1875 gave the President of the Republic, i.e., the Cabinet, acting in the President's name, the power to negotiate and ratify treaties, to appoint diplomatic representatives, and to dispose of the armed forces of the State (Law of July 16, 1875, Article 8; Law of February 25, 1875, Article 3). Certain treaties were valid only when approved by a majority of the Senators and the Deputies: those relating to territory, peace, commerce, finances, and personal and property rights of Frenchmen abroad. It is significant that important political engagements, like treaties of alliance, did not require legislative approval and might even be kept secret for long periods of time. In France as elsewhere initiative and control in foreign affairs rested with the Executive, legislative checks being of less practical importance than the Constitution might seem to indicate. These arrangements were not significantly altered by the French Constitution of 1946. The Cabinet was made responsible only to the National Assembly, or lower house, and not to the Council of the Republic, a new upper chamber chosen by indirect election. The new French charter expressed a pious hope of world order: "On condition of reciprocity, France consents to the limitation of sovereignty necessary to the organization and defense of peace."

A word or two may be added regarding the position of the courts in foreign relations. The American Constitution (Article VI, Section 2) declares that all treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be regarded, along with the Constitution itself and laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, as "the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitutions or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." This means that all American courts, both state and federal, enforce treaties as law in cases which come before them requiring their application. State statutes contrary to treaties are held unconstitutional by the federal courts. As between a conflicting federal statute and a treaty, the courts enforce the most recent
in point of time, since the Constitution places treaties and federal laws in the same category and Congress clearly has the right, under American constitutional law, to abrogate treaties by legislative act. In accordance with the "doctrine of political questions," however, the federal courts accept the interpretation placed upon treaties by the political branch, i.e., the executive branch, of the government. The same applies to the enforcement of customary international law in American courts. In most other States, treaties and international law are likewise enforced in the courts, though sometimes only when they have been enacted into statutory form. In the absence of the judicial review of legislation in most other governments, the Executive and the legislature are fully responsible for the observance of the international obligations of the State.

In summary, the constitutional arrangements of most democratic States require some form of legislative participation in diplomacy, but initiative and control still remain for the most part in the hands of the Executive. Whatever degree of "democratization" of foreign policy has been attained has been achieved by imposing legislative checks upon the freedom of action of the Executive and by making the Executive responsible to the legislature, as in European parliamentary regimes, or to the electorate, as in the United States. Direct popular control over foreign affairs is by its nature unworkable. In Switzerland, to be sure, certain treaties must be ratified by popular referendum; and the Utopian French Constitution of June 24, 1793 (which was never put into operation in this respect), required a vote of popular assemblies in the communes for all declarations of war. Popular referenda on questions of foreign policy are, by common consent, impracticable. Such responsibility to the electorate as exists is enforced through legislative action and through the popular election of policy-determining officials. In both cases, such responsibility is vague and intangible, and control continues to reside in the executive officials and in the diplomatic bureaucracy of the Foreign Offices and the field services.

4. CONFERENCES

'T was greenwich, and the gromyko
Did byrnes and trygve in the lie;
All evatt was the vandenberg
And the thomas connally.

Beware the Molotov, my son!
Avoid its clauses if you can.
Beware the yalta bird, and shun
The red azerbaijan!
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He took his trieste sword in hand,
Long time the mukdun foe he sought;
Then rested he by the nuclear tree,
And fissioned there in thought.

And as in fulton thought he stood,
The Molotov, with ears aflame,
Came brettoning through the plenary wood
And vetoed as it came.

Offside! No score! And more and more,
His iron blade went snicker-snack.
He cast his vote, and sent a note,
Requesting an answer back.

“And hast thou dunn the Molotov?
“Come to my arms, my bullitt boy!
“Oh atherton! Oh culbertson!”
He murphied in his joy . . .

—ERIC LARRABEE, Diplomatic Jabberwocky, 1946.

Ever since the Congress of Westphalia, and indeed to some extent before, the sovereignties of the Western State System have supplemented their routine contacts through Foreign Offices and Foreign Services by emergency meetings among heads of States, Foreign Ministers, *ad hoc* delegations, or regular envoys. The Council and Assembly of the League, and the Security Council and General Assembly of U.N., along with a large number of affiliated organizations, represent a recent tendency to “institutionalize” the method of conference through periodic or continuous meetings of delegates. These bodies will be discussed in Chapter VI. Here it is appropriate to notice that despite these permanent arrangements for consultation the number of special meetings of diplomats has increased so phenomenally in the 20th century as to leave ordinary citizens (and sometimes even statesmen) bewildered and confused by the multiplicity and complexity of international gatherings.

In the year 1939, for example, the U.S.A. took part in 76 international conferences. In 1946 it belonged to no less than 145 international bodies, holding more or less regular meetings, and participated in 250 conferences. During the two midsummer months of 1947, the U.S.A. took part in 41 conferences, including 14 sessions of various U.N. bodies, 4 arranged by the Food and Agriculture Organization, 4 by the International Labor Organization, 3 by the International Civil Aviation Organization, 2 by the World Health Organization, plus an astonishing variety of other meetings, ranging from the Caribbean Commission and the International Sugar Council to the International Rubber Study Group, the International Meteorological Organ-
Of the 562 days of his incumbency in office, Secretary of State Byrnes spent 350 days attending international conferences, all but one of them outside the U.S.A. In commenting on the mechanical aspects of a single meeting—i.e., the New York session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel—he noted that 855,000 pages of data were mimeographed, 143,000 maps were cut, and 44,000 volumes of documents were prepared in the process of completing the five peace treaties signed on February 10, 1947.

Apart from periodic sessions of permanent organizations, every international conference meets on the invitation of one or more States. The participants draw up an "agenda" of subjects to be discussed, adopt rules of procedure, and decide whether the discussion shall be public or secret. Ever since Woodrow Wilson popularized the phrase "open covenants, openly arrived at," critics of "secret diplomacy" have demanded public sessions on the assumption that full publicity is "democratic" and promotes honesty, understanding, and agreement. In reality, the reverse is more nearly true. At public gatherings (e.g., U.N. meetings) national spokesmen invariably talk to the microphones, the gallery, the local public, and their home public instead of talking to one another. Having openly committed themselves to a given position, they cannot recede from it without loss of prestige. Whatever the other evils of private sessions may be, they unquestionably facilitate compromise among divergent views—which is the sine qua non of success in every conference.

Conference organization frequently resembles that of a legislature, with a chairman, secretaries, committee meetings, and plenary sessions. The analogy is false, however, since legislators represent people, not sovereignties; reach decisions usually by majority vote; and enact law binding on the minority and enforceable on individuals. Diplomats speak for governments, none of which can be bound by any decision which it does not accept. Every conference therefore reaches decisions only by unanimity. Its acts are contracts or understandings among States, not statutes to be obeyed by individuals. They take the form of treaties, executive agreements, resolutions, recommendations, joint communiqués, and often agreements to disagree, to adjourn, to reconvene, or to delay, postpone, or ignore the questions at issue. When accords are incorporated into treaties, they are legally binding on the States represented only when ratified by the signatory governments.

Any effort to review, even in outline, all the international conferences of recent years would require many volumes, each much longer than this one.

19 Speaking Frankly, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
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The major top-level political conferences of the victorious Powers during and after World War II will nevertheless here be catalogued (at the risk of insufferable boredom) in the hope that such a chronology, accompanied by relevant documents, may prove useful for reference purposes in connection with issues discussed later in these pages. In each case the place and date of meeting are listed, with the names of the major participants, a résumé of results, and, as regards the more significant meetings, the text of such communiqués, declarations, protocols, and statements of common purpose as have been made public at the time of writing.

Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, with staffs and advisers, meet for the first time off Newfoundland Banks on board U.S.S. Augusta and H.M.S. Prince of Wales and issue a “Declaration of Principles”:

Joint declaration: The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;
Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

WASHINGTON, December 22ff., 1941. Churchill, accompanied by Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Supply, and top-level military and naval advisers,
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confers with Roosevelt and aides. Churchill addresses Congress, December 26: "... Twice in a single generation the catastrophe of world war has fallen upon us. Twice in our life-time has the long arm of fate reached out across the ocean to bring the U.S. into the forefront of the battle. If we had kept together after the last war, if we had taken common measures for our safety, the renewal of the curse need never have fallen upon us. Do we not owe it to ourselves, to our children, to tormented mankind, to make sure that these catastrophes do not engulf us for a third time? ..."

United Nations Declaration, January 1, 1942. Representatives of 26 governments in Washington pledge solidarity against the enemy:

A joint declaration by the U.S.A., the U.K. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the U.S.S.R., China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Jugoslavia.

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the joint declaration of the President of the U.S.A. and the Prime Minister of the U.K. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated Aug. 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter, being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, declare:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

Done at Washington, January First, 1942.

The United States of America, by Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by Winston Churchill.
On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Maxim Litvinov.
Ambassador.


Agreement (announced January 26) to establish Anglo-American Combined Raw Materials Board, Munitions Assignment Board, and Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, plus (February 6) Combined Chiefs of Staff Group. Followed by Anglo-Dutch-Australian-New Zealand Pacific Council (February 9) in London to consult with Combined Chiefs of Staff, Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (March 9) to improve living standards in Caribbean islands, and Pacific War Council (March 30) in Washington to

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coordinate war efforts of U.S.A., Britain, Canada, China, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand.


LONDON AND WASHINGTON, May 20-June 11, 1942. V. M. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, confers with Churchill, Eden, Roosevelt, Hull, et al. Signs 20-year Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance (May 26) and Lend-Lease Agreement with U.S.A. (June 11), together with communiqué declaring “a full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942.”


CASABLANCA, Morocco, January 14-26, 1943. Roosevelt and aides confer with Churchill, Giraud, and De Gaulle on war plans. F.D.R. declares United Nations will make peace only on basis of “unconditional surrender.” Communiqué of January 26:

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have been in conference near Casablanca since Jan. 14.

They were accompanied by the combined Chiefs of Staff of the two countries; namely,

FOR THE UNITED STATES:

Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Navy; Lieut. Gen. H. H. Arnold, commanding the U.S. Army Air Forces, and

FOR GREAT BRITAIN:

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord; Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

These were assisted by:


20 See Chap. XI.
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The President was accompanied by Harry Hopkins [chairman of the British-American Munitions Assignment Board] and was joined by W. Averell Harriman [U.S. defense expediter in England].

With the Prime Minister was Lord Leathers, British Minister of War Transport.

For ten days the combined staffs have been in constant session, meeting two or three times a day and recording progress at intervals to the President and Prime Minister.

The entire field of the war was surveyed theatre by theatre throughout the world, and all resources were marshaled for a more intense prosecution of the war by sea, land, and air.

Nothing like this prolonged discussion between two allies has ever taken place before. Complete agreement was reached between the leaders of the two countries and their respective staffs upon war plans and enterprises to be undertaken during the campaigns of 1943 against Germany, Italy and Japan with a view to drawing the utmost advantage from the markedly favorable turn of events at the close of 1942.

Premier Stalin was cordially invited to meet the President and Prime Minister, in which case the meeting would have been held very much farther to the east. He was unable to leave Russia at this time on account of the great offensive which he himself, as Commander in Chief, is directing.

The President and Prime Minister realized up to the full the enormous weight of the war which Russia is successfully bearing along her whole land front, and their prime object has been to draw as much weight as possible off the Russian armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best selected points.

Premier Stalin has been fully informed of the military proposals.

The President and Prime Minister have been in communication with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. They have apprised him of the measures which they are undertaking to assist him in China's magnificient and unrelaxing struggle for the common cause.

The occasion of the meeting between the President and Prime Minister made it opportune to invite General Giraud [Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud, High Commissioner of French Africa] to confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to arrange for a meeting between him and General de Gaulle [Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Fighting French Commander]. The two generals have been in close consultation.

The President and Prime Minister and their combined staffs, having completed their plans for the offensive campaigns of 1943, have now separated in order to put them into active and concerted execution.

WASHINGTON, May 11-25, 1943. Churchill confers with Roosevelt, following Eden’s visit to Washington in March, to concert strategic plans.


MOSCOW, October 19-30, 1943. Hull, Eden, and aides confer with Stalin, Molotov, and aides, plus Ambassador Foo Ping-Sheung, and reach first general Anglo-American-Soviet understanding of the war. Joint communiqué:

The Conference of Foreign Secretaries of the U.S.A., Mr. Cordell Hull, of the U.K., Mr. Anthony Eden, and of the Soviet Union, Mr. V. M. Molotov, took place at Moscow from the 19th to 30th of October 1943. There were twelve meetings.
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In addition to the Foreign Secretaries, the following took part in the Conference:
For the Soviet Union: Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, Mr. M. M. Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. A. Sergeyev, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Maj. Gen. A. A. Gryzlov, of the General Staff, Mr. G. F. Saksin, Senior Official of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and experts.

The agenda included all the questions submitted for discussion by the three Governments. Some of the questions called for final decisions and these were taken. On other questions, after discussion, decisions of principle were taken: these questions were referred for detailed consideration to commissions specially set up for the purpose, or reserved for treatment through diplomatic channels. Other questions again were disposed of by an exchange of views.

The Governments of the U.S., the U.K., and the Soviet Union have been in close cooperation in all matters concerning the common war effort. But this is the first time that the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments have been able to meet together in conference.

In the first place there were frank and exhaustive discussions of the measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers, representing the respective Chiefs of Staff, in order to discuss definite military operations, with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared, and in order to create a basis for the closest military cooperation in the future between the three countries.

Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the unanimous recognition by the three Governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted.

This conviction is expressed in a declaration in which the Chinese Government joined during the Conference and which was signed by the three Foreign Secretaries and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow on behalf of their Governments. This declaration, published today, provides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war and in all matters pertaining to the surrender and disarmament of the enemies with which the four countries are respectively at war. It sets forth the principles upon which the four Governments agree that a broad system of international cooperation and security should be based. Provision is made for the inclusion of all other peace-loving nations, great and small, in this system.

The Conference agreed to set up machinery for insuring the closest cooperation between the three Governments in the examination of European questions arising as the war develops. For this purpose, the Conference decided to establish in London an European Advisory Commission to study these questions and to make joint recommendations to the three Governments.

 Provision was made for continuing, when necessary, tripartite consultations of representatives of the three Governments in the respective capitals through the existing diplomatic channels.

The Conference also agreed to establish an Advisory Council for matters relating to Italy, to be composed in the first instance of representatives of their three Governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation. Provision is made for the addition to this council of representatives of Greece and Jugoslavia in view of their special interests arising out of the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the
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present war. This Council will deal with day-to-day questions, other than military operations, and will make recommendations designed to coordinate Allied policy with regard to Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries considered it appropriate to reaffirm, by a declaration published today, the attitude of their Governments in favor of restoration of democracy in Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries declared it to be the purpose of their Governments to restore the independence of Austria. At the same time they reminded Austria that in the final settlement account will be taken of efforts that Austria may make toward its own liberation. The declaration on Austria is published today.

The Foreign Secretaries issued at the Conference a declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin containing a solemn warning that at the time of granting any armistice to any German Government those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have had any connection with atrocities and executions in countries overrun by German forces will be taken back to the countries in which their abominable crimes were committed to be charged and punished according to the laws of those countries.

In the atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding which characterized all the work of the Conference, consideration was also given to other important questions. These included not only questions of a current nature, but also questions concerning the treatment of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites, economic cooperation and the assurance of general peace.

DECLARATION OF FOUR NATIONS ON GENERAL SECURITY

The Governments of the U.S.A., the U.K., the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis Powers with which they respectively are at war until such Powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of insuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership of all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.
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7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of
the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the
regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

V. Molotov
Anthony Eden
Cordell Hull
Foo Ping-Sheung

Declaration Regarding Italy

The Foreign Secretaries of the U.S.A., the U.K. and the Soviet Union have estab-
lished that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy to-
wards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil
influences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed, and that the Italian people shall be
given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon
democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the U.S.A. and the U.K. declare that the action of their
Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as
paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In the furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three
Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put
into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by
the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have
always opposed Fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of
public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also
be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be sup-
pressed.

4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and
from the institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded a full
amnesty.

6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and other persons known or suspected to be war criminals shall be
arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as
active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full
effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander in Chief
on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The three
Governments, parties to this declaration will at the request of any one of them consult
on this matter.

It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right
of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

Declaration on Austria

The Governments of the U.K., the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. are agreed that
Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated
from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938,
as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected
in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and
independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves,
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as well as those neighboring States which will be faced with similar problems, to find
that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade
for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final
settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

Statement on Atrocities

Signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin

The U.K., the U.S., and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence
of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated
by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they
are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new
thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of
government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being
redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers and that in their despera-
tion the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is
now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the
territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites and on French
and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the
thirty-three United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their
declaration as follows:

At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in
Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have
been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres,
and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds
were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of
these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein.
Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard
especially to invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Jugo-
slavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands; to Norway, Denmark, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, and Italy.

Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Italian officers or in the execu-
tion of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who
have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet
Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know they will be brought
back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they
have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent
blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied
Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to
their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals whose
offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint
decision of the Governments of the Allies.

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1943. Representatives of 44 states sign agree-
ment establishing United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(UNRRA).

CAIRO, November 22-25, 1943. Roosevelt and Churchill confer with Chiang
Kai-shek and pledge restoration to China of all territories seized by Japan
since 1914 and independence for Korea "in due course." Joint communiqué:
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The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising. The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

TEHERAN, November 28-December 1, 1943. Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, and aides confer on war plans, reach secret military accord, pledge independence, sovereignty, and integrity of Iran, and proclaim solidarity to win war and peace. Accords of December 1:

Declaration of the Three Powers:

We—the President of the U.S., the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the capital of our Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace—we are sure that our concord will win an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air. Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL and STALIN
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Declaration Regarding Iran:

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R. and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their worldwide military operations and to the worldwide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
JOSEPH V. STALIN
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Secret Protocol: 21

The Conference:

(1) Agreed that the partisans in Jugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by Commando operations;

(2) Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year;

(3) Took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war;

(4) Took note that Operation Overlord [the landings in Normandy] would be launched during May, 1944, in conjunction with an operation against southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the eastern to the western front;

(5) Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
JOSEPH V. STALIN
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

21 Released by the State Department, Mar. 24, 1947.

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CAIRO, December 4-6, 1943. Roosevelt and Churchill meet President Ismet Inonu and Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu and reaffirm Anglo-Turkish alliance and firm friendship among Turkey, U.S.A., and U.S.S.R.


QUEBEC, September 11-15, 1944. Roosevelt and Churchill confer, along with Eden and representatives of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Agree on occupation zones in Germany. F.D.R. and W.S.C. accept “Morgenthau Plan” for German deindustrialization, which, however, is unacceptable to Hull, is later modified by U.S. Cabinet, and is abandoned by Truman Administration.22

MOSCOW, October 9-19, 1944. Churchill and Eden confer with Stalin and Molotov. Agreement reached that U.S.S.R. is to have “a largely preponderant voice” in Bulgaria and Rumania, with same for Britain in Greece.23

YALTA, February 4-11, 1945. Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Stettinius, Eden, Molotov, Marshall, Brooke, Antonov, Hopkins, Cadogan, Vishinsky, et al. meet in Crimea. Part I of the agreements was released, in part, March 5, 1945; Parts II, VI to VIII, and XIII on February 12, 1945; Part V on March 19, 1947; and Parts III, IV, IX to XII, and XIV and the agreement regarding Japan on March 24, 1947. Two-thirds of the agreements were thus kept secret for more than three years. The following text does not include a brief accord on care and repatriation of liberated Allied prisoners and civilians found in Germany, nor the long preliminary report released February 12, 1945, which merely summarizes those portions of the accord released at that time.

23 James F. Byrnes revealed this accord (The New York Times, Oct. 18, 1947) in comment on a denial by British Foreign Office spokesman that Britain and U.S.S.R. had agreed on “spheres.” He asserted:

“Evidently the Foreign Office spokesman is not informed. My statement was based on a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, dated March 8, 1945, in the first paragraph of which, after deploring Soviet actions in Rumania, Mr. Churchill said:

“We have been hampered in our protests against these developments by the fact that, in order to have the freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at Moscow in October recognized that Russia should have a largely preponderant voice in Rumania and Bulgaria while we took the lead in Greece. Stalin adhered very strictly to this understanding during the thirty days’ fighting against the Communists and Elas in the city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most disagreeable to him and those around him.’”
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PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions.

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:
1. That a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.
2. The nations to be invited to this Conference should be:
   (a) The United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and
   (b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and U.S.A. will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and Byelorussia.
3. That the U.S. Government, on behalf of the three Powers, should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed world organization.
4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

"Invitation"

"The Government of the U.S.A. on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of —— to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on the 25th of April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. Voting"

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
"In the event that the Government of —— desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the U.S.A. will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."
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Territorial trusteeship:
It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:
The Premier of the U.S.S.R., the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the U.S.A. have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite States of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated State or former Axis satellite State in Europe where, in their judgment, conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated State or any former Axis satellite State in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.
In issuing this declaration, the three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.
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III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarization and dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee consisting of Mr. [Anthony] Eden [their Foreign Secretary] (chairman), Mr. [John] Winant [of the United States] and Mr. [Fedor T.] Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

Protocol on the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the German Reparations in Kind

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:
   (a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.
   (b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.
   (c) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exacting of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the U.S.S.R., one from the United Kingdom and one from the U.S.A.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

   "The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50 per cent of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the repara-
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The question by the Moscow Reparation Commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

VII. POLAND

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi Parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with some digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

VIII. JUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. [Nan] Subasitch:

(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the agreement.

(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(i) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and
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(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the communiqué of the Conference.

IX. ITALO-JUGOSLAV FRONTIER—ITALO-AUSTRIAN FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation, and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. JUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Jugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a State still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another State. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Jugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:
(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.
(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.
(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention, and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The foregoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
M. MOLTOV
ANTHONY EDEN

AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and
the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
   (a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
   (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
   (c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Feb. 11, 1945.

JOSEPH V. STALIN
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

SAN FRANCISCO, April 25-June 26, 1945 (see pp. 327ff.).

POTS DAM, July 17-August 2, 1945. Truman, Byrnes, Churchill, Eden, Attlee, Bevin, Stalin, Molotov, et al. meet to consider provisional German settlement, procedures of peacemaking, and other matters. These accords were released August 3, 1945, with the exception of IB, C, D, IV, XIII to XX, and Annexes I and II, all of which were released March 24, 1947.

PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF BERLIN CONFERENCE

The Berlin Conference of the three heads of government of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and U.K., which took place from July 17 to Aug. 2, 1945, came to the following conclusions:

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

1

There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., China, France and the U.S.A.
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2

(I) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(II) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than Sept. 1, 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

3

(I) As its immediate important task the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a Government adequate for the purpose is established.

(II) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purpose of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(III) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the member Governments.

4

(I) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(II) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convene a formal conference of the State chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

B. It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows:

Council of Foreign Ministers draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of the three Governments to the Governments of China and France:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member Governments might agree to refer to it.

The text adopted by the three Governments is as follows:

"In agreement with the Governments of the United States, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and U.S.S.R., the U.S. Government, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of China (France) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. His Majesty’s Government, the U.S. Government, the Soviet Government attach much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements and they hope to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation."

C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for
the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom.

D. The conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly, it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

II. THE PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD

A. Political Principles

[1] In accordance with the agreement on control machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders in Chief of the armed forces of the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

[2] So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

[3] The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(1) The complete disarming and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS, SA, SD and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(II) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(III) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to insure that they are not revived in any form and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.
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(IV) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

[4]

All Nazi laws which provide the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

[5]

War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

[6]

All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

[7]

German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

[8]

The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

[9]

The administration in Germany should be directed toward the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(I) Local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(II) All democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(III) Representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(IV) For the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

[10]

Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.
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B. Economic Principles

[11]

In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany’s approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned, or if not removed, shall be destroyed.

[12]

At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

[13]

In organizing the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

[14]

During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end, common policies shall be established in regard to:

(a) Mining and industrial production and its allocation;
(b) Agriculture, forestry and fishing;
(c) Wages, prices and rationing;
(d) Import and export programs for Germany as a whole;
(e) Currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
(f) Reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
(g) Transportation and communications.

In applying these policies, account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

[15]

Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy, but only to the extent necessary:

(a) To carry out programs of industrial disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations and of approved exports and imports.
(b) To assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries, excluding the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.)
(c) To insure in the manner determined by the Central Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.
(d) To control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.
(e) To control all German public and private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, etc., connected with economic activities.
In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

Measures shall be promptly taken:
(a) To effect essential repair of transport;
(b) To enlarge coal production;
(c) To maximize agricultural output; and
(d) To effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany, the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in Paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of the reparations agreement.

III. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R. and from appropriate German external assets.

The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the western zones and from appropriate German external assets.

In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the western zones:
(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.
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(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

[5]

The amount of equipment to be removed from the western zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

[6]

Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in Paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4(a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for repair shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the zone commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

[7]

Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of Paragraph 6.

[8]

The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the western zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in Paragraph 9 below.

[9]

The Governments of the U.K. and U.S.A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the eastern zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and eastern Austria.

[10]

The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

IV. DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE

A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:

1. The total strength of the German surface Navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.A.

2. Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the Technical Commission appointed by the three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German shipbuilding
or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the government.

3. The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A. for experimental and technical purposes.

4. All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy pertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 3 hereof shall be handed over to the respective Powers receiving such ships.

5. The three Governments agree to constitute a Tripartite Naval Commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15 Aug., 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.

6. The three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15 Feb., 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the commission.

7. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:

1. The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the U.S.A. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.

2. The allocation, manning and operation of these ships during the Japanese war period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

3. While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with Paragraph 1.

4. German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the three Powers.

5. The three Governments agree to constitute a Tripartite Merchant Marine Commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than Sept. 1, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.

V. CITY OF KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that, pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the
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section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VI. WAR CRIMINALS

The three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of these major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943, have no particular geographical localization. The three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1 September.

VII. AUSTRIA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria. The three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the City of Vienna.

[The following sentence was not included in the agreement published Aug. 3, but the sections following it were made public then.]

It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria.

VIII. POLAND

A. Declaration

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the recognized Government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad
who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference, the three heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the Western Niesse River and along the Western Niesse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this Conference and including the area of the former Free City of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

IX. CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

The three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of peace treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part, the three Governments have included the preparation for a peace treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress toward re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a peace treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing peace treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of peace treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.
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The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

"1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

"2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The three Governments feel bound, however, to make it clear that they, for their part, would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

X. TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

After an exchange of views on this question, it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian colonial territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian colonial territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XI. REVISED ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PROCEDURE IN RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND HUNGARY

The three Governments took note that the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government's proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto (Annex 1).

XII. ORDERLY TRANSFER OF GERMAN POPULATIONS

The three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special
regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIII. OIL EQUIPMENT IN RUMANIA

The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet members, and one to be composed of United States and Soviet members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment in Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot.

XIV. IRAN

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Teheran and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.

XV. THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER

A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached:

Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this zone, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain international.

The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the U.K. and France.

XVI. THE BLACK SEA STRAITS

The three Governments recognize that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failure to meet present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.

XVII. INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS

The Conference considered a proposal of the United States delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

XVIII. EUROPEAN INLAND TRANSPORT CONFERENCE

The British and United States delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet delegation of the desire of the British and United States Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance
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that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened Conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this Conference.

XIX. DIRECTIVES TO MILITARY COMMANDERS ON ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY

The three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council for Germany informing him of all decisions of the Conference affecting matters within the scope of his duties.

XX. USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELLITE REPARATIONS OR "WAR TROPHIES"

The proposal (Annex II) presented by the United States delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

XXI. MILITARY TALKS

During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the three Governments on military matters of common interest.

ANNEX I

Text of a letter transmitted on July 12 to the representatives of the United States and United Kingdom Governments on the Allied Control Commission in Hungary.

"In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary.

1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice-President) of the A.C.C. will regularly call conferences with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the A.C.C. The conferences will be called once in ten days, or more frequently in case of need.

"Directives of the A.C.C. on questions of principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives.

2. The British and American representatives in the A.C.C. will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the A.C.C., convoked by the President of the A.C.C., which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the A.C.C. for questions connected with the execution by the A.C.C. of its functions.

3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted, provided that the A.C.C. is previously informed of the time and route of the journeys.

4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the A.C.C. within a time limit of not more than one week.

5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American representatives on the A.C.C. under arrangements and within time limits established by the A.C.C., or in special cases by previous coordination with the President of the A.C.C.

"I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing statutes regarding the A.C.C. in Hungary, which was confirmed on Jan. 20, 1945, shall remain in force in the future." 

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ANNEX II

Use of Allied property for satellite reparations or "war trophies."

1. The burden of reparation and "war trophies" should not fall on Allied nationals.

2. Capital equipment. We object to the removal of such Allied property as reparations, "war trophies" or under any other guise. Loss would accrue to Allied nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure of Allied property makes impossible the fulfillment by the satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the Allied nations and their nationals.

The United States looks to the other occupying Powers for the return of any equipment already removed and the cessation of removals. Where such equipment will not or cannot be returned, the United States will demand of the satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment.

These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by Allied nationals. In the event of removals of property in which the American as well as the entire Allied interest is less than substantial, the United States expects adequate, effective and prompt compensation.

3. Current production. While the United States does not oppose reparation out of current production of Allied investments, the satellite must provide immediate and adequate compensation to the Allied nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that they can recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have equal priority with reparations.

We deem it essential that the satellites not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals access, on equal terms, to their trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately modify any existing arrangements which may have that effect.

LONDON, September 11-October 3, 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers (Bevin, Byrnes, Molotov, Bidault, Wang Shih Chieh) meets to discuss peace treaty for Italy and Axis satellites. Bevin and Byrnes insist on French and Chinese participation in Balkan treaty drafting, final formulation of treaties by a large general conference, and more democracy in Balkans. Molotov insists on limiting treaty making to Big Three and Anglo-American recognition of Bulgarian and Rumanian Governments. Result: deadlock, and no agreement even on a joint statement of disagreement.

MOSCOW, December 16-26, 1945. Three Power Conference (Bevin, Byrnes, Molotov). Final communiqué, December 27:

The Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the U.S.A. met in Moscow from Dec. 16 to Dec. 26, 1945, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference, confirmed at the Berlin Conference, that there should be periodic consultation between them. At the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers, discussions took place on an informal and exploratory basis and agreement was reached on the following questions:
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I. PREPARATION OF PEACE TREATIES WITH ITALY, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY AND FINLAND

As announced on the 24th of December, 1945, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed to have requested the adherence of the Governments of France and China to the following procedure with respect to the preparation of peace treaties:

1. In the drawing up by the Council of Foreign Ministers of treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, only members of the Council who are, or under the terms of the agreement establishing the Council of Foreign Ministers adopted at the Berlin Conference are deemed to be, signatory of the surrender terms will participate, unless and until the Council takes further action under the agreement to invite other members of the Council to participate on questions directly concerning them. That is to say:

   A. The terms of the peace treaty with Italy will be drafted by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France;
   B. The terms of the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom;
   C. The terms of the peace treaty with Finland by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

The deputies of the Foreign Ministers will immediately resume their work in London on the basis of understandings reached on the questions discussed at the first plenary session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

2. When the preparation of all these drafts has been completed, the Council of Foreign Ministers will convocate a Conference for the purpose of considering treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The Conference will consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers together with all members of the United Nations which have waged war with substantial military force against European enemy states, namely: U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., China, France, Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Byelorussia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Union of South Africa, Jugoslavia, Ukraine. The Conference will be held not later than May 1, 1946.

3. After the conclusion of the deliberations of the Conference and upon consideration of its recommendations, the States signatory to the terms of armistice with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland—France being regarded as such for the purposes of the peace treaty with Italy—will draw up final texts of peace treaties.

4. The final texts of the respective peace treaties as so drawn up will be signed by representatives of the States represented at the Conference which are at war with the enemy States in question. The texts of the respective peace treaties will then be submitted to the other United Nations which are at war with the enemy States in question.

5. The peace treaties will come into force immediately after they have been ratified by the Allied States signatory to the respective armistices, France being regarded as such in the case of the peace with Italy. These treaties are subject to ratification by the enemy States in question.

II. FAR EASTERN COMMISSION AND ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

A. FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

Agreement was reached, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to take the place of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. The terms of reference for the Far Eastern Commission are as follows:
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I. Establishment of the Commission

A Far Eastern Commission is hereby established composed of the representatives of the U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Philippine Commonwealth.

II. Functions

A. The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be:
1. To formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished.
2. To review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
3. To consider such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the participating Governments reached in accordance with the voting procedure provided for in Article V, Section 2 hereunder.

B. The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations nor with regard to territorial adjustments.

C. The Commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Council for Japan and will respect existing control machinery in Japan, including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander's command of occupational forces.

III. Functions of the United States Government

1. The U.S. Government shall prepare directives in accordance with policy decisions of the Commission and shall transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate U.S. Government agency. The Supreme Commander shall be charged with the implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the Commission.
2. If the Commission decides that any directive or action reviewed in accordance with Article II-A-2 should be modified, its decision shall be regarded as a policy decision.
3. The U.S. Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission; provided that any directive dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control, or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission.
4. All directives issued shall be filed with the Commission.

IV. Other Methods of Consultation

The establishment of the Commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of consultation on Far Eastern issues by the participating Governments.

V. Composition

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall consist of one representative of each of the States party to this agreement. The membership of the Commission may be increased by agreement among the participating Powers as conditions warrant by the addition of representatives of other United Nations in the Far East or having territories therein. The Commission shall provide for full and adequate consultations, as occasion may require, with representatives of the United Nations not members of the Commission
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in regard to matters before the Commission which are of particular concern to such nations.

2. The Commission may take action by less than unanimous vote provided that action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following Powers: U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., and China.

VI. Location and Organization

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall have its headquarters in Washington. It may meet at other places as occasion requires, including Tokyo, if and when it deems it desirable to do so. It may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

2. Each representative on the Commission may be accompanied by an appropriate staff comprising both civilian and military representation.

3. The Commission shall organize its secretariat, appoint such committees as may be deemed advisable, and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.

VII. Termination

The Far Eastern Commission shall cease to function when a decision to that effect is taken by the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following Powers: U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., and China. Prior to the termination of its functions, the Commission shall transfer to any interim or permanent security organization of which the participating Governments are members those functions which may appropriately be transferred.

It was agreed that the Government of the United States on behalf of the four Powers should present the terms of reference to the other Governments specified in Article I and invite them to participate in the Commission on the revised basis.

B. ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

The following agreement was also reached, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of an Allied Council for Japan:

1. There shall be established an Allied Council with its seat in Tokyo under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (or his deputy) for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the terms of surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and of directives supplementary thereto; and for the purpose of exercising the control authority herein granted.

2. The membership of the Allied Council shall consist of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy), who shall be Chairman and U.S. member; a U.S.S.R. member; a Chinese member, and a member representing jointly the U.K., Australia, New Zealand and India.

3. Each member shall be entitled to have an appropriate staff consisting of military and civilian advisers.

4. The Allied Council shall meet not less often than once every two weeks.

5. The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the terms of surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and directives supplementary thereto. In all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander who is the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan. He will consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decisions upon these matters shall be controlling.

6. If, regarding the implementation of policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission on questions concerning a change in the regime of control, fundamental changes
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in the Japanese constitutional structure, and a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, a member of the Council disagrees with the Supreme Commander (or his deputy), the Supreme Commander will withhold the issuance of orders on these questions pending agreement thereon in the Far Eastern Commission.

7. In cases of necessity the Supreme Commander may make decisions concerning the change of individual Ministers of the Japanese Government, or concerning the filling of vacancies created by the resignation of individual Cabinet members, after appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the other Allied Powers on the Allied Council.

III. KOREA

1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent State, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., China, the U.K. and the U.S. prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea, a Conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.

IV. CHINA

The three Foreign Secretaries exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife. They reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Byrnes had several conversations concerning Soviet and American armed forces in China.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet forces had disarmed and deported Japanese troops in Manchuria but that withdrawal of Soviet forces had been postponed until Feb. 1 at the request of the Chinese Government.
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Mr. Byrnes pointed out that American forces were in North China at the request of the Chinese Government, and referred also to the primary responsibility of the United States in the implementation of the terms of surrender with respect to the disarming and deportation of Japanese troops. He stated that American forces would be withdrawn just as soon as this responsibility was discharged or the Chinese Government was in a position to discharge the responsibility without the assistance of American forces.

The two Foreign Secretaries were in complete accord as to the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities.

V. RUMANIA

The three Governments are prepared to give King Michael the advice for which he has asked in his letter of Aug. 21, 1945, on the broadening of the Rumanian Government. The King should be advised that one member of the National Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the Government. The Commission referred to below shall satisfy itself that

A. They are truly representative members of the groups or the parties not represented in the Government;
B. They are suitable and will work loyally with the Government.

The three Governments take note that the Rumanian Government thus reorganized should declare that free and unfettered elections will be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot. All democratic and anti-Fascist parties should have the right to take part in these elections and to put forward candidates. The reorganized Government should give assurances concerning the grant of freedom of the press, speech, religion and association.

A. Y. Vishinsky, Ambassador Averell Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to proceed to Bucharest immediately to consult with King Michael and members of the present Government with a view to the execution of the above-mentioned tasks.

As soon as these tasks are accomplished and the required assurances have been received, the Government of Rumania, with which the Soviet Government maintains diplomatic relations, will be recognized by the Government of the U.S.A. and the Government of the U.K.

VI. BULGARIA

It is understood by the three Governments that the Soviet Government takes upon itself the mission of giving friendly advice to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the desirability of the inclusion in the Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front, now being formed, of an additional two representatives of other democratic groups, who

A. Are truly representative of the groups of the parties which are not participating in the Government and
B. Are really suitable and will work loyally with the Government.

As soon as the Governments of the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom are convinced that this friendly advice has been accepted by the Bulgarian Government and the said additional representatives have been included in its body, the Government of the U.S. and the Government of the U.K. will recognize the Bulgarian Government, with which the Government of the Soviet Union already has diplomatic relations.
VII. THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS OF A COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Discussion of the subject of atomic energy related to the question of the establishment of a Commission by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the U.K. have agreed to recommend, for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the establishment by the United Nations of a Commission to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters. They have agreed to invite the other permanent members of the Security Council, France and China, together with Canada, to join with them in assuming the initiative in sponsoring the following resolution at the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in January, 1946:

Resolved by the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Commission, with the composition and competence set out hereunder, to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters.

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION

A Commission is hereby established by the General Assembly with the terms of reference set out under Section V below.

II. RELATIONS OF THE COMMISSION WITH THE ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

A. The Commission shall submit its reports and recommendations to the Security Council, and such reports and recommendations shall be made public unless the Security Council, in the interests of peace and security, otherwise directs. In the appropriate cases the Security Council should transmit these reports to the General Assembly and the members of the United Nations, as well as to the Economic and Social Council and other organs within the framework of the United Nations.

B. In view of the Security Council's primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council shall issue directions to the Commission in matters affecting security. On these matters the Commission shall be accountable for its work to the Security Council.

III. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission shall be composed of one representative from each of those States represented on the Security Council, and Canada, when that State is not a member of the Security Council. Each representative on the Commission may have such assistants as he may desire.

IV. RULES OF PROCEDURE

The Commission shall have whatever staff it may deem necessary, and shall make recommendations for its rules of procedure to the Security Council, which shall approve them as a procedural matter.

V. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission shall proceed with the utmost dispatch and inquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular the Commission shall make specific proposals:

A. For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

B. For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes;
C. For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;
D. For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.

The Commission shall not infringe upon the responsibilities of any organ of the United Nations, but should present recommendations for the consideration of those organs in the performance of their tasks under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

LONDON, April 25-May 16, 1946. Council of Foreign Ministers meets to draft five peace treaties.

PARIS, June 15-July 12, 1946. Council of Foreign Ministers completes drafting of five peace treaties, with disagreements reduced to minor points.

Paris Peace Conference, July 29-October 15, 1946. Delegates of 21 states meet in Luxemburg Palace to discuss and make recommendations regarding the draft treaties. Attlee, Bevin, Mackenzie King, General Smuts, Bidault, Byrnes, Senators Tom Connally and Arthur H. Vandenberg, Molotov, Vishinsky, et al. represent Big Four. Total delegates and secretaries 1,385; journalists 2,000; guards 1,040; paper used 5 tons per day on busy days; official languages English, French, Russian. Big Four propose action by two-thirds vote. Small States favor majority vote. Compromise: full "recommendations" to Council of Foreign Ministers to be adopted by two-thirds vote, but proposals passed by simple majority may also be forwarded to Council. Conference operates through five commissions (Italy, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria) and four committees (military, legal, and two economic). Agents of enemy States heard but have no votes.

NEW YORK, November 4-December 12, 1946. Council of Foreign Ministers meets at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel and puts five treaties in final form. Texts released January 17, 1947. Treaties formally signed at Quai d'Orsay, PARIS, February 10, 1947, by representatives of five enemy States and of Allied States at war with each.\(^{24}\)

Major Terms of Peace Treaties of February 10, 1947

1. Italy and U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., France, China, Australia, Belgium, Byelorussia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Ukraine, South Africa, and Yugoslavia. 90 articles. 17 annexes. Territory: To France—small districts in the regions of Little St. Bernard, Mont Thabor, Chaberton, Mont Cenis, Tenda, and Briga. To Yugoslavia—Zara, Pelagosa, Lagosta and other islands along Dalmatian coast; the Istrian Peninsula and most of the remainder of the Province of Venezia Giulia, with Trieste and environs to become a "Free Territory" to be governed under a statute approved by U.N. Security Council, which shall also appoint

\(^{24}\) The texts are too bulky to be reproduced here. They are available in the Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series, 1947, The New York Times, Jan. 18, 1947, and Current History, March and April, 1947.

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Governor. To Greece—Rhodes and other Dodecanese Islands; sovereignty over African colonies renounced, with their disposition to be determined within one year by U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and France, which, in absence of agreement, will refer issue to U.N. General Assembly and be bound by its recommendation; independence of Albania and Ethiopia recognized. Disarmament: Demilitarization of frontiers with France and Jugoslovakia; prohibition of atomic weapons, guided missiles, guns with range over 30 km., manned and noncontact mines and torpedoes, aircraft carriers, submarines, assault craft, and bombing planes; heavy and medium tanks limited to 200, Navy to two battleships, total tonnage of 67,500 tons in all other categories, 25,000 officers and men; Army to 250,000; Air Force to 200 fighter and reconnaissance and 150 transport aircraft. Reparations: $100,000,000 to U.S.S.R. over 7 years out of war-factory equipment, Italian assets in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and current industrial production, with U.S.S.R. furnishing raw materials on commercial terms; $125,000,000 to Jugoslovakia, $105,000,000 to Greece, $25,000,000 to Ethiopia and $5,000,000 to Albania over 7 years out of war-factory equipment, current industrial production, and other Italian assets.

2. Bulgaria and U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., Australia, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Greece, India, New Zealand, Ukraine, South Africa, and Jugoslovakia. 38 articles. 6 annexes. Territory: Frontiers of January 1, 1941, restored. Disarmament: Army limited to 55,000, Anti-aircraft artillery to 1,800 men, Navy to 3,500 men and 7,250 tons, Air Force to 5,200 men and 90 airplanes, of which not more than 70 may be combat types; banned weapons same as for Italy. Reparations: $45,000,000 to Greece and $25,000,000 to Jugoslovakia in kind over 8 years.

3. Hungary and U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., Australia, Byelorussia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, Ukraine, South Africa, and Jugoslovakia. 42 articles. 6 annexes. Territory: Frontiers of January 1, 1938, with Austria and Jugoslovakia restored; same as to Czechoslovak frontier, except for cession to Czechoslovakia of three villages west of Danube and south of Bratislava; Vienna award of November 2, 1938, annulled, with resulting retrocession of Transylvania to Rumania. Disarmament: Army limited to 65,000, Air Force to 5,000 and 90 airplanes, of which not more than 70 may be combat types; banned weapons same as for Italy. Reparations: $200,000,000 to U.S.S.R., $50,000,000 to Jugoslovakia, and $50,000,000 to Czechoslovakia in kind over 8 years.

4. Rumania and U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., Australia, Byelorussia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, Ukraine, and South Africa. 40 articles. 6 annexes. Territory: Frontiers of January 1, 1941, restored, except that Hungarian-Rumanian frontier of January 1, 1938, is reestablished along with Soviet-Rumanian frontier fixed by Soviet-Rumanian agreement of June 28, 1940, and Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement of June 29, 1945. Disarmament: Army limited to 120,000, anti-aircraft artillery to 5,000, Navy to 5,000 men and 15,000 tons, Air Force to 8,000 men and 150 airplanes, of which not more than 100 may be combat types; banned weapons same as for Italy. Reparations: $300,000,000 to U.S.S.R. in kind over 8 years from September 12, 1944.

5. Finland and U.S.S.R., U.K., Australia, Byelorussia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, Ukraine, and South Africa. 36 articles. 6 annexes. Territory: Frontiers of January 1, 1941, restored, except that Province of Petsamo is ceded to U.S.S.R. Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, restored, except that U.S.S.R. renounces leasehold at Hangö and acquires a 50-year lease, at 5,000,000 Finnish marks per annum, of Porkkala-Udd area, west of Helsingfors, for a Soviet naval base. Disarmament: Army limited to 34,400, Navy to 4,500 men and 10,000 tons, Air Force to 3,000 men and 60 airplanes. Reparations: $300,000,000 to U.S.S.R. in kind over 8 years from September 19, 1944.

moscow, March 10-April 24, 1947. Council of Foreign Ministers (Marshall, Bevin, Bidault, and Molotov) meet to consider peace treaties for Austria and Germany. Agree on abolition of State of Prussia. Molotov pro-
poses exchange of views on situation in China. Marshall objects. Issue dropped. The U.S.S.R. and Western Powers accuse each other of laxness in demilitarization and de-Nazification of Reich. Molotov protests unification of British and U.S. zones and asks four-Power administration of Ruhr and $10,000,000,000 in German reparations to U.S.S.R., to be paid over 18 years out of current production. Bidault asks four-Power administration of Ruhr and German coal for France. Marshall rejects Soviet proposal "categorically" and urges that part of Polish-administered German territory go back to Reich. Session ends in deadlock.


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The end is not yet, for conferences of diplomats, like death and taxes, are always with us. Whether their fruits are sweet or bitter depends less on the good will or ill will of the participants than upon their willingness and ability to reconcile the divergent demands and expectations of sovereignties into viable bargains acceptable to those possessed of decisive power. In the absence of accord, the practice of diplomacy, which is often a species of war conducted by favors and fraud, easily passes over into open threats or use of force.

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CHAPTER V

THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE

1. self-help

Fury said to a mouse that he met in the house, "Let us both go to law: I will prosecute you.—Come, I'll take no denial: we must have a trial; for really this morning I've nothing to do." Said the mouse to the cur, "Such a trial, dear sir, with no jury or judge, would be wasting our breath." "I'll be judge, I'll be jury," said cunning old Fury; "I'll try the whole cause and condemn you to death."—LeWIS CARROLL, Alice in Wonderland.

RIGHTS and obligations of States received reasonably clear definition long before there existed any procedures for their enforcement. It is sometimes held to be a principle of private law that there is no right without a remedy. If this notion were applied to international law, it would mean that States have no rights, since "remedies" in international society are seldom effective. It would be more accurate to say, however, that the observance of the rights of States depends upon their power to compel respect on the part of other States. In the development of private law, remedies were established simultaneously with rights and even in some cases antedated clear definitions of rights. In international law, on the other hand, because of the peculiar nature of the relations between independent sovereignties, legal rights were recognized long before adequate remedies for their protection came into being. The promptings of ambition, the will-to-power, the lust for conquest, the pursuit of national interests all dictate coercion as a method of dealing with other States quite as much as considerations of legal rights. States seek security and the realization of their aspirations by efforts to impose their will upon one another by force. Each State resorts to self-help, i.e., to its own power and resources, in its attempts to protect its rights and interests.

War is obviously the ultimate means of coercion in interstate relations. In war each belligerent acts as policeman, judge, jury, sheriff, and executioner all in one. Questions of legal rights and obligations may be raised on both sides at the beginning of war as excuses, rationalizations, pretexts,
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or plausible formulations of interests in the pursuit of which war seems preferable to surrender or compromise. War is a means of settling disputes only in the sense that, after an appropriate interval of bloodshed and destruction, the weaker party will be disposed to yield to the stronger or both will fall exhausted and agree to a compromise settlement which seemed unacceptable so long as each felt optimistic about imposing its will on the other. The terms of peace will set up new legal relationships between the disputants, reflecting the verdict of arms and destined to be more or less durable, depending upon the wisdom of the victors, the weakness of the vanquished, and subsequent shifts of power relationships. If neither side has succeeded in imposing its will on the other, the terms of the peace may make no reference to the original dispute at all. Such was the case with the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, which terminated the Anglo-American War of 1812. Under such circumstances, the dispute is "settled" by common agreement to say no more about it. That war is the most completely unsatisfactory method of settling disputes scarcely calls for demonstration. If war were to be judged on such grounds, it would have been banished long ago. But States generally resort to war not in the conviction that it represents the best mode of adjusting controversies, but because armed coercion is an instrument of State power and a means of protecting and promoting the political interests of the State, quite apart from questions of legal rights.

There are various methods of hostile redress short of war which also involve an element of coercion. These may be broadly classified as threats of force, acts of retort, and acts of reprisal. Threats of force may take the form of military, naval, or aerial maneuvers, mobilization, the dispatch of an ultimatum, and the like. None of these is either injurious in fact to the other party or a violation of his legal rights but is a more or less violent gesture designed to frighten him into a more tractable frame of mind. Needless to say, most wars break out after one or both parties to a controversy have made threats of force which fail to produce the desired result. Acts of retort are definitely injurious to the other party, though not in violation of his legal rights. Such measures are always within the bounds of customary international law and are performed entirely within the jurisdiction of the State taking such action. Discriminatory tariff duties or penalties, the suspension of commercial intercourse, and the use of an economic boycott are common examples. In 1808-09 the Jefferson Administration enforced an embargo on American trade with Great Britain and France as a means of bringing their Governments to terms in the controversies over neutral rights. In this case the measure of retort was unsuccessful, and the United States suffered more than its victims. China's anti-Japanese boycott of 1931-32 was an act of retort in retaliation for the Japanese military occupation of
Manchuria. Such acts are not, in and of themselves, violations of the customary legal rights of the victim State, though they sometimes involve breaches of treaty obligations and often lead to violent incidents. When the victim retaliates in kind, grave consequences may easily ensue.

The severance of diplomatic relations (formerly a precursor of war) has been increasingly resorted to in the 20th century as an expression of displeasure—and, at times, as a device of domestic politics. Whether such an act is materially injurious to the victim depends upon circumstances. Whether it is a legal injury depends upon relevant treaties. Diplomatic ruptures are not per se acts of retortion or reprisal (see below) and are scarcely to be regarded any longer as threats of force. The U.S. has often withheld recognition from, or broken relations with, Latin-American Governments which it has disapproved. By so doing it has sometimes promoted their replacement by more acceptable regimes. On May 26, 1927, the Baldwin Cabinet in Britain severed relations with the U.S.S.R., which it accused of espionage and anti-British propaganda. They were resumed by the new Labor Government on October 1, 1929. On April 25, 1943, Moscow severed relations with the Polish Government in Exile by way of protest at its attitude toward frontier revision and its apparent acceptance of Goebbels’s fable that the 12,000 Polish officers murdered by the Nazis in Katyn Forest near Smolensk had been butchered by Soviet terrorists. This action led ultimately to the disintegration of the Sikorski-Mikolajczyk regime. In late October, 1947, President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla of Chile, whose Government was engaged in smashing a strike of miners, found “Communism” a convenient scapegoat. He expelled Yugoslav diplomats, on charges of instigating the strike. Belgrade severed relations with Chile, which in turn broke relations with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. At the same time (October 21, 1947) Brazil, having outlawed its own Communist Party, severed relations with the U.S.S.R. to avenge “national honor” after the Soviet press asserted that President Dutra had accepted decorations from Hitler—an allegation, incidentally, which was true. These moves not only had obvious utility in domestic politics but were designed to curry favor with Washington.

Acts of reprisal, as distinct from retortion and threats of force, are in patent violation of the legal rights of the other party. Prior to the abolition of privateering by the Declaration of Paris of 1856, it was usual for States to authorize private reprisals by issuing “letters of marque and reprisal” to their nationals with unsatisfied financial claims against a foreign State. Such individuals were then free to plunder the commerce of the other State up to the amount of their claims. In 1832 President Jackson urged Congress

1 See pp. 168-169.
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to authorize the seizure of goods from French vessels on the high seas as a means of compelling France to meet her financial obligations to the United States. Reprisals of this type are, happily, no longer permissible. Public reprisals, however, are still recognized as a legitimate method of redress. They may take the form of hostile embargoes, pacific blockades, acts of intervention, and acts of overt hostility indistinguishable from war in everything but name. An embargo is hostile, i.e., a violation of the rights of its victim and therefore an act of reprisal rather than of retortion, when it takes the form of the seizure of the ships or goods of nationals of the other State. This practice is now looked upon with disfavor; even on the outbreak of war, enemy merchant vessels in port are usually allowed “days of grace” within which they may depart unmolested. A blockade consists in action by naval forces to intercept commerce. A war blockade may be applied to vessels of all States entering or leaving the blockaded ports. A “pacific” blockade, however, must be limited in its enforcement to the vessels of the parties to the controversy and cannot lawfully be extended to vessels of third States. The first modern instance of this practice was the pacific blockade of Greece by the Powers in 1827. This led to the great naval battle of Navarino, in which the Turkish-Egyptian fleet was destroyed; but war was not declared, and the blockade was applied only to Greek and Turkish vessels and to those of the flag of the blockading States. New Granada was subjected to a pacific blockade by Great Britain in 1836, Mexico by France in 1838, Greece by Great Britain in 1850, China by France in 1854, Greece by Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia in 1886, Zanzibar by Portugal in 1888, Crete by the Powers in 1897, Venezuela by Great Britain, Germany, and Italy in 1902, Soviet Russia by the other Powers in 1918-21, etc. Most pacific blockades are directed by Great Powers against small ones too weak to resort to war or to retaliate effectively. Those directed against strong States usually lead to war.

All acts of intervention are acts of reprisal when they are resorted to as a means of bringing diplomatic pressure to bear upon their victim and when they are unaccompanied by any intention of creating a legal state of war. In 1914 the United States bombarded and occupied Veracruz, and two years later it sent a military expedition into northern Mexico, in both instances disclaiming any intention of making war. The American interventions in the Caribbean States have been similar in character. The attack of the Powers upon the Shimonoseki forts (Japan) in 1863, the allied expedition against Peiping in 1901, and the Italian bombardment of Corfu in 1923 are other examples. The military occupation of the Ruhr Valley in 1923 was likewise an act of reprisal for German nonpayment of reparations, though the French and Belgian Governments insisted that they were author-
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ized to take such action by the Treaty of Versailles. In January and February of 1932, Japanese military and naval forces, in retaliation against the Chinese boycott, bombarded and occupied Shanghai, after several weeks of severe fighting. In every such case, the victim whose rights are violated may regard the act as a *casus belli* and resort to war. The act itself does not automatically create a state of war, regardless of how much fighting takes place, unless one party or the other expresses an intention to make war. These various forms of pressure may thus be indistinguishable in fact from actual war, but they are “pacific” in the sense that a legal state of war is not inaugurated by them.

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All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter.—EDMUND BURKE, *On Conciliation with America*, March 22, 1775.

A treaty, or, to speak more correctly, a negotiation . . . is a cunning endeavor to obtain by peaceful manoeuvre, and the chicanery of Cabinets, those advantages which a nation would otherwise have wrested by force of arms,—in the same manner as a conscientious highwayman reforms and becomes a quiet and praiseworthy citizen, contenting himself with cheating his neighbor out of that property he would formerly have seized with open violence.—WASHINGTON IRVING.

If the parties to a dispute are disposed to discuss their differences rather than to threaten one another or to fight about them, they will resort to negotiation as a means of settlement. Negotiations may be conducted through diplomacy, through conference, or through the services of third States offering good offices or mediation. In the first instance the regular diplomatic channels may be utilized for an exchange of views in an effort to reach an adjustment. The Foreign Minister of either State may call in the Ambassador or Minister of the other for consultation. Or the two Foreign Ministers may confer with one another directly. Or they may appoint special agents, publicly or secretly, to carry on discussions. If an agreement is reached, it may be incorporated into an exchange of notes or some more formal international engagement. If negotiations are unsuccessful, other methods of settlement may be resorted to. The conduct of negotiations is essentially a bargaining process, for there can be no successful settlement by this method without give-and-take on both sides. Legal rights will be argued; but considerations of State power, equity, and political expediency will also be thrown into the scales. Each side will necessarily strive to attain maximum advantages with minimum concessions to the other. The respective Foreign
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Offices formulate their own claims and, by a more or less prolonged exchange of diplomatic correspondence, fence and parry with one another until some consensus is reached or until the negotiations break down in failure. In all negotiations the contending States remain judges of their own cases. The time consumed, however, allows an interval for popular passions to cool and facilitates compromise.

When two States are unable to reach any agreement with regard to a pending controversy and relations between them become "strained," it is permissible for outside States to offer their services in an effort to facilitate a settlement. If such interposition is dictatorial in character, it constitutes intervention. But if it is purely advisory, it cannot be regarded as an unfriendly act. Neither can the third State take offense if its offer is declined. A "tender of good offices" is usually nothing more than a mere polite inquiry as to whether the third State can be of service in preserving or restoring peace. It is often extended at the request of one of the parties to the controversy and is frequently made after a rupture of diplomatic relations or in the course of a war, as a means of restoring communication between the parties. If a tender of good offices is accepted on both sides, the third State may transmit suggestions for a settlement between the parties or may make such suggestions itself. In the latter case, true mediation occurs. Good offices consist in an invitation to resume discussions. Mediation, which normally follows an acceptance of good offices, consists in the actual transmission of suggestions. The mediating State does not seek to impose a settlement on the parties but attempts rather to create the atmosphere and the means necessary for a settlement. In 1813 the Russian Government offered its mediation to Great Britain and the United States in an effort to terminate the war which had broken out in the preceding year. The United States at once accepted the offer and sent commissioners to St. Petersburg to negotiate, but the British Government declined to reciprocate. Peace negotiations were finally opened by direct conversations between the parties. In 1905 President Roosevelt made a tender of good offices to Russia and Japan, then at war. The offer was accepted on both sides. The U.S.A. then acted as mediator and arranged a peace conference at Portsmouth, N. H. Its suggestions were instrumental in enabling the belligerents to come to an agreement and frame a peace treaty.

The first Convention of the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 contained a number of provisions regarding good offices and mediation, in addition to providing for the creation of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration. In its revised form, as amended by the second Conference of 1907, it provided that the contracting Powers "agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly
Powers" in cases of serious disagreements or disputes between them. All Powers were recognized to have the right to offer good offices and mediation to disputants. "The exercise of this right shall never be regarded by one or the other of the parties in conflict as an unfriendly act." The function of a mediator was declared to be that of "reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen between the States at variance." It was made clear that mediation is purely advisory and that the function of the would-be mediator is at an end as soon as his suggestions are declined by either party. The Convention likewise made provision for a plan of mediation (never subsequently utilized) whereby disputing States were to refer the controversy to two designated mediating Powers which would have exclusive control over efforts to achieve a settlement for a period of 30 days.

The term "conciliation" is frequently used to refer to the sequel of successful mediation, i.e., to the process whereby an outside party promotes an agreement between contending States. This procedure was institutionalized in the League of Nations Covenant, which made the Council an agency of conciliation. The members of the League agreed by Article 15 to submit to the Council "any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement." The Council was authorized to endeavor to settle the dispute. If its report was unanimously agreed to by its members, other than the representatives of the disputing States, the members of the League agreed that they would not go to war with any party to the dispute which complied with the recommendations of the report.

None of these permanent procedures was resorted to in the efforts made in 1939 to avert the outbreak of war. Only in the case of the hostilities between the U.S.S.R. and Finland did the victim of aggression appeal to the League of Nations. In the war crisis of August 4-September 3, 1939, The Hague and Geneva procedures were ignored, but various governments tendered their good offices to the disputants. On August 22, Chamberlain addressed a personal letter to Hitler urging direct German-Polish negotiations, with the aid of a neutral intermediary if desired by both sides. Hitler's reply of August 23 was inconclusive. While London and Paris pressed Warsaw to negotiate, King Leopold of Belgium, in the name of the Oslo States, broadcast a plea for peace on August 23. Pope Pius XII did likewise on the following day. At the same time, President Roosevelt appealed to King Victor Emmanuel of Italy to "formulate proposals for a pacific settlement of the present crisis." He also urged Chancellor Hitler and President Moscicki of Poland to refrain from all hostile acts "for a reasonable and stipulated period" and to seek a solution by way of negotiation or arbitration or conciliation through a moderator from one of the American Re-
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publics or one of the traditionally neutral European States. Warsaw agreed, but a second message from Washington to Berlin produced no reply until September 1, when Hitler merely said that Poland’s attitude had nullified all his efforts to keep the peace. An appeal by the Prime Minister of Canada on August 26 and a tender of good offices by King Leopold and Queen Wilhelmina on August 29 were also without effect.

Hitler meanwhile offered an alliance to Britain on August 25 on condition of a German-Polish settlement satisfactory to the Reich. The British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, flew to London with this proposal and returned on August 28 with suggestions for a settlement and assurances that Poland was “prepared to enter into discussions.” The Nazi leaders later declared that this was a lie and that London had sought to trick Berlin by pretending that Warsaw was ready to negotiate when in fact Warsaw had no such intention. The fact was that Warsaw was quite willing to “negotiate” on a basis of equality and compromise and had extended such assurances to Washington and London, but Berlin’s conception of “negotiations” was one according to which Poland must send a special emissary to Berlin with full powers to accept German proposals at once. On August 29, Hitler and Ribbentrop told Henderson that they agreed to “accept the proposed inter-mediation of the British Government to send a Polish representative invested with plenipotentiary powers. They expect his arrival on Wednesday, August 30.” The Ambassador said this “sounded like an ultimatum.” This the Nazi leaders denied. Halifax promised “careful consideration” of the German reply but said “... it is, of course, unreasonable to expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin today.” Polish Foreign Minister Beck refused to go to Berlin, lest he be treated as Schuschnigg and Hacha had been treated. Warsaw ordered mobilization on August 30.

At midnight, August 30-31 (Wednesday-Thursday), Henderson saw Ribbentrop, who said that German proposals for a settlement had been drawn up but that, since no Polish plenipotentiary had arrived by midnight, it was too late. He then read or, as the Ambassador put it, “gabbled through to me as fast as he could in a tone of the utmost scorn and annoyance,” a plan of 16 points whereby Germany was to annex Danzig and the status of the Corridor would be determined by a plebiscite. The proposals were not unreasonable, but the difference of views between Berlin on the one hand and London and Warsaw on the other as to the meaning of “negotiations” was never bridged. The 16 points were not transmitted either to Poland or to Britain but were broadcast by Wilhelmstrasse during the evening of August 31. The Polish Ambassador, Josef Lipski, had seen Ribbentrop at 6.30 P.M. to tell him that his Government was “weighing favorably” the British suggestions and would give its formal reply within two hours. He did not have
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“full power” to accept the 16 points. He did not ask for them. Ribbentrop did not offer them. An hour later the German Government severed all communications with Poland, so that no further discussions were possible. A last appeal by the Pope was without result. German armies invaded Poland at dawn on Friday, September 1, 1939.

Mussolini offered his mediation on August 31 in the hope of preventing war between the Allies and his own ally, Hitler. Even after the German invasion of Poland was launched, French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet accepted the Italian proposal for a conference. His willingness to compromise was the cause of the delay in Anglo-French action. The British and French notes to Berlin of September 1 were not ultimata but warnings and appeals. Beck was horrified. “We are in the thick of war, as the result of unprovoked aggression. The question before us is not one of a conference, but of the common action to be taken by the Allies to resist.” Italian mediation efforts continued on Saturday. But Halifax would not consent to a conference unless Germany agreed to withdraw her troops from Poland and refrain from further attack. This condition Hitler was unwilling to accept. Bonnet was overruled in his efforts to arrange another Munich. He was obliged to phone Ciano Saturday evening that the French Cabinet, also, could not consent to a conference unless German forces would evacuate Polish territory. Rome thereupon informed Berlin that it could do nothing more. Allied ultimata to the Reich were delivered on Sunday. The Anglo-French declarations of war followed. When one Power is bent upon the destruction of another or upon the unilateral imposition of its terms under threat of force, there is obviously no possibility of settlement by “negotiation.”

To return to the condition (once regarded as “normal”) in which compromise is possible: With respect to certain types of international controversies, States are willing to resort to methods of settlement which are in advance of negotiation in the sense that recourse is had to more or less impartial tribunals of adjustment but which fall short of arbitration or adjudication in that the disputants are unwilling to bind themselves in advance to accept such recommendations as may be made. These procedures can conveniently be described as methods approaching arbitration. In every instance the parties remain free to accept or reject the solution proposed by the agencies which they have created. These procedures fall into the categories of mixed commissions, commissions of inquiry, and commissions of conciliation.

A mixed commission is a body of representatives chosen by two disputing governments to make recommendations for its settlement. It consists of an even number of delegates, half chosen by each side—an arrangement which compels the members either to agree to disagree or to come to a definite
settlement. The members of mixed commissions are usually technical experts, qualified to ascertain the facts of the controversy. A commission of inquiry differs from a mixed commission in that it usually consists of an odd number of members and limits itself to fact finding. Its findings are again purely recommendations. This method of settlement was first provided for by general international agreement in the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes drawn up at the first Hague Conference. The Convention declared in part:

In differences of an international nature involving neither honor nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of fact, the signatory Powers recommend that the parties who have not been able to come to an agreement by means of diplomacy should, as far as circumstances allow, institute an international commission of inquiry, to facilitate a solution of these differences by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation (Article 9).

The scheme of settlement here proposed was based upon a procedure whereby the parties to a dispute would, by special agreement, set up a commission of inquiry, designate the questions to be put to it, and indicate the rules to be followed. The commission would make an investigation, hear both sides, call witnesses and experts, and prepare a report limited to a statement of facts, leaving the parties "entire freedom as to the effect to be given to the statement." This procedure was first applied in the Dogger Bank affair of 1904. A Russian squadron, proceeding through the North Sea on its way to the Far East in the course of the Russo-Japanese War, fired upon a number of British trawlers under the impression that they were Japanese torpedo boats. In Great Britain, ally of Japan since 1902, a popular clamor for war commenced at once, and the Government demanded immediate explanations and reparations from Russia. The two States agreed to submit the questions of fact connected with the incident to a Commission of Inquiry of five members, consisting of British, Russian, American, and French naval officers with a fifth member (an officer in the Austro-Hungarian Navy) chosen by the other four. The Commission met at Paris and published its report on February 25, 1905. It found the Russian squadron at fault, and the Russian Government paid an indemnity of £65,000. The same procedure was resorted to by Germany and the Netherlands with regard to responsibility for the sinking of a Dutch steamer in 1916. The Commission here found that the vessel was sunk by a torpedo fired by a German submarine, and an indemnity was likewise paid. Resort to the procedure outlined in the Hague Convention was not in any sense obligatory, and the Commissions were not permanent agencies but merely ad hoc bodies set up for each particular controversy.

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In an effort to institutionalize this procedure the United States, through Secretary of State Bryan, proposed to other States in 1913 the negotiation of a series of bilateral treaties which should set up permanent boards or Commissions of Conciliation to which all disputes, without exception, should be submitted. These Commissions were to consist of five members: two nationals of the parties, two chosen by the parties from among foreign nationals, and the fifth selected by agreement. The Commissions were to be given a year's time to report, during which period the parties agreed not to resort to hostilities. Thirty of the so-called Bryan "cooling-off" treaties were negotiated, and 21 came into force—9 with European States, 11 with Latin-American States, and 1 with China. Only 10 Commissions were set up. None of them was ever utilized for the settlement of any dispute, and the entire scheme has been allowed to lapse. This effort to create permanent Commissions of Conciliation thus bore no immediate fruits, although the principle in question reappeared in a number of post-1919 treaties. For example, the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Treaty of Nonaggression and Conciliation, signed at Rio de Janeiro, October 10, 1933, provided for Conciliation Commissions of five members, three of whom should be nonnationals of the disputing States. The signatories undertook to submit disputes to such Commissions, but their reports "shall in no case have the character of a final decision or arbitral award."

Feeble and futile as such efforts have been, the processes of direct negotiation between States have proliferated at an amazing rate during the past half century. The normal result of successful negotiation is a treaty or executive agreement recording the terms of a bargain. Treaty making as a problem of international law and as a device for settling inter-Allied disputes after World War II has been reviewed above. Here, by way of suggesting the extent to which States have resorted to these procedures, cognizance may be taken of American experience. The U.S.A. signed its first treaties (with France) on February 6, 1778. Between 1778 and 1838, 50 more treaties were concluded. The next 30 years saw 110 treaty engagements enter into force; the following three decades, 134; and the last 50 years, over 1,000. During the single calendar year 1946, no less than 78 American treaties and agreements entered into force, of which, however, only 7 were submitted to the Senate and were thus treaties in the technical sense: a Treaty on General Relations with the Philippines, July 4, 1946; "Protocols" on Sanitary Aerial and Maritime Navigation, April 23, 1946; "Conventions" with Britain on Double Taxation, April 16, 1945; and "Protocols" on the marketing of sugar and coffee. All the rest, including the Act of Chapultepec, the Constitution of UNESCO, the IRO accord, and many commercial agreements which formerly would have been treaties were
executive agreements. In 1946 the State Department discontinued its \textit{Treaty Series} and \textit{Executive Agreements Series} in favor of a \textit{Treaties and Other International Acts Series}, numbered consecutively and beginning with No. 1501. The U.S.-Greek aid agreement of June 20, 1947, was No. 1625, representing the total of international accords entered into by the U.S.A. since 1778.

3. \textbf{Arbitration}

It is impossible to attack as a transgressor him who offers to lay his grievance before a tribunal of arbitration.—Archidamus, King of Sparta.

If a difficulty should arise between the aforesaid cities, which cannot easily be settled by themselves, it shall be decided by the arbitration of the Sovereign Pontiff; and if one of the parties violates the treaty, we agree that His Holiness shall excommunicate the offending city.—Treaty between Venice and Genoa, 1235.

Article 37 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes defined arbitration as follows:

International arbitration has for its object the settlement of disputes between States by judges of their own choice, and on the basis of respect for law. Recourse to arbitration implies an engagement to submit in good faith to the award (Article 37 of the first Convention of 1907).

This definition involves four elements which are the distinguishing features of genuine international arbitration: (1) settlement of disputes between States through their own voluntary action, (2) by judges of their own choice, (3) on the basis of respect for law, and (4) with an obligation to accept the award as binding. The last-named element distinguishes arbitration sharply from the methods dealt with above, in which recommendations are purely advisory. The phrase "respect for law" implies that arbitrators are free to consider extralegal aspects of a controversy, if this will contribute toward a settlement, and are not bound to apply the strict letter of international law to the case before them. C. C. Hyde defines international arbitration as "an impartial adjudication according to law, and that before a tribunal of which at least a single member, who is commonly a national of a State neutral to the contest, acts as umpire."\textsuperscript{2} This suggests that the process of arbitration is identical with that of adjudication except as to the method of choosing judges. In practice, arbitral tribunals have usually acted as judicial bodies and have applied the principles of international law to the controversies submitted to them. It remains true, nevertheless,

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States}, Vol. II, pp. 111-112.
that arbitrators have more discretion than judges of a court and may apply principles of equity and justice, as well as political considerations, in making their award—a procedure inadmissible in a genuine judicial body.

Arbitration as a method of settling international disputes is of great antiquity. The earliest treaty of which any record remains was an arbitration treaty. The practice of arbitration was extensively resorted to in the State Systems preceding the present one, particularly among the Greeks. During the medieval period there were numerous papal arbitrations and an appreciable number of secular arbitrations between temporal rulers. Between 1500 and 1800, however, arbitration went out of fashion as a mode of adjusting differences, except for a few 17th-century English arbitration treaties negotiated by Cromwell. The practice was revived in the Jay Treaty of 1794 between Great Britain and the United States. By this instrument, four Commissions were set up, to locate the source of the Mississippi, to settle the St. Croix River boundary, to pass upon the claims of British subjects for prerevolutionary mercantile debts confiscated by the United States, and to judge of reciprocal claims arising out of the seizure of American vessels by British cruisers and the capture of British merchantmen by French privateers fitted out in American ports. These Commissions were really arbitral tribunals, with the exception of the first, which might be better described as a commission of inquiry. The first failed in its object. The second located the St. Croix River to the satisfaction of both parties, subject to certain later readjustments of the boundary. The third failed to agree upon an award, but by the Convention of 1802 the British Government agreed to accept $2,664,000 in settlement of the claims in question. The fourth awarded $11,650,000 to the American claimants and $143,428 to the British claimants. Between 1794 and 1900 it has been estimated that there were no less than 400 international arbitrations, of which the most spectacular was doubtless the arbitration at Geneva, under the terms of the Treaty of Washington of 1871, of the claims of the United States against Great Britain for violations of neutral obligations during the American Civil War. Since 1900, recourse to arbitration has become even more frequent, until it is now one of the best established procedures for the settlement of international controversies.

In its simplest form, arbitration involves the negotiation by the parties to the dispute of a bilateral treaty, known as a *compromis*, in which they state clearly the question to be arbitrated, name the arbitrators or specify the method of their selection, and set forth the rules of procedure and the principles of law or equity to be applied. This arrangement is still used in

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3 See p. 171.
many instances, particularly for the settlement of financial claims. General rules of arbitral procedure have gradually been developed, however, which now render it unnecessary to specify in detail how a particular tribunal shall act. In 1875 the Institute of International Law drew up a code of arbitral procedure, and in 1889 the first Pan-American Conference prepared a complete scheme of arbitration, which was not adopted, however, at that time. When a dispute is not submitted to the judgment of a single arbitrator, such as the Sovereign of a third State, a tribunal is set up consisting usually of one or two nationals of each of the disputing States, plus one or more nationals of outside States. These may be named in the compromis or chosen by the other members of the tribunal. One of the outsiders usually acts as umpire. The tribunal—almost invariably consisting of an odd number of members—meets at some designated place, organizes itself, and proceeds to hear both sides of the controversy. Each party argues its case through attorneys, who present briefs in the form of cases and countercases. The exchange of written arguments may be followed by oral pleading and the summoning of witnesses, though there is no use of a jury. The tribunal then reaches its decision by a majority vote and submits a written statement of the award, with the reasons therefor, to the respective disputants. Minority opinions may be rendered by the members of the tribunal who differ with the majority, but they are without legal effect.

An arbitral award is binding upon the parties and constitutes a final settlement of the controversy. States sometimes expressly reserve in the compromis the right to demand a reconsideration on the basis of the discovery of some new fact of vital importance, unknown to the tribunal or to the party making the demand at the time of the award. Arbitral awards may also be rejected on certain other grounds. If the arbitrators exceed their authority under the compromis, the award is not binding. In 1827 the United States and Great Britain submitted to the arbitration of the King of the Netherlands the question of the location of the "highlands" mentioned in the Treaty of 1783 as marking the American-Canadian boundary between Maine and Quebec. The arbitrator drew a compromise line through a valley located between two sets of highlands, and both parties rejected the award on the ground that "highlands" could not be situated in a valley and that the arbitrator had exceeded his instructions. The subsequent discovery of fraud, bribery, or coercion in the course of an arbitration also invalidates the award, but such cases are rare. In general, arbitral awards are almost always accepted in good faith and loyally carried out, for States refrain from submitting questions to arbitration unless they are prepared to accept whatever settlement the tribunal may reach.

In the development of arbitral procedure, the next step beyond ad hoc
agreements providing for the submission of a particular dispute to a particular tribunal was the inclusion in other treaties of provisions for the submission to arbitration of disputes arising thereunder. In addition to this arrangement, States also began to negotiate general arbitration treaties, specifying that all future controversies of a designated character between the signatories would be submitted to arbitration. During the 19th century the number of general arbitration treaties and of arbitral clauses in other treaties steadily increased. Prior to 1855 only 6 such treaties were in operation. Thirty were negotiated between 1865 and 1894; 50 in the ensuing decade, and 123 between 1905 and 1914. Such treaties provide for what is known as "compulsory," or "obligatory," arbitration. These adjectives are somewhat misleading, since the treaties referred to merely constitute a voluntary pledge that the parties will in future submit to arbitration certain specified types of disputes. They frequently contain such broad qualifications and exceptions as to leave the parties almost complete liberty of action with regard to any particular controversy. Many pre-1914 general arbitration treaties, modeled after the Anglo-French Treaty of October 14, 1903, specified that all cases should be excluded from their operation which involved "national honor, independence, vital interests, or the interests of third parties." "These phrases are vague and indefinite and lend themselves to the purposes of any statesman who may desire to proceed to extremities. An interest becomes vital when a government chooses to consider it as such, and there is no fixed criterion of 'national honor.'" 4 Prior to 1917 thirty-six bilateral treaties had been signed providing for the submission to arbitration of any dispute whatever between the parties, without qualification. The first of these was the Treaty of May 28, 1902, between Argentina and Chile. Nineteen other treaties provided for the arbitration of any dispute not involving constitutional questions. But no general treaty of this kind had been entered into between any two of the Great Powers. Projects of general compulsory arbitration treaties were defeated at both the first and second Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes bound the parties to resort to arbitration only "in so far as circumstances permit" (Article 38, Convention of October 18, 1907).

Despite American championship of arbitration, the actual practice of the United States has been measurably behind that of other Powers. This has been due in part to the divergent attitudes of successive administrations and in part to the opposition of the Senate. The American Government has arbitrated numerous controversies, particularly with Great Britain, through

ad hoc compromis agreements. It has likewise included arbitration clauses in numerous other treaties but has not always availed itself of the opportunities provided in this fashion. Article 21 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico of February 2, 1848, for example, specified that the parties would "consider" the arbitration of all future difficulties not settled by diplomacy; but when Mexico in 1916 proposed the arbitration of current controversies between the two Governments, the United States declined the suggestion and instead resorted to reprisals by capturing and occupying Veracruz. Again, in 1927, when the dispute over the alleged confiscatory effects of Mexico's land and oil laws became acute, a widespread popular demand for arbitration appeared in the United States and even won the support of the Senate, but the Administration declined to resort to this mode of settlement. The United States proposed arbitration of the controversies of 1938 arising out of Mexican expropriation of American oil properties, but Mexico declined. Arbitrators usually apply existing laws. When one of the parties to a dispute challenges the justice of established law, arbitration offers little promise of a settlement.

As for general treaties providing for "compulsory" arbitration, so many obstacles have been encountered that the United States has long been in the rear of the procession of States entering into arrangements of this kind. In 1896, following the successful arbitration of the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, the British Government proposed to the United States a general treaty providing for obligatory arbitration. Secretary of State Olney, who insisted that arbitration should be made "automatic," was even more enthusiastic than Lord Salisbury; and on January 11, 1897, a treaty was signed which went far in the direction of such an arrangement. The Senate, however, rejected the treaty, and nothing came of the proposal at the moment. The American delegates to the first Hague Conference of 1899 were instructed to champion arbitration and to work for the establishment of an international court of justice; but anything in the nature of compulsory arbitration was ruled out by the Conference. Following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and the Anglo-French Arbitration Treaty of 1903, the United States signed a number of general treaties for the obligatory arbitration of questions of a legal nature, which, with the exception of controversies involving national honor, independence, vital interests, or the interests of third States, were to be submitted to the Hague Permanent "Court" of Arbitration. Here, as in all such treaties, it was of course contemplated that each compromis for the submission of a particular dispute to arbitration would be, not a formal treaty requiring ratification, but merely an administrative agreement under the terms of the general treaty. But the Senate insisted that each compromis must be expressly ap-
proved by it as a “treaty” before the arbitration could proceed. President Roosevelt declared that this was “mere nonsense” which made the general treaties “shams.” The Administration therefore withdrew the treaties from Senate consideration and abandoned the whole enterprise. In Europe the formulation of a *compromis* under general arbitration treaties has always been regarded as a merely procedural matter, for unless it is so regarded there is no value in the general treaties.

In 1908, Secretary of State Root revived the negotiations and concluded some 25 treaties containing the provisions demanded by the Senate. In fact, as John Bassett Moore pointed out, the treaties represented a step backward in one sense, since, prior to 1908, pecuniary claims had often been arbitrated without concluding a formal treaty with the foreign government, whereas under the new arrangement a treaty had to be concluded for each arbitration. This feature, added to the exceptions of independence, national honor, and vital interests, made the treaties little more than meaningless gestures. In 1911-12, another group of general arbitration treaties was negotiated by President Taft and Secretary of State Knox. They abandoned the exceptions of vital interests and national honor and pledged the parties to arbitrate all differences “which are justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law and equity.” These treaties provided for a joint high commission of inquiry to determine whether a particular controversy was “justiciable.” The Senate objected to this arrangement, struck it out, and inserted numerous reservations prohibiting the arbitration of a whole series of cases—with the result that President Taft declared of the treaties, after the Senate had finished with them, that “their own father would not recognize them.” In disgust, he dropped the whole project. Except for the Bryan conciliation treaties, nothing more was done by the United States, prior to the outbreak of World War I, in the direction of perfecting international machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes.

The post-Versailles arbitration treaties of the United States are for the most part based upon the Treaty of 1928 with France. They omit the exceptions of national honor and vital interests but contain exceptions of cases within the domestic jurisdiction of the parties, involving the interests of third parties, depending upon or involving “the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning domestic questions, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine,” or involving the observance of obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations. Each *compromis*, moreover, must take the form of a separate treaty which must be submitted to the

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5 See his *Principles of American Diplomacy*, p. 331, and *International Law and Some Current Illusions*, p. 86.
THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE

Senate. The exceptions are almost as flexible as those in the prewar treaties. In other words, the United States in its general arbitration treaties has said no more than that it will enter into special treaties for the arbitration of particular disputes if it regards them as suitable for arbitration, i.e., not falling within the exceptions, and if the Senate, in its wisdom, sees fit to approve ratification of such special treaties. The American Government is obviously not prepared to commit itself to arbitrate particular controversies automatically, unless the language employed is so vague and flexible that loopholes can readily be discovered through which disputes can be excluded from the operation of the general treaties if considerations of political expediency dictate such action. Though many other States have entered into general arbitration treaties which really pledge them to arbitrate certain types of disputes, the United States has reserved its liberty of action to such a degree that its general arbitration treaties are little more than empty words.

The most important step thus far taken toward the institutionalization of arbitration was the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by the first Hague Conference of 1899. This agency is neither “permanent” nor a “court,” for its members are not required to reside and work at The Hague, nor do they collectively constitute a judicial body. Its name is due to the confusion between arbitration and adjudication which prevailed at the time of its establishment. It came into being through the signature and ratification by a large number of States of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. This multilateral engagement required each of the signatory Powers to designate for a term of six years “four persons of known competency in questions of international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties of arbitrators.” The list of arbitrators so compiled is kept at the international bureau of the “Court” at The Hague as a panel from which States may pick an arbitral tribunal for the settlement of particular controversies. A new tribunal is picked for each dispute by means of a compromís between the parties. Only the panel is permanent. Resort to this procedure is entirely optional and voluntary. At the second Hague Conference of 1907, it was provided that, of the two arbitrators appointed by each party, “only one can be its national, or chosen from among the persons selected by it as members of the Permanent Court.” This ensures a majority of neutral members on each tribunal.

This institution is nothing more than a list of arbitrators and a secretariat. It has doubtless received more attention than its practical importance warrants. It did, nevertheless, stimulate general interest in arbitration; and it has performed a useful, if limited, function in disposing satisfactorily of a number of disputes submitted to it. Between 1903, when the United States and Mexico established the first tribunal to deal with the “Pious Funds”
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case, and 1914, fifteen cases had been arbitrated in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Convention. These included international claims against Venezuela, the right of the dhows of Muscat to fly the French flag in the face of British objections, the Norway-Sweden maritime-boundary dispute, the Anglo-American North Atlantic fisheries controversy, a Dutch-Portuguese boundary dispute on the Island of Timor, the Franco-German dispute over the Casablanca deserters, two Franco-Italian disputes, a Russo-Turkish dispute, and other cases of lesser importance. Most of these disputes were of little political significance, though arbitration achieved a settlement where diplomacy had failed. After 1922, most of the cases which would have been arbitrated in this fashion were adjudicated by the World Court. From the record of the years, as well as from the logic of arbitral procedure itself, it is clear that arbitration, taken by itself, is no substitute for war but merely a convenient device for settling certain types of controversies with regard to which the parties are willing to accept the decision of an impartial third party. The international controversies which lead to war are precisely those involving questions which States are unwilling to submit to arbitration or to adjudication or, for that matter, to any form of pacific settlement which obliges the contestants in advance to subordinate their special and exclusive interests to the will of impartial international agencies.

Recent “arbitrations” imposed by Fascist Powers on weak neighbors scarcely deserve to be regarded as falling within the usual meaning of the term. Thus Germany and Italy “arbitrated” the boundary dispute between Hungary and truncated Czechoslovakia and handed down an “award” from Vienna on November 2, 1938, by which Budapest was given a generous slice of Slovakia and the lowlands of Ruthenia. In similar fashion, Ribbentrop and Ciano “mediated” in the dispute between Hungary and Rumania over Transylvania and on August 30, 1940, “pronounced an arbitral sentence” whereby Hungary was given the northeastern half of Transylvania and the Axis “guaranteed” the remnant of Rumania. In the first case, Germany occupied what was left of Czechoslovakia within five months. In the second case, Germany occupied what was left of Rumania within five weeks. In both cases the alleged “arbitration” was not voluntary, not by judges chosen by the disputants, and not on the basis of respect for law. Such “arbitrations,” however, promise to become more and more frequent in an epoch of undiluted power politics.

4. INTERNATIONAL COURTS

In concerning the office of an arbiter, we must consider whether he be elected into the place of a judge, or with some laxer power, which
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Seneca speaks of as the proper power of an arbiter: “The judge is limited by rules of law: the umpire is left quite free, and can soften law and justice by kindness and mercy.” So Aristotle says, “that a fair man will rather go to an arbiter than to a judge, because the arbiter looks to equity, the judge to law.”—Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis.

If it be true, as seems likely, that arbitration in the future will not progress much beyond its present status, the cause is to be found both in the unwillingness of States to submit politically important disputes to arbitral tribunals and in the fact that disputes which are regarded as suitable for such treatment are increasingly settled by adjudication rather than by arbitration. The two procedures have in the past been much confused. But it is now permissible, and indeed essential for clarity of thought, to distinguish sharply between them. Arbitration and adjudication are both modes of settlement whereby disputing States voluntarily submit their differences to an impartial outside agency. In both cases the parties agree in advance to abide by the award or decision. But in arbitration, even under The Hague procedure, the agency of settlement is an ad hoc tribunal specifically chosen by the parties for the purpose of dealing with a single controversy. The tribunal gathers evidence, hears arguments, and makes an award on the basis of respect for international law, taking into account such extralegal and political considerations as the arbitrators may think useful to achieve a settlement. In true adjudication, on the other hand, the agency of settlement is a permanent and continuous judicial body, not chosen by the parties but existing independently of them, and not weighing considerations of equity or politics but applying quite literally to the cases before it the established principles of international law. A true court proceeds from case to case, builds up precedents, and gradually creates a consistent body of case law. Arbitral tribunals, lacking continuity and corporate existence, are unable to act in this fashion.

The adjudication of international disputes is obviously impossible without the prior creation of a permanent international court to which they may be submitted. Numerous unofficial proposals were put forward in various States during the 19th century for the creation of an international judicial tribunal. But apparently insuperable obstacles stood in the way of the fulfillment of the vision. The principle of State equality seemed to require that all States be represented on any world court—an arrangement which would require a court of impossible size. Regional courts would have only regional utility. There were disputes, moreover, arising from differing national interpretations of certain moot points of international law. What legal principles should such a court apply? How were cases to be brought before it if it were
created? What authority, if any, would such a body have to enforce its decisions?

These problems were discussed at the first Hague Conference, but without result. The Permanent Court of Arbitration there established was a court in nothing but name. They were again discussed, more fruitfully but again unsuccessfully in the final event, at the second Hague Conference of 1907. Elihu Root, Secretary of State of the United States, instructed the American delegates to work for the “development of the Hague tribunal into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility.” This proposal met with the support of the British and Russian delegates, who likewise presented projects for a world court. A plan was drawn up for the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice which should be a true judicial agency sitting permanently at The Hague. Unfortunately, however, no agreement could be reached regarding the number of the judges and the method of their selection. For all the 44 participating States to be “represented” on the court was out of the question, and the minor Powers were unwilling to establish a court which might be dominated by the Great Powers. The whole scheme therefore failed, the Conference recommending the adoption of the plan when an acceptable method of selecting the judges could be devised. A similar fate overtook the project of an international prize court, which was also discussed at the second Hague Conference. An agreement was reached to set up a court to pass upon the legality of captures in naval war. The tribunal was to consist of 15 judges, the eight Great Powers having permanent appointees on the bench and the lesser Powers sharing the remaining seats by a process of rotation. The court was to hear appeals from national prize courts, both States and individuals having a right of recourse to it. The convention for its creation was signed by 33 States, but difficulties developed over the fact that much of the international law of prize is unsettled. The British Government rejected the plan for this reason, and the lesser naval Powers and the land Powers accordingly suspended further action. The London Naval Conference of 1908-09 sought to codify the law of prize and drew up the Declaration of London. But this in turn was rejected by the House of Lords and failed of ratification. Both these efforts to establish an international court thus failed, in one instance because of disagreement as to the method of choosing judges, in the other because of disagreement over the international law to be applied.

The first genuine international court to be fully established on a working basis was the creation of the United States and five Republics of Central
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America. Under the inspiration of the American State Department, the Central American Peace Conference of 1907 set up the Central American Court of Justice, consisting of five judges, one each for Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. The signatory States agreed to submit all questions to it for decision, without qualifications or reservations, unless they could be settled by negotiations. Its jurisdiction was thus "compulsory." This remarkable international agency had an even wider jurisdiction than the Supreme Court of the United States in that private citizens might bring suits against States before it. It was established for a 10-year period and went out of existence in 1917, after a decade of useful service, under somewhat peculiar circumstances. Costa Rica and El Salvador had brought suit against Nicaragua, whose puppet Government, supported by American marines, had negotiated the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1916 with the United States. By this agreement the "Colossus of the North" was given canal rights along the San Juan River, which divides Nicaragua from Costa Rica, and also the right of fortifying the Gulf of Fonseca, which commands the Pacific coast not only of Nicaragua, but also of El Salvador and Honduras. The other States alleged that Nicaragua was legally incompetent to conclude such a treaty without their consent, since it affected their rights adversely and Nicaragua could not lawfully cede away what she did not possess. The Court accepted this view and decided the suit against Nicaragua. The latter, however, with the tacit approval of the State Department at Washington, refused to abide by the decision. The other States then took the entirely reasonable view that there was nothing to be gained by maintaining a court if its members were free to ignore its judgments. They accordingly declined to renew the arrangement. What Washington had created it likewise destroyed, and this fruitful experiment thus suffered an untimely demise. The Conference on Central American Affairs at Washington in 1923 put into effect a new scheme; but this is modeled after the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration and is not a true court in any sense.

Not until the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 was it possible to create a permanent international judicial agency of wide jurisdiction. President Wilson regarded the creation of a World Court as a necessary feature of the peace settlement. Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations entrusted to the Council of the League the task of formulating and submitting to its members plans for the establishment of a "Permanent Court of International Justice." The Court was to be competent to hear and determine any dispute submitted to it by the parties and to give advisory opinions upon any question referred to it by the Council or Assembly of the League. In accordance with this provision, the Council in 1920 appointed a Commission of Jurists, upon which Elihu Root served for the United States. The Commis-
sion prepared a "Statute," or constitution, of the proposed Court, which was submitted first to the Council and then by the Council to the Assembly and the members of the League. The Statute became effective, not through any action of the Council or Assembly, but through its ratification on the part of the member States. The first panel of judges was elected in September of 1921. On February 15, 1922, the judges convened at The Hague, and the ceremonies of the official establishment of the Court were performed in the Great Hall of Justice of the Peace Palace, which had been erected by Andrew Carnegie for the Hague tribunal of arbitration created 23 years before. The same strange irony which made President Wilson a prophet without honor in his own land made the United States, long an ardent proponent of international adjudication, one of the few States not members of the Court.6

The thorny problem of the selection of judges was ingeniously solved in the Statute. Originally, 11 judges and 4 deputy judges were provided for; but the amendments of 1930 increased the number of judges to 15, and in February, 1936, the deputy judgships were abolished. All had nine-year terms. Candidates for these positions were nominated by the national groups of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, each group having the right to name 4 candidates, only 2 of whom might be of its own nationality. The Secretary-General of the League prepared an alphabetical list of the persons so nominated and transmitted it to the Council and Assembly of the League. These bodies, each voting independently, elected the judges by majority vote. In the event of disagreement, recourse was had to a conference of six members, three from the Council and three from the Assembly, for the purpose of submitting to their respective bodies one name for each vacant seat. If it was still impossible to reach an agreement, the judges already chosen filled vacancies from the candidates who had been voted for in the Assembly or in the Council. Large and small States alike thus had an equal voice in the selection of judges, and the dilemma of 1907 was resolved without creating a court of unwieldy size. At the first election of September, 1921, 89 candidates were nominated, and all places were filled by majority vote of the Council and Assembly after three days of balloting. At the second election (1930), 60 candidates were nominated. The Council and Assembly cast 11 ballots for judges and 6 ballots for deputy judges before an agreement was reached.7

6 See Chap. XI, Section 1.
7 Article 9 of the Statute provided, "At every election, the electors shall bear in mind that not only should all the persons appointed as members of the Court possess the qualifications required, but the whole body also should represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world." Professor Manley O. Hudson
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The equally difficult question of the jurisdiction of the Court was solved with equal ingenuity. The Commission of Jurists which drafted the Statute recommended compulsory or obligatory jurisdiction with respect to the disputes mentioned in Article 13 of the League Covenant and Article 36 of the Statute, i.e., disputes as to (1) the interpretation of a treaty; (2) any question of international law; (3) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; and (4) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. This arrangement was rejected by the Council and the Assembly on the ground that Article 14 of the Covenant contemplated a court with voluntary jurisdiction. In general, the Court had jurisdiction only over such disputes as member States were willing to submit to it. Article 36 of the Statute, however, was transformed into an "optional clause" which member States might accept or reject as they wished. Those accepting it recognized the jurisdiction of the Court to be compulsory, without special agreement, for the four categories of disputes mentioned, provided that both parties to the dispute had adhered to the "optional clause." In other words, they agreed in advance to submit all disputes in these categories to the Court for settlement. States not accepting the clause remained free to submit, or refuse to submit, such disputes to the Court as they chose. Almost 50 States adhered to Article 36 of the Statute for varying terms of years.

The Permanent Court of International Justice represented the most important and successful effort thus far made to establish an international judicial tribunal for the adjudication of controversies between States. Its record during the 17 years of its existence revealed it to be a body of very great value, both as a tribunal to render judgments between litigating States and as an agency to advise the Council of the League on the legal aspects of international problems. The Court rendered in all 32 judgments, 200 orders, and 27 advisory opinions. All were accepted in good faith, and only rarely, as in the Austro-German customs union opinion of September 5, 1931, were its members criticized for placing their national prejudices above the impartial logic of the law. It built up a body of legal precedents of great utility for the solution of future international cases of a justiciable character. If it was not a panacea for war or a means of settling all international disputes—and assuredly it was neither—the cause lay in the fact

(United States) was a judge of the Court at the time of the outbreak of World War II. John Bassett Moore, distinguished American international jurist who died Nov. 13, 1947, at the age of eighty-six, was one of the original judges. Charles Evans Hughes and Frank B. Kellogg also served on the Court.

8 See Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942. See also the same writer's annual surveys of the Court's work, beginning in 1923, in the American Journal of International Law.
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that States do not regard all disputes as justiciable and that the realm of international law is not coterminous with the realm of international politics.

With the collapse of the League in World War II, the Permanent Court of International Justice ceased to function. It came to a formal end with a resolution of the last Assembly of the League in April, 1946. Meanwhile, however, a new World Court emerged phoenixlike from the ashes of the old under the name of the “International Court of Justice.” The change of nomenclature perhaps suggests, albeit unintentionally, that “justice” is seldom “international” and that courts among nations are peculiarly impermanent. The new body was described as one of “the principal organs of the United Nations” (Article 7 of Charter), coordinate in prestige and authority with the General Assembly and Security Council. On invitation of the Powers sponsoring the San Francisco Conference, an international Committee of Jurists met in Washington in April, 1945, under the chairmanship of Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser of the State Department. Its Draft Statute and Report became the basis of the new Statute of the new Court approved at San Francisco.

In reality the “new” tribunal was the old one slightly revised. The provisions of its Statute, even as to the numbering of the articles, were almost identical with the arrangements outlined above. As before, 15 judges are nominated by the groups of the Hague tribunal and elected for nine-year terms by majority vote of the Assembly and Council—one-third of the first panel, however, retiring every three years.9 The Statute is part of the U.N. Charter and may be amended in the same fashion. As before, “only States

9 For the first election (February 6-9, 1946), no less than 76 candidates were nominated. Among the 15 judges chosen after four ballots, a drawing of lots determined fixed terms as follows:

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<tr>
<th>9-year term</th>
<th>6-year term</th>
<th>3-year term</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sir A. D. McNair (United Kingdom)</td>
<td>G. H. Hackworth (United States)</td>
<td>John M. Read (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jules Basdevant (France)</td>
<td>Sergei B. Krylov (Soviet Union)</td>
<td>Milovan Zoricitch (Yugoslavia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Philadelphi de Barros Azevedo (Brazil)</td>
<td>Fehelo Alfaro (Mexico)</td>
<td>Bohdan Winiarski (Poland)</td>
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<td>Alejandro Alvarez (Chile)</td>
<td>Helge Klaestad (Norway)</td>
<td>Abdel Hamid Badawi (Egypt)</td>
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<td>Jose G. Guerrero (El Salvador)</td>
<td>Charles de Visscher (Belgium)</td>
<td>Hsu Mo (China)</td>
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In future all judges will be named for a full nine-year term. They do not, of course, represent their countries but act as genuinely international officials. The General Assembly fixed annual salaries at 54,000 Dutch florins, plus a 15,000-florin allowance for the President and 10,000 florins for the Vice-President.
may be parties in cases before the Court” (Article 34). Advisory opinions may be asked not only by the Assembly and the Council but by the ILO, the Economic and Social Council, UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are both members of the new Court. Article 36 remains the “optional clause” by which States may accept “compulsory” or “automatic” jurisdiction. In adhering to it, however, the U.S.A.—ungraciously and (in the opinion of some jurists) dangerously—asserted that it should not apply to (1) disputes entrusted for settlement to other tribunals; (2) “disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the U.S.A., as determined by the U.S.A.”; and (3) disputes under multilateral treaties, unless all signatories are parties to the case or the U.S.A. “specially agrees to jurisdiction.”

The International Court of Justice met for the first time on April 3, 1946, at The Hague. Judge Guerrero was elected President and Judge Basdevant Vice-President, and Edvard Hambro was chosen as Registrar. At the Peace Palace on April 18 a public inaugural meeting took place. Revised rules of procedure were adopted. The budget of the Court (part of the U.N. budget) was $477,208 for 1946 and $638,412 for 1947, the U.N. paying the Carnegie Foundation at The Hague 48,000 florins a year for the use by the Court of chambers in the Peace Palace. By the close of 1947 no requests for advisory opinions had been made. Despite British intimations of willingness to adjudicate an old controversy with Guatemala over the borders of British Honduras, only one actual case had been submitted: Britain’s claims against Albania arising out of the blowing up in Corfu Channel of two destroyers on October 22, 1946, with the loss of 44 lives, allegedly as a result of mines laid by, or with the knowledge of, Albanian authorities. After long and inconclusive wrangling, featured by a Soviet veto of a finding of guilt against Albania, the U.N. Security Council proposed recourse to the Court on April 9, 1947. On May 3, 1947, Britain finally asked the Court for a judgment, though apparently without consulting Albania first, as the rules require. Albania, though not a member of the Court, agreed to the proceedings as an evidence of good will. That its first case should be supercharged with power politics was scarcely a hopeful omen for the future utility of the new tribunal.

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10 The U.S. Declaration of August 14, 1946, Department of State Bulletin, 1946, p. 452. Senators Austin, Connally, and Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles favored the qualifications noted above. Interpreted broadly, they virtually leave the U.S.A. free to decline to go before the Court, thus establishing an ironic continuity with earlier American policies toward arbitration and adjudication.
The years between 1919 and 1939 were marked by the conclusion of more international agreements for the pacific settlement of international disputes than were negotiated during many decades prior to World War I. Between November 11, 1918, and November 11, 1928, no less than 130 treaties of investigation, conciliation, arbitration, or adjudication were signed, exclusive of those between the U.S.S.R. and its neighbors. The great majority of these engagements were signed after 1924 and were eloquent testimony to the world-wide yearning for peace and security. The texts of these agreements fill almost 1,000 pages of a good-sized book.\textsuperscript{11}

Regional arrangements in the Western Hemisphere paralleled these more general engagements. At the Fifth Pan-American Conference, held in 1923 at Santiago, Chile, the Gondra “Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between American States” was signed. It authorized submission of all controversies to \textit{ad hoc} Commissions of Inquiry and set up two permanent diplomatic committees to initiate pacific settlement. On January 5, 1929, at the Pan-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration in Washington, a General Convention on Inter-American Conciliation was signed, authorizing the committees to exercise conciliatory functions and permitting the Commissions to attempt conciliation as well as investigation. A supplementary General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration (1929) outlined arbitral procedure whereby the signatories would submit “juridical” questions to arbitration by special treaty, subject to reservations of questions affecting domestic jurisdiction and third States. A Protocol of Progressive Arbitration sought to encourage the signatories to withdraw numerous other exceptions and reservations. The Argentine Anti-War Pact of October 10, 1933 (the Saavedra Lamas Treaty), condemned wars of aggression, pledged nonrecognition of territorial arrangements effected by nonpacific means, and contemplated inter-American cooperation to preserve neutrality. This complex system of conciliation and \textit{ad hoc} arbitration, buttressed by numerous bilateral agreements, left much to be desired.

The lacunae were in part remedied at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, originally proposed and opened in person by President Roosevelt at Buenos Aires on December 1, 1936. Secretary Hull attended throughout the sessions, which were presided over by Señor Saavedra Lamas. The “Good Neighbor” policy of the United States made possible a greater degree of good will and mutual understanding than had hitherto been achieved in Pan-American gatherings. Prior to adjournment on December 23, delegates from all the American Republics signed no less than 69 conventions, resolutions, and recommendations providing for more

\textsuperscript{11} See Max Habicht’s excellent compilation and analysis of \textit{Post-war Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes}, 1931, 1,103 pages.
intimate economic and cultural relations. A "Collective Security" Convention pledged consultation in the event of any war or threat of war, in the Americas or elsewhere, with the object of achieving a common policy for the preservation of peace. A "Declaration of Solidarity" condemned territorial conquest, intervention, and forcible efforts to collect pecuniary claims and provided for consultation in the event of "any act of an unfriendly nature" toward any of the American Republics—thus, in principle, making the Monroe Doctrine a multilateral rather than a unilateral statement of policy. A separate Protocol condemned all acts of intervention and provided for consultation in the event of such acts. A Neutrality Convention pledged discussion in the event of any conflict between the signatories in order to promote "a common and solidary attitude" among them as neutrals.

These instruments furthered friendship but did not create any new peace machinery or pledge the parties to anything beyond consultation and abstract condemnation of war, conquest, and intervention. The Neutrality Convention was limited to American wars. The arms and loans embargoes against belligerents which the signatories agreed to "consider" were to be subject to domestic legislation and the League Covenant. Argentina made a further reservation exempting foodstuffs and civilian raw materials from embargo and reserving freedom of action even with regard to arms exports in wars of aggression. With the exception of Brazil, all the larger Latin-American States were members of the League and were unprepared to follow the United States in embargoing impartially all belligerents in future wars with no distinction between aggressors and victims of aggression. Proposals for an "American League of Nations" were without immediate result. Yet the way was paved at Buenos Aires for a large measure of inter-American collaboration, which could reasonably be expected to promote the pacific settlement of controversies in the Western Hemisphere.

The verdict of time on this amazing proliferation of procedures for pacific settlement was unkind. Many peace seekers supposed that peace could be had cheaply, with no assumption of risks or responsibilities for the organization and enforcement of peace, simply by multiplying agreements and agencies for the settlement of disputes. The diplomats of appeasement in the Western democracies supposed that peace could be had by using these procedures to grant the demands of the new Caesars. Both suppositions were tragically mistaken. By 1937 the League of Nations had been reduced to a hypocritical farce and the World Court to a panel of almost idle jurists, thanks to the policies of democratic governments which professed their championship of order and law in international relations. By 1939 all the procedures of pacific settlement among the Great Powers had become empty.
forms. By 1941 they had become a memory. Whether after World War II the new network of peace pacts, pledges, and solemn obligations to resort only to pacific modes of settlement would have a happier future was by no means certain in 1948.

Here, as elsewhere and ever, men have been deceived by words without content and by forms without substance. War is seldom the result of the lack of procedures to settle differences pacifically. Its roots lie far below this thin veneer of conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication which has been spread over the Western State System in its later days. The clashes of wills which lead to war revolve about goals and purposes and great dynamic forces driving States to action which are not to be constrained within the confines of forms, written documents, and ingenious artifices. These goals, purposes, and forces (and the interests and values which lie behind them) are scarcely touched as yet by the new dispensation. The struggle for power proceeds along its accustomed channels, bending the new barriers to its ways or brushing them aside in the excitement and passion of great international crises. Until the fundamentals are altered, the new rules and principles of pacific settlement tend to resemble certain branches of classical economics in that they are addressed to hypothetical situations which never come to pass in the world of reality. The network of peace pledges prevented only such wars as would never have occurred and had no value in the great conflicts of interests and policies which were not “disputes” at all, justiciable or otherwise, but life-and-death combats for power and profits between the nation-states. Nevertheless, the threads of the net were spun. In the fabric lay the hope of an ordered and peaceful world. But the cloth was not cut to fit the wearer. The wearer refuses to don the garment permanently for his own protection, preferring to relapse into the traditional bloody rags and tatters of self-help, coercion, and war.

SUGGESTED READINGS

Fleming, Denna Frank: The United States and the World Court, New York, Doubleday, 1945.
THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE


CHAPTER VI

ADVENTURES IN WORLD ORDER

1. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: PLANS AND PRACTICES

And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain of the
Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and
shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it.
And many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the
mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will
teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths: for out of Zion
shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And
he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and
they shall beat their swords into plow-shares, and their spears into
pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war any more.—The Book of Isaiah, 2:2-4.

The development of international law, diplomatic practice, and pro-
cedures for the settlement of disputes has ever been stimulated by the
quest for a warless world. Of equal significance have been the prac-
tical exigencies of cooperation among States in dealing with common prob-
lems not always directly related to questions of war and peace. On the one
hand, pacifists and idealists have theorized about the law of nations, the
functions of diplomats, and the utility of arbitration and adjudication as a
means of promoting peace. On the other hand, the growth of commerce,
travel, and communication among States has obliged practical statesmen
to face new problems of common interest to all States and to devise agencies
for their solution. The forms which the members of the Western State System
have created to facilitate their dealings with one another all reflect these two
sources of inspiration: theory and practice, spirit and substance, ideal and
reality. (In international affairs, no less than in other human relations, the
patterns of social action which men devise to achieve their purposes embody
both Utopian aspirations and the concrete experience of many yesterdays.

Certain of the State Systems of the past developed the rudiments of inter-
national organization. The Amphictyonic Council and the various confedera-
tions of the Greek city-states were noteworthy prototypes. The State Systems
of ancient China and India also had approximations to leagues of nations
and other forms of institutionalized international cooperation. The World State of Rome and the medieval ideal of imperial unity both precluded the possibility of genuine international organization. Dante’s speculations on world organization were overshadowed by the imperial ideal. His contemporary, Pierre Dubois, to be sure, was more realistic. His *De recuperatione sanctae terrae*, published in 1305, was the first clear formulation of a plan for permanent interstate cooperation. He proposed a temporal union of the princes of Europe with a council and a court and cooperative action to rescue the Holy Land from the infidel. But it was not possible to envisage common agencies of cooperation among States until sovereign territorial units had emerged out of feudal confusion and built up a new system of independent political entities. Even after this development had taken place, the States of the Western State System were for centuries so exclusively occupied in struggling with one another for power and prestige that they had no common interests requiring institutionalized cooperation. The periodical wars to which this struggle gave rise, however, caused scholars and thinkers in many States to reflect upon the possibility of establishing international institutions to keep the peace. The result was the fabrication of a long series of theoretical and Utopian schemes to link together the States of the world into some kind of conference or league.

Two of these schemes appeared about the time that Hugo Grotius published his treatise on international law. An obscure monk, Emeric Crucé, issued *Le nouveau Cynée* in 1623. He contemplated the formation of a world union of States, including China, Persia, and the Indies, which should strive to promote freedom of trade among its members, foster the construction of interoceanic canals, and keep the peace through an elaborate structure of negotiation and arbitration, embodying a world assembly and a world court. The other scheme—the “Grand Design” of Henry IV—is described by the Duc de Sully in his memoirs and is attributed by him to the great French King who assumed the throne in 1593 and died by the dagger of Ravaillac in 1610. It was based upon the assumption that no State of Europe could permanently establish its ascendancy over the others and that all should therefore cooperate to keep the peace. This was to be achieved by dividing Europe into 15 Powers which would have nothing for which to envy one another. These States would form a general council modeled after the Amphictyonic Council of the Greeks. The council would consist of four commissioners for each of the Great Powers and three for each of the lesser ones, all to be chosen for a three-year term. This body of commissioners would discuss all problems and pacify all quarrels among the nations and would be supplemented by six regional councils, from whose decision appeal could be taken to the general council. The latter would have at its disposal an in-
international army and navy to enforce its decisions and keep the peace. Premiers Tardieu and Herriot of France made this same proposal for the League of Nations at the General Disarmament Conference of 1932. The scheme of King Henry was aimed primarily at reducing the power of the House of Hapsburg. The Tardieu proposal was aimed at preventing any forcible revision of the 1919 peace settlement by Germany, Austria, or Hungary. Both projects failed of adoption.

Toward the end of the 17th century the Quaker missionary, theologian, and colonizer, William Penn, propounded an even more ingenious, if less practicable, plan of international organization in his *Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (1693). He proposed a general diet, estates, or parliament of all European princes to meet periodically for the purpose of establishing rules of international law and settling international disputes. "If any of the sovereignties that constitute the imperial States shall refuse to submit their claim or pretensions to them, or to abide and perform the judgment thereof, and seek their remedy by arms, or delay their compliance beyond the time prefixed in their resolutions, all the other sovereignties, united as one strength, shall compel the submission and performance of the sentence, with damages to the suffering party, and charges to the sovereignties that obliged their submission." Since all war, argued Penn, is waged to keep, to recover, or to conquer territory, the imperial diet can keep the peace by adjusting territorial controversies. He suggested that representation and voting strength in the international parliament be based upon national wealth: 12 units for the Holy Roman Empire, 10 each for France and Spain, 8 for Italy, 6 for England, 3 for Portugal, 10 each for Turkey and Muscovy, etc. This scheme would have numerous advantages. Peace would be preserved, friendship among princes would be promoted, they would be enabled to marry for love instead of for reasons of State, and, not least important, "the reputation of Christianity will in some degree be recovered in the sight of infidels." This scheme, too, needless to say, failed to receive serious consideration from any of the governments of the day.

At the time of the Conference of Utrecht the learned Abbé Saint-Pierre published his *Project of Perpetual Peace*, which he communicated to the French Minister, Fleury. The statesman commented dryly: "You have forgotten an essential article, that of dispatching missionaries to touch the hearts of princes and to persuade them to enter into your views." The good Abbé proposed an alliance of all States which should guarantee the territory of all its members, suppress revolutions, and maintain monarchs on their thrones. The alliance would oppose by force of arms any Power which should refuse to give effect to its judgments or make treaties contrary to them. Utrecht was to be designated as the City of Peace. Each State would
maintain agents there who would constitute an assembly, authorized to keep
the peace and to enact, by majority vote, all laws necessary and proper to
give effect to its decisions and to achieve the objects of the alliance.

Jean Jacques Rousseau, vagabond philosopher of Geneva, used the Abbé’s
essay as the basis for his own interesting contribution to the literature of
international organization. In his *Extrait du projet de paix perpetuelle de M. l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre* (1761), he contended that the imperfections of
governments are due less to their constitutions than to their foreign relations.
The care which ought to be devoted to internal administration and security
is withheld owing to the need of external security. Men have prevented little
wars only to kindle greater ones, and the only solution is a union of nations
by which States, no less than individuals, are made subject to laws. The
balance of power is at best an uneasy and unstable equilibrium. Without a
community of interests among States, asserted Rousseau, there can be no
stability or lasting peace. All the Powers of Europe must therefore be
brought together in a solid confederation, with a common tribunal to pass
laws and regulations binding upon its members. The confederation must
have coercive power to enforce its decisions, and it must be able to prevent
members from seceding as soon as they imagine their particular interests
to be contrary to the general interest. Rousseau accordingly proposed an
international agreement of five articles for the purpose of achieving “A
Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe.” The first article would
establish a perpetual and irrevocable alliance, working through a permanent
diet or congress where all disputes would be settled by arbitration or judicial
pronouncement. The second would deal with membership, finances, and
officers. Each State would have one vote in the diet, the presidency of which
would be rotated, and each would contribute its share to the expenses. By
the third article, the federation would guarantee to all its members their
territorial integrity and present form of government. Article 4 specified
that any State breaking the treaty would be placed under the ban of Europe,
proscribed as a public enemy, and proceeded against in arms by all the
other members. By Article 5, the plenipotentiaries in the congress would
have power, by a three-quarters majority, to frame common rules for the
guidance of all.

In his *Principles of International Law* (1786-89) Jeremy Bentham fol-
lowed in Rousseau’s footsteps. He argued that war, which he defined as
“mischief on the greatest scale,” can be prevented by defensive alliances,
general guarantees, disarmament, and the abandonment of colonial im-
perialism. By agreement the forces of the several nations comprising the
European System are to be reduced and fixed and the distant dependencies
of each State are to be emancipated. Secret diplomacy and the deeper causes
of war must be eliminated, and conditions must be created appropriate to
the establishment of a tribunal of peace with power to enforce its decisions
on refractory States. Tariff barriers, bounties, and colonies must alike be
abolished. "Mark well the contrast," declared Bentham. "All trade is in its
essence advantageous—even to that party to whom it is least so. All war
is in its essence ruinous; and yet the great employments of government are
to treasure up occasions for war, and to put fetters on trade." Unless gov-
ernments can be induced to desist from these activities, there can be no
hope of peace.

Not least in the list of contributors to the Utopias of international orga-
nization was the celibate philosopher of Koenigsberg, Immanuel Kant. In
1795 he published his essay Zum ewigen Frieden ("Toward Eternal Peace")
which begins, in good Kantian fashion, with the postulate that the highest
of all practical problems for the human race is the establishment of a civil
society administering right according to law, i.e., the reconciliation of power
and liberty. The external relations of States must be regulated through an
international federation. "Every State, even the smallest, may thus rely for
its safety and its rights, not on its own power, nor on its own judgment of
right, but only on this foedus amphictionium—on the combined power of
this league of states, and on the decision of the common will according to
laws." Man is civilized but not yet moralized. No true or lasting league of
nations is possible without a long process of internal improvement within
States to create the proper moral atmosphere. On the basis of these observa-
tions, Kant drew up articles of perpetual peace among States. His scheme
rested upon the maintenance of the independence of all States, the accept-
ance of the principle of nonintervention, and the gradual abolition of
standing armies. His articles provided for republican constitutions for all
States, world citizenship, and a federation of free States for the protection
of international rights. At the close of his Rechtslehre, Kant likewise dwelt
on the necessity of a universal union of States, voluntary in character,
through which the idea of public rights among nations might become real
and differences might be settled by civil process instead of by war.

Since the beginning of the 19th century the number of theoretical plans
of international organization has multiplied manyfold. If the recent thinkers
who have formulated such programs have been less distinguished than their
more famous predecessors, they have been no less earnest and ingenious in
the presentation of their proposals. Every general war has given rise to a
rich crop of plans for perpetual peace. Those referred to above were in-
spired, successively, by the Wars of Religion, the conflicts between Louis XIV
and his neighbors, the Seven Years' War, and the American and French
Revolutionary Wars. The Napoleonic Wars and World War I led to such
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A profuse output of schemes to keep the peace that the mere enumeration of them would require many pages. It is significant that all these schemes were directed toward the prevention of war. All of them embodied some form of international league, confederation, or alliance, operating through a representative body of delegates for the discussion of international problems and the settlement of international disputes. Almost all of them envisaged the application of international coercion against peacebreaking States. And it is equally significant that “practical” statesmen and governments, traditionally engaged in the pursuit of exclusively national objects, were uniformly uninterested in such schemes except in situations where tangible political interests could be served by organizing international support behind them.

Prior to 1815 international organization was a vision of dreamers rather than a concern of statesmen. Only when the existing European System had been all but demolished by the impact of revolutionary and Napoleonic France did States perceive the necessity of permanent institutions of cooperation to avert a recurrence of catastrophe. The victors of Leipzig and Waterloo represented triumphant reaction. They were bent upon restoring what had been destroyed and determined to preserve what had been restored. To achieve these objects they banded themselves together into a rudimentary type of organization to maintain the status quo, keep the peace, and suppress revolution wherever it might raise its head. Under the provisions of the final act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, and of the second Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815, Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia established the Quadruple Alliance, which became the Quintuple Alliance in 1818 through the admission of a chastened and reactionary France. For the first time, all the Great Powers of Europe had joined forces to serve their common interests. The organization which they created functioned through periodical congresses. At the insistence of Tsar Alexander I the structure was crowned by the Holy Alliance agreement of September 26, 1815, among Alexander, Francis of Austria, and Frederick William of Prussia. In this romantic and religious document the three Sovereigns, “in the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity,” pledged themselves “to take for their sole guide the precepts of that holy religion, namely, the precepts of justice, Christian charity, and peace,” to “remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity,” to consider themselves all as “members of one and the same Christian nation,” and to receive “with equal ardor and affection into this holy alliance” all other Powers subscribing to its sacred principles.

Behind this façade of mysticism there existed here the first genuine approximation to international organization in the history of the Western State System. The organization was partial, incomplete, fragmentary, and lacking
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in permanent agencies—legislative, executive, or judicial. Its purposes were reactionary and ran counter to the great dynamic forces of bourgeois nationalism and constitutionalism which were destined to undo its work and bring it to ruin. Nevertheless, it was a true international organization, existing in fact and not merely in the minds of Utopian theorists, and it did function successfully for a time under the leadership of Metternich, its guiding genius. Congresses were summoned at intervals to devise means of keeping the peace and suppressing revolution. At Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle, European political problems were discussed, and rules of diplomatic precedence and procedure were drawn up. At Troppau, in 1820, Metternich proposed international intervention to put down the revolts which had broken out in Naples and Spain. At Laibach, in 1821, Austria was granted a mandate by the Powers to intervene in Italy. With its action thus sanctioned by international authority, the Austrian Government sent troops to restore monarchical absolutism in Naples and Piedmont. At Verona, in 1823, France was similarly given a mandate to suppress the constitutional movement in Spain. Britain withdrew from the organization, however, and joined the U.S.A. in opposing any extension of its activities to the Western Hemisphere. The organization failed to act in the Greek insurrection of 1821 and had become moribund by the time of the French and Belgian Revolutions of 1830. The Revolutions of 1848 led to its final collapse and disappearance.

If any "lesson" is to be drawn from this experiment, it is that the success of such an organization is determined by the extent to which its members feel themselves bound together by common purposes which can best be served by cooperative action. In the absence of common purposes and a disposition to cooperate, the organization can achieve nothing. Its efficacy, within these limits, depends upon the degree to which cooperative action is definitely institutionalized through permanent central agencies and upon the provisions made for the peaceful and orderly modification of the status quo. These are the criteria which must be applied to the evaluation of all international organization. The "Holy Alliance," when tested by these criteria, was found wanting and came to a timely end.

The disappearance of the Holy Alliance was followed by the development of a habit of consultation among the Powers which came to be referred to as the "Concert of Europe." Here was no international organization, but merely a disposition on the part of States to confer with one another in international conferences at such times as their interests dictated. The Concert of Europe emerged out of the efforts of the Powers to deal with the "Eastern Question," and it functioned fairly successfully in supervising the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The independence of Greece was recognized by the Powers, acting jointly, in 1829. The Concert was dis-
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rupted by the Crimean War but was reconstituted at Paris in 1856 and at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The Powers likewise acted in concert in the recognition and neutralization of Belgium and in the partition of Africa and Asia among the great imperial States. But the conflicting interests and policies led to discord. In crises, when its services were most needed, it was nonexistent; for it had no permanent organs or procedures, and each State determined for itself, in each situation, whether it would cooperate or not. In 1870, when Count Beust of Austria failed in his efforts to arrange a conference to prevent the Franco-Prussian War, he exclaimed, “I cannot find Europe!” Whenever the exclusively national interests of the States of Europe reasserted themselves in the face of the general interests of all States, the Concert ceased to function. And yet it represented the only approximation to institutionalized cooperation among the Powers in dealing with questions of high politics during the whole period between the dissolution of the Holy Alliance and the outbreak of Armageddon in 1914.

If the members of the Western State System were not sufficiently bound together by their political interests to make possible the building of an enduring structure of international organization to serve these interests, they were nevertheless constrained by economic and social developments to cooperate closely with one another for the protection and promotion of interests of lesser importance. This cooperation assumed the form of the establishment of permanent international agencies of an administrative character, usually called “public international unions.” Problems of international communication were among the first to command the attention of governments. With the growth of trade and travel, the international regulation of waterways, railroads, telegraphy, and postal service became imperative. In 1856 a number of States established the bases of the European Commission of the Danube, composed of representatives of the members, for the purpose of facilitating and regulating traffic on the great waterway of southeastern Europe. The Commission was established by international agreement as a permanent administrative agency with authority to maintain and improve the navigability of the lower Danube, to fix, collect, and apportion tolls, to enforce navigation rules, and to license tugs, lighters, and pilots. On fundamental matters of principle, the Commission acted only by the unanimous consent of its members, but on administrative questions it acted by simple majority decisions. The organization has been modified by many subsequent agreements. The supplementary International Commission for the Danube, set up by the Treaty of Versailles, cooperated with the European Commission to improve transportation facilities. Many other commissions to deal in similar fashion with other waterways have been established from time to time. The Rhine River Commission, the Congo River
The International Commission for Air Navigation, set up in 1922, under the Air Convention of 1919, similarly functioned as an international agency for the regulation of aerial navigation.

Telegraphic communication across national frontiers likewise involves numerous problems which can be dealt with effectively only by international action. These problems were first handled through bilateral treaties between neighboring States. Austria and Prussia concluded the first of such treaties in 1850. France, Belgium, and Prussia followed suit. In 1852 most of the Continental States signed a multilateral convention to regulate telegraphic communication. In 1856, at an international conference at Paris at which 20 States were represented, the International Telegraphic Union was established as a permanent regulatory agency. A multilateral convention set forth the general principles of the new structure, and a règlement specified in some detail the administrative rules to be followed by the signatories and applied by the organization. A conference of diplomatic representatives was provided for to discuss common problems and amend the règlement by unanimous vote as necessity might require. A permanent administrative bureau was established at Bern, Switzerland, to gather and distribute information regarding telegraphic communication and to carry out the provisions of the agreement. In 1906, 29 States sent delegates to Berlin, where another convention and règlement were signed establishing the International Radiotelegraphic Union, consisting of a conference of plenipotentiaries to revise the convention, an administrative conference to deal with modifications of the règlement, and a bureau which is identical with that of the Telegraphic Union. The second conference of this organization was held in London in 1912 and, in view of the greatest of all sea disasters in peacetime—the sinking of the liner Titanic in April, 1912, as a result of its collision with an iceberg in the North Atlantic—devoted much attention to wireless communication on ships. The third International Radiotelegraphic Congress was held in Washington in 1927. It was attended by representatives of 79 contracting administrations, who drew up a new convention and two appended sets of regulations, allocating radio wave lengths to various services by international agreement and dealing in detail with various problems of broadcasting and transmission. The fourth Congress met at Madrid in 1932.

The problems of international postal communication led to the creation in 1874 of the best-known of the public international unions—the Universal Postal Union. In 1817, France and the Netherlands signed the first bilateral postal convention. Other treaties followed, but each State sought to place the burden of postal charges on the other. Rates were high and uncertain;
and there was no uniformity of national regulations regarding charges, routes, weights, registry, etc. On August 4, 1862, Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General of the U.S., invited other postal administrations to take remedial action. "Many embarrassments to foreign correspondence," he wrote, "exist in this, and probably in other postal departments, which can be remedied only by international concert of action. . . . Without entering into details, it is evident that the international adjustment of a common basis for direct correspondence, and for intermediate land and ocean transit, and for an international registry system, and for the exchange of printed matter, is clearly of the first importance to the commercial and social intercourse between this and other nations." A meeting was held in Paris in May, 1863. No definite action was taken, but 31 regulatory articles were agreed upon and submitted to the Governments represented. Many difficulties remained, however. The Austro-German Postal Union of 1850 was a model of successful cooperation; and in 1868 Herr Stephan, Director-General of Posts of the North German Confederation, proposed the organization of a universal postal union, embracing all civilized States. The Franco-Prussian War interrupted the negotiations, but a few years later the Government of Switzerland, at the suggestion of the German, Belgian, and Dutch Governments, invited the Powers to send delegates to a conference at Bern. In September, 1874, representatives of 22 States assembled and began discussion of various projects and suggestions. Within a few weeks a convention and a règlement were drawn up, and the General Postal Union (later renamed the Universal Postal Union) was created.

This remarkably successful organization is based upon the principle that all the member States form a single postal territory for the reciprocal exchange of mail. Uniform rates for foreign correspondence are fixed, and charges are normally borne by the State of origin. Transit charges on mail matter passing through a State are based on total net weight and mileage. Detailed regulations deal with registered articles, return receipts, prepayment, reply coupons, exemptions from postage, prohibitions on sending certain articles through the mails, etc. Under the original arrangements a congress of plenipotentiaries, to meet every five years, was given authority to amend the convention or the règlement, and questions of technical detail were to be dealt with by a periodical conference of administrators. An international bureau was set up at Bern to collect, publish, and distribute information on postal questions, to issue a journal, and to act as an international clearinghouse for the settlement of accounts. The bureau also circulates proposals for changes in the convention or the règlement, which may be made by any administration during the intervals between the congresses and conferences, provided that two other administrations concur. Votes on
such proposals are taken by the bureau. Sixteen of the 39 articles of the convention can be amended only by unanimity and the rest by majority vote.

In practice, the conference has ceased to exist, and all the work of the organization is done by the congress and the bureau. At the periodical congresses, decisions are really arrived at by majority vote. Members may refuse to sign or ratify proposed amendments; but since the practical disadvantages of withdrawal are so great that small comfort can be derived from abstract rights of independence and sovereignty, this is a theoretical rather than an actual danger. The cooperating postal administrations frequently put proposed changes into operation without waiting for formal ratification on the part of the political authorities entrusted with treaty making. The congresses have always functioned through discussion and compromise and have shown a willingness to make exceptions to general rules in special cases. In 1906 Persia, for example, requested the right to levy charges on incoming mail as well as outgoing mail, contrary to the general principles of the Union. The Persian postal authorities, it appeared, derived very little revenue from outgoing mail but were put to great expense to distribute by camel caravan the large quantities of Bibles sent into the country by Christian missionary societies. Persia was consequently granted the right to tax all incoming printed matter. The Universal Postal Union has kept postal rates throughout the world at a minimum level and has made possible what could never have been achieved by national action: cheap and rapid postal communication between all parts of the globe under the supervision of a permanent international agency capable of securing uniform regulations and of dealing effectively with all new problems as they arise.

Problems of health, sanitation, commerce, finance, and humanitarian reform have led to the creation of public international unions no less significant in their respective fields than those dealing with international communication. These organizations are far too numerous to be described here individually. Reinsch, in his book of 1911 entitled Public International Unions, listed 45 such organizations, of which over half had permanent administrative bureaus or commissions. The term should not be applied, however, to international arrangements for cooperation which do not set up permanent central organs, for these differ in no particular from ordinary multilateral conventions. The Handbook of International Organizations published by the League of Nations listed some two dozen associations of States, outside of the League itself and its subsidiary agencies, which were true international organizations. All of these were established since 1850, nine of them since 1914. They covered a wide range of interests. Brief mention may be made of a few of the more important.

The International Bureau of Weights and Measures (the Metric Union)
was established in 1875 for the purpose of maintaining at the common ex-
pense of the parties an international body of scientific experts at Paris, 
working under the direction of an international commission and a general 
conference, who should prepare and maintain standard prototypes of the 
meter, the centimeter, the millimeter, the kilometer, the gram, the milligram, 
the kilogram, and all units of the metric system. These are decimal multiples 
or fractions of the meter, originally considered one ten-millionth part of 
the earth’s meridian quadrant through Paris. The international prototypes, 
prepared with the utmost care and kept under constant conditions of tem-
perature and humidity, are constantly being compared with national stand-
ards, which are thus verified and made as accurate and uniform as possible. 
The Bureau of Trade Marks, Copyrights, and Patents makes possible the 
international registration at Bern of these industrial and literary property 
rights—a procedure which entitles them to legal protection in all the con-
tracting States. The International Union for the Publication of Customs 
Tariffs publishes at the common expense “the customs tariffs of the various 
States of the globe and the modifications that may, in future, be made in 
these tariffs” (Article II of the Convention of July 5, 1890). The Interna-
tional Institute of Agriculture, established in Rome in 1904, collects, pub-
lishes, and distributes information relating to the production and movements 
of crops and livestock, studies agricultural cooperation, credit, and insur-
ance, and recommends measures for the protection of the economic interests 
of farmers. The Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1868 established the Inter-
national Red Cross for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded 
in wartime. The Union for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade 
(1890), the Union for the Regulation of the African Liquor Traffic (1890), 
and the International Opium Commission (1909) were likewise created to 
deal with social and humanitarian problems. On September 27, 1945, the 
U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Britain, France, and seven other Governments signed 
an accord in London establishing a European inland transport organization 
to fix rates and regulate traffic on Continental waterways. In the aftermath 
of World War II a bewildering variety of new organizations came into being, 
many of them, like most of the older agencies, loosely affiliated with the 
United Nations Organization.

The international unions exhibit interesting departures from traditional 
attitudes and behavior patterns in a number of respects. In almost every 
instance the member States, by agreement, have in effect surrendered a por-
tion of their sovereignty and independence and have transferred power to an 
international body over what was once a “domestic question.” In the prac-
tical operation of the unions, moreover, the obstructive principles of State
equality and action by unanimity have been largely abandoned, and decisions are reached by majority vote of the member States. These concessions are prerequisites to successful international collaboration. The structure of the unions is such that broad questions of principle are dealt with by diplomatic representatives meeting in periodical congresses, and problems of administrative detail are dealt with by the actual administrators meeting in conferences or working through the permanent bureaus. The national administrations are geared together into an effective international administration. Problems which were formerly discussed and quarreled about by diplomats in terms of national honor, prestige, and sovereignty are removed from the sphere of "politics" and made problems of "administration," to be considered by administrative experts in terms of efficiency, economy, and the progressive adaptation of means to ends. Organized social intelligence is applied to the fulfillment of human needs. An anarchic and individualistic system of relationships in which each State pursues its own interests, with resulting inconvenience and loss to all, is replaced by organization and planning through which all cooperate to serve the common interests.

It is clear, however, that this form of collaboration is not adaptable to all problems of international concern. The major sources of tension and conflict among States, the great problems of power, prestige, territory, armaments, and markets, cannot readily be transferred from the political sphere to the administrative sphere so long as national attitudes toward these things remain what they have been in the past. The public international unions have functioned successfully in dealing with matters of no particular interest to patriots or politicians. States are quite prepared to regard questions of postal service, weights and measures, sanitation, and telegraphy as matters of international concern which they can safely and advantageously submit to international regulation. But they are not yet prepared to deal in the same fashion with questions of armaments, colonies, or economic opportunities in "backward" areas; and they are not at all prepared to submit to international control their decisions regarding tariffs, immigration, security, or territorial claims. The problems involving "national honor" and "vital interests" are those which States are unwilling to submit to arbitration or adjudication. They are the same problems which States are reluctant to submit to agencies of international organization and administration.

2. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: FROM COVENANT TO CATASTROPHE

... It would be a master stroke if those Great Powers honestly bent on peace would form a league of peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force, if necessary, its being
broken by others. The supreme difficulty in connection with developing the peace work of The Hague arises from the lack of any executive power, of any police to enforce the decrees of the courts. In any community of any size the authority of the courts rests upon actual or potential force; on the existence of a police, or on the knowledge that the able-bodied men of the country are both ready and willing to see that the decrees of judicial and legislative bodies are put into effect. In new and wild communities where there is violence, an honest man must protect himself; and until other means of securing his safety are devised, it is both foolish and wicked to persuade him to surrender his arms while the men who are dangerous to the community retain theirs. He should not renounce the right to protect himself by his own efforts until the community is so organized that it can effectively relieve the individual of the duty of putting down violence. So it is with nations. Each nation must keep well prepared to defend itself until the establishment of some form of international police power, competent and willing to prevent violence as between nations. As things are now, such power to command peace throughout the world could best be assured by some combination between those great nations which sincerely desire peace and have no thought themselves of committing aggressions. The combination might at first be only to secure peace within certain definite limits and certain definite conditions; but the ruler or statesman who should bring about such a combination would have earned his place in history for all time and his title to the gratitude of all mankind.—THEODORE ROOSEVELT, International Peace, an address before the Nobel Prize Committee, delivered at Oslo, Norway, May 5, 1910.

The establishment of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 represented the most ambitious effort thus far made to extend the method of international organization into the sphere of political relations among States. Between the collapse of the Holy Alliance and 1914, enormous numbers of people throughout the Western world organized themselves in their private capacities to promote cooperation across national frontiers in the pursuit of a great variety of economic, scientific, religious, and esthetic interests. At the same time, States organized public institutions and agencies of cooperation among governments to deal with problems of transportation, communication, commerce, finance, health, sanitation, social questions, and the like. But during this period no effort was made to set up an international organization of States to deal with broader political questions. The Concert of Europe functioned fitfully, and the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 offered vain promise of peace on earth, good will to men. (No permanent procedures of political collaboration were set up, however, until the world-shattering cataclysm of 1914-18 brought disaster to all nations alike and led to a world-wide demand for a league of States to keep the peace.)
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Conception. The League of Nations was founded by Woodrow Wilson. If it was not his invention (and the process of political invention is at best ill understood), it was at any rate the project upon which he, more than any other contemporary statesman, had set his heart. He played a large part in writing into the Covenant the ideas of others and the experience of the past. He insisted emphatically, moreover, upon the creation of the League at the Peace Conference and upon the incorporation of the Covenant into the peace treaties. Had it not been for his active leadership, it is quite possible that the League would not have been established. In a broader sense, however, the League was a synthesis of the ideas of many people in many lands, and it embodied in a single structure all the past experience of the States of the world in establishing and maintaining international organizations. That experience was supplemented by the efforts of the Allied Governments during the war to work out methods of joint action for the purpose of coordinating their activities in the fields of shipping, food supplies, munitions, and military affairs. The League was the culmination of a long process of practical and theoretical preparation for the building of an enduring structure of cooperation among States.

Popular interest in the possibilities of a League began to manifest itself in the United States shortly after the outbreak of the great conflict and grew rapidly during the period of American neutrality. A "League to Enforce Peace" was established by a group of prominent public leaders, including many outstanding figures in the Republican party, headed by former President William Howard Taft. The organization held a conference in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, in June of 1915, and adopted a four-point program which received wide publicity. The program called for the submission of all justiciable international disputes to arbitration, the submission of all other disputes to a council of conciliation, the application of economic and military force by all States against any State resorting to war without submitting its disputes to pacific settlement, and the convocation of periodical congresses to codify international law. This program was a synthesis of the Hague arbitration system and the Bryan "cooling-off" treaties, with a new element of sanctions added to them. At the end of May, 1916, the or-

1 Not until the spring of 1918, when the great German offensives threatened to break through the western front, did the Allied Governments finally agree to appoint a single Commander in Chief of their armies in the person of Marshal Foch. It was only in the face of this supreme emergency that the Allied Maritime Transport Council, the Munitions Council, the Food Council, and the other coordinating agencies began to function effectively. Here, as in the public international unions, success was attained when the problems at stake were dealt with directly by administrators as administrative problems, instead of by diplomats as political problems. See J. A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control, 1921, passim.
ganization held another conference in Washington "to devise and determine upon measures for giving effect" to these proposals. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge declared that "the limits of voluntary arbitration have been reached" and that international force must be placed behind peace.

I know the difficulties which arise when we speak of anything which seems to involve an alliance. But I do not believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace.\(^2\)

President Wilson, though more restrained, definitely committed himself to the major purposes of the organization.

"We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world," asserted the American President. The peace of the world "must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established." We believe, first, "that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which [it] shall live"; second, "that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that the great and powerful nations expect and insist upon"; third, "that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations. . . . So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation."\(^3\)

On January 22, 1917, President Wilson addressed the American Senate on a "World League for Peace."\(^4\)

In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power, which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man, must take that for granted. . . . It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should


\(^3\) Ibid.

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play no part in that great enterprise. . . . The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance. . . . I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: That no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competition of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression and selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We can stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

Less than a week after these brave words were uttered, the German Government announced the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, and President Wilson responded by severing diplomatic relations between Washington and Berlin. On April 6, 1917, the American Congress, on the President's recommendation, declared war against Germany. In his war message, President Wilson again insisted that peace in the future could never be maintained except by a world-wide partnership of democratic nations. "It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion." Wilson's facility at phrasemaking made him an invaluable asset to the Allied cause and the chief interpreter of Allied war aims to a weary and blood-sickened world. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1917 he clarified his views regarding the purposes of the "war to end war" and the struggle to "make the world safe for democracy" in a series of public addresses. Early in January, 1918, he received two pleas for a concise restatement of war aims which would have popular propagandist value. One was from Lord Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, who was worried over the restlessness of the British trade unions. The other was from Edgar Sisson, representative in Russia of the U.S. Committee on Public Information, who was trying to feed peace propaganda into Germany and to inspire the exhausted peasants and workers of Russia to continue the hopeless battle against the Central Powers. In re-
sponse to these appeals, President Wilson, on January 8, 1918, issued his famous program of 14 points, the last of which declared, “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.” In the following September, Wilson asserted “the constitution of that league of nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself.” On November 11, 1918, came the armistice and peace; and in January of 1919 the Peace Conference opened in Paris.

Birth. By this time numerous plans for a league, both official and unofficial, had been put forward. In March, 1918, a committee of the British Foreign Office, with Lord Phillimore as its chairman, had prepared a draft convention for the creation of a league. Three months later, Colonel House, President Wilson’s confidential adviser, prepared another draft on the basis of Wilson’s own ideas. In July of 1918 Wilson typed out his own first draft. In December General Smuts of South Africa proposed a plan containing the germs of the Council and the Mandate System. At the same time Lord Robert Cecil prepared a new draft on the basis of the Phillimore report. Wilson prepared his second draft on January 10, 1919, and his third draft 10 days later to submit to the Peace Conference. Meanwhile, the British delegation to the Conference had combined the Cecil and Smuts drafts into an official British draft of January 20, 1919. Since the third Wilson draft and the British draft diverged at a number of points, they were submitted to Cecil Hurst, Legal Adviser of the British delegation, and to David Hunter Miller of the American delegation, for revision. The result was the composite Hurst-Miller draft of February 3, 1919, which was used as a basis for discussion by the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference.

A Commission of 19 was chosen, with the small Powers in a minority of 1. Wilson assumed the chairmanship of the Commission, and the work was rapidly pushed forward by the combined efforts of the British and American representatives. On February 14 the tentative draft of the Covenant was presented to the Conference as a whole for its consideration. “A living thing is born,” asserted the American President. “While it is elastic, while it is general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing we are called upon to make definite. It is a guarantee of peace. It is a definite guarantee by word against aggression. Armed force is in the background in this program, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war. . . . [But] it is not in contemplation that this should be merely a league
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to secure the peace of the world. It is a league that can be used for cooperation in any international matter."

A few subsequent changes were made in the Covenant; and on April 28, 1919, the revised document was accepted unanimously at a plenary session of the Conference. The other terms of the victors' peace were gradually hammered out, and on June 28 the German delegates were called into the Hall of Mirrors in the great château of Louis XIV and compelled to attach their signatures to the Treaty of Versailles. The first 26 articles of the Treaty contained the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant was likewise incorporated into the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria of September 10, 1919; the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, November 27, 1919; the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary, June 4, 1920; and the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey, August 10, 1920. The last-named agreement was repudiated by the Turkish Nationalists. The four other treaties were ratified. On January 10, 1920, the League of Nations came officially into existence with the deposit at the Quai d'Orsay of 18 ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles.

Anatomy. If the League be defined functionally, it was in the first place an agency for the enforcement of certain provisions contained in the peace treaties and in other supplementary agreements. In this capacity the League was intended to preserve and maintain the status quo established by the Peace Conference. It was entrusted with certain administrative and supervisory functions usually exercised by the victors themselves at the close of a war but here conferred upon an international agency. Among these were the protection of national minorities, the supervision of the Free City of Danzig, the administration of the Saar Valley, and the operation of the Mandate System. In the second place, the League was a means of promoting international cooperation in dealing with problems of health, social questions, finances, transportation, communication, and the like. In this capacity it served to integrate and coordinate the activities of the existing public international unions. In the third place, the League was an agency for the prevention of war and the pacific settlement of disputes. All threats to peace were within its competence; and all controversies among its members were, in theory at least, submitted to the procedures of arbitration, adjudication, or conciliation provided for in the Covenant.

Article 1 of the Covenant provided for membership and withdrawal. The Covenant, as incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles, was signed by 31 of the 32 States named in the Annex. The thirty-second, China, became an original member by signing the Treaty of St. Germain. Of these 32 signa-

5 The full text of the Covenant, which is well worth rereading in the 1950's, will be found in the Appendices.
ADVENTURES IN WORLD ORDER

tories, 3 failed to ratify the treaties: Ecuador, the Hejaz, and the U.S.A. By January 10, 1920, 19 ratifications had been deposited at the Quai d'Orsay; and by April of 1920 a total of 42 States had become original members of the League, comprising the 29 Allied and Associated Powers which ratified the peace treaties (including Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India along with the 24 fully sovereign Allied belligerents) and the 13 neutrals invited in the Annex to accede to the Covenant. Mexico, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic were not mentioned in the list of neutrals, because their Governments were not at the time recognized by all the Allied and Associated Powers. India and the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire were given full status as members, though by a curious error of phraseology in the Annex Great Britain itself was referred to as the "British Empire," with the Dominions and India listed separately below. Subsequently, 21 other States were admitted to membership.6 Only 6 States of the world never applied for membership: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Nepal, Manchukuo, and the United States of America.

The structure of the League can be described in terms of its major organs: the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat. The Assembly was the representative and deliberative organ of the League, consisting of all its members, with each entitled to one vote in accordance with the ancient principle of State equality. The Assembly met annually every September in Geneva and held several special sessions. Each member State was entitled to have not more than three delegates and several alternates at the Assembly meetings. The delegates from each State collectively cast the vote to which the State was entitled, in accordance with their instructions. Delegates were ordinarily chosen, like other diplomatic representatives, by the executive authorities of the State, though, in many Assemblies, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers themselves acted as delegates. A number of States maintained permanent delegations at Geneva. The Assembly elected its own presiding officers and made its own rules in harmony with the provisions of the Covenant. Its agenda was prepared in advance by the Secretary-General and was subject to modification by the Assembly itself. Its organization resembled that of a legislative body in that it followed the usual principles of parliamentary procedure and operated through committees. It maintained six regular standing committees—on constitutional and legal questions, on technical organizations, on reduction of armaments, on budgetary matters, on social and

6 In 1920 Albania, Finland, Bulgaria, Austria, Costa Rica, and Luxemburg were elected as members; in 1922 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were admitted; in 1923 Hungary, Ethiopia, and the Irish Free State; in 1924 the Dominican Republic; in 1926 Germany; in 1931 Mexico; in 1932 Turkey and Iraq; in 1934 Afghanistan, Ecuador, and the U.S.S.R.; and in 1937 Egypt.
humanitarian questions, and on political questions—and was free to appoint special committees for particular purposes.

The functions of the Assembly were very broad, even if somewhat vague. Article 3 of the Covenant declared that it “may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.” In practice, it exercised three general types of powers: electoral, constituent, and deliberative. In the exercise of its electoral functions, it elected new members to the League by a two-thirds vote, as occasion arose; it elected annually three of the nine nonpermanent members of the Council by a majority vote; and, in conjunction with the Council, it elected every nine years by majority vote the 15 judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice. It also approved by majority vote the Council’s nominations for the post of Secretary-General. As a constituent body, it amended the Covenant in accordance with the provisions of Article 26. In this capacity, it acted by majority vote, but amendments had to be approved unanimously by the Council and were subject to the ratifications of the member States. As a deliberative body, the Assembly considered general political, economic, and technical questions of international interest, advised the reconsideration of inapplicable treaties under Article 19 (it never exercised this power), supervised the work of the Council and of the technical organizations, and prepared the annual budget of the League. The budget usually totaled about $6,000,000, which, it was pointed out by pacifists, was about one-fifth the cost of a single modern battleship. The budget was prepared by the Secretariat, subject to revision by the Assembly, and was divided into three major parts, one for the Secretariat and special organizations, one for the International Labor Office, and one for the Permanent Court of International Justice. The 1935 budget totaled $6,128,000 (gold) and the 1936 budget about $5,655,000. The Assembly provided for the apportionment of these expenses among the members in accordance with a scale (1937-39) totaling 923 units, on which Great Britain paid 108 units, France 80, the Soviet Union 94, Italy 60, India 49, China 42, Spain 40, and so on, down to 1 unit each for such small States as Albania, Haiti, Liberia, and Luxemburg. These important functions made the Assembly the dominant organ of the League, though because of its nature and size it could not act so swiftly and expeditiously as the Council.

The Council of the League was designed to be a small body on which the Great Powers should have permanent seats, with the other seats rotated among the lesser Powers. It was originally contemplated that it would consist of 5 permanent seats to be occupied by the U.S.A., Britain, France, Italy, and Japan and 4 nonpermanent seats, assigned temporarily in 1920 to Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece, their successors to be chosen periodically.
by the Assembly. The refusal of the United States to join the League reduced the ratio of Great Powers to small Powers to 4:4. In 1922, 2 additional nonpermanent seats were added, making a Council of 10 members. The admission of Germany to the League created a “Council crisis” which necessitated further reorganization. The German Government agreed to enter the League only on condition of being received on a basis of complete equality and of receiving a permanent seat on the Council. Brazil, Spain, and Poland presented demands for permanent seats at the same time, which were resisted by Germany and other States. Though Germany could be admitted to the League by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, it could secure a permanent seat on the Council only by unanimous vote of that body. An impasse was created which the special session of the Assembly in March, 1926, was unable to resolve. On March 18 the Council set up a special committee to study the problem. In accordance with its recommendations, subsequently approved by the Council and the Assembly, the Council was enlarged by establishing 9 nonpermanent seats, 3 to be filled annually for three-year terms by the Assembly. By a two-thirds vote the Assembly could declare nonpermanent members reeligible, could fix rules for the election of nonpermanent members, and could, if it chose, elect in toto an entirely new group of nonpermanent members. Under the terms of this compromise, Germany was admitted to a permanent seat on the Council. Poland was satisfied to be declared reeligible to a nonpermanent seat for another three-year term. Brazil and Spain, however, gave notice of their intention to withdraw from the League. Spain later reconsidered her intention, but Brazil ceased to be a member in 1928. In 1933 a tenth nonpermanent seat was provisionally created for three years and was assigned to Portugal (1933-36). In 1936, 2 nonpermanent seats were created for the ensuing three years and assigned to Latvia and China (1936-39). By 1939 the Council consisted of 3 permanent members, Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R., and 11 nonpermanent members.

The functions of the Council were as broad as those of the Assembly. It met four times a year, or oftener as occasion required. Like the larger body, it could deal “with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world” (Article 4). Its powers could be expanded by treaty agreements among States. The minorities treaties conferred special powers on the Council in regard to the supervision of the enforcement of their obligations. The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, between the Allied Powers and Turkey, similarly gave the Council jurisdiction over the Mosul dispute. The Council was free to refuse to assume such special duties but it never did so. In practice, the most important function of the Council was the settlement of international disputes. It shared this function
with the Assembly, but the latter seldom intervened. The Council also had executive, administrative, and supervisory functions in connection with Danzig, the Saar Valley, the Mandate System, etc. Under Articles 10 to 16 of the Covenant, it had authority to mobilize the sanctions of the League against a Covenant-breaking State. The Council likewise carried out recommendations of the Assembly, prepared plans for disarmament, nominated the Secretary-General, and approved his appointments to subordinate positions in the Secretariat. All other League functions were shared concurrently by the Council and the Assembly.

It should be noted that, although the Council and the Assembly were both, in theory, expected to reach decisions only by unanimity, many practical departures from this rule took place. Article 5 declared that on matters of procedure, as distinct from "decisions," action could be taken by majority vote. In practice, the moral pressure brought to bear on small minorities was frequently sufficient to compel acquiescence in action which technically was by unanimity but in fact was by majority vote. In the Assembly, moreover, a clear distinction was made between recommendations and decisions. In the former case, action was by a simple majority. Most of the acts of the Assembly took the form of recommendations or vœux ("wishes"). There is likewise the well-established rule of law that no one shall be judge in his own case, which meant that in the consideration of international disputes the litigating parties were not permitted to vote. The Covenant itself made additional qualifications to the unanimity principle. Nonmembers were admitted to the League by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. Amendments to the Covenant were passed by a majority vote of the States in the Assembly. Judges of the Permanent Court were elected by a majority vote. It could be argued that all League actions were in any case only recommendations, since the League could not bind any State without its consent and all League acts were legally subject to ratification by the members before they became binding obligations. In view of these developments, the rule of unanimity, which in the past constituted a serious obstacle to effective international cooperation, became of theoretical rather than of practical importance.

The Secretariat was the permanent administrative organ of the League and consisted of an international civil service of almost 600 expert officials and subordinates residing at Geneva. It bore the same relation to the League as a whole as do the bureaus of the public international unions to their respective organizations. The Secretariat was headed by a Secretary-General, appointed by the Council with the approval of the Assembly. Sir Eric Drummond of Great Britain held this office from 1920 to 1933 and was largely responsible for the establishment and organization of the Secretariat. He was succeeded by M. Joseph Avenol of France. The Secretary-General ap-
pointed his subordinates with the approval of the Council. His immediate subordinates were two Deputy Secretaries-General and two Undersecretaries. One of each of these higher posts was held by a national of each of the Great Powers in the League. The body of the Secretariat was divided into sections, headed by directors. The officials of the Secretariat were not recruited by civil service examinations but were chosen by the Secretary-General on the basis of professional competence, with a proper regard for the distribution of posts among the various States. The officials were in no sense governmental representatives, however, but were responsible only to the Secretariat itself, to which they made a declaration of loyalty. They were charged with the compilation and publication of information on all the complex problems which came before the League for consideration and with the secretarial work of the Council and Assembly, which included the preparation of agenda, the translation of speeches into French and English (the two official languages of the League), and the preparation and publication of the Assembly and Council minutes in the Official Journal.

There were organized around the League a number of technical agencies, commissions, and advisory committees. Two of these—the Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments and the Mandates Commission—were provided for in the Covenant (Articles 9 and 22). The others were established by the Council as bodies of technical experts to supply information and give advice on the various complex problems falling within the sphere of the League's competence. These organizations worked in close cooperation with the corresponding sections of the Secretariat.

Four great technical organizations were set up in this fashion. The Economic and Financial Organization was composed of an economic committee and a finance committee, each consisting of 12 to 15 experts, to which were added a fiscal committee and a committee of statistical experts. Under the general direction of the Council, the Economic and Financial Organization prepared reports on subjects submitted to it for examination. If it decided that there was a prospect of effective international cooperation with respect to a particular subject, it prepared a program and recommended that the Council call an international conference to draft a convention dealing with the problem. Such conventions as emerged from this procedure were, of course, subject to ratification by the participating governments before they went into effect.

The Organization for Communications and Transit consisted of a periodical general conference of technical representatives chosen by the members of the League and an advisory and technical committee on communications and transit, made up of experts chosen by the general conference and entrusted with the duties of carrying out conference decisions and preparing
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for future conferences. The Health Organization consisted of the health committee of 20 members and the advisory council, which was identical with the permanent committee of the International Office of Public Health at Paris. The health committee drew up resolutions on international health problems on the basis of the data prepared by the health section and transmitted them to the advisory committee for consideration. The latter made recommendations to the Council. The Organization was supplemented by numerous committees, joint commissions, subcommittees, subcommissions, and the like, dealing with health insurance, maternity, smallpox, tuberculosis, sleeping sickness, malaria, preventive medicine, etc. The public-health activities of the member States were thus coordinated and a basis laid for the conclusion of international conventions dealing with health problems. The Health Organization maintained an Eastern Bureau at Singapore and an International Leprosy Center at Rio de Janeiro. Its work as a whole was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation.

In 1922 the Council set up the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation to coordinate the work of such bodies as the International Research Council, the International Academic Union, and Institute of International Law. In 1924 the Council accepted an offer of the French Government to establish in Paris an International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation to act as the secretariat of the Committee. The Institute, the Committee, various special committees, and 42 national committees, coupled with the International Educational Cinematographic Institute, were later linked together into an Intellectual Cooperation Organization, comparable with the three mentioned above. Each of these organizations was served by the appropriate section of the Secretariat of the League.

The International Labor Organization (ILO) had its headquarters at Geneva and, though distinct from the League proper, was an integral part of the whole League system. Its creation was due to an effort on the part of the Paris Peace Conference to satisfy the demands of organized labor and to provide a mechanism for dealing internationally with labor problems which would present the appearance of fulfilling the pledges made to labor by the various belligerent governments during the war period. Article 23 of the Covenant of the League defined the general purposes of the Organization. Its constitution was embodied in Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. It could be amended by a two-thirds vote of the Conference, subject to ratification by all States on the League Council and three-fourths of the members of the League. The Organization consists of three parts. The General Conference comprises four delegates from each State (two representing the participating governments, one chosen by the governments to speak for the most representative employers' organization in their respective countries, and
one chosen to speak for the most representative workers’ organization). The General Conference assembles annually. The delegates vote individually and deliberate upon the items of the agenda prepared by the Governing Body. They draw up, by a two-thirds majority, recommendations or draft conventions on labor legislation which are supposed to be submitted within a year to the national legislatures for ratification. The Governing Body, which meets every three months, consists of 32 members chosen for a three-year term. Sixteen are appointed by the member governments, 8 of these representing the States of chief industrial importance (originally, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, India, the Soviet Union, and the United States) with the remaining 8 picked by the other government delegates at the Conference. The other 16 members of the Governing Body are chosen half by the employers’ delegates at the Conference and half by the workers’ delegates. The Governing Body prepares the agenda of the Conferences, appoints the Director of the International Labor Office, and supervises its work. The International Labor Office consists of some 350 experts appointed by the Director and is the secretariat of the Organization. It gathers and publishes information on labor legislation and assists the Governing Body in preparing for the Conferences. M. Albert Thomas was its Director from its establishment until his death in April, 1932. Harold Butler was named his successor, and was succeeded in turn by John G. Winant and Edward J. Phelan. The expenses of the International Labor Organization were met out of the League budget. It is now affiliated with U.N.

The primary purpose of the ILO is to promote uniformity of labor legislation throughout the world. National governments are frequently reluctant to enact adequate protective legislation for wage earners because the States granting such protection are alleged to be placed at a competitive disadvantage in world markets in comparison with States where employers are free to exploit labor without legislative hindrances. The problem involved can be dealt with adequately only by international action. It cannot be said, however, that the International Labor Organization achieved very much in this direction. Draft conventions and recommendations were binding only when ratified by the member States. More than 50 such proposals were made prior to World War II; but many did not receive general ratification, and some were not even submitted to the national legislatures. The methods provided for ensuring the execution of such conventions as were ratified did not prevent violations. The Organization provides an international forum for the discussion of labor legislation; it prepares the way for the formulation of international standards of labor legislation and constitutes a useful agency for the collection and publication of labor statistics; it promotes the crystallization of attitudes and policies on the part of governments, employers’
associations, and labor unions in the member States. But its actions are purely advisory, and its achievements are scarcely proportionate to the time and energy devoted to its work.

There thus came into existence after World War I an elaborately integrated structure of international organization far in advance of anything which existed prior to 1914. This structure reflected an enormous multiplication of the common interests and purposes of States. It was without precedent or parallel in earlier State Systems. It represented a culmination of the forms which have been evolved in the Western State System for the regulation of the relations among States and the promotion of international cooperation. It provided an opportunity for the international control of a large number of technical, economic, and social problems through international conventions based upon the advice of professional specialists and through permanent institutionalized cooperation among the administrative officials of the nation-states. It likewise provided an opportunity for the constant discussion of international political problems and the pacific settlement of disputes among governments. It constituted an embryonic international government which might have developed into a true world federation if the members of the Western State System had been capable of integrating their particular national interests into world-wide international interests.

Pathology. The task of safeguarding the interests of each by protecting the security of all was beyond the capacity, or at least beyond the will, of the statesmen who were responsible for the crucial decisions and indecisions in foreign policy during the years of the League’s decay. The League and its associated agencies never became symbols of human brotherhood eliciting love and loyalty from large numbers of people in all lands and thereby developing the prestige and authority required by an incipient world government. The League remained a method of cooperation among sovereign governments. The subjects and citizens of governments remained patriots devoted only to national interests. In some States, they were bewitched by visions of tribal conquest; in others, frightened into passivity; in still others, befuddled and betrayed. Nowhere were they united in the effective service of common purposes. The Governments of the democratic Great Powers, moreover, upon which the future of the League depended, fell into the hands of those who were utterly lacking in the loyalty, wisdom, and courage through which alone the League could survive by fulfilling the dreams of its founders. The League’s white palace in Ariana Park, by the shores of Geneva’s Lake Leman, therefore became, in the end, a sepulcher.

The outward symptoms of the League’s demise are easily described. The rate of withdrawal of States from membership reflected the progress of a fatal disease. The first State to give the required two-year notice of resigna-
tion was Costa Rica, January 1, 1925. The reasons were financial. The result was unimportant. But Brazil gave notice on June 12, 1926, for reasons of "prestige." Japan followed (March 27, 1933) and then Germany (October 14, 1933) for reasons of Realpolitik. Paraguay did likewise (February 23, 1935); and then, after the destruction of one League member by another, Guatemala (May 15, 1936), Honduras (June 20, 1936), Nicaragua (June 26, 1936), El Salvador (August 10, 1937), Italy (December 11, 1937), Chile (May 13, 1938), Venezuela (July 12, 1938), Peru (April 8, 1939), Albania (April 13, 1939), Spain (May 8, 1939), and Rumania (July 10, 1940).

By the close of 1938, the 62 States that had at one time or another been League members were reduced to 49. Two members, Ethiopia and Austria, had been destroyed and another, Czechoslovakia, half destroyed. In 1939-40, more League members were extinguished by the aggressors: Czechoslovakia, Albania, Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, etc. The Soviet Union was "expelled." At the end, only 1 Great Power was left in the League, Great Britain, and only 31 scattered and insecure smaller States. On May 16, 1940, M. Avenol dismissed most of the employees of the Secretariat, and on June 25 he discharged the remainder. He himself resigned. A few "non-political" officials found refuge in Princeton University, over which Woodrow Wilson had once presided. A remnant of the ILO fled to Toronto. The judges of the World Court were scattered to the winds. By summer's end of 1940 the whole League system had become a memory. Even the memory seemed all but lost in a panic flight before the Horsemen of the Apocalypse.

This deuce was obviously part of the death of the world. The larger tragedy will be dealt with elsewhere in these pages. Yet that tragedy was in many of its acts and scenes played at Geneva. Its leitmotif was the refusal of the Anglo-French appeasers to use the League to enforce peace by protecting the weak against the strong and by preventing and punishing international lawbreaking. The League, being but a method of concerted action, could not act against aggressions when its leading actors were determined first to evade their own obligations and second to use the League as a vehicle for appeasing the aggressors. The League perished because its members failed to use it to compel the orderly settlement of disputes and to prevent lawless aggression. This bitter tale is too long to be retold here in its entirety. Yet a few episodes must be recounted to suggest the Nemesis which condemned the League, and much else, to death.

Early League efforts to cope with aggressors were not reassuring. When Italy bombarded and occupied the Greek island of Corfu in 1923 and Greece appealed to the League, the Italian delegate, Salandra, declared that Article 16 of the Covenant could not be applied, since Italy did not intend to com-
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mit an act of war. The League Council permitted the Conference of Ambassadors to settle the dispute on terms entirely favorable to Italy. In dealing with small States the League Powers were more resolute and more successful. A dispute between Sweden and Finland in 1920 over the Åland Islands was resolved without violence, as was the dispute between Poland and Germany in 1921 over Upper Silesia. The Greek-Bulgarian border clash of 1925 was effectively dealt with by a Council "stop-fight" resolution and a local inquiry, followed by a settlement whereby Athens paid Sofia an indemnity of $210,000 for having violated Bulgarian territory. When Peruvian troops in September, 1932, occupied the Colombian port of Leticia on the Amazon, the Council was able with the diplomatic support of the United States to induce the parties to refrain from hostilities and to bring about the eventual evacuation of the seized area. League efforts to deal with the Gran Chaco War (1928-35) between Bolivia and Paraguay had no result save Paraguay's withdrawal from the League, thanks largely to inept meddling by the United States and complete lack of coordination between Pan-American peace machinery and that of the League. No sanctions were imposed in this instance, but the League members imposed an arms embargo against the belligerents. On January 16, 1935, following Paraguay's rejection of League peace proposals, the Assembly recommended that the embargo against Bolivia be lifted. This action had no visible effect in preventing Paraguay from winning the war or in influencing the terms of peace.

In their first great test in dealing with aggression by a Great Power, the League members failed to restrain the lawbreaker and protect his victim. Following Japanese occupation of central Manchuria on September 18, 1931, China invoked the Covenant, calling attention by stages to Articles 10, 11, 15, and 16. Sir John Simon, then British Foreign Minister, was determined to thwart any effective action by the League or by the United States against Japan. In this he was completely successful. A Council resolution of September 21, 1931, calling upon the disputants to withdraw their troops, was ignored by Tokyo. As the fighting spread, the United States, for the first time and the last, authorized a representative (Prentiss B. Gilbert) to sit with the Council in invoking the Pact of Paris. On October 24 the Council called on Japan to withdraw its troops by November 16. By this date Japanese forces were fighting their way into northern Manchuria. On December 10 the Council appointed a Commission of five members, headed by Lord Lytton, to study the situation. When Japan attacked Shanghai, China appealed to the Assembly, which adopted a resolution (March 4, 1932) calling for Japanese evacuation of Shanghai and another (March 11) reiterating the Stimson Doctrine. Tokyo did indeed quit Shanghai under the armistice of May 5 but continued to hold Manchuria—now transmuted
into “Manchukuo” under puppet regent Henry Pu-Yi, whom Japan formally recognized by the signature of a treaty of protectorate on September 15, 1932. After a leisurely visit to the Far East the Lytton Commission issued a report of 100,000 words on October 3, 1932, recommending—much too late—a reasonable compromise. On February 24, 1933, the Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Japan and accepting these recommendations. Tokyo rejected them and left Geneva. The other League Powers did nothing apart from refusing to recognize Manchukuo.

Italians and Germans dreaming of empire were not slow to grasp the lesson of these events. In Europe the paralysis of the Western Powers (and therefore of the League) first manifested itself in the aftermath of the breakdown of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference. When the German Government repudiated the military clauses of Versailles and introduced conscription on March 16, 1935, London and Paris were content to take refuge in a long but wholly innocuous resolution of the League Council (April 17, 1935), condemning Germany, threatening in the event of further treaty breaking to “call into play all appropriate measures on the part of the members of the League,” and appointing a committee to define “the economic and financial measures which might be applied, should, in the future, a State, whether a member of the League of Nations or not, endanger peace by unilateral repudiation of its international obligations.” When Germany on March 7, 1936, repudiated Locarno and began remilitarizing the Rhineland, the Western Powers avoided any counteraction save another resolution (March 19, 1936) of the League Council, meeting in London, whereby it was discovered that Germany had “committed a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles” and the Secretary-General was instructed so to inform the signatories of the Locarno Treaty—who were already well aware of the fact. Subsequent German moves of rearmament and aggression produced no echo at Geneva, since London and Paris preferred to act (or not to act) outside of the League.

Crisis. Fascist designs upon Ethiopia put the League Powers to their crucial test. Here as before they were found wanting, despite the imposition for the first time, and the last, of feeble sanctions against the aggressor. This gesture was hypocrisy, for the responsible leaders of France and Britain had agreed not to offer effective opposition to il Duce’s ambitions. They assumed that Italy could be won as an ally against the Reich by tacit support of Mussolini’s African dream. They discovered too late that such tactics made Italy an ally of the Reich against the Western Powers—for the modern Caesars, like those of old, respect strength and despise weakness. The almost unanimous demand of the British electorate for a firm policy of support of the League and resistance to aggression was demonstrated in the “Na-
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tional Peace Ballot” conducted by the League of Nations Union in 1934-35. This sentiment caused Stanley Baldwin and his fellow Tories, who stood for election on the slogan “Our Word Is Our Bond!” to go through the motions of sanctions. This maneuver was successful. In the polling of November 14, 1935, the Government won 431 out of 615 seats in the Commons. It then proceeded to break its word in an ultimately successful effort to betray Ethiopia and the Covenant.

The role of the lesser members of the League in this sordid sequence of events was that of a flock of sheep deceived by jackals in sheep’s clothing. French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval was bent upon buying Italian “friendship” at any cost. He therefore opposed every effort at Geneva to act upon Ethiopia’s original appeal of December 13, 1934. Eight days previously, Ethiopian and Italian forces had clashed at Ual Ual in the Ogaden Desert, well within the Ethiopian frontier. In fear of invasion, Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, Negus Negusti (King of Kings), Chosen of God, and Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, instructed the ministers of his dusky medieval realm to invoke Article 11 of the Covenant on January 3, 1935. But Laval met Mussolini in Rome. On January 7 they signed a series of complex agreements. Il Duce agreed to “consult” on the defense of Austria and to “concert” in the event of German repudiation of disarmament obligations. In “final” settlement of Italian claims on France, he accepted 2,500 shares in the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, 309 square miles of desert in French Somaliland, and 44,000 square miles of desert south of Libya. Laval, despite his subsequent denials, secretly agreed to look the other way when Mussolini should attempt the conquest of Ethiopia. Rome informed London of the bargain early in January. Downing Street appointed a Foreign Office Commission headed by Sir John Maffey to make recommendations. On June 18, 1935, it recommended that Britain should not oppose Italian designs on Ethiopia but should on the contrary “seize the occasion to obtain, if possible, rectifications of the frontiers of British Somaliland, Kenya, and the Sudan.”

Under these circumstances (unknown at the time to all save the “insiders”), any effort to organize collective security against the aggressor was foredoomed. Through the spring and summer of 1935, while Italian troops, airplanes, tanks, and poison gas poured through the Suez Canal in preparation for the blow to come, Pierre Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare obstructed all Ethiopian efforts at Geneva to initiate League action. A Council resolution of May 25 dealt only with the arbitration of the Ual Ual incident. When the Arbitral Commission, appointed under the Italian-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928 and consisting of Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti, Signor Raffaele Montagna, Professor Albert de La Pradelle, and Professor Pitman B. Potter,
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was deadlocked because of Italian objections to any examination of the question of title to Ual Ual, the Council (August 3) instructed it not to discuss frontier questions. The Commission finally selected Nicolas Politis as a fifth member and handed down an “award” on September 3 holding that neither Ethiopia nor Italy was responsible for the original clash at Ual Ual. Mussolini thus gave away his pretext. But he was resolved to invade Ethiopia without any pretext. The responsible leaders of Britain and France were resolved to connive in his plans.

The most they were disposed to do was to threaten feeble penalties for the benefit of the British electorate and neutral opinion in the event that Mussolini should resort to war. Meanwhile, they sought to deter him from doing so by offering him control of Ethiopia without war. On August 15, at a Three Power Conference in London, Laval and Eden offered Baron Aloisi a plan for “territorial adjustments” and “collective assistance” to Ethiopia, “particular account being taken of the special interests of Italy.” Mussolini rejected it. On September 18 a League Commission of Five proposed “international assistance to Ethiopia”—i.e., Italian domination. Mussolini was uninterested. “If you offered me all of Ethiopia on a silver platter,” he is reported to have said to the French Ambassador, “I would refuse it, for I have resolved to take it by force.”

Laval and Hoare reluctantly concluded that Mussolini would attack and that they must go through the motions at Geneva of imposing sanctions. Otherwise the voters of Britain and France, unfamiliar with the subtleties of Realpolitik as practiced by the appeasers and convinced that their own safety lay in support of the League and enforcement of the Covenant, might turn them out of office and elect honest men in their places. On September 10, 1935, Hoare and Laval secretly agreed at Geneva to rule out “military sanctions,” “naval blockade,” “closure of the Suez Canal—in a word everything that might lead to war.” On the next day, Hoare declared publicly at Geneva that his Government stood “for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance [meaning “assistance”?] to all acts of unprovoked aggression.” Laval asserted, “France is faithful to the Covenant.” Both men privately assured Mussolini that he had nothing to fear.

On October 1, 1935, Mussolini ordered the invasion of Ethiopia. Rome informed the Council that Ethiopian mobilization was a threat and provocation, aggravated by the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from the frontier, and that “the warlike and aggressive spirit of Ethiopia has succeeded in imposing war against Italy.” On October 5 the Council reassembled to consider the report of the Committee of Thirteen, which refuted the Italian charges and noted that Italy was solemnly bound to refrain from resorting
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to force by a variety of engagements. Aloisi contended that Italy was a victim of aggression and was acting within the Covenant. M. Tecla Hawariati for Ethiopia asked for action under Article 16. The Council appointed a Committee of Six, which reported that “the Council has come to the conclusion that the Italian Government has resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.”

On October 7, 1935, with Italy in the negative, the Council unanimously adopted a report of the Committee of Thirteen. On a roll call, all the members expressed their agreement with the report of the Committee of Six. At the Assembly meeting of October 9, all the members save Italy, Albania, Austria, and Hungary accepted the Council’s conclusions and subsequently voted to apply sanctions. Aloisi declaimed, “Caught as she is in the tide of her full spiritual and material development but confined within territorial limits that are stifling her, Italy must make her voice heard in this Assembly as the voice of the proletariat calling for justice.”

The sanctions themselves were ineffective and indeed aided Mussolini to make an unpopular war popular by pretending that he was successfully defying the British Empire and the world. On October 8, 1935, George Lansbury, “Christian pacifist” and Parliamentary leader of the British Labor Party, resigned his post in protest against sanctions to which his party as well as the British Cabinet were committed. On October 10, 51 Governments in the League Assembly confirmed the Council’s verdict that Italy had resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12 and established a “Committee of Fifty for Coordination of Measures under Article 16.” Only Italy and her satellites, Austria and Hungary, voted in the negative, and only 4 other States—Switzerland, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela—attached reservations to their acceptance of sanctions. On October 11 the Coordination Committee established a smaller Committee of Eighteen, which drafted five sanctions proposals. The first contemplated lifting the arms embargo against Ethiopia and its continued application against Italy. On October 14 the Committee voted a second proposal to ban all loans and bank credits to Italy. On October 19 the three remaining proposals were adopted, forbidding all imports from Italy, banning the export to Italy of certain raw materials, and providing for mutual assistance among League members to minimize losses entailed by sanctions. The appeal for sanctions met with a surprisingly unanimous response from the League members, many of whom put the arms and loan embargo into effect at once. On November 18, 1935, the “economic siege” of Italy got fully under way.

No sooner were economic sanctions applied than the betrayal of Ethiopia by Britain and France began to assume organized form. On December 8 it became known that Hoare and Laval had agreed to a “peace plan”
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whereby the aggressor was to be rewarded with control of two-thirds of Ethiopia. The British and French Foreign Ministers did not see fit to communicate their plan to the Council until December 13, exactly a year after Ethiopia had first appealed for protection. Laval requested the Council to express no views until Rome and Addis Ababa had been heard from. The plan failed because of Italian indifference. A storm of British indignation unseated Hoare, but the Council on December 19 thanked the British and French Governments for their suggestions and requested its Committee of Thirteen to examine the situation as a whole.

During January the Council evaded Ethiopian proposals that it undertake an impartial inquiry into Italian bombardments of Red Cross units and that it extend financial aid to Ethiopia. On January 23 the Committee of Thirteen adopted a unanimous report, accepted by the Council, rejecting all inquiry or assistance. The Committee of Thirteen met in London and requested Chairman Madariaga to take steps to restore peace and to bring to Italy's attention Ethiopian allegations of Italian use of poison gas contrary to the Protocol of June 17, 1925. Italy invited Madariaga to Rome and accused Ethiopia of atrocities. During April the Committee considered, discussed, postponed, delayed, and equivocated in a mood of "watchful waiting." On April 20 the Council met. After debate, it expressed regret that conciliation had failed, recalled that both belligerents were bound by the gas convention, and at length, in desperation, addressed to Italy "a supreme appeal that . . . she should bring to the settlement of her dispute with Ethiopia that spirit which the League of Nations is entitled to expect from one of its original members."

Words and feeble gestures availed nothing against bombing planes spraying poison from the clouds. Addis Ababa fell to the new barbarians come to save it from barbarism. Haile Selassie fled. From Jerusalem he wired the Secretary-General on May 10, 1936, that he had left his capital to "avoid the extermination of the Ethiopian people" and to devote himself to "the preservation of the age-old independence of Ethiopia and the principles of collective security and the sanctity of international obligations, all of which were threatened by Italy." He asked the League not to recognize the conquest and to pursue its efforts to secure respect for the Covenant. The Council met on May 11. Aloisi withdrew in protest over the presence of an Ethiopian delegation. Ethiopia asked a full application of Article 16. Argentina condemned postponement. Ecuador, which had already abandoned all measures against Italy, asked that sanctions be lifted since the war was over. Chile agreed. The Council delayed a decision until June 16, however, and resolved to keep sanctions in force meanwhile. Argentina now called for an
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Assembly meeting, which was convoked for June 30. The Council met four
days beforehand, while Italy announced that she could take no part in its
meeting or in Locarno negotiations so long as sanctions remained in force.
Eden, now acting as President, prevailed upon the Council to throw all
responsibility upon the Assembly. Beck announced that Poland had ended
sanctions.

Among Haile Selassie’s last words from Ethiopian territory before his
flight was a prophetic utterance:

Do the peoples of the world not yet realize that by fighting on until the bitter
end I am not only performing my sacred duty to my people but standing guard
in the last citadel of collective security? Are they too blind to see that I have
my responsibilities to the whole of humanity to face? I must still hold on until
my tardy allies appear. If they never come, then I say prophetically and without
bitterness, “The West will perish.”

Death Agony. Britain now assumed leadership in destroying the League.
On June 5, 1936, as Eden welcomed Haile Selassie to his lonely exile in
England, Sir Samuel Hoare reentered the British Cabinet as First Lord of
the Admiralty. On June 10 Neville Chamberlain told the Nineteen Hundred
Club, “There is no use for us to shut our eyes to realities. . . . If we have
retained any vestige of common sense, surely we must admit that we have
tried to impose on the League a task which it was beyond its powers to ful-
fill. . . . Is it not apparent that the policy of sanctions involves a risk of
war?” Italy had lost half its gold reserves. Italian imports had been reduced
from $14,650,000 in February, 1935, to $8,239,000 in February, 1936, and
exports from $10,775,000 to $5,666,000. A continuation of sanctions might
well have undermined the Fascist regime despite its Ethiopian victory. But
precisely this was what the Anglo-French appeasers feared most. Sanctions
failed to halt aggression because the leaders of the democracies were more
desirous of placating the aggressor than of impeding the march of Fascism.
They now scrambled with indecent haste to betray the victim of banditry
and to embrace the bandit.

The Assembly of June 30-July 4, 1936, abandoned Ethiopia to her fate.
President Van Zeeland, Premier of Belgium, read a note from Rome: “The
Ethiopian populations . . . welcome the Italian troops as champions of
freedom, justice, civilization, and order. . . . Italy views the work she has
undertaken as a sacred mission of civilization and proposes to carry it out
according to the principles of the Covenant of the League and of other inter-
national agreements which set forth the duties of civilizing Powers. . . .
The Italian Government declares itself ready to give once more its willing
and practical cooperation to the League. . . . It is in this spirit that Italy

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ACCEDED TO THE TREATY OF RIO DE JANEIRO [THE ARGENTINE ANTIWAR PACT] OF OCTOBER 10, 1933."

These words were intended, not as satire, but as a plea for the lifting of sanctions. Eden had already announced British abandonment of sanctions to the House of Commons on June 18. He had declared, "No Ethiopian Government survives in any part of the Emperor's territory." An Ethiopian Government did survive at Gore, as Eden undoubtedly knew; but its cables to London were sent by the British transmitters not via Khartoum but via Asmara in Italian Eritrea, where they were, of course, suppressed. British and French efforts to dissuade Haile Selassie from speaking in Geneva failed. They were not yet prepared, in view of the attitude of the small Powers, to appease Italy by moving the expulsion of Ethiopia from the League or the exclusion of her delegation from the Assembly. The Negus came. As he mounted the rostrum, Italian journalists in the press gallery shrieked curses and execrations until they were expelled by the police. Haile Selassie spoke to an Assembly shamed into silence:

I am here today to claim that justice that is due to my people, and the assistance promised to it eight months ago by fifty-two nations who asserted that an act of aggression had been committed in violation of international treaties. [He reviewed the agonies inflicted upon his subjects by Italian poison gas and the betrayal of his country by Powers pledged to defend its independence and integrity.] I decided to come myself to testify against the crime perpetrated against my people and to give Europe warning of the doom that awaits it if it bows before the fait accompli. . . . If a strong government finds that it can with impunity destroy a weak people, then the hour has struck for that weak people to appeal to the League of Nations to give its judgment in all freedom. God and history will remember your decision. . . . What answer am I to take back to my people?

The answer was desertion. Blum spoke of the beauties of peace, disarmament, and collective security. Eden spoke of the failure of sanctions and declared that the Covenant must be amended. Litvinov asserted that sanctions would have stopped aggression had they been vigorously enforced. The League must be strengthened and not be made safe for aggressors. M. Ter Waters of South Africa declared that the impending decision would "shatter for generations all international confidence and all hope of realizing world peace. . . . Order is losing to chaos: the spectacle of power has hypnotized the world." The prevailing despair was symbolized on July 3 by the suicide on the floor of the Assembly of Stefan Lux, a Czech journalist, who shot himself with the cry "C'est le dernier coup!" to draw attention to the plight of the Jews in Germany. Ethiopia asked the Assembly to declare that it would recognize no annexation obtained by force and to recommend a loan of £10,000,000 to Ethiopia under conditions to be fixed by the Council.
The latter proposal was rejected, 23 to 1, with 25 abstentions. As for the former, the Assembly virtually ignored it and closed its session of July 4 with the adoption of an ignominious resolution expressing “firm attachment to the principles of the Covenant,” soliciting proposals for the reform of the League, and recommending “that its coordination committee shall make all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken by them in execution of Article 16.” Sanctions were abandoned. Ethiopia was abandoned. Collective security was abandoned.

Early in September Secretary-General Avenol went to Rome, like the Emperor Henry IV to Canossa, to beg Fascist forgiveness of the League and to arrange Italy’s return to Geneva in exchange for the exclusion of Ethiopia. Mussolini agreed on condition that the Assembly which was about to meet should refuse to seat the Ethiopian delegation. The French “People’s Front” Cabinet, created to save liberty and peace from Fascism, obligingly brought pressure on Professor Jéze to prevent him from acting as Ethiopian delegate. His law classes at the Sorbonne had already been broken up by riotous pro-Fascist students. His own government now forbade him to serve. Downing Street and the Quai d’Orsay made plans to have the Assembly’s Credentials Committee invalidate Haile Selassie’s entire delegation. When the Seventeenth Assembly convened on September 21, 1936, the Anglo-French plan failed because of the opposition of the smaller Powers, supported by the U.S.S.R. which felt that an Anglo-Franco-Italian rapprochement with Germany in a new Locarno would be but a prelude to a Nazi attack upon the Soviet Union. Haile Selassie hurriedly summoned his former American adviser, Everett A. Colson, to replace Jéze. For the first time an American citizen sat as a delegate on the floor of the League Assembly. Haile Selassie flew from London to Geneva. Eden and Delbos in the Credentials Committee found a majority in favor of seating the Ethiopian delegation. Eden thereupon declared, with more shrewdness than honesty, that his Government had no objection to seating the delegation. British diplomatic prestige, already irreparably shattered, fell to a new low. By a vote of 39 to 4 the delegation was seated. Italy withheld “cooperation.”

The last curtain fell in the spring of 1938. London proposed that the League Council, holding its one hundred and first meeting in Geneva, scrap the Stimson Doctrine and approve formal diplomatic recognition of Italian title to Ethiopia on the part of the League members as promised in the Ciano-Perth Accord of April 16, 1938—another tragic milestone along the appeasers’ road toward disaster. Washington was silent. Haile Selassie sought to block this final betrayal by making a “token payment” of 10,000 Swiss francs on Ethiopia’s defaulted dues. On May 12, 1938, Halifax declared:
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We must not be afraid to face the facts squarely. . . . When, as here, two ideals are in conflict—on the one hand the ideal of devotion, unflinching but unpractical, to some high purpose; on the other hand the ideal of a practical victory for peace—I cannot doubt that the stronger claim is that of peace. . . . Nothing is gained and much may be lost by refusal to face facts. Great as is the League of Nations, the ends it exists to serve are greater than itself and the greatest of those ends is peace. . . .

Haile Selassie, small and dark, a ruler of barbarians but every inch a king, replied in words which pronounced the doom of the League and of the Western Powers:

The Ethiopian people, to whom all assistance was refused, are climbing alone their path to Calvary. No humiliation has been spared the victim of aggression. All resources and procedures have been tried with a view to excluding Ethiopia from the League as the aggressor demands. . . . Will law win as against force? Or force as against law? . . . Many Powers threatened with aggression and feeling their weakness have abandoned Ethiopia. They have uttered the cry of panic and rout: “Everyone for himself.” . . . It is a certainty that they would be abandoned as Ethiopia has been, and between the two evils they have chosen one which the fear of aggression led them to consider the lesser. May God forgive them. . . . There are different ways to maintain peace. There is the maintenance of peace through right and there is peace at any price. . . . The League would be committing suicide if after having been created to maintain peace through right it were to abandon that principle and adopt instead the principle of peace at any price, even the price of immolation of a member state at the feet of its aggressor.

The Council chose suicide. Council President Wilhelm Munters of Latvia declared that each member should decide for itself whether to recognize Italian title to Ethiopia. Only four delegations objected: New Zealand, Bolivia, China, and the U.S.S.R. Britain and France recognized Italian title to Ethiopia in November. Nineteen months later, Mussolini reciprocated with a declaration of war.

Burial. The League never recovered. On September 13, 1937, the Eighteenth Assembly had celebrated the opening of the magnificent new Assembly Hall. The League Palace cost $15,000,000. The new Council Chamber was decorated with murals by Sert, donated by the Spanish Republic, depicting the liberation of mankind from tyranny, intolerance, and injustice. Aga Khan supplied 2,500 bottles of champagne. But the celebration was a wake. Spain, torn by war and Fascist invasion which the League Powers condoned, failed of reelection to the Council. China, torn by new Japanese invasion which the League Powers condoned, invoked the Covenant. A parley of signatories of the Nine Power Pact met in Brussels on November 3 and adjourned on November 24, 1937, without taking action. In Litvinov’s words the conferees
said to Japan, “Take your plunder and peace be with you,” and to China, “Love your aggressor, resist not evil.”

On May 14, 1938, Alvarez del Vayo pleaded with the Council to urge the end of the policy of “nonintervention,” as the Assembly had threatened to do in its resolution of October 4, 1937, if foreign troops were not withdrawn from Spain. Halifax and Bonnet voted against his plea. Only Litvinov voted for it. Spain was abandoned. China was abandoned. Austria was already abandoned. On September 16, 1938, Earl De La Warr, Lord Privy Seal, came to the funereal Nineteenth Assembly to urge that the sanctions article be diluted. He hurried away without waiting to hear Wellington Koo’s plea for the application of Articles 16 and 17 against Japan. The Chinese delegate asked whether the League was “to be no more than an Egyptian mummy dressed up with all the luxuries and splendors of the living but devoid of life.” On September 28 the Council held that sanctions were inapplicable to Japan. On September 29, as the Western Powers abandoned Czechoslovakia at Munich, the Assembly passed a resolution expressing hope for European peace. On September 30, it voted to sever the Covenant from the tattered Treaty of Versailles while the Council resolved that sanctions against Japan were discretionary.

The ultimate immolation of the League by its makers was without dignity. Geneva’s halls were silent during the crisis which led to war in the summer of 1939. For all their illusions, the last leaders of Poland had themselves done too much to destroy the League to suppose that any purpose would be served by appealing to Geneva for aid. Britain and France made no appeal. They were now at war with the Caesarism to which they had sacrificed the small and the weak on the League’s altar. But on December 3, 1939, Joseph Avenol received a note from Finland to the members of the Council invoking Articles 11 and 15 against the Soviet Union whose armies had attacked the Finns four days before. Argentina at once demanded the expulsion of the U.S.S.R. from the League. The most flagrant aggressions of Japan, Italy, and the Reich had produced no such proposal in Geneva’s heyday. But most of the members regarded Communist aggression as far more monstrous than Fascist aggression, despite the fact (or perhaps because of the fact) that up to 1939 the U.S.S.R. was the only Great Power which had observed its obligations under the Covenant and had striven to make the League an effective instrument of collective security.

Moscow contemptuously declined to discuss the issue. On December 14 the Assembly unanimously voted to approve the Argentine proposal. The Council concurred and found “in virtue of Article 16, paragraph 4 of the Covenant that by its act the U.S.S.R. has placed itself outside of the League of Nations. It follows that the U.S.S.R. is no longer a member of the
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League.” Wellington Koo whistled and exclaimed, “China got nothing like that.” Nor had any of the earlier victims of aggression. But what Finland got was a hollow gesture. No other sanctions were proposed. Unlike Ethiopia, Finland was granted tangible aid by some of the League members. The aid, however, as Lloyd George put it, was “too little and too late.” Helsingfors accepted defeat and made peace on March 12, 1940. The Assembly and the Council were dead. Their futile words against Moscow were a swan song.

The final (Twenty-first) League Assembly, attended by 34 delegations, met in Geneva, April 8, 1946, amid the wreckage of a blasted world. When the Argentine delegation walked out indignantly because of failure to win one of the eight Vice-Presidencies, Sir Hartley Shawcross commented: “But this is a funeral, not a christening.” President Carl Hambro reminisced: “We know that we were lacking in moral courage. . . . We know that we were reluctant to show responsibility for great decisions where greatness was needed, and we know we cannot escape history.” He dedicated the “funeral” to the success of the United Nations. But a motion to give the U.S.S.R. a share of the assets of the bankrupt concern was defeated. On April 19 the delegates approved a motion declaring that “with effect from this day, following the close of the present session of the Assembly, the League of Nations shall cease to exist except for the sole purpose of the liquidation of its affairs.”

3. UNITED NATIONS: FROM CHARTER TO SCHISM

The world is a stupendous machine, composed of innumerable parts, each of which being a free agent, has a volition and action of its own; and on this ground arises the difficulty of assuring success in any enterprise depending on the volition of numerous agents. We may set the machine in motion, and dispose every wheel to one certain end; but when it depends on the volition of any one wheel, and the corresponding action of every wheel, the result is uncertain.—Niccolò Machiavelli, On Fortune, Chance, etc.

Without an enduring understanding [among the Super-Powers] upon their fundamental purposes, interests and obligations to one another, all organizations to preserve peace are creations on paper and the path is wide open again for the rise of a new aggressor. . . . For these Powers to become divided in their aims, and fail to recognize and harmonize their basic interests, can produce only disaster, and no machinery, as such, can produce this essential harmony and unity.—Cordell Hull, April 9, 1944.

The actions [of U.N] will be effective if the Great Powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated.—Joseph Stalin, November 6, 1944.

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In biological evolution, species which fail to adapt themselves to environmental change become extinct. In the evolution of the civilizations of *Homo sapiens*, societies which cling to old ways in the face of new challenges experience failure, frustration, and ultimate demise. The peoples and politicians of the Western State System in 1945-46 revived the League of Nations under a new name and resumed the ancient game of power politics under the spell of new symbols, despite the experiences of 1919-39. Those experiences demonstrated that world peace cannot be kept by leagues of sovereignties and that such leagues are doomed to utter futility when their members pursue competitive “national interests” rather than common purposes relevant to the welfare and survival of mankind.

(The United Nations Organization is the League of Nations in a new guise. The several respects in which it differs from its predecessor are none of them of sufficient import to invalidate this description. The U.N., unlike the League, was established during, rather than after, a world war. Its Charter, unlike the Covenant,7 was not devised at a peace conference and not incorporated in peace treaties. Its initial principle, the “sovereign equality of all peace-loving States,”8 was later modified to require unanimity of the Great Powers in the Security Council. Its structure was the work, not of any new Woodrow Wilson, but of the American, British, Soviet, and Chinese delegations at Dumbarton Oaks, August 21-October 7, 1944. Its wordy “Constitution,” comprising 111 articles as against the 26 articles of the Covenant, was put together by a Conference of 50 States at San Francisco in the spring of 1945. The preamble of the document—“We the peoples of the United Nations”—is misleading, since those who drafted it spoke for governments, not peoples, and established not a federation of peoples but a league of States. Fulfillment of the hopes of its founders required continuing cooperation among Great Powers. With the advent of fear, friction, and “cold war” among them, before the new organization came into being, these hopes faded into gloom. The genesis and nature of the new league must nevertheless be sketched out, if only to illustrate anew the tragic dilemma in which contemporary mankind is caught.

**Deus ex Machina.** The League Covenant was the work of 19 men who met fifteen times in the early months of 1919. The U.N. Charter was the work of 50 delegations, toiling mightily during two months in San Francisco, April 25-June 26, 1945, on the invitation of the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and China. There were present in all 282 delegates, 1,444 assistants, 1,058 members of the International Secretariat, 2,636 journalists and radiomen, 2,252 Army and Navy aides, 800 Boy Scouts, 400 Red Cross workers, 188 telephone and

7 See Appendices for full texts of both documents.
8 See p. 332.
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telegraph operators, etc. The average output of documents per day was 500,000 pages. On one day 1,700,000 pages were distributed. If the verdict of time on these prodigious labors was already becoming unfavorable three years after the event, this is not to be attributed to lack of good will, intelligence, or even statesmanship on the part of the founders. Politicians and diplomats by the nature of their functions cannot transcend to any significant degree the cultural context in which they must operate. This privilege is reserved for poets, philosophers, and prophets—who, for the most "realistic" of reasons, are never entrusted with any such task as that of rescuing decadent civilizations from disintegration or saving the human race from suicide. Had the San Francisco Conference known that the atomic age was about to dawn in terrifying splendor within three weeks after its adjournment, its members might have come to different conclusions. But such speculation is idle. The past is irreversible. Man's fate, moreover, is to cling always to old solutions in the face of new problems. Like Woodrow Wilson, Metternich, Kant, Rousseau, Penn, and all their predecessors, the men who met at the Golden Gate built their hopes for peace on a league of sovereignties.

On January 10, 1946, in the blue-and-gold auditorium of Central Hall, Westminster, the General Assembly of U.N. met for the first time. The date was the twenty-sixth anniversary of the formal birth of the League of Nations. Dr. Eduardo Zuleta Angel of Colombia, temporary Chairman and President of the Preparatory Commission, gave the opening address. Premier Attlee delivered a speech of welcome and of hope. The first item of business was the election of a permanent President. In the balloting Paul Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium, won, 28 to 23, over Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway. The Assembly next chose six Committees of 51 members each—Political and Security; Economic and Financial; Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural; Trusteeship; Administrative and Budgetary; and Legal—along with a General (or steering) Committee, comprising the chairmen of the six Committees and the seven Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. The delegates next elected the 18 members of the Economic and Social Council: the U.S.A., Colombia, Greece, Albania, Jugoslavia, and Lebanon for one year; the U.K., U.S.S.R., Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Norway, and India for two years; and France, China, Canada, Chile, Peru, and Belgium for three years.

The Assembly on January 12 designated the six nonpermanent members

of the Security Council: Egypt, Mexico, and the Netherlands for one year and Australia, Brazil, and Poland for two years. On January 17, 1946, the Council met for the first time and elected Norman J. O. Makin of Australia as its first President, the other members to assume the office by rotation, month by month, in alphabetical order of States. After voting to bar Franco Spain from membership, appointing Trygve Lie (on the recommendation of the Security Council) as Secretary-General for a five-year term, and deciding to establish permanent headquarters in or near New York City, the Assembly adjourned the 1st part of its first session on February 15. The Council followed suit on February 16, agreeing to reconvene in New York and to act, henceforth, as a continuous body. The enterprise thus launched, amid London’s winter fogs, was already touched by a malady which boded ill for its future. But hopes were high. If men and statesmen everywhere had made the success of the endeavor the first object of their efforts, hope could have become reality.

The Machinery of Salvation. The vast and sprawling apparatus of U.N., when reduced to a neat chart, inspires awe, confusion, and an almost inescapable conviction among the unwary that an effective government of the world community has been brought into being. Since the conviction is false, the chart is here omitted. A brief description of the machine is, nonetheless, in order. Whatever verdict be rendered on its central principle, it is not to be denied that the mechanism is elaborate, ingenious, and impressive, nor should it be forgotten at any point that through these cumbersome procedures thousands of earnest and forward-looking men and women, within the U.N. and in all the member governments, are striving mightily to meet, in one fashion or another, the real and often desperate needs of millions of human beings and to give substance to their aspirations for a life free from fear and want.

The original members of U.N. were the 51 States at San Francisco which signed and ratified the Charter. Additional members are admitted (Article 4)—provided that they are “peace-loving,” accept the obligations of the Charter, and are deemed “able and willing” to carry them out—by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council, which, in such matters, must act with the approval of all five permanent members. In 1946-47 the U.S.A. and U.K. refused to approve admission of Albania and Mongolia, and the U.S.S.R. refused to approve Trans-Jordan, Eire, and Portugal. When the Western Powers barred Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, Moscow vetoed Italy, Austria, and Finland. But Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, and Siam were admitted. Pakistan and Yemen became members on September 30, 1947, bringing total membership to 57 States. Burma (1948) was 58th. The Charter makes no provision for withdrawal,
though such a right is implied in national sovereignty, which, for better or worse, is the foundation of U.N. Members which are deemed to have violated the Charter may be suspended or expelled by the Assembly on recommendation of the Council (Articles 5, 6). All members must register their treaties and agreements with the Secretariat for publication and may not invoke any unregistered accord before any U.N. body (Article 102).

Like the League, the U.N. can act only by, through, and on sovereign States. None of its organs is vested with any power of legislation over individuals or with any authority to levy taxes, regulate commerce, or maintain independent armed forces. Like every league or confederation, the U.N. is dependent for revenues on contributions by members or on philanthropy. By virtue of a gift of property, valued at $8,500,000, from John D. Rockefeller, Jr., supplemented by a further property gift of $2,000,000 from New York City, the U.N. will ultimately move from temporary headquarters at Lake Success and Flushing Meadow to a site between Forty-second and Forty-eighth Streets along East River on Manhattan Island. The skyscrapers which are to become the permanent headquarters will cost $65,000,000; this sum, at the time of writing, seemed likely to be a loan or gift from the U.S.A. The regular budget of U.N. provided for expenditures of c. $19,600,000 in 1946; $23,000,000 in 1947; and $35,000,000 in 1948. The latter figure is roughly 1/1,000 of the budget of the U.S. Government for 1947-48. The U.N. revenues are derived from contributions in accordance with a scale (1947) by which the U.S.A. pays 39.89% of the total; the U.K. 11.84%; the U.S.S.R., Byelorussia, and Ukraine 7.40%; France and China 6% each; India 3.95%; and such States as Liberia, Paraguay, Haiti, and Honduras 0.04%.

Over two-thirds of the U.N. budget is devoted to maintaining the Secretariat. This body of some 2,000 international civil servants was first recruited in 1946-47, largely from citizens of the U.S.A. The oath of office requires all appointees to exercise their duties “in all loyalty, discretion and conscience” and to regulate their conduct “with the interests of the U.N. only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of duties from any government or other authority external to the organization.” Secretary-General Trygve Lie is aided by eight Assistant Secretaries-General, each in charge of a Department: Security Council Affairs, Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Trusteeship and Information from Non-self-governing Territories, Conference and General Services, Administrative and Financial Services, Legal, and Public Information. The members of the Secretariat are indispensable as fact finders, advisers, administrators, experts, and clerks. Upon their competence and devotion depend the successful consideration and execution of all policies. But policy itself (if one may
use the term in discussing an organization which is not a government) depends upon the uncertain relationships among national States, each of which has its own bureaucracy, having few contacts with U.N. and necessarily absorbed in purposes and tasks which have only a coincidental, and sometimes an antithetical, relationship to those of the U.N. Secretariat.

The "policy-making" agencies cannot properly be thought of in terms of legislative and executive organs. These functions, accurately defined, are here nonexistent. Yet the Charter provides elaborately for institutions through which States, if they choose, can settle controversies and undertake joint enterprises. So complex, indeed, is the structure that nothing short of a thick volume could trace out its intricacies.\(^{10}\) But the broad pattern can be sketched without doing violence to the facts.

The Security Council, entrusted with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," consists of the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., France, and China as permanent members, plus six non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly.\(^{11}\) The Council meets at least once every two weeks. It deals with disputes or situations likely to endanger peace and recommends appropriate methods and/or substance of a settlement. In case of a breach of the peace (Articles 39 to 54), the Council may call upon member States to sever diplomatic and economic relations with the offender or may resort to demonstrations, blockades, or military operations conducted by contingents supplied by member States and directed by the U.N. Military Staff Committee—all subject, however, to special agreements (none of which had been concluded by the spring of 1948) and further qualified (Article 51) by "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs."

The framers of the Charter thus accepted the theory of "collective security," according to which peace can be kept through the cooperative coercion of peacebreaking States by peace-loving States.\(^{12}\) But cognizance was taken,

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\(^{10}\) On the International Court of Justice, see p. 281ff. On the Trusteeship Council, see Chap. IX. On the Atomic Energy Commission, see Chap. XII.

\(^{11}\) The First Assembly elected Egypt, Mexico, and the Netherlands for one year and Australia, Brazil, and Poland for two years. The former group of States was replaced in 1947 by Belgium, Colombia, and Syria, whose terms expire at the end of 1948. The second group was replaced by Argentina, Canada, and the Ukraine, whose terms expire on January 1, 1950. The Ukraine was elected only after a prolonged deadlock in the fall of 1947 between the Ukraine and India, marked by a dozen ballots in which neither secured the necessary two-thirds vote and attributable to growing friction between the Soviet bloc and the Atlantic Powers—which seemed determined to put the U.S.S.R. in a minority of 1 on the new Council instead of the usual minority of 2. With Indian withdrawal, the Ukraine was elected November 13, 1947.

\(^{12}\) See p. 355ff.
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as was not the case in the Covenant, of the fact that any collective coercion of a Great Power means not peace but world war. The Charter, therefore, stipulated the unanimity of the Great Powers. The delegates at Dumbarton Oaks were unable to reach agreement on voting procedure. At Yalta a formula was devised and subsequently interpreted at San Francisco, in a Four Power Statement of June 7, 1945, to mean that any permanent member not only could “veto” any proposal to use collective coercion but could veto proposals to investigate or make recommendations (which might initiate a “chain of events” leading to enforcement action) and could even veto a decision as to whether any given question was “substantive” or “procedural” (see Article 27 of the Charter). This distinction, along with the distinction between “situations” and “disputes,” gave rise to endless wrangling and mountains of controversy.

Yet the intent of the framers is clear, however much it may have been distorted or abused. All five permanent members of the Council must agree to coercive measures and to any lesser action which might lead toward such measures. Obviously none of the five would agree to its own coercion by the others. Each may block coercion of a lesser Power if it chooses and may veto inquiries and proposals likely to lead to such a result. Many small States and numerous private critics have argued that all this is outrageous, since it means that the Great Powers are “above the law.” But, as the framers clearly perceived, the fact is inescapable that any coercion of a Great Power, or of a small State supported by a Great Power, is a prescription not for law, order, or peace but for wholesale violence. Of this, however, more anon.

The General Assembly, often called the “town meeting of the world,” functions on the basis of one vote for each member State, important questions requiring a two-thirds vote for action. While the Charter, the delegates, and the press all speak of “decisions” of the Assembly, this term does not mean in law or in fact that the Assembly, by two-thirds vote or any vote, can order any sovereign State to take action it is unwilling to take or refrain from any action it is determined to take. Aside from its budgetary, administrative, and electoral functions, the Assembly merely makes “recommendations” to its members or to other U.N. organs. It is expressly barred (Article 12) from making recommendations regarding disputes or situations before the Security Council unless the Council so requests. The Assembly is no more a legislative body than any other conference of diplomats. Its delegates talk, listen, report, study, consider, propose, deliberate, debate, vote, etc. What they do not, and in the nature of the case cannot, do is to make rules of law binding on individuals. Apart from moral suasion, neither

13 See p. 228.
can they make rules binding on any government which declines to approve.

The Assembly held the second part of its First Session in New York, October 23-December 15, 1946. It met in special session on Palestine, April 27-May 15, 1947, and convened in its Second Session on September 16, 1947. Its six standing Committees have been noted above. Its numerous ad hoc committees and special bodies vary from session to session.\(^{14}\)

The ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL is provided for in Articles 61 to 72 (q.v.) of the Charter. This body of 18 States is also limited to giving advice and making studies and recommendations—a fact which is not altered by the complexity of its organization and by the multiplicity of the specialized agencies with which it consults. The ECOSOC has Commissions on Human Rights (with Subcommissions on Freedom of Information and the Press, Protection of Minorities, and Prevention of Discrimination), Status of Women, Social Questions, Economics and Employment (with Subcommissions on Devastated Areas, Employment, Balance of Payments, Economic Development, etc.), Transport and Communication, Statistics, Narcotic Drugs, etc. The “specialized agencies” include the Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the International Trade Organization (ITO), and a steadily growing list of similar functional entities far too numerous to be described or even listed.

**Mysteries of Thermodynamics.** This fantastically elaborate apparatus of international cooperation would have proved puzzling to any sophisticated interplanetary traveler who might have alighted near Lake Success or on Flushing Meadow in midwinter of 1948. (In observing the activities of U.N. he would see many thousands of people, almost all of them earnest and honest, busily at work on a great variety of problems. All their tasks, he might perceive, had a common denominator—i.e., a demonstrable relationship to noble purposes: to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,” and promote “justice,” “respect for law,” “social progress,” “better standards of life in larger freedom,” “tolerance,” “security,” and the capacity of men to “live together in peace with one another as good neighbors.” )

Our mythical man from Mars would doubtless conclude that these objectives are altogether admirable, sensible, and indeed necessary to the collective welfare and even to the survival of *Homo sapiens*. As he watched

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the men and women of U.N. working like eager beavers at their manifold
tasks, he would get the impression of many wheels and of wheels within
wheels, all revolving swiftly amid a maze of motors, pistons, valves, and
belts. He would at first conclude that the work in hand was going wonder-
fully well, that the whole huge locomotive was functioning smoothly, and
that the mileage to be traversed would be covered in no time at all.

Then suddenly, to his astonishment, our visitor would see that nothing
of the kind was taking place. Amid all the hum and whir and clatter, inter-
spersed with the hiss of steam, the clang of bells, and the blast of whistles,
the great machine was standing quite still. Inner wheels appeared uncon-
nected with outer wheels. Some driving wheels were revolving, but these
were off the ground. Those on the ground were mired in mud. The tracks
originally laid had since been torn up. The entire engine, indeed, was tilting
at a crazy angle and seemed likely to slip into the lake. The various en-
gineers, firemen, and brakemen, moreover, seemed to be chasing one another
madly over the locomotive, shouting imprecations and brandishing monkey
wrenches, hot pokers, and sticks of dynamite over each other’s heads. The
stalled passengers gathered in rival groups to cheer or boo the contestants
and seemed rather more than likely to fall into open brawling among them-
selves, with no further thought of the journey or of their original destina-
tion. . . .

How is so great a failure of so inspiring an enterprise in so brief a time
to be explained? Two answers suggest themselves: The engine is of faulty
construction. The engineers lack will and skill to run it. Both are true.
Like the League, the U.N. rests upon the premise that peace can be kept
through the armed coercion of sovereignties by sovereignties. That this
premise is demonstrably false will be argued below. (But the U.N. also rests
upon the principle of concord and unanimity among Great Powers.) So long
as that concord was a reality, as at Teheran, Yalta, San Francisco, and Pots-
dam, it was possible to suppose that the U.N., for all its defects, could yet
be made to work. But as soon as the giants had fallen out among themselves
and the victorious coalition had broken down into a “cold war” between the
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the United Nations could no longer function to
fulfill the purposes stated in the Charter.

Breakdown. The ways in which and the motives and purposes, real or
fancied, for which the two Super-Powers of the post-Potsdam world became
rivals and potential foes will be discussed later in connection with their
foreign policies. Here it is enough simply to note the impact of the rift on
U.N. With the wisdom of retrospection, it is now clear that Washington
and Moscow, having decided to wage diplomatic war against one another (or
at any rate not to make peace), would each have better served its own cause
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and the world’s hopes had it refrained from carrying the quarrel into the Security Council and General Assembly. The issues at stake had not arisen in U.N. and plainly could not be settled there. Their settlement depended on willingness by both sides to compromise differences in direct negotiation. Their discord could never be dispelled through U.N. but might well wreck U.N. if injected into its counsels. Prudence and foresight would have dictated that the contending colossi should contend outside U.N. and leave the new organization to develop as best it could in the promotion of such non-political purposes as are common to all men.

But the temptation on both sides to use U.N. as an arena and to employ its tangled technicalities as weapons was too strong to be resisted. The record of the wreckers is much too complex to be reviewed in less than several hundred pages. Its salient features suggest that the U.S.A. and the U.K. took the first steps to use the U.N. against the U.S.S.R., rather than the other way about—and this not because of any oversupply of official vice or virtue, but only because Washington and London on almost any issue could easily mobilize majorities in Council and Assembly against Moscow, which, in turn, could scarcely ever enlist majorities against the Western Powers.\textsuperscript{15} On January 19, 1946, two days after the Security Council first met, Iran formally accused the U.S.S.R. of interference in its internal affairs. The charge was quite true. Soviet troops still remained in northern Iran, protected a puppet regime in Iranian Azerbaijan, and apparently pro-

\textsuperscript{15} In \textit{The Cold War} (New York, Harpers, 1947), pp. 58-59, Walter Lippmann wrote in the autumn of 1947: “The State Department, in its attempt to operate under the Truman Doctrine, has shown where that doctrine would take us. It would take us to the destruction of the U.N. . . . The United Nations cannot deal with disputes that involve the balance of power in the world. The balance of power has to be redressed and settled in the peace treaties by the Great Powers themselves. . . . Until such a settlement is reached, the United Nations has to be protected by its supporters from the strains, the burdens, the discredit, of having to deal with issues that it is not designed to deal with. . . . No good and nothing but harm can come of using the Security Council and the Assembly as an arena of the great dispute, or of acting as if we did not realize the inherent limitations of the Charter and thought that somehow we could by main force and awkwardness use the United Nations Organization to overawe and compel the Russians. All that can come of that is to discredit the United Nations on issues it cannot settle and thus to foreclose the future of the U.N., which can begin only if and when these issues have been settled. Judging by the speeches in the Greek affair of the British and the American delegates, Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Herschel Johnson appear to be acting on instructions which treat the U.N. as expendable in our conflict with Russia. It is a great pity. Nothing is being accomplished to win the conflict, to assuage it, or to settle it. But the U.N., which should be preserved as the last best hope of mankind that the conflict can be settled and a peace achieved, is being chewed up. . . . It is implicit in the policy [of the State Department] that the U.N. has no future as a universal society, and that either the U.N. will be cast aside like the League of Nations, or it will be transformed into an anti-Soviet coalition. In either event the U.N. will have been destroyed.”
posed to stay until the Government at Teheran should agree to Soviet oil concessions in the north to match the Anglo-American concessions in the south. But the issue was clearly one between Washington, London, and Moscow. It was then quite capable of amicable settlement, with no injury to Iranian independence, if each Power had been prepared to respect the interests and aspirations of the others in an accord among equals. Moscow assumed, correctly, that the Iranian accusation was British inspired. Gromyko and Manuilsky retaliated by complaining to the Council that British troops in Greece and Indonesia were a threat to peace. By early February, Vishinsky and Bevin, supported by Stettinius, were exchanging insults.

The design of things to come was here sharply etched. On March 19, Iran invoked Article 35 of the Charter, accused Moscow of continued intervention and of maintaining troops in Iran beyond March 2 (the agreed date of withdrawal), and asked for “an immediate and just solution of this dispute by the Security Council.” On March 24, Moscow announced that its forces had begun to withdraw on March 2 and that “total evacuation can be completed in 5 or 6 weeks if nothing unforeseen occurs.” When the Council met at Hunter College on March 25, 1946, Gromyko’s request that the dispute be not placed on the agenda was overruled, 8 to 3. On March 27, he walked out of the meeting. In the sequel all Soviet troops were evacuated (May 6) after Premier Chavam had agreed on March 24 to submit to Parliament within seven months a project of a joint Soviet-Iranian company to explore and develop oil resources in northern Iran. (The Premier did not submit the project until October, 1947, when Parliament, with open U.S. encouragement, rejected it.) All through the spring, repeated Soviet efforts to remove the item from the agenda, supported at length by Iran itself and by a legal opinion submitted by Trygve Lie, were staunchly resisted by Stettinius and Cadogan.

Thereafter, on more and more issues, the U.S. and U.K. representatives on the Council pushed to a vote proposals which they knew the Soviet delegate would not accept. In each instance the vote went against the U.S.S.R., usually 8 to 3 or 9 to 2. And in many cases Gromyko exercised his veto power to prevent action unacceptable to his Government. By the autumn of 1947 there had been a score of such Soviet vetoes. Anglo-American spokesmen were now accusing the U.S.S.R. of abusing the veto, “defying the will of the majority” and “paralyzing” the Security Council. Having discovered that they could almost always rally China, France, and the lesser States into an anti-Soviet majority, Moscow thus bearing the onus of using the veto, the State Department and Downing Street consistently pressed their advantage and won victory after victory, to the tune of widespread demands for
amending the Charter to “eliminate the veto” or even for expelling the U.S.S.R.

On September 17, 1947, Marshall told the assembly that voting procedure in the Council should be modified, that a “Little Assembly” (Interim Committee on Peace and Security) should be set up as a continuous body to perform functions which the veto prevented the Council from performing, and that the Assembly should establish a new Balkan border Commission and assume the duty of fostering the independence of Korea. These proposals, considered in the light of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan (in both of which programs the U.N. was ignored) demonstrated that the President and Secretary of State were quite prepared to treat U.N. as a lesser division of the State Department, to be by-passed at certain times and to be used at others when American purposes could be served thereby. On September 18, 1947, Andrei Vishinsky retaliated by a slashing indictment of “warmongers” and by submitting a resolution asking the U.N. to condemn “the criminal propaganda for a new war, carried on in reactionary circles in a number of countries and, in particular, in the U.S.A., Turkey and Greece”; to ask all Governments to impose “criminal penalties” against war propaganda; and to implement swiftly the decisions of January 24 and December 14, 1946, on atomic weapons and reduction of armaments. The Kremlin thereby demonstrated that it was quite prepared to treat the U.N. as a forum of demagoguery where any and all devices to discredit and embarrass the U.S.A. were justified.

Whoever was the “victor” in this battle of words, the U.N. was unquestionably the loser. Despite initial U.S. objections, the Assembly finally passed (unanimously) a diluted resolution (naming no names) in condemnation of warmongering. It also established a weakened version of a “Little Assembly” and set up a Balkan Commission and a Korean Electoral Commission. The U.S.S.R. and its allies declared they would take no part whatever in the activities of any of these three bodies. By the close of 1947 the U.N. was already in process of becoming two different organizations, one pro-American, anti-Soviet, and boycotted by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, and the other a universal league dominated by the U.S.A. and its supporters with the Soviet bloc in a minority and still exercising the veto in the Council. On September 23, 1947, Trygve Lie vainly appealed for a return to the spirit of Yalta and San Francisco: “The very cornerstone of the U.N., Big Power cooperation and understanding, is being shaken. . . . The peoples of the world, and many governments as well, are shocked, frightened and discouraged. . . . The veto issue is more of a symptom than a cause. . . . Fear breeds hate and hate breeds danger.”
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4. THE MYTHOLOGY OF PEACE

The curse of political anarchy which comes from the distribution of sovereignty among a plurality of local States has afflicted other societies before ours; but, in all those other cases in which the same situation has arisen, it has always been transitory. For anarchy by its very nature cures itself sooner or later, by one means or another. The cure may come through a voluntary, pacific, rational constructive effort—such as we are making in our day—an effort to deprive the local States of their sovereignty for the benefit of society as a whole without at the same time depriving them of their existence. Alternately, the cure may come through the blind, violent, irrational, and destructive clash of material forces.—Arnold J. Toynbee.

To assert and to show that unilateral national power cannot bring national security without ruining national welfare only proves that, unless the nations of the world can use their power co-operatively and not competitively, disaster will come. It does not of itself prove that the nations will be able or willing to act in accordance with this knowledge. They may or may not be willing to give up their sovereignty, even if one can prove, as I think it can be proved, that adherence to national sovereignty threatens ruination all around. For the curious thing is that individuals and nations may misinterpret what their self-interest is and how it can best be achieved. We, therefore, ask the realists whether they have adequately examined the concept of self-interest or whether they have permitted themselves to be hypnotized by a slogan. For national self-interest and national sovereignty and power may well be incompatible. Why, then, do people choose the wrong type of self-interest?—Linden A. Mander, Foundations of Modern World Society, 1947.

The capacity of Homo sapiens for self-delusion in times of trouble is almost infinite. Men and women facing hope, high adventure, and a future in which they have confidence are quite capable, within limits, of rational thought and action regarding ends and means, the nature of reality, and the most effective procedures for realizing their purposes. But the same men and women, when afflicted with doubt and despair over a world they never made and can neither comprehend nor control, seek self-assurance by reverting to the most primitive animism, magic, and superstition.

The quest for peace in an age of war is all but foredoomed to failure by the propensity of people everywhere to believe what they wish to believe rather than to accept truths which clash with cherished pride and prejudice. The preconditions of enduring peace, and therefore of law, order, justice, and freedom, in a world community of nations can be stated very succinctly, albeit at the risk of apparent dogmatism. In all past experience, peace has been a product of government—i.e., of the organization of the community
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into a preponderance of power exercised by the dispensers of force, fraud, and favors among individual citizens, who cooperate and obey out of fear, love, and calculations of advantage. Never have peace, order, law, and justice been attained in any community, whether consisting of individuals, families, clans, tribes, provinces, or nations, without government or against government. In the global community of the Western State System, there can be stable and enduring peace only through world government—and in no other way whatever. Such a regime, in theory, could be brought into being through the voluntary transfer by sovereignties of limited but adequate powers to enact law enforceable on individuals and to keep peace among States through authority to tax, to legislate, to impose its statutes, and to require submission of interstate disputes to its own political or judicial tribunals. But in fact such a step is apparently blocked by the stubborn devotion of men and women everywhere to their tribal gods and by their ignorance, suspicion, and fear in the face of all proposals that all sovereignties pool a portion of their power for the sake of the common defense and general welfare.

Having thus rejected in the name of "realism" the only realistic way of arriving at peace—and yet being sorely beset and anxious over the periodic recurrence of soul-searing and world-shattering contests in arms among sovereignties—contemporary mankind persists in believing that peace can somehow be had by mystic rituals of semantics and statesmanship which are as relevant to the problem as are the incantations of preliterate sorcerers to the cause and cure of disease. "National preparedness" and "collective security" are currently the most widespread and pernicious of these illusions. Certain others deserve mention, however, in what must unhappily be a catalogue of follies on the part of politicians, publicists, and patriots. The sad task of enumerating and refuting these errors is justified only by the thought that the discovery of wisdom is impossible without the exposure of fallacy.

The Fable of Outlawing War. The solution of the problem of peace through international agreements, wherein the signatories pledge themselves to refrain from war, is not distinctive of the post-Versailles and post-Potsdam periods. Early treaties pledging eternal peace and friendship among the parties constituted, by implication, a renunciation of war, as do all treaties providing for the pacific settlement of disputes. The League Covenant was such a treaty, as were the Locarno agreements of 1925.

The conclusion of the Locarno Pacts was followed by negotiations, initiated by the Soviet Union, for similar pacts in eastern Europe. On December 17, 1925, the first of these treaties was concluded at the Soviet Embassy in Paris between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey. Article 1 provided for the neu-
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trality of each party in the event of the other party being attacked by any third party or parties. In Article 2 each party undertook not to attack the other and not to participate in hostile acts or agreements with third parties directed against the other, including financial and economic boycotts. The appended protocols provided for pacific means of settlement. "The best proof of the peaceable intentions of the agreement," declared Litvinov, "is the fact that the Soviet Government is ready to conclude an analogous agreement with all countries with which it has normal relations." Similar non-aggression pacts were concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Germany (April 26, 1926), Lithuania (September 28, 1926), Afghanistan (August 31, 1926), Persia (October 1, 1927), Estonia (May 2, 1932), Latvia (February 5, 1932), Finland (January 21, 1932), Poland (July 25, 1932), France (November 29, 1932), and—ironically—with Germany once more (August 23, 1939).

The Soviet Union supplemented its nonaggression pacts by efforts to define aggression. At the London Economic Conference of 1933, Litvinov signed a multilateral convention defining aggression with Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey (July 3), another with Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Turkey, and Jugoslavia (July 4), and a third with Lithuania (July 4). Finland adhered later. These agreements were based upon the Polits Report (May 24, 1933) of the Security Committee of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference, which in turn was based upon the proposals of the Soviet delegates at Geneva. They declared that the aggressor in an international conflict would be considered that State which first declares war, invades foreign territory, attacks the territory, naval vessels, or aircraft of another State, imposes a naval blockade, or aids armed bands to invade the territory of another State.

These agreements and various others to be noticed below were all regional in character and provided for the renunciation of war by bilateral or multilateral agreements. The Covenant of the League and the Charter of U.N. were general renunciations of war by world-wide agreement. Following the establishment of the League, a long series of efforts was embarked upon to render more specific and effective the obligations not to resort to war. The first of these was embodied in the Cecil-Requin Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923, which declared (Article 1) that "aggressive war is an international crime and [the contracting parties] severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commission." The knotty problem of defining aggression was to be left to the League Council, which would designate the State which was the victim of aggression in a particular conflict and therefore entitled to assistance from the other signatories. After the rejection of this arrangement, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 appeared. Its preamble asserted that "a
war of aggression constitutes a violation of [the solidarity of the members of the international community] and an international crime.” It contemplated the amendment of the Covenant and provided that the signatory States would agree “in no case to resort to war,” except in resistance to aggression or with the consent of the Council or Assembly. The signatories also agreed to “abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression against another State.” An aggressor State was defined as one going to war after refusing to accept the procedures for pacific settlement provided for or rejecting a decision. In doubtful cases the Council would designate the aggressor and apply sanctions. The British Government failed to ratify the Protocol, and it was abandoned. The Locarno Pacts followed as a regional substitute for general agreement.

The negotiations preceding the Kellogg-Briand Pact (the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War) had been initiated in June, 1927, by a proposal from M. Briand to Secretary of State Kellogg for a bilateral Franco-American treaty solemnly renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Mr. Kellogg, with the support of peace seekers everywhere, proposed making the treaty multilateral and general. Briand agreed, provided that it should be restricted to “wars of aggression.” Kellogg dissented, and the French Government finally agreed to general renunciation. Great Britain agreed to become a party on condition of reserving its liberty of action in “certain [undefined] regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety.” This British “Monroe Doctrine” was accepted, though the Canadian and Irish Governments and subsequently the Egyptian, Turkish, and Persian Governments declared themselves not bound by it. The Pact was signed at the Quai d'Orsay on August 27, 1928, by representatives of 15 States. By the close of 1930 it had been adhered to by 61 States, Argentina and Brazil being the only important abstainers. After considerable wrangling over ratification and some subsequent interpretations and understandings, President Hoover proclaimed the Pact in force on July 24, 1929. Its text follows:

... Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind;

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which hereafter seeks to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;

Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provi-
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sions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy; [the high contracting parties] have decided to conclude a Treaty and for that purpose have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries.

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article 2

The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

Article 3

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the high contracting parties named in the preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington.

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties hereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to furnish each Government named in the preamble and every Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence.

The Soviet Union was the first to ratify the Pact, despite the fact that it was denounced in Moscow for its indefiniteness and irrelevance. On December 29, 1928, the Soviet Minister in Warsaw proposed that the two Powers, along with Lithuania, should sign a Protocol (the "Litvinov Protocol") making the Pact effective between them at once without waiting for the general exchange of ratifications. The Soviet note deplored Poland's earlier refusal to sign a nonaggression and neutrality agreement. The Polish Government accepted in principle but made formal objections and counterproposals for the inclusion of Rumania and all the Baltic States. Litvinov accepted these suggestions at once. Lithuania had already accepted the Soviet proposal on January 3, 1929, and suggested to Latvia and Estonia that they should adhere to the Protocol. On February 9, 1929, the Protocol was signed.
at Moscow by representatives of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Rumania. Lithuania and Turkey adhered on April 1, Danzig on April 30, and Persia on July 4. Simultaneous efforts to "close the gap in the Covenant" by incorporating the Kellogg Pact into amendments failed.

In summary, then, the States of the world renounced war and agreed to enforce this renunciation by refusing to recognize any advantage, territorial or otherwise, achieved by one State through warlike coercion of another. Why, then, was peace not assured? The explanation of this paradox is to be found in part in the meaning attached to the Pact in the interpretative notes and understandings which preceded its ratification. No technical "reservations" were made. At French insistence, however, the Pact was expressly understood not to apply to wars of self-defense or to obligations under existing military alliances. At British insistence the Pact was understood not to interfere with a State's liberty of action in areas vital to its interests—and these areas were purposely left undefined in the British "Monroe Doctrine." In the United States, it was understood (at least by the State Department) that the Pact in no way interfered with the right of the United States to enforce the American Monroe Doctrine—likewise undefined—in the name of self-defense. During the negotiation of the Pact, representatives of the United States at Havana strongly opposed the nonintervention resolution sponsored by the Latin Americans. It was agreed by all parties that the Pact forbade only "wars of aggression" and did not apply to defensive hostilities, to hostilities against a State violating its obligations under the agreement, or to hostilities required by the League Covenant, the Locarno Treaties, or other engagements of alliance or neutrality. 16

The Pact, moreover, lacked any effective means of enforcement. It was understood that if one signatory violated the Pact the others were released from it. The Pact was no stronger than its weakest link. But a State resorting to force to protect or promote its interests can always argue, with much show of reason, that the Pact does not apply, since it is acting in "self-defense." It can also argue, with equal reason, that all measures of "settlement" unaccompanied by a declaration of war are "pacific," as indeed they are in a technical, legal sense. Other States may dissent, and "world opinion" (if one admits its possibility in a world of multitudinous diversity and discord) may condemn. But a State which is strong and determined will not be restrained by verbal censure. It will be restrained only by superior force.

16 Under the Pact and comparable instruments, an aggressor may be legally defined as a State which persists in resorting to force contrary to obligations it has assumed and in violation of procedures it has accepted for implementing such obligations. See Quincy Wright, "The Concept of Aggression in International Law," American Journal of International Law, July, 1935, pp. 373-395.
The efficacy of the Stimson Doctrine as a restraining influence was negligible. The Foreign Office at Tokyo, in its note to the United States of January 16, 1932, commented dryly:

The Government of Japan takes note of the statement by the Government of the United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens or which might be brought about by means contrary to the Treaty of August 27, 1928. It might be the subject of an academic doubt, whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and always voids the ends secured, but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means, that question does not practically arise.

In reality, the Stimson Doctrine failed of its purpose. On February 24, 1933, the League Assembly adopted a report of the Committee of Nineteen which provided that the members of the League would "continue not to recognize this regime [Manchukuo] either de jure or de facto." An advisory committee, with which the United States cooperated, recommended the exclusion of Manchukuo from international conventions, the nonacceptance of Manchukuan passports, and a number of postal, currency, and consular restrictions on relations with the new State. But on March 3, 1934, El Salvador granted formal recognition to Manchukuo; and on April 29, 1936, Germany concluded a commercial agreement constituting at least de facto recognition. The United States continued to provoke Japanese resentment by adhering to the Stimson Doctrine in the Far East, but neither the United States nor the League Powers formally applied the Doctrine to the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Indeed, the Italian decision to annex Ethiopia, rather than to set up a puppet State, was perhaps influenced by the Stimson Doctrine. This decision left other States with no practical means of withholding recognition from the fait accompli. The United States and certain other Governments, to be sure, continued for a time to maintain fictitious diplomatic posts at Addis Ababa, accredited to a nonexistent Ethiopian Government, and pretended to receive Italian diplomats only as representatives of Victor Emmanuel as "King of Italy" and not as "Emperor of Ethiopia." Germany, on the other hand, accepted the conquest by reducing her legation at Addis Ababa to a consulate general on July 25, 1936, and on October 25 expressly recognized Italian title. Austria, Hungary, and Japan followed suit. In May, 1938, the League Council renounced the Stimson Doctrine. General recognition of Italian title to Ethiopia followed. The device of the legal boycott did not outlaw war, restrain aggression, or prevent conquest. The underlying assumption of the Doctrine was as naïve and as far removed from the realities of international politics as was the whole theory of the outlawry of war itself.
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The Kellogg Pact and other agreements for the renunciation of war, however, had one legal effect of temporary significance. They rendered it expedient for States to refrain from formal declarations of war or from the expression of any intention to inaugurate a state of war in the legal sense. Even this myth, however, soon became a thing of shreds and patches. After years of armed combat, Paraguay abandoned the pretense of "peace" and declared war on Bolivia on May 10, 1933. Neighboring States declared their neutrality. In 1935-36 Italy, the only European Great Power which had signed the Argentine Anti-War Treaty of 1933, openly violated that compact, as well as the Kellogg Pact, the League Covenant, and other engagements, by waging war upon and destroying the last independent kingdom of Africa. Although the Covenant was invoked against Italy, the other agreements were conveniently forgotten, as was the Stimson Doctrine. The U.S., before the outbreak of hostilities, merely expressed the hope that Italy and Ethiopia would both observe their obligations. In October, however, the American Government recognized the existence of a state of war and proclaimed its neutrality. But it did not adopt any "common and solidary attitude" with other neutrals. Here the renunciation of war broke down completely, and the status of belligerents and neutrals in an anarchic State System resumed its ancient sway. The assumption of violence and the law of the jungle in international politics are not to be uprooted by pious hopes, however solemn are the pacts in which such hopes are incorporated.

The revival of the concept of outlawing war in the Nuremberg trials, in the U.N. Charter (Article 2), and in various supplementary regional agreements in no way alters the judgment already rendered by logic and by events. On the contrary, the verdict is confirmed. That the point needs reemphasis after 32 centuries of failure 17 is but fresh evidence of the determination of men and governments to believe what is untrue, to reject what is true, and to persist in devotion to formulas which are demonstrably unworkable.

The Dream of Disarmament. For many centuries many seekers after peace have believed that wars are caused by armaments, that arms races lead to conflict, and that peace can be had by agreement to limit or reduce national military and naval establishments. In reality, the reverse is more nearly true: war machines are reduced only when peace seems probable, the expectation of conflict leads to competition in armaments, and armaments spring from war and from the anticipation of war. Yet men have long sought to put the cart before the horse—since the horse is intractable and best ignored, while the cart can be moved about at will, even if to no effect.

17 See p. 31.
The record of failure between world wars is worth recalling. Following the disarmament of Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the naval Powers began considering the possibility of putting an end to the new armaments race which had already begun. President Harding invited the other naval Powers—Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy—to attend a Conference, which was broadened to include China, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal, for the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems. The measure of success achieved by the Washington Conference, which met on November 12, 1921, has never been equaled by any succeeding disarmament conference. Its success was due to the fact that none of the participants had any political purposes to serve by establishing its naval superiority over any of the others and that all of them had both a political and a financial interest in stabilizing armaments at the existing levels. If naval armaments were limited or reduced proportionately for all, the “security” and the fighting potential of each would be unaffected. In the opening address of the Conference, Charles Evans Hughes, the American Secretary of State, offered to abandon the American building program in return for concessions from Great Britain and Japan. He proposed limitation and reduction on the basis of the status quo, through the scrapping of certain ships and the abandonment of building plans.

This bold proposal was at length accepted; Great Britain, the United States, and Japan agreed on a 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships, i.e., battleships and battle cruisers. France and Italy later accepted a ratio of 1.67 each. The Five Power Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed February 6, 1922, provided for the scrapping of 68 ships, built or planned. The United States was left with 18 capital ships of 525,850 tons, Great Britain with 20 ships (most of them smaller and older than the American) of 558,950 tons, Japan with 10 of 301,320 tons, France with 10 of 221,170 tons, and Italy with 10 of 182,800 tons. The treaty likewise limited aircraft carriers to a total of 135,000 tons each for Great Britain and the United States, 81,000 for Japan, and 60,000 each for France and Italy. No agreement could be reached on other types of vessels.

On February 10, 1927, President Coolidge invited Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy to participate in a Conference with the United States to limit construction of the types of vessel not covered by the Washington agreement. Great Britain and Japan accepted, but France and Italy refused.

The Geneva, or Coolidge, Conference, which met on June 20, 1927, was thus a three-Power conference, with the participants represented by their delegations to the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. These gentlemen were largely admirals and naval experts with no great enthusiasm for abolishing their own jobs. On August
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4 the Conference broke up in failure. On February 13, 1929, the American Congress authorized the President to construct fifteen 10,000-ton cruisers and one aircraft carrier at a cost of $274,000,000.

On April 22, 1929, Mr. Hugh Gibson, at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, took the first step toward allaying the new friction by declaring that the United States was prepared to consider further limitation and reduction on the basis of the French thesis: global limitation by tonnage and division of total tonnage for each State into the four categories of capital ships, aircraft carriers, surface vessels below 10,000 tons, and submarines, with maximums fixed for each category. The way was gradually prepared for a new agreement. The British Government, in view of the Kellogg Pact, decided to reduce its cruiser demands from 70 to 50 units.

On October 4, MacDonald arrived in New York on a good-will tour, and, on October 8, invitations to a new naval conference were dispatched by the British Government to the United States, Japan, France, and Italy after the Prime Minister had spent a week end with Hoover at Rapidan.

The London Naval Conference opened on January 21, 1930. It eventuated in a partial, ambiguous treaty for arms limitation, signed April 22, 1930—which is not worth summarizing since its terms were nullified within a few years.

The General Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations—the culmination of a decade of international efforts to attain disarmament and ensure peace—met at Geneva on February 3, 1932, with Arthur Henderson presiding over 232 delegates, representing 57 States. By an ironic coincidence, open warfare was going on at Shanghai while the delegates deliberated at Geneva. Five main committees were created to deal with budgetary limitation, political problems, and land, air, and naval armaments. The delegates brought with them no less than 337 separate proposals. On February 5 André Tardieu, head of the French delegation and, perhaps not inappropriately, Minister of War, presented a sensational scheme for the creation of a “preventive and punitive international police force” through action by the various States to place at the disposal of the League of Nations civil aircraft over a specified tonnage, bombing planes, and all other “offensive” weapons such as capital ships, batteries of long-range artillery, and submarines. This scheme was to be accompanied by compulsory arbitration and a new definition of aggression. The proposal at once encountered strong American, British, and German opposition. This and other proposals got nowhere. The Conference was stillborn.

No useful purpose would here be served by reviewing the painful tale of the subsequent efforts to breathe life into the Conference and of its slow decline and miserable demise. Stresemann had died on October 3, 1929.
Briand died on March 7, 1932. Failure greeted all efforts to prevent the Conference from following him to the grave. Neither President Hoover's dramatic proposals of June 22, 1932, nor Chancellor von Papen's obscure schemes of a Franco-German alliance, nor the “Beneš Resolution” of July 23 recording “progress” achieved, nor Germany's threat to withdraw of September 14, nor the “equality formula” offered to Berlin on December 6, nor MacDonald's appeal of March 10, 1933, nor Roosevelt’s plea of May 16, 1933, nor even Norman Davis's pledge of May 22, 1933, promising no American obstruction to collective sanctions against peacebreakers, was able to break the deadlock.

The Nazi revolution of 1933 delivered the coup de grâce. The refusal of the French bloc to grant arms equality to Germany had contributed to the triumph of German Fascism. The destruction of the Republic by Hitler's belligerent followers convinced the French bloc of the wisdom of having refused arms equality to Germany. German Fascism would take by force what German democracy had been unable to obtain by bargaining. The France which had not hesitated to send troops against the disarmed Germany of 1923 would not dare to send troops against the rearmed “Third Reich.” The new German rulers were not interested in equality of armaments rights save in so far as the slogan of Frieden und Gleichberechtigung could serve the purposes of propaganda at home and abroad. Their new objectives in foreign policy called for the militarization of the nation on such a scale as to dwarf Hohenzollern militarism into insignificance. They moved at once to create a colossal war machine. They were deterred from repudiating immediately the League, the Disarmament Conference, the Treaty of Versailles, the Locarno engagements, and all other legalistic impedimenta in the way of Fascist imperialism only by considerations of diplomatic expediency. To proceed step by step, to becloud the issue on each occasion with reassuring promises and specious “peace” proposals, to play upon British and French fears, sympathies, and anxieties—these were the techniques which would involve few risks and open the road for the downfall of the French bloc, the conquest of Czechoslovakia, the Danube Valley, and the Ukraine, and the establishment of German military hegemony over Europe.

All discussion of reducing armaments now became utterly futile. On the fatal morning of October 14, 1933, Sir John Simon presented to the Bureau of the Conference a statement, approved by France and the United States, designed to meet German demands for arms equality and French demands for security. The essence of the compromise was a four-year transitional period during which Germany would be content with her inferior status and after which the heavily armed Powers would begin to reduce their armaments. The reply from Berlin came within three hours: without warning or
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discussion, Germany announced her withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. Hitler's first venture in the rude diplomacy of the *fait accompli* was a success. The other Powers gasped and did nothing. The German electorate almost unanimously endorsed the policy of isolation and defiance in the referendum of November 12. The Conference at Geneva expired.

Corpses are not interred when no one will assume responsibility for burial. The dead body of the Disarmament Conference long remained exposed to view at Geneva, the assembled diplomats ever and anon addressing it as though it lived and shuddering slightly at their macabre humor. On January 31, 1934, London sought to induce Berlin to return to the Conference by proposing that the Reich be permitted to have military aircraft, heavier artillery, and more numerous battalions. Mussolini made a similar gesture. He also proposed the abolition of chemical warfare and prohibition of bombardment of civilian populations. (Two years later, his bombing planes were raining poison gas on defenseless Ethiopians!) France spurned such schemes, demanded security, and pointed in alarm to the Nazi Stormtroops.

On March 16, 1935, Germany repudiated Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and reintroduced military conscription. Arthur Henderson died on October 20, 1935. On March 7, 1936, Germany repudiated Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, denounced Locarno, and sent troops into the demilitarized Rhineland. After 16 years, the circle of frustration was closed. Efforts at world disarmament through the League had begun with the unilateral disarmament of Germany. The efforts ceased with the unilateral rearmament of Germany. The collective intelligence of Europe, having failed to achieve security, turned toward preparations for suicide.

Simultaneously the great sea Powers reached a similar impasse. Naval disarmament had begun in 1921 with the termination of an Anglo-American-Japanese naval race. Naval disarmament ended in 1936 with the resumption of the race. This melancholy tale of failure—as menacing to peace in the Pacific as was the failure at Geneva to peace in Europe—revolved about American opposition to Japanese demands for naval parity. Preliminary conversations looking toward a new naval agreement to replace the Washington and London Treaties were initiated in the winter of 1933-34. Washington proposed the continuation of established ratios. Tokyo proposed the abolition of long-range battleships and cruisers and equality between reduced Japanese and American fleets. Neither Government receded from this position in later discussion. In June, 1934, tripartite negotiations in London revealed that no basis existed for an agreement. Japan contended that the increased cruising radius of battleships, the increased range of guns, and the development of transoceanic aircraft threatened Japanese security under the 5:5:3
ratio. She proposed parity and a reduction of navies to purely defensive forces. The United States contended that parity of navies would not afford parity of security, since the United States, unlike Japan, had two continental coast lines to defend and had vulnerable positions in the far Pacific. The result was a deadlock.

An unsuccessful disarmament conference is always worse than none at all, for it increases suspicions and insecurity and promotes preparation for war. Wisdom would have dictated that no new naval conference be held when it became clear that the Washington and London Treaties were doomed and that the Japanese and American positions were irreconcilable. But Downing Street and the State Department were imbued with the Anglo-Saxon conviction that talk around a table is always desirable. They pressed for a conference, promised in the 1930 settlement. The preliminary negotiations ended in December, 1934, with Britain and the United States opposing the Japanese plea for parity and maneuvering to put the blame for a breakdown on Tokyo. On December 29, 1934, Ambassador Hirosi Saito submitted a communication to Secretary of State Hull:

In accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty concerning the limitation of naval armament signed at Washington on the 6th February 1922, the Government of Japan hereby gives notice to the Government of the United States of America of their intention to terminate the said Treaty, which will accordingly cease to be in force after the 31st December 1936.

The London Treaty of 1930 was scheduled to expire on the same date. Washington moved at once to build its fleet up to full treaty strength by 1942. President Roosevelt expressed his conviction that the United States must keep pace in building with other naval Powers so as to maintain the 5:5:3 ratio. The British Government eyed the new German Navy with some apprehension. On June 18, 1935, in the name of "realism," Sir Samuel Hoare announced a Naval Pact with Joachim von Ribbentrop whereby the Reich was granted a Navy 35% of the strength of the British Navy in all categories of vessels save submarines, which Germany might build up to 45% or even 100% of the British strength. This agreement, so far as Britain was concerned, superseded the naval limitations imposed upon Germany at Versailles. It was negotiated by Downing Street three months after London had protested against German violation of the armaments clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. It was negotiated, moreover, without consultation with France and the U.S.S.R., both of which felt that they had been betrayed by Britain and were directly menaced by German sea forces. Moscow and Paris moved to increase their fleets in the face of this threat, just as the United States increased its Navy in the face of Japan's demand for parity.
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Despite these inauspicious developments, delegations from the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy met in London on December 9, 1935. Neither the American-Japanese nor the Franco-Italian deadlock over parity had been resolved. Each delegation reiterated the proposals already made by its Government. Speeches, appeals, and counterproposals effected no compromise. An American plea for a 20% reduction in navies with existing ratios continued met with no support. The Japanese plea for a “common upper limit” was rejected. On January 15, 1936, the Japanese delegation withdrew from the Conference. Negotiations continued among the four remaining Powers. On March 25, 1936, a new Naval Treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, and the United States. Japan would have none of it. Italy refused to sign in the face of League sanctions and British naval threats in the Mediterranean.

The new Treaty provided neither for reduction nor quantitative limitation of naval armaments. Its only contribution was an agreement on the tonnage and guns of war vessels. Capital ships were limited to 35,000 tons and to 14-inch guns—or to 16-inch guns in the event of Japanese nonadherence. No capital ship of less than 17,500 tons would be laid down prior to January 1, 1943. Aircraft carriers were limited to 23,000 tons and 6.1-inch guns, light surface vessels to 8,000 tons, and submarines to 2,000 tons. The signatories agreed to exchange information on future building programs. Numerous “safeguarding” and “escape” clauses opened the way for departure from even these limited restrictions. The American and British Governments reiterated their adherence to the principle of parity between themselves. London and Tokyo availed themselves of the escape clauses of earlier agreements to enlarge their fleets before the close of 1936.

By the beginning of 1937, all treaties imposing quantitative restrictions on the three great naval Powers were at an end. By March, the British Government had announced plans for constructing 238,000 tons of new battleships, including three 35,000-ton dreadnoughts, and for expending over £100,000,000 in the ensuing year on naval armaments. The United States followed suit, and Japan struggled desperately to keep pace with her wealthier rivals in a naval race which was far costlier and more dangerous than that which preceded 1914. On April 28, 1939, Hitler denounced the Anglo-German Naval Pact of 1935 on the ground that Britain’s alliance with Poland was hostile to the Reich and a violation of the purpose of the agreement. Disarmament had become a memory. On the walls at the feast of Belshazzar, the destruction of his kingdom was foretold by the cryptic words mene, mene, tekel, upharsin. The letters of FAILURE, written large over the portals of successive disarmament conferences during the two decades after Versailles, became letters of impending catastrophe for the Western world.
The tragic experience of the past led the victors of World War II to say less about disarmament than had those of World War I. The Atlantic Charter, to be sure, included the old slogan. But the U.N. Charter, unlike the Covenant, contained no specific provision for reduction of armaments. Molotov's ambitious program for disarmament, presented to the Assembly on October 29, 1946, recalled Litvinov's similar plea before the League Preparatory Commission in November, 1927, in that it was designed to embarrass the Western Powers. A unanimous Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, called upon the Security Council to make plans for the reduction and limitation of armaments. These pious hopes, as usual, came to nothing, since they were based on precisely the delusions which had doomed similar efforts to dismal failure between 1919 and 1939. But here, as elsewhere in international affairs, "the true test of faith is to believe what is absurd."

The Magic of Militarism. Those who are skeptical of disarmament as a means to peace (and sometimes even those who are enthusiastic over it) readily comfort themselves with the thought that, if peace can be kept in no other way, it can surely be kept by "my" nation amassing such formidable armaments that "your" nation and others will never dare to risk war. This fallacy is as old as States and State Systems. In an anarchic community of nations, arms are tools of national power. They are never means of keeping peace, unless they are used, as Roman arms were used, to extinguish the sovereignty of all other States. Only on this condition is there any validity in the old Roman adage: Si vis pacem, para bellum. ("If you wish peace, prepare for war.") Competitive national armaments make war more, not less, likely, particularly when powerful States seek to arm themselves to a degree which will intimidate all rivals and, in intent, render them helpless. This hallucination of declining civilizations is as old as Nineveh and as new as the atomic arms race. "Militarism," observes Arnold J. Toynbee, "has been by far the commonest cause of the breakdowns of civilizations during the last four or five millennia which have witnessed the score or so of breakdowns that are on record up to the present date. Militarism breaks a civilization down by causing the local States into which the society is articulated to collide with one another in destructive fratricidal conflicts. In this suicidal process the entire social fabric becomes fuel to feed the devouring flame in the brazen bosom of Moloch." 18

With rare exceptions, those whose chosen profession is arms have never displayed any desire or capacity to admit the fact that armaments are meant for war and have no other function. Since all men are moved by conscience

18 A Study of History, one-volume abridgment, p. 190.
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to pay lip service to peace, all militarists through the ages have found it useful to demand bigger and better armaments as means of "preserving peace"—and have invariably found millions of deluded patriots ready to accept their view. Napoleon, the Kaiser, Mussolini, Hirohito, and Hitler incessantly told their countrymen and the world that their war machines were intended solely for "defense" and the "maintenance of peace."

Since the autumn of 1945 not a week has gone by without some prominent American general, admiral, or diplomat telling his fellow citizens that the safety of America and the peace of the world depend upon American military, naval, aerial, and atomic supremacy. Soviet citizens have been told precisely the same thing by Soviet commanders and officials. That the thesis is utterly false, as shown conclusively by the experience of 5,000 years, does not in the least prevent politicians, patriots, and even peace seekers from accepting it with zest and alacrity.

The Democratic Delusion. During World War I, and to a greater degree during World War II, another fiction won widespread support in the U.S.A. and in western Europe. This is the contention that wars are initiated by autocracies, dictatorships, or totalitarian despotisms, that democracies are by nature peaceful, and that world peace can be assured by "making the world safe for democracy" and liberating all peoples from tyrants—presumably through world war. Clarence K. Streit in his pleas for a federation of democracies has repeatedly expounded this thesis, as have innumerable political leaders, diplomats, strategists, journalists, and preachers in the Atlantic communities.

Here again the most elementary knowledge of history suffices to dispel the delusion, although in fact it never does for those who insist on believing not what is true but what they wish to believe. Only this much of the thesis is valid: military dictators frequently, and Fascist regimes almost invariably, solve their economic, social, and political problems at home by planning and waging wars abroad. In such cases, war becomes less a weapon of State power than a tool of domestic politics. Even here, however, war is possible only because the international community is not organized to make it impossible. War is the fruit of anarchy among sovereignties. It is not, and has never been, the direct result of ideological or institutional peculiarities.

Indeed, were any such correlation to be established, it would suggest precisely the opposite of what is intended and argued by the disciples of this school of mythmakers. The great colonial empires in Africa and Asia were, for the most part, acquired by wars of conquest. The most numerous and successful aggressions in this process were perpetrated, not by undemocratic governments, but by Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and pre-Fascist Italy. The U.S.A., moreover, declared war on England in 1812 in
the hope of conquering Canada and Florida; plotted the annexation of Texas and California; attacked Mexico in 1846 and relieved it of almost half its territory; unleashed war against Spain in 1898; "took Panama" in 1903; occupied many of the Caribbean Republics for varying periods of years; and defied Germany and Japan in 1940-41 by giving open aid to their enemies. All these acts may be judged necessary and proper in terms of national interest. But they demolish the argument that democracies, through some subtle and undefined virtue, are necessarily peace-loving while non-democracies are bellicose.

Quincy Wright, in the most comprehensive study of war thus far made, summarizes his findings in the matter as follows:

Statistics can hardly be invoked to show that democracies have been less often involved in war than autocracies. . . . More convincing statistical correlations can be found by comparing the trend toward democracy in periods of general peace and away from democracy in periods of general war. This correlation, however, may prove that peace produces democracy rather than that democracy produces peace. . . . Democracies, while usually theoretically against war, often fail to take measures, whether to balance power or to organize the world democratically, which might preserve the peace. Instead, they insist upon policies which . . . are in fact likely to lead to war.19

Another current fable deserves mention here: the idea, very popular in Anglo-American circles since 1945, that in international conferences and U.N. bodies, action by majority vote is "democratic" and that requirements of unanimity and use of the "veto" are "undemocratic" and a "defiance of the majority will." So absurd is this proposition that its refutation would be unnecessary save that so many have accepted it so blindly and clung to it so long.

In all diplomatic conferences, delegates represent sovereign governments, not populations or electorates. The concept of the "sovereign equality" of States, reflected in the principle of one vote for each, is not the fulfillment but the negation of democracy by any definition of the term. Among contemporary sovereignties, 36 have fewer than 10,000,000 people each, and of these the majority have fewer than 5,000,000 each, compared with hundreds of millions in the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China, and India. To count all as equal is to count each inhabitant of Iceland as worth 1,000 inhabitants of the U.S.A. and each citizen of Panama as worth 1,000 Chinese. Half the members of the U.N. comprise among themselves a total of less than 8% of the world's population. Should these States vote together in the Assembly, they

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could outvote the delegates whose countries include four-fifths of the people of the world. To equate such procedures with "democracy" is to be guilty of obvious dishonesty or hopeless befuddlement.

The Fiction of Collective Security. One of the oldest and assuredly the most widespread and tenaciously held of the superstitions of the searchers after peace is the belief that the goal can be gained through arrangements by which all nations will agree to combined coercive action against any nation breaking the law or taking the sword. All the theorists dealt with above accepted this view. It was written into the League Covenant. It was revived in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and, with the qualifications already noted, written into the U.N. Charter. It appeared, with minor variations, in the Geneva Protocol of 1924, the Locarno Pacts of 1925, the Act of Chapultepec of 1945, the Pact of Petropolis of 1947, and numerous other accords and projects.

The facile logic of "collective security" is so plausible as to appeal persuasively to all who are innocent of historical knowledge and incapable of analytical thought. If all States covenant together to use their combined power against any lawbreaking or war-making States, the offender will be restrained from his offense or, if not, will be swiftly frustrated and brought to justice. War will thus be at an end, except for international police action against States violating the law. Obviously, no State can resist the joint power of all other States turned against it. No State will run such a risk. Hence the alleged wisdom and necessity of including such stipulations in covenants, charters, and other treaties without end.

To assert that this principle also is irrelevant, false, and unworkable is to fly in the face of the considered judgment of the overwhelming majority of politicians, patriots, and even political scientists throughout the world. But here, as in all human affairs, principles are judged by their consequences in practice. If the record of the past is any guide to the possibilities of the future, the verdict—alas!—is wholly consistent and incontrovertible. When put to the test in all past and present State Systems, the theory of collective security has invariably broken down in evasion, irresponsibility, and failure, marked either by general acquiescence in successful aggression (which the theory is designed to prevent or punish) or by general and prolonged war (which the theory is designed to abolish). If there are any significant exceptions to this statement, they have never been made a matter of record.

The vexed question of the "vef" in the U.N. Security Council reveals anew the utter confusion resulting from efforts to keep peace by waging war.20 The framers of the Charter wisely provided that collective coercion, and all

20 On the general problem, see p. 332; on its relationship to the control of atomic energy, see Chap. XII.
other steps which might lead toward it, could be undertaken only with the unanimous approval of the Great Powers. That unanimity of the Big Five should also have been required for admission of new members and for decisions as to whether any particular question is procedural or substantive was perhaps unnecessary and unfortunate. In 1947-48, however, most advocates of “abolition of the veto” were firmly persuaded (or pretended to be) that peace could better be kept by coercing Great Powers than by not coercing them. Some took comfort in Article 51 (q.v.) of the Charter, under which, it was argued, individual or collective wars of “self-defense” could still be fought regardless of the veto—as if any war fought anywhere at any time had ever been presented by either side as anything other than an act of “self-defense.” Thus Sir Hartley Shawcross on June 10, 1947, spoke hopefully of Article 51 and said: “The plan which we aim at formulating will, we may hope, go as far as is possible toward organizing against an aggressor the forces of the rest of the United Nations.” Others wished to make very certain that wars could still be legalized in the name of keeping peace. On July 18, 1947, Dr. José Arce, for Argentina, formally proposed amendment of the Charter to eliminate the veto—a procedure which would also require unanimity of the Great Powers.

The assumption that a major Power, if deprived of the veto, placed in a minority of one, and menaced with collective sanctions by all other States, will yield without resistance to demands made upon it has no warrant whatever in logic or experience. The entire theory of peace through war here reaches a redictio ad absurdum which, in the weird reasoning of its advocates, can be stated thus: Peace can be kept if all States agree to coerce each State breaking the peace; but coercion of Great Powers will always be resisted and therefore means war, not peace; each Great Power should accordingly have the right of thwarting measures of collective coercion; but if the Powers are not in fact unanimous, there can then be no coercion at all; hence in such cases Great Powers should abandon the right to prevent coercion; all States will then be free to act together against the Great Powers; if the result is war instead of peace, the war at least will be “justified,” since it will be waged in the name of peace—which is precisely the case with every war ever fought since the dawn of history. The acceptance of such proposals can accomplish nothing except, in theory, to make all local wars general wars and to make a false formula for peace the occasion for ensuring bigger and better armed conflicts. It need scarcely be added, in the spirit of Gertrude Stein’s “A Rose Is a Rose,” that a war is a war whether it is vetoed or vetoless and whether it is fought in the name of States vs. States or of U.N. vs. aggressor States.

When in the chronicles of wasted time the historians of the future mourn-
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fully dissect the reasons for the failure of this latest scheme to keep the peace, they will discover that many of the reasons were plainly elucidated long before the United Nations was ever dreamed of. The crucial error lies in the false analogy between the members of a national society and the members of the “society” of nations. Since there is in fact no resemblance between them in their interrelations, either as to size, relative power, social cohesion, or disposition to act together, it follows that the coercion of the one by the many as a sanction of law and a means to peace is a wholly different matter in the two contexts. That two things utterly dissimilar should have come to be widely regarded as one and the same thing is doubtless a tribute to the anthropomorphic deification of the nation-state in modern times. Only if States were numbered by millions or at least by thousands, only if all were somewhat equal in power, only if all were bound together effectively by shared symbols and practices would it be possible to organize the community of States in the fashion which has been repeatedly and vainly proposed. Since the necessary conditions have always been lacking, the hoped-for result has never been attained.

The central error leads to a further error: the formula of the coercion of States by States. No single instance in all human experience can be cited wherein law has ever been effectively enforced or peace has ever been successfully maintained through an arrangement whereby States were subjected to economic and military pressures by an association of States, or even by a “central government” composed of States. On this rock every league and confederation through the ages has invariably been wrecked. The reason for failure is not mysterious. There is no way of coercing a State without penalizing collectively most or all of its inhabitants. People who are citizens of States are emotionally identified with local symbols of loyalty and not with the symbols of any league, association, or confederation of which their State happens to be a member. When a State is coerced, its leaders find it easy to rally popular support against the “police” (i.e., the other States imposing the coercion), while the “police officers” find it difficult or impossible to rally any popular support to the cause of coercion, even in their own States. As Mussolini discovered in 1935, the psychological cards are thus stacked in favor of the “criminal” and against the forces of “law and order,” a situation which is exactly the opposite of that prevailing in the relations among individuals in any national community. The invariable consequence is the failure or abandonment of the effort at coercion or war between the coercers and the coerced.

It is singular that these considerations are now perceived with a minimum of clarity by the very people whose “founding fathers” perceived them with a maximum of clarity. The essence of the fallacy was fully explored and ex-
posed in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. At the outset, many believed that law, order, and peace would be impossible in the then sadly dis-United States unless the new national government were given power to coerce the States. Both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans originally made provision for this type of collective security. The last clause of the Virginia Plan authorized the United States "to call forth the forces of the Union against any member of the Union failing to do its duty under the Articles thereof."

George Mason of Virginia argued that "punishment could not in the nature of things be executed on the States collectively, and therefore that such a Government was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt required it." James Madison opined that "the use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. . . . Any Government for the States formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States would prove . . . visionary and fallacious." 21

The New Jersey Plan specified that "if any State, or any body of men in any State, shall oppose or prevent ye carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth ye power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel obedience to such Acts, or an Observance of such Treaties." Said Mr. Randolph: "There are but two modes, by which the end of Genl. Govt. can be attained; the 1st. is by coercion as proposed by Mr. P.'s. plan. 2. by real legislation, as propd. by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended, also to habituate the instruments of it to shed blood & riot in the spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequently trained them up for the service of Ambition. We must resort therefore to a national Legislation over individuals." 22 Alexander Hamilton said that by "force" one might understand "a coercion of laws or coercion of arms. . . . But how can this force be exerted on States collectively? It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase and a dissolution of the Union ensue." 23 Added Madison:

The coercion, on which efficacy of the plan depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will be impregnable, the smaller only can feel

the vengeance of it. He illustrated the position by the history of the Amphictyonic Confederates: and the ban of the German Empire. It was the cobweb which could entangle the weak, but would be the sport of the strong.24

Colonel Mason agreed with this view and observed:

It was acknowledged by [Mr. Patterson] that his plan could not be enforced without military coercion. Does he consider the force of this concession? The most jarring elements of nature, fire and water themselves are not more incompatible than such a mixture of civil liberty and military execution. . . . Will not the citizens of the invaded State assist one another till they rise as one Man and shake off the Union altogether.25

Before the Virginia Convention called to pass upon the new Constitution, Madison said of one of the ancient Greek confederacies that “though its powers were more considerable in many respects than those of our present system, yet it had the same radical defect. Its powers were exercised over its individual members in their political capacities. To this capital defect it owed its disorders and final destruction. It was compelled to recur to the sanguinary coercion of war to enforce its decrees.” 26 Before the New York Convention, Hamilton put the matter even more strongly:

To coerce the States is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised. A failure of compliance will never be confined to a single State. This being the case, can we suppose it wise to hazard a civil war? . . . The thing is a dream, it is impossible. . . . What is the cure for this great evil? Nothing, but to enable the national laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as those of the States do.27

5. THE NEW FEDERALISTS

Experience is the oracle of truth and where its responses are unequivocal they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in its present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity by substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy.—The Federalist, No. 15.

We believe that peace is not merely the absence of war, but the presence of justice, of law, of order—in short, of government and institutions of government; that world peace can be created and maintained only under world law, universal and strong enough to prevent armed

26 Freeman and Paullin, op. cit., p. 16, quoting Elliott's Debates.
conflict between nations. . . . While endorsing the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a world community favorable to peace, we will work primarily to strengthen the United Nations into a world government of limited powers adequate to prevent war and having direct jurisdiction over the individual in those matters within its competence.—UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS, INC., 1946.

That Americans today should be committed to attempting on a world scale, where the difficulties are infinitely greater than they were in the United States of 1787, a program which the founders of their own Republic rightly dismissed as mad is a measure of the tragic frustration of our time. That the program should be persisted in after its futility has been demonstrated anew as recently as a decade ago at Geneva renders the tragedy greater and the inevitable frustration more bitter.

If peace can never be had through the coercion of States by the whole community of States, it is pertinent to inquire what other new departures, if any, are available. Only two offer substantial promise of attaining the goal. At present, both these are unhappily in the realm of the "academic," a term which has come to be synonymous with unimportant or impracticable. One is the abolition of a multiplicity of States through the universal dominion of a single Super-State. The other is a union of States through federation, a solution which the framers of the American Constitution were able to achieve but which many of their descendants are apparently unable even to understand. The former development would establish world citizenship in a World State, with no problems of relations among sovereignties remaining. The latter would establish a dual citizenship on a global scale, with all people bound both by a world federal law within a limited sphere and by State (i.e., national or municipal) law in all other spheres. Both solutions would replace the coercion of States by the enforcement of law on individuals.

Nothing can be clearer than that a single World Imperium to keep the peace is an impossibility. The achievements of the Caesars of ancient Rome and of the Mongol Khans of Tartary in the 13th century have not been duplicated in the Western State System and will not soon be realized. In the future as in the past, any effort to unite all mankind under one rule can reasonably be expected to encounter the same resistances that defeated the ambitions of Louis XIV, Napoleon I, Wilhelm II, Hitler, and Hirohito. Neither America nor Britain nor Russia will unite the world by the sword during the next generation. The international community will therefore remain a community of separate sovereignties.

The federation of these sovereignties is a far more promising enterprise.
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Such a union, like every federation, would involve a division of powers between central and local units of government by means of a written constitution which neither alone could change. It would also involve two citizenships and two spheres of law. The global federal law would be enforceable, not on States as States, but on individuals through courts. Within its designated area, it would prevail over national or municipal law in cases of conflict, with a world court not only adjudicating legal controversies among States but also acting in an appellate capacity as a court of last resort for the application and clarification of a body of constitutional principles actually commensurate with the integration and interdependence of the world community. The relations between the two spheres of law would be governed by the principle stated in Section 2 of Article VI of the fundamental charter of the American Union:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding.

The applicability of these principles to the world problem of uniting effectively a multiplicity of States without subjecting them to the coercion of one another or of a central authority has long been urged by many distinguished Americans. As long ago as 1910, Hamilton Holt wrote: “The United States must become the model for the United Nations.” More recently, the same conception has been presented ably and eloquently by many others, including Robert Lee Humber, Justice Owen Roberts, Ely Culbertson, the late Wendell Willkie, and Clarence K. Streit, founder of Federal Union. All recognize that federalism is no perfect guarantee of peace and that no such guarantee is possible in an imperfect world of imperfect men. One costly civil conflict was required to preserve the United States. A federal United Nations might experience similar crises. But the armed coercion of individuals defying federal authority is a wholly different process from the armed clash of States. In the difference lies the measure of the progress away from anarchy and toward government which federalism represents.28

Despite the fact that the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Brazil, Mexico, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Jugoslavia, and (prospectively) India all had federal governments, the coalition which won World War II and established the U.N. never gave serious consideration to creating a global federation rather

28 This passage and the concluding portions of the preceding section are adapted from “The Dilemma of the Peace-seekers,” American Political Science Review, February, 1945, by the author.
than a new league of sovereignties. Winston Churchill, to be sure, in his last despairing appeal of June 16, 1940, to Premier Paul Reynaud proposed a genuine Anglo-French federation as a means of keeping France in the war. The offer was not too little, but it was too late. Churchill never preached federalism again until after the war, and then only as a possible basis for an anti-Soviet coalition. At Dumbarton Oaks, Soviet spokesmen displayed mild interest in federalism as a basis of world order but later ridiculed and denounced all such projects as visionary, bourgeois, "imperialistic," and "anti-Soviet." Aside from the late Wendell Willkie, Henry A. Wallace, and, for a time, Harold Stassen, no prominent American leader raised his voice in favor of federalism during or after the war. Whatever interest President Roosevelt may have had in such a project was effectively stifled by the State Department. Under the Truman-Byrnes-Marshall regime, executive interest in world federation was conspicuous by its absence.

The task of educating public opinion to the merits of federalism fell to private citizens. To do justice to all the individuals and organizations which have participated in the enterprise is quite impossible. Yet a few deserve mention. Robert Lee Humber, acting effectively as a "one-man lobby" in state capitals, beginning in North Carolina in March, 1941, induced a dozen legislatures to adopt his "Declaration of the Federation of the World." On October 24, 1945, Senator Glen H. Taylor of Idaho introduced a resolution in the U.S. Senate, supported by an able address, proposing American action to transform U.N. into a federal world republic. A group of distinguished Americans endorsed a Declaration prepared in Dublin, N. H., October 16, 1945, calling for the replacement of U.N. by a World Federal Government, operating through a World Legislative Assembly, chosen on the principle of weighted representation and authorized to enact laws, within the defined area of its jurisdiction, enforceable on individuals. On February 1, 1946, the Dublin Conference Committee presented a petition to the U.N. General Assembly proposing extensive amendments of the Charter to achieve the federalists' goal. In mid-March, 1946, the Rollins College Conference on World Government proposed that the U.N. be "transformed from a league of sovereign states into a government deriving its specific powers from the peoples of the world," with the Assembly exercising limited powers of legis-

29 Including Alan Cranston, Grenville Clark, Thomas H. Mahony, Albert Einstein, Lewis Mumford, Rex Stout, Emery Reeves, Frank Aydelotte, Beardsley Ruml, Henry D. Smyth, Norman Cousins, Tom O. Griessemer, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Charles J. Bolte, Cord Meyer, Jr., Michael Straight, et al. A dissent was rendered by Owen J. Roberts, A. J. G. Priest, Michael William, Stringfellow Barr, and Clarence K. Streit on the ground that "simultaneously with efforts to attain a World Federal Government, the U.S. should explore the possibilities of forming a nuclear union with nations where individual liberty exists."
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lation and the Council functioning as an executive department. The Massachusetts Committee for World Federation sponsored referendum campaigns in 1942 and 1946. In the latter year the voters of the Commonwealth, 586,093 to 63,624, favored the transformation of U.N. into a limited federal government of the world. Resolutions to this effect were approved by the Massachusetts legislature in March, 1947.

Among the national organizations in the U.S.A. devoted to the cause of federalism in 1946-48, Clarence K. Streit’s Federal Union, Inc., advocated a union of democracies as a step toward global federation. United World Federalists, Inc. (headed by Cord Meyer, Grenville Clark, Norman Cousins, Thomas K. Finletter, W. T. Holliday, Robert Lee Humber, Raymond Swing, Carl van Doren, et al.) worked for a revision of the U.N. Charter to establish a universal world federation. In October, 1946, 75 delegates from 37 organizations in 14 countries met in Luxemburg in the first International Conference of Federalists to create an International Association of all such organizations. In August, 1947, 400 delegates from 82 organizations in 20 countries gathered in Montreux in the name of the World Movement for World Federal Government. They adopted a Declaration asserting that the U.N. “is powerless, as at present constituted, to stop the drift to war” and calling for a universal federation empowered to raise revenues independently, to maintain supranational armed forces, and to enact law enforceable on individuals—this to be furthered by a world constituent assembly to meet in 1950. “More than ever time presses. And this time we must not fail.” United World Federalists held their first annual convention in St. Louis, November 1-2, 1947, and voted to ally themselves with the World Movement and to work for global federation both inside and outside the U.N.

Another group working toward the same goal (with interesting variations) was the “Citizens’ Committee for United Nations Reform,” founded by Ely Culbertson. This versatile Russian-American, known to millions as a bridge expert, evolved out of his own cogitations about world peace his “Quota Force Plan,” according to which peace would be kept by a World Peace Force consisting of an International Contingent, directed by the U.N. Security Council and made up of volunteers from small States, with national contingents of the major Powers as reserves. The International Contingent would comprise 20% of the armed forces of the world, the U.S.A., U.K., and


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U.S.S.R. each having 20% and China and France having 10% each. This ingenious arithmetic, argued its author, would afford security to all States by leaving the giants sufficient power to resist attack and by affording the pygmies sufficient force for defense to render aggression impracticable. This scheme—"with Russia if possible, without Russia if necessary"—contemplated abolition of the "veto," measures for disarmament and control of atomic energy, and authorization to the World Court to decide when aggression occurs and to the Security Council to take punitive action. Its merit lay in its recognition of the facts of power. Its weakness lay in its appeal to Russophobes and its confusion between the federal process of enforcing law on individuals and the anarchic process of coercing States.

A more genuinely federal formula emerged from Robert M. Hutchins's "Committee to Frame a World Constitution," which published Common Cause and included among its members G. A. Borgese, Mortimer J. Adler, Stringfellow Barr, Albert Guerard, Robert Redfield, and Rexford G. Tugwell. Its tentative proposals, advanced late in 1947, contemplated a federal world government with powers of legislation and taxation comparable with those of the U.S.A. "If we wish to be saved," wrote Chancellor Hutchins, "we shall have to practice justice and love, practices which have long been commended to us by the very highest authority. . . . We hope to be ready before 1950. . . . The world at large will have ample occasion to learn from our success and failures and to teach us and others. . . . A pattern will be available. We do not think it will be adopted; we dare to hope that it will not be ignored."

The ultimate verdict of history on these endeavors was unclear as this volume went to press. The immediate verdict of politics was unfavorable. The new federalists were summoning mankind to renounce the cult of national power, to limit sovereignty, to build government in the world society with functions narrowly limited but adequate to keep the peace through legislation addressed to individuals rather than States. All logic and experience indicated that the problem of global peace could be solved in no other way. All men want peace. Most men were therefore prepared to subscribe to the federal principle in so far as they understood its meaning. But here, as always, men want some things more than peace: sovereignty, freedom, patriotism, national conceit, and all the rites and blood sacrifices of their tribal gods. That all these cherished values would become as dust in the event of World War III was not enough to prevent men everywhere from acting in their defense, or what they believed to be their defense—and thereby, in all likelihood, rendering their destruction inevitable.

The vain lament of Dante echoes down through the centuries, now as a grim curse and final warning. Men listen anxiously—and turn back, sorely
troubled but somehow comforted, to the creeds and delusions of times gone by. The sacrifice of sacred symbols required by a new departure is apparently beyond the capacity of today’s generation to make. Better to cling to the ancient faith and revert to sovereignty, anarchy, power politics, and war. If war in the atomic age should spell the suicide of the race or, at best, the irreparable ruin of Western civilization, this result would be deplored but would perhaps not be wholly unwelcome to a neurotic generation lacking skill or will to survive.

To cling to anarchy and violence in the holy name of defending virtue against vice is the path of least resistance. To build peace through global government calls for qualities of daring, imagination, and creative endeavor which seem beyond the power of rulers and ruled in an age of disenchantment and hysteria. “We have war,” said Bartolomeo Vanzetti, “because we are not sufficiently heroic for a life which does not need war.” Man’s adventures in world order threaten to end in deadlock and tragic frustration. The consideration of whatever hope remains is best deferred to the closing pages of this book.

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In all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbors; which is a posture of war. . . . The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. . . . It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no "mine" and "thine" distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long as he can keep it.—THOMAS HOBBES, Leviathan, 1651.

Book Three

DESIGN FOR ANARCHY

O Lord our God, help us to tear their soldiers to bloody shreds with our shells; help us to cover their smiling fields with the pale forms of their patriot dead; help us to drown the thunder of the guns with the cries of the wounded, writhing in pain; help us to lay waste their humble homes with a hurricane of fire; help us to wring the hearts of their unoffending widows with unavailing grief; help us to turn them out roofless with their little children to wander unfriendled through the wastes of their desolated land in rags and hunger and thirst, sport of the sun flames of summer and the icy winds of winter, broken in spirit, worn with travail, imploring Thee for the refuge of the grave and denied it—for our sakes, who adore Thee, Lord, blast their hopes, blight their lives, protract their bitter pilgrimage, make heavy their steps, water their way with their tears, stain the white snow with the blood of their wounded feet! We ask of One who is the spirit of love and who is the ever faithful refuge and friend of all that are sore beset, and seek His aid with humble and contrite hearts. Grant our prayer, O Lord, and Thine shall be the praise and honor and glory, now and ever. Amen.—MARK TWAIN, War Prayer.
INTRODUCTION TO BOOK THREE

War is less the product of evil within the hearts of men than of anarchy in the relations among men. When people murder their neighbors, burn their homes, and ravage their fields, they do so partly because collective fears and worries drive them to madness and brutishness. The primal beast in every man is civilized with difficulty. It breaks forth anew when inner anxieties and outer opportunities lend glamour to the guilty joys of pillage and butchery and enable men to externalize their aggressions with impunity. But aggressions flow from the maladjustments and frustrations of communities which are badly governed or governed in separate local areas not coterminous with the interests and needs of their inhabitants. Opportunities for collective crime result from ineffective enforcement of law. Where no central power exists to defend peace by restraining the use of force on the part of some against others and by imposing justice upon all, the result is anarchy. The inevitable fruit of anarchy in all civilized societies is war.

Anarchy is the absence of government. Where there is no government, each man fears and hates his fellows and protects his interests as best he can by his own strength. When government in an ordered society breaks down, all rivalries for power and all strivings for larger shares of available satisfactions sooner or later assume the form of violent conflict among individuals, classes, sections, parties, and factions. When, as in the world community of nations, government has not yet been established in a far-flung society which can no longer have order or peace without it, the local societies whose members have established peace and order within their frontiers become rivals among themselves—first for a brighter place in the sun and then for control of the tools of power which, once possessed, will enable each to coerce its neighbors and impose its demands and dreams upon them. Since trial by battle is the ultimate method of adjusting conflicts of claims among the members of such a society, each member is driven to seek superiority of fighting ability over his competitors in order that he may escape destruction at their hands and, if possible, destroy them lest he himself be destroyed.

These age-old motives and reckonings have characterized the conduct of sovereignties in every State System unwilling or unable to replace anarchy by government. Their inner nature and outer manifestations in the contemporary world society will be examined in the following chapters.
CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICS OF POWER

1. THE ASSUMPTION OF VIOLENCE

Plenty begets Pride; Pride, Envy, Envy, Warre, Warre, Poverty, Poverty humble Care; Humility breeds Peace, and Peace breeds Plenty; Thus around the World doth rowle alternately.


War is politics continued by other [i.e., forcible] means.—Clausewitz, On War.

When I say that the principal cause of war is war itself, I mean that the aim for which war is judged worth while is most often something which itself affects military power. Just as in military operations each side aims at getting anything which will give it a military advantage, so in diplomacy each side aims at getting anything which will enhance its power. Diplomacy is potential war. It is permeated by the struggle for power and when potential breaks out into actual war, that is usually because irreconcilable claims have been made to some element of power, and neither side can claim such preponderance as to compel the other to give way by a mere threat.—R. G. Hawtrey, Economic Aspects of Sovereignty.

The institution of war has troubled men's minds and tormented their souls since the first civilizations. Moralists have repeatedly denounced it as the greatest of evils. Statesmen have generally deplored it but often pronounced it salutary or necessary to preserve "independence," "honor," "freedom," and—"peace." Home-front patriots have usually found it good, in so far as it furnished patriotic excitement, vicarious joy of battle without risk, and, more frequently than not, jobs, contracts, profits, and wealth with a minimum of competitive effort. Soldiers and sailors have found it alternately beautiful and hideous, fascinating and boring, heroic and criminal, magnificent and monstrous. Most men and women would doubtless concur in the judgment of Croesus, King of Lydia, in his words of woe to Cyrus the Persian: "No one is so senseless as to choose of his own free will war rather than peace, since in peace the sons bury their fathers, but in war the fathers bury their sons."
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Yet it is only in periods of "World States" or Universal Empires that men have known peace as anything other than an interlude between wars. The anguish of spirit which war brings consciously to many, and unconsciously to all, stems from an inner conflict. All the higher religions of mankind and many of the lesser creeds have preached love and brotherhood among the children of God. But all men through the ages have found in war a stimulant to action, an occasion for self-sacrifice, a gaudy escape from tedium and guilt, and a means to the happiness, as Nietzsche put it, of "murder with a good conscience." War has ever been the epitome of the eternal conflict in men's hearts between the bestial and superhuman, the diabolical and the divine. Since men appear incapable of loving one another as members of humanity, they succeed in achieving their most plausible approximation to love, fellowship, solidarity, and collective endeavor for "unselfish" ends through fearing and hating and then butchering one another as members of national communities or religious cults or disciples of ideological creeds. Through war their frustrations, tensions, and aggressions find modes of expression which are not only socially sanctioned but are equated with the highest level of morality and selfless devotion in all the civilized cultures of the species. To ignore these aspects of organized violence among men would be to study international relations in a vacuum. Yet to pursue them would take us far afield.¹

War, it will here be argued, is a phenomenon of politics, to be understood as regards its cause and course and cure (if any) within the context of specifically political motives and practices. Love, fear, and hate are as universal as human experience itself. They are the wells of energy and action within all personalities which overflow at the command of the war makers. But men may, and often do, love their wives, their children, their neighbors rather than their country, State, or faith. They may discharge their hates, fears, and frustrations in private rather than public ways by beating their spouses, offspring, or dogs, brawling with their friends, abusing their employers or employees, or losing themselves in alcohol, sex, or gambling—all acts which, however deplorable, are less destructive to society as a whole than organized intergroup violence. War itself is not "instinctive" and is not implicit in "human nature." The collective fixations of rage, fright, or affection on the public symbols of government and fatherland, of "our" side and "their" side, is a product of a specific type of civic training and a particular pattern of political activity and purpose.

If it be true that the State itself, as a ubiquitous institution in all literate

¹ For an excellent statement of the problem, see "Tensions Affecting International Understanding" (Paris, UNESCO, May, 1947), A Preliminary Outline of a Study Project in the Social Sciences Section, prepared with the aid of Dr. Edward A. Shils.
cultures, most probably had its origins in violence, theft, and exploitation, then it might seem to follow that political man, acting in the name of the State, almost inevitably resorts to exploitation, theft, and violence in dealing with other States. The record of the past, however, scarcely supports any such sweeping conclusion. On the contrary, it suggests almost incontrovertibly that men organized into States are disposed to fight other men organized into States only when the States are fully sovereign and acknowledge no authority superior to themselves. The human communities named Illinois and Wisconsin, Sonora and Chihuahua, Ontario and Quebec, Kazak and Kirghiz are also “States.” They neither wage war nor assume its possibility among themselves because their citizens acknowledge a loyalty higher than their local allegiance. If such other communities as “France,” “Germany,” “the United States,” and “the Soviet Union” are in a different position toward one another, the difference lies precisely in the circumstance that no higher power stands above them.

The Will to Power. The broader aspects of interstate politics under these conditions admit of simple and precise description, thanks to the recorded experience of past and present State Systems and to the comments of shrewd observers through the centuries. The sovereign members of a community of States lacking common government must inevitably view one another with distrust and anxiety. Since each has no control over the acts of the others, enjoys no participation in any effective merging of local purposes into a larger polity, and accordingly has no assurance as to what others may do, all must suspect the worst of each. Every unit in such a System necessarily seeks safety by relying on its own power and viewing with alarm the power of its neighbors. This being so, the neighbors have no choice but to do likewise.

The “power” which must thus be solicitously guarded in one’s own State and looked at askance in other States is, in the last analysis, military power or fighting capacity. Power per se is ability to “win friends and influence people,” to evoke sympathy, to command obedience, to employ effectively all the devices of coercion, propaganda, and material indulements and deprivations likely to induce respect and cooperation. But the power which is of prime concern to sovereignties in dealing with other sovereignties is a quality at once simpler, more limited, and more uncertain than the power which concerns politicians, parties, pressure groups, lobbies, and voters acting within the framework of organized government. Here recourse to force is minimized and indeed effectively forbidden (usually) by those entrusted with a monopoly of coercive authority. Fraud and favors—i.e., appeals to

2 See p. 10.
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prejudice, reason, and avarice—are predominant under conditions regarded as normal. But among independent States these means of influence, while often important, are restricted in their scope and efficacy. The ultima ratio regum of sovereigns in dealing with other sovereigns is force.

From all past experience each State must assume that its capacity to protect its interests and defend its existence in the face of other States is contingent upon its ability to employ armed violence persuasively. With some exceptions to be noted presently, no State incapable of waging effective war can reasonably expect other States to meet its demands, heed its wishes, or even acknowledge its right to survival. In the bargaining processes of diplomacy, "prestige" is all-important. Prestige is reputation for power. Diplomacy is thus potential war, just as war is a business of seeking political objectives by military coercion rather than by bargaining. In both cases, ability to use arms with skill and success is rather more than likely to be decisive. The pursuit of power, therefore, tends to become an end in itself rather than a means to other ends. No other ends matter if the State lacks power to serve its ultimate end: self-preservation.

Concern with fighting capacity easily becomes an obsession by virtue of the fact that each State, ideally, can best preserve its power by expanding it and can most surely guarantee its own security by depriving others of theirs. Every sovereignty can best maintain its own independence against all possible threats by extinguishing the independence of its neighbors and rivals. If it possesses sufficient power to do so, and others lack sufficient power to resist the effort, it will, with almost mathematical certainty, proceed to subject them to its authority. This being so, each State which hopes to survive must not only maintain its own power in a shape adequate for all anticipated contingencies but must seek to thwart any enhancement of the power of others which might enable them to prevail in a test of force.

Power is thus a relative, not an absolute, quantity. One State's gain is, automatically, another's loss. Each State, moreover, will concern itself not with power in relationship to all other States, regardless of time or place, but only with power in relationship to particular States which are envisaged as rivals and potential foes. Power is local, as well as relative. Its efficacy diminishes as it is extended through distance, even in periods (like our own) of the most advanced technology for overcoming mileage and exerting force effectively at remote points.

The Waltz of the Powers. The Western State System has developed in such fashion that no one of its members possesses at any time sufficient power to extend its control over all the others. In the interests of self-defense, the members tend to combine against any one which is a potential menace to all. Invariably the pretender to world power is repressed by a coalition of
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the prospective victims. Each Power thus retains its independence, and the State System is preserved. Under these circumstances, an equilibrium, or balance of power, results. Any enhancement of the power of one State is a disturbance of the equilibrium and a potential threat to the others. At times this equilibrium is intangible, imponderable, and in the background of diplomatic action. At other times, it is clearly and sharply defined in alliances and coalitions. Each member of an alliance has an interest in forestalling any enhancement of the power of any member of the opposing alliance. The two coalitions, or groupings, of Powers are thus held together by common power interests, and conflicts for power become issues between the alliances as a whole. This pattern of power relationships has characterized the Western State System from its earliest beginnings.

The difficulties involved in the balancing process, and the delicacy and finesse with which operations must be conducted, were well put by Bolingbroke in the early 18th century:

The scales of the balance of power will never be exactly poised, nor is the precise point of equality either desirable or necessary to be discerned. It is sufficient in this as in other human affairs, that the deviation be not too great. Some there will always be. A constant attention to these deviations is therefore necessary. When they are little their increase may be easily prevented by early care and the precautions that good policy suggests. But when they become great for want of this care and these precautions, or by the force of unforeseen events, more vigor is to be exerted, and greater efforts to be made. But even in such cases, much reflection is necessary on all the circumstances that form the conjuncture; lest, by attacking with ill success, the deviation be confirmed, and the power that is deemed already exorbitant become more so; and lest, by attacking with good success, whilst one scale is pillaged, too much weight of power be thrown into the other. In such cases, he who has considered, in the histories of former ages, the strange revolutions that time produces, and the perpetual flux and reflux of public as well as private fortunes, of kingdoms and states as well as of those who govern or are governed in them, will incline to think, that if the scales can be brought back by a war, nearly, though not exactly, to the point they were at before this great deviation from it, the rest may be left to accidents, and to the use that good policy is able to make of them.8

The larger design, as exemplified in the Italian State System of the Renaissance, is thus described by Arnold J. Toynbee:

The Balance of Power is a system of political dynamics that comes into play whenever a society articulates itself into a number of mutually independent local States; and the Italian Society that had differentiated itself from the rest of Western Christendom had at the same time articulated itself in this very way. The movement to extricate Italy from the Holy Roman Empire had been carried through by a host of city-states which were striving, each for itself, to assert a

right of local self-determination; thus the creation of an Italian World apart and the articulation of this world into a multiplicity of States were coeval events. In such a world the Balance of Power operates in a general way to keep the average calibre of States low in terms of every criterion for the measurement of political power: in territory, population and wealth. For any State which threatens to increase its calibre above the prevailing average becomes subject, almost automatically, to pressure from all the other states within reach; and it is one of the laws of the Balance of Power that this pressure is greatest at the centre of the group of States concerned and weakest at the periphery.¹

The role of small States in this system of relationships is a peculiar one. The very minute States of Europe are historical curiosities and play no part in power relationships. But such States as Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Albania, and the like, are all adjacent to infinitely more powerful States which could easily impose their will upon them and extinguish their independence if granted a free hand. But usually this result is rendered impossible by the conflicting power interests of the great States themselves. The small States, being impotent, have no power interests of their own save the preservation of their independence; and this they are able to protect, not by their own power, but by fitting themselves into the power relations of their mighty neighbors. The small States are often "buffers." They stand at the focal points of tension between the Great Powers, with the result that each Power prefers the maintenance of the independence of the small State to the extinction of that independence at the hands of a rival Power. Portugal was long a buffer of this kind between Spain and England. The Low Countries lay between England, France, and Germany. Each of these States opposed control by either of the others of this strategically vital area containing the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt. During the past two centuries England has successively fought Spain, Austria, France, and Germany when these States threatened to dominate this region. Belgium and the Netherlands are (or were) thus relatively secure in their independence, because of the power relations between their larger neighbors. Denmark was similarly a buffer between Germany and Britain, for the sea-power interests of the latter moved the British Government to oppose control of Denmark by a powerful Continental State as vigilantly as it opposed such control of the Netherlands, Belgium, or Portugal. Switzerland is most secure of all, for it was long surrounded by Great Powers: France, Germany, Italy, and formerly Austria-Hungary. In every case the buffer State is dependent for its security in peacetime upon the diplomatic rivalries of its neighbors. In a general war among the Powers, it may be

able to remain neutral (e.g., Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian States, 1914-18), unless it becomes a theater of battle between the belligerents (e.g., Belgium in 1914). In the latter case, it must align itself with that coalition which seems least likely to deprive it of independence in the event of victory or else remain neutral and face ruin (e.g., the Scandinavian States and the Low Countries, 1939-40).

Considerations of a similar character serve to explain the continued independence of small or weak native States in the areas of imperialistic rivalries between the Powers. The native States which lay directly athwart the path of expansion of a Great Power, unopposed by other Powers, have all succumbed. Those which survive are located at the tension points between rival imperialisms. Neither of the rival Powers wishes the other to enlarge its territory by annexing the intervening buffer State. The latter is enabled by this circumstance to play off the imperialists against one another. Ethiopia was thus the vortex of converging drives of British, French, and Italian expansionists. These drives long neutralized one another. Turkey has similarly profited by conflicts between Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Iran and Afghanistan have been buffer States between British and Russian imperialisms. China has retained nominal control of Tibet, because neither Russia nor Great Britain could afford to permit the other to acquire it. China itself has thus far escaped complete partition for similar reasons. Siam lies at the focal point of rival imperialisms in southeastern Asia. The independence of the Latin-American Republics was originally championed by the United States to forestall European conquest. By the same token, the remaining colonial possessions of the minor Powers are relatively secure against appropriation by the Great Powers, because none of the latter can permit any of the others to acquire them. The Portuguese colonies in Africa were long buffers between Great Britain and Germany. For over half a century neither Great Britain nor France nor the United States nor Japan would permit either of the others to acquire the Dutch East Indies, for this would have upset completely the established equilibrium in the southwestern Pacific.

The Balance of Indulgences and Deprivations. As regards the complex plays and counterplays of the Great Powers themselves in their constant efforts to maintain or upset the balance of power, it is useful to recall Bismarck's suggestive distinction between “satiated” and “unsatiated” States. At any given period of time, the existing equilibrium, the prevailing distribution of power, the established ratios of territories, populations, armies, navies, colonies, etc., will appear ideal to the States which are its beneficiaries and unendurable to the States which do not feel that they have received their just due. The satiated States, content with the status quo, will usually be
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those which have been victorious in the last armed conflict and have been able to create a status quo in accordance with their own interests. The unsatiated States, bent upon modifying the status quo to their own advantage, will normally be those defeated in the last war and deprived of power by the victors. Rival alliances and coalitions emerge out of these relationships, the satiated States combining to protect what they have acquired and the unsatiated combining to acquire what they covet.

All States do not, of course, fall into these neat categories, for some have complex and contradictory interests which drive them in opposite directions. But generally speaking, the broad currents of Great Power politics can be interpreted in these terms. Prior to 1870, France was a satiated State, determined to preserve the prevailing equilibrium. This equilibrium was upset by the unification of Italy and Germany. French efforts to thwart German unification ended in disaster; and after 1871 France became an unsatiated State, bent upon recovering what had been lost. Germany under Bismarck was content with the status quo and formed alliances with Italy and Austria-Hungary to preserve it. France sought allies as a counterweight. Insatiable Tsarist Russia, driving toward the Straits and the Balkans, was a logical partner in the anti-German coalition. Britain was won over when German colonial, commercial, and naval ambitions caused Downing Street to regard Germany as a menace to the established distribution of sea power, markets, and imperial possessions. Britain was more interested in preserving the status quo than in upsetting it. Italy desired upsets both at the expense of Vienna and Paris. These two Powers were, therefore, not “loyal” members of the coalitions which they had joined. Britain joined the weaker side in 1914 only after considerable hesitation. Italy deserted her allies and followed suit in 1915. After the Entente victory and the Peace Settlement of 1919, the new victors became status quo States and the vanquished became “revisionist,” i.e., revanchard, in their policies. By the same logic the Axis Powers, after their conquest of most of the Continent in 1939-40, asked nothing more than “peace” on the basis of the “new order” which they were striving to establish, but Britain fought on to restore a balance, and the United States and the Soviet Union became challengers of the victors.

In this ceaseless and uneasy striving for power, States which benefit from the established status quo seek naturally to preserve that from which they benefit. States which feel humiliated, hampered, and oppressed by the status quo seek as naturally to modify it. Satiated States are therefore likely to appear to be “pacific.” They are committed to peace. They demand “security,” for they are content with the equilibrium which peace and security will perpetuate. Unsatiated States demand changes, rectifications of frontiers, a revision of treaties, a redistribution of territory and power. In so far as
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the fulfillment of these demands is resisted by status quo States, in so far as this resistance makes possible their realization only through coercion and conflict, such States appear to be "aggressive" and lacking in enthusiasm for peace. If such States have been reduced to impotence, as was the case with France from 1871 to 1894 and with Germany after 1919, they must speak softly, conceal their aims, and refrain from challenges or provocations, which would result only in further losses in the event of a test of force.

In the struggle between "satiated" and "unsatiated," between "haves" and "have-nots," the States in the former category do not pursue "dynamic" or "aggressive" policies simply because of the relatively disadvantageous position they occupy in the total distribution of power. Such policies are a consequence of the hope of ultimately changing the distribution. Great Powers can entertain such hopes. Minor Powers usually cannot. Germany, Japan, and Italy pursued aggressive policies in the 1930's because such policies, though dangerous, offered hope of success. Bulgaria, Hungary, or Lithuania, if unaided by Great Powers, had no such hopes and were long obliged to acquiesce in the status quo. Aggressive policies are likewise a consequence of internal tensions, insecurities, and hatreds, driving rulers to adventures abroad as a means of mobilizing acquiescence at home. Unsatiated Powers are typically those in which collective deprivations, bred of diplomatic or military frustrations coupled with economic maladjustments and latent class conflict within the State, give rise to demands for revanche and to ruthless efforts to restore unity, self-respect, power, and prosperity by attacks upon other nations.

A peculiar geographical pattern of relationships in the playing of the power game manifests itself in every State System. In 300 B.C. it was described by Kautilya in his Arthasastra in commenting on the appropriate rules of political rivalry in ancient India:

The king, who, being possessed of great character and best-fitted elements of sovereignty, is the fountain of policy, is termed the conqueror. The king who is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the conqueror's territory is termed the enemy. The king who is likewise situated close to the enemy, but separated from the conqueror only by the enemy, is termed the friend [of the conqueror]. A neighbouring foe of considerable power is styled an enemy; and when he is involved in calamities or has taken himself to evil ways, he becomes assailable; and when he has little or no help, he becomes destructible; otherwise [i.e., when he is provided with some help], he deserves to be harassed or reduced. Such are the aspects of an enemy. In front of the conqueror and close to his enemy, there happen to be situated kings such as the conqueror's friend, next to him, the enemy's friend, and next to the last, the conqueror's friend's friend. In the rear of the conqueror, there happen to be situated a rearward enemy, a rearward friend, an ally of the rearward enemy, and an ally of the rearward friend.
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On the chessboard of power politics, each Power is typically the potential enemy of its neighbors and the potential ally of its neighbor’s neighbors. States which are neighbors are “friends” only when they both fear a third neighbor (as Britain and France vis-à-vis Germany, 1904-40) or when they have by mutual consent renounced the game of power (as the United States and Canada since 1815). Proximity otherwise breeds rivalry for control of border areas which, once controlled, will give the controller superiority of power over his neighbor. Since outflanking and encircling operations are of the essence of war and since diplomacy is potential war, it is advantageous for each Power to have allies on the flanks or in the rear of its foe. Thus France and Britain were aligned with Russia before 1914 and with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania after 1919. In the face of this bloc, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union had common interests which found expression in the “Axis” and in the partitions of Poland and Rumania in 1939-40. In the larger arena of the world, Germany, Italy, and Japan became allies against the U.S.S.R. and the English-speaking Powers, while the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain became allies against the opposing coalition.

In the balancing-of-power process, long-festering fears and hatreds lead to periodical explosions of violence because the process operates haltingly and ineffectively. Any increase in the power of unsatiated States, through heavier armaments or alliances, creates new insecurities among the satiated and causes them to seek to redress the balance by still heavier armaments or counteralliances. But the compensatory policies seldom restore the equilibrium to its old level. They create new insecurities among the “have-nots,” driving them to further steps to enhance their ability to overthrow the status quo by force. The “haves,” moreover, are committed to “peace” and are reluctant to risk conflict or meet a challenge by a war of prevention. They typically procrastinate, make excuses for inaction, and fall victims to depressing anxieties without taking decisive action until it is too late to restore the balance. Imperial Germany after 1871 thus permitted France to rearm and form a coalition against her, without counterattacking until the strategic moment had long since passed. The French bloc and Britain, after 1933, permitted Germany and Italy to increase their power to a point at which they could upset the status quo and render any effort to thwart their designs highly dangerous. Counteraction was postponed in proportion as it became more and more difficult. The instability of each equilibrium generates tensions that explode in cataclysmic readjustments through wholesale violence because the players of the game of power are unable or unwilling to achieve smooth and gradual readjustments by other means.
In so great a defeat [the Battle of Anghiari, 1439], and in a battle which continued four hours, only one man died and he, not from wounds inflicted by hostile weapons or any honorable means, but, having fallen from his horse, was trampled to death. Combatants then engaged with little danger; being nearly all mounted, covered with armor, and preserved from death whenever they chose to surrender, there was no necessity for risking their lives; while fighting their armor defended them, and when they could resist no longer they yielded and were safe.—NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, *The History of Florence.*

Bombardment, barrage, curtain fire, mines, gas, tanks, machine guns, hand-grenades—words, words, but they hold the horror of the world. . . . We see men living with their skulls blown open; we see soldiers run with their two feet cut off, they stagger on their splintered stumps into the next shell hole; a lance-corporal crawls a mile and a half on his hands, dragging his smashed knee after him; another goes to the dressing station and over his clasped hands bulge his intestines; we see men without mouths, without jaws, without faces; we find one man who has held the artery of his arm in his teeth for two hours in order not to bleed to death. The sun goes down, night comes, shells whine, life is at an end. Still the little piece of convulsed earth in which we lie is held. We have yielded no more than a few hundred yards of it as a prize to the enemy. But on every yard there lies a dead man.—ERICH MARIA REMARQUE, *All Quiet on the Western Front.*

In the folkways of childhood, at least in America, it is customary for the young, when taunted by playmates, to shout: "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me!" Among adults, in both savage and civilized societies, words acquire such magic potency as to invalidate the slogan. Yet, even in the most sophisticated communities, most human experience suggests that the infliction or threat of physical violence is generally more efficacious in bringing about the submission of the recalcitrant than verbal rituals, since men are creatures full of fear and easily hurt. Even in the relations between a Prince and his subjects, declared the Florentine, it is better for the ruler to be feared than loved. But men are also creatures full of courage and easily moved to deeds of valor. Their will to resist coercion is often unbreakable. As compared with the other large carnivores, however, men are fragile organisms whose ability to resist is readily impaired by pain, whose senses are speedily benumbed by surgical shock, and whose lives can be snuffed out quite simply by injury to vital organs.

In the evolution of the precursors of *Homo sapiens*, teeth and claws became progressively less formidable as manual dexterity and cortical poten-
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tialities increased. While it is uncertain whether the ape-men used fists to evoke obedience, it is clear that they used sticks and stones and knives of flint against one another as well as against other beasts. In the hunt and in primitive fighting the utility of a knife on the end of a stick, and of missiles hurled by mechanical aids, became obvious long before the invention of writing and the rise of city-states. The former device developed into spear, battle-ax, sword, and bayonet; the latter into sling, catapult, bow and arrows, and gun. The use of fire to discourage the foe is also of respectable antiquity. Since the advent of metallurgy it has been evident to all that the most effective means of inflicting injury is to hurl bits of metal, preferably hot, into the tissues of the victim and that the best way of avoiding injury is to wear metallic garb, to acquire speed through the use of horse, wagon, car, or airplane, or to take refuge from flying metal behind stone walls, in vehicles of wood or iron, or, at worst, in holes in the ground. The belated adaptation of gunpowder (long used by the Chinese for fireworks) to the arts of war as practiced by Western Christians did not alter these essential characteristics of hostilities, nor did the more recent invention of internal-combustion engines for fast transport by land, sea, or air. The prime objective, even as in the days of Lagash and Ur, is still to put the enemy to flight or render him hors de combat by dissecting nerves, muscles, viscera, and bones through the subcutaneous introduction of pieces of metal into his body. All technological progress in warfare has consisted in devising more efficient means of producing and delivering to the ultimate consumer more metal, more swiftly, more cheaply, over greater distances, and at less risk to the producer and the middleman. Not until the invention of the atomic bomb was a truly novel means hit upon to end enemy resistance by ending enemy existence.

How to Win Wars. The basic principles of tactics and strategy are also as old as war itself. Timing and placing are of the essence—i.e., “getting there firstest with the mostest”—since victory is most readily won by achieving a decisive superiority over the foe in men and weapons at a decisive point. Since no force of fighters, whether on land or sea or in the air, fights well or effectively when broken up or obliged to face attack from two or more directions at once, good generalship aims at breaking through enemy lines, splitting enemy forces, and surrounding the remnants. Outflanking, encirclement, and annihilation constitute the eternal triad of successful battle from Arbela to Austerlitz, Cannae to Crete, Salamis to Stalingrad, Trasimene to Trafalgar, Zama to Zeebruge. All the other manifold aspects of belligerent operations are subsidiary to the first and last purpose of so arranging matters that the enemy will cease to resist because the crucial components of his means of fighting are shattered, isolated, and destroyed.
The fascinating and gory story of weapons and strategy through the ages cannot here be told. Its leitmotiv, however, is simple. Under the grim stimulus of war, human ingenuity has ever been concentrated on inventing invincible arms and tactics, devising invulnerable armor and fortifications with which they could be countered, and then creating still more lethal tools and schemes of assault whereby to crush the stoutest positions and the toughest battalions. The history of warfare is one of constant oscillation between attack which is superior to defense and defense which is superior to attack. Swords and spears are checkmated by shields and armor. Footmen are smashed by horsemen. Cavalry is cut down by longbows. Castles resist siege and are at length demolished by artillery. Wooden ships are sunk by ironclads. Dreadnoughts are nullified by submarines and bombing planes. Machine guns and barbed wire produce the ghastly futility of trench warfare (1914-18). Tanks, dive bombers, mobile heavy guns, and rockets restore the "war of movement" in 1939-45 and put an end to "impregnable" Maginot Lines and "unassailable" trench systems.

The systematic application of science to war in the 20th century has produced such a galaxy of death-dealing gadgets as to stagger the imagination of even the most obtuse layman and to gladden the heart of even the most unimaginative militarist. World War I produced heavy siege guns, experimental artillery capable of firing shells 70 miles, poison gas, the first extensive use of submarines and aircraft, improved machine guns, flame throwers, and the first tanks. World War II completely overshadowed its predecessor in the production of new devices of slaughter and devastation. Amphibious warfare became a fine art with the aid of LST's, "ducks," and "weasels." Attack by, and defense against, submarines reached new heights. Radar and loran made it possible to "see" target areas, planes, and ships in the dark. Proximity fuses on shells (first used in antiaircraft guns but employed on land in the Battle of the Bulge and thereafter) enabled death to find its victims almost automatically. Aerial bombardiers acquired "blockbusters," torpedoes, and incendiary bombs of terrible effectiveness. Rocket shells, first successfully employed by the Russians in 1941, evolved into the 14-ton German V-2, carrying a ton of explosives, rising 100 miles above the earth, and hitting targets 200 miles and more away at a speed of 3,800 miles per hour, thus precluding all possibility of interception or local defense by means now available.

5 For a suggestive sketch, elaborated with great erudition in the six-volume work, see Arnold J. Toynbee, *ibid.*, pp. 194-195 and 331-336.

6 The most complete and graphic account of these and many other new weapons is *Scientists against Time* by James Phinney Baxter III.
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Since V-J day the pace of inventing new weapons and improving old ones has become so rapid that any survey is obsolete before it can be published. Bigger and better atomic bombs replaced the missiles which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Atomic war heads in long-range rockets entered into the realm of the possible. Scores of Nazi scientists and technicians were employed by the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. to produce improved V-2's. New types of jet planes approached and presently surpassed the speed of sound. Various types of robot flying bombs mushroomed in laboratories and factories. Research in bacteriological warfare made such amazing progress that Dr. Gerald Wendt, speaking September 18, 1946, to a General Electric science forum in Schenectady, N. Y., asserted soberly: "If World War III comes, which we pray will never happen, it will be a war in which most people may die from silent, insidious, anti-human weapons that make no sound, give no warning, destroy no forts or ships or cities, but can wipe out human beings by the millions."

Soldiers and Statesmen. Analysts of world politics, along with the rest of the human race, ignore such developments at their peril. But they are necessarily more concerned with the links between strategy and diplomacy in the formulation of policy and with the liaison, in specific governments and particular situations, between professional specialists in force and professional specialists in fraud and favors. Here, as always in such matters, all generalizations are false, including the generalization that all generalizations are false. The familiar pacifist view that civilian politicians are often pushed into war by those whose career is military violence is supported by little evidence and refuted by much. In the contemporary epoch at least, professional soldiers, including members of General Staffs, tend to be cautious, conservative, and unadventurous. Preparation for war is more pleasant than war itself. Safe military careers are not promoted but jeopardized by open tests of force. Every High Command, moreover, invariably wants more men, more supplies, more ships, more weapons, more planning, more time before it feels wholly "ready for war." Hyperpatriotic fire-eaters, moreover, are more common in most modern States among businessmen, petty burghers, and political demagogues than among aristocrats, generals, and admirals.

Two examples must suffice from modern Germany, symbol par excellence of militarism in its most extreme form. The Navy League, established in 1898 to propagandize for a huge German fleet, had 1,000,000 members by 1910 and spent almost $250,000 annually. This was less an organization of admirals, interested in self-aggrandizement, than one of little businessmen and professional people, motivated by ardent patriotism—and subsidized by German "big business" interests, motivated by an equally ardent patriotism and possibly by an interest in the profitable contracts required by naval expansion. On other aspects of the relationship between "militarists" and civilians in the Second Reich, see Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War"
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Even in wartime, in democratic and totalitarian States alike, major strategic decisions are more frequently made by civilian leaders than by military specialists. “War,” observed Clemenceau sagely, “is far too serious a business to be left to the generals.” In postwar periods in most modern nations (with a few notable exceptions, to be sure) generals who go into diplomacy and politics are almost invariably bad diplomats and poor politicians. In periods of increasing militarism, such as our own time, the expert practitioners of war tend to gain increasing influence over civilians in the formulation of national policies and even in the occupancy of high political posts. George C. Marshall was the first top-ranking general and Chief of Staff to become U.S. Secretary of State. Numerous other executive and diplomatic posts were filled by military career men in the Truman Administration, in part because of the temper of the times and in part, no doubt, because a Chief Executive who was once an artillery captain is likely to revere generals, just as one who was once a small businessman is likely to be excessively deferential toward bankers and “big” businessmen. Government by generals, however, is not inevitably more bellvolent than government by civilians. Statesmen often have a less accurate sense of the limits of what can be achieved by armed force than do soldiers. Government by generals tends rather to be merely incompetent government, since generals are trained to command and not to govern, which requires wholly different talents.

Arma Virumque. Armaments are instruments of national policy, in peace no less than in war, for they largely determine the success of efforts to attain objectives through diplomacy. A diplomacy which is unsupported by potential fighting power is usually impotent. This fighting power need not be put to the test of war for it to count in the scales of diplomatic balances. A test of force is unnecessary when one disputant possesses an obvious supe-


Hitler in the 1930’s was never pushed into military adventures abroad by the General Staff but on the contrary faced the opposition of the military specialists in most of his major moves. He is reported to have said in 1941: “Before I was head of the German Government I thought the German General Staff was like a butcher’s dog—something to be held tight by the collar because it threatened to attack all and sundry. Since then I have had to recognize that the General Staff is anything but that. It has consistently tried to impede every action that I have thought necessary. It objected to the military occupation of the Rhineland, to the march into Austria, to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and finally even to the war against Poland. The General Staff warned me against offensive action in France, and against the war with Russia. It is I who have always had to goad on this ‘butcher’s dog’” [pp. 34-35 of They Almost Killed Hitler (edited by Gero v. S. Gaevernitz). Based on the Personal Account of Fabian von Schlabrendorff (New York, Macmillan, 1947)].

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riority in armaments. The weaker party will yield without risking further losses through inevitable defeat in an open contest of strength, unless the stronger demands the extinction of the weaker as the price of peace. In such a case (e.g., Italy and Ethiopia in 1935, Britain and the Boer Republics in 1898, the U.S.S.R. and Finland in 1939, Italy and Greece in 1940), a feeble contestant may fight desperately and hopelessly in preference to surrender before *force majeure*, for surrender means national annihilation and the accidents of war may, miraculously, afford salvation. But when the demands of strong Powers upon weak Powers are not pressed to this point, and still more when they do not include territorial cessions, weakness yields to strength without armed resistance, for resistance may lead to extinction, whereas surrender, however humiliating, leaves the victim at least alive. By the same token, a man set upon by thieves may give up his money to save his life; but one assaulted by known assassins may fight his foes furiously, even if only to sell his life dearly. A test of force through war is necessary between Great Powers only when an apparent parity of strength exists and each side can hope to impose its will on the other. When one side knows that it is hopelessly inferior, it yields to diplomatic pressure and renders actual physical coercion unnecessary. Diplomacy is war by another name. It differs from war, not in objectives, but only in methods.

Diplomacy and strategy must go hand in hand. Every Great Power must strive in peacetime to prepare for war. It must maintain its armaments at a level which will secure recognition for the demands of its diplomats. It must strive, by persuasion or by force, to safeguard its power interests in areas of vital importance to it. Its diplomacy must be directed toward the control of strategic points which will enable it to exercise its power effectively. Power begets more power, and more power begets the demand for still more to protect what is already acquired. Great Britain must secure the Suez Canal, because she must defend India. To defend the Suez Canal she must control Egypt. To defend Egypt, she must control the Sudan, Aden, Malta, Cyprus, and Gibraltar. To defend her vast Empire she must maintain a Navy second to none, control naval bases all over the world, and strive to dominate as many strategic waterways as possible. Japan must control Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula in order to protect Korea and dominate the Gulf of Pohai. To control Port Arthur, she must control the railways of the Manchurian hinterland. To control these she must control Manchuria. To defend Manchuria, she must dominate Mongolia. The United States must defend the Panama Canal. This requires American naval dominance in the Caribbean. This in turn demands the control of the passages of the Caribbean—Bahia Honda and Guantanamo in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands—and control of the island bases that control the pas-

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sages: the West Indies, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Newfoundland. It likewise leads to the control of the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands off the east coast of Nicaragua and of the Gulf of Fonseca on the west coast as strategic prerequisites to the defense of a possible Nicaraguan Canal. The diplomacy of strategy and the strategy of diplomacy are inseparable.

In a crisis, when a test of force appears imminent, control of policy passes from diplomats to strategists. When war is being waged, diplomacy is conducted by armies, navies, and air fleets. In the summer of 1914, in all the belligerent States, a point in the crisis was sooner or later reached at which war became "inevitable." This was the point at which the General Staffs and the Army commanders insisted upon military measures which rendered further diplomatic conversations futile. These recommendations were at first refused by the diplomats, so long as a chance of peace remained, and then accepted after a decision for war had been reached. The pressure of the militarists in every instance influenced this decision. In Russia the Foreign Minister and the General Staff agreed upon general mobilization on July 30. The Tsar hesitated but finally acquiesced in an action which made war unavoidable. In France, General Joffre asked the Cabinet on July 31 for permission to move troops to the frontier. The Cabinet granted the request, with reservations (the 10-kilometer "withdrawal") dictated by diplomatic considerations. On August 1, Joffre demanded the mobilization of the French Army, and his demand was granted. Once the demands of the strategists were accepted, diplomatic maneuvers were replaced by military tactics. The same pattern was clearly revealed in Japanese policy toward China in 1931-33 and in the European war crisis of 1939. As soon as physical coercion is openly resorted to, the formulation of policy passes into the hands of the masters of force. War is diplomacy by another name and with a different technique.

In summary, military violence is the ultimate weapon of State power. So long as this is true, State power is necessarily directed toward increasing its opportunities for the effective exercise of military violence. Power depends upon armaments. Armaments depend upon population, economic resources, and technology. In both diplomacy and war, attention is concentrated upon acquiring control of resources and strategic points which will enhance State power. The power interests of States are necessarily expressed in economic terms which reflect the interests of their ruling classes. These interests are defended and promoted by physical force, actual or potential. In diplomacy the apparent potentialities of the force of rival States determine the outcome of clashes of wills. In war the actual fighting power of the belligerents determines which will shall prevail. In both cases the assumption of violence lies beneath the surface of politics. In a System of sovereign
nation-states, armed conflict between the units is an inevitable incident in the competitive struggle for power in which they are engaged, so long as each pursues its own interests by self-help.

The Markets of Mars. In our own culture, as in others which have preceded it, grave questions have been raised among those given to reflection as to whether the increasing dedication of all energies and resources to the practice of war is compatible with the survival of civilization. The initial issue here has to do with the human and material costs of war in an industrialized global society. Universal conscription, economic mobilization, and the concept of the nation in arms, coupled with the size and striking power of modern fighting forces and the deadly effects of modern weapons, make warfare an ever heavier burden. In terms of numbers killed, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, continuing intermittently for a quarter of a century and involving all major Powers, cost c. 2,000,000 lives. The Crimean War took almost 800,000 lives in two years. The American Civil War killed some 700,000 soldiers. The brief and localized Franco-Prussian and Russo-Japanese Wars each cost less than 200,000 lives, though the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 are estimated to have produced almost 500,000 fatal casualties. The total dead in all wars between 1790 and 1914 was about 4,500,000.

World War I, on the other hand, snuffed out almost 8,600,000 lives in four years, counting only direct casualties. The Allies mobilized 42,190,000 troops, of whom 5,160,000 were slain, 13,000,000 were wounded, and 4,120,000 were prisoners and missing. The Central Powers mobilized 23,000,000 troops, of whom 3,380,000 were killed, 8,400,000 were wounded, and 3,600,000 were prisoners and missing. Of all men in uniform, 6 out of every 10 were casualties. World War II produced c. 15,000,000 battle deaths among the Great Powers: U.S.S.R. 7,500,000; Germany 3,000,000; China 2,200,000; Japan 1,500,000; U.K. 300,000; U.S.A. 300,000; Italy 300,000; France 200,000. A Vatican study released November 21, 1945, estimated total military and civilian dead at 22,000,000. This is probably an underestimate. In the U.S.S.R., apart from military casualties, some 8,000,000 lives were lost through siege, starvation, disease, mass murder, decreased birth rates, and increased death rates. Half a million German civilians perished under aerial bombardment and probably an equal number of Japanese, not counting the victims of the two atomic bombs. The U.S.A., however, suffered almost twice as many deaths from civilian accidents during 1941-45 as from enemy action—a circumstance calculated to impress Americans less than other peoples with the human waste of war.

George C. Marshall in Ten Eventful Years, 1937-1947 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.).
The material costs of modern war are literally incalculable, since figures of expenditures and damages are no longer meaningful. World War I is estimated to have cost all the belligerent Governments a total of $200,000,000,000, plus an additional $138,000,000,000 for value of lives lost, damage to neutrals, losses of civilian production, relief costs, etc. The combined value of all public-school buildings in the U.S.A. in 1913 would have paid total war expenses in 1917 for only one week. With half a dozen exceptions, no university or college in America cost as much to build as a single modern battleship. Aside from China, where no reliable figures are available, World War II is estimated to have cost all the belligerents some $1,154,000,000,000 for direct war expenditures and $231,000,000,000 in property losses, with the U.S.A. spending $341,000,000,000 (up to 1946), Germany $275,000,000,000, the U.S.S.R. $200,000,000,000, the U.K. $120,000,000,000, Italy $94,000,000,000, and Japan $56,000,000,000. All such estimates can be no more than approximations. They nevertheless suggest that the price of total war is astronomical.

It would be naïve to assume, however, that these costs represent sacrifices of goods and services which would otherwise be available for constructive use. In the short run, not only is modern war profitable to all participants (except for the casualties and the veterans whose bonuses and pensions are less than their civilian earning capacity), but it ensures full production, full employment at high wages, and handsome dividends to private investors, manufacturers, and merchants. In both "capitalist" and "socialist" economies, though more so in the former than in the latter, money spent by governments on war flows into the pockets of those who produce the goods to do the job—and is only partly siphoned off in taxes. In 1917, according to the Federal Trade Commission, the leading American steel companies made from 52 to 109% on their investments. World War I created 21,000 new American millionaires and gave workers and farmers higher earnings than they had ever known before. Full data for World War II are not yet available. But it is clear that, despite higher tax rates, even larger profits, salaries, and wages were produced by colossal public spending and that the very rich became richer and more numerous than ever before.

To contemporary mankind, total war presents the deceptive appearance of a primrose path to plenty. The Nazi regime restored the Reich to prosperity (prior to 1944) through preparing and waging war. In the U.S.A., total national income, estimated at $79,000,000,000 in 1929, did not, amid the doldrums of depression and partial recovery, exceed this level until 1941 ($97,000,000,000), when public expenditures in anticipation of war gave new work to men and machines. The period of American belligerency saw national income doubled—i.e., to almost $200,000,000,000 annually. Despite
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the reduction of actual purchasing power through postwar inflation, the fact is not to be denied that war gave farmers, workers, some professional people, and almost all businessmen larger real incomes than they had ever known before. The same phenomenon manifested itself in Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan (until the debacle) and would assuredly have appeared also in “socialist” guise in the Soviet Union except for the staggering human and material losses inflicted by the Axis onslaught.

The conclusions drawn from these experiences of yesterday by many of the immediate beneficiaries of war are at the heart of the world’s tragedy of today and tomorrow. War is inexorably a source of destruction, impoverishment, and breakdown. Wealth and welfare cannot possibly be enhanced through systematic waste and ruin. If the reverse appears to be the case, this illusion is attributable to the fact that the nations of the West in the present age have as yet devised no means of assuring full use of labor, capital, and resources save through the vast public spending and planning required by total war. This circumstance suggests that the national communities of modern civilization have become incapable of affording their peoples any assurance of work, well-being, and a sense of salvation except through the exciting imperatives and glittering profits of mutual slaughter. No other definition of social purpose seems capable of arousing comparable energies and inducing comparable acquiescence in political direction and public subsidization of private economic activity.

But, to the degree to which this is in truth the case, the contemporary world society is already far advanced along the road toward suicide. Despite the gaudy achievements of the war makers in stimulating science, technology, industry, and agriculture, only the demented will suppose that prosperity through militarism, plenty through war, and salvation at the hands of the “savior with the sword” are anything other than the hallucinations of mass madness. Productive labor devoted to the tasks of destruction is in the end self-destructive. This conclusion is validated by all past experience from ancient Assyria to the Nazi Reich. If the future of modern man is to be a future of “garrison-states,” dedicated wholeheartedly to the work of death, then that future can lead only to the grave. The verdict of time on these dismal prospects is not likely to differ from the judgment of today’s greatest living historian:

In the downward course of a broken-down civilization’s career there may be truth in the Ionian philosopher Heraclitus’s saying that “War is the father of all things.” The sinister concentration of the society’s dwindling powers upon the absorbing business of fratricidal warfare may generate a military prowess that will place the neighbouring societies at the war-obsessed society’s mercy, and may strike out a military technique that will serve as a key to the acquisition
of a far-reaching technical mastery over the Material World. Since the vulgar estimates of human prosperity are reckoned in terms of power and wealth, it thus often happens that the opening chapters in the history of a society's tragic decline are popularly hailed as the culminating chapters of a magnificent growth; and this ironic misconception may even persist for centuries. Sooner or later, however, disillusionment is bound to follow; for a society that has become incurably divided against itself is almost certain to "put back into the business" of war the greater part of those additional resources, human and material, which the same business has incidentally brought into its hands.\textsuperscript{10}

3. \textsc{The Strategy of Fear}

Civilized Governments do not openly acknowledge themselves to be bandits or plunderers; they can always put forward a "case" in their favour. This they do, partly because they offer lip-service to the morality which in practice they ignore, and partly because, for political reasons, they do not wish to offend brutally the opinion of moral people in their own or other countries.—R. B. Mowat, \textit{Public and Private Morality}, London, 1933, p. 122.

For Americans world wars in this century are a combination of an economic pump primer and a lynching bee. To put over the spending, you must be able to pull off a foreign lynching. The dynamic is moral indignation—the Kaiser, Hitler, Stalin and so on \textit{ad infinitum}. Just as there will always be an England to save, there will also always be a foreign devil to Lynch. And lynching is 100% American. It’s an old American custom. The one and only redeeming feature about lynching as an American folkway has been that Americans, including the lynchers, usually are ashamed of it. The internationalists have supplied a form of lynching that the natives need not be ashamed of. On the contrary, the new lynching can be proudly and piously boasted of. The internationalists have found a way to bring Sadism within the odor of sanctity.—Lawrence Dennis, \textit{The Appeal to Reason}, September 27, 1947.

The realistic practitioners of modern power politics are never free agents. Seldom can they pursue their diplomatic and strategic calculations with any certainty that masses of men, on this or that side of frontiers or battle lines, will react as strategists and diplomats hope they will. Electorates are fickle, skeptical, indifferent, ignorant, and perverse. Brute violence is often effective against isolated individuals. It is seldom effective against whole populations, since mass terrorism is commonly self-defeating. These limitations on the uses of armed coercion impose on all policy makers the need of employing other means to serve their purposes.

These means, of necessity, comprise the techniques of altering the normal

\textsuperscript{10}Toynbee, \textit{op. cit.}
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distribution of economic satisfactions in such wise as to reward friends and punish enemies. They include the skills of manipulating socially significant symbols in such a fashion as to induce the desired emotional responses. Force is the *ne plus ultra* of States and statesmen in dealing with other States and with their own subjects or citizens. But when force alone does not suffice, favors and fraud are called for. The arts of using them successfully are age-old. In the current epoch they have been elevated to the pseudo-scientific dignity of "economic warfare," "political warfare," "psychological warfare," and the like. To explore all the theories, methods, applications, and consequences of these auxiliary devices for the pursuit of power is precluded by limitations of space. A few comments are nevertheless in order by way of suggesting the complexity of the enterprise.

The Mobilization of Acquiescence. Foreign policy is an expression of a State's will-to-power. States consist of sundry millions of patriots who obey the leaders who decide how and when and where power is to be pursued and against whom and with whom. Leaders in democracies are elected representatives answerable to their followers and periodically subject to reelection or retirement. They therefore find it difficult to practice *Realpolitik*, for they are impeded not only by the stubborn facts of the international environment to which they must adapt their ends and means, but also by the desires and hopes and illusions of masses of voters who know little of the subtleties of diplomacy. Leaders in autocracies are more free because their followers are less free. They may often say, as Louis XIV is credited with saying, "L'Etat, c'est moi!" ("The State? That's me!") They may play the game of power abroad with no checks at home so long as they win successes or at least avoid disasters.

But in every State, whatever the inner form of its polity, diplomacy is the work of particular persons among the high and mighty who have become specialists in Machiavelli's art. Foreign policies present the appearance of being formulated, at each given moment of time, by particular individuals occupying high executive posts in governments. President, Premier, Foreign Minister, Secretary of Defense, Ministers of War, Navy, and Air must all consider at all times their relations with one another, with their subordinates in their respective bureaucracies, with legislators, with the press, with the most influential members of the social elite or ruling class, with public opinion, and with all the various pressure groups, lobbies, and civic organizations which may demand, accept, criticize, reject, or oppose any given decision or policy in foreign affairs.

The task of enlisting support at home is least difficult when all accept the familiar plea that domestic politics should "stop at the water's edge." Laborite foreign policy in Britain after July, 1945, with Attlee and Bevin
at the helm, was in many respects indistinguishable from Tory foreign policy under Churchill and Eden—to the great satisfaction of all concerned, save the Laborite “rebels,” who demanded something different. In the U.S.A. the political objectives of the Truman Administration, both at home and abroad, were greatly furthered by the principle of a “bipartisan” foreign policy, coupled with virtual unanimity on the part of the press and active enthusiasm on the part of almost all Republican and Democratic leaders, except for such heretics as Henry A. Wallace, who suffered dismissal and discredit for his pains. In the U.S.S.R., public dissent from current government policies is, of course, not tolerated. Cleavages and controversies within the Politburo, where ultimate decisions are made, are never permitted to become matters of public knowledge.

Makers of policy in all States, whether democratic or dictatorial, enjoy maximum immunity from criticism at home and, therefore, maximum freedom of action abroad when they can identify the policies they favor with the highest patriotism and label all dissenters as unpatriotic, subversive, or servants of foreign sovereignties. Such identification is not difficult to achieve, particularly in periods of international tension, if the policies in question are presented to press and public in sufficiently plausible guise and appear to be successful without involving excessive risks. The credenda and miranda of nationalism, to be examined in the next chapter, constitute the universal faith of modern mankind. To play upon them, as upon the keys of an organ, in order to produce harmony and rhythm in the practice of diplomacy and strategy is not only the privilege but perhaps the duty of all who hold high office in all the nation-states. Exuberant public approval of foreign policy is best attained by appealing to love of country, hatred of “alien ideologies,” and fear of foreign foes—and to the anxiety of critics lest they be linked with national enemies in the minds of all good patriots.

The Uses of Morality. What is striking in this process, however, is that all adroit practitioners of these arts usually find it inexpedient to appeal for public approval either in logical terms of the imperatives of power politics or in nonlogical terms of the superiority of “our” tribe over “their” tribe. In most cases, at least in communities whose citizens are largely literate and imbued in one fashion or another with the legacy of the Jewish-Greek-Christian tradition, it is deemed essential by power holders to present their policies invariably in terms of moral abstractions. Almost never does the statesman say: We are better men than they and we must impose our will upon them. Almost always he says: Our cause is the cause of virtue, wisdom, freedom, law, justice, generosity, and peace; their cause is the cause of sin, ignorance, tyranny, crime, iniquity, greed, and war; rally then, my brethren,
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in opposing and thwarting and, if need be, doing battle with the forces of
darkness, lest the source of all light be extinguished.

Examples are as numerous as political speeches and as old as recorded
time. The interested student may select at random any speech of Pericles,
Demosthenes, Cato, or Cicero, or of Wilson, Lloyd George, the Kaiser, Lenin,
Mussolini, Stalin, Hitler, Roosevelt (T.R. or F.D.R.), Hirohito, Churchill,
Truman, Bevin, Byrnes, De Gaulle, or Eisenhower. In each instance, without
exception, the appeal is to alleged principles of eternal and universal recti-
tude and against vice and wickedness. Thus in the “cold war” between East
and West in the post-Potsdam period:

Churchill in Fulton, Mo., March 5, 1946:

We must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of
freedom and the rights of man. . . . From Stettin to Trieste, an Iron Curtain
has descended across the Continent. Police governments are pervading from
Moscow. . . . Communist Parties or Fifth Columns constitute a growing chal-
lenge and peril to Christian civilization.

Stalin, March 27, 1946:

I think that the “present fear of war” is being brought about by the actions
of certain political groups engaged in propaganda of a new war and by these
means sowing seeds of discord and uncertainty.

James F. Byrnes, May 20, 1946:

We must take the offensive for peace, as we took the offensive for war. . . .
There is no Iron Curtain that the aggregate sentiments of mankind cannot
penetrate.

Molotov, May 27, 1946:

No self-respecting Allied State will allow the will of another State to be im-
posed upon it. . . . The Soviet Union is fully convinced of the correctness of its
policy which is aimed at defending the cause of peace and the progress of
humanity.

John Foster Dulles, June 3, 1946:

It can be taken as certain that as the full implications of the Soviet system
come to be better understood by the American people, it will revive in them
the spirit which led their forebears to pledge their lives, their fortunes and their
sacred honor to secure their personal freedom. We must act on the assumption
that the Soviet program, if persisted in, will not peacefully succeed.


To execute a murderer is not an immoral act. And the more certain the Soviet
Government is that we shall use the atomic bomb against it if it continues its
career of aggression, the more likely the Soviet Government will be to refrain from aggression—at least until it has the atomic bomb.

Etc., ad infinitum.

This age-old phenomenon of political semantics suggests two conclusions, one heartening, the other discouraging. The first is that all men and women everywhere, as judged by politicians, are actually against sin and in favor of virtue and can therefore be appealed to most effectively in these terms. The second is that all politicians are hypocrites. The latter conclusion, however, is demonstrably false. Many, if not most, political leaders believe what they say. And the more preposterous are the utterances, the more firmly they are believed. Few wars, if any, are the result of conspiracies by wicked men, whether the "wicked" be identified as diplomats, strategists, arms makers, industrialists, bankers, aristocrats, or demagogues. War occurs because all men value certain other things more than they value peace. Whatever these things may be, they are equated, quite honestly even if naïvely, with the cause of God against Satan.

The Functions of Mendacity. Yet it is not to be gainsaid that, in the service of this sacred cause, policy makers often find it wise and necessary to tell lies, lest the whole truth raise doubts in the minds of the faithful. The arts of falsehood were developed into an exact science by the leaders of the Fascist Powers (1935-45). Communists also lie when it serves their purposes. The practice is more perilous in democracies, where freedom of inquiry and public criticism are still respected. Even here, however, misrepresentation as a means of mobilizing public approval for policies which might otherwise be opposed is an ancient and respectable device. Thus, for example, the officials of the Quai D'Orsay in 1914, fearing that many Frenchmen might resent a war precipitated by the truculence of the Tsarist regime, deliberately falsified the documentary record in the French Yellow Book of 1914 to make it appear that Russian mobilization was ordered after, instead of before, general mobilization in Germany and Austria-Hungary.11 Or, to take a more recent example, Secretary of State Byrnes, on March 12,
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1946, sent a note to Moscow inquiring about recent Soviet troop movements in Iran. The State Department simultaneously released to the press a report which caused The New York Times to run the following eight-column banner headlines:

HEAVY RUSSIAN COLUMNS MOVE EAST IN IRAN; TURKEY OR IRAQ MAY BE COAL (March 13); SOVIET TANKS APPROACH TEHERAN (March 14); U.S. PLANS U.N.O. SHOWDOWN ON IRAN; MOSCOW DENIES TROOP REPORTS; Soviet said to double Azerbaijan garrison and triple Tabriz. . . . One column heads toward Turkish border (March 15); RUSSIANS PRESS ON (March 16). On the latter day Frederick Kuh reported in PM: “British authorities have admitted that there is no evidence whatever indicating that Red Army forces have moved beyond the Soviet area in Iran.” On March 23 Premier Ahmad Ghavam in Teheran officially asserted that no additional Soviet troops had entered Iran since March 2 and that some contingents previously in Iran had been withdrawn. On April 19, under a headline “Russians reinforce army in Bulgaria by 80,000 men,” The New York Times published a 20-inch front page story by Cyrus L. Sulzberger from London, giving details of the “reinforcement.” On April 22 in a two-inch report on page five the same paper quoted the AP in Sofia: “Official Bulgarian and American military sources declared today that they had no knowledge of any recent increase in the number of Soviet troops stationed in Bulgaria. . . . A representative of the American military mission said: ‘We have heard no news about any new Soviet arrivals whatsoever.’” 12

But to conclude from such incidents that national decisions to resort to war are commonly the consequence of a “plot” on the part of politicians or pressmen would be quite unwarranted. Given the broad pattern of international anarchy among sovereignties, coupled with the propensity of multitudes to surrender to chauvinistic hysteria, it is often the case that reluctant Ministers and doubtful legislators are literally forced into a decision for war by popular demands. When dictators allege that mass pressure leaves them no choice, the contention is suspect. But even in the most liberal of democracies such pressure does in fact sometimes lead to hostilities in the face of hesitancy or opposition in official circles. To cite but a single instance, this was clearly the situation in the U.S.A. in 1898. While the Administration in Washington negotiated and sought compromise with regard to damage to American interests in the Cuban insurrection, Hearst and Pulitzer, the major “yellow press” magnates of the day, competed with one another in arousing patriotic indignation over Spanish crimes in Cuba. In the end, President and Congress yielded to the clamor of press and populace

12 This example is not intended as a criticism of The New York Times, which is, beyond question, the most accurate and reliable newspaper in America and in the world. However, on the astonishing inaccuracy of the Times’s reports of events in Russia, 1917-20, see Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, “A Test of the News,” New Republic, Aug. 4, 1920.
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for war. Since the conflict involved no appreciable risk and promised an exhilarating inflation of the national ego, it met with mass enthusiasm and may well be deemed a classic case of "democracy" controlling foreign policy. Mark Twain, however, expressed the belief that the populace had been deceived:

The loud little handful—as usual—will shout for the war. The pulpit will—warily and cautiously—object—at first; the great big dull bulk of the nation will rub its sleepy eyes and try to make out why there should be a war, and will say, earnestly and indignantly, "It's unjust and dishonorable and there is no necessity for it." Then the handful will shout louder.... And now the whole nation—pulpit and all—will take up the war cry, and shout itself hoarse, and mob any honest man who ventures to open his mouth; and presently such mouths will cease to open. Next, the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame on the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception.¹⁸

The Art of Symbol Manipulation. The related problem of influencing public attitudes in other States offers peculiar difficulties. In all nations of the present epoch, propaganda from foreign sources is twice or thrice as suspect as propaganda from domestic sources. Modern Foreign Offices are often allotted secret funds to conduct propaganda abroad. Prior to 1914 most of the Paris press was in the pay of the Imperial Russian Government, which sought, through bribes and subsidies, to influence French opinion favorably toward Tsarist bonds, the French-Russian alliance, and the need of resisting the German menace. Prior to 1939 much of the French press was in the pay of Mussolini and Hitler. In 1934-35 the Hearst press in the U.S.A. gave favorable publicity to the views of Goering, Goebbels, and Rosenberg. Foreign Offices likewise seek to control their domestic press—sometimes, albeit rarely, through secret bribery, more often through advice, directives, censorship, "news leaks," and other favors to sympathetic papers and deprivation or reproof to critical journalists. During and since World War II short-wave broadcasting has become another important medium of influencing public attitudes abroad, with results that admit of no precise calculation.

Another measure which is indispensable to conquerors who aim at maximum results at minimum costs is that of organizing disciplined and faithful groups of traitors inside States earmarked for conquest. Such groups are of three kinds: high civil and military officials who are bought or converted

¹⁸ The Mysterious Stranger, 1898. See also Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, 1931
to secret sympathy with the cause of the alien conqueror; revolutionary political parties, bribed and directed by the conqueror but acting ostensibly as patriotic organizations aiming at national renovation through exposure of corruption and abuses; and organized linguistic minorities seeking "autonomy," "self-determination," or "return to the fatherland." Members of the first category are useful for organizing coups d'état in crisis situations, manufactured to order by the diplomacy of the conqueror, and for paralyzing resistance to invasion. Those in the second category are able to discredit the leaders of the enemy State, to spread doubt and confusion, and, if they win an obedient mass following, to furnish popular support for appeasement, defeatism, or the direct subversion of the State. Members of national minorities, when they can be brought under totalitarian control and manipulated from abroad, are highly effective in provoking "persecution," winning democratic sympathy, and lending plausibility to irredentist and annexationist ambitions. Which type of group or which combination of groups can be organized and used most efficiently to disrupt the doomed State obviously depends upon circumstances.

_feeible and amateurish efforts toward the development of this technique of "boring from within" were made by the Bolshevik rulers of the U.S.S.R. almost as soon as they seized power in Russia in 1917. On the model of the Second, or Amsterdam, International of Socialist Parties, they sought to organize Communist Parties in every country, federated in the Third, or Communist, International and subservient to Moscow. This world revolutionary conspiracy, however, failed completely of its purpose, for such parties either remained insignificant minorities (as in Great Britain and the United States) or else (as in Italy, Germany, and France) frightened all decent citizens into support of "anti-Communist" activities. Their chief importance was that of acting as foils or scapegoats for the far more widespread and efficient revolutionary conspiracy organized by the Fascist Caesars. Here all devices were successfully employed, and support was obtained from members of all classes. The aggressions of Japan in eastern Asia, of Italy in the Mediterranean and Africa, and of Germany in Central and western Europe were all made possible by the successful use of the various types of "Trojan Horse" and "Fifth Column" here suggested.\[^{14}\]"

\[^{14}\]See Chap. X for specific instances of the application of these techniques. According to Homer's _Iliad_ the Greeks finally conquered long-besieged Troy in the legendary Trojan War by pretending to abandon the siege and leaving behind them a huge wooden horse filled with warriors. When the Trojans drew the horse into the city as a trophy of victory, the warriors leaped out and so confused and decimated the defenders.
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occupation” or “pacific” invasions. Overt violence should never be used save as a last resort. If circumstances permit of the effective use of the preparatory measures already indicated, violence will be unnecessary, for no possibility of effective counterviolence will remain. Totalitarian diplomacy (i.e., bargaining, threats, intrigue, espionage, conspiracy, and the organization of revolution) is totalitarian war carried on by “pacific” means. The goal of diplomacy, as of strategy, is to outflank, encircle, and paralyze the enemy forces so as to induce nonresistance and surrender. The achievement of the goal requires that the enemy be disintegrated and demoralized from within, so that all will to resist is dissipated, and isolated from without, so that no allies will be available if resistance is attempted. The latter purpose is best promoted by making “deals” and concluding bilateral nonaggression and neutrality pacts with as many neighbors and friends of the intended victim as possible. Each may thus be dealt with in turn and conquered separately with no danger of opposition by a united coalition.

When the stage is appropriately set, it becomes feasible to strike with minimum risks. If the victim has already been sufficiently “softened” and deserted in advance by his prospective allies (e.g., Austria in March, 1938), a sudden blow will often turn the trick. Such blows are best struck during the night or just before dawn and preferably on Fridays and Saturdays, since the attention of the victims and their friends will usually be turned elsewhere at such times. Once the blow is struck, other governments will find it easier to acquiesce in the fait accompli than to take counter measures which are already too late. Leaders of democracies can commonly be counted upon to take the course which is easiest or most popular. If the victim is disposed to resist, a prolonged crisis may be necessary to wear down his endurance. The arts of precipitating crises, managing their development, making threats and promises, feigning moderation or lunacy, spreading panic, increasing demands, and “saving peace” at the very last moment by an illusion of concessions are arts which the efficient conqueror must learn to employ with skill and subtlety. Under favorable conditions, these arts, properly practiced, may produce almost miraculous results—as when Hitler in 1938 induced Chamberlain and Daladier to believe that his designs upon Czechoslovakia were but the prelude to an assault upon the U.S.S.R. and thereby induced them, in the name of “peace” and “self-determination,” to

that the city fell. The original “Fifth Column” was a group of Rebel sympathizers in Madrid whose activities were expected to paralyze Loyalist resistance, thereby enabling the four advancing columns of Mola and Franco to take the city in October, 1936. Loyalist vigilance and Soviet military aid spoiled the plan. Madrid’s Fifth Column had no opportunity to do its work successfully until all Loyalist military resistance collapsed in February and March, 1939.
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deceive their own people, to abandon Prague, and to compel Beneš to surrender to Berlin.

The wise conqueror will recognize, however, that the devices already reviewed may prepare the way for a total war of annihilation against once powerful foes but will never by themselves lead to the destruction of such foes. In the end, force must be used. But force should never be used until one has overwhelming superiority and the enemy is so weakened that his powers of resistance are at a minimum. This state of affairs is not difficult to achieve if one knows how to capitalize upon every weakness of the foe, how to befuddle and confuse his leaders, how to distract his attention and divide his people against themselves with irrelevancies (e.g., anti-Semitism and anti-Communism), how to penetrate his military secrets, how to build a military economy and a military society dedicated to the single aim of conquest, how to develop new weapons, new tactics, new strategy, new commanders, above all how to restore in war the superiority of the attack over the defense. To attack is to conquer. To remain on the defensive is to invite defeat.

To break the resistance of the enemy, it is needful to keep at least a generation ahead of him in military science and two generations ahead of him in political science. The largest and most formidable enemy forces can readily be crushed at small cost by a 3:1 superiority in tanks, dive bombers, parachute troops, and armored divisions. It is well, however, to leave as little as possible to chance and to supplement the crushing technique of the blitzkrieg with a well-coordinated action of spies, saboteurs, traitors, pacifists, appeasers, Trojan Horses, and Fifth Columnists behind enemy lines. In this fashion, political leaders can be seduced or bewildered, military commanders can be misled into actions certain to ensure the destruction of their forces, ports and fortresses can be rendered defenseless, airfields can be destroyed or occupied by local agents of the invader, bridges and roadways can be seized and made secure, enemy troops can be led to believe that they are deserted or betrayed, while mysterious and paralyzing terror is unleashed against the civilian population. Here again careful planning will produce almost miraculous results. Enterprises in conquest which formerly took months or years to carry through now become a matter of weeks, days, or even hours.

Once a country is broken and occupied, it will usually be found convenient to turn its civil administration over to a puppet regime, recruited from the ranks of the natives who have long been in the pay of the conqueror. Puppet rulers should not be raised to positions of prominence, however, before military victory is won, nor should it be assumed that a puppet can ever, by himself, rally a following and win a campaign. This was Stalin's
mistake in recognizing Otto Kuusinen as “Premier” of Finland at the outset of the Finnish War of 1939 and Tokyo’s mistake in setting up Wang Ching-wei at Nanking in March, 1940, and granting him diplomatic recognition in November. Mussolini acted more wisely in establishing Shefket Verlaci as “ruler” of Albania in April, 1939, after the country had been effectively occupied by Italian troops and King Zog driven out. Il Duce, however, was deceived in his hopes of setting up a puppet regime in Athens a year and a half later and was therefore led into military disaster. Hitler deemed the outright annexation of Austria preferable to a puppet regime under Austrian Nazis. He likewise annexed Sudetenland in preference to administering it through a puppet regime under Konrad Henlein. Father Josef Tiso, however, became a useful puppet ruler of Slovakia after March, 1939. It similarly proved advisable to keep King Christian on the throne of conquered Denmark and to employ Vidkun Quisling as administrator of Norway after King Haakon had rejected all inducements and fled the country. Puppets, however, are peculiarly allergic to assassins, and this difficulty cannot always be guarded against.

After each conquest is completed, it is wise to offer “peace” to remaining enemies and to make propitiatory gestures toward outside Powers whose people may be alarmed by the march of aggression. Such offers should be designed to bring about a cessation of hostilities on apparently moderate terms, couched in the language of compromise, justice, humanity, a new world order, and the like. Such offers will raise the morale of one’s own people and create doubts among enemy and neutral populations as to the desirability of further resistance. If they are accepted, the resulting negotiations can easily be exploited to complete the demoralization of the enemy and the disillusionment of the neutrals in order to render all alike helpless before a new onslaught some months or years hence. If they are not accepted, they have still served the purpose of putting upon the foe the onus of continuing hostilities. Inducements to come to terms should be judiciously interspersed with threats. Terrorization of civilians is often more effective (and always safer) than attacks upon the armed forces of the foe. Threats of terrorization are sometimes more effective than the actuality. It is likewise useful to make “alliances” with as many other Powers as possible, even if they be empty of content, since some enemies can always be discouraged by the appearance of an overwhelming coalition and some neutrals can always be intimidated by like devices. Here again, however, it is fatal to confuse appearances with reality. Every delay, every truce, every possibility of a “negotiated settlement” must be utilized to prepare the new arms with which unconquered enemies can later be subjugated.

How long and how far these arts of conquest can be successfully applied

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is a question which can be answered only by experimentation. Other things being equal, the domestic victories won through these skills can be duplicated by diplomatic victories, and these in turn by military victories—first in local areas, then on a continental scale, and finally on a world scale. But the wise conqueror will realize that other things seldom remain equal. His own caution, his acuteness of perception, his intuitive sense of strategy and timing become dulled with the passing years and with an unbroken succession of triumphs. His very victories open eyes abroad that were hitherto closed. They lead to alarm in unexpected places, to the repudiation of old leaders and the emergence of new ones, to a growing ability on the part of prospective victims to see through the ideological and military tricks of the conqueror, to learn in the hard school of tears and blood, to adapt for their own purposes the weapons and tactics of the aggressor. It is a dangerous thing to convince any great people by threats and blackmail that its choice lies between conquering or being conquered. It is perilous to reawaken in any nation a passionate devotion to freedom. These sentiments break through the entangling cobwebs of illusion and summon to dynamic action reserves of wisdom and courage hitherto unsuspected.

Thus the people of Spain, although utterly unprepared to meet the assault upon their liberties launched against them by the Axis, fought heroically and successfully in defense of their rights for over two years. Despite large-scale military intervention against them by Germany, Italy, and Portugal, they would have triumphed over the Fascist Rebels had it not been for the determination of Baldwin, Eden, Chamberlain, Halifax, Blum, Delbos, Daladier, Bonnet, Hull, and Roosevelt to deprive them of arms and ensure their defeat. Thus the Finns inflicted grievous losses upon the Soviet invaders of 1939 before they were finally compelled to sue for peace. Thus the British experienced a national awakening in the summer of 1940, and the Greeks, vastly inferior in numbers and materials, hurled back the Italian invaders in the autumn as their distant ancestors had once beaten back the hordes of Persia.

Most world conquerors of the past (but by no means all) were sooner or later brought to ruin by the forces of resistance which their conquests unleashed against them. In epochs of cultural decadence, however, the conquest of all the known world is quite within the capacity of a nation or a group of nations consecrated to war and led by ruthless adventurers. In such periods the victims of aggression each seek safety in flight and avoid any common action until it is too late. The balance of power is therewith destroyed. The victims, moreover, cling to the end to their beloved illusions and suffer the inevitable fate of the witless and the sightless. There is abun-
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dant evidence in the record of the recent past that the 20th century of the Western world is precisely such an era. If so, then the conquerors of today need impose no geographical limits to the scope of their ambitions, for they may be certain that their larger and more distant victims will so behave as to bring down upon themselves a fate comparable to that which overtakes the initial victims in the first stages of the unification of the world by the sword.

The Tactics of Propaganda. When cold war becomes hot war, the problem of supplementing force by favors and fraud becomes more complex. Sabotage, espionage, and assassination in enemy countries may help to win military victory. Both the Allies and the Fascist Powers made effective use of these techniques in World War II, though highest honors here must go to the enemy. On the other hand, the familiar notion that local Communist Parties are effective agents of Soviet diplomacy and strategy found little support in fact during the struggle of 1941-45. In Germany, which in 1933 had the largest and best organized Communist Party in the world outside of the U.S.S.R., not a single major act of resistance or sabotage was attributable to German Communists. On the contrary, all the abortive plots to overthrow the Nazi leadership were concocted by aristocrats, industrialists, and militarists and never by revolutionary proletarians. Communist agents in bourgeois States are likely to be effective as organizers of secret war only when they are beyond suspicion by virtue of being respectably patriotic men and women of wealth, skill, or influence—usually a remote though by no means impossible contingency. Communist plotting on behalf of the U.S.S.R. was equally futile in other States at war with the Soviet Union, though local Communists toward the end of the conflict played effective roles in underground resistance movements in Italy, France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, though never in Germany. The Western Powers, conversely, sought to make use in enemy countries of disgruntled nobles, businessmen, officers, and middle-class liberals—sometimes with useful results, as in North Africa and Italy.

While the available scientific literature of wartime propaganda is voluminous, the basic principles of the art are exceedingly simple. In World War II the experts in Goebbels’s Ministry of Propaganda, the U.S. Office of War Information, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Tokyo, and Radio Moscow played upon a few brief themes in their broadcasts to both

15 See, as one of the best actual mystery stories of the day, Richard Hirsch, The Soviet Spies (New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1947), a sober but fascinating exposé of the Soviet spy plot in Canada revealed by Igor Gouzenko, who abandoned the Soviet Embassy, Sept. 5, 1945, and delivered 100 stolen secret documents to the Canadian authorities. See also Igor Gouzenko, The Iron Curtain, Dutton, 1948.
home and enemy audiences: (1) we are virtuous, the foe is wicked; (2) we are strong, the foe is weak; (3) we shall win, and the foe will lose. Variations are permissible on the second and third themes. In times of adversity it may be expedient to stress our weakness and their strength as a means of inducing new exertions at home and complacency in enemy communities. Goebbels’s “strategy of gloom” after Stalingrad is an admirable illustration. Both sides made use of “radio quislings” and of “clandestine stations”—i.e., broadcasts purporting to come from enemy territory and addressed to enemy audiences by dissident or subtly critical apologists for the leaders in power. In all cases the objectives of war propaganda are so to interpret facts and events as to evoke among one’s own people fear and hatred of the foe, loyalty to the cause, and confidence in ultimate victory and to evoke, if possible, among enemy peoples doubt about victory, anxiety over war losses, distrust of the future, and respect for the foe, mingled with skepticism as to the value of continued resistance.

“Wedge driving” is the stock in trade of all war propagandists. Its purpose is to provoke rifts (1) between enemy governments and peoples and (2) between allied governments in the enemy coalition. The late Dr. Goebbels (without question the most competent and unscrupulous propagandist of World War II) concocted a masterpiece of this genre in April, 1943. Through all available media of publicity, he and his aides spread the story that the Wehrmacht had discovered in Katyn Forest near Smolensk the bodies of some 12,000 Polish officers murdered by “Jewish-Bolshevik terrorists” in the spring of 1940. The officers were in fact quite dead and were actually buried, having fallen into the hands of the Nazis, who slaughtered them all in the autumn of 1941. The “horror of Katyn” impressed the anti-Soviet Polish Government in Exile sufficiently to cause it to follow Berlin’s pious example in appealing to the International Red Cross for an “impartial investigation”—at which Moscow severed diplomatic relations with the Sikorsky regime. New variants of this technique with new actors and events have appeared in the postvictory epoch, as Goebbels confidently predicted would be the case. Moscow depicts American follies and crimes and appeals to Americans in the name of peace, and to Europeans in the name of decency and national independence, to resist the U.S. “imperialists.” Washington, hesitantly followed by London, appeals to the long-suffering “Russian people” and to the communities “oppressed by the Communist yoke” to reassert their freedom and resist the “tyrants” of the Kremlin.

Propaganda of the Deed. All sophisticated experts realize that maximum results can be attained among enemy populations only when personal experience, plus incontrovertible events, undermine morale by suggesting that
the cause is lost. The best propaganda is the propaganda of action. Hence
the wisdom of blockades, designed to starve the foe into submission, and of
“economic warfare,” designed to cut off vital supplies of war materials and
civilian commodities from neutral sources through boycotts, blacklists, pre-
clusive buying, and comparable devices. Such familiar procedures were
supplemented in World War II on the part of the enemy coalition by well-
organized campaigns of terrorism, enslavement, and genocide—i.e., mass
extermination of subjugated populations by forced labor, planned famine,
 firing squads, gas wagons, and large-scale factories for the asphyxiation
and incineration of millions of victims, some of whom were subjected to
fatal medical experiments while others were scientifically converted into
fertilizer and soap. Despite military defeat, the Nazi regime won the war
of annihilation by slaughtering Jews, Poles, Czechs, and Russians in num-
bers completely overshadowing the number of Germans slain by guns and
bombs. The modern crime of genocide was originated not by the Nazis,
but by the Turks in dealing with the Armenians in the 1890’s and again in
1915-16.16

Past experience indicates that wholesale massacre of enemy peoples, as
a means of breaking the will of the survivors and evoking obedience, is of
doubtful efficacy. If all are slain and no survivors remain, the resources
and skills of the conquered are lost to the conqueror. If some survive, they
are likely to be imbued with undying hatred for the victor. The sheer phys-
ical task of butchering people by the millions, moreover, proved difficult
even for the most competent of Nazi experts. The problem, to be sure, has
now been solved by the atomic bomb. Its extensive use in the next war will
assuredly bring about the demise of millions with neatness, economy, and
dispatch. But the devastated areas will be valueless and cannot be safely
occupied by the victors for months or years after the funereal event. Ex-
pediency, as well as morality, would appear to dictate abstention from
massacre. But the logic of power often fails to heed the dictates of either
ethics or reason.

4. MACHTPOLITIK AND GEOPOLITIK

Men, Yron, money, and breade be the strengthe of the warre, but of
these fower, the first two be most necessarie; because men and yron
 fynde money and breade; but breade and money fynde not men and
yron.—Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War (translation of 1586).

16 When Turkish troops occupied Baku in the autumn of 1918, they butchered 30,000
Soviet citizens of Armenian origin. Among the startling innovations of the Truman
Doctrine was the “discovery” by Maj. Gen. Lunsford Oliver, head of the U.S. Military
Mission to Turkey, that “the massacre of the Armenians after the first World War
was really started by the Armenians” (speech in Chicago, Aug. 28, 1947).
The best informed one wins the final victory.—Benjamin Disraeli.
The future struggle for world power and the fate of National Socialism will be decided in America.—Karl Haushofer, 1931.

In the study and practice of power politics, as in most human affairs, the modern temper is driven to search for "scientific" methods of inquiry and "scientific" principles as guides to action. Since careful observation, directed research, and controlled experimentation have supplied key concepts and "laws" regarding the phenomena studied by astronomers, physicists, chemists, and biologists, social scientists have striven to duplicate these feats in the analysis of human behavior and group relations. Such efforts have won conspicuous triumphs in some areas of investigation. To dismiss them as inherently futile is itself a confession of futility and defeatism. It may be conceded at once, however, that all attempts to date to reduce war and other manifestations of international anarchy to an exact science have been, on the whole, unsuccessful. Prediction and/or control are rendered difficult by imponderables, subtleties, and complexities which are more amenable to intuitive insight and dynamic leadership than to the skills of scientific technicians. The golden key which opens all mysteries, solves all puzzles, and reorders all data in logical array is remarkably elusive in this field. Yet a brief commentary on some of these endeavors is not without value.

The arts of war and of Realpolitik, both in theory and in practice, have of late been revolutionized by two parallel streams of change, interacting upon one another and producing results without precedent in earlier times. Both represent social and political consequences of the "Industrial Revolution." One has to do with weapons of power, the other with the arena in which the power game is played. Between the close of the Wars of Religion and the late 18th century, war and diplomacy had limited objectives, sought by limited means in limited areas of competition and conflict. Armies were small forces of professional troops and mercenaries, officered by gentlemen. Kings and statesmen acted with caution and moderation since, with few exceptions, they envisaged their task as one of maintaining the equilibrium and cohesion of the family of European States through local pressures for local purposes involving restricted risks and a minimum of disturbance to the everyday lives of their own and other peoples. These relatively happy days were ended by the advent of (1) mass armies, universal conscription, economic mobilization, and the ascendancy of scientists and technicians in the organization of military establishments; and (2) the progressive conquest of space in a fashion which converted all the earth into a theater of

The transformation of war by the physical and biological sciences need not be here further elaborated. The “shrinking of the world” is suggested by the new facts of travel. British envoys in Rome in the 1830’s required 13 days to get to London, precisely the time required by the couriers of Julius Caesar. Today the journey is a matter of hours. In 1790 a voyager from Boston, using the fastest available means of regularly scheduled transport, needed 1 day to reach Worcester, 2 for Portland or Hartford, 4 for New York, 5 for Philadelphia, 7 for Baltimore, 20 for Knoxville, and 40 or more for Europe. In 1938 the hurrying Bostonian could reach Bermuda, Vancouver, or Mexico City in 1 day, Panama or Honolulu in 2, London, Paris, Rio, or Guam in 5, Hong Kong, Moscow, or Istanbul in 7, Zanzibar or Singapore in 11. By 1948 he could easily reach Europe in 1 day, Asia in 3, and Australia in 4. Jules Verne’s vision of Around the World in Eighty Days, obviously fantastic when published, has long since become a jest. Modern air transport makes possible the circumnavigation of the planet in 80 hours, or in constantly decreasing fractions thereof.

These developments have altered irrevocably the politics of power and the science of force. “Limited war” has given way to “absolute war” (Karl von Clausewitz), this to “total war” (Erich von Ludendorff), and this, in turn, to totalitarian mobilization, blitzkrieg, the strategy of annihilation, and visions of completely mechanized “push-button warfare” in which entire enemy communities thousands of miles away will, it is hoped, be wiped out in one blow. Meanwhile, pending the all but certain arrival of this devoutly wished consummation, sundry strategists and scholars have sought to restate the problem of competition for power among sovereignties in a new dimension which is spatially as large as the globe and temporally as small as an ancient township.

In the course of this enterprise, the focus of professional and public attention has shifted from point to point as each new source of power or weapon of battle has impressed itself most vividly on men’s minds. The practices of governmental control of business activity—i.e., mercantilism, neomercantilism, and, more recently, “economic planning”—have led some to develop the thesis that national power rests primarily on wise and masterly regulation of the national economy by the State—e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List, Walter Rathenau, and Bernard Baruch, among

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18 Figures from Eugene Staley, World Economy in Transition, 1939.
19 The best one-volume work on modern military theory, with a valuable annotated bibliography, is Edward Mead Earle (editor), Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler.
others. More specifically military writers have argued anew the merits of the swift offensive (e.g., H. von Moltke, Alfred von Schlieffen, Ferdinand Foch, Charles de Gaulle) or the relative impregnability of modern defenses (Maginot, Gamelin, Liddell Hart). The cult of the decisiveness of sea power was first popularized at the turn of the century by Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S.N., who was echoed by various British, Continental, and Japanese writers. The more recent contention that contemporary wars are won through air power was first developed in 1921 by Gen. Giulio Douhet of Italy and later propounded in America by Gen. William Mitchell and Alexander de Seversky. The most recent literature on rocket warfare, bacteriological warfare, and atomic warfare is already growing at a rapid rate.

The most impressive single effort thus far to correlate and synthesize these various approaches and to link them with new concepts of global geography is that of the “geopoliticians.” This movement, curiously enough, stems in a sense from the “wheel maps” of the Middle Ages, which depicted Jerusalem as the “center” of the world, with the precise spot marked on the floor of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. This quaint notion is absurd to anyone who pictures the world in terms of the familiar “Mercator’s projection,” with the American continents in the middle and the northernmost land masses of the planet vastly inflated by virtue of converting a sphere into a cylinder. A glance at a globe, however, reveals that the Holy Land does in fact lie near the mid-point of the great Eurasian-African land mass.

In 1904 the English geographer, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, delivered a lecture in London on “The Geographical Pivot of History,” in which he pointed out the peculiar role of the “fertile crescent” extending from Palestine to the Persian Gulf. In his Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919) he developed the concepts of the “World Island” (i.e., Asia-Europe-Africa) and the “Heartland” (i.e., the north central Eurasian plains whose waters drain into the Arctic or inland seas). He suggested that the holders of the Heartland, while able to threaten peripheral areas, are secure against the sea power of the Atlantic and Pacific coastal States and that land-based air power might well prove superior to naval might. His moral was: Never permit Germany to control eastern Europe. His motto was: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World Island commands the world.”

Meanwhile a German geographer and major general, Karl Haushofer (who prior to 1914 had visited and written about the Far East and the “Indo-Pacific sphere”), interested himself in Mackinder’s formulations; pursued the studies suggested by his predecessor at the University of Munich,

20 For a good brief discussion of various map projections and their uses and limitations, see Nicolas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, 1944.
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Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904); and borrowed the term Geopolitik from the writings of the Swedish scholar, Rudolf Kjellen. In 1922, Haushofer founded in Munich the Institute of Geopolitics, which published the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik and became a large research organization. He predicted approvingly the Japanese program of Greater East Asia and as early as 1923 asserted: “Italy and Japan are the future allies of Germany.” He published Macht und Erde (1927), Wehrgeopolitik (1932), Weltpolitik von Heute (1934), and innumerable monographs and articles. His aide-de-camp in World War I was Rudolf Hess, through whom he first met Hitler in 1924. Since der Führer and his coconspirators found much of value for their purposes in Haushofer’s “new science,” they made much of him after 1933, permitting him to keep his Jewish wife, proclaiming his two sons “honorary Aryans,” and expanding the Institute as a center of geopolitical planning for world conquest.

But this marriage of the new science to the new barbarism came to an evil ending. Haushofer fully shared the patriotic, Pan-German, expansionist ambitions of the Nazi leaders and was equally concerned with making the Reich a “World Power” over the ruins of the British Empire. But he favored a German-Russian-Japanese bloc and warned that any Japanese frontal attack on China or any German frontal attack on Russia would bog down in the vast reaches of Eurasia and end in disaster. When his advice was ignored and his predictions were realized, he fell from grace. His eldest son, Albrecht, was arrested for plotting against Hitler, imprisoned, and finally murdered on the eve of the fall of Berlin. Haushofer himself was sent to Dachau concentration camp in 1944. His younger son, Heinz, suffered a like fate. Both were liberated with the end of the war. He returned to Munich, a bitter and broken old man. On March 10, 1946, he and his faithful wife committed suicide.

To extract the wheat of science from the chaff of nonsense and mysticism in the still burgeoning literature of Geopolitik is no simple task. There is no past or present evidence to support Sir Halford’s original political and strategic generalizations about the Heartland (as he himself conceded in his last days), even though some aspects of Anglo-American policy toward Russia since 1945 suggest acceptance of the error in high places. Haushofer’s views of China and Russia have been vindicated by events, along with the emphasis placed on the Near East by all the exponents of this school. The late Nicolas Spykman, outstanding disciple of geopolitics in the U.S.A., applied many of its concepts brilliantly and fruitfully to the problems of the American continents. He reformulated Mackinder’s original dictum: If any Power or bloc of Powers brings the “Rimlands,” or coastal plains of Eurasia, under unified control, it can command the World Island and
threaten the security of both the Heartland Powers (Russia and China) and the Island Powers (Britain and America). Just as Allied victory in World War II was contingent upon effective cooperation among U.S.A., U.K., and U.S.S.R., so enduring peace depends upon a stable balance and concert among them to the end that the Rimlands shall not be used by either against the other and shall not again fall under the control of any other Power or coalition.

It is not uncharitable, nor is it a denial of the value of much of the literature in this field, to suggest that these and other valid conclusions can be reached by routes less devious than those taken by the geopoliticians. This discipline or pseudo science views the data of world geography in terms of the struggle for global power among giant sovereignties. Since the outcome of such struggles depends always on unpredictable factors of morale and on incalculable “happenstances” in peace and war, along with consideration of space, position, matériel, and national purpose, a truly “scientific” formula for victory or even for survival is in the nature of the case impossible. Diplomacy and war, like bridge, boxing, horse racing, chess, and football, have their rules, principles, and techniques derived from practice or custom. But none of them makes possible any reliable prediction as to which player will win in any given contest. It is certain, however, that, as long as the struggle continues, the contestants will rationalize their purposes in plausible jargon, seize eagerly upon every new weapon and strategic plan, and grasp always after some principle or hypothesis which promises success. If the effort almost invariably ends in frustration, the cause may lie in the circumstance that the game itself, under the conditions of the 20th century, is a self-defeating enterprise.

5. THE WORLD OF THE SUPER-POWERS

When Pyrrhus had retired into Epirus and left Macedonia, he had a fair occasion given him by fortune to enjoy himself in quiet and to govern his kingdom in peace. But he was persuaded that neither to annoy others nor to be annoyed by them was a life insufferably tedious and languishing. His anxiety for fresh employment was relieved by his preparations for war against Rome. A certain Thessalonian named Cineas, one of his trusted advisers and a man of sound sense, perceiving what was afoot, drew Pyrrhus into a conversation. “If it please heaven that we conquer the Romans,” he inquired, “what use, Sir, shall we make of our victory?” Pyrrhus explained that the conquest of Rome would open the way to subduing all Italy. Cineas suggested that surely the triumphs were not to stop there. Pyrrhus then allowed his visions of conquest to extend to Sicily, to Carthage, to Libya, to all the other insolent enemies of his kingdom. “But,” asked Cineas, “when we have
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conquered all, what are we to do then?” “Why, then, my friend,” said Pyrrhus, laughing, “we will take our ease, and drink and be merry.” Cineas, having brought him thus far, replied: “And what hinders us from drinking and taking our ease now, when we have already those things in our hands at which we propose to arrive through seas of blood, through infinite toils and dangers, through innumerable calamities which we must both cause and suffer?” This discourse of Cineas gave Pyrrhus pain, but produced no change in his plans.—PLUTARCH, Life of Pyrrhus.

In the perspective of the long centuries during which the Western State System emerged in Europe and evolved into a global constellation of sovereignties, World War II represents another formidable attempt to achieve the political unification of the world community by violence. Here, as before, the Powers aspiring to universal dominion were ultimately crushed by a superior coalition of Powers raised up against them by their own ambitions and by the resolve of their intended victims to perish rather than surrender. The final result was the preservation of the existence and independence of the victors and the restoration of the State System as a congeries of separate sovereignties. And here, as before, the triumphant allies drifted apart and presently became rivals for power among themselves.

This pattern has repeated itself with majestic monotony for many generations. Napoleonic France was beaten in 1813-15 by a coalition of England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. The next war among Great Powers (1854-56) was fought between Russia and England, with France as England’s ally; the next but one (1866) between Austria and Prussia; and the third (1870-71) between Prussia and France. Hohenzollern Germany and Austria-Hungary were vanquished in 1918 by a coalition of Britain, France, Russia, America, Italy, and Japan. The next war (1918-20) was fought, in a confused and desultory fashion, to be sure, by Britain, France, America, and Japan against the new Russian revolutionary regime. The next thereafter found Britain, America, and the Soviet Union aligned against Germany, Italy, and Japan, which were at length crushed by the “United Nations.” Within two years after victory, the victorious coalition had become hopelessly disunited. The next war . . . ?

Despite the persistence of this antique design for anarchy, some novel features of the new time are noteworthy. One is the schism since 1917 between the new Russia and the Atlantic Powers, the former viewing the latter as a foul matrix of bourgeois decadence, capitalist exploitation, imperialistic sin, and wicked plots to attack and destroy the proletarian paradise; and the latter viewing the former as a hideous citadel of tyranny, slavery, godlessness, and viciously subversive conspiracy to destroy property, piety, and popular rule throughout the world.
These attitudes constitute the most striking current illustration of the effects of ideological preconceptions and class interests on foreign policy. They explain four major deviations in our time from what might otherwise be regarded as the normal pattern of power relationships.

1. Russia, then in the grip of civil war and intervention, was excluded from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, where peacemaking was complicated by fears of Bolshevism and by hopes of bolstering defeated Germany as a bulwark against the "Red menace." 21

2. The rulers of Britain, France, Poland, and the Little Entente, though possessed in the 1920's of overwhelming military superiority over a disarmed Germany and a feeble Italy, threw away all the components of effective power in the 1930's out of fear of the U.S.S.R., grudging admiration.

21 In a confidential memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference, David Lloyd George wrote:

"The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics whose dream is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms. This danger is no mere chimera. . . . Once that happens all eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik Revolution and within a year we may witness the spectacle of nearly 300,000,000 people organized into a vast Red Army, prepared for a renewal of the attack on western Europe. This is a prospect which no one can face with equanimity. Yet the news which came from Hungary yesterday shows only too clearly this danger is no fancy. . . . If we are wise, we shall offer to Germany a peace, which while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative of Bolshevism. . . . We should open to her the raw materials and markets of the world on equal terms with ourselves, and should do everything possible to enable the German people to get upon their legs again. . . . A large army of occupation for an indefinite period is out of the question. . . . It seems to me that we ought to endeavor to draw up a peace settlement. . . which will contain in itself no provocations for future wars, and which will constitute an alternative to Bolshevism. . . . Soviet imperialism does not merely menace the States on Russia's border. It threatens the whole of Asia and is as near to America as it is to France." This document is reproduced in Chap. IV, "The Birth of the League," of Mirror of the Past (New York, Wyn, 1946) by Konni Zilliacus, M.P. As late as Nov. 28, 1934, Lloyd George was still saying: "In a very short time, perhaps in a year or two, the conservative elements in this country will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe. . . . Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be welcoming Germany as our friend." The thoughtful reader will see a portent in the interesting fact that both these statements could as well have been made in 1947-48. Even Winston Churchill in a speech in Rome, Jan. 20, 1927, could assert: "I could not help being charmed by Signor Mussolini's gentle and simple bearing and by his calm, detached poise in spite of so many burdens and dangers. . . . If I had been an Italian I am sure that I should have been whole-heartedly with you from the start to the finish in your triumphant struggle against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism. . . . Your movement has rendered a service to the whole world. . . . Italy has shown that there is a way of fighting the subversive forces which can rally the masses of the people, properly led, to value and wish to defend the honor and stability of civilized society. She has provided the necessary antidote to the Russian poison. Hereafter no great nation will go unprovided with an ultimate means of protection against the cancerous growth of Bolshevism."
for Fascism, and hopes that Germany and Russia could be set against one another to their mutual destruction, while the West played the always enviable role of *tertius gaudens*. Fascism itself was the counterrevolution, bred of the effective fear of the rich for the poor and the futile hatred of the poor for the rich in an epoch of economic breakdown and impoverishment. The preparations of the Fascist Powers for conquest were acquiesced in, and even facilitated, by Paris, London, and Washington, in part because Western policy makers envisaged Fascism as a protection against Communism. Thus Laval “appeased” Mussolini and thereby made him Hitler’s ally. Sarraut and Flandin yielded the Rhineland to the Nazi Reich. Blum abandoned Spain to the Axis. Daladier and Bonnet looked complacently on the loss of Austria and actively joined Chamberlain and Halifax in compelling Prague to surrender to Berlin. The French bloc was demolished at Munich by the act of its makers. Many of the Nazi tanks that crushed France in 1940 were made in the Czech Skoda works. By the same logic, Britain and America “appeased” Japan until Tokyo was in a position to undertake the subjugation of all of eastern Asia. This voluntary surrender by dominant powers of a position of originally unassailable preponderance was without precedent in the annals of diplomacy.

3. The defensive coalition called for by the new threat of world conquest did not come into being until its major members were all confronted with almost irreparable disaster. The French-Czech-Soviet alliance of 1935 could easily have halted the Third Reich without war. It was thrown away at Munich. A new Anglo-French-Soviet alliance in 1939 could still have prevented war—or, at worst, brought Germany to quick defeat. London and Paris refused to pay Moscow’s price. The U.S.S.R. came to terms with Berlin, hoping to play the “happy third” in a war among bourgeois States, but gained instead only a brief interlude of peace followed by a murderous assault launched by an enemy now in control of all the Continent. Nothing short of Pearl Harbor sufficed to make America the fighting ally of Britain and Russia against the Triplice.

4. The victors of 1945 fell to quarreling among themselves more swiftly and more bitterly than did the members of any other triumphant coalition of recent centuries. Long before the burial of the dead, the clearing of the rubble, and the making of the peace, the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R., though brought to the verge of ruin by their past disunity, again renewed the mutual fears and hates of old and added new ones to their witches’ broth. In consequence, Fascism reborn sprang from the body of Fascism dead, while German and Japanese superpatriots, with heads bloody but unbowed, cherished dreams of ultimate *revanche*.

These pathological aspects of the contemporary politics of power are
THE POLITICS OF POWER

paralleled by other developments which are less the result of the psychoses of patriots and the follies of statesmen than of impersonal forces of technology, science, and the military arts producing results willed by no one. The number of “Great Powers” has steadily declined, while the capacity of secondary and minor Powers to play the game of power has approached the vanishing point. Only vast, wealthy, highly industrialized States of continental proportions have the components of power essential for the preparation and waging of effective war in the mid-20th century. Of the three surviving “Super-Powers,” only the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. qualify for the title, since Britain is now hopelessly inferior in the wherewithal of fighting capacity. France and China, though “Great Powers” by courtesy, are in fact not Powers at all in relationship to the formidable might of either America or Russia. The rehabilitation of Germany and Japan, vehemently insisted upon by the U.S.A. in 1947-48, seemed less likely to restore these former Powers to their lost status of “Greatness” than to make them wards and pensioners, manning America’s advanced outposts against the U.S.S.R.

A major result of these changes in the components and loci of power is that the Western State System, which has always been characterized by a multiplicity of Powers, has now become a duality of Powers. Multipolarity has dissolved into bipolarity as the basic design of global politics. This transformation means, among other things, that it is no longer true that each Power is the potential enemy of its neighbors and the potential ally of its neighbor’s neighbors. Diplomatic encirclement is no longer possible in a contest of only two contenders. As in all bipolar political systems, each Power now tends to be the ally of its neighbors and the enemy of its neighbor’s neighbors, which in turn are allies of the enemy Power. The lesser States, being relatively impotent, seek safety by allying themselves with one or the other of the giants. To be allied with the near Power is safer than to be allied with the far Power, even if very little safety is left in either case. Each colossus strives to use the lesser communities closest to it as satellites, buffers, puppets, or bulwarks against the other. Whatever polite formulas of traditional diplomacy may be used to save face, there can no longer be alliances among equals. Only the two Leviathans are roughly equal. All others are inferior and therefore dependent.

Under these circumstances, it is not currently useful to chart the relative positions of the Great Powers through time in terms of population, armies, navies, merchant fleets, foreign trade, steel production, and the like—even if adequate data for the war years were available. It suffices to note that as of 1948 the U.S.S.R. and its satellites comprised a population outnumbering that of all the rest of Europe and maintained troops under arms outnumbering those of all other States combined, with the exception of China.
THE WORLD OF THE SUPER-POWERS

The U.S.A. possessed almost two-thirds of the world’s usable naval tonnage (including over four-fifths of all the world’s aircraft carriers), deployed a long-range air force probably greater than all others put together, guarded the world’s largest stock pile of atomic bombs, controlled well over half the world’s merchant shipping, produced at least half of all the world’s steel, possessed more than half of all the manufacturing facilities on earth, carried on the largest part of the world’s foreign trade, and was the only remaining major source of liquid capital.

Except in one area, the two titans, being located on opposite sides of the Northern Hemisphere, are nowhere contiguous and are therefore constrained to bargain and battle, coldly or hotly as the case may be, only by, about, through, and over other States. The exception is Bering Strait, where the two Diomede Islands, one Soviet and the other American, are only a few miles apart. Increasing attention has lately been given by strategists on both sides to the whole vast expanse of the north polar icecap and the Arctic Ocean. Canada, lying between the monsters, might serve theoretically as a neutral buffer. In reality, no such role is possible unless Washington and Moscow both desire it, as they emphatically did not at the time of writing. Any disposition of the Dominion to align itself with the U.S.S.R. could and would be thwarted by the U.S.A. Canadian propensities to align Ottawa with Washington against Moscow could not be thwarted by the U.S.S.R. By 1948, in fact if not in form, Canada had become a strategic dependency of its mighty southern neighbor, to the tune of arms standardization, joint maneuvers in the Far North, aerial collaboration, loans, and military missions. The Kremlin, having no means of preventing this development save the relatively feeble means of espionage, sabotage, and psychological warfare, had to content itself with efforts to checkmate U.S. bases in Alaska, Canada, Iceland, and Greenland by multiplying its own advanced bases in northern Siberia and the near-by Arctic islands.

In the larger arena it was elementary that neither of the Super-Powers could willingly permit the other to control the Rimlands of Europe, the Near and Middle East, and the Far East, lest they be used as effective bastions of defense or dangerous bases of attack. When in 1945 the armies of the enemies-to-be met joyfully as allies and comrades in arms over the ruins of German and Japanese power, the U.S.S.R. was in effective control of eastern Germany and Austria, eastern Europe, the Balkans north of Greece, northern Iran, Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, northern Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kurils. The U.S.A., with Britain as partner, had control of, or was exercising effective influence over, western Germany and Austria, western Europe, Italy, Greece, Turkey, most of Iran, all of Japan, and part of China. Given this allocation of power, the question arises as to which colossus
was henceforth to act as a "satiated Power" and which as "unsatiated."

Leaving for later pages a study of postwar and prewar foreign policies, a careful analysis of official attitudes and conduct in both capitals after the summer of 1945 may suggest that, if the Bismarckian dichotomy has here any utility at all, its application leads to conclusions other than those commonly accepted in the West. The propaganda devices of politicians and pressmen of both Powers were all of a piece. The symbol-artists in each camp painted a portrait of their own State as pacific, democratic, tolerant, freedom-loving, cooperative, generous, humanitarian, antiimperialist, and threatened by the other, which in turn was depicted as aggressive, undemocratic, spiteful, servile, obstructionist, greedy, selfish, imperialistic, and menacing. To argue that both portraits were caricatures or that either was true or false would be a work of supererogation—which would, in addition, be unpatriotic since the ancient tribal gods, now as of yore, are potent and wrathful gods who will have no other gods before them. This much, however, can be said with some semblance of accuracy and detachment:

Washington, aided by London, sought after V-J day to diminish or (in intent) exclude Soviet influence in eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East and therewith restrict the spatial expanse of Soviet power to limits as little extended as possible beyond those of 1939. Moscow, conversely, sought to consolidate and perpetuate the distribution of power flowing from the military verdict of 1944-45. In this sense the U.S.S.R. was "satiated" and on the "defensive," while the U.S.A. was dissatisfied with the postarmistice status quo and was actively seeking to alter it to Soviet disadvantage, however much it suited Anglo-American spokesmen to describe every Soviet countermove as evidence of "aggression" and "expansion." Here, as always, attack is the best defense, and expansion is the surest guarantee against contraction. By 1947 the U.S.S.R. had felt obliged to withdraw its troops from northern Iran and Manchuria, though it had consolidated its political position in Slavic Europe and in Hungary and Rumania as well. The U.S.A. had assumed the defense of Greece and Turkey, made secure its position in Japan, committed itself doubtfully to support Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communists, was still challenging (to little effect) the Soviet position in eastern Europe and the Balkans, and was striving to buttress western Germany, Austria, Italy, and France against Soviet counterpressure.

How long, how bitterly, and with what final results this hazardous rivalry for power in the Rimlands would continue without eventuating in an explosion or a new equilibrium was uncertain as 1948 opened. Had each side accepted in good faith the Yalta-Potsdam formulas for a global balance of power, the struggle perhaps need never have begun. Once begun, each
side (to paraphrase R. G. Hawtrey's apt language) strove for every increment of power which would give it an advantage, real or fancied, over the other in anticipation of an ultimate crisis when one side should put forward demands to which the other would be unwilling to yield in the face of a mere threat. If, as, and when that crisis should materialize, it might reasonably be expected to produce a result similar to that bred by all such crises in the past—save that, in the preatomic era, civilizations have usually survived the sequel.

The ever-fascinating and never-certain issue of how evenly the rivals were matched hinges here to a peculiar degree on the imponderables, some of which will be referred to in later chapters. A conspectus of a few of the purely material factors may have some value, however, in indicating a rough order of relative magnitude between the giants, as well as rates of change.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Continental area, square miles (1948)</td>
<td>3,022,387</td>
<td>8,390,490</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>122,700,000</td>
<td>160,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>145,000,000</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives lost in World War II (1941-45):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>c. 8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Ships (1948):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops under arms (1945)</td>
<td>c. 1,350,000</td>
<td>c. 4,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steel production, tons.</td>
<td>32,000,000 (1913)</td>
<td>15,000,000 (1946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80,000,000 (1944)</td>
<td>25,400,000 (planned for 1950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig-iron production, tons.</td>
<td>31,400,000 (1913)</td>
<td>11,000,000 (1946)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55,000,000 (1944)</td>
<td>19,500,000 (planned for 1950)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coal production, tons.</td>
<td>517,000,000 (1913)</td>
<td>166,000,000 (1940)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>616,000,000 (1944)</td>
<td>250,000,000 (planned for 1950)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil production, tons.</td>
<td>34,000,000 (1913)</td>
<td>31,000,000 (1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>206,000,000 (1945)</td>
<td>35,400,000 (planned for 1950)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
THE POLITICS OF POWER

These figures indicate overwhelming American superiority over the U.S.S.R. in all the decisive elements of strength save sheer territory and population. A survey of other industries, particularly those concerned with aviation, motorcars, railroads, shipbuilding, and atomic energy, would reveal an even greater disparity. Soviet weakness is counterbalanced to some extent by the relative instability of a capitalist, as compared with a socialist, economy and by the possible disadvantages which the U.S.A. may encounter in the conduct of political warfare by virtue of the emotional identification of some of its leaders and diplomats with medieval monarchs, feudal aristocrats, and native entrepreneurs and officials not noted for probity.

American preponderance is diminished to a more obvious degree by the facts of distance. Movement of masses of men and matériel by land is still swifter and easier than movement by sea or air. American naval forces could not prevent Soviet land forces from occupying most of Europe and Asia in the event of war, nor could American air forces preclude this result, despite lavish use of atomic bombs. The American problem would then be to win a war of attrition through more atomic bombs, followed eventually by invasion and occupation of Eurasia. This enterprise might prove more difficult of accomplishment than the infliction of heavy damage on American cities by the enemy. The past record of American experts in calculating Soviet fighting capacity is not encouraging. Soviet morale, mass, size, location, and interior lines of land communication are all factors which may reduce appreciably the American margin of apparent invincibility.

Further speculation on this unpleasant theme may be deferred. It is to be doubted whether any meaningful “victory” could be won in such a war. What was not to be doubted in 1948 was that such a war, whatever its novel weapons and lethal results might be, would sooner or later come if the policy makers in Washington and Moscow continued to play the ancient game of power in the ancient way.

22 The following public statements, for example, were all made in June, 1941, following the Axis invasion of the U.S.S.R.:

George E. Sokolsky: “Soviet Russia has bluffed the world for a quarter of a century, and the bluff has been called. . . . Soviet Russia will soon be eliminated from the war altogether.” Martin Dies: “Hitler will be in control of Russia within 30 days.” Fletcher Pratt: “It will take a miracle bigger than any since biblical times to save Russia from a quick and complete defeat.” The New York Times: “It seems probable that Hitler will be able to achieve his main military objectives in Russia within a few weeks.” Paul Malon: “America’s diplomats and military men agree in their expectation of what will be the fate of Russia. They both give the Reds no more than four to six weeks.” Karl von Weygand, Hearst journalist: “Win or lose the war, the Stalin regime is fairly certain to go. It is doubtful whether the Communist regime can withstand the shock of such a war.”
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THE POLITICS OF POWER

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CHAPTER VIII

THE NEW TRIBALISM

1. PATRIOTISM AND PEOPLE

National patriotism is the firm conviction that the best country in the world is the one you happened to be born in.—G. B. Shaw.

Universal conscript military service, with its twin brother universal suffrage, has mastered all Continental Europe—with what promises of massacre and bankruptcy for the 20th century!—Hippolyte Adolphe Taine, Les Origines de la France contemporaine, 1891.

The outstanding characteristic of the peoples of the Western State System is their devotion to the “nations” into which they have got themselves divided. The Western world is a world of nations. The Western State System is a system of nation-states. The Western peoples and their Oriental and African imitators are keenly aware of themselves as “nationals” of particular nation-states, already in existence or striving to be born. Millions are influenced more in their emotions and behavior by a sense of national solidarity and fellow feeling with their fellow nationals than by their racial, religious, economic, esthetic, or recreational interests. This becomes most apparent in wartime, when governments demand and usually receive unswerving and undivided allegiance to the nation. All other interests are in form, if not always in substance, subordinated to the supreme end of saving the fatherland, chastising the national foe, and enabling the nation to impose its will on the enemy nation. In 1914 and in 1939, throughout the European Continent, labor leaders forgot their slogans of class solidarity, pacifists forgot their crusade against war, churchmen forgot the Prince of Peace, socialists forgot the general strike of the workers of the world which would make war impossible. Merchants, munition makers, and militarists had less to forget. All rallied to the unfurled banners of the nations in arms. All hurled themselves into the fiery furnace, chanting hymns of hate. But war merely brings to the surface and makes plain through pathological exaggeration what already exists in peace: an almost universal disposition to place the nation before all other human groupings, to give
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precedence to national interests above all other interests, to look upon national patriotism as the highest type of loyalty and allegiance.

The Making of Patriots. The emotions and ideologies of patriotism are instilled into people in every nation by an elaborate process of inculcation. Nationalism is an inseparable component of the cultural heritage handed down from generation to generation in every modern society. Upon the eager minds of little children, as upon a blank slate, are written at an early age the large characters of “mother,” “home,” and “heaven,” “flag,” “fatherland,” and “patriotism.” The first impressions of the Great Society outside of the family, the neighborhood, and the kindergarten are associated with national emblems, heroes, myths, and traditions. Every child in the Western world, before he has learned how to read and write his national language, has learned how to respond to the gaily colored banner which is the flag of his fatherland, to the stirring rhythm of the song which is his national anthem, to the names and legends of the great nation builders who are revered as men like gods. Awe, respect, reverence, and enthusiasm toward the nation-state and its symbolic representations are inculcated from infancy.

Next comes the primer, with its quaint little tales of national glory and achievement, and then the elements of national history and geography. In later childhood there is nationalistic history with a vengeance, patriotic exercises, Flag Day celebrations, festivals and fun for Independence Day, or Constitution Day, or Bastille Day, or Guy Fawkes Day. Puberty brings membership in the Boy Scouts or the Girl Scouts, outings and parties and training in citizenship. In adolescence the young citizen enters secondary school. He becomes acquainted with the alien tongues and customs of enemies and strangers. He studies the national literature, the national history, the national Kultur. He becomes politically conscious and emotionally inspired by a fuller appreciation of his identity with his fatherland. La Patrie becomes father, mother, mistress, or lover in the heart of the youthful patriot; and he (or she) is taught to swear undying allegiance to that which is more sacred even than truth, honor, or life itself. And at length, in early adulthood, comes, in most lands, military service for the young man, romantic attachments to soldier lovers for the young woman, the right to vote and pay taxes, and a deep sense of loyalty and devotion to that half-real, half-mystical entity which is the nation-state. Thus, through the seven ages of the patriot, national sentiment is systematically instilled into the citizens of every State—with the home, the church, the school, the army, the press, the political party, the business enterprise, and the State itself all contributing mightily to that process through which children and raw youths are transformed into ideally loyal and patriotic good citizens.

The mechanisms, procedures, and techniques of education and propaganda
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through which this result is attained have been analyzed in many States by
a score of assiduous scholars.1 The primitive initiation ceremonies of the
tribe or clan through which the rising generation is made a participant in
the social group are repeated with elaborate variation in the educational
processes of every modern nation. Youth is conditioned to allegiance—no
longer to the tribe, the clan, the class, the caste, the province, or the city,
but to the nation, which demands an allegiance above all other allegiances
and a loyalty requiring, if need be, the supreme sacrifice on the altar of
patriotism. What youth has been taught, age seldom forgets—and all modern
States are nations of patriots whose rulers may ordinarily rely upon the
unswerving devotion of the great masses of the citizens to the mighty traditions
of the national past. Each State thus develops and enriches its own person-
ality by perpetually recreating itself in its own image. Each State perpetually
models its figures of earth and gets them more and more to its liking. Each
State becomes symbolized as an anthropomorphic deity to which are attrib-
tuted the national virtues and vices, the national achievements and frus-
trations. Each patriot, like a new Narcissus, is enthralled by the beauty of
his own image, which he sees reflected in the national mirror; and he feels
himself to be one with the nation.

The Genesis of Modern Patriotism. An understanding of the process of
manufacturing patriots, however, does not in itself serve to explain why
national patriotism has come to occupy such an all-pervading place in the
culture and ideology of Western civilization. This is perhaps one of the
mysteries which Western man, in his ceaseless efforts to understand himself,
can never quite comprehend.2 Nationalism is an advanced form of ethno-
centrism, in which the limits of social cohesion are coterminous with the
bounds of the language and culture of people in a large community inhabi-
ting extensive territories. Ethnocentrism implies friendship with the members
of the “in-group” and hostility toward members of all “out-groups.” The
in-group is the focus of all social life. Each new generation is initiated into
the rituals and ceremonies which symbolize its solidarity. Law, language,

1 See C. E. Merriam, The Making of Citizens, 1931, the concluding volume of the
series, which includes Elizabeth Weber, The Duk-Duks; C. J. H. Hayes, France, a
Nation of Patriots; John Gaus, Great Britain: a Study in Civic Loyalty; S. N. Harper,
Civic Training in Soviet Russia; Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Mon-
archy; and Paul Kosok, Modern Germany: A Study of Conflicting Loyalties.

2 “What has given great vogue to nationalism in modern times? We really do not
know. It is a pity that we do not know, for if we did, we could probably make some
fairly accurate guess as to the future of nationalism. As it is, we have to content our-
selves with hypotheses and suggestions. Of these the most plausible would appear to
be the underlying tendency in modern times to regard the national state as the medium
through which civilization is best assured and advanced” (C. J. H. Hayes, The Historical

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PATRIOTISM AND PEOPLE

art, religion, government, morality, family institutions, economic activities are all phases of the group culture, all strands in the ties which bind the individuals into a social whole. These fruits of social living are enjoyed only by the members of the group and are denied to outside groups, even though they may be extended to individual aliens in accordance with the ancient custom of hospitality. Through them the community is made aware of itself as a collective entity set apart from outside communities. “Stranger” is usually “enemy,” and foreign cultures are strange and hostile.

A “nation” consists of a relatively large number of people spread over a relatively large area and bound together by common ties of language and culture. The communities which composed the civilizations of the Near East and the Mediterranean Basin in ancient times were, for the most part, not nations in this sense. In their political organization they were city-states, military monarchies, or “world empires,” consisting either of small communities of culturally homogeneous people or of large aggregations of culturally diverse peoples brought under unified control through war and political subjugation. The same was true of the peoples of the Western world in the early medieval period. Group solidarity, civic loyalty, and political organization rested, not upon national communities, but upon smaller or larger units. Nationalism appeared only as “nations” came into existence and attained awareness of their own identity.

Hans Kohn, ablest contemporary student of modern nationalism, points out that the new creed “as we understand it, is not older than the second half of the 18th century.” Early tribalism in Israel and Athens gave way to a universalism which has persisted almost (but not quite) to our own times. The great “national” leaders and writers of the Enlightenment, degraded to the stature of tribal patriots by later generations, were nothing of the kind. Frederick the Great made a Frenchman President of the Prussian Royal Academy and declared himself content to have lived in the age of Voltaire. Johann Gottfried Herder denounced Prussia, praised Czechs and Russians, and proclaimed: “The human race is one whole; we work and suffer, sow and harvest, each for all.” Hans Kohn concludes:

Nationalism, taking the place of religion, is as diversified in its manifestations and aspirations, in its form and even its substance as religion itself. . . . Yet in all its diversities it fulfills one great task—giving meaning to man’s life and justifying his noble and ignoble passions before himself and history, lifting him above the loneliness and futilities of his days, and endowing the order and power of government, without which no society can exist, with the majesty of true authority. . . . [But] nationalism is only a passing form of integration, beneficial and vitalizing, yet by its own exaggeration and dynamism easily destructive of human liberty. . . . From Jerusalem and Athens shine also the eternal guiding
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stars which lift the age of nationalism above itself, pointing forward on the road to deeper liberty and to higher forms of integration.3

It seems probable that conflicts among culturally divergent populations played a significant role in producing within each community that sense of its own identity, that feeling of solidarity and common interest, that conception of the personality or ego of the group which is of the essence of national patriotism. Contacts of war would seem to be more effective than any other kind in producing the type of group cohesion which lies behind nationalism. No emotion unifies a group so readily as hatred for a common enemy. Group hostility to the foreign foe arouses the most elemental types of defensive behavior, which serve to give the primitive group a solidarity it could never attain otherwise. International relations in the formative period of nationalism were for the most part those of war. Anglo-Saxon England attained a degree of national unity for the first time when Alfred the Great rallied his subjects to resist the Danish invasion. Norman England was already an embryonic national State, with a national Government of considerable power and authority and with a population increasingly impressed with its "Englishness" by virtue of chronic conflicts with the Scots, the Irish, and the French. In France, localism and provincialism gave way to a common consciousness of "Frenchness" in the course of the Hundred Years' War, when its inhabitants at last organized themselves for effective resistance against the English invaders and found a fitting symbol of the national cause in the person of the first great heroic figure of the French nation, Jeanne d'Arc. In Spain, constant warfare against the southern Saracens gave birth to Spanish nationalism and produced that blending of patriotic sentiment and crusading Catholicism which became its distinctive characteristic. In every case nationalism was born of war against alien groups.

All the later nationalisms between the 15th century and the 20th were similarly born of conflict situations between societies already differing from one another in language, religion, and institutions and made more aware of these differences by increased contacts with aliens. Dutch nationalism attained full flower in the long struggle against Spanish rule of the Netherlands. Swiss nationalism emerged out of conflicts with Austria. Sweden became a nation through conflicts with Russians and Poles and Germans. American nationalism was generated by the War of the Revolution. In the 19th century, Italian nationalism attained political unity for Italy as a result of common resistance to foreign invasion and common conflicts against

3 All quotations are from The Idea of Nationalism (New York, Macmillan, 1944), which deserves to be regarded as the definitive history of the ideological origins of contemporary nationalism.

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Austria. The German nation became a unified State through conflict with Danes, Austrians, and Frenchmen, after Napoleonic domination and the "War of Liberation" earlier in the century converted Prussians, Bavarians, Swabians, and Württembergers into "Germans." The peculiarly intense and fanatical nationalism of the Balkan peoples has been the product of armed revolt against the Turks and of the presence within the Peninsula of a large number of divergent linguistic and religious groups, each of which became aware of itself through contact and conflict with its neighbors. Irish nationalism, Turkish nationalism, Japanese nationalism, Indian nationalism, and Chinese nationalism were likewise products of conflict against alien rulers, alien invaders, or alien foes across the frontier.

This suggests that the process whereby a community acquires a sense of its own identity and national personality bears a certain resemblance to the process whereby an individual growing up in society acquires a self, or ego, of his own. Social psychologists are generally agreed that an individual growing up to biological maturity in complete isolation from his fellows would not have a complete human "personality." The individual becomes humanized by social contacts and interactions with his fellows. His innate impulses are inhibited, directed, and conditioned through social pressure—until his personality becomes, in the language of the psychoanalyst, a fusion of instinctive biological drives (the "Id"), the conscious thinking and acting self (the "Ego"), and the unconscious controls and repressions of id and ego drives (the "Super-Ego"). The individual becomes aware of himself and develops distinctive personality traits by "taking the role of the other," by socialized experience with other persons.

Similarly, a nation acquires its ego by contacts with other nations. It becomes acutely aware of its own identity to the degree to which such contacts are intimate, rich, and varied. Contacts of war would seem to promote national solidarity more effectively than contacts of peace, for war requires cooperation in the interest of self-preservation. It emotionalizes and dramatizes the symbols, flags, songs, slogans, traditions, and leaders which give unity to the group and distinguish it from other groups. National patriotism is the most complete expression of ethnocentrism. Its devotees are imbued with an intense consciousness of the collective personality of the national community, and this collective personality emerges out of social contacts and interactions between divergent groups not dissimilar to those contacts and interactions between single human beings which produce and enrich the individual personality. The history of this process remains to be written by

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5 This phrase was frequently used by the late Prof. George H. Mead in his lectures in social psychology at the University of Chicago.
social psychologists with historical training or by historians who are also social psychologists.  

The Faith of Patriots. Nationalists everywhere exalt the nation-state as the highest form of political and social organization. The national community must achieve political independence. It must incorporate within its frontiers all peoples speaking the language and having the culture of the

Lewis A. Dexter ("People, Patriotism and Power Politics" in Social Studies, December, 1943) states succinctly the relationship between mass faith and individual personality:

"To understand international power politics, it is only necessary to know why the gang on one side of the river hates the gang on the other and how it is that the different fraternities struggle so bitterly for the prizes of campus politics. For these rivalries also exemplify a common pattern in Western societies—the tendency to glorify one's own group and to hate outsiders. . . . One cannot without irritating one's friends and associates reiterate in a modern society: 'I am a very great man.' But one can, as a member of certain groups, constantly proclaim: 'We are very great men.' And, since numerous associates say the same, it sounds like truth. . . ."

"Those of us who are moved by considerations of 'national honor,' 'national prestige,' and 'sovereignty,' to the extent that we become chauvinists are so moved because our social institutions and cultural traditions have molded us into personalities who need that particular sort of outlet for hostility and vainglory. Unless we understand this fact, planners for peace are, in their fight against jingoism,* likely to attack symptoms rather than causes.

"Nationalism goes back to a basic conflict in the training of the child. On the one hand, he learns that in fact the way to attain rewards is often to be aggressive and assertive. On the other hand, he is taught that the good child is quiet, unselfish, and modest; and he discovers that although being aggressive often pays, it sometimes gets one into more trouble than 'goodness.' Some persons discover a convenient solution for their dilemma; they become selfish, aggressive, pushing in the name of the welfare of the group to which they belong. There is less reason then to fear punishment.

"The tendency to attack outsiders is re-enforced by the need to hate which some children (especially the ambitious, energetic type) acquire as they grow up. They are taught, for example, that every little boy can become President or a millionaire, without learning how great the odds against any particular little boy are. Consequently, when they finally realize that the chances in their own individual cases to succeed quickly are not good, it is a shock. Dissatisfaction can be turned inward, against the self, as it often is, leading in mild cases to gloominess or grouchiness, in extreme cases to some forms of 'insanity.' Dissatisfaction can be expressed against those who actually did succeed or the procedures by which they rose to power; this is often unsafe, because their good will is necessary to keep what one has. So, dissatisfaction is often deflected against the logically irrelevant target which the foreigner provides. It is not necessary of course that the object of hate be actually a foreigner; it is merely essential that he be some one whose good will is not at all necessary and preferable that he be sufficiently remote so that the fact that he is after all human is not too evident. So, we find some business men convinced of the inequity and wickedness of trade union leaders, some intellectuals finding in business men the modern equivalent of personal devils, and some church leaders (who accept without flinching, opportunism within their own denomination) agitated about sin in distant places, etc. But, in our society, the foreigner is the easiest person to hate, because there is such a comprehensive documentation, through folklore and tradition, of the thorough-going hatefulness of each different group of foreigners."
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national society. It must compel conformity to the dominant language and
culture on the part of alien groups within its frontier. It must attain unity,
uniformity, solidarity. It must assert its rights vigorously and protect its
interests energetically in contacts with other national groups. It is the all in
all, the ne plus ultra, the final and perfect embodiment of social living for
all loyal patriots. It is beyond good and evil, right or wrong; for its interests
are supreme and paramount, and all means toward its greater glory and
power are justified by the end. “A true nationalist places his country above
everything; he therefore conceives, treats, and resolves all pending questions
in their relation to the national interest.”  

His object is “the exclusive pur-
suit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity,
and a steady increase of national power—for a nation declines when it loses mili-
tary might.”  

To the patriot the nation-state is a great goddess to be
worshiped, to be loved, to be served—and all sacrifices in her service are noble
and heroic. She calls out to her worshipers:

Citizens, it is I (the Great Mother, la Patrie) that undertakes to protect your
personal safety, your peace, your property: What wilt thou give me in return for
constant benefit? If it happens that I am in peril, if unnatural children torment
my bosom . . . wouldst thou abandon me in these stormy moments for the price
of my invariable protection? . . . No! . . . There are times when I would com-
mand the sacrifice . . . even of thy life which I have so steadily protected. 

The poetry of chauvinism transcends all the imperatives of morality and
reason:

Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in
the right; but our country, right or wrong! (Stephen Decatur, April, 1816.)

When Japan shall be empowered with the Holy Faith, she will pacify other
peoples as seems good to her. Hereafter Japan shall command foreign powers. Mark
it well, all of you! They have been called hitherto Japan and foreign
lands; hereafter there shall be naught but Japan! (The sacred literature of
Tenrikyo.)

Baldur von Schirach, Nazi youth leader, addressing the Hitler Jugend
in October, 1933, at the unveiling in Westphalia of a war memorial in the
form of a monument to the Archangel Michael:

Here we will not speak the warm words of peace, the words “home” and
“Fatherland.” Our words are spoken in the face of the awful summons of war.

7 Charles Maurras, in Action Française, June 10, 1908, p. 969.
p. 165.
9 Barrère in Procès-verbal de l’assemblée nationale, No. 699, pp. 7-8, cited in Hayes, op. cit., pp. 69-70. This and the preceding quotations all refer to French nationalism, but
the values and ideology which they suggest are typical of all nationalisms.
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Youths, your hands are now raised in an oath before this monument which is erected to the sublimity of bloodshed—and Michael is the Angel of Death—and you are swearing that your lives belong to the Reich, and your blood to der Führer.

Lord! Let the beautiful ships which are on their way to our Africa arrive safely at their port. Grant that our soldiers on the sunny roads on the other side of the sea have fortune as their guiding star and glory as their goal. Grant that they may crown with fresh laurels the old, glorious flags of Vittorio Veneto, which now wave under the tropic sky. Let the culture of the new Rome of Mussolini fuse with that of Caesar’s Rome to a poem of greatness. Let the Italian Empire dreamed of by our great men and our martyrs become reality in the near future. Lord! Let our lives, if Mother Italy demand it, become a joyful sacrifice on the altar of Thy holy and just Will. (Prayer for the Ballila Boys, L’Azione coloniale, Rome, 1935.)

The legions which [America] sends forth are armed not with the sword but with the Cross. The higher State to which she seeks the allegiance of all mankind is not of human but of divine origin. She cherishes no purpose save to merit the favors of Almighty God. . . . We extended our domain over distant islands in order to safeguard our own interests and accepted the consequent obligation to bestow opportunity and liberty upon less favored people. (Inaugural Address of Calvin Coolidge, March 4, 1925.)

Finally, as a spokesman of one of the newest (and oldest) nationalisms of our time, Ilya Ehrenburg to the Red Army, 1943:

Together with you marches the frail little girl, Zoya, and the stern marines of Sevastopol. Together with you march your ancestors who welded together this land of Russia—the knights of Prince Igor, the legions of Dmitri. Together with you march the soldiers of 1812 who routed the invincible Napoleon. Together with you march Budenny’s troops, Chapayev’s volunteers, barefooted, hungry and all-conquering. Together with you march your children, your mother, your wife. They bless you! . . . Soldier, together with you marches Russia! She is beside you. Listen to her winged step. In the moment of battle, she will cheer you with a glad word. If you waver, she will uphold you. If you conquer, she will embrace you.

It is not without significance that nationalism has flowered most luxuriantly in the period since the French Revolution, during which the bourgeoisie has risen to political power in most of the Western States. The nation-states of western Europe were originally dynastic creations of warrior-kings. Loyalty has been transferred from king to State, from monarch to fatherland, only since the rise of modern mechanized economy. Machine industry brought social integration and interdependence on a national scale. Bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism inspired the majority of the citizens of the nation-state with the attitudes, ideals, and values of popular patriotism. Of the three great passwords of the middle-class revolution—“liberty,”
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“equality,” “fraternity”—only fraternity, i.e., national solidarity, was fully achieved, for liberty and equality in a social order of economic inequality and insecurity have remained dreams only partly fulfilled. Out of the gigantic efflorescence of mass patriotism in Napoleonic France, out of the military impact of Napoleonic France upon Europe, was born a nationalist awakening of the ascendant middle classes throughout the Continent. During all the 19th century, liberalism and nationalism were the two faces of the bourgeois revolt against the ancien régime throughout the Western world. Only in the old Germany and the old Russia did the landowning aristocracy retain a large degree of political power—and even here the members of this class became more patriotic than the bourgeois patriots. The same observation might be made of contemporary Japan. Patriotism places allegiance to the whole national community and to its political symbol, the national State, above allegiance to caste or class or party. But it is nevertheless true that nationalism as a cult and a way of life became a mighty driving force in the hands of bourgeois patriot-liberals and that it has received general acceptance in the period during which merchants, bankers, and industrial entrepreneurs—the ruling classes in the epoch of capitalism—took political power unto themselves in the great nation-states. This historical coincidence need not be taken to mean that nationalism is of significance only as a manifestation of the attitudes and ideology of the bourgeoisie. But it is clear that this class has in most States played the largest role in the elaboration and inculcation of the attitudes and ideology of nationalism.

Extreme nationalism of the Fascist variety has various faces in various countries, but it has everywhere certain common characteristics. Like nationalism in its earliest form, it is born of war and conflict among nations. It is everywhere directed against past, present, or future “enemy” nations. Perhaps its most striking characteristic is its divorce from 19th-century bourgeois liberalism. It is still for the most part bourgeois in terms of the social and economic status of its devotees. But it is the bourgeois nationalism of an age in which the position of the bourgeoisie as a ruling class is everywhere challenged by enemies within and without. Since the challenge must be met and the enemies must be suppressed, emphasis is placed, not upon liberty, equality, and laissez-faire individualism, but upon law and order, discipline, national unity, and salvation through ultrapatriotic dictatorship.

Liberty is not an end but a means. As a means it must be controlled and dominated. This involves force . . . the assembling of the greatest force possible, the inexorable use of force whenever necessary—and by force is meant physical, armed force. . . . When a group or a party is in power it is under an obligation to fortify itself and defend itself against all comers. . . . Liberty is today no longer the chaste and austere virgin for whom the generations of the first half

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of the last century fought and died. For the gallant, restless, and bitter youth who face the dawn of a new history there are other words that exercise a far greater fascination, and these words are: order, hierarchy, discipline. . . . Fascism has already stepped over, and if it be necessary it will turn tranquilly and again step over, the more or less putrescent corpse of the Goddess of Liberty.\(^{10}\)

In accordance with this philosophy, “strong” government is called for to suppress all “national enemies,” in which category are usually placed all racial or linguistic minorities and all political groups aiming at changing the existing distribution of wealth and political power. The most common objects of attack are Socialists, Communists, labor leaders, liberals, Jews, aliens of all kinds, and all who by virtue of race, language, religion, or political doctrines fail to conform to the highest standards of patriotic respectability. “Strong” government is likewise called for to discipline and organize the nation, to regulate and coordinate all economic activity, to regiment the entire population in order to give greater power to the State. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany are good examples of the political and economic forms which extreme nationalism has devised to achieve its purposes.

That such a nationalism involves a repudiation of civilization and a monstrous reversion to barbarism and paganism was perceived, with amazing insight and foresight, by Heinrich Heine a century before the event. In his literary history of Germany he wrote:

The philosopher of Nature will be terrible because he will appear in alliance with the primitive powers of Nature, able to evoke the demoniac energies of old Germanic Pantheism—doing which there will awake in him that battle-madness which we find among the ancient Teutonic races who fought neither to kill nor to conquer, but for the very love of fighting itself. It is the fairest merit of Christianity that it somewhat mitigated that brutal German *gaudium certaminis* or joy in battle, but it could not destroy it. And should that subduing talisman, the Cross, break, then will come crashing and roaring forth the wild madness of the old champions, the insane Berserker rage, of which the Northern poets say and sing. That talisman is brittle, and the day will come when it will pitifully break. The old stone gods will rise from long-forgotten ruin and rub the dust of a thousand years from their eyes, and Thor, leaping to life with his giant hammer, will crush the Gothic cathedrals!

That nationalism and international conflict are concomitant and seemingly inseparable features of international politics in the Western State System is in no need of demonstration to those familiar with the past. States waged war on one another before nationalism in its modern form had come into being. The wars among the dynastic States of western Europe between the 14th and 18th centuries contributed powerfully to the development of

\(^{10}\) Benito Mussolini in “Forza e consenso,” *Gerarchia*, March, 1923.
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nationalism among their subjects. In a State System of nation-states, wars are inevitably fought between nationalities made aware of their identity through conflict, imbued with national consciousness in the heat of battle, and fused into solidarity by bellicose symbols, gestures, and acts. Common opposition to an alien group, common resistance to an invader, common participation in an attack upon the enemy fuse national societies together much more effectively than any amount of undramatic collaboration in the tasks of peace. National patriotism, by virtue of its origins, its faith, its deeds, and its symbols, is essentially bellicose and bellivolent. It puts the power interests of each State into terms of nationalistic aspirations. Peace-loving patriots are highly exceptional. A pacific nationalism is almost a contradiction in terms. If all patriots are not warlike, at least all wars are patriotic and serve to raise the enthusiasms of patriotism to fever heat. The cult of the nation-state is a cult of Mars, god of battles—and, even in a generation when all the world cries for peace, the various efforts to recondition patriots, to re-educate nationalists, to reform the whole nationalist ideology in the direction of international peace and cooperation have thus far given little promise of permanent success.

Population Policies. Nations consist of people. People represent power. The national patriot is ever concerned with increasing the number of patriots (provided that they conform to the requisite standards of orthodoxy) and barring from the national community those who are “alien,” “disloyal,” and “subversive.” Apart from the witch hunts regularly conducted in most modern states by the self-appointed guardians of patriotic purity,11 these attitudes and aspirations find expression in governmental policies designed to influence the size and composition of the national population.

As for purely quantitative desiderata, it is useful to recall the dismal thesis of Thomas Malthus, early 19th-century English economist. He postulated a constant growth of population in geometric ratio as against an increase in means of subsistence in arithmetic ratio. Hence population growth presses inexorably on resources and must inevitably keep mass living standards down to a bare subsistence level. Something of the kind has indeed happened in India and China. But Malthus was in error in overlooking the effects of industrialization on living standards and rates of population increase. Urban populations seldom reproduce themselves. The restriction and planning of parenthood through contraception is now quite general in the


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Western nations, despite denunciation of it by the Roman Catholic Church. Population growth is determined, not by any simple relationship between reproduction and resources, but by (1) the birth rate, which is affected by the number and fecundity of childbearing mothers, by birth control, and by social habits and customs; (2) the death rate, which is affected by longevity, war, and the control of disease; (3) the natural resources at the command of a given population, which influence both the birth rate and the death rate; and (4) the level of technology, which has a bearing upon all the three other factors.

Such phrases as “overpopulation,” “underpopulation,” or “surplus population,” glibly bandied about by nationalists and imperialists, have no meaning except as they are related to these factors. Overpopulation in a given area has nothing to do with the size, density, or resources of the population but can refer only to a situation in which there is sufficient pressure of population on resources to cause a reduction of living standards or to retard their improvement. Underpopulation can mean only a situation in which the number of people available to exploit natural resources is too few for the most profitable exploitation possible. Overpopulation—or underconsumption, or underdeveloped technology (these are all the same thing)—has long existed in large parts of Asia, where the level of technology has been constant for centuries, where contraception has never been generally practiced, and where living standards have been kept down to a bare subsistence level. Famines, pestilences, unemployment, and extensive emigration are typical symptoms of overpopulation of this kind. But an improvement in technology may make it possible for a given area to sustain an enormously greater population on a higher standard of living than was possible at a lower technological level. The present territory of the United States sustained only a million or so Indians in pre-Columbian days, because hunting and fishing and primitive agriculture were the only means of livelihood. It now sustains 145,000,000 people through intensive agriculture, industry, and commerce. Germany, with 30,000,000 in the mid-19th century, was overpopulated, as shown by low living standards and wholesale emigration. Germany, with 60,000,000 people in the early 20th century, was no longer overpopulated, for the industrialization of the country had intervened. It has long been alleged that Japan and Italy are overpopulated, but no deterioration of living standards had taken place in either country prior to the Great Depression. Density of population per square mile is also no index to overpopulation. Before World War II the Netherlands had 669 people to the square mile, Belgium 755, Great Britain 500, Germany 371,
Italy 350, and Japan 476. On the other hand, the United States had 34 people to the square mile, the Soviet Union 21, Argentina 7, Brazil 9, Canada 2, and Australia less than 2. These figures by themselves do not in the least prove that the first group of States is overpopulated or that the second group is underpopulated, if one measures these conditions by living standards. One can properly speak of overpopulation only in relation to numbers, resources, technology, and standards of living. This phrase is more frequently a rationalization of expansionist ambitions than a statement of economic and social facts.

A rational and scientific population policy would be one aimed at securing an economic optimum population, i.e., a population of such size in relation to resources and technology that all its members could enjoy the highest possible standard of living. Such a policy might call for a larger population in such States as Russia, Australia, and Argentina, in order that existing resources might be more adequately utilized. It might call for a smaller population in highly developed industrial States. Though expert opinion is not unanimous on this point, it is probable that, if economic well-being were the sole test of wisdom in such matters, it would follow that a substantial reduction of population in most of the great States of the world would be advantageous to succeeding generations. Such a reduction is, in fact, impending in northwestern Europe and in North America, but it is viewed with alarm by governments and has taken place in spite of governmental efforts to check it.

It is scarcely necessary to point out that the population policies of national governments are not based on welfare considerations. Military and political power, rather than social and economic well-being, is the immediate objective of the economic nationalists who so largely dictate governmental policies. The patriot favors all governmental measures that seem likely to increase the rate of population growth. He condemns all that threaten to limit the unchecked growth of population. He is joined in condemnation by many churchmen who are opposed to birth control for theological reasons. He is also joined by moralists and reformers to whom liberty means license and to whom compulsions, inhibitions, and prohibitions are preferable to organized intelligence and freedom of choice as roads to the good life. He is joined by many others: the employer of labor who wants labor to be cheap and who knows that it can be cheap only when it is abundant; the military expert who feels that men rather than machines win wars; the physician who would keep the laity in ignorance and profit from the esoteric mysteries of his trade; the timeserving politician who shouts
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with the crowd and who would sell his soul to the devil before he would offend the religious and moral sensibilities of his constituents; and by a few sincere sociologists and economists who view an impending decline of population with apprehension for reasons not directly connected with the economic welfare of the next generation. This combination is overwhelming and decisive, and the voices of the more farsighted physicians, politicians, economists, sociologists, social workers, and labor leaders are lost in the storm.

There is very little conclusive evidence, however, that taxes on bachelors, laws against contraception, and public prizes for large families (resorted to extensively in the U.S.S.R., Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, France, and some other States) have any demonstrable effect in increasing population, save in so far as economic and social security encourages parents to have children which are otherwise a source of impoverishment. Some population experts even contend that immigration policies have no quantitative effect, arguing that a large influx from abroad diminishes the reproduction rate of those already residing in the national community while barriers against immigrants tend to raise the rate proportionately.

The U.S.A., long the land par excellence of mass immigration, barred Orientals in 1882, along with lunatics, idiots, and indigents. During the decade prior to 1914, European immigrants to America averaged a million a year. Since 1921, American legislation has restricted immigration quantitatively and sought to affect it qualitatively by a quota system, giving preference to northern and western Europeans and discriminating against southern and eastern Europeans, with Orientals still barred except for small quotas granted the Chinese (105 annually, since 1943), Filipinos, and East Indians (100 each annually, since 1946). Protests against discrimination from Rome, Bucharest, Tokyo, and other capitals produced no results in the 1920's, save to increase the determination of the xenophobes to bar out "undesirables." Since 1920 only 150,000 immigrants a year are admissible to the erstwhile "melting pot" of the Atlantic world. In most years the quotas have not been filled.12 Eloquent professions of solicitude for war refugees, displaced persons, and other victims of disaster abroad had, at the time of writing, resulted in no legislation relaxing previous restrictions. Here, as elsewhere, population policies dictated by patriotic tribalism are for the most part lacking in rationality and fail to attain the goals allegedly desired. They flow less from knowledge of the problem and of relationships between ends and means than they do from primitive fears, hates, and national conceits.

PERSECUTORS AND PARIAHS

2. PERSECUTORS AND PARIAHS

Our modern Western nationalism has an ecclesiastical tinge; for, while in one aspect it is a reversion to the idolatrous self-worship of the tribe which was the only religion known to Man before the first of the "higher religions" was discovered by an oppressed internal proletariat, this Western neo-tribalism is a tribalism with a difference. The primitive religion has been deformed into an enormity through being power-driven with a misapplied Christian driving-force. The Golden Calf—or Lion or Bear or Eagle, or whatever the tribal totem may happen to be—is being worshipped in our world today with an intensity of feeling and a singleness of mind which ought not to be directed by human souls towards any god but God Himself. And it is not surprising to find that we have been propitiating these blasphemously idolized tribal deities with the human sacrifices which they relish and exact.—ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A Study of History.

Prejudice is our method of transferring our own sickness to others. It is our ruse for disliking others rather than ourselves. We find absolution in our prejudices. We find also in them an enemy made to order rather than inimical forces out of our control. Prejudice is a raft onto which the shipwrecked mind clammers and paddles to safety.—BEN HECHT, A Guide for the Bedevilled.

Race and Language. Everywhere, modern nationalism as a cult and a political dogma postulates the political independence of a national community as its original goal and its ultimate ideal. To all patriots throughout the world, no truth is more elementary than that the nation must be "free" to govern itself, to work out its own destiny, to formulate its own foreign policy. The nation must therefore attain statehood, i.e., become an independent and sovereign political entity. If existence and independence are the most fundamental rights of States under international law, they are likewise the most fundamental values of national patriotism. Nothing engenders patriotic fever among a people more effectively than foreign control or oppression. Nothing seems more supremely desirable to the patriot, or more in accordance with the most obvious principles of justice and common sense, than the political independence of the nation. The cry of national self-determination is accordingly the most poignant and insistent demand put forward by the nationalists of all countries. Each nationality demands political independence for itself, though it is seldom willing to grant the same right to the subject nationalities under its control. Each nation-state expresses its will to power in international politics, no longer in terms of dynastic interests, but in terms of "national" interests. The nation must be served by enhancing its power and prestige in every way possible, and all its
nationals rejoice in this adventure. The resulting tensions, the ensuing conflicts of interests and policies have been perhaps the most fruitful sources of international friction during the past century and the most important factors underlying the attitudes of governments and peoples toward one another.

This demand for self-determination, for the political independence of the national community, obviously raises questions, as soon as attempts are made to translate it into action, of what is the national community. Of whom does it consist? What persons are “nationals,” to be included within the frontiers of the nation-state, and what persons are aliens? What territories shall the national community insist upon including within its political boundary? What is the criterion of nationality?

In the contemporary world, two criteria of nationality have received general acceptance: race and language.

The test of race is a wholly unworkable criterion of nationality; but it is frequently emphasized by patriots, largely as a result of their efforts to rationalize designs of aggrandizement or discrimination against disliked minorities. The veriest novice in biology knows that “racial purity” is entirely nonexistent among the nations of the earth and that mankind can be classified into races only in the crudest and most unscientific fashion. If “pure races” ever existed in the human family, they have long since disappeared as a result of migrations, wars, conquests, travel, intermarriage, and miscegenation on the grandest scale over thousands of years. And as for biologically pure national stocks, there are none. The population of every modern nation is made up of a large number of mingled strains, each of which was itself originally a mixture of earlier stocks.

_Homo sapiens_ is hopelessly mongrel, and all attempts to dig up pure pedigrees for any of the sons of Adam are doomed to failure. Equally absurd are most popular notions of racial differences and race prejudice. People may easily be conditioned by their cultural environment to dislike members of an alien race, particularly where there is a clash of economic interests between the two groups. But that there is any inherent racial prejudice in the human animal is disproved by innumerable instances of perfect interracial harmony and cooperation. People of different races differ in their capacities and achievements, owing in large part to differences in economic opportunities, cultural background, climatic stimuli, and social environment. But individual differences are greater than racial differences, and glib generalizations of racial superiority or inferiority are little more than rationalizations of culturally inherited prejudices.

Yet men and women are white, black, red, yellow, or brown, with various shadings in between; and within each of these groups there are physical
differences of stature, body build, hair, skin, and eye color, shape of skull, and the like. These differences are sufficiently marked to enable nationalist doctrinaires to spin finely woven theories of racial virtues and vices, of instinctive racial sympathies and antipathies, and of racial purity as the only proper criterion of nationality. The scientific unsoundness of these theories has not made them less effective in influencing attitudes and behavior. The cult of Aryanism was one of the earliest of the pseudoscientific rationalizations to gain general acceptance. Prof. Max Müller first developed the myth of the existence of an Aryan race on the basis of the resemblances among the various Aryan, or Indo-European, languages. Von Jhering, in his *Evolution of the Aryans*, carried this idea a step farther. Gobineau, in his *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (1884), developed the idea of Aryan superiority and of racial purity as a prerequisite of high civilization. Among the so-called "Aryans," however, were obvious physical differences which led to the familiar division of the white race into categories of Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a Germanized Englishman, first presented persuasively the notion of "Teutonic" superiority. Teutonism, Gallicism, Anglo-Saxonism were all cut of the same cloth, as is the cult of "Nordic" supremacy which has flourished so amazingly in the backward areas of Anglo-Saxon North America.¹³

These efforts to link nationality with race or to find in racial purity a new basis of social cohesion in contrast to nationality have intensified racial and national prejudices. They have influenced the immigration legislation and population policies of national governments. They have lent popular support to imperialism and to the subjugation and exploitation of "backward" peoples by the "superior" races. But they have not resulted in any widespread cult of racialism comparable with nationalism. People in most parts of the world continue to regard themselves as Englishmen, Persians, Germans, Japanese, Italians, Bulgarians, etc., rather than as Nordics, Mediterraneans, Alpines, yellow men, black men, or brown men. People identify themselves much more readily with "nations," religious denominations, and economic classes than with largely imaginary racial groups.

If race has not become the basis of nationality, the same can scarcely be said of language. Race and language obviously have no necessary connection with one another, since the one is a biological phenomenon and the other is part of the cultural legacy of the past. People are born with skin color, eye color, skull shapes, and the other physical marks of race. But the language they learn depends, not on their heredity, but on their cultural

environment. Language, though no indication whatever of race, is everywhere the best index of an individual’s cultural environment—of the linguistic and cultural group of which he is a member. By the same token, one’s mother tongue is everywhere taken as the best criterion of one’s nationality. Most of the nations of the earth are nations, not because they are politically independent and socially unified, but because their peoples use a common speech which differs from that of other nations. Englishmen, Americans, and British colonials, it is true, all speak variants of a single language. Portuguese and Brazilians use a single language. So do Frenchmen and Haitians, and likewise Spaniards, Mexicans, Chileans, Argentines, Peruvians, and the other Spanish-Americans. For these people, varying dialects, rather than language, may indicate nationality. On the other hand, Swiss nationals may speak French, German, or Italian and still be Swiss; and Belgians may speak French or Flemish without ceasing to be Belgians. For the most part, however, distinctions of nationality, in the social and cultural rather than in the legal sense, are coterminous with distinctions of language. With few exceptions, Germans are Germans because they sprechen echt Deutsch, Frenchmen are Frenchmen because they parlent la belle langue française, Englishmen are Englishmen because they speak the king’s English. This association between language and national consciousness appears as natural and obvious as the association between race and nationality appears strange and false. The historical circumstances of the establishment of the older national groups have made the association inevitable. Language is almost universally regarded as the most important single criterion of national sentiment and allegiance. In the last analysis, however, nationality is a matter, not of race or language, but of social attitudes, sentiments, and ideologies.

The Demand for “Self-determination.” The fact that the national group is so generally regarded as coinciding with the language group has meant that the aspirations of nationalists are usually envisaged in terms of the common “national” interests of all who speak the same tongue. Common language has come to be the test of nationality—so much so that States like Switzerland or Belgium or the old Austria-Hungary, where more than one tongue prevails, are often spoken of as “nonnational” or “multinational” States. Whatever the location of political boundaries may be at any given time, “nations” in the nonpolitical sense are aggregations of people aware of themselves as units by virtue of linguistic and cultural ties. The national community whose independence is postulated by nationalism is a community whose members employ the same speech. If the language group does not possess independence, it must achieve it. If, having attained independence, it does not include within the nation-state all those who speak the mother
tongue, efforts must be made toward their annexation, even at the cost of the
dismemberment of neighboring States. If there are those within the State
who do not speak the mother tongue, they must be taught, assimilated, and
if necessary coerced into abandoning their own language and culture in the
name of national unity and power. From these articles of faith of the na-
tional patriot flow many of the consequences of nationalism in the realm of
international politics.

The most obvious consequence has been the fragmentation of the world
into a large number of sovereign nation-states in the name of national self-
determination and independence. Each linguistic group, as it has become
infected with the nationalist germ (and the malady is extraordinarily con-
tagious), has striven to attain its political independence, to achieve state-
hood, to set up national housekeeping for itself. The notion that a national
language group can live contentedly under the political control of a govern-
ment representing another and different group is anathema to the national
patriot. Frenchmen have resisted English domination, Germans have resisted
French domination, Poles have resisted German domination, Lithuanians and
Ruthenians have resisted Polish domination. Each national community has
asserted its right to political independence as soon as national consciousness
has taken root and flourished among its people. In the ancient world and in
the Middle Ages, people differing in language and culture were content
enough to live together under a common political control embodied in world
empires or in complex feudal State forms. Not so in the modern era of
Western civilization. Each distinct linguistic group must build its own State,
win its own independence, have its own territory, flag, army, bureaucracy,
and all the other trappings of sovereignty.

Demands for national self-determination and independence became pe-
culiarly insistent during World War I and were utilized by the Allied Gov-
ernments as a means of encouraging the disruption of the enemy States and
of convincing their own citizens that the Allied cause was the cause of
justice and liberty. President Wilson, as the most eloquent phrasemaker
among the statesmen who formulated “war aims” for popular consumption,
constantly emphasized the “rights of small nations.” Even before the United
States entered the war, he laid it down as a principle “that no nation should
seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every
people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of de-
velopment, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the
great and powerful.” 14 The “Fourteen Points” address of January 8, 1918,
demanded self-determination for the peoples of Central and eastern Europe;

14 Address to the Senate, Jan. 22, 1917.
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and in February, 1918, the American President, in an address to Congress, said:

Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in the game. Peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the newly emancipated nationalities insisted that the slogan of self-determination be translated into political reality. The Allied Governments gave effect to these demands wherever they found it politically advantageous to do so. It was clear, however, that in many cases political boundaries could not be made to coincide with language boundaries; for the intermingling of tongues in Central Europe is so confused that this ideal is impossible of attainment. The independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Jugoslavia, Albania, and Greater Rumania and later of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was accepted as a matter of course. But the boundaries which the new States insisted upon and the boundary adjustments which the victors demanded for themselves were dictated quite as much by considerations of economics, strategy, and territorial aggrandizement as by the expressed desire to grant to the populations affected a right of self-determination. When “self-determination” threatened to thwart the territorial ambitions of the victors, it was denied to the peoples in question. Germans were transferred to foreign rule in the Tirol, in Alsace, and in the Polish Corridor, with no opportunity of expressing their preferences. Hungarians were transferred to Rumanian, Jugoslav, and Czech control in a similar fashion. Lithuanians, Russians, and Ukrainians were annexed without their consent by Poland and Rumania. But wherever there appeared a possibility of reducing further the territory and power of the defeated States, self-determination was appealed to and the populations in question were given an opportunity to express their wishes through plebiscites.

The plebiscite, or popular referendum, as a means of enabling peoples to attain national self-determination, has seldom been applied in recent times to an entire national community to determine whether or not its members desire political independence, though the division of Sweden and Norway into independent kingdoms in 1905 was sanctioned by a popular vote. Plebiscites were held in the States of Italy in 1860 and 1861 prior to their amalgamation into the new kingdom. Such referenda have been repeatedly held to ascertain the preferences of the inhabitants of a particular territory as between two outside States seeking control. Napoleon III held a plebiscite

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in Nice and Savoy prior to their annexation to France in 1859. The Treaty of Ancón in 1883 between Chile and Peru provided for a plebiscite in Tacna-Arica which was never held, in spite of efforts on the part of the U.S.A. to make arrangements for a vote in 1923-25. The Treaties of 1919 provided for nine popular referenda: in Schleswig, Allenstein, Marienwerder, Upper Silesia, Eupen, Malmédy, Klagenfurt, Burgenland, and the Saar Valley. In most of Schleswig the population voted to remain under German, rather than Danish, sovereignty, and in Allenstein and Marienwerder the East Prussians likewise voted for German rather than Polish control. In Upper Silesia 707,000 votes were cast for Germany and 479,000 for Poland (1921). The League Council, however, divided the area, to the great disgust of nationalists in both countries. Eupen and Malmédy, formerly German territories, voted for annexation to Belgium. Klagenfurt, in dispute between Austria and Yugoslavia, voted for Austria. Burgenland voted for Austrian rather than Hungarian rule. The plebiscite of January 13, 1935, restored the Saar to German sovereignty. In a plebiscite of 1947 the Saarlanders voted for France.

Although the plebiscite method commends itself to idealistic self-determinationists, it is fraught with numerous dangers and difficulties. Even when adequate neutral policing is provided and satisfactory suffrage qualifications and electoral procedures are devised, the referendum itself embitters national feeling, creates temptations to bribery, coercion, and terrorism on both sides, and offers no assurance that the voters will record their permanent national preferences rather than their fears, prejudices, and economic interests of the moment. Territories and peoples continue to be transferred from State to State, and to be granted or denied national independence, in accordance with the dictates of political expediency and the verdict of force. Whenever the outcome fails to correspond to the demands of the peoples themselves, local dissatisfaction, international tension, and controversies between neighboring States invariably ensue.

National Irredentism. Another phenomenon of nationalism, which may conveniently be characterized as "irredentism," is closely related to the cry for self-determination and has been an equally fruitful source of conflict among the nation-states. The term is of Italian origin. In 1861, Italian nationalists at length achieved the goal which they had pursued for decades. A United Kingdom of Italy was created through the annexation to Piedmont of the lesser States of the south. Venetia was wrested from Austria in 1867, and Rome was added to the new nation in 1870. But a large Italian-speaking community in Trentino and the Tirol remained under Austrian rule. No Italian patriot could regard the task of national unification as completed until these regions were likewise "liberated." They came to be known as Italia Irredenta ("Italy Unredeemed"). Toward them were turned the eyes
of all patriots. Their annexation became one of the major objectives of Italian foreign policy. The French annexation of Tunis in 1881 threw Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria-Hungary, for Italian patriots had regarded the North African province as a future Italian colony. But, in the Triple Alliance of 1882, Italy remained an ally of dubious loyalty, for the demands of nationalism were more appealing than the demands of imperialism. So long as Austria-Hungary retained control of Italia Irredenta, the Italian Government could not rest content with the prevailing arrangements. In 1914 Italy remained neutral and sought to bargain with her neighbor and erstwhile ally for possession of the unredeemed provinces as the price of her entrance into the war on the side of the Central Powers. But the Allies were more generous in promises; and by the secret Treaty of London of May, 1915, they pledged Italy the realization of her irredentist ambitions at Austria’s expense, on condition of her joining their cause. Italy accordingly declared war upon Austria-Hungary and in the peace settlement was awarded the coveted territories and considerably more besides. National irredentism was thus the guiding star of Italian foreign policy for over half a century.

Such aspirations are almost universal among patriots. Irredentist nationalists invariably strive to incorporate into the nation-state such territories as are inhabited by kinsmen of common speech and culture across the frontier. The claims of nationality and the cry of self-determination supersede the claims of legal right and are assumed to justify annexationist ambitions in such situations. Numerous “irredentas” of this character existed in pre-1914 Europe. Alsace-Lorraine under German rule was France irredenta; for every French patriot prayed and hoped for the revanche which would enable the Republic to take back to its bosom the “lost provinces,” snatched away by Bismarck in 1871. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Dalmatian coast under Austrian rule were Serbia irredenta; and Serbian patriots were determined, by fair means or foul, to incorporate the South Slav inhabitants of these regions into a Greater Serbia. Transylvania, under Hungarian rule, and Bessarabia, under Russian rule, were Rumania irredenta, for they were in large part inhabited by Rumanian-speaking peoples whose control by an alien government was intolerable to the people themselves and to their fellow patriots within Rumania. Macedonia and Silistra, under Serbian and Rumanian rule, respectively, were Bulgaria irredenta for similar reasons. The post-1919 irredentas were even more numerous. Germany now had her own “lost provinces” and her own irredentas: Upper Silesia, Pomorze and Netze (the Polish Corridor), Danzig, Memel, German-speaking Austria, the German Tirol, the German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia, and Alsace-Lorraine. No German patriot could regard as permanent the loss of these areas,
nor could he rest content until they were recovered, at least in part. Hungarian nationalists were similarly embittered over the dismemberment of the ancient Magyar State and strove to incorporate into a resurrected Hungary the millions of Magyars annexed by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. The Åland Islands were an irredenta for Sweden, eastern Karelia for Finland, Vilna for Lithuania, the Dodecanese Islands for Greece. Bulgaria had her old grievances and a new irredenta as well in western Thrace, taken from her by Greece. The eastern provinces of Poland and Rumanian Bessarabia, with their Byelorussian and Ukrainian populations, were a new Russia irredenta. Such attitudes tend to prevail wherever political frontiers fail to follow the boundaries of language, and they are among the most productive causes of tension and conflict among the nations.

These attitudes and aspirations lie at the root of the various pannationalistic movements which have flourished so abundantly. "Pan-Germanism" in the pre-1914 period contemplated the annexation to a united Germany of all German-speaking peoples in adjacent foreign States. The Pan-German League, established in 1894, strove "to quicken the national sentiment of all Germans and in particular to awaken and foster the sense of racial and cultural kinship of all sections of the German people." Pre-1914 Pan-Slavism was a similar movement, sponsored by Russian patriots and by certain South Slav groups. It aimed at the "liberation" of the Slavic peoples living under German, Austrian, or Turkish rule and the formation of a Slavic confederacy dominated by Russia. As early as the 17th century, the Croat, Krijanitcha, urged a political union of Slavic peoples. Pan-Slavic Congresses were held in 1848, 1867, and 1908. These ambitions played a large role in the pre-1914 foreign policy of Imperial Russia. Combined with annexationist designs on Constantinople and the Straits, they caused Russia to come to the defense of Serbia against Austria-Hungary. The Russian Revolution and the political independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia temporarily deprived Pan-Slavism of much of its significance. The "Norden Movement" in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark was a comparable Pan-Scandinavian movement. Pan-Anglianism has striven to encourage closer political relations between the English-speaking peoples. Joseph Chamberlain in 1898 advocated an Anglo-American alliance as part of this program. The English-Speaking Union endeavors to promote closer cultural and economic contacts between the United States and the British Empire. Pan-Americanism is a movement of a somewhat different character, for any political union of the Latin peoples of South and Central America with the northern Anglo-Saxon peoples runs counter to the national aspirations of all Latin Americans. Pan-Latinism and Pan-Hispanism, however, are much more solidly grounded in national sentiment. They do not reflect irredentist ambitions so much as a feeling that

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linguistic and cultural ties should be made the basis for closer political and economic relations. Pan-Africanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabianism, Pan-Turanianism, Pan-Asianism, and other movements reflect similar sentiments and ambitions.\textsuperscript{15}

The nationalistic aspirations of self-determination and irredentism breed inevitable discontent with all national boundaries which are at variance with the lines of language and culture. Very rarely can these lines be ascertained to the satisfaction of all parties. When they are ascertained, they are often unacceptable for economic or strategic reasons. Italy, for example, recovered Italia Irredenta in 1919 but insisted also on acquiring the Brenner Pass and the southern slope of the Tirolean Alps for reasons of defense, with the result that 250,000 German-speaking peoples around Bozen (Bolzano) were placed under Italian rule. Boundaries drawn to conform to the wishes of the population are criticized by other patriots (or even by the same ones) for other reasons. In such a situation, no rational basis exists for the demarcation of frontiers. Efforts to minimize tension are frustrated by annexationist ambitions. Each State exerts its power to gain all the territory possible as a means to greater power, wealth, and security. Power considerations are rationalized in terms of self-determination or irredentism or, when these are inapplicable, in terms of other catchwords and symbols. "Historic" frontiers are insisted upon. "Natural" boundaries are demanded. "Manifest destiny" is called upon to justify annexation. When the line of linguistic cleavage is gained, then the next river or mountain range becomes the goal; and when that is attained, some line beyond becomes the natural and necessary frontier. Boundaries are fixed by the clash, in peace or war, of the rival wills-to-power of the nation-states. Nationalism spurs the rivalry and furnishes formulas and slogans, in terms of which each national community can reassure itself of the justice and rectitude of its ambitions.

National Minorities. Not only is each nation-state anxious, in its quest for territory and power, to extend its control over the peoples beyond its frontier who speak its language, but it is equally anxious to achieve linguistic and cultural homogeneity among the peoples within its frontiers. "Self-determination" is a phrase used by nationalists only with reference to the oppressed subject peoples of other States. Their "liberation" will weaken the power of the State controlling them and thus enhance that of its neighbor. The neighbor is accordingly solicitous over their fate, particularly when they speak his own language and constitute an irredenta. Patriots are con-

\textsuperscript{15} See R. L. Buell, \textit{International Relations}, 1929, pp. 76-95.
cerned in quite a different way, however, with the minority groups in the population of their own State. These groups must under no circumstances be liberated or granted a right of self-determination. They must be assimilated in the name of national unity and patriotic solidarity. They must be induced or compelled to abandon their own identity and their ties with other peoples beyond the frontier. They must learn the prevailing language, adopt the prevailing customs, and make themselves one with their fellow citizens.

The "problem of national minorities" arises from such nationalistic efforts at assimilation and from the counterefforts, supported by the national consciousness of the minorities, to resist assimilation at all costs. Except for the sentiments, attitudes, and ideologies of nationalism, there would be no problem. Peoples heterogeneous in language, race, and religion might dwell together peaceably under a single sovereignty, as in the Roman Empire, with no attempts made on the part of the government to impose uniformity of tongues and creeds on its subjects and consequently no attempts at resistance to such efforts on the part of minorities. But, in the age of nationalism, any such rational arrangements are regarded by all patriots as highly undesirable and even dangerous. Unassimilated minorities are viewed with alarm; for they are presumed to be of doubtful loyalty, to constitute an alien and possibly hostile element in the population, and to be peculiarly susceptible to secret conspirings with neighboring enemy nations of their own blood and language. These suspicions may be at first unjustified, but they find justification as soon as efforts are made to extinguish the identity of the minority. People cling doggedly to their language and culture—never more so than in the era of nationalism, when these things are closely associated with the social cohesion and political self-respect of the community. Efforts at assimilation are vigorously resisted with an energy and determination equivalent to the pressure brought to bear by the assimilators. Resistance assumes the appearance of disloyalty; and this in turn justifies the national government, in the eyes of its patriots, in applying more coercion. The greater the coercion, the greater the resistance; the greater the resistance, the greater the coercion. The outcome of the cycle is persecution, revolt, international complications, and often war.

In pre-1914 Europe, the prevalent policy pursued by governments toward minorities might be described as one of forcible assimilation. This policy was adopted, with minor variations, by the four Governments of Europe which had the largest minority groups living under their control—those of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. It was, almost without exception, unsuccessful in suppressing the identity of the minorities or in compelling them to adopt the language, culture, creeds, and institutions of the majority group. Indeed, it more frequently intensified to the point of
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desperation the solidarity of the oppressed groups and thus rendered impos-
sible the achievement of its own purposes. The failure of this policy had
already received a certain degree of recognition in various treaties which
protected minority rights and made forcible assimilation difficult. Religious
minorities were the first to receive international protection in this fashion,
following the wars and persecutions of the Reformation period. The Peace
of Augsburg (1555) and the Treaties of Westphalia both gave to minority
religious groups a degree of protection from efforts at persecution on the
part of the majority denomination. Here, as always, intolerance gave way to
tolerance only when persecution had brought disaster and when the folly of
achieving conversion by coercion was evident at all. The Powers exacted
pledges regarding the protection of religious minorities in Holland and
Greece in 1815 and 1830, respectively, on the occasions of the union of
Belgium with Holland and of the recognition of Greek independence.

The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 required Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia,
Rumania, and Turkey to refrain from discriminating against religious minor-
ities. As early as 1839, Turkey had been obliged to pledge equal treatment
of its subjects regardless of religion, race, or language. The failure of the
Turkish Government to observe this and subsequent pledges led to repeated
diplomatic representations and interventions by the Powers. From time to
time, international inspectors and supervisors were dispatched to Turkish
territory to guarantee the protection of minorities in Armenia and Mac-
donia. These efforts at treaty protection and international guarantees were
largely ineffective, however, and were utilized by interested Powers to further
their own designs. They were not applied, moreover, to such powerful States
as Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, where the minorities were entirely
at the mercy of the national patriots bent upon assimilating them.

In 1918-19 the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the partial dissolution
of the Russian, Turkish, and German Empires, coupled with the redrawing
of frontiers in the name of self-determination, reduced the minorities of
Europe from 54,000,000 to about 17,000,000. But 7,500,000 Germans, 3,000,-
000 Magyars, and about 1,350,000 Bulgarians were placed under alien rule
in France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Italy, and Greece,
along with 500,000 Jugoslavs in Italy; 4,500,000 Ruthenians and Ukrainians
in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania; and several million Russians along
Poland’s eastern frontier. One-fourth of Jugoslavia’s population, one-third
of Poland’s population, two-fifths of Czechoslovakia’s population (not count-
ing the Slovaks as a minority), and over one-tenth of Italy’s population con-
sisted of linguistic minorities. To permit a revision to policies of forcible
assimilation on the part of the overenthusiastic patriots of the new States

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would create widespread domestic disorder and international tension throughout Central Europe.

The Peace Conference of 1919, in considering the broader aspects of the problem, devised a new method of international regulation, involving the incorporation of protective guarantees in treaties between the new States and the Allied Powers and the provision of international machinery through the League of Nations to ensure the observance of these obligations. The first of the minorities treaties was imposed upon Poland and signed June 28, 1919. Other treaties followed, with Czechoslovakia (September 10, 1919), Yugoslavia (September 10, 1919), Rumania (December 9, 1919), Greece (August 10, 1920). The Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, of September 10, 1919 (Articles 62 to 69), of Trianon with Hungary, of June 4, 1920 (Articles 54 to 60), of Neuilly with Bulgaria, of November 27, 1919 (Articles 49 to 57), and of Lausanne with Turkey, of July 24, 1923 (Articles 37 to 45), likewise contained clauses for the protection of minorities, largely modeled upon the Polish Treaty. The Baltic States and Albania were subsequently induced to accept the same obligations. Fifteen States of Central and southeastern Europe, including Finland, Danzig, and Greece, were thus obliged to renounce their efforts at forcible assimilation and to protect the rights of minorities living within their frontiers.

In all these arrangements, various general principles were set forth. The States in question must protect the life and liberty of all inhabitants “without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion” (Polish Treaty, Article 2). “All inhabitants . . . shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals” (Article 3). All persons born within the territory of these States are entitled to rights of citizenship. “All persons born in Polish territory who are not born nationals of another State shall ipso facto become Polish nationals” (Article 6). “All . . . nationals shall be equal before the law and enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language, or religion. Differences of religion, creed, or confession shall not prejudice any national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments or the exercise of professions and industries” (Articles 7 to 9). “No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any . . . national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in

16 A resolution of the First Assembly, Dec. 15, 1920, declared “in the event of Albania, the Baltic and Caucasian States being admitted into the League, the Assembly requests that they should take the necessary measures to enforce the principles of the minorities treaties and that they should arrange with the Council the details required to carry this object into effect” (League of Nations Records of Assembly, 1920, Vol. I, pp. 568-569).
religion, in the press or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding any establishment of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given for the use of their [the minorities'] language either orally or in writing before the courts” (Articles 3 to 4). The States involved must grant educational facilities for instruction in their own language to minorities in districts where a considerable proportion of the population is of minority speech (Article 9). Among these items some are essentially guarantees of individual rights, and others protect the minorities as groups by giving them schools and a share of public funds where they constitute a “considerable proportion” (in practice, usually one-fifth) of the population. Lines of race, religion, and language do not, of course, always coincide; and the ultimate test of whether a group is a minority is historical, social, and psychological.

Two means were provided for ensuring the observance of these obligations: The guarantees were declared in the treaties to be part of the fundamental law of the States concerned. The minorities were placed under the protection of the League of Nations. The Council of the League, in a series of resolutions, worked out a procedure for dealing with minority problems. The minorities fared better than would have been the case in the absence of such international protection. On the other hand, it could not be said, nor could it be reasonably expected, that all discrimination and persecution were eliminated. States not bound by the minorities treaties were free to treat their minorities as badly as they liked. A Lithuanian proposal of 1925 to make these obligations universal was rejected. Even in treaty States, minorities in which no Government on the Council was particularly interested did not receive a full measure of protection. Such was the situation of the Jews in Rumania and Hungary, the Hungarians in Rumania, and the Ukrainians in Poland. Prior to 1926, the Council took official cognizance of only three petitions. It never asked a State to withdraw objectionable measures but merely expressed the hope that the State would observe its obligations. After the admission of Germany to the League, the Council acted on minority questions more frequently and with greater energy. The largest number of petitions came from the German minority in Polish Upper Silesia, which was perhaps the best organized and most articulate of the minority groups. The petitions, most of which were considered by the Council in 1929, related primarily to minority schools, language instruction, and property rights. Some of these grievances were remedied by Council action, but permanent harmony was not achieved. All such disputes, the Council insisted, were subjects of discussion between the Council and the State concerned, never between governments. But since the Council was a political body, it pro-
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cceeded with great circumspection and was often tempted to side-step embarrassing issues or to make innocuous or ineffective recommendations.

In contrast to the ultimately unsuccessful method of protecting minority rights by international guarantees, the United States exhibits on the largest scale the most successful application of still another method of dealing with minorities—one which may be termed “voluntary assimilation.” The original American Indian population of the United States has been largely confined to reservations, where it is cared for (or neglected) by the Federal Government. The population groups in the U.S.A. whose members are of European ancestry have never been regarded as “minorities” in the European sense. “Americanization” was rapid and amazingly successful because, on the one hand, it was not coercive in character and on the other it did not encounter the resistance of national sentiment among those being Americanized. This process is now of only historical interest. By 1940 almost 80% of the population consisted of native-born whites, less than 10% of foreign-born whites, 9% of Negroes, 1% of Mexicans, and less than half of 1% of American Indians, Japanese, and Chinese combined.

The last-named groups, particularly Negroes, continue to be subjected in many parts of America to a variety of social, economic, and political discriminations which still make a mockery of professions of liberty, equality, and fraternity for those who are “off-color.” In 1942 most Japanese in the U.S.A., including the Nisei, or native-born American citizens, were uprooted from their homes on the west coast and placed in concentration camps. There was no mob violence against them, however. The lynching of Negroes in the American South, moreover, has declined sharply in recent decades. It is nevertheless true that the America of the mid-20th century is still a land of widespread anti-Negro, anti-Oriental, anti-Semitic, and antiforeign sentiment which often reduces a substantial proportion of its citizens to the status of outcasts.17

In sharp contrast to this failure of ethnic democracy in the world’s great-

17 On Nov. 28, 1947, at a meeting at Geneva of the Subcommission on Minorities and Discrimination of the Human Rights Commission of the UNECOSOC, Mr. A. P. Borisov of the U.S.S.R. assailed American treatment of Negroes and urged that advocacy of racial, national, and religious discrimination be made a punishable crime. The Subcommission rejected this proposal but condemned “incitement to violence against any religious group, race, nation or minority.” All such proposals are, of course, merely recommendations to national governments. On the same day, by an interesting coincidence, David A. Embury, speaking in New York at the thirty-ninth annual convention of the National Inter-Fraternity Conference, denounced college and university administrations for seeking the abolition of racial and religious restrictions on membership in fraternities and sororities. He praised discrimination as truly democratic and attributed efforts to abolish it to “Soviet semantics” and “subversive” campus groups. “There is nothing arbitrary or capricious or unnatural about fraternity membership restrictions based on race, creed or color.”
est democracy, the U.S.S.R., which is in most other respects nondemocratic and totalitarian, has achieved the largest measure of genuine equality among diverse races and nationalities anywhere on the planet. The Marxist-Stalinist solution of the age-old problem was that of complete cultural autonomy within the political and economic framework of the proletarian State. All efforts at "Russification" were abandoned, at least in theory, and each of the many nationalities of the U.S.S.R. was not only permitted but encouraged to use its own language, develop its own culture, and pursue its own way of life. So long as the content of the national cultures and the political and economic institutions of the nationalities were "proletarian" in spirit and substance, the forms could be "national." The 1923 Federal Constitution of the Soviet Union incorporated this solution into the political structure of the State, as did the Stalin Constitution of 1936. Political unity and social cohesion are given to Soviet society by the All-Union Communist Party, which, like the Soviet Government itself, rests upon complete equality for all nationalities and races. These arrangements put an end to the minorities problem in Russia. In the absence of efforts at assimilation by the majority groups, there is no basis for irredentist or secessionist aspirations among the minorities. In the absence of political, economic, or social discrimination based on lines of race and language, there is no problem of interracial relations.

The Triumph of Intolerance. The whole post-Versailles system of protecting minorities broke down in the face of a resurgence of racial and national intolerance long before 1939. The Polish Government proposed in 1934 that all the members of the League accept identical obligations to protect minorities. On September 13, 1934, M. Beck told the Fifteenth Assembly that Poland would refuse all further cooperation in protecting minorities until a general and uniform system had been accepted. On September 14 the delegates of Great Britain, France, and Italy (cosignatories of the Polish Minorities Treaty) declared that no State could release itself from such obligations by unilateral action. In the Sixth Committee, it became clear that certain governments were not willing to accept universal obligations. The Polish proposal was therefore dropped. The rising tide of anti-Semitism in Poland indicated that minority rights were no longer being protected with even a semblance of adequacy. Other States followed the Polish example in ignoring their obligations and refusing to cooperate with the League.

Germany was not bound by treaty to refrain from persecuting the Jews of the Reich. No effective action was taken through the League either to halt Nazi anti-Semitism or to provide a refuge for its victims. Here an old problem was posed in a new setting. Since the "Diaspora," or dispersion
of the Jews over the ancient world, the Jews have ceased to be a “nation” and their descendants have nowhere constituted a “national minority” in the usual sense of the term. Until the French Revolution they were almost everywhere in the Western world discriminated against as a religious minority and confined in ghettos. Religious anti-Semitism was a characteristic feature of both Catholic and Protestant Christianity until the 19th century. As it waned under the impact of liberalism, many Jews lost the age-old religious and cultural heritage which they had so persistently cherished in the face of persecution. Nationalism made most Jews loyal and patriotic citizens with no irredentist or self-determinationist aspirations. But no sooner had medieval religious anti-Semitism disappeared than modern racial anti-Semitism was born. Jews began to be persecuted once more, not because they were non-Christians, but because they were falsely alleged to constitute a “race” bent upon exploiting the populations among whom they lived.

Racial anti-Semitism is a product of the insecurities of decaying social systems. Its sources are to be found, not in the attitudes or behavior of Jews, but in the fears of power holders anxious to deflect mass resentments at injustices away from themselves and onto a scapegoat minority. Thus, in Tsarist Russia, the imperial bureaucracy incited mobs to pogroms in order that impoverished peasants might discharge their aggressions against Jews rather than landlords and exploited workers might relieve their wrath at the expense of Israelis instead of employers and officials. In the last decades of the 19th century, the socially insecure Kleinbürger, or lower middle class, in Central Europe began to show symptoms of increasing anti-Semitism. This class suffered from a sense of oppression induced by its weak economic position between big business and finance on the one hand and organized labor on the other. In Jew-baiting and racial mysticism, it found a release for its tensions. That the Jews are not a race, that Aryanism is a fiction, that the “Jewish world conspiracy” is a myth were without significance, for these things have no relevance to the social and psychological roots of modern anti-Semitism. Belief in the preposterous is ever the true test of faith.

This resumption of persecution produced its inevitable reaction, the rise of a Jewish counternationalism. In 1896, Theodore Herzl published Der Judenstaat. “The Jews have but one way of saving themselves—a return to their own people and an emigration to their own land.” Herzl’s followers held the first Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897. Herzl died in 1904; but political Zionism, aiming at the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, continued to spread among those who saw no refuge elsewhere. In the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, the British Government yielded to the plea of the Zionist leader, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, and pledged itself to the
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establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The mandate indeed became a thriving community and a useful center of Jewish culture. But it was scarcely a substitute for tolerance. Neither did the other Jewish “home” in remote Siberia, Biro-Bidjan, created by the U.S.S.R., offer any hope of ultimate salvation to the 16,500,000 Jews of the world.

In the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler, anti-Semitism received its most complete contemporary expression. The Jews of Germany had not constituted a minority. They were more indifferent to Zionism and more completely assimilated than most Jews in other countries. They had become good Germans. But anti-Semitism became the basis of the Nazi Weltanschauung, the source of the Nazi racial philosophy, the inspiration of the swastika flag, and the alpha and omega of Nazi racial legislation. In the National Socialist dictatorship, Junkers and industrialists were protected from the bitterness of peasants, workers, and petty burghers by Jew-baiting. The politicians in power deflected the aggressions of the masses onto Jewish scapegoats. On April 1, 1933, a one-day boycott of all Jewish businesses and professions initiated the “cold pogrom.” There followed a series of laws barring Jews from the civil service, the Army, and a constantly enlarged number of private vocations. As economic and social insecurity in the Nazi State gave rise to increasing popular unrest, the attack upon the Jews was intensified. The “Nuremberg Laws” of September, 1935, deprived the Jews of citizenship, forbade intermarriage between Jews and “Aryans,” and barred Jewish children from the public schools. The Jews, having already been driven from the professions in large numbers, were driven from business likewise and became a pariah caste. The nationwide pogrom of November, 1938, shocked all the democratic world.

With their livelihood destroyed and all living made intolerable, thousands of Jews fled Germany. Other governments did little to avert the tragedy. Since no minority treaty protected the Jews, their fate was a German “domestic” matter. But the international problem created by Nazi persecution could not be escaped. On October 26, 1933, the League Council appointed

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18 In 1925 there were 564,379 professing Israelites in Germany, or 0.9% of the population. Extensive intermarriage had created perhaps 2,000,000 more Germans who were partly Jewish by ancestry. During World War I, 12,000 German Jews gave their lives for the Fatherland and three Jewish geniuses helped make possible Germany’s long resistance to a world in arms: Fritz Haber, the chemist, who invented the processes of fixing nitrogen from the air in 1915 and thus made Germany independent of foreign nitrates; Erich von Richthofen, greatest of war aces; and Walter Rathenau, organizer of the German war industries. Richthofen was killed in battle and was thus spared the sight of his subordinate, Hermann Goering, becoming a leader of an anti-Semitic movement and Minister of Air in the Nazi Cabinet. Rathenau was assassinated by anti-Semitic nationalists in 1922. Haber, a broken man, died in exile in Switzerland, Jan. 29, 1934.
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James G. McDonald as High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany. McDonald sought to coordinate relief and resettlement activities, but neither he nor the League had any public funds for this purpose. Private contributions were totally inadequate. On December 27, 1935, the High Commissioner resigned. He condemned the Nazi regime for pauperizing hundreds of thousands of its subjects and made a plea for League pressure on Berlin “by all pacific means” to bring the persecutions to an end. “The League must ask for a modification of policies which constitute a source of unrest and perplexity in the world, a challenge to the conscience of mankind and a menace to the legitimate interests of these States affected by the immigration of German refugees.” In the sequel the League neither assumed responsibility for caring for the fugitives nor took any steps to check Nazi anti-Semitism at its source. Thousands of German Jews with means went to Palestine, France, England, America, and other lands. Other thousands faced starvation in exile, and the majority, having no means to go abroad, remained in Germany to face a living death. Meanwhile, other Fascist groups in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and other countries strove to follow the Nazi example by persecuting the Jews and attempting to drive them out into an inhospitable world.

Another heavy blow at Jewish hopes was the British White Paper of May 17, 1939, declaring that His Majesty’s Government had no intention of making Palestine a Jewish State and would henceforth appease the Arabs by restricting land sales and limiting Jewish immigration to 10,000 per year for five years, with an additional 25,000 admissible at the discretion of the British High Commissioner. With the coming of war, the last doors were all but closed. Millions of people hitherto free, Jews and non-Jews alike, became victims of Nazi intolerance. With no place to flee, with no one to protect them, they were swallowed in black night with only the faintest echo of their futile lamentations reaching the outer world.

What followed was the most appalling demonstration of our time that “whom the gods would destroy they first make mad”—and that those incapable of solving their problems by acting together in the service of life have no final alternative to acting against one another in the service of death. The conquest of Europe by the Wehrmacht (1939-41) placed scores of millions of defenseless people at the mercy of the sadists who ruled the Reich. So long as prospects of victory were bright, the twisted men of Berlin were content to limit themselves to large-scale deportation and enslavement of alien workers, prolonged detention of war prisoners as a means of reducing birth rates among subjugated populations (e.g., France), looting of conquered lands, and local atrocities and massacres as devices to terrorize unruly subjects. But when the tide of war turned in 1942-43 the
Nazi leaders embarked upon a program of systematic extermination of the “inferior races” who dared to defy their will.

This saturnalia of scientifically organized torture and murder became fully known to the world only in the later phases of hostilities. Its scale was so monstrous, its methods so satanic, and its results so revolting that outsiders almost ceased to be shocked. Men’s capacity for indignation and sympathy is limited. The wine of violence and brutality, moreover, is a heady wine, which all men like to drink if they dare. The Fascist psychopaths, as they sensed the approach of doom, slew uncounted millions of Poles, Czechs, Jugoslavs, and Russians. But here, as always, the first and last victims of the new cannibalism were the Jews. No less than 6,000,000 European Jews were put to death. Almost all were helpless prisoners of their executioners. In only one case behind the Nazi lines were they able to offer resistance: in the spring of 1943 the people of the Warsaw ghetto, facing retail extermination, chose wholesale death in battle as preferable. With fists, knives, stones, and such guns as they could get they fought the Wehrmacht until all their homes were reduced to rubble and ashes and every last man, woman, and child among them was slaughtered. The Nazi technique of mass murder elsewhere may be suggested by excerpts from two accounts, among thousands now available.

Jan Karski, a Polish underground fighter disguised as an Estonian guard, visited a Jewish death camp near Belzec. He saw thousands of prisoners jammed into freight cars, which were then locked:

The floors of the car had been covered with a thick, white powder. It was quicklime. Quicklime is simply unslaked lime or calcium oxide that has been dehydrated. Anyone who has seen cement being mixed knows what occurs when water is poured on lime. The mixture bubbles and steams as the powder combines with the water, generating a large amount of heat.

Here the lime served a double purpose in the Nazi economy of brutality. The moist flesh coming in contact with the lime is rapidly dehydrated and burned. The occupants of the cars would be literally burned to death before long, the flesh eaten from their bones. Thus, the Jews would “die in agony,” fulfilling the promise Himmler had issued “in accord with the will of der Führer,” in Warsaw, in 1942. Secondly, the lime would prevent decomposing bodies from spreading disease. It was efficient and inexpensive—a perfectly chosen agent for their purposes.

It took three hours to fill up the entire train by repetitions of this procedure. It was twilight when the 46 (I counted them) cars were packed. From one end to the other, the train, with its quivering cargo of flesh, seemed to throb, vibrate, rock, and jump as if bewitched. There would be a strangely uniform momentary lull and then, again, the train would begin to moan and sob, wail and howl. Inside the camp a few score dead bodies remained and a few in the final throes of death. German policemen walked around at leisure with smoking guns, pump-
ing bullets into anything, that by a moan or motion betrayed an excess of vitality. Soon, not a single one was left alive. In the now quiet camp the only sounds were the inhuman screams that were echoes from the moving train. Then these, too, ceased. All that was now left was the stench of excrement and rotting straw and a queer, sickening, acidulous odor which, I thought, may have come from the quantities of blood that had been let, and with which the ground was stained.¹⁹

Among the documents assembled at Nuremberg were numerous descriptions of similar horrors. For example, in U.S.A. Exhibit 494, Hermann Friedrich Graebe related under oath the Nazi murder methods in the vicinity of Dutno in the Ukraine, where SS men first compelled their prisoners to disrobe:

Without screaming or weeping these people undressed, stood around in family groups, kissed each other, said farewells and waited for a sign from another SS man, who stood near the pit, also with a whip in his hand. During the 15 minutes that I stood near the pit I heard no complaint or plea for mercy. I watched a family of about 8 persons, a man and woman, both about 50 with their children of about 20 to 24. An old woman with snow-white hair was holding a one-year-old child in her arms and singing to it, and tickling it. The child was cooing with delight. The couple were looking on with tears in their eyes. The father was holding the hand of a boy about 10 years old and speaking to him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed toward the sky, stroked his head, and seemed to explain something to him. At that moment the SS man at the pit shouted something to his comrade. The latter counted off about 20 persons and instructed them to go behind the earth mound. Among them was the family, which I have mentioned. I well remember a girl, slim and with black hair, who as she passed close to me, pointed to herself and said, "23." I walked around the mound, and found myself confronted by a tremendous grave. People were closely wedged together and lying on top of each other so that only their heads were visible. Nearly all had blood running over their shoulders from their heads. Some of the people shot were still moving. Some were lifting their arms and turning their heads to show that they were still alive. The pit was already ⅔ full. I estimated that it already contained about 1000 people. I looked for the man who did the shooting. He was an SS man, who sat at the edge of the narrow end of the pit, his feet dangling into the pit. He had a tommy gun on his knees and was smoking a cigarette. The people, completely naked, went down some steps which were cut in the clay well of the pit and clambered over the heads of the people lying there, to the place to which the SS man directed them. They lay down in front of the dead or injured people; some caressed those who were still alive and spoke to them in a low voice. Then I heard a series of shots. I looked into the pit and saw that the bodies were twitching or the heads lying already motionless on top of the bodies that lay under them.

In the aftermath of Allied victory, all measures of retribution and reparation were of necessity feeble gestures in view of the enormity of enemy

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crimes. Trials of criminals, denunciations of "genocide," and eloquent re-
affirmation of tolerance and brotherhood could not conceal the fact that in a world more broken and insecure than ever (and more addicted than ever to nationalistic megalomania, racial mythology, and ideological fanaticism)

the battle for sweetness and light against savagery and black night was by no means permanently won. The breakdown of all devices and formulas between world wars for reconciling justice with nationalism in the treatment of minorities precluded any general revival of plebiscites, treaties, and international guarantees of the rights of outcasts. Surviving Jews on the Continent found almost all doors closed against them, including those of

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Palestine. Other refugees, "stateless" individuals, and unrepatriable "displaced persons" included several hundred thousand Poles, Balts, Ukrainians, Jugoslavs, and others who refused to return to their homelands out of hatred of Soviet influence or fear of punishment for past collaboration with the foe. They remained dependent on private and public charity. By 1948 the new International Refugee Organization had made only modest progress in finding them new homes.

As for the many millions of German-speaking peoples beyond the borders of the Reich, the past role of many as Nazi "Fifth Columnists," exploiters, and persecutors led the liberated peoples and their new governments to adopt drastic measures of defense for the future. Warsaw and Moscow expelled many Germans from East Prussia. Poland ousted virtually the entire German population from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which were resettled by Poles from the former eastern provinces. Czechoslovakia deported to the shrunken Reich the majority of the Suedetendeutsche. The sufferings of the victims elicited much sympathy in Britain and America, but little elsewhere. The deportees, unlike millions formerly uprooted by the Nazis, were at any rate not converted into slaves, fertilizer, and soap.

On the model of the arrangements of 1919 between Greece and Bulgaria and of 1923 between Turkey and Greece, arrangements were made for the exchange of minorities on either side of the new frontiers between Poland and the U.S.S.R, and between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. While precise figures are still unavailable, it is clear that post-Potsdam Europe had fewer linguistic minorities within national frontiers than ever before. On the other hand, the number of German, Italian, and Magyar "irredentas" was greatly increased. Should the superpatriots of the defeated States ever again have effective military power at their disposal, the new map, like the old, would furnish ample occasion for indignation, incentives for torture and murder, and pretexts for war.

3. PATRIOTISM AND PROFITS

It is patent that in our days not wealth alone is accumulated, but immense power and despotic economic domination are concentrated in the hands of a few, who for the most part are not the owners, but only the trustees and directors of invested funds which they administer at their own good pleasure. This domination is most powerfully exercised by those who, because they hold and control money, also govern credit and determine its allotment, for that reason supplying, so to speak, the lifeblood to the entire economic body, and grasping in their hands, as it were, the very soul of production, so that no one can breathe against their will. This accumulation of power, the characteristic note
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of the modern economic order, is a natural result of limitless free competition which permits the survival of those only who are the strongest, and this often means those who fight most relentlessly, and pay least heed to the dictates of conscience.—Encyclical Letter, Quaedagesimo anno, 1931, pp. 46-47.

I understand by economic nationalism the point of view that it ought to be the object of statesmanship in economic matters to increase the power rather than the economic well-being of a given society.—T. E. Gregory.

The economic consequences of national patriotism are no less significant for international politics than its "political" manifestations. The traditional division of human motives and activities into "economic" and "political" is at best artificial. The "political animal" of Aristotle is no less an imaginary creature than the "economic man" of the classical economists. Men and women in their private capacities have, from time immemorial, striven to gain for themselves the necessities of life, to create wealth, and to increase their material well-being. They have likewise striven to exercise power over one another and to set up common procedures and institutions for the exercise of power, through which their "public" affairs could be regulated and administered. But the line between "private" and "public" affairs is purely arbitrary and relative. The distinction between economics and politics, business and government, profit motives and power motives is useful only for purposes of academic division of labor and not for purposes of analyzing realistically the whole complex of human interrelationships and social behavior. In contemporary Western civilization there is no form of economic activity which is not affected by governmental action, and there is no type of political or governmental activity which is not intimately connected with the production and distribution of wealth. These relationships in our own age have been profoundly affected by the cult of the nation-state.

Economic Nationalism. The national patriot necessarily thinks of international economic relations, as he thinks of international political relations, in terms of "national interests." He regards the sovereign nation-state not merely as the normal basis of political organization, but likewise as the basis of economic activity. The fatherland to which he grants supreme loyalty is the land which produces his meat and drink, his corn and cabbage, his potatoes and peas. Its fields and farms and vineyards give employment to him or to many of his fellow citizens. Its factories, mills, and mines, its shops and stores and business offices, its ships and railways and air lines are the bases of national prosperity. The maintenance and promotion of this prosperity are the primary concern of government, for the nation which is prosperous presumably becomes wealthy and strong and politically in-
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luential in world affairs. The government is accordingly called upon to enact such legislation as will contribute to prosperity and economic power. It is expected to administer its relations with foreign governments in such fashion as will be most advantageous to the national economy. These assumptions and ideas, and the governmental policies which flow therefrom, can conveniently be described by the phrase "economic nationalism."

In a rational world, governmental regulation of economic activity would be directed toward welfare rather than power. In the world of the Western nation-states, the reverse is the case. If the power of the State and the economic welfare of its inhabitants do not coincide, the patriot must insist that the power and security of the State are paramount and that economic sacrifices are necessary on the altar of the fatherland. It must not run the risk of being cut off from essential sources of raw materials or manufactured goods in wartime. It must not run the risk of defeat through lack of cannon fodder. It must not permit investments to be made where they will be jeopardized by war, with a resulting diminution of national power and prestige. In anticipation of war the State must maintain its own military industries and have its own sources of supply. It must strive to attain economic self-sufficiency, to make itself as far as possible a strong and self-contained economic system. This may involve a heavy cost, but the exigencies of war require that welfare be sacrificed to power.

The relative political influence of producers and consumers, moreover, leads to similar results. Generally speaking, all producers are also consumers, and vice versa, and in a sane world there would be no clash of interests between them. But, in the salesman's and advertiser's world of capitalistic industry, production is organized and managed by a relatively small number of persons whose control over the productive process is out of all proportion to their consuming capacity. The great mass of consumers are employees who work for wages or salaries and who have no control over production. They have an interest in low prices, cheap goods, reduced living costs, and more abundant goods and services of all kinds from whatever source, domestic or foreign. But they are inarticulate, unorganized, unaware often of the effect upon them of governmental policies and economic measures. They have no political power or influence over domestic legislation proportionate to their numbers.²⁰ Those who control production, on the other hand, are the great entrepreneurs, the captains of industry, the

²⁰ "Power depends for its habits upon a consciousness of possession, a habit of organization, an ability to produce an immediate effect. In a democratic State, where there are great inequalities of economic power, the main characteristics of the poor are exactly the want of these. They do not know the power that they possess. They hardly realize what can be effected by organizing their interest. They lack direct access to those who govern them. Any action by the working classes, even in a democratic
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business leaders, the owners of the means of production, the bankers, capitalists, and employers of labor. These persons organize production and produce goods and services for profit. Profits are dependent upon prices. Prices are dependent upon the well-known "law of supply and demand." If foreign goods can be shut out or heavily taxed, if domestic industries can be "protected" and subsidized, the domestic producers can monopolize the domestic market and raise prices to enhance profits. Protective tariffs, bounties, and indirect governmental assistance of various kinds are instrumental in bringing about this result. The producers are few, highly organized, well aware of their interests, and politically influential in proportion to their economic power. They can usually bring effective pressure to bear to secure governmental aid. In the name of patriotism, national self-sufficiency, and the "full dinner pail" for the workingman, they can determine public policies in their own interests and persuade the consumers to acquiesce or even to imagine themselves to be benefited by the process. The patriot and the profiteer work hand in hand.

Raw Materials. If population is the most elementary foundation of national power, the great primary commodities which are indispensable to the operation of modern industry are of almost equal importance in the calculation of statesmen, businessmen, and economic nationalists. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the economic foundations of State power were to be found in local agriculture, forestry, shipbuilding, and such simple industries as could be supplied with needed raw materials from the national economy. Economic activity was simple and diversified. People traded with one another across political frontiers; but each State was largely sufficient unto itself, for the raw materials of its industries could be found within its boundaries. But the introduction of machinery and steam power created an economic order demanding coal and iron in large quantities. The States possessing abundant amounts of these mineral resources—Britain, Germany, and the U.S.A.—passed more rapidly and completely through the transition from agricultural to industrial society. This transition involved the progressive utilization, for a bewildering variety of productive purposes, of an

State, involves risk to their economic security out of all proportion to the certainty of gain. They have rarely in their hands the instruments necessary to secure their desires. They have seldom even learned how these may best be formulated and defended. They labor under the sense of inferiority which comes from perpetual obedience to orders without any full experience of the confidence which comes from the habit of command. They tend to confound the institutions they have inherited with the inescapable foundations of society. There is, in fact, every reason to expect that a State built upon universal suffrage will be responsible for wider concessions to the multitude than will be granted under any alternative form; but there is no historic reason to suppose that such a State will be able of itself directly to alter at the root the social results of an economically unequal society" (Harold J. Laski, Politics, 1931, pp. 26-27).
ever greater number of raw materials—cotton, rubber, sugar, oil, nitrates, copper, etc. That industrialized States can with great speed bring enormously greater power to bear in a distant area than is possible for agricultural States is a natural result of the new technology. The fact itself has been amply demonstrated in every great contest of power among States during the past century. Agrarian States have therefore striven to industrialize themselves, quite as much for political and military reasons as for reasons related to wealth production and living standards. The struggle for power and for diplomatic and strategic advantages has played a role in promoting economic competition among national societies quite as important as that played by "economic" motivations in a narrower sense. Competition has been especially keen with regard to basic raw materials, and governmental policies have been particularly directed toward deriving maximum political and economic advantages from the control of such materials. The resulting relationships constitute one of the most interesting phases of economic nationalism in the world economy of the 20th century.

The problem which arises here can be put in quite simple terms. It is due to the uneven distribution of basic raw materials over the globe, to the determination of competing private producers to derive maximum profit from such materials, and to the determination of national governments to regulate production and trade in such materials in the interests of national power and profits. The basic materials are available only in certain areas and in restricted amounts. The great mineral resources—coal, iron, petroleum, and a variety of metals—are found only in certain regions of the earth and are obviously present in definitely limited quantities. The great vegetable resources—rubber, cotton, sugar, wheat, etc.—can be produced continuously, but only in the regions which are suitable to their cultivation by virtue of soil and climate.21

No international struggle would take place if producers and consumers throughout the world were left free to buy and sell in accordance with their needs and inclinations, for such goods would then flow as easily across national frontiers as they now do across provincial or district frontiers within the nation. But large producers, in their quest for profit, and large consumers, in their quest for cheap sources of supply, call for governmental intervention or assistance. And patriotic governments are the more willing to render such assistance out of a desire, inspired by considerations of national

21 The United States, which is most nearly self-sufficient in basic raw materials, is obliged to import all its rubber, chromite, antimony, and tin and almost all its manganese, nickel, tungsten, mica, and mercury. On the other hand, it has export surpluses of coal, oil, copper, sulphur, zinc, and phosphates. The U.S.S.R. is in the next most advantageous position, with Germany, Italy, and Japan most dependent on foreign sources of supply. See Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, 1936.
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power, to utilize such materials as they control for purposes of diplomatic bargaining. They seek to acquire, if possible, independent sources of supply in order to be secure in wartime and in order to prevent other governments and national producing groups from charging monopolistic prices. The result is a welter of monopolistic combinations, price-fixing arrangements, export and import duties, quotas, prohibitions, and valorization schemes.

To review all these measures for all the basic commodities would take more pages than are included in this volume. The fundamental patterns of policy, with the purposes lying behind them and the results ensuing from them, are more important than the details of special cases. In general, governmental regulation of raw materials takes the form either of control of exports and imports or of restrictions on production and marketing. Customs duties or import taxes on goods entering a country are frequently levied for the purpose of barring out foreign raw materials and of raising prices in the domestic market to the advantage of the “protected” domestic producers. Export duties are constitutionally impossible in the United States and are seldom imposed by industrialized countries, but they are much in vogue in colonial regions and in States which are sources of important raw materials for the outside world. Such duties are usually intended to raise revenue or to conserve resources; but they may also be used, by States enjoying a monopolistic position, to raise world prices. Governmental policies dictated by economic nationalism have been directed toward the acquisition of independent sources of basic raw materials as well as toward price fixing and the exploitation of monopolistic advantages. The currency of such phrases as “oil diplomacy,” “oil imperialism,” “rubber imperialism,” and the like, is indicative of general recognition of the fact that the territorial and political ambitions of States are greatly influenced by such considerations.

The fascinating and intricate story of the international struggle for petroleum resources is too long to be recounted here, but a few of its salient features may be suggested. The rapid adoption of petroleum for power, light, and lubrication and the amazingly large number of products resulting from its distillation have led to its rapid and wasteful exploitation in all parts of the world where it is found. The United States normally produces 70% of the total world production, Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, Persia, Rumania, the Dutch East Indies, Colombia, and Peru following next in order. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are the only Great Powers which have sources of supply within their own territory adequate to meet their own needs. The oil business was long conducted on a world-wide scale by a small number of huge industrial combinations, including the Standard Oil (American), the Royal Dutch Shell (Anglo-Dutch), and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (British). The British Government owned the controlling stock in the Anglo-
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Persian Oil Company and frequently gave diplomatic support to the Royal Dutch Shell, as did the American Government to the Standard Oil and other American oil interests. Washington protested against the British policy of excluding aliens from the control of petroleum supplies within the Empire. The Dutch Government pursued a similar policy in the East Indies. French legislation virtually excluded from the French sources of supply all companies not under French control. Powerful governments are able to enforce such policies in the face of foreign protest. Weaker governments, like that of Mexico, are often compelled to abandon such monopolistic efforts under pressure of the Great Powers. The United States has not pursued a discriminatory exclusion policy, except in retaliation against particular States, and has demanded an "Open Door" policy throughout the world as a means of enabling Americans to enter foreign fields.

The Near East has been a theater of acute international friction for the control of oil resources. The unsuccessful British intervention against the Soviet Government in the Russian Civil War was in part inspired by a desire to secure possession of the rich Caucasian oil fields. Prior to 1914, Anglo-German rivalry in the Near East centered in the oil fields of Mesopotamia. On April 14, 1920, at San Remo, the British and French Governments, acting in the interests of military security and on behalf of the prospective profits of their oil corporations, reached an agreement for the division between them of rights to exploit oil resources in Rumania, Russia, Mesopotamia, and elsewhere. The U.S.A. protested against this "horse trading" in oil-bearing areas, on the ground that it contemplated exclusion of Americans and other foreign nationals from the opportunities for profit in these regions. At the Lausanne Conference of 1923, the local hotels housed more representatives of oil companies than of governments, and the resulting treaties were oleaginous in the extreme. Britain insisted successfully upon the abandonment of Turkish claims to the Mosul district, reputed to be rich in oil reserves, in favor of Iraq, under British mandate. The British and French Governments were unable to validate all their contested claims; but the great game of oil imperialism went on, private producers posing as patriots in order to enlist governmental support for their profit-making schemes and governments granting such support for reasons of strategy and power politics. The story of oil diplomacy in Mexico, Colombia, and other regions reveals the same basic motives at work, creating the same types of governmental policies. The story of the international struggle for other basic resources differs only in degree and not in kind from that already suggested.

Neomercantilism. The policies of economic nationalism, directed toward exclusive national control and monopolistic exploitation of the world's raw materials, are but a phase of the competitive struggle for markets carried
on by the nation-states. Trade carried on by producers and merchants would be of little direct significance for international politics if it went on without governmental interference or regulation. But international trade, even more than domestic trade, has almost always been subjected to various forms of State control. Competition in international trade is not competition among the governments of the nation-states, for governments, until recently, seldom engaged in commerce. It is competition among private merchants who receive governmental support in their search for profit. Such support is extended because the profit seekers possess sufficient political influence to control governmental action and because government seeks to enhance national power through striving after markets abroad and economic self-sufficiency at home. In the 20th century, ambassadors, consuls, and commercial agents have often acted as advertisers and promoters of private business.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the prevailing school of economic thought in western Europe was that of the mercantilists, who held that government should regulate trade for the purpose of enhancing national wealth and prosperity. This early philosophy of economic nationalism was based upon a number of serious misconceptions. Trade was regarded less as a mutually advantageous exchange of commodities than as a process in which one party lost what the other gained. Gold was regarded less as a convenient symbol of value and a useful medium of exchange than as an embodiment of riches. A nation’s wealth was assumed to be equivalent to its stock of gold. All that would increase the gold stock was therefore good; all that diminished it was bad. It was observed that when a nation’s exporters sold more goods abroad than its importers purchased the surplus of exports over imports was paid for in gold instead of goods. Since this situation produced a flow of gold into the country, it was looked upon as “favorable”—and, ever since, an excess of national exports over imports has been called a “favorable balance of trade.” On the other hand, it was observed that, when importers purchased more goods abroad than exporters sold, gold flowed out of the country. An excess of imports over exports was consequently described as an “unfavorable balance of trade.” Inasmuch as gold was assumed to be wealth, governmental policies were directed toward encouraging exports by bounties and subsidies of various kinds and discouraging imports by tariffs, embargoes, and prohibitions. At the same time, colonial trade was monopolized by the nationals of the mother country in order that it, too, might contribute as much as possible to the national wealth. Domestic trade was likewise subjected to numerous restrictions and regulations.

The decline of mercantilistic policies was due less to the demonstrated fallacies of mercantilist logic than to the political ascendancy of the new bourgeoisie born of the Industrial Revolution. The new manufacturers and
merchants found the old restrictions a burdensome interference with free profit seeking. The publication of Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* in 1776 and the work of the Continental economists known as the “Physiocrats” revealed clearly the lacunae in mercantilist reasoning and furnished intellectual respectability to the demand for an end of governmental interference with trade. Gold, it was pointed out, is not wealth but simply a medium of exchange in terms of which commodities are priced. An inflow of gold into a nation tends to raise the price level, for the purchasing power of gold varies inversely with its quantity. An outflow of gold lowers prices for the same reason. If an excess of exports over imports leads to an inflow of gold, prices rise, domestic costs of production increase, and the nation’s exporters are less and less able to compete effectively in foreign markets with producers in other nations where prices are lower. At the same time, foreign exporters, attracted by the higher prices, send in goods in increasing volume. The export surplus consequently tends to vanish and to be replaced by an import surplus, as a result of the effect upon trade of changing national price levels due to gold movements. Conversely, an excess of imports over exports causes gold to flow out, lowers prices, and places exporters at a competitive advantage and importers at a competitive disadvantage, with the result that the movement is in course of time reversed. In short, gold movements and price levels tend to keep foreign trade at an equilibrium. It is impossible for a nation, in the long run, to export more than it imports. In the long run a nation’s imports and exports, including in these terms, not merely commodities, but all the items in the international balance such as shipping charges, insurance premiums, investments, and immigrant remittances, must attain parity. Governmental efforts to prevent this are ineffective and mischievous.

Out of this reasoning developed the “free-trade” doctrine of the classical laissez-faire economists, which the new bourgeois governments adopted quite generally. In 1846 the Corn Laws (import duties on grain) were abandoned in Great Britain, which then became a free-trade country. The United States adopted lower tariffs between 1830 and 1860. The Anglo-French Cobden Treaty of 1860 provided for French tariff reduction. German tariff duties were almost completely abandoned in the mid-century. The period of untrammeled individualism, with governmental regulation of economic activity reduced to a minimum, was marked by the general abandonment of mercantilist restrictions on foreign trade and the progressive adoption of free-trade policies by many governments. In the absence of governmental interference with foreign trade, producers, importers, and exporters will buy and sell freely across national frontiers in accordance with the dictates of price and the opportunities for profit. Each nation will specialize in the produc-

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tion of those commodities which, by virtue of climate, resources, and technical skill, it can produce most cheaply. It will sell these goods abroad and receive in exchange goods which can be produced more cheaply abroad than at home. World-wide geographical specialization develops, and each nation gains economically by free exchange with all others. The resulting trade is advantageous to all concerned, even to those to whom it is least so.

In spite of the fact that the logic of free trade has never been successfully refuted, the governments of the nation-states have progressively abandoned it since 1870 and have once more erected higher and higher tariff walls in a new quest for prosperity and economic self-sufficiency. As soon as production began to outrun the market, as soon as competition in all markets became increasingly keen, entrepreneurs began to perceive possibilities of profit through governmental action. They abandoned their former laissez-faire attitude and looked to government to bar out competitors from the domestic market and to assist them in conquering foreign markets. In the United States the tariff “for revenue only” was replaced during the Civil War by a tariff designed to protect national producers from foreign competition and to encourage home industry. The McKinley Tariff of 1890 was enacted to prevent the importation of various foreign goods or to make their prices so high in the American market that they could not compete successfully with similar American goods. The Dingley Tariff of 1897 and the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909 raised duties to still higher levels. The (Democratic) Underwood Tariff of 1913 lowered import duties, but only temporarily. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 carried American tariff duties to unprecedentedly high levels, and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930) of the Hoover Administration carried protectionism to a point which threatened the complete strangulation of American import trade. In Germany, Bismarck's protective Tariff of 1879 inaugurated a permanent policy of high duties on both agricultural and industrial imports. The Third French Republic adopted moderate protectionism in 1881 and subsequently imposed higher and higher duties on imports. These three States set the pace, and others followed step by step, until almost all nations in retaliation and self-defense had become protectionist by the turn of the century. The general economic disorganization following World War I and the determination of the new States of Europe to become economically self-contained led to the erection of higher tariff barriers everywhere, until finally even Great Britain, the last citadel of free trade, abandoned its ancient faith and embraced protectionism in 1931. A large section of the British Liberal Party, along with Ramsay MacDonald and the renegade members of the Labor Party, followed the example of the American Democratic Party in abandoning traditional convictions and championing neomercantilism.

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Broadly speaking, protectionist and prohibitive customs duties on imports are in most cases economically indefensible, for they diminish national wealth and prosperity rather than increase them. But such duties may be politically justified if it is assumed that the legitimate objective of governmental regulation of foreign commerce is the enhancement of State power, regardless of the economic cost. It is arguable that the promotion of uneconomical home industries and the attainment of national economic self-sufficiency are politically advantageous to a State, since they diminish its dependence upon foreign sources of supply, lessen the dangers of loss from an economic blockade in wartime, and perhaps increase its fighting power by making it self-contained. These political gains are always paid for in economic losses, but the economic nationalists may contend that power and security are worth whatever they cost in welfare.

But this is only a partial explanation of the paradox of neomercantilism. Tariff protectionists invariably insist that restrictions on imports are “economically” advantageous as well as politically desirable, and they have succeeded in convincing a politically effective majority in most modern States that this is really the case. Tariff-making politicians (and this includes most politicians) are perpetually at odds with free-trade economists (and this includes most economists). When a thousand American economists petitioned President Hoover not to sign the Tariff Act of 1930, on the ground that it would bring ruin to American foreign trade, the Chief Executive showed himself to be a politician rather than an economist by ignoring the plea and signing the Act. The explanation of such situations is to be found in the domestic economic effects of tariffs and in the nature of the domestic political process as it affects tariff making.

Almost every tariff is a device whereby privileged and protected domestic producers are enabled to exploit the domestic market more effectively by charging their customers monopoly or quasi-monopoly prices. It likewise enables inefficient and uneconomical domestic producers to continue production by antiquated methods, since they are protected from more efficient foreign competitors who produce better goods at lower cost. What is an economic loss to the country as a whole, however, is not merely a political gain for the power of the State but an economic gain also (at the expense of consumers) for the influential producers who rule the State and shape its policies.

Under these circumstances, tariff making becomes a process in which ever larger numbers of interested producers call loudly for protection, i.e., for higher prices in the domestic market, and pose as patriots promoting national prosperity. Once a tariff wall is set up, vested interests arise behind it and assume that they possess an inalienable right to the profits of patriotic

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protectionism. They demand more and more protection as a means to greater and greater profits, and other producers' groups soon demand the same privilege. These demands cannot be ignored by politicians, for such groups control political parties. Legislators and executives cannot ignore their master's voice and continue to enjoy the profits and perquisites of holding public office. To raise tariff duties is always politically easy; for those who profit thereby pay generously for such services, and those who lose are dumb and voiceless. To lower tariff duties is almost always politically impossible, for the vested interests which profit from them are too powerful to be defied.

At the same time that the protectionist governments of the world have endeavored to exclude imports, they have attempted to promote exports by a variety of devices. The mercantilist doctrine, which regarded an outflow of goods as "favorable" and an inflow of goods as "unfavorable," has received new recognition at the hands of entrepreneurs anxious to enhance profits, both by monopolizing the domestic market and by selling their surpluses in foreign markets. Government aid has been solicited by profit seekers to achieve both these purposes. It has been freely granted by patriotic legislators who find economic nationalism politically expedient. Government bounties have frequently been paid to exporters. The payment of "drawbacks" is a device with a similar purpose. Manufacturers who import raw materials to be used in the fabrication of goods for export are refunded the tariff duties paid on such materials. More recently, as in the American Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930, such manufacturers are often permitted to import goods for eventual export without paying any duty in the first place.

Bounties and drawbacks are only two of the innumerable methods employed by governments to subsidize and encourage export trade. Railway freight rates on exported goods are often reduced. Financial aid from governments to shipping lines is now customary in most commercial States, as a means both of promoting exports and of making available a large tonnage of merchant shipping for use in war. This aid may take the form of direct bounties, of large payments for mail services, or of various disguised subsidies. The American Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 exempts export-trade associations from the operation of the antitrust laws. These and other devices frequently make profitable the practice of "dumping," i.e., of selling goods in foreign markets at a price lower than that charged in the domestic market, for the purpose of disposing of surpluses, conquering new markets by swamping competition, or limiting domestic supplies to raise prices in the home market.

The logical end of these policies is reached when the government of each State makes it impossible for its nationals to purchase anything from foreigners and does all in its power to enable them to sell goods to foreigners.
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Each national unit seeks to sell without buying. International trade is progressively impeded, and each nation-state finds its efforts to promote exports thwarted by the determination of all other States to bar out imports. Out of this situation have emerged commercial treaties, international tariff bargaining, import and export quotas, and the acute strangulation of world commerce which developed after 1930. The nature of this economic dilemma will be examined below, along with national and international efforts to solve the problem. Here it is enough to notice how national economic policies in the era of neomercantilism have produced a crisis as a result of the collaboration of patriots and profiteers.

Investment Policies. In the epoch of world economy, of large-scale production and immense accumulations of wealth in the hands of those who look farther and farther afield for profitable investment opportunities, it is natural that governments should concern themselves with movements of capital across frontiers, no less than with movements of goods. Capitalists and investors, as well as manufacturers and merchants, early perceived the possibility of increasing their profits through enlisting governmental support in their behalf. And politicians and statesmen similarly perceived the possibility of increasing national prestige and achieving diplomatic objectives through an adroit use of investments and loans as weapons of power politics. Governmental regulation of capital movements has accordingly become the order of the day, and the diplomacy of high finance has, like Jehovah, moved in mysterious ways its wonders to perform.

This outward movement of capital began first, naturally enough, in Great Britain, the cradle of modern industrial capitalism. By 1914, private British capital to the value of about $19,500,000,000 had been invested abroad, British investments increasing at the rate of $1,000,000,000 a year. In the case of Germany, about $6,700,000,000 had been invested abroad, with an annual increase of perhaps $250,000,000. France was less industrialized and therefore less wealthy in liquid capital than her neighbors; but the stockings of the peasant, the artisan, and the petit bourgeois were long and deep. About $8,600,000,000 of French private capital had found its way abroad by 1914, with an increase of perhaps $500,000,000 a year. Belgian, Dutch, Swiss, Italian, and other investors likewise found it possible to get more for their money by sending it abroad to remote and exotic places than by investing it in domestic industry. From northwestern Europe there flowed outward a golden stream of capital, running like the blood of life through the veins of industry and commerce all over the world. And from the backward and capital-hungry regions there flowed back a steady stream of dividends, premiums, interest payments, and commissions to enrich the lenders from the profits of the borrowers. In the U.S.A., until recently a new, unde-
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veloped country, more foreign capital was absorbed that was exported. Some $4,000,000,000 of European capital was invested in the United States by 1914, though it should be noted that over $2,500,000,000 of American capital had already gone into the Caribbean area, Canada, and Europe.

World War I and its aftermath produced a complete reversal in the international position of the United States from the point of view of movements of private capital. The American colossus was transformed from the greatest debtor to the second greatest creditor country in the world. One of the first effects of the war was to cause European investors in the United States to sell their stocks and bonds in American industries to Americans, who became increasingly eager to purchase them with the onset of the feverish flush of war prosperity. Some $2,500,000,000 worth of American securities held abroad was repurchased in this fashion. Private investors in the United States, moreover, reaped a rich harvest by lending money to enterprises of all kinds abroad and to the Allied Governments through the purchase of their war bonds. Under the influence of an unprecedented European demand for goods and services at almost any price, American industry, commerce, and finance entered upon a "boom" period which lasted, with minor interruptions, until the great crash of 1929. Twenty-one thousand new American millionaires emerged from the most profitable of all American wars. The newly accumulated hoards of capital in the United States fed the automobile industry, the motion-picture industry, the radio industry, and the stock market—and then looked abroad for still greater profits. After 1924, American loans flowed to Europe, particularly to Germany, in a great flood, and it became possible in the United States to sell at lucrative prices almost any foreign security, public or private, printed on good paper with the requisite gilt edge. American loans and investments in Europe increased from about a third of a billion dollars to over $5,500,000,000, in Canada from $750,000,000 to almost $4,500,000,000, in South America from $100,000,000 to $3,000,000,000, in the Caribbean area from $1,250,000,000 to almost $3,000,000,000. So large was this flow of capital that American investors, by 1931, had exported about $18,000,000,000 abroad, exclusive of intergovernmental debts. After 1931, in the face of world-wide defaults and bankruptcies, the outward movement of American capital practically ceased, and many of the loans of the boom epoch became worthless.

European capital-exporting countries also suffered a reduction of their investments abroad. British foreign investments fell from $19,500,000,000 in 1914 to $18,200,000,000 in 1929; French from $8,600,000,000 to $3,500,000,000; and German from $6,700,000,000 to $1,100,000,000. At the beginning of the Great Depression the Netherlands had $2,300,000,000 invested abroad, Switzerland $2,000,000,000, Belgium $1,500,000,000, Japan $1,000,000,000.
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000,000, Sweden $500,000,000, and other States smaller sums, making an estimated world total of foreign investments of $47,500,000,000 before the crash. These figures were substantially reduced after 1929, though subsequent estimates are difficult because of the fluctuating value of securities and currencies.

Quite apart from governmental efforts to control these great capital movements, they produce in themselves economic and social effects with political ramifications. Some of these effects will be considered below in connection with imperialism, Great Power politics, and the contemporary crisis of capitalism. From the point of view of economic nationalism, the most significant aspect of capital exports and imports is that they have frequently been regulated by governments for the purpose of promoting national power and prestige and attaining diplomatic objectives having no direct relation to the immediate interests of borrowers or lenders. If "free trade" prevailed in the world's investment markets, i.e., if governments permitted investors and borrowers to do as they pleased and if investors and borrowers made no appeals for governmental assistance or support, loans would be made and investments would be placed in accordance with pure profit considerations. Mistakes of judgment would certainly occur, and frauds and swindles might be even more frequent, for brokers and investment bankers are not distinguished from ordinary mortals by excessive wisdom or honesty. But governments would not be at once involved in the results, and capital movements would scarcely deserve consideration in a treatise on international politics. In fact, however, this situation seldom prevails, for the governments of capital-exporting States are disposed to point with pride to a swelling volume of foreign investments and to use the money power of their financiers for political purposes, whereas the governments of capital-importing States often view with alarm the invasion of the domestic market by foreign capitalists and seek to check their influence in various ways.

The methods employed to control capital exports vary considerably from State to State. The devices used are both positive and preventive. They aim to encourage private investments in certain States and to discourage them in others. In almost every case some form of official approval is required before foreign stocks and bonds may be listed and sold in the local market. The implication of governmental supervision is that the government will grant diplomatic support to approved lenders if their interests are jeopardized, whereas it may withhold such support from loans which have not met with official approval. This fact alone is usually sufficient, in most capital-exporting States, to ensure a large degree of governmental control over foreign loans and investments, regardless of the particular devices utilized.

The purposes for which such control is exercised are various and sundry...
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Considerations of economic welfare would dictate governmental supervision to prevent fraud, dishonesty, and undue risks and to safeguard borrowers and lenders alike. But considerations of patriotism, power, and profits lead to quite different motives and purposes. At least four specific political objectives have been sought by governments in their regulating objectives.

1. Loans are often encouraged to strengthen an ally.
2. Loans are frequently discouraged to weaken a past or prospective enemy State.
3. Loans are often encouraged or forbidden as a means of obtaining political, economic, or financial concessions from the government of another State.
4. Loans have frequently been encouraged by governments as a means of securing economic and political control of "backward" areas.

In the words of one commentator describing the political role of capital exports in Europe before 1914:

Capital was called upon to abstain from investment in the lands of potential enemies. It was urged or commanded into the service of allies. It was encouraged to develop the areas that were within the political system of the country where it accumulated. It was upheld in ventures which sustained a national political ambition or hope. In France and Germany, and within the alliances which they headed, it came to be commonly regarded as a servant of national purposes rather than an ordinary private possession to be disposed of in accordance with the private judgment and on the private risk of the owner.

Though nationalistic bankers and investors have found it lucrative to wrap themselves in the national flag, to call upon governments to protect their interests abroad, and to drink deeply of the profits of patriotism, patriotic statesmen in the pursuit of diplomatic prestige, political influence, and imperial possessions have at the same time found bankers and investors willing tools of the politics of power. Here, again, a mutually advantageous combination of patriots and profit seekers shapes the policies of economic nationalism and impels the nation-states to action in the international arena.

Politics Conquers Economics. The rise and spread of "totalitarianism" and the advent of World War II have everywhere accelerated the trend to-

22 President Taft declared in 1912, "The diplomacy of the present Administration has sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one that appeals alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims. It is an effort frankly directed to the increase of American trade upon the axiomatic principle that the Government of the United States shall extend all proper support to every legitimate and beneficial American enterprise abroad" (annual message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1912).
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ward economic nationalism and profoundly altered, beyond all hope of restoration, the relationships between private business and Great Power politics. Soviet totalitarianism abolished all private business in Russia in favor of State-controlled enterprise. A Socialist State has no problem of bribing or coercing private entrepreneurs to serve the higher purposes of Realpolitik. All goods are bought and sold abroad by State trusts. Money is loaned or borrowed by State banks. Tariffs, bounties, and other devices to regulate private business disappear. A central agency, possessed of effective control over investment, production, and distribution, directs the flow of goods, services, and money across frontiers as well as within them. Economic decisions are made by politicians. Their motivations, like those of all politicians, revolve around the protection and promotion of their own power and that of the Great Power which they rule, rather than around the economic welfare per se of their subjects.

The new socialism has spread itself over the world and led everywhere to the imposition of political controls upon all economic activity, in sharp contrast to the hidden control of government by business which often prevailed in the heyday of competitive capitalism. "Communism," to be sure, is still restricted to Russia and its satellites, and Fascism in theory and pretense is "anti-Communist" and solicitous of the interests of private property and profits. In fact, Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, and Japanese militarism all developed a degree of State control over business, and particularly over foreign trade, which differed little from that prevailing in the U.S.S.R. "Private" capitalists and industrialists were still tolerated, provided that they yielded unquestioning obedience to the new political elite. If they did not (like Fritz Thyssen, the German steel magnate, who originally subsidized the Nazi Party and helped put Hitler in power), they were expropriated, imprisoned, or deported. Politicians fixed prices and wages, established quotas of production exports and imports, managed money and credit, suppressed competition, promoted monopoly, and administered the entire national economy as a unit.

The purpose of these operations—invariably in the case of the Fascist Powers, frequently in the case of the U.S.S.R.—is to enhance the power of the State and to use business and finance to serve diplomatic and military ends. Under these conditions the last vestiges of the free market disappear. Totalitarian States, by controlling and rationing foreign exchange and putting international trade on a barter basis, oblige their merchants to buy and sell, not where goods and services can be bought most cheaply or sold most profitably, but where high policy dictates the conferring of benefits or the imposition of penalties. By such devices, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht and his successor as German Minister of Economics and Reichsbank President, Walter
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Funk, set Germany’s Anglo-American creditors by the ears, invaded Latin-American and Oriental markets, and brought all of southeastern Europe into economic subjection to the Reich long before any armies marched or any planes left their hangars with loads of bombs.

The enormous diplomatic and military advantages accruing to the totalitarian States from these methods (so long as they dealt with private businessmen in other lands) compelled democratic governments to resort to comparable practices in self-defense. Many steps in this direction had been taken after 1930 in attempts to cope with the Great Depression. More steps followed with the approach of war. The leaders of France, however, never learned how to meet the business strategy of the Reich. The slow-minded aristocrats and businessmen who governed England in the 1930’s learned only slowly how to adapt their behavior to the dangers and opportunities of a changed world. In America, where “individualism” persisted longest and public regulation of business was most vigorously opposed, the transition came by stages after 1933—first in governmental control of money, credit, and the securities market, later in the promotion of exports through government loans to foreign purchasers, still later in the control of exports through embargoes and in the actual conduct of certain foreign-trade operations, particularly in strategic raw materials, by public agencies. The Export-Import Bank, originally established as a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to help develop Soviet trade (in which field it had done no business up to the time of writing), later became a vehicle for public loans to actual or prospective victims of aggression, particularly China.24

Under the impact of hostilities, Britain and the British Dominions developed measures of economic mobilization and economic warfare involving as complete control over business by government as anything to be found in Germany, Italy, or Japan. America moved more slowly in the same direction. No measures less than these, no reliance on “private initiative” or “business as usual,” could suffice either to keep the economies of the democratic Powers functioning or to meet the threat of totalitarian war. The new socialism, whether democratic or despotic in its philosophy, had come to stay—at least in the sense that all business enterprise, and all activities of farmers and workers as well, would henceforth be publicly controlled for public purposes defined by political leaders.

By a singular paradox, however, these developments, which carried economic nationalism to its logical terminal point, coincided with the waning of the nation-state as a politicoeconomic unit and with the passing of both

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‘nationalism’ and ‘economics’ as these things were understood before 1914. In the world society of the future the currency and trade areas within which the State will control international business and command it to serve the ends of politics will not be areas defined by national boundaries. They will be at least great continental blocs and at most a world federation. Within each area the purposes of such control may be, as in the recent past and present, the waging of economic and military wars of annihilation against other areas, with the vanquished enslaved by the victors. Or the purposes of control may be the maintenance of productivity and the promotion of a safer and richer life for all. The answer to this riddle is still hidden in the fog of dubious battle and in the doubtful wisdom of the leaders of men. In either case the power and glory of the nation-state will be forgotten goals, superseded by the broader purposes of more daring minds. And if the enrichment of nations is still possible in the world of tomorrow, it will be achieved not by each seeking its own good at the expense of its neighbors but by each cooperating with its neighbors in a common program which will leave to the national states of today a role as small as that now enjoyed by the provinces, principalities, and city-states of yesterday.

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Politics: the art by which politicians obtain campaign contributions from the rich and votes from the poor on the pretext of protecting one from the other.—Oscar Ameringer.

“Cheshire-Puss,” Alice began . . . “would you tell me please which way I ought to go from here?” “That depends a good deal on where you want to go,” said the Cat. “I don’t much care where”—said Alice. “Then it doesn’t matter much which way you go,” said the Cat. “—so long as I get somewhere,” Alice added as an explanation. “Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the Cat, “if only you walk long enough. . . . In that direction lives a Hatter; and in that direction lives a March Hare. Visit either you like: they’re both mad.” “But I don’t want to go among mad people,” Alice remarked. “Oh, you can’t help that,” said the Cat, “we’re all mad here. I’m mad, you’re mad.” “How do you know I am mad?” said Alice. “You must be,” said the Cat, “or you wouldn’t have come here.”—Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland.

For most of modern mankind the business of living has become a panic flight before the Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Famine, Pestilence, War, and Death. This shocking state of affairs was entirely unanticipated by the optimists of the palmy days before 1914, when men could still believe in unending “progress” and feel confident that all was for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Man had conquered Nature. Man had in his
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hands the tools to bring peace and plenty to all the planet. Man had a future brighter than any preceding generation had ever dreamed of. To answer adequately the question of why these high hopes were so bitterly frustrated would be to retell the whole story of Western culture with a degree of insight and understanding not as yet vouchedsafed to any participant observer. Yet an answer of a kind must be attempted.

Chaos and breakdown have their hidden “laws” and their secret “causes” no less than order and progress. The tragedy of modern man is the tragedy of Faust, who sold his soul to Mephistopheles in order to recapture his youth—and then used the energies of youth to bring others to ruin and finally to encompass his own doom. In the language of sociologists, rather than poets, Western man has become a victim of “cultural lag.” He perfected the skills and devised the gadgets required to make the world an economic unity, a cultural unity, and, potentially at least, a political unity. But he had already learned how to live his life in a prescientific and pre-machine age in which the world was not a unity but rather a loose aggregation of national tribes in which each tribe was “independent” and more or less sufficient unto itself. Animals capable of learning often suffer from their inability or reluctance to forget or modify what they have learned. Solutions to old problems, once learned, are carried over into new situations and applied to new problems to which they are inapplicable. The result is frustration. If frustration provokes no effective adjustment to new needs in new ways, the result is madness and disaster.

The contemporary tragedy of the new economy, in so far as it can be explained by a too simple formula, arises out of the circumstance that competition tends to become self-destructive. When free competition wanes, the price mechanism no longer functions to preserve a balance. In its initial phase, capitalism operated in expanding markets in which competition was the life of trade and new enterprises were constantly being established to meet new demands. Subsequently markets expanded less rapidly and then began to contract in periodical deflations of increasing severity, caused in part by the fact that the unequal distribution of wealth and income left insufficient purchasing power in the hands of the masses of consumers to buy the output of the new industry and agriculture at prices profitable to the producers. In contracting markets, competition becomes destructive. To escape losses, producers combine for protection, i.e., for restricting output and for fixing prices at levels determined not by free competition but by agreement or decree. Entrepreneurs combine in corporations, cartels, and trusts and seek to establish monopolies. They demand from governments “protective” tariffs to bar out of the home market goods from abroad or to compel their sale at prices no lower than those profitable to domestic pro
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iucers. Entrepreneurs further seek and secure aid from the State in the form of diplomatic protection and subsidies wherewith to win new foreign markets.

At a later stage comes governmental price fixing, production quotas, dumping or destruction of surpluses, and "planned economy." All these efforts to escape from the unhappy consequences of unlimited competition in shrinking markets tend to destroy competition, to make certain prices rigid and inflexible, and to disrupt the maintenance of economic equilibrium through price changes. Private monopoly in its various forms becomes the death of trade. Periods of prosperity become highly inflationary and speculative, all producers profiting from general and artificial price increases. Depressions become more acute and prolonged because the deflationary processes necessary to achieve a readjustment are interrupted by artificial price controls. In passing from its competitive phase to its monopolistic phase, capitalism passed into a vicious circle from which no escape has yet appeared.

The Great Depression exhibited in exaggerated form the general symptoms characteristic of all such depressions. Everywhere it grew out of the boom period of 1924-28, marked by rising or stationary price levels, a great increase in almost all lines of production, high wages, huge profits, tremendous investments at home and abroad, credit expansion, and wild speculation in securities. Sales began declining in 1929 as markets became incapable of absorbing the flood of goods, even under the impetus of installment purchasing, long-term credits, and high-pressure advertising. Declining sales brought declining production and price cutting. The lofty structure of inflated credit and security values began to topple. The New York Stock Market panic of October-November, 1929, initiated a prolonged and progressive collapse of security prices which brought ruin to millions of speculating investors. Commodity prices and production began to decline rapidly. Factories closed, wages fell, unemployment increased, and purchasing power fell more swiftly than prices. In a desperate effort to save something of their vanishing markets, some producers and distributors cut prices still more severely, and others kept their prices artificially high and thus prevented deflation from restoring an equilibrium. All fixed obligations became increasingly difficult to meet. Banks closed, corporations became insolvent, tax revenues declined while millions of hungry unemployed clamored for relief. The collapse of the Kredit-Anstalt of Vienna in the spring of 1931 presaged new disasters in Europe. The great industrialized nations—Germany, Britain, and the U.S.A.—were gripped by economic paralysis.

The social and political consequences of economic maladjustment became so serious that governments were obliged to intervene. Their intervention
was usually designed to halt the fall of values, to restrict output, to "stabilize" prices, and to put an artificial end to a process of deflation which had already become artificial and abnormal because of the disappearance of the automatic, competitive controls of an earlier epoch. The "cures" aggravated the disease by multiplying its causes. Governmental deficits became enormous. Emergency measures were of no avail, and even the abandonment of the gold standard and the inflation of the currency in many countries were without effect. By the summer of 1932, the fall of price levels had apparently stopped for certain commodities; but countless millions were without work and wages, and the subsequent recovery of production and trade was painful and slow.

To the workers struggling along on a dole or subject to the mercies of private and local charity, to the farmer whose mortgage is foreclosed because the prices of his crops net him no money with which to meet payments, to the businessman forced into bankruptcy, and to the banker whose folly or indiscretion has led to the disappearance of depositors' money in worthless investments, it may appear a far cry from the Depression to international politics. But to the exporter, the importer, the foreign investor, the diplomat, and the reflective observer of world affairs the problems of the economic order and those of the political order, national and international, are inseparably linked. The economic crisis is deserving of the careful consideration of the student of international politics, not merely because the power of States rests upon economic resources and productivity, but because the crisis is both a cause and a result of the policies of governments in their dealings with one another. Economic nationalism in all its aspects played a large role in precipitating the crisis, and governments confronted with ruin reacted defensively by becoming more nationalistic and mercantilistic than ever. In this fashion, they aggravated the conditions they strove to ameliorate. The frenzied diplomacy of the Depression period centered in problems created by the crisis: vanishing gold reserves, the postponement or repudiation of public and private debts, barriers to trade, disappearing markets, dumping, social unrest, and revolution. All national efforts to deal with the crisis not only failed to achieve the expected results but in many cases actually worsened the situation. There was general agreement that only international efforts could be effective. International efforts required cooperation among governments still primarily interested in national power and prestige and in the profits of their own nationals. Such cooperation was difficult to achieve and was often ineffective because of its halting and hesitant character.

It would be pleasant, but quite pointless, to pretend that the problems here posed are unhappy memories of the past or are on the eve of solution.
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in the future. They are recurrent in our time because the maladjustments of the world economy grow worse and not better, decade by decade. These disorders are aggravated, not alleviated, by world wars. As the economic paralysis of 1929-33 followed the political and military paroxysm of 1914-18, so the holocaust of 1939-45 will all but inevitably be followed by an even graver and more prolonged prostration of production and distribution in the Atlantic communities in years to come. As these words were written, the new night was already falling, after a number of foreshadowings in the gathering gloom. The dark shape of the crisis of capitalism in its current phase was not yet altogether clear. It is beyond the purview of this study to undertake any exposition or critique of the Marxist, Keynesian, and other analyses of the issue—or to offer, even in summary, the statistical data which give pause and concern to all who see and think.25

The major economic consequences of World War II may be summarized as follows: (1) The socialized economy of the U.S.S.R., although grievously shattered by the enemy onslaught, demonstrated its vitality, its productivity, and its capacity to recuperate, achieve relative stability on a low level of living standards, and move forward slowly toward greater production and consumption. (2) The Fascist-capitalist economies of Germany, Italy, and Japan were wrecked and made dependent for any prospect of recovery on American charity and investment. (3) The democratic-capitalist economies of western Europe and Britain were reduced to insolvency and obliged to seek salvation through socialism and through American aid. (4) Under the impetus of war the U.S.A., as the "arsenal of democracy," almost doubled its productive capacity in heavy industry; greatly increased its agricultural output; fantastically expanded its foreign trade; achieved a level of general prosperity never before known; abruptly abandoned wartime controls in favor of the assumed "normalcy" of the alleged "free market"; achieved postwar full employment through inflation; and, by 1948, faced an impoverished world which could continue to buy the output of American factories and farms only if given dollars for the purpose by the American Government.

To assert that this situation left the world economy more unstable and

25 The seriously interested student and reader should dedicate himself to the exciting intellectual adventure (also fraught with political implications and perhaps with economic and social hope for the days to come) of reading and evaluating the writings of the late John Maynard Keynes. For a nontechnical presentation of the Marxist view, see Fritz Sternberg, The Coming Crisis (1947), and Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (revised edition, 1946). For a nontechnical exposition of the viewpoint of business leaders who are prepared to think in terms of facts rather than fictions, see Beardsley Ruml, Tomorrow's Business (1946), and Chester Bowles, Tomorrow without Fear (1946).
unbalanced than ever would be a masterpiece of understatement. Through the chaos and waste of war the crowded, urbanized communities of western Europe, in their unhappy halfway house between capitalism and socialism, had lost much of their capacity to produce the surplus goods and services (beyond the purchasing power of their own consumers) wherewith they had traditionally paid for food and raw materials from abroad. They had likewise lost much of their foreign market for the sale of such goods as they were able to produce. Most of the world was desperately impoverished and tended to buy what it could from the flood of commodities pouring forth from a vastly expanded American industry and agriculture. If Europe lacked means to pay for imports, without which millions of Europeans must starve, the U.S.A. lacked markets in which to sell exports, without which millions of Americans would have no work. The habits of nationalism and the schism between East and West forbade any genuinely international or global effort to resolve the dilemma.

At the risk of oversimplification, it is fair to say that the issue was met in 1945-49 by America giving goods away to Europe. American producers were, in the last analysis, paid in dollars by the U.S. Government out of funds derived from taxation, borrowing, credit inflation, or printing presses. European consumers, in so far as they were not objects of pure charity, paid their own governments in pounds, francs, lire, marks, etc., for what they received. But since the consumers could not produce, export, and sell enough of their own produce in the U.S.A. or in other markets to earn the dollars with which to pay the American producers and since they clearly could not borrow enough dollars from private American sources, the deficit had to be met from American public sources in the form of governmental loans, credits, and gifts of dollars—which, in effect, were used to pay American manufacturers, farmers, merchants, and workers for what was "sold" abroad.

On the successive devices for giving—e.g., Lend-Lease, UNRRA, "loans," the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, etc.—see Chap. XI. International long-term foreign investments, while difficult to estimate accurately, have declined since 1914. One authority, James W. Angell ("International Investment and Free Enterprise," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, May, 1947), estimates that British investments abroad totaled 19.5 billions of dollars in 1914, 18.2 in 1929, 22.9 in 1938, and 14.1 in 1946. Dutch investments were 2.0 in 1914, 2.3 in 1929, 4.8 in 1938, but only 1.5 in 1944. French investments declined from 8.6 in 1914 to 1.6 in 1944. World totals were estimated at 41.6 in 1914, 47.5 in 1929, 52.8 in 1938, and 38.7 in 1946. Only U.S. investments increased: 2.5 in 1914, 14.7 in 1929, 11.5 in 1938, 11.4 in 1944, and 20.3 in 1946. The latter figure, however, includes governmental as well as private investment. The trend of the times is toward smaller and smaller investments of private capital across frontiers and ever larger intergovernmental grants, most of which are in no sense "investments" or even "loans" but gifts or subsidies necessitated by considerations of charity, Realpolitik, or the need of maintaining export "sales" in order to postpone depression at home.
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This process kept Europe alive. It also resulted in full production and employment in the U.S.A., marked in 1947 by 60,000,000 jobs, by exports running at the rate of $19,000,000,000 annually (with a "favorable" balance of $1,000,000,000 per month),\(^{27}\) and by steadily rising prices which caused business to boom and, at the same time, progressively reduced the ability of consumers, both at home and abroad, to buy the fabulous output of the American business system.

Whether the resulting relationships be viewed in Keynesian terms of the balance of savings and investments, or in Marxian terms of the enrichment of the "bourgeoisie" and the impoverishment of the "proletariat," or in simple terms of ordinary bookkeeping, the conclusion is the same: Such a condition could not indefinitely continue without precipitating general bankruptcy and collapse. What form the debacle would take and precisely when it would manifest itself were unclear early in 1948. But it was abundantly clear to all with eyes to see that the weird relationships of production, distribution, and consumption suggested above must sooner or later produce an impasse. Only the most determined of optimists could take for granted the existence or emergence in government and business, on both sides of the Atlantic, of those qualities of global vision and courageously imaginative leadership which alone could avert breakdown or convert it into a point of departure for the building of a truly viable and hopeful world economy.

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Those who have been present at any deliberative assemblies of men will have observed how erroneous their opinions often are; and in fact, unless they are directed by superior men, they are apt to be contrary to all reason. But as superior men in corrupt republics (especially in periods of peace and quiet) are generally hated, either from jealousy or the ambition of others, it follows that the preference is given to what common error approves, or to what is suggested by men who are more desirous of pleasing the masses than of promoting the general good. When, however, adversity comes, then the error is discovered, and then the people fly for safety to those whom in prosperity they had neglected, as we shall show at length in its proper place. Certain events also easily mislead men who have not a great deal of experience, for they have in them so much that resembles truth that men easily persuade themselves that they are correct in the judgment they have formed upon the subject.—Niccolò Machiavelli, _The Discourses._

Poverty and war are the prime disorders of the Great Society in the 20th century, poisoning its parts and threatening the whole with putrescence and

\(^{27}\) In the month of October, 1947, U.S. exports totaled $1,225,700,000 while U.S. imports totaled only $491,500,000.
death. Each contributes to the ravages of the other in a grim pathology of malignancy. Behind a false glow of health and heroism, war wastes the soma and psyche of its victims, depriving them of substance and spirit and weakening their will and strength to recover from its effects. Impoverishment, in turn, drives sick communities to seek surcease from pain in the opiates and stimulants which make of arms and conquest a primrose path to the fires of hysteria, diabolism, and battle madness. The wiser among the attending physicians know full well that “political nationalism” and “economic nationalism” do not constitute an adequate diagnosis. Yet these names for the etiology of violence and want do suggest significant aspects of the total process of disease.

Such efforts as have been made to effect a cure and nurse the unhappy patient back to health have been directed toward mitigating the nationalistic fever and promoting international or global measures to accelerate circulation, improve digestion, and restore the metabolic balance of the body politic and the body economic. The melancholy tale of the war against war, ever futile and always renewed, has been dealt with elsewhere.28 The story of efforts at international economic cooperation through governmental action is scarcely happier, and for similar reasons. Yet it deserves sketching out, if only because life means hope and the doctors have not yet turned over the case irrevocably to the morticians, who wait eagerly in the anteroom. Such a survey can best proceed in sequence from the oldest and simplest to the latest and most ingenious remedies.

The Most-favored-nation Clause. The origins of neomercantilism and the increasing prevalence throughout the world of prohibitive tariff policies have been considered above. If protectionism is pushed to its logical limit, each State will exclude all imports from other States while it continues its efforts (obviously vain in such a situation) to market its own exports abroad. Under such circumstances, all international trade will be strangled, and all the national economies will be left to suffocate within their closed compartments. In point of fact, this state of affairs has never quite been reached, though the Western States seemed to be approaching it at the close of 1932. Normally, each government has a sufficient interest in keeping foreign markets open for its own nationals to induce it to keep open its own markets for foreigners, provided that the requisite quid pro quo can be secured. Here is a basis for bargaining and a reciprocal exchange of favors. If in a particular case another State cannot be induced to grant tariff concessions, discriminatory or penalty duties may be resorted to. If the other State retaliates in kind, a “tariff war” results until one side or the other yields and

28 See pp. 338ff.
strikes a bargain. As many such bargains and special arrangements can be entered into as there are States in the world and commodities entering into international trade.

Out of this situation there emerged at an early period the "most-favored-nation" clause of commercial treaties, as a partial solution of the problem. Commercial treaties, *i.e.*, agreements setting forth the conditions of trade between the two signatory States, are of great antiquity. In the ancient State Systems and in the medieval and early modern period of the Western State System, they usually consisted of special bargains between the parties. As trade expanded, the resulting confusion of bilateral favors and discriminations became increasingly burdensome. All States gradually recognized that this situation was advantageous to none and began incorporating into their commercial treaties reciprocal pledges whereby each signatory agreed to afford to the commerce of the other as favorable treatment as it granted to any "most favored" third State. The purpose of the most-favored-nation clause was to minimize special bargains and favors and to eliminate discrimination. To the degree to which States were bound by such clauses, general equality of commercial treatment was assured. Each State was bound to accord equal treatment in tariff duties and commercial regulations to the trade of all other States with which it had concluded such treaties. Some commercial treaties have gone beyond this and provided for "national treatment," *i.e.*, treatment of aliens as favorable as that granted to citizens. But national treatment has been limited for the most part to taxation and navigation rules and has little direct bearing on import or export duties.

The U.S.A. long adhered to the so-called "conditional," or "American," form of the most-favored-nation clause, in contrast to the "unconditional," or "European," form. Its first commercial treaty—that with France of February 6, 1778—granted reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment, "in respect of commerce and navigation . . . freely, if the concession was freely made, or on allowing the same compensation if the concession was conditional." The American form of the most-favored-nation clause opened the door wide to extensive discriminations and to a large number of special bargains. The American State Department always reserved the right to decide for itself what compensation was identical or equivalent. This interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause led to endless wrangling over "equivalence of compensation." The tariff history of the United States and of other States adhering to the conditional interpretation is filled with special bargains, inequalities of treatment, diplomatic protests and recriminations, and an amount of friction and misunderstanding out of all proportion to the advantages derived from this evasion of the fundamental purpose of most-favored-nation treatment.
In 1923 the United States abandoned the conditional form of the most-favored-nation clause in its new commercial treaties with Brazil and Germany and has since adhered to the European, or unconditional, form. Under this form, which is now almost universal, each party agrees to levy against the commerce of the other "no higher or other duties, conditions, or prohibitions" than are imposed on the same commodity imported from or exported to any other foreign country. Any favor granted to a third State "shall simultaneously and unconditionally, without request and without compensation, be extended" to the same commodity of the other signatory party. These provisions were incorporated in the usual language in Article 7 of the German-American Treaty, signed December 8, 1923, and proclaimed on October 14, 1925.

Each of the high contracting parties binds itself unconditionally to impose no higher or other duties or conditions and no prohibition on the importation of any article, the growth, produce, or manufacture, of the territories of the other than are or shall be imposed on the importation of any like article, the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country.

Each of the high contracting parties also binds itself unconditionally to impose no higher or other charges or other restrictions or prohibitions on goods exported to the territories of the other high contracting parties than are imposed on goods exported to any other foreign country.

Any advantage of whatsoever kind which either high contracting party may extend to any article, the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country shall simultaneously and unconditionally, without request and without compensation, be extended to the like article, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the other high contracting party.29

It should be observed that the most-favored-nation clause is aimed at preventing discriminations and has no effect whatever upon the height of tariff walls. Under its provisions a State may levy as high duties on imports as it likes or prohibit them altogether, so long as the duties or prohibitions are applied equally to all States enjoying most-favored-nation treatment. The application of duties is dealt with in commercial treaties, but the level of duties is ordinarily a "domestic question" beyond the control of other States. The most-favored-nation clause has been only partly effective in achieving even the limited objective of equality of treatment. Neighboring States still find it advantageous to make special bargains with one another involving discrimination against third States. Such discriminations can be

29 This article makes the same arrangement for all advantages accorded by either party to the nationals, vessels, or goods of third States but excepts from these obligations purely border traffic within a 10-mile zone on either side of the customs frontiers and likewise excepts the commerce of the United States with Cuba, Panama, and other dependencies.

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effected either by exceptions incorporated in treaties or by sundry legislative
and administrative expedients. Minute classifications of commodities in tariff
acts are sometimes resorted to. Or a State may impose quotas on imports
or limit foreign-exchange operations to attain the same objective. Universal
equality of treatment has never been achieved. Meanwhile, tariff walls have
risen steadily throughout the world.

The United States set the pace by enacting the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930. This Act was followed by foreign retaliation and by a catastrophic
decline in international trade. During the first six months of 1929 the U.S.A.
exported goods to the value of $2,623,200,000. During the same period of
1932, American exports amounted to only $841,800,000. American exports
thus fell 67.8% in this period, and imports fell 62.1%. During 1931 as
compared with 1930, American exports fell 36.9%, British exports 31.8%,
French 29.0%, German 20.2%, and Japanese 22.9%. Creditor countries
generally experienced a larger loss of exports than imports, whereas debtor
countries curtailed their imports by a larger percentage than their exports
decayed. On the American Revenue Act of 1932, additional import duties
were imposed on lumber, copper, coal, and oil. Britain resorted to “tempo-
rary” protectionism in the autumn of 1931 and on March 1, 1932, imposed a
general 10% ad valorem duty on imports, with other increases to follow as
a result of the agreements considered at the Imperial Economic Conference
at Ottawa during the summer. The French Government not only increased
its import duties but restricted imports by a system of quotas on a large
variety of manufactured and semimanufactured articles. On September 6,
1932, Germany adopted a new scale of tariff duties, in many cases 100% higher than those hitherto prevailing. Everywhere, among Great and small
Powers alike, similar prohibitions, quotas, licensing systems, foreign-ex-
change restrictions, and other insurmountable trade barriers were resorted
to, all in the face of such a rapid rate of decline in international trade as to
threaten its complete disappearance in the absence of a recovery of prices
and markets.

This situation, which presents in exaggerated form the same tendencies
operating in more normal times, led to a frenzied quest for salvation through
the same remedies (again in exaggerated form) attempted earlier. These rem-
edies may be classified into three categories: (1) purely national remedies,
consisting for the most part of carrying economic nationalism to its logical
conclusion; (2) international remedies through bargains of various kinds
among particular States or groups of States; (3) international remedies
through efforts at world-wide agreements among all States to deal with
world-wide problems.

The forms and purposes of purely national action have already been sug
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gested. Each national government strives to safeguard the domestic market for its producers by restricting imports. It may likewise grant favors or subsidies to exporters in the hope of retaining its foreign markets. But exports will vanish in proportion as imports are made impossible; for it is an axiom of international trade that he who does not buy, neither shall he sell. Retaliatory tariffs and restrictive measures on the part of other States will tend to destroy export markets. Each State is thus compelled to see its foreign trade approach the vanishing point and to have national economic self-sufficiency thrust upon it whether it will or no. In the period of the Great Depression the term "autarchy" came into general use in Europe to describe such a self-contained national economy. It need scarcely be pointed out that this solution tends toward the abolition of international trade and is acceptable only to States which are prepared to forego the advantages of geographical specialization and to accept lower living standards for their populations. In the world economy of the 20th century, no nation, however large and rich in resources, can sever its economic contacts with others without paying an enormous price. The U.S.A. is perhaps more nearly self-sufficient than any other country; but it is obliged to import tin, chromium, manganese, nickel, rubber, and dozens of other products not locally available in sufficient quantities to supply domestic needs. On the other hand, its economy is organized on the assumption that 20% of its wheat crop, 40% of its tobacco, 60% of its cotton, and considerable proportions of other products will be sold in foreign markets. It has often been pointed out that less than 10% of the total annual production of exportable American commodities is sold abroad, but this margin is just sufficient to make the difference between prosperity and depression. The U.S.A. could not dispense with its foreign markets without disorganizing completely its whole economic structure and returning to a standard of life far below that now prevailing. Smaller and poorer States would obviously suffer even more severely from efforts at achieving autarchy. The uneven distribution of basic raw materials and the economic interdependence of nations render this solution impossible. Those who advocate it preach a counsel of despair.

Customs Unions. If national action is inadequate, international action must be resorted to. Tariff bargains between individual States have long been part of the established commercial policy of nations. In periods of crisis, such bargains become more advantageous than ever; for when all States are raising barriers to trade, special arrangements between neighbors may be the means of economic survival. The most extreme form of such action is the customs union, in which two or more States abolish all tariffs between them and adopt a common tariff for outside States. Liechtenstein maintained a customs union with Austria-Hungary prior to 1914 and later
joined Switzerland in such an arrangement. Such unions have also existed between Italy and San Marino and between France and Monaco. Other instances are to be found in the relations between Poland and Danzig; France and the Saar; the city of Geneva and the French districts of Gex and Savoy; Syria and Palestine; and certain States of the Baltic region and of Latin America. Luxemburg had a customs union with Germany before 1914 and another with Belgium after 1918. In 1946-47, through a series of accords, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg ("Benelux") formed a customs union in which all tariffs among them were to be abolished over a period of years.

Projects for customs unions frequently fail because they seem to foreshadow political union between the parties, as did the German Zollverein of 1833 and the Austro-Hungarian union of 1851. On March 23, 1931, Austria and Germany announced a plan for a customs union in which each party would retain its political independence and other States would be invited to join. France, Italy, and the Little Entente opposed the project for political reasons and appealed to the League Council, which requested the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion as to the legality of the plan. On September 5, 1931, the Court held by vote of 8 to 7 that the scheme was illegal under the financial protocol of 1922 and the Treaty of St. Germain. Under French pressure, Berlin and Vienna abandoned their design. Austria reluctantly accepted a new League loan of $43,000,000 and agreed to abandon all plans for union with Germany for 20 years. The decision of the Court was perhaps legally correct. But the opposition of the Governments was politically and economically shortsighted since it helped to perpetuate German and Austrian impoverishment, further discredited the German Republic, contributed to the rise of Hitler, and caused many Germans and Austrians to conclude that political union, achieved if need be in defiance of the Powers, was the only possible path to economic collaboration.

Many bilateral or multilateral reductions of trade barriers short of a complete customs union have been attempted. On August 21, 1932, at the British Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa, agreements were signed among the Dominions (long committed to protectionism) and the United Kingdom (newly converted to trade barriers) for intraimperial quotas and preferences. On May 14, 1934, Italy, Austria, and Hungary signed eight agreements at Rome whereby Italy and Austria agreed to buy more Hungarian wheat, Hungary agreed to buy more industrial products from Italy and Austria, and all three States granted tariff preferences to one another. Such agreements may promote freer trade among the participants, but they tend to impose new barriers to trade between the signatories and outside States, since their advantages are necessarily restricted to the parties which...
expressly enter into them. The most-favored-nation clause is thus evaded and a regime of special bargains and discriminations restored.

This result, along with political considerations, caused the U.S.A. to take a dim view of the bilateral trade agreements entered into after 1945 by the U.S.S.R. with Sweden, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. In a completely socialized economy, where all foreign trade is a state monopoly (as in the U.S.S.R.), duties on imports have no economic significance but are at most a fiscal device. Goods are bought abroad only because they are needed in the operation of the planned economy. Goods are sold abroad only as a means of buying other goods. Under such conditions the most-favored-nation clause has no real meaning. Soviet trade pacts typically provide for the exchange of specified quantities of imports for specified quantities of exports. The effect, though not the form, of a customs union is achieved with respect to the commodities covered by intergovernmental contracts. American protests over such arrangements were futile—the more so as the U.S.A. refused to extend loans or credits to the States in the Soviet bloc and thereby left them no option but to maximize trade among themselves through special bargains.

Reciprocal Trade Agreements. One of the most ingenious and notable efforts to restore freedom of trade is found in the new commercial policy of the United States embodied in the Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934, which authorized the President for a period of three years to negotiate bilateral agreements for reciprocal reduction of tariffs, subject to termination or extension after three years' operation. In the agreements the President could increase or reduce established American tariff duties by not more than 50%. The reductions would be extended to other States having most-favored-nation agreements with Washington but might be withheld from countries discriminating against American goods. The Executive was thus given power to bargain with other governments for lower duties without departing from the spirit of the most-favored-nation clause and without the necessity of securing Congressional approval for each reduction or of submitting each agreement to the Senate before ratification.

The first agreement under the new Act was signed with Cuba and became effective on September 3, 1934. The U.S.A. reduced its tariff on Cuban sugar from 2 to 0.9 cent a pound and granted reductions on tobacco, rum, pineapples, and other Cuban products in return for Cuban reductions on American manufactures and foodstuffs. Because of Cuba's special relations with the United States, these advantages were not extended to outside States. On February 2, 1935, an agreement was signed with Brazil by which the United States agreed to keep 90.8% of its imports from Brazil on the free list and to reduce duties on Brazil nuts, castor beans, and manganese, while Brazil
cut duties on American automobiles, machinery, fruits, and oatmeal. This and the subsequent agreements were extended by Washington to other States having most-favored-nation treaties. Agreements were signed with Belgium, February 27, 1935; Colombia, September 13, 1935; Canada, November 15, 1935; Switzerland, January 9, 1936; Guatemala, April 24, 1936; France, May 6, 1936; Finland, May 18, 1936; Costa Rica, November 28, 1936; etc. By the beginning of the third Roosevelt Administration a score of such agreements had been signed. States which discriminated against American goods or subsidized exports—notably Germany, Japan, and Australia—were deprived of the advantages of the pacts or subjected to countervailing duties. The new policy stimulated trade and seemed to offer hope of reducing barriers by bilateral bargains within the framework of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment.

The original Act was renewed by Congress at intervals, though its future beyond 1948 was in some doubt by virtue of the fact that the Republicans, who won a majority in both Chambers in 1946, had voted heavily against it in 1945. Under its terms an impressive array of pacts were signed, with the complex agreements concluded at Geneva in November, 1947, marking the culmination of these hopeful developments. Despite the outcries of protectionists, some 2,000 lowered tariff schedules on almost 4,000 items, comprising 70% of dutiable imports, went into effect in the U.S.A. on January 1, 1948. Skeptics justifiably pointed out that the problem of world trade had become less one of reducing barriers than one of somehow alleviating the fundamental unbalance outlined in the preceding section. American policy makers, subject to possible reversal by Congress, were now dedicated to the promotion of a global commercial regime of relatively free trade, with the minimum of State controls, through general adoption of the principle of reciprocal and multilateral reduction of trade barriers. Other postwar steps toward this goal can best be understood through a brief consideration of antecedents.

Half a League Onward. One of the avowed objectives of the founders of the League of Nations was to enable the member States to use its procedures to promote freer world trade and international monetary and financial stability. In October, 1920, the Council established the Financial and Economic Committee, which in turn prepared the World Economic Conference held in Geneva, May 4-27, 1927. The Conference worked through three committees: on commerce, on agriculture, and on industry. M. Loucheur, whose views were shared by the Conference as a whole, pointed out that the delegates could do no more than recommend the facilitation of trade and the removal of prohibitions on imports and exports. "Neither this Conference nor any other body can override State sovereignty. This Conference can only
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provide the means of economic disarmament, it cannot achieve it.” In the final report and resolutions of the Conference, the delegates declared unanimously that “each nation’s commerce is today being hampered by barriers established by other nations, resulting in a situation, especially in Europe, that is highly detrimental to the general welfare.” They further declared that “the time has come to put a stop to the growth of customs tariffs and to reverse the direction.” These prescriptions were in every case merely recommendations, which were largely ignored by the governments of the participating States.

The subsequent history of League endeavors in this direction is a tale of almost unrelieved failure. During 1932, efforts were initiated, in the various European chancelleries, to summon a second World Economic Conference. It was clear from past experience, however, that nothing whatever could be achieved by the conference method if the conferees were unwilling to make concessions in the interests of an agreement on constructive measures. Since no general willingness to modify policies of economic nationalism was observable, the Conference was repeatedly postponed. In July the United States agreed to participate, only on condition that there be no discussion of tariff, debts, and reparations—a demand which would make the Conference resemble a wedding without the bride or, more appropriately, a funeral without the corpse. The Conference met in London in June, 1933, following the conclusion of a temporary world-wide tariff truce, but soon broke up in complete disagreement and futility because the United States, though originally conceding that monetary and tariff problems were inseparable, refused to limit the depreciation of its currency inaugurated in the preceding March. Without a currency agreement, other Powers refused to reduce tariffs. Efforts to reduce trade barriers by world-wide international agreement were now practically abandoned, pending a restoration of some stable international medium of exchange.

Golden Hoard. The breakdown of the gold standard contributed to commercial chaos among the nations. Before 1914, almost all countries had currencies convertible into gold at fixed rates. They could be exchanged for one another at rates reflecting their gold value. When supply and demand in foreign-exchange marts fluctuated with variations of imports and exports, balances were met by gold movements. If State A exported to B more than it imported, B’s debts would be met by sending gold to A. This access of gold, in theory and to some degree in practice, would tend to cause an expansion of currency and credit in A, and B’s loss of gold would provide a corresponding contraction within its own economy. In the sequel, price levels in A would tend to rise and those in B to fall. This in turn would encourage buyers in A to purchase from B and would discourage sellers in A from
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selling to $B$; conversely, $B$'s sellers could increase profits by greater sales to $A$ because of rising prices, and $B$'s buyers would normally buy less from $A$ for the same reason. Thus an equilibrium in trade would be restored by the effects upon prices of the gold movements caused by the initial disequilibrium. The exchanges would return to par, and gold movements would cease. The international gold standard functioned effectively before 1914 without large gold movements so long as gold could be freely bought, sold, and transferred from country to country and so long as governments did not interfere extensively with foreign-exchange rates, gold movements, price levels, and imports and exports of goods.

The necessary conditions for the successful operation of the gold standard disappeared with World War I. Belligerent governments forbade or controlled gold exports and ceased to exchange paper currency for gold. After the war the gold standard was restored—at the prewar level by Britain in 1925, at one-fifth of the old level by France in 1926, and at various other levels by other States. Here was the first element of maladjustment. Sterling was overvalued; i.e., British costs and prices remained high in relationship to costs and prices elsewhere, with the result that British exports were discouraged, imports were encouraged, and Britain lost gold. Francs were undervalued; i.e., French prices were low, with the franc worth 5 cents in gold instead of 20 cents as in 1914, with the result that imports fell, exports increased, and France accumulated huge gold stocks, which failed to raise internal prices proportionately or to lower prices in the countries whence the gold came. Governments and central banks, moreover, were anxious to promote domestic stability of price levels and were reluctant to permit gold movements to influence prices. Discount rates were changed to counteract the natural course of events. Britain failed to deflate her currency and price level to a point which would compensate for the pound's overvaluation. The United States with its enormous gold holdings failed to inflate currency and prices to a corresponding degree. Tariffs and other trade barriers made impossible a restoration of equilibrium through increased imports in the countries with high price levels and increased exports from countries with low prices. In addition, a large volume of short-term international obligations grew up because of uncertainty about long-term investments, which were difficult to liquidate readily. The rapid movements of these obligations from country to country during each economic or political crisis contributed to instability of exchange rates.

The impact of the Great Depression on this already precarious structure was disastrous. In countries where prices fell first, compensatory exports could not be developed because of tariffs abroad. Short- and long-term investments were withdrawn in panic, with resultant gold losses. To keep cur-
rencies convertible into gold and to permit continued gold exports meant the continued fall of prices in an endless spiral of deflation, with consequent economic prostration and social and political unrest. Governments, by necessity or by choice, suspended gold payments and forbade gold exports, thus permitting their currencies to fall on the exchanges. Depreciation of currencies tended to raise domestic prices and thus halt deflation. But since domestic prices usually increased less rapidly than exchange rates fell, entrepreneurs in countries with depreciated currencies could undersell competitors in world markets, with a resultant expansion of exports, a reduction of imports, a cessation of the outflow of gold, and a stimulus to an inflow of gold. Countries with currencies still on gold found their markets disappearing, their exports declining despite subsidies and other aid, their imports increasing despite new tariffs and quotas, their gold flowing out, and their national economies sinking ever deeper into a morass of seemingly endless deflation. The "automatic" balancing mechanisms no longer functioned because free competition, free trade, free gold movements were all at an end. In order to halt deflation at home by raising domestic price levels and to meet competition in foreign markets by lowering the prices of their goods in relationship to prices elsewhere, governments still on gold abandoned it and followed the procession in depreciating currencies. In the race to depreciate, trade advantages lay with the States whose currencies fell most rapidly.

This general formula applies with few qualifications to the actual course of events. In the summer of 1931 the political crisis, engendered by the Austro-German customs union project and the financial difficulties of the Kredit-Anstalt of Vienna, led to large-scale withdrawals of foreign capital from Central Europe, initiated by politically inspired French withdrawals designed to bring pressure to bear on the Austrian and German Governments. Since British banks held Central European obligations in large amounts, the rapid fall in the prices of these obligations menaced the solvency of London's financial institutions and precipitated a panic withdrawal of funds from London. Credits advanced by the Bank of France and the Federal Reserve System failed to stem the tide. Faced with huge gold losses and catastrophic deflation, the British Government suspended the gold standard on September 21, 1931. All the Dominions, except Canada and South Africa, followed suit, as did the Scandinavian countries and many Latin-American States, constituting the "sterling bloc." The pound fell about 40% in terms of gold currencies. British exports increased, and domestic deflation was halted. In December, 1931, Japan abandoned gold and allowed the yen to depreciate 66% (June, 1935), with a resultant export boom and loud protests from foreign competitors. In the U.S.A. the banking crisis of March,
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1933, was followed by the suspension of gold payments. The dollar fell, prices rose, deflation ceased, prosperity seemed at last to be just around the corner. President Roosevelt was therefore unwilling at the London Conference to stabilize currency. The Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934, authorized the President to devalue the dollar from 40 to 50%. On January 31 an executive proclamation fixed the value of the dollar at 59.6% of its former gold value. With this depreciation of 41%, American exports could compete once more with British and Japanese goods in world markets. On March 29, 1935, Belgium abandoned gold and depreciated her currency 25%. Following steady losses of gold, France followed suit on September 26, 1936, and depreciated the franc 30% from 6.63 to 4.66 cents. Switzerland and the Netherlands did likewise. Italy depreciated the lira 41%. Germany, possessing almost no gold and imbued with a nation-wide fear of renewed inflation, clung desperately to a gold standard which was wholly fictitious. By the close of 1936 the gold standard had ceased to exist as an international medium of exchange.

In October, 1936, the American Government expressed its willingness to buy gold in the world market at a fixed price of $35 per ounce as compared with $20 before depreciation. This policy, coupled with America's "favorable" balance of trade, produced a fantastic result. Since the world purchasing power of $35 was greater than that of an ounce of gold translated into any other currency, most of the world's gold gravitated to the United States. In the 1920's, Americans sold huge export surpluses abroad without buying any comparable quantities of imports through a heavy export (i.e., "investment") of private capital to foreign markets. In the 1930's this outflow of capital came to an end. Export surpluses continued to grow, however, by virtue of imports of gold. Output of the world's gold mines was stimulated from $707,000,000 (paper) in 1934 to $1,000,000,000 (paper) in 1939. The French gold reserves declined from $5,445,000,000 in December, 1934, to $3,191,000,000 in November, 1939; the Italian from $518,000,000 to $193,000,000; the Japanese from $394,000,000 to $164,000,000; the German from $32,000,000 to $29,000,000. By the end of 1940, American gold stocks had increased to $20,000,000,000, representing about 80% of the world's monetary gold. This growing hoard was for the most part buried in the hills of Kentucky and strongly guarded—in apparent imitation of the giant Fafnir who concealed the stolen Rheingold in a cave and transformed himself into a dragon to protect it. Whether America's gold hoard, like Fafnir's, would tempt some Siegfried to slay the guardian was uncertain. Its utility was not greater than that of the riches of Fafnir. It might indeed prove as much of a curse to its possessors as did the gold of the Ring of the Nibelung—if, as
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was probable, all other lands ceased to use gold in any form for currency purposes.

Meanwhile, efforts to stabilize currencies by agreement (like the Anglo-French-American accord of September 26, 1936) offered no hope of a restoration of the international gold standard or even of fixed ratios of exchange. The outbreak of war in 1939 led to new Anglo-French currency arrangements but in the sequel demolished the remnants of what had once been a viable system of free international exchange. In no country was paper money any longer convertible into gold. All currencies were “managed”—i.e., controlled—along with credit and foreign exchange, by political authorities, not by private banks or by the fluctuating needs of a competitive market. This at least promised to be a permanent innovation.

Intergovernmental Debts. Nothing revealed more clearly the breakdown of the old world economy than the fate of the huge intergovernmental debts left over from World War I. These obligations fell into two categories: (1) loans among the Allied and Associated Governments for the purpose of prosecuting the war; (2) indemnity payments, or “reparations,” imposed upon Germany by the victors. The total volume of these obligations was entirely unprecedented, and the economic and financial problems involved in their payment were of unparalleled magnitude and complexity. The story of 15 years of negotiations and controversy over inter-Allied debts and reparations can be conveniently divided into five periods: (1) from the Peace Conference, 1919, to the Dawes Plan, 1924; (2) from the Dawes Plan to the Young Plan, 1929; (3) from the Young Plan to the Hoover moratorium, 1931; (4) from the Hoover moratorium to the Lausanne Conference, 1932; (5) from the Lausanne Conference to the final collapse of the whole debt structure.

It is essential in the first instance to emphasize certain elementary economic facts regarding intergovernmental debt payments which were familiar enough to economists in 1919 but which were lost sight of by diplomats and politicians because of ignorance or the dictates of political expediency. If the government of State A is obliged to pay money to the government of State B, its first problem is that of raising the necessary funds within State A out of taxes or loans. State A’s ability to accomplish this is obviously the primary measure of “capacity to pay.” But the raising of the funds in State A does not of itself ensure payment. The funds will be in the currency of State A, but State B wishes payment in its own currency. If State B is willing to accept goods in payment, State A may place the funds at its disposal for the purchase of such goods within A’s frontiers. They may then be transported to B, and the obligation will be discharged by this transaction. In all probability, however, State B will refuse goods in any large quantity,
for an inflow of goods will lower prices and cause State B's producers to
demand protection from such a catastrophe. State B's consumers will usu-
ally have nothing to say in reaching this decision. At the same time, State
B's politicians and taxpayers will demand payment. State A must then pay
in gold. But gold stocks are quite insufficient to meet payments of the mag-
nitude of those in question. State A will, in fact, pay in bills of exchange,
ultimately redeemable in gold, which are normally the only international
medium and measure of value. With the funds it has raised in its own cur-
rency, the government of State A will purchase bills or drafts payable in
B's currency, or in the currency of some third State, and ultimately redeem-
able in gold. Such bills will be available for purchase in State A in propor-
tion as State A's exporters have sold abroad more than its importers have
bought. Unless State A maintains a "favorable" balance of trade of sufficient
magnitude to meet debt payments, its government cannot transfer funds to B
by purchasing foreign exchange, without upsetting the exchange rates to its
own disadvantage. If bills on B are not available in sufficient amount, the
purchases by the government of A will increase their price, i.e., will raise
the value of B's currency as measured in A's currency on the international
exchanges. A's currency will decline in international-exchange value; and
A's whole monetary system will become demoralized, along with its com-
merce and industry. In the last analysis, payment can be made only in goods
—if not in goods shipped to B, then in goods sold to outside States in excess
of what is purchased. If international payments are not to prove disastrous
to the payer, they must involve an export surplus. But an export surplus on
the part of the payer is likely to be viewed with alarm by the payee, who
erects tariff walls to keep out the payer's goods and resents any invasion
of outside foreign markets by the payer in competition with his own exports.
Here, in brief, is the riddle of international debts. By comparison, the old
problem of eating one's cake and having it too is easy of solution.

The implications of this dilemma were scarcely appreciated at the Paris
Peace Conference. Fantastic figures running into hundreds of billions of
dollars were bandied about, but the absurdity of expecting Germany alone
to pay for the colossal costs of the conflict was recognized, even by Clemenceau and Lloyd George. It was accordingly decided to leave the exact amount
to be fixed by "experts" and to impose only a blanket obligation on Germany
in the treaty.

The indemnity was to be disguised as "reparations," on the popular as-
sumption that Germany, as the aggressor, had inflicted the war upon her
innocent victims. Reparation payments were to include all civilian losses, de-
struction of nonmilitary property, and military pensions. Germany was like-
wise required to make certain payments in kind and to pay 20,000,000,000
gold marks by May 1, 1921. The so-called “Dawes Plan,” which was accepted on August 16, 1924, following the Ruhr adventure, was a stopgap arrangement, designed to give Germany a breathing spell without offending French sensibilities. It did not reduce the total of Germany’s obligations or fix the number of annual payments. It did provide for the evacuation of the Ruhr, for foreign control over German finances, and for a reduced schedule of annual installments. This agreement temporarily removed the problem from the sphere of acute diplomatic controversy and paved the way for the Briand-Stresemann period of Franco-German rapprochement, marked by the Locarno Treaties of 1925, the admission of Germany to the League in 1926, the formation of the Franco-German steel cartel, and the final evacuation of the Rhineland in June of 1930.

Meanwhile there had been much friction over the inter-Allied debts, followed by the conclusion of a series of debt-funding agreements. The Soviet Government repudiated the Russian war debts on the ground, among others, that Russia had not shared in the fruits of victory. The other debtor governments manifested no enthusiasm for meeting their obligations. No interest or principal was paid to the U.S.A. until 1923. The Allied Governments in general, and the French Government in particular, took the view that the debts should be canceled, since America had entered the war belatedly, grown wealthy therefrom, and suffered negligible losses. The Allied taxpayers were persuaded of the injustice of repayment and, in the event that payment was demanded, were disposed to support policies to wrest the necessary sums from Germany. In 1922 Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, offered to reduce Britain’s claims on Germany, France, and Italy to the amount demanded from Great Britain by the United States. The implication of this proposal was that general cancellation might be made possible by American generosity.

These and similar suggestions fell upon deaf ears in America. Payment in full was demanded by the new Republican Administration. Secretary of State Hughes denied that any connection existed between the Allied debts to the United States and German reparation payments—a legal fiction, completely divorced from financial realities, to which the American Government consistently attempted to adhere. The Foreign Debt Funding Act, passed by Congress and approved February 9, 1922, created a Debt Commission of five members to refund or convert principal and interest into bonds “in such form . . . as shall be deemed for the best interest of the United States of America,” provided that the maximum time of maturity should not exceed June 15, 1947, and the minimum rate of interest should be 4½%. These conditions proved unworkable; they were subsequently modified, with Congressional approval. In 1921, pressure had been brought to bear upon
the debtors by the State Department through a boycott on private loans to governments refusing to refund their obligations. Negotiations commenced first with Great Britain and were pursued with other debtors on the basis of "capacity to pay." The terms of the Liberty Loan Acts and of the Foreign Debt Funding Act were departed from. The principal sums were kept intact, but the reduction of interest rates and the spreading of the payments over a period of 62 years amounted to a cancellation of a substantial part of the original obligations. On a 4½% interest rate, the total indebtedness would have amounted to almost $33,000,000,000. Nearly $11,000,000,000 of this total was canceled, since the debt-funding agreement provided for total principal and interest payments of $22,188,484,000.

The various agreements were signed between 1923 and 1926, and during the same period the Allied Governments adjusted their debts to one another. The U.S.A. refused to deal with the debtors collectively and applied no consistent principles in negotiating the agreements, apart from the vague criterion of "capacity to pay." Britain, which was the first to offer to pay, was charged 3.3% interest. France, which delayed longest, was charged only 0.4%. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania paid 3.3%, Belgium 1.7%, and Jugoslavia 1%.

No sooner were these agreements concluded than it became apparent that Germany could not meet the Dawes Plan annuities, even out of new American (private) loans. A new committee of experts, headed by Owen D. Young, was appointed; and, after months of arduous and acrimonious negotiations, its report—the Young Plan—was accepted by the Powers on June 9, 1929. The Plan was designed to be "complete and final." Total German indebtedness was scaled down to $26,500,000,000, with payments to run until 1988. With interest figured at 5½%, the principal of the German debt would be about $8,800,000,000 under this scheme. Germany was to pay variable annuities, ranging from 1,707,900,000 gold marks in 1930-31 to 2,428,800,000 gold marks in 1965-66. The payments were so adjusted that the sums owing to the U.S.A. by the Allies would equal 65% of the annual German payment. The Reparation Commission was abolished, and a Bank for International Settlements was created to handle reparation transactions. Germany recovered financial autonomy and was made responsible for transfers, with a right to postpone transfers or payments for a period not exceeding two years, subject to investigation by a special Advisory Committee. With slight modifications, the Plan was approved at the Conference at The Hague of August, 1929, and was incorporated into a final Act, signed at The Hague on January 20, 1930.

These "final" settlements proved to be no more final than their prede-
cessors. Whether the payments could have been made had “prosperity” continued to prevail is an academic question. Germany borrowed more in private loans between 1924 and 1930 than she paid in reparations. The whole process was one whereby the American Government collected money paid to the Allies by Germany out of funds borrowed from American bankers and American purchasers of foreign securities. The enormous sums involved represented no transfers of tangible goods and services across frontiers, but only the scribbling of the mad bookkeepers of frenzied international finance. When this process of paying debts by incurring still greater debts came to its inevitable end in the crash of 1929-31, the whole intergovernmental debt structure collapsed, along with private credit.

American private lending to Germany came to an end in 1930. Symptoms of the Depression appeared in Germany as early as the summer of 1928. The stream of American capital was already drying up as the result of the diversion of funds for speculative purposes during the American stock-market boom. The Wall Street debacle in the autumn of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression were followed by widespread bankruptcy and unemployment. By the spring of 1931 it was clear that a gigantic financial panic was impending in Germany and that all debts, public and private, were jeopardized. Germany could borrow no more, and her foreign creditors were liquidating both short-term credits and long-term investments. Further reparation payments were out of the question. Allied debt payments to the United States likewise became impossible in the face of budgetary deficits and disturbed exchange rates.

In this critical situation, the Hoover moratorium proposal was announced, June 20, 1931. The panic among Germany’s creditors had reached such proportions that it seemed clear that most of the German banks would be unable to open on Monday morning, June 22. American bankers brought pressure to bear on Washington. After receipt of an appeal from President von Hindenburg and hurried consultations with financiers, officials, and Congressmen, President Hoover announced his plan, probably with considerable reluctance in view of Congressional and popular opposition to any reduction or cancellation of war debts. In his announcement he proposed “the postponement during one year of all payments on intergovernmental debts, reparations, and relief debts, both principal and interest, of course not including obligations of governments held by private parties. Subject to confirmation by Congress, the American Government will postpone all payment upon the debts of foreign governments to the American Government payable during the fiscal year beginning July 1 next, conditional on a like postponement for one year of all payments on intergovernmental debts owing the important creditor Powers.” The announcement listed the Senators
and Representatives who had sanctioned the plan, mentioned Messrs. Dawes and Young as having approved, and sought to soothe provincial opposition by presenting the scheme as a step toward the restoration of prosperity. The old formulas were reiterated once more:

The repayments of debts due to us from the Allies for the advances for war and reconstruction were settled upon a basis not contingent upon German reparations or related thereto. Therefore, reparations necessarily wholly a European problem with which we have no relation. I do not approve in any remote sense of the cancellation of the debts to us.

In December, 1931, the American Congress refused to act upon President Hoover’s recommendation that the World War Debt Funding Commission be reestablished. It ratified the moratorium but declared that it did not approve, in any remote sense, of the cancellation or reduction of the debts and that its action was not to be construed as foreshadowing any future modification of this policy. The Allied Governments were persuaded to sign agreements for the repayment of the postponed installments in annual sums at 4% interest, to be remitted over a 10-year period—presumably in addition to the regular installments falling due under the debt-funding agreement. When the moratorium year expired on June 30, 1932, no new arrangements had been concluded, despite the fact that the debtors were even less able to pay than they had been a year previously.

German reparations, however, were at long last wiped out, albeit conditionally, by the Lausanne Conference of June-July, 1932. The European Governments were given to understand by Washington that any readjustment of the inter-Allied debts must be preceded by a solution of the reparations question. Such a readjustment must be brought about by the European Powers, and the United States refused to take any part in their deliberations. The Lausanne accords made no mention of the inter-Allied debts, but a supplementary “gentlemen’s agreement” of July 7 provided that ratification should be contingent upon a satisfactory settlement with the United States. This arrangement was apparently insisted upon by France. Herriot expressed his intention of not submitting the accords to Parliament for ratification until favorable trans-Atlantic developments should have occurred. “What must be clearly understood is that the link is now definitely established between the settlement of reparations and the solution of the debt problem with relation to the United States. Everything is now subordinated to an agreement with America.”

The State Department expressed its pleasure at the Lausanne accords but declared that “on the question of war debts owing to the United States by the European Governments, there is no change in the attitude of the Ameri-
can Government” (press release of July 9, 1932). In a letter to Senator Borah, President Hoover declared on July 14, “While I do not assume it to be the purpose of any of these agreements to effect combined action of our debtors, if it shall be so interpreted, then I do not propose that the American people shall be pressed into any line of action or that our policies shall be in any way influenced by such a combination, either open or implied.”

The zenith of futilitarianism was reached when Washington insisted on excluding these problems from the agenda of the proposed World Economic Conference as the price of its participation. Out of deference to the American view, the official invitation declared that “the questions of reparations, of debts, and of specific tariff rates (as distinguished from tariff policy) will be excluded from the scope of the Conference.”

The end was now at hand. European requests for postponement of payments due on December 15, 1932, led to a futile conference between President Hoover and President-elect Roosevelt and to an exchange of notes between Washington and foreign capitals. On December 15 Britain paid $95,550,000 in gold bars. Italy, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland also paid; but France, Belgium, Poland, Estonia, and Hungary defaulted on payments totaling $24,996,511.85. Congressional and public insistence on payment in full tied the hands of the new President and made impossible any agreement for reduced payments, with the result that all payments were soon suspended. President Roosevelt accepted small “token” payments from a number of debtors in June, 1933. Others defaulted. Only Finland paid in full. More tokens and defaults followed in December. Even token payments ceased after the passage by Congress in April, 1934, of Senator Hiram Johnson’s bill to forbid private American loans to defaulting governments. The Attorney General ruled that States which had made no payments, including the U.S.S.R., were defaulters under the Act but that Britain, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland were not defaulters and would not be so regarded if they paid in full the installments due on June 15. Following labored exchanges of notes, all the debtors defaulted in toto on the appointed day, save Finland, which paid its installment of $166,538. This was all the Treasury received out of $174,647,439.19 due, with $303,196,205.26 in accrued installments unpaid. On December 15, 1934, the U.S.A. received $228,538 from Finland and nothing from the other debtors. After that date only Finland stubbornly persisted in making payments until Congress in 1940 suspended Finland’s obligations. German reparations were dead. Inter-Allied debts were dead. The American war debts were dead. The collapse of the intergovernmental debt structure of the 1920’s was thus
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complete, thanks to the persistence of attitudes and policies making payments impossible.

This belated liquidation of intergovernmental obligations was not followed, however, by any sane reordering of international economic relations. On the contrary, it coincided with the growth of autarchy and with the swift descent of most of the capitalist economies toward complete breakdown. But a “cure” was at long last discovered, first by Adolf Hitler and Hjalmar Schacht. It enabled the German Government, and eventually others, to revive the capital goods industries, abolish unemployment, restore prosperity, and spend money in ever larger amounts. The cure consisted in colossal armament programs in preparation for Armageddon. Men who lacked wit and will to abolish poverty and achieve plenty through a reordering of resources and labor to serve human needs found it easy to attain both objectives by devoting resources and labor to preparations for war. International trade became more and more a weapon of Realpolitik. National economies became more and more military economies, “socialist” rather than “capitalist” in their controls and their incentives to productivity.

The tribes of men, having reduced themselves to beggary by the efforts of each to enrich itself at the expense of others, refused to abandon old ways and meet new problems with imagination. As beggars, they once more made themselves rich—or fancied themselves rich—by beating idle plowshares into swords and idle pruning hooks into spears. At length they again devoted themselves wholeheartedly to mutual slaughter and destruction.

New Beginnings. For reasons already discussed, the impact of World War II on the world economy was far more destructive than that of the first general holocaust of the 20th century. The task of grappling with chaos largely fell to the U.S.A. Many of the follies and fallacies of the long armistice were avoided. A new structure of international economic and financial collaboration was reared. Its details are far too intricate, baffling, and debatable for brief exposition. Its utility and prospects were becoming increasingly doubtful as these words were written. Its general shape must nevertheless be outlined.

Apart from the meeting of extraordinary emergencies (which were assumed to be abnormal but soon became so normal as to cease to be extraordinary), American economic foreign policy during and after hostilities presupposed the possibility of achieving a world economy characterized by stable currencies, low tariffs, expanding markets for private enterprise, and a creative and unimpeded flow of commerce and investment over the globe. In the matter of intergovernmental financial transactions, the cruder errors

30 Cf. Thomas Brockway, Battles without Bullets: The Story of Economic Warfare (Foreign Policy Association, 1939).
of earlier years were eschewed. There was no important volume of borrowing by belligerents from private sources abroad. The U.S.A. financed and supplied its allies through Lend-Lease, the "master agreements" (of which the first was signed with Britain in February, 1942) providing that eventual settlements should be made in such wise as not to impose burdens on trade. Despite "reverse Lend-Lease" and subsequent repayment for certain items, almost all of the $50,000,000,000 extended in this fashion became gifts. Under the new dispensation, reparations from the vanquished were exacted in goods, not in money.\textsuperscript{31} Despite bitter wrangling among the victors over the appropriate kinds and amounts of deliveries, the idiotic drama of 1920-30 was not reenacted.

Under Hull, Stettinius, Byrnes, and Marshall, the Department of State pursued assiduously the objectives of stability and plenty through reduction of impediments on commerce and investment and sundry devices to promote economic collaboration. Since there was plainly no hope of a restoration of the international gold standard or of any large-scale flow of American private capital abroad, it was necessary to promote exchange stability and productive investment through intergovernmental action. At Bretton Woods, N. H., delegates and experts of 44 governments met, July 1-22, 1944, under the Presidency of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Lord Keynes and Harry White both playing a major role in planning. The result was the creation of two complex institutions: the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.\textsuperscript{32} The former, with a capital of $8,800,000,000 (of which the U.S.A. contributed $2,750,000,000), was designed to promote stability in exchanges by making available to all member States limited access to a pool of monetary resources for the purpose of meeting temporary deficits and minimizing the monetary effects of unbalances in international trade. The Bank, with a capital of $9,100,000,000 (of which the U.S.A. contributed $3,175,000,000), was designed to underwrite international investments, and in some cases to engage directly in investment, through a pooling of capital resources. The Fund, ideally, might have eventuated in a world currency to replace gold, with all international accounts carried in "bancor" (Lord Keynes's proposal) or "unitas" (Mr. White's invention). The Bank, ideally, might have become a global planning agency for productive investment of capital.

Neither of these ideals was attained, partly because of the timidity of the

\textsuperscript{31} See Chap. X.

delegates who devised the institutions, partly because of the magnitude of
global economic disorders after 1945, and partly because of the determina-
tion of the State Department to use both agencies as weapons of the new
“dollar diplomacy.” After some hesitation, the U.S.S.R. decided to abstain
from participation in both institutions. After protracted negotiations, the
final terms upon which they were linked with the U.N. were of such a char-
acter as to make them less international agencies of world reconstruction
than instruments of American foreign policy—with that policy concerned
less with the well-being of the peoples of the world than with the waging
of “cold war” on the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. Another hopeful endeavor
toward a sane reordering of international economic and financial relations
was thereby deprived of most of its usefulness by virtue of the imperatives
of economic nationalism. Under these circumstances, which promised to be
constant in 1948 and thereafter, any discussion of the structure and function-
ing of the Bank and Fund would be entirely “academic,” a term equivalent
in American semantics to “irrelevant,” “visionary,” and “crackpot.”

Similar considerations doomed to frustration the parallel American at-
ttempt to promote “free trade” through international action. In preparation
for, and during the course of, the Geneva negotiations of 1947 for reciprocal
reduction of tariffs, the U.S.A. sponsored the establishment of an Inter-
national Trade Organization (ITO) to study, discuss, and recommend na-
tional policies calculated to promote freer trade. A General Conference met
in Havana in November, 1947, to bring the new institution into being. Its
objectives were admirable. Its platitudes were mellifluous. Its power to induce
or compel adherence by national governments to its purposes was negligible. Its
purposes themselves had become tangential to the economic woes afflicting
most of mankind.

Illusions and Realities. A sober consideration of the parlous state of
production and distribution throughout the world economy in 1948 sug-
gested that none of the arrangements thus far devised to stimulate recovery,
stability, and prosperity was in the least likely to achieve the avowed pur-
poses of its proponents. Disease cannot be cured by alleviating symptoms
rather than dealing with causes. International efforts to reduce trade bar-
riers, achieve monetary equilibrium, and promote investment cannot achieve
their objectives so long as nothing effective is done to remove the sources
of the paralysis of investment, unbalance of exchanges, and decline of
trade. These disorders are fruits of war. A world community whose member
sovereignties are still dedicated to anticipations of, and preparation for, war

88 See “International Trade Organization” by Grant S. McClellan, F.P.A. Reports,
Mar. 15, 1946.
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cannot conceivably cope with the economic consequences of war, past and prospective. These disorders are also due to the cessation, or at least diminution, of the fabulous tempo of expansion—of population, markets, productive and distributive facilities, and opportunities for the profitable employment of land, labor, and capital—which the Western world experienced during the first century following the Industrial Revolution.

If the analysis attempted in the preceding pages has any validity, it points to the conclusion that neomercantilism, inflation and deflation of currencies, and the decline of investment are all attributable, not only to patriotic profiteering, power politics, and the assumption of violence, but also to the crisis of capitalism in its mature phase. No remedy is possible, nor can any escape from ultimate prostration be found, save under two alternative conditions: (1) the displacement of capitalism by a radically different system for the production and distribution of goods and services, offering greater promise of stability and progress; (2) the renovation of capitalism in such wise as to make possible a resumption of the steady expansion of enterprise, commerce, and investment characteristic of the 19th century. The former solution has been embraced in full by Russia and in part by Britain and western Europe. To all Americans committed to "free enterprise" and the profit system, this choice is anathema. The second alternative, if it is to be realized, calls for a type of American leadership, in both business and politics, which was conspicuous by its absence in the years immediately following World War II.

In 1948 the American leaders who displayed some grasp of the exigencies of the times were either dead (Wendell Willkie, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John Winant), denied all access to public office (Chester Bowles and Sumner Welles), or held up to ridicule and insult by most politicians and pressmen (Henry A. Wallace). Homo americanus of the Truman era preferred to believe that capitalism could be saved by combating socialist and Communist sin; denouncing all public control of business enterprise, except that designed to enhance profits; fighting organized labor; maximizing unearned income; promoting inflation; subsidizing Fascism in China, Turkey, Greece, and Latin America; singing hymns to monopoly, parading as "free enterprise"; pinning the "Red" label on all who hinted at the desirability of a different approach to the grave issues of the day; and preparing for a holy war against the wickedness of Marxist Muscovy. No amount of logical demonstration that these procedures would spell not the salvation but the death of capitalism seemed likely to alter the views of the magnates of business, government, and the press—and of a befuddled electorate whose members were disposed to believe what they were told so long as wages were in-
creasing, profits were climbing, and everyone was happily engaged in getting his while the getting was good.

In fact, a wholly different orientation toward national and international economic problems was called for if capitalism was to avoid catastrophe. The essence of the cure, inescapably, had to be sought in methods of promoting a new era of economic expansion on a global scale. An economy motivated by private profit flourishes only through growth. Contraction and stagnation threaten it with death. Expansion called for business statesmanship to cut costs and prices and to sacrifice temporary gain in order to enable workers and consumers all over the earth to support an ever larger volume of business. It also called for government action to plan and direct a world-wide expansion of production and consumption, without regard to political or ideological motivations, through purposeful investment of capital to develop resources and raise living standards in the impoverished and underprivileged regions of the planet. In the absence of such expansion, no amount of tinkering with commercial policies, exchange problems, or politically inspired programs of relief and recovery could achieve the ends which all professed to desire.

To outline the specific measures required for such a program seems (at the time of writing) to be little more than a withdrawal from the world. Those obsessed with national power and private profit close their minds to all proposals for world government or for a global economy of abundance. In the America of 1947-48 such appeals were either ignored or greeted with indignation. Henry A. Wallace, almost the sole surviving heir of the vision of Roosevelt and Willkie, was widely assailed as a victim of “globaloney,” a fatuous advocate of “milk for Hottentots,” a misguided visionary, or, more probably, an agent of subversion or treason. The actual programs of business and government, which in the U.S.A. had become indistinguishable, were mathematically certain to lead to new crises and collapse. The collapse might well precipitate neo-Fascism and war, both of which do indeed cure the disorders of a sick capitalism—with the operation invariably successful and with the patient invariably expiring. Or the collapse might invoke a new departure, offering hope that private enterprise, political freedom, and public planning might yet be synthesized in a new pattern of promise for a viable and expanding world economy. Which choice would be made was, fortunately, still in doubt as these pages went to press.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER IX

THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN

1. PATTERNS FOR IMPERIALISM

Take up the White Man's Burden—
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered fold and wild—
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.

—RUDYARD KIPLING, 1899.

A new spirit inspired by the policy of the good neighbor was born at Montevideo. It was the spirit of the Golden Rule. . . . We must sell abroad more of our surpluses.—CORDELL HULL, February 10, 1934.

Patriotism and economic nationalism have contributed to policies of territorial aggrandizement on the part of the nation-states. These policies have, until recently, led to most spectacular results in the backward regions of the globe, where native governments have been unable to offer effective resistance to Great Powers. The latter have succeeded in partitioning most of the non-European world among themselves, sometimes by peaceful bargaining, sometimes by war. “Imperialism” is the collective and all-embracing term usually applied to these and related phenomena. This term, like most words ending in “ism,” has a multitude of meanings, none of them clear and precise. Historians apply it generally to all situations in which States acquire colonies or build empires. They usually distinguish this process from that of simple conquest by limiting the application of the term to instances where the conquered are alien in language, culture, or race to the conquerors or where noncontiguous overseas territory is acquired. Patriots employ “imperialism” as an epithet of opprobrium to describe the territorial ambitions of enemy States. Communists apply it to the historical epoch which they regard as marking the last stage of capitalism.

From the point of view of the present study, imperialism is chiefly significant as a phase of the competitive struggle for power among the sovereign
units of the Western State System. That struggle typically takes the form of efforts on the part of the nation-states to increase their power by extending their control over new land. In the modern period of Western civilization, it has been easier for the States of Europe—and for the non-European States which have adopted the technology of Europe—to acquire new land at the expense of the small, weak States or of the politically unorganized natives of the non-European world than to wrest contiguous territory from powerful neighbors. Conquest has followed the paths of least resistance and has reflected the dictates of interest and opportunity. The political partition and the economic exploitation of America, Asia, Africa, and the islands of the Seven Seas at the hands of the great States constitute the most grandiose and characteristic expression of the will-to-power in modern times. It is this process, with all its political, economic, and cultural ramifications, to which the term “imperialism” will be applied in the following pages.

The Old Colonialism. In the second half of the 15th century the peoples of western Europe invented or adapted to their own uses a number of devices which enabled their Governments to exercise military and political power overseas much more effectively than had been possible hitherto. The general employment of gunpowder in warfare was perhaps the most significant of these developments. The invention of printing, the construction of larger, sturdier, and more seaworthy sailing vessels, the progress made in the sciences of navigation, geography, and astronomy, the improvements in road building, carriage construction, and fortifications, and the elaboration of the institutions of banking and commerce also played their part in producing those economic and social changes usually associated with the transition from “medieval” to “modern” times. These devices greatly altered the technological differential between the European and non-European world to the advantage of the former. When competing Mediterranean merchants sought new routes to the Indies in order that they might import more cheaply and sell more profitably the spices, precious stones, drugs, dyes, perfumes, woods, and rare fabrics of the Orient, they found ships and navigators at their service capable of doing what had not been done before—sailing around Africa, crossing the Atlantic, exploring distant sea routes, and finally circumnavigating the globe.

The Governments of the European States at once perceived the possibilities of increasing their power and wealth by assisting their merchants in the quest for profits, their missionaries in the quest for converts, their navigators and explorers in the quest for adventure, fame, and fortune. They accordingly organized commercial and colonizing companies, fitted out exploring expeditions, and developed their sea power as a means to the attainment of this purpose. And when Negroes, Hindus, Arabs, South Sea Islanders, or
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Amerindians offered resistance to conquest, the European States sent out military and naval expeditions to confer upon them by force the blessings of Christianity, to save them from temptation by relieving them of their riches, or in some cases to exterminate them in order that white men might take their lands. The establishment of political control over the newly conquered regions seemed a necessary step to foster commerce and promote economic exploitation. Each European State was determined to monopolize for itself and for its subjects as many of the new opportunities as possible. The tools of resistance available to the victims of these ambitions were no match for the tools of the conquerors. The bow and arrow, the spear, the lance, the canoe, and the small sailing craft could not cope with the blunderbuss, the cannon, the galleon, and the armed man-of-war. The non-European peoples were consequently vanquished, and great colonial empires were established by the Atlantic seaboard States which possessed navigators, ships, and sea power and had direct access to the great ocean highways.

If European technology in the 16th and 17th centuries was superior to that of the non-European peoples, it was still feeble and ineffective by the standards of the 20th century. The path of empire was arduous and beset with difficulties, delays, and detours of all kinds. Empire building was accordingly a slow and painful process, requiring not years or decades, but generations and centuries. The old colonial empires were created very gradually. Portugal first rose to brief commercial ascendancy and conquered the Moluccas (Spice Islands) in the East Indies, Angola on the West African coast, a strip of East Africa opposite Madagascar, Brazil in South America, and other scattered possessions. Portuguese sea power was unequal to the task of maintaining this empire, however, and it soon suffered partial dissolution. Spain conquered most of the New World, as well as various Pacific islands, and waxed wealthy and powerful with the gold and silver of the Aztecs and the Incas. The old Spanish empire was the largest, richest, and most imposing of the colonial domains; but Spanish power rapidly declined, owing to policies of ruthless exploitation, mercantilistic monopoly, and religious intolerance. The destruction of the Armada by the English and the elements in 1588 foreshadowed the end of Spain's overseas domain.

In the first half of the 17th century, the Netherlands rose to a position of commercial and naval supremacy. The Dutch conquered most of the Portuguese possessions in the East Indies and established settlements on the Atlantic coast of North and South America. But Dutch sea power was worsted in contests with England. The Netherlands soon fell to the rank of a second- and then of a third-rate Power. France entered the lists later and established footholds in Canada, the Great Lakes region, the Mississippi Valley, and India. This large empire was not settled by Frenchmen but was feebly held
by scattered military posts unsupported by adequate sea power. England, having vanquished Spain and the Netherlands, entered the arena last of all. But the English colonies of North America were settlement colonies with a large and growing white population. The constant growth of English sea power ensured English colonial supremacy. In the long combat with France, England finally triumphed, both in India and in North America. The first great epoch of European imperialism thus came to an end with England holding North America east of the Mississippi and north of the Great Lakes, much of India, and various possessions in the East and West Indies, Africa, and the Pacific. Spain still held most of South America, all of Central America and Mexico, North America west of the Mississippi, the Philippine Islands in the East Indies, and smaller scattered islands. Portugal retained Brazil, the Azores, the Madeiras, the Cape Verde Islands, and portions of the African coast line; and the Dutch held the major portion of the East Indies and the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. The French colonial empire had all but disappeared.

The First Retreat. The period between 1763 and 1880 was a century of the decline of commercial and naval imperialism, the partial dissolution of the old empires, the agrarian expansion of Russia and America, and the full flowering of industrialism and nationalism in Europe. Britain lost her Atlantic seaboard colonies in the American Revolution. Spain and Portugal lost their Western empires in the Latin-American Revolutions. Mercantilism and the doctrines of the old colonialism fell into disrepute. France, to be sure, conquered Algeria in the 1830's; and Britain took control of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and other overseas regions. But, in general, European Governments lost interest in colonies and came to regard them as a wasteful and unprofitable extravagance. While the old empires decayed, two new empires—or, more accurately, two States of continental proportions—came into prominence in world politics. Tsarist Russia continued its land-hungry, military imperialism, pushing eastward and southward into Central Asia and toward the Pacific. At the same time, the American giant of the New World extended its power across the North American continent at the expense of France, Spain, and Mexico. Other Powers remained quiescent.

Viewed in retrospect, this century was but an interlude between the old and the new imperialism. It was a period during which the Western States were revolutionizing their technology and gathering their energies for another epoch of overseas expansion, destined to overshadow completely all earlier achievements. The new drives to imperialism came from the Industrial Revolution and the cult of the nation-state, from the new capitalism and the new nationalism, from entrepreneurs, exporters, and investors, and from patriots, thirsty for national power and glory. The advent of the ma-
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chine produced a direct effect upon the technological differential between the Western States and the non-European world. In the realm of transportation, the wooden sailing vessel, the stagecoach, and the mud highway were in course of time replaced by the steel steamship, the steam railway, the concrete road, the bicycle, the motorcar, the electric line, and the airplane. In the realm of communication, the old modes of dispatching messages by horseback, stagecoach, or ship gave way to the telegraph, the telephone, the radio, and modern postal services. In the realm of warfare, the pistol, the blunderbuss, and the muzzle-loading cannon were replaced by revolvers, rifles, machine guns, heavy mobile artillery, armored cars, tanks, dreadnoughts, submarines, bombing planes, and other strange weapons. Problems of distant military operations and remote colonial administration became child's play for those with the new technology at their disposal. The non-European peoples now found European technology to be, not two or five times more effective than their own, but a hundred or even a thousand times more effective. A single modern cruiser could destroy with ease a vast squadron of sailing vessels. A single battery of modern artillery could demolish the strongest fortification of the premachine age. A single machine-gun company or a few airplanes could put to flight an enormous army equipped with more antiquated weapons. In short, the Industrial Revolution placed at the disposal of the Western States tools of colonial conquest and administration of a range and potency inconceivable in any earlier period.

The indirect economic effects of the new technology have been as significant for imperialism as its direct effects upon the political and military power of governments. The productivity of the new industry was many times greater than that of the old handicraft economy. An enormous flood of goods of all kinds poured out of mills and factories, seeking purchasers wherever they might be found. Population in the industrial States doubled, trebled, and quadrupled. Standards of living ascended dizzyly. Home markets soon became glutted, in spite of increasing populations and rising living standards. Farmers and manufacturers turned abroad for an outlet. The total foreign trade of the world, estimated at $1,400,000,000 in 1800, grew to $4,000,000,000 by 1850, $10,000,000,000 by 1870, $20,100,000,000 by 1900, $40,400,000,000 by 1913, and $65,200,000,000 by 1927. The great markets of the Orient and Latin America became spheres of keen competition among rival national groups of entrepreneurs and exporters. The rich natural resources of Africa, Asia, and the Americas were demanded in ever greater quantity to feed the seemingly insatiable hunger of the god of the machine. As fortunes were accumulated by the profit makers, as great sums of liquid capital were piled up, the new captains of industry and
finance turned abroad for investment markets as well as for commodity markets. The backward areas of the earth—rich in resources or in labor power or in consumptive capacity, but poor in capital and undeveloped industrially and commercially—became happy hunting grounds for the profit seekers of Western capitalism. From western Europe, from the U.S.A., from Westernized Japan, there poured forth a deluge of ships, goods, and money, inundating the rest of the world.

The New Imperialism. Within the brief period of three decades—roughly from 1880 to 1910—the imperial Powers partitioned the world among themselves. Within a single generation, larger colonial empires were established than had been created during the three centuries of the old imperialism. Britain conquered an imperial domain upon which the sun never sets. France created the second largest colonial empire of the world. Imperial Russia pushed onward into Asia. Two new Powers, Italy and Germany, entered the field belatedly and carved out empires of their own in regions not yet seized by their rivals. The U.S.A. reached out into the Pacific and the Caribbean for new territory, power, and profits. The new Japan created a colonial empire in eastern Asia and the western Pacific. Lesser States kept what they had (e.g., Portugal and the Netherlands) or carved out new empires (e.g., Belgium). Only Spain lost most of her remaining overseas possessions. By 1914 the process of peaceful partitioning was practically completed. The new epoch entered upon the phase of armed combat among the empires for world supremacy.

Rule Britannia. The British Empire, or, more accurately, the “British Commonwealth of Nations” as it has been officially designated since 1926, was by far the largest of the imperial domains. It was scattered over the six continents and the Seven Seas and included within its frontiers something like one-fifth of the land area of the globe and one-quarter of its population. It differed from the other empires in that its largest units were self-governing Dominions, largely inhabited by the descendants of those who emigrated overseas from the mother country. Viewed as a whole, however, it represented not an empire created by outward-moving settlers, colonizing empty land, but an empire built up by conquest and by the imposition of British rule upon alien peoples. Fewer than 80,000,000 of its 500,000,000 inhabitants were of the white race, and of these 47,000,000 lived in the mother country. Of the white British subjects, several millions were of non-English stock, such as the French in Canada, the Dutch in South Africa, and the Irish of the Irish Free State. If the Empire was not precisely built up inadvertently in periods of absence of mind, as some have alleged, it nevertheless represented the result of a long process of accretion, expansion, and internal evolution.
The richest and most populous unit of the Empire was India. Early in the 17th century, trading posts were established along the coasts by the British East India Company, an organization of private merchants who received a charter from the Crown, giving them a monopoly of British trade with India and authorizing them to rule over the natives within their sphere of commercial operation. Since the disintegration of the Empire of the Great Mogul, India had been divided into warring principalities in whose quarrels the Europeans found an excellent opportunity for intervention. The British East India Company and the French East India Company became rivals for commercial and political supremacy, the former triumphing over the latter in the Seven Years’ War (1756-63) and undertaking all the functions of government in the portions of the country under its control. Huge profits were made by the members of the Company and by its agents, who were almost completely free from governmental supervision prior to 1784 and were then subjected to merely a loose control by Parliamentary commissions. The area of British power was gradually extended by conquest. In 1818 the Mahratta Confederacy of Princes was overthrown and its land in central and western India annexed. In 1849 the Sikhs of the Punjab were similarly conquered and brought under British rule. A series of wars on the eastern frontier culminated in the annexation of Burma in 1886. Baluchistan became a province of British India in 1903.

Meanwhile, native resentment at alien control had flamed out in the great Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, which was crushed two years later after extensive fighting and the customary atrocities on both sides. An Act of Parliament of 1858 abolished the East India Company and transferred its powers to the Crown. A large part of the country was left under the control of the native Princes, with British advisers directing them. The administration of the remainder was placed in the hands of a Viceroy, assisted by executive and legislative councils, both appointed by the British Government and acting under the supervision of the Secretary of State for India. Under the pressure of Indian nationalist agitation for autonomy, a limited degree of native participation in the government was subsequently permitted.

If any consciously formulated and consistently pursued purpose played a part in the creation of the Empire, that purpose was to safeguard the channels of trade between India and Great Britain. Considerations of trade and strategy along the line from Manchester to Calcutta played a prominent part in the acquisition of coaling stations, naval bases, colonies, and protectorates along the two routes from England to India—one around Africa and the other through the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea. Both routes, before they divide west of Gibraltar, lie along the coast of Portugal, and Portugal had been more or less under British influence since
the early 18th century. The southern route circumscribed the African continent. Along its course, Great Britain controls Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, South Africa, Tanganyika Territory, Kenya Colony, and scattered islands in the South Atlantic and in the western Indian Ocean. The shorter Mediterranean-Red Sea route was of even greater strategic significance. British hegemony in the Mediterranean was assured by the possession of Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus and in the Red Sea by possession of Aden, British Somaliland, and the Sudan and by effective control of Egypt and the Suez Canal.¹

In the region between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, British power was secured through control of Palestine and Iraq. The security of north-south communications between the two routes was attained by acquiring Rhodesia, Uganda, and other points in Africa between Cairo and the Cape. The vital line of imperial defense was extended eastward in two directions to include Malacca, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, British New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand, on a line from India to the southern Pacific; and Hong Kong and Weihaiwei on a line curving northeastward around Asia from Singapore to the Yellow Sea. In the Western Hemisphere the Empire included Canada, Newfoundland, British Honduras, Jamaica, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, a string of Caribbean islands, British Guiana in South America, and sundry islands in the South Atlantic and the South Pacific.

These segments of the globe-girdling arcs of British imperial power were put together through a mixed process of settlement and conquest, involving the imposition of British rule upon native peoples, the granting of autonomy to British settlers, or the seizure of territories of other States. From a strategic point of view, Egypt and South Africa were the two most important links in the line of imperial defense, for they commanded the two routes to India. The Suez Canal, the construction of which was begun in 1859, lies entirely within Egyptian territory. The Government of the country was heavily indebted to European bankers, who encouraged its extravagant borrowing. In 1876, the Khedive offered to sell a large number of shares of his Suez Canal stock as a means of extricating himself from his difficulties. The British Prime Minister, Disraeli, with an eye open for imperial bargains, purchased the shares for the British Government. In the following year, Great Britain and France took over the management of Egyptian finances. In 1882 the disgruntled natives, under the leadership of Arabi Pasha, rallied to the cry of “Egypt for the Egyptians!” and rose in revolt against the Khedive and

¹ In a note of Oct. 7, 1924, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald declared “... it is no less true today than in 1922 that the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt remains a vital British interest and that absolute certainty for the free passage of British ships is the foundation on which the entire defensive strategy of the British Empire rests” (Parliamentary Command Papers 2269, 1924).
the foreign bankers. France failed to act; and a British army marched in, quelled the uprising, took control of military as well as financial affairs, and seemingly prepared for an indefinite sojourn. Under Mohammed Ahmed—the “Mahdi”—the fanatical Moslems of the Sudan attacked the invaders in 1885, massacred Gordon and the British garrison at Khartoum, and defied British power for more than a decade, until the dervishes were crushed by Kitchener at Omdurman in 1898. The Sudan became an Anglo-Egyptian “condominium.” France relinquished her claims in 1904; and Egypt, still nominally under the suzerainty of the Sultan, passed under British control. It was officially proclaimed a protectorate in 1914.

South Africa was settled by Dutch colonists in the 17th century and remained a Dutch colony until 1814, when it was awarded to Britain at the Congress of Vienna. As a result of constant friction between the old Dutch and the new English settlers, the Dutch packed up bag and baggage in 1836 and migrated northward, where they established the two independent Boer Republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In 1877, Britain announced the annexation of the South African Republic (Transvaal). The Dutch successfully resisted this attack, and Britain again recognized their independence in 1884. But the discovery of the Rand gold deposits led to a rush of Englishmen into the Transvaal and resulted in the Boers being outnumbered by the Uitlanders, or foreigners, who sought to control the Government and transfer authority to Britain. Cecil Rhodes, millionaire gold and diamond prospector, conspired with Joseph Chamberlain, British Colonial Secretary, to bring on a war which would result in the annexation of the Transvaal to the Empire. The spectacular “Jameson Raid” of 1895 failed in its purpose but convinced the Boers that they must prepare to resist British aggression. When they refused a British demand that suffrage rights be granted to the Uitlanders, war broke out in 1899. Under the leadership of Paul Kruger, the tiny Boer Republics defeated the British and compelled the British Government to mobilize a large army and to send her ablest generals, Roberts and Kitchener, to South Africa. A British force of 250,000 troops was required to overcome the 40,000 Boer soldiers. The conflict, which Lloyd George called “a war for 45% dividends,” cost Great Britain £250,000,-000 and 30,000 lives. Not until 1902 was Boer independence extinguished and were the Transvaal and Orange Free State reduced to colonial status. In 1906-07 the new Liberal Ministry granted responsible government to the Boers, and in 1909 the Union of South Africa was created as a federation of the four provinces of the Cape of Good Hope, Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Natal. This grant of dominion self-government to the Boers has ensured their loyalty to the Empire, though the future of the Union is clouded by growing unrest among the native Negro population, which greatly out-
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numbers the whites and is subjected to a status of political, economic, and social inferiority.

The other self-governing Dominions of the Empire, with the exception of Ireland, are "settlement" colonies rather than conquests. Canada, to be sure, was conquered from the French in 1763, but the French Canadians remained loyal during the American Revolution and were subsequently outnumbered by English-speaking immigrants. Following the suppression of the Rebellion of 1837, self-government was gradually introduced. On the basis of the report of Lord Durham (1839), the British North America Act of 1867 united all of the colonies except Newfoundland into the present federation of the Dominion of Canada, which consists of nine self-governing provinces and a central Government independent in all important respects. Newfoundland is a self-governing Dominion in its own right. New Zealand and the arid island continent of Australia were claimed for the British Crown by Captain Cook at the end of the 18th century. Australia was first used as a penal colony and was gradually settled by immigrants from England. In 1900 the six Australian colonies of New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, West Australia, and Tasmania were united into a self-governing federal union. New Zealand was formally annexed to the Empire in 1839. In 1907, it was organized as a self-governing Dominion. Ireland received Dominion status in the Irish Free State Act of 1921. The six Dominions of the Empire were all theoretically subject to control by the Parliament at Westminster, in which they had no representation, and in form their Constitutions were simply Parliamentary statutes. In fact, however, the Constitutions were quasi treaties which conferred upon the Dominions rights of complete local autonomy and self-government. The British Crown remained the symbol of imperial unity, but the royal Governors General in the Dominions occupied the same position with respect to the Dominion Parliaments and Cabinets that the King occupied with respect to the Parliament and Cabinet of the United Kingdom, i.e., that of a figurehead with power to recommend and to admonish, but with no power to control policy and administration. The Dominions all became independent members of the League of Nations and maintained their own diplomatic services, entered into treaties with foreign governments, and in general conducted themselves like sovereign States.

The Empire as a whole, including Great Britain, India, the Dominions, the Crown colonies, the protectorates, and the mandates, gradually evolved away from the form of political organization prevailing before the American Revolution, when Parliament claimed the right to tax and legislate for all the parts, and became a federation of self-governing units. The new colonial policy of the 19th century repudiated the monopolistic economic doctrine of mercantilism and sought to achieve imperial unity through compromise.
and cooperation rather than through dictation by the home Government. That imperial loyalty was attained is shown by the fact that in the Boer War and in both World Wars the Dominions fully supported Great Britain. At the end of the 19th century, Joseph Chamberlain pleaded eloquently for imperial federation. In 1887, the first Imperial Conference was held as a means of discussing common problems of trade and defense. Such conferences were held at fairly regular intervals thereafter. The 1926 Conference took cognizance of the new constitutional structure of the Empire and gave it its present official name of the British Commonwealth of Nations. This title suggests that the Empire, like the Trinity, was both singular and plural at the same time. At the 1930 Conference the Statute of Westminster recognized the equality of the Dominions with Great Britain in the Commonwealth. The Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa in the summer of 1932 adopted measures designed to make the Empire more nearly self-sufficient commercially, but the divergent interests and the protectionist policies of its several units made “imperial preference” a slogan rather than a reality and precluded any complete customs union.

The major units of the British colonial empire in 1948, excluding the homelands, the self-governing Dominions, and India, are shown in the following table, with the latest estimates of areas and approximate populations.

**France Overseas.** The colonial empire of France is the second largest in the world in area and population. Unlike the British Empire, it represented less a reconstruction and expansion of the old imperial dominions of the 18th century than a creation *de novo* of the 19th century. The old French colonial empire collapsed under the blows of Britain in the Seven Years’ War. By 1815, French overseas possessions included only five Indian ports, French Guiana in South America, Guadeloupe and Martinique in the West Indies, and a few scattered islands. The building of the new empire began with the conquest of Algeria in North Africa in the 1830’s. In the face of stout resistance and numerous revolts, French power was pushed into the interior. French settlements were established along the Ivory and Guinea coasts in the 1840’s. Under the Second Empire (1852-70), control of Algeria was consolidated, New Caledonia and adjacent islands in the Pacific were acquired (1853), expeditions were sent into Cochin China and Annam (1858) to avenge the murder of missionaries, and a French protectorate was established over Cambodia (1863). The attempt to conquer Mexico (1863-66) ended in disaster.

Upon the foundations laid by its predecessors, the Third French Republic built an imposing colonial edifice to compensate itself for its loss of power and prestige in Europe and to protect merchants, missionaries, investors,
## THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN

### British Colonies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political divisions</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area, square miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Europe:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>Gibraltar</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>II. Africa:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anglo-Egypt Sudan</td>
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<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sierra Leone and Protectorate</td>
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<td>275,000</td>
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<td>Tristan da Cunha</td>
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<td>Ascension Island</td>
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<td>Italian Somaliland *</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>194,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya *</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>679,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea *</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>15,754</td>
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<td><strong>III. Asia:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Malaya—Federated Malay States</td>
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<td>27,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Malaya—Straits Settlements</td>
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<td>1,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Malaya—other Malay States</td>
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<td>23,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>10,429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and concessionaires. The major fields of French imperial expansion were North and Central Africa, the southwestern Indian Ocean, and southeastern Asia. In 1881, French troops descended upon Tunis in the name of protecting Algeria from raiding tribesmen. The interests of investors and of holders of Tunisian bonds were safeguarded by the conversion of the country into a French protectorate. From the foothold already established in Senegal, on
the West African coast, expeditions were sent up the Senegal River toward Timbuktu and westward along the Niger Valley. French Equatorial Africa north of the Congo was acquired in 1884. By 1893, Mauretania, Dahomey, and the central Sudan were secured, and a broad belt of French power stretched across the Sahara from the Guinea coast on the south to Algeria and Tunis on the north. On the eastern coast of the Dark Continent, France held a small but strategically valuable strip of Somaliland at the head of the Gulf of Aden. The agents of French imperialism pushed westward from Somaliland across Abyssinia and eastward from the French Sudan to converge on the headwaters of the Nile. But this was already a British sphere of influence. Following the meeting at Fashoda between Marchand and Kitchener in 1898, French ambitions yielded before British power, and the two segments of the French empire in North Africa remained separated by Ethiopia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. If British resistance to French encroachments in the Sudan was effective, German resistance to French encroachments in Morocco was not; and, after several diplomatic crises, most of this remnant of the Moslem world became a French protectorate in 1912.

### The French Colonial Empire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political divisions</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area, square miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Indo-China</td>
<td>24,500,000</td>
<td>286,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French West Africa</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
<td>1,815,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Equatorial Africa</td>
<td>3,740,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroons</td>
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<td>166,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Togoland</td>
<td>781,000</td>
<td>21,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French India</td>
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<tr>
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<td>310,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Réunion</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
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<td>8,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Somaliland</td>
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<td>Society Islands</td>
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<td>French Guiana and Inini</td>
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<td>34,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Pierre and Miquelon</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, ancient claims to Madagascar, the huge island lying off the southeast coast of Africa, were vigorously pressed at the instigation of French
PATTERNS FOR IMPERIALISM

property owners, naval officers, and expansionist diplomats. In 1885 a Treaty of Protectorate was concluded which led to endless difficulties, culminating in annexation in 1896. The conquest of Madagascar was completed by the ruthless repression of the native Hovas’ resistance to the invaders. In southeastern Asia the Government of the Republic utilized its position in Cambodia and Cochin China to establish a protectorate over Annam and Tonkin in 1884, a procedure which led to an indecisive war with China. The annexation of Laos in 1892 completed the creation of French Indo-China. Among France’s other Oriental possessions were five ports in India, Kwangchowwan in China, New Caledonia, Tahiti, and Syria, the last acquired as a mandate in 1922.

The Price of Defeat. Italy’s imperial career was begun belatedly and was hampered by Italy’s relative weakness as compared with Britain and France. Italian patriots and imperialists bitterly resented the French conquest of Tunis but were unable to prevent its successful completion. Italy established a foothold in Eritrea on the Red Sea coast, north of French Somaliland, and in 1889 acquired a larger colony in Italian Somaliland, on the easternmost tip of the African shore line. Italian designs against Ethiopia were frustrated by the crushing defeat of the invaders at the hands of the natives in the Battle of Aduwa (1896). A decade later, Italy, France, and Great Britain all agreed to respect the independence of the Ethiopian Kingdom. The French Government pledged itself not to oppose Italian ambitions in Tripoli, and in 1911 Italy waged a war upon Turkey which ended in the annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. These provinces were united in the colony of Libya, which was held with considerable difficulty and at great expense in the face of Arab rebellions. After 1918 its boundaries were extended westward with the consent of France and eastward with the consent of Britain. The successful invasion and conquest of Ethiopia in 1935-36 increased the size of the Italian colonial empire by one-quarter, more than quadrupled its population, and created a broad belt of Italian power in East Africa from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. All the Italian colonies were lost in World War II.

The colonial empire of Imperial Germany was likewise created belatedly and was lost in its entirety in World War I. Between 1884 and 1890, Germany acquired Togoland on the Guinea coast, Cameroons between Nigeria and French Equatorial Africa (extended to the Congo in the Franco-German settlement of 1911), German South-West Africa between Portuguese Angola and British South Africa, and German East Africa between Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, and Nyasa on the west and the Indian Ocean on the east. A general native rebellion in German East Africa in 1905 led to great loss of life before German authority was restored by the customary blood-and-
iron methods of imperialists everywhere. In Asia and Oceania, Germany acquired Kiaochow in the Shantung Peninsula as a leasehold from China (1899), the Bismarck Archipelago (1884), the Marshall Islands (1885), the Caroline Islands (1899), the Pellew Islands (1899), the Marianas Islands (1899), and two of the Samoan group (1899). In 1884 Germany annexed the northeastern section of New Guinea (Kaiser-Wilhelmsland). These territories were all seized by the Allies, and by the Peace Settlement of 1919 they passed to the victors as mandates of the League of Nations. Togoland and Cameroons were divided between Britain and France. South-West Africa became a mandate of the Union of South Africa. German East Africa became a British mandate (Tanganyika), the small western section known as Ruanda-Urundi becoming a Belgium mandate. Kiaochow, seized by Japan in 1914, was restored to China in 1922. The German Pacific islands north of the Equator became Japanese mandates, and those to the south became mandates of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia. Kaiser-Wilhelmsland likewise became an Australian mandate. Post-Versailles Germany thus remained without overseas possessions of any kind.

The Lesser Empires. The only other States of western Europe with overseas territories were Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway. Spain, once mistress of the greatest of all colonial empires, lost the last of her possessions in America and the Far East in 1898-99. As a somewhat pathetic and expensive compensation for her losses, she obtained three strips of African coast: Spanish Morocco, opposite Gibraltar, Rio de Oro, opposite the Canary Islands, and Rio Muni on the Guinea coast. The enormous losses of men and money incurred in the effort to suppress the revolt of Abd-el Krim in Morocco (1920-25) contributed to the overthrow of the Spanish Monarchy in April of 1931. Portugal, whose navigators and explorers first opened Africa to Europe in the 15th century, retained only Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique and Zambezia), Portuguese West Africa (Angola), Portuguese Guinea, and St. Thomas, Principe Island, and the Cape Verde Islands. The Azores and the Madeiras are governed as part of the homeland. Portuguese efforts to unite the East and West African possessions were frustrated by Cecil Rhodes and the British Government in 1891. Portugal retained none of her American possessions and had in Asia only Timor and the ports of Goa in India and Macao in China.

The Netherlands retained a larger proportion of the old colonial empire, including Dutch Guiana in South America and, in southeastern Asia, Java, Sumatra, most of Borneo, Celebes, and Dutch New Guinea, with the adjacent islands. The African empire of Belgium was the creation of King Leopold II, who became interested in the explorations of Livingstone and Stanley in the Congo Basin and took the initiative in the formation of the “Interna-
A Belgian commercial company, the International Association of the Congo, was formed two years later; and in 1885 the “Congo Free State” with Leopold as its personal Sovereign was recognized by the Powers. Through the atrocious exploitation of native forced labor, Leopold and his fellow investors made millions from the trade in rubber, ivory, and palm oil. In 1908, after numerous scandals, “reforms” were introduced, and the shrewd Leopold surrendered the Congo to the Belgian Government for a liberal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political divisions</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area, square miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. The Netherlands:</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands East Indies</td>
<td>72,000,000</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curaçao</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Portugal:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ifni</td>
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<td>V. Denmark:</td>
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<td>144</td>
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<tr>
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<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouvet Island</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN

compensation. The Belgian mandate of Ruanda-Urundi lay just west of the
Belgian Congo. Denmark retained a somewhat controversial title to Green-
land and was united with Iceland in a personal union under a common King,
until 1943 when Iceland became an independent Republic.

Muscovite Behemoth. Of the other empires of the Powers, the largest
was that of Russia. The expansion of the Russian State differed from that
of the States of western Europe in that it represented the spreading out
over contiguous territory of a land-hungry agrarian population, rather than
an imperialism of commerce, sea power, and investments over the ocean
highways. The only noncontiguous possession ever acquired by Russia was
Alaska, sold to the United States in 1867. This process of expansion brought
under Russian power a large number of non-Russian peoples, some of them
on a primitive cultural level. The power of the Tsardom was extended over
a vast realm stretching from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Pacific, cover-
ing eastern Europe and northern Asia, and comprising one-sixth of the
land surface of the globe. The original Grand Duchy of Muscovy brought
most of European Russia under its control by the end of the 16th century.
The early Tsars of the Romanov Dynasty (1613-1917) pushed Russian
power eastward across Siberia and reached the Pacific before the end of the
17th century. Continued pressure westward and southward for outlets to the
sea led to the founding of St. Petersburg in 1703, the annexation of Estonia
and Latvia from Sweden in the year 1721, the expulsion of the Turks from
the north coast of the Black Sea, the partition of Poland at the end of the
18th century, the acquisition of Finland in 1809, and the occupation of Bes-
sarabia in 1812. These conquests were followed in the 19th century by the
penetration of the Transcaucasian territories, Central Asia, the Amur River
region of the Pacific coast, and Manchuria. Further Russian expansion in
eastern Asia was checked by Japan, in Central Asia by Britain, and in the
Balkans and the Near East by Britain, France, Turkey, and later by Austria-
Hungary and Germany. The Russian Revolution led to the independence of
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland and the loss of Bessarabia
to Rumania. The new Soviet Union remained, however, the largest of the
Great Powers next to the British Empire, both in territory and in popula-
tion. In Asia, it extended its control beyond the old limits, for the new
Soviet spheres of influence include Outer Mongolia and an undefined area
of Chinese Turkestan north of Tibet. In Europe, it recovered the Baltic
States, eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and a slice of Finland in 1939-40.

American Leviathan. The expansion of the U.S.A. prior to the 20th
century resembled that of Russia in that it was the expansion of an agrarian
population across a contiguous territory of continental dimensions. Alaska
was the only noncontiguous possession prior to 1898. In the last two
years of the century the United States annexed the Hawaiian Islands and Samoa, and seized Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, and Guam as the fruits of victory of the Spanish-American War. After 1900 the U.S.A. embarked upon an active career of commercial and financial imperialism in the Western Hemisphere. In 1903, Cuba became an American protectorate as a condition of its independence, and Panama accepted a similar status. The construction of the Panama Canal and the growth of American commerce and investments in the Caribbean led to the imposition of American protectorates upon the Dominican Republic (1905) and upon Haiti (1915), the purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark (1917), and chronic interventions in the Central American States for reasons of strategy, commerce, and "dollar diplomacy." The American islands in the Pacific and American trade in the Far East led to the projection of a policy of establishing American naval supremacy in the Pacific.

The great rival of the U.S.A. for control of the Pacific was Japan, whose new empire in eastern Asia made her one of the great imperial Powers. Following the reopening of Japan to contacts with the West in the middle of the 19th century, her peoples imported, along with other elements of Western culture, industrial capitalism, militarism, and imperialism. In 1894, Japan waged war on China, defeated her, annexed Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, and detached Korea from Chinese control. She was compelled to give up Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula under Russian pressure, supported by Germany, France, and Britain. Russo-Japanese conflict for control of South Manchuria culminated in war in 1904-05. A second Japanese victory enabled the Empire to annex southern Sakhalin, acquire Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula by leasehold from China (on whose
lands the war was fought), and free Korea and southern Manchuria from Russian influence. Korea was annexed in 1910. Japan, in alliance with Britain after 1902, declared war upon Germany in 1914 and seized Kiaochow, Shantung, and the German islands in the North Pacific. The islands she retained as mandates; but she was obliged, under Chinese, Russian, and American pressure, to give up Shantung, to relinquish her design to establish a protectorate over China, and to evacuate the Russian territory occupied by Japanese troops during the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War. In the autumn of 1931, Japanese troops ousted the Chinese authorities from Manchuria, subsequently conquered most of eastern Asia and finally lost all in the debacle of 1944-45.

Devices of the Conquerors. This brief survey of the empires has dealt primarily with territories which have been openly annexed or brought under the direct control of the imperial Powers. Mention must also be made of the indirect forms of imperialism through which varying degrees of foreign control have been imposed upon States still nominally independent. The leasehold has been a device commonly resorted to for this purpose. The German “colony” of Kiaochow in China was acquired in 1898 through a 99-year lease from the Chinese Government. China was likewise compelled to lease Port Arthur and Dairen to Russia in 1898 for 25 years. In 1905, Russia was obliged to transfer these leases to Japan, which coerced China into extending them until 1997 in the 21 demands of 1915. France leased Kwangchowwan in 1898. The U.S.A. has also leased naval bases from Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, and Britain. In 1903 the Republic of Panama, established by a revolution against Colombia, instigated in Washington and supported by American naval forces, leased to the U.S.A. in perpetuity the Canal Zone for a consideration of $10,000,000 and an annual payment of $250,000. The same agreement made Panama a protectorate by giving the American Government the right to use its forces to protect the Canal and maintain order. The treaty agreements (now lapsed) between the U.S.A. and Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua also made these States semiprotectorates.

The protectorate as a form of imperial control usually involves the retention of agencies of local self-government on the part of the “protected” State, with the “protecting” State assuming control of the foreign relations, the defense, and sometimes the financial affairs of the victim. “Spheres of influence” represent another device of imperial control. This phrase is usually applied to areas in which imperial Powers are granted economic privileges and the native States retain sovereignty and political authority. It is also loosely used to describe a situation in which an imperial Power exercises an appreciable degree of control over a region which it has not formally
annexed or converted into a protectorate. By the agreements of 1896 and 1904, Britain and France divided Siam into spheres of influence. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 divided Persia into British and Russian spheres, with an intermediate zone between them. Manchuria, Tibet, and the southern provinces of China were at various times spheres of influence, respectively, of Japan, Britain, and France. The territories of Turkey have from time to time been divided into spheres of influence among Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. In Africa and Asia, annexations and the establishment of protectorates have usually been preceded by the creation of such spheres. In other instances, imperial control has been established over backward States through various devices of financial supervision, tariff regulation, extraterritoriality, military intervention, etc.

The most significant result of the new imperialism for international politics has been the partition of most of the non-European world among the colonial Powers of the Western State System. It is worthy of note that, although this new conquest of the world involved innumerable wars against weak States and native peoples on the part of the imperialistic Governments, it was for the most part achieved without war among the imperial Powers themselves. The Crimean War of 1854-56 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 were the only open clashes of arms between the Great Powers for control of backward areas prior to 1914. The Spanish-American War of 1898 was waged by a Great Power against a third-rate Power. All other conflicts and controversies among the empire builders were adjusted pacifically by diplomacy, conference, bargaining over pawns, and horse trading in territory and populations. War, rebellion, and repression there were in abundance, for the path of empire is red with the blood of its victims. Britishers fought and beat Hindus, Egyptians, Arabs, Turks, Afghans, Boers, Bantu, Bushmen, Chinese, and Polynesians. Frenchmen fought and beat Arabs, Syrians, Hovas, Chinese, Siamese, etc. Americans fought and beat Filipinos, Haitians, Mexicans, Nicaraguans, etc. But before 1914, with the exceptions noted, the Great Powers did not fight one another so long as native States remained to be conquered and new lands remained unclaimed. But when the world became filled with jostling imperialists, friction between the Powers increased to a dangerous degree. The Great War of 1914 initiated a life-and-death struggle among the great States themselves, interrupted in 1919 and resumed in 1939. It is not impossible that the 20th century may witness a series of suicidal combats between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. for world mastery.

The Art of Empire Building. If the process of imperialism is to be understood in terms of its actual functioning rather than in terms of preconceived dogmas and theories of interpretation, it must be studied, not through a consideration of abstract generalizations, but through a careful examina-
tion of men, motives, facts, and events in particular situations. To examine in detail the process of empire building in all its manifestations would obviously be impossible even in a work of many volumes. It is quite out of the question in the present study. A reflective consideration of the way in which the Great Powers acquired their colonial domains, however, reveals notable uniformities of motives, techniques, and results which can justifiably be made the basis for certain observations more or less applicable to all the empire builders. With minor variations of time, place, circumstances, and personalities, the sequence of events is much the same whether one studies the United States in Nicaragua, Haiti, or the Philippines; Great Britain in Burma, Borneo, or Hong Kong; France in Siam, Syria, or Madagascar; Belgium in the Congo; the Netherlands in Java; Portugal in Angola; Spain in Morocco; or Japan in Manchuria. All show much the same pattern.

Should some new Machiavelli, capable of looking objectively and realistically at this pattern, attempt to set forth the maxims which modern statesmen must follow if they would be successful in empire building, his precepts might read somewhat as follows:

Choose as your field of operation some area, preferably rich in resources, which is weakly held by a feeble State or has a weak independent government of its own. If your capitalists, traders, and investors already have interests in this area, make a great show of protecting these interests and complain bitterly over every infringement on them, real or imaginary. If no interests exist, create some by inducing your profit seekers to enter the region. In either case, act in close cooperation with private business. Use the power of the State to serve business, and use business interests to further political designs. Look about you circumspectly to see what the interests and policies of other Powers are. If they conflict with yours, if they are certain to oppose you when you endeavor to acquire control of the territory, decide whether you can safely defy them or must come to terms. Defiance is dangerous unless you have a great preponderance of power and your rivals are weak or only moderately interested. Coming to terms is more advantageous if you can offer a quid pro quo for their acquiescence or support. Diplomacy and war—bargaining and force—are essential means of preparing the ground for action.

When all is in readiness, manufacture a pretext, an incident, a grievance which will make your aggression appear defensive and thus justify it in the eyes of your patriots and of certain opinion groups in other States. Deceive your parliament and press, if necessary, as to your intentions, and make much of national honor, vital interests, the sanctity of the flag, the necessity of protecting the rights of your citizens abroad, the blessings of Christianity, and the duties of humanitarianism. It is often possible, by intrigues among
The native politicians conducted by your businessmen, diplomats, and naval officers, to achieve your purposes by cleverly contrived revolutions without an open resort to force. If this seems too difficult, strike swiftly, decisively, with overwhelming strength, in order that you may paralyze resistance, impose your will, and confront your own people and the world with a fait accompli. Speak softly to foreign governments which object, but never yield to their objections unless you feel unable to defeat them if they should resort to extreme measures. Secure recognition of your new position in treaties, and use the treaty rights as a means of further extending your power if you do not gain all you desire at a blow. Whether you create a colony, a protectorate, or a dominion or merely establish financial and military control over the region depends upon circumstances. In any case, once in power, make firm your control by assisting your bankers to loan money to the local government, by securing concessions for your businessmen and investors, and by acquiring trading privileges for your merchants and exporters. This economic exploitation of the area will enhance the profits of your businessmen and make them disposed to cooperate with you in future ventures. Unless carried out too wastefully, it will make the territory a more valuable asset to the State. Placate the local inhabitants wherever possible by granting them small favors and benefits, or even the appearance of self-rule, for long-nursed grievances breed resentment and future trouble. When they will not be placated and offer resistance, stop at nothing to crush their will, for in the eyes of your businessmen and patriots yours is a mission of enlightenment and civilization.

These maxims of imperialist behavior are not offered in any spirit of cynicism or jesting but are presented in all seriousness as precepts which imperialist statesmen have followed. They are offered not as praise or condemnation, nor indeed as judgment of any kind, but simply as necessary prescriptions which successful empire builders must adhere to. These were the methods employed by Britain and France in Africa and southeastern Asia. These were the methods utilized by imperial Germany in Africa, Asia, and the South Seas during the creation of the original German colonial empire. These have been the methods used by the U.S.A. in the Caribbean, by Japan in China, by Italy in Africa.

Why Have Colonies? As soon as questions are raised regarding the ends behind the means, the deeper motives beneath the technique, the underlying purposes which are served by the practice of the art of empire building, complex problems of interpretation and evaluation present themselves for solution. These problems are usually resolved by glib formulas which express half truths but fail to explain imperialism in its totality. "Overpopulation," "the need for markets," "the white man's burden," "capital investments,"
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“trade follows the flag,” “exploitation of subject peoples,” and “the monopolistic stage of capitalism” are among the formulas which have gained wide acceptance. Each emphasizes one element in the process whereby the Western nation-states have divided the world among them. Each seeks to explain the entire process in terms of this single element, which is regarded at the same time as a clue to motives and purposes and an explanation of results. The validity of each hypothesis can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of its proponents by a careful selection of evidence to prove a case, and each can be as readily disproved by a compilation of negative evidence. Every interpretation and evaluation in the fifth decade of the 20th century must necessarily be tentative, for the Western State System is still in the midst of the epoch of imperialism. Whither the road which has been taken will finally lead no one can now say. As one commentator aptly put it:

The question is too complex, despite its brevity, to be disposed of neatly in a final formula or a facile phrase. The answer can be obtained only by summing up the profit-and-loss account in each of half a dozen departments of activity, and combining the net results. An exhaustive study of each item would require more than one volume and more than a single lifetime. In the end, some of the benefits and evils of imperialism would still be imponderable, and the final judgment would be subjective rather than scientific, for no scientific balance can be devised to weigh ships against schools, raw materials against wars, profits against patriotism, civilization against cannibalism.²

The problem of analyzing the purposes and fruits of imperialism is made peculiarly difficult by the fact that prior intentions are usually hopelessly confused with subsequent results, both in official apologies and in public discussions. Results are cited in explanation of original motives with which they have no connection at the time of action. If the American occupation of Haiti leads to the construction of roads, schools, and hospitals, the occupation is defended in terms which suggest that its original purpose was to construct roads, schools, and hospitals, despite the fact that those who engineered the occupation had no such purpose in mind. The American annexation of Alaska is justified by gold discoveries, though the very existence of gold in the territory was unknown at the time of the purchase. Prior intentions, moreover, are frequently disguised in such ambiguous verbiage that the outside observer may well wonder whether those who framed and executed policies had any clear conception in their own minds of why they were acting. The arts of dissimulation, misrepresentation, and rationalization are so highly developed that the practitioners are deceived by their own cleverness. After naval strategists had dictated the annexation of the Philippine Islands for reasons of high politics, President McKinley justified the

² P. T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, p. 526.
acquisition by solicitude for the little brown brothers "for whom Christ also died." After sugar, investments, and naval policy dictated the conversion of Cuba into an American protectorate, its "emancipation" from Spain was defended in the name of humanity and self-determination. In democratic States, profit motives and power motives must be skillfully concealed in terms of humanitarianism, civilizing missions, religious conversion, and material benefits conferred upon the backward peoples; for, as a distinguished Florentine diplomat pointed out some centuries ago, "the vulgar are ever caught by appearances and judge solely by the event." The multitudes of patriots and taxpayers are moved to enthusiasm and self-glorification by the tactics of interested minorities, and the shouts of the multitude move statesmen to action as a means of retaining public favor. In this jumble of slogans, catchwords, and emotional appeals to irrationality, it is next to impossible to separate the honest and the dishonest, the sincere and the insincere, the realities and the illusions.

The alleged motives may be divided into those which postulate benefits to the home country and those which postulate benefits to the colony. As for the first of these, it is argued that colonies are necessary as outlets for surplus population, as markets for goods produced in the home country, as markets for surplus capital seeking investment, and as sources for the raw materials essential to make the nation self-sufficient and secure. These arguments are at best of the post hoc, ergo propter hoc variety. At worst, they are pure rationalizations of quite other purposes or figments of too vivid imaginations skilled in wish-fulfillment thinking.

The establishment of political control over some backward area works no magic whereby the wealth of the area is appropriated and distributed piecemeal among the citizens of the imperial State. The type of imperialism which involves the seizure of the goods and chattels of the conquered and the distribution of the inhabitants as slaves among the conquerors has, until recently, been regarded as obsolete. When a modern State asserts title to a backward region, the property of the inhabitants remains in the hands of its former owners precisely as before, or it is bought up and exploited by interested investors of the conquering State for their own private profit. In the first case, the total population of the State which has asserted title derives no economic benefit whatever from the new status; and, in the second, the general benefit, if any, is entirely incidental and completely negligible. The direction of trade and investment, it is true, may be altered by political means, but it cannot be demonstrated that the masses of voters and taxpayers in the mother country gain anything thereby except additional satisfaction for their patriotic impulses.

The value of colonies to the imperial nation-states as outlets for surplus
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population has thus far been completely negligible, despite the large role played by this alleged purpose in imperialistic propaganda in Germany, Italy, Japan, and other supposedly “overpopulated” States. Since most of the empires are located in tropical or subtropical areas unsuitable for residence by Europeans and since emigrants prefer to go to congenial lands of easy economic opportunity, there has been no appreciable outflow of population from the nation-states to their colonies. During the past half century, fewer than 500,000 of the 20,000,000 Europeans who took up permanent residence outside of Europe went to the colonial territories of European Governments. After 30 years of colonialism, only 20,000 Germans lived in Germany's colonies in 1914, compared with over three times this number on Manhattan Island alone. In 1931 all the Italian colonies in Africa contained only 55,000 Europeans, many of whom were not Italians. Twice as many Italians lived in New York City. In 1930 there were only 238,000 Japanese in all Manchuria. By 1935 the number was still under 750,000, though Japan’s population had increased almost 5,000,000 in the interval and Manchuria’s Chinese population had increased by 4,500,000. In 1933 there were 543,000 Japanese in Korea and 257,000 in Formosa. The “surplus population” argument for imperialism has played its part in convincing patriots of the necessity of expansion, for reasons, facts, and logic are usually conspicuous by their absence in the mental processes of emotional nationalists. It has therefore been utilized effectively by imperialists as a means of securing popular support for their policies. But, in view of the results, it can be regarded as an honestly and consciously formulated purpose behind the quest for empire only on the assumption that statesmen are imbeciles or madmen.

It is likewise not difficult to show, despite appearances to the contrary, that most colonies are not acquired by States as markets for goods or for investments, though such motives may influence particular groups of politically influential imperialists and may be regarded as plausible by the citizenry. “Trade follows the flag,” cries the imperialist—and the crowd believes and approves. In fact, trade does not follow the flag in most cases; and where it does, the economic results, though profitable for the traders involved, are of little significance to the people of the home State. The total trade of the colonial empires is reasonably impressive in round numbers—or was before the onset of the Great Depression. During the post-Versailles years when “prosperity” still prevailed, the total foreign commerce of the colonies of the world reached an annual figure of about $15,000,000,000, something less than one-quarter of the world’s international trade. The British Empire accounted for three-quarters of this colonial trade, the United States enjoying 10% of it and the other colonial Powers smaller proportions.
Patterns for Imperialism

Efforts on the part of the imperial States to monopolize such trade for their own nationals in many cases led to an increased percentage of the foreign trade of the colonies being carried on with the mother country. But only two imperial Powers enjoyed over half of the trade of their colonies: the United States and Japan. Even in these cases, colonial trade was a negligible fraction of the State’s total foreign trade and an infinitesimal fraction of the total domestic and foreign commerce of the State. The larger part of this fraction would in most cases be enjoyed by the imperial State without political control of the territories with which the trade is carried on. To a few industries in the colonial States, e.g., those concerned with cotton textiles and iron and steel, colonial markets are of considerable importance. In the national economy as a whole, these markets are of minor significance.

The same statement may be made regarding exports of capital. Investment interests have often played a leading role in the process of imperialism. “Dollar diplomacy” suggests empire building on a grand scale. But most of the foreign investments and loans of the imperial States are made, not in their colonies, but in foreign countries. Accurate investment figures are difficult to obtain, but there is no question regarding the validity of this generalization for all the capital-exporting States. Again professions and facts are widely at variance. Again the professions must be regarded as rationalizations, superstitions, and shibboleths, not as accurate verbalizations of the purposes of imperialism. Between 1931 and 1937, for example, Japan had “invested” $682,000,000 in Manchukuo, but $312,000,000 of this sum represented the cost (wholly unproductive) of maintaining armed forces and suppressing “banditry” and only $40,000,000 represented private investments. Each dollar invested by Japanese capitalists thus cost the Japanese taxpayers $17—and the ungrateful capitalists found other markets for investment more attractive.

Finally, it may be pointed out that the contention that colonies are acquired as sources of raw materials is also without foundation, either in the political process of empire building or in the economic results of the process. On the one hand, efforts on the part of imperial States to fix world prices of raw materials exported from their colonies, and thus make profits for their own nationals at the expense of foreign purchasers, have been largely unsuccessful. On the other hand, none of the imperial Powers derived the major portion of its required raw materials from its colonies. Colonial raw materials are sold to purchasers willing to buy them, and such purchasers are quite as likely to be found in foreign States as in the mother country. Purchasers needing raw materials buy them where they are to be had most cheaply, and the sources of supply are quite as likely to be found in foreign States or colonies as in the territories of the State of
the purchasers. Self-sufficiency in raw materials is impossible even for Great Britain, with her vast and variegated Empire, and is quite out of the question for other States. If the empires were acquired to make the imperial States self-sufficient in such goods, the experiment failed miserably. In point of fact, this, too, is not a "purpose" of imperialism, but a phrase employed by profit seekers and by power-and-prestige politicians to bewilder the uninitiated and win popular approval for policies motivated by considerations of a different character.

If space permitted, it could be demonstrated statistically that the taxpayers of every imperial Power have been obliged to pour out blood and treasure for the acquisition and administration of colonies out of all proportion to any economic gains secured by the mother country from colonial areas or to any alleged "benefits" conferred upon the subject peoples. The most that can be said in support of the contention that colonies are "profitable" to the nation holding them is that the progressive fragmentation of the world into politically defined economic units, cut off from free-trading opportunities with other units, coupled with the collapse of the international gold standard, makes it economically advantageous for certain States to have colonies for the disposal of surplus goods and capital and for the purchase of raw materials. In a world of neomercantilism and autarchy, the absence of tariff obstacles, import quotas, and exchange difficulties are welcome features of trade among colonies and the States controlling them. But these "advantages" are themselves by-products of the enormous losses accruing to world economy as a whole from restrictions upon the free flow of goods and services across frontiers. Where all States are alike impoverished, each can relieve its poverty slightly by controlling colonies. Starving men may fight for dry crusts. But the nourishment thus obtained does not demonstrate that dry crusts constitute an adequate diet. In terms of economic welfare, imperialism is almost universally a costly and wasteful luxury.

Each particular purpose, however, plays its role in the total complexity of purposes. The entire process has been so confused, anarchic, and disorderly that no clear, single purpose is discernible. The preceding observations have served their end if they have suggested (1) that no "single-purpose" explanation of imperialism is tenable, whether it be couched in political, economic, religious, or humanitarian terms and (2) that the course of empire building has been one in which no single directing intelligence has ever played a controlling role, save in a few exceptional instances. Generally speaking, scores of divergent interests in the imperial States, by a more or less blind and uncoordinated pushing and pulling, have contributed to

a final result not clearly foreseen at the outset by anyone and certainly not
representing any consciously formulated and willfully executed program on
the part of any single individual or group. Contemporary colonialism is a
phenomenon of Western civilization in the age of private capitalism, bour-
geois individualism, planless economy, parliamentary democracy, and dema-
gogic politics. These aspects of Western culture suggest one of its dominant
characteristics: pluralism, competition among a bewildering multitude of
interests and forces, uncontrolled and uncontrollable economic and political
drifting under the impact of pressures released by the Industrial Revolution
and not yet brought under the control of organized social intelligence. Out
of the interaction of interests and forces, certain consequences flow which
take on the appearance—which are indeed deliberately given the appearance
—of purpose and planning on the part of the whole community of the
nation-state. But this is appearance only, for the forces which have produced
the consequences are part of a chaotic jumble of interests and groups within
each nation. “Imperialism” is such a consequence. Its “purposes” are in-
telligible only in terms of the nature of the political process within and
between the nation-states themselves.

If imperialism is viewed as a phase of the struggle for power between
States, its results must be judged in terms of its role in power politics. The
most obvious result of the competitive quest for empire is war—war, first
between the imperial States and the backward peoples, and then war among
the imperial States themselves. Whether investors use Foreign Offices to
enhance profits or Foreign Offices use investors to extend State power, the
diplomatic influence of the State is placed at the disposal of the empire
builders; and if diplomacy fails to attain the goal, it is supported by coercion
and military force. This force has been used on innumerable occasions
against the native States which resist conquest. There is scarcely a single
colony of any of the Great Powers which was not won through bloodshed.
Such wars are often costly (e.g., the Boer War and the Manchurian hostilities
of 1931-33); they are sometimes disastrous to conquerors and conquered
alike (e.g., Spain in Morocco, France in Mexico); they almost always in-
volve atrocities, abuses, fierce resentment, and savage repression (e.g., the
U.S.A. in the Philippines and Haiti, France in Madagascar and Syria, Ger-
many in South-West Africa, Britain in India, Egypt, the Sudan, China, and
elsewhere). In general, however, colonial wars do not, in and of themselves,
upset the balance of power or bring the conquerors to ruin. They tend rather
to increase the power of the imperial States and to enhance the profits of
their immediate beneficiaries. The situation is quite different when the im-
perial States engage in war with one another for mastery of tropical lands
or Oriental markets. Prior to 1800, even such wars normally had little effect

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upon the nation-states themselves, apart from changing titles to territories and bringing about redistributions of power and prestige. In the machine age, however, such conflicts have become enormously costly and destructive of life and property whenever Great Powers have been belligerents on opposite sides. The fruits of empire building, garnered by the war god, are destruction, death, bankruptcy, and national ruin. Yet these fruits are seldom weighed in the balances of those who tabulate profits and losses.

2. CRIES FOR FREEDOM

For behold the Lord, the Lord of hosts, doth take away from Jerusalem and from Judah the stay and the staff, the whole stay of bread and the whole stay of water, the mighty man, and the man of war, the judge, and the prophet, and the prudent, and the ancient, the captain of fifty, and the honourable man, and the counsellor, and the cunning artificer, and the eloquent orator. . . . And the people shall be oppressed, every one by another, and every one by his neighbor; . . . For Jerusalem is ruined, and Judah is fallen: . . . Woe unto the wicked! it shall be ill with him: for the reward of his hands shall be given him. . . . What mean ye that ye beat my people to pieces, and grind the faces of the poor? saith the Lord God of hosts.—The Book of Isaiah, Chapter 3.

The fruits of imperialism must also be judged in terms of the increasingly bitter resentment on the part of the subject populations. Limitations of space do not permit a review here of the long and tragic tale of the exploitation of the "backward" races, of their gradual conversion to Western conceptions of racial and national pride, of their vehement demands for justice and freedom, of savage repressions and reprisals, and of grudging concessions slowly wrested from the masters by the sweat and tears and blood of colonial slaves in revolt. Colonies held by force alone are precariously held. To win the loyalty of the conquered is difficult so long as national aspirations for self-determination are denied. To induce acquiescence by distributing material benefits is equally difficult, since benefits are costly and are often received with resentment rather than with gratitude. The amelioration of the economic lot of the subjugated is frequently quite incompatible with the whole ideology of imperialism and with the success of the quest for profits by privileged exploiters who use diplomats and strategists (or who are used by diplomats and strategists) to further imperialistic purposes. To grant genuine independence to the victims of the game tends to make the game itself quite pointless. Here brief cognizance may be taken of some of the more striking manifestations of colonial revolt.
C R I E S  F O R  F R E E D O M

The Revolt of Islam. Most of the Negroid peoples of central and southern Africa and of the islands of the South Seas are preliterate aborigines who, before the coming of the white man, possessed rich and stable primitive cultures but had no writing, no science, no organized states, and no means of acting together effectively against superior European technology. After a century and more of subjugation, exploitation, and “civilization,” most of them remain today preiterate or illiterate, with their native ways often corrupted by influences intruded from without. They are not yet capable of “self-government,” nor are they likely in the near future, despite the spread of local nationalism, to achieve much measure of solidarity or find means of throwing off their alien yoke.

Matters are quite otherwise among the 300,000,000 Moslems who inhabit the broad belt of territory stretching from Gibraltar to Singapore and the East Indies. Many of these peoples, particularly the 50,000,000 whose native tongue is Arabic, are the heirs of one of the great civilized cultures of the world. Their ancestors of a thousand years ago excelled Europeans in almost all the arts of living and built a vast imperium which, after its initial disintegration, was reunited by the Ottoman Turks. Only of late, within the past dozen decades, have the followers of the Prophet suffered subjugation at the hands of Christian Powers. Almost half came under British rule, half of the balance falling to France and the Netherlands.

Moslem efforts to cast off the yoke of the infidel have assumed so many shapes that any generalized account is bound to be misleading. Islam is not a unity, even religiously. Aside from many smaller sects, its devotees are divided into orthodox Sunnites and dissident Shiashites (the latter mainly in Iraq and southern Arabia), who refused to recognize the Caliphate at Constantinople. This office was abolished in 1924 with separation of Church and State in the new Turkey. But no reunion of factions resulted. The economic and social structure of the Moslem societies of the Near East is remarkably uniform, but its basic features make for discord and weakness rather than unity. That structure is essentially feudal, a small class of rich landowners exploiting multitudes of miserable peasants who, with few exceptions, are illiterate, disease-ridden, half-starved, and inarticulate and live more like beasts than men. The Arabic dynasties and aristocracies are slow to act together. They have found it profitable to bargain separately with alien businessmen and diplomats in the interest of enhancing their revenues and preserving inviolate the social status quo.

Contemporary imperialism in the Levant and the new clash of Christendom, Judaism, and Islam are unintelligible on any assumption of a simple revolt of united native nationalists against Western rule. The feudal elites have become nationalists, among other reasons, because their privileges have
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lately been jeopardized by dim stirrings among the dark and sodden masses
of the fellahin and by voices of protest raised among the still meager but
vocal ranks of intellectuals and middle-class liberals. To clamor for "inde-
pendence," to appeal to native patriotism, to damn European imperialists,
to cultivate xenophobia, to assail Jews are all devices whereby insecure
ruling classes evoke allegiance from subclasses and deflect popular resent-
ments from themselves. Who forgets these aspects of the Moslem world can
understand nothing of what has happened or is likely to happen in the
internal and international politics of the worshipers of Allah.

A few salient events of the recent past must here suffice as guides to the
troubled present. In 1903 the Pan-Islam Society was founded in London.
Its efforts to promote Moslem unity met with little success. The Allies of
World War I found it expedient to support anti-Turkish Pan-Arabism. By
the Treaty of October 24, 1915, Emir Hussein of the Hejaz was promised
British aid in creating a united Arab State in exchange for rebellion and
war against Turkey. The pledge was broken. Britain and France partitioned
the lands north of Arabia between themselves by the secret Sykes-Picot
agreement of 1916. Iraq, Syria, and Palestine were made mandates.4 Local
Arab revolts were ruthlessly crushed by British and French troops. In the
early 1920's, Hussein's rival, King Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud, defeated him in
war, established a united Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and in 1934 also con-
quered but then restored the Kingdom of Yemen under the Iman Yahyah.
The larger unity of the Arab lands remained remote. Meanwhile, far to the
west in Spanish Morocco, Riffian warriors rose in revolt in an effort to
throw out the Spanish and French rulers of their country. Under Abd-el
Krim, able leader and strategist, they crushed the Spanish forces, fought
the French to a standstill, and were not compelled to yield until large
European armies under Marshal Pétain drove Krim into the mountains in
1926. At the same time, French battalions drowned in blood a formidable
revolt of the Druse tribesmen in Syria, destroying much of Damascus in
the process.

This pattern of fierce and futile rebellion, followed by savage and suc-
cessful suppression, gave way in the fullness of time to new departures.
Local uprisings, to be sure, continued far beyond the 1920's. Iraq, Syria,
Palestine, Libya, and Egypt were all scenes of sporadic rioting and blood-
shed. Hatred of the French seethed in North Africa. In Algeria an insurrec-
tion of May, 1945, was put down with the loss of thousands of lives. In 1947
the aging Abd-el Krim, returning from long exile, "escaped" into Egypt
from the French ship carrying him through Suez and hinted darkly at new

4 See Section 5, below.
violence in Morocco if independence were not granted. But most Arab leaders seized upon other means of furthering their purposes. Haj Amin el Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and head of the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine, took the lead in joining the Axis against the Western Powers. Following the failure of the pro-Nazi revolt in Iraq in 1941, which he helped to organize, he fled to the Reich. After the collapse of the Fascist Powers, he "escaped" from confinement in France (June, 1947), took refuge in Egypt, and resumed direction of anti-Jewish and "antiimperialist" activities. His colleagues among the politicians of Arab nationalism found new opportunities for intrigue, profit, and political success in Britain's postwar debility, in Anglo-American fears of Russia, and in the thirst for oil on the part of American businessmen and strategists.

Petroleum and Patriotism. The future "verdict of history," always rendered with the wisdom of hindsight, may well be that the most decisive single development in the Near and Middle East in the 20th century was the discovery of gigantic oil reserves in the Arab lands. Proved total reserves, exceeding those of the U.S.A., are estimated at more than 21,000,000,000 barrels of which 6,500,000,000 are in Iran, 5,000,000,000 in Iraq, and over 5,000,000,000 in Saudi Arabia. Without here attempting to untangle the tangled tale of "oil imperialism," cognizance must yet be taken of the cavalcade of pounds and dollars. First in the field were the British. When the Navy converted to oil, the Admiralty persuaded the Cabinet to establish the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (1912), which secured exclusive concessions in South Iran and later extended its operations into Ceylon, Iraq, Kuwait, and Egypt. Anglo-Dutch Shell was not far behind. French interests also played a role. On the eve of World War II only two U.S. corporations were doing significant business in the area: Standard of California and the Texas Oil Co. But these did well and joined forces on a fifty-fifty basis to form the Bahrein Petroleum Co. and the Arabian American Oil Co., which obtained monopolistic rights in the fabulously rich deposits of Bahrein Island and Saudi Arabia.

5 Nazi anti-Semites were not anti-Arabs, though Arabic, like Hebrew, is of course a Semitic language, just as Yiddish (akin to early German) is an "Aryan" language. For photographic and documentary evidence of the collaboration of the Grand Mufti with Hitlerism, see "The Arab Higher Committee," a report submitted to U.N. in May, 1947, by The Nation Associates, N. Y.

THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN

Other developments came thick and fast. In 1947, Standard of N. J. bought a 30% interest and Socony-Vacuum a 10% interest in the Arabian American Co., which in turn made agreements with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. to purchase and market part of the latter's production. The Gulf Oil Co., jointly with Anglo-Iranian, secured a rich concession in Kuwait. Of the total shares of the Iraq Petroleum Co., Socony-Vacuum and Standard of N. J. each owns half of 23.75%, British, Dutch, and French interests each holding a like amount and the remaining 5% being held by Gulbenkian, a wealthy Armenian residing in Paris. Sundry subsidiaries of the oil giants acquired pipe lines and marketing rights in a complex pattern of exploration, extraction, refining, and distribution in which diplomats and strategists work hand in hand with investors, engineers, managers, and salesmen in the service of power and profit. No less than $100,000,000 in American capital was invested in Saudi Arabia during and immediately after World War II. Within a decade the total was expected to increase to $1,000,000,000.

While the long-run impact of these events on the Arabic economy, society, and polity was open to debate, the immediate effect was simple and obvious. The State Department, Downing Street, and the oil corporations came to terms with local potentates and landowners, who were paid henceforth in money for concessions and received large unearned incomes from royalties on output and exports. The Sheik of Bahrein became a new Midas. Ibn Saud and his 40 sons received $40,000 per day in royalties at the rate of 4 gold shillings per ton, or c. 22 cents per barrel, for all oil produced in the Kingdom. By 1950 they were certain to derive no less than $50,000,000 per year from the concessionaires. They already enjoyed loans from the oil companies, the British and U.S. Governments, and Lend-Lease and (in 1946) $10,000,000 from the U.S. Export-Import Bank. As derricks, cracking plants, and pipe lines bloomed in the desert, medieval dynasts and feudal lords became modern plutocrats.

A few thousand Arab peasants were transformed into oil workers. Some native businessmen profited. Living standards were locally improved. Schemes for social reform and regional developments were bruited about. But these results were purely coincidental. The "Sheiks of Araby" were more interested in railroads, motorcars, airplanes, palaces, guns, and jewels than in schools, hospitals, irrigation projects, or the aspirations of the under-privileged. What was basic was the enrichment of the Arab ruling class, the establishment of ties of interest and sentiment between its members and the sources of their new wealth, and the consolidation, rather than the undermining, of the feudal structure of the Moslem communities. Diplomacy and strategy reinforced business. Ibn Saud left his Kingdom for the first time in February, 1945, to meet President Roosevelt (on his way home from
Yalta) aboard an American cruiser in the Suez Canal. British and American military missions materialized everywhere as by the magic of Aladdin’s lamp. Early in 1946 the U.S. Army completed a huge airport at Dharan near the coast of the Persian Gulf. After three years it was to go to Ibn Saud’s Government but to be operated by American personnel. Capable of accommodating the largest bombers, it was within easy striking distance of the Caucasian oil fields of the U.S.S.R.

The Arab League. Under these novel circumstances, the spokesmen of Arab nationalism contrived new devices. Britain was disposed to yield to blackmail—partly to defend the Near East from the Axis during the war, partly to lubricate postwar oil diplomacy. In the spring of 1945, France was forced by Britain to quit the Levant. Syria and Lebanon became independent States. In May, 1946, London detached Trans-Jordan from Palestine and made it a Kingdom under Emir Abdullah, whose army was commanded by British Brigadier Glubb Pasha. Abdullah dreamed of a “Greater Syria,” uniting Trans-Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq under one crown—to be worn by Abdullah. On the principle of making hay while the sun is setting, the Government of Egypt in 1946-47 negotiated and agitated, inside and outside of U.N., for termination of the British Treaty of 1936, evacuation of all British troops, and annexation of the Sudan.

The most striking of the new developments was the establishment of the Arab League. On March 22, 1945, Arab leaders from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine drew up a pact in Cairo to strengthen relations, “safeguard their independence and sovereignty,” and promote economic, social, and cultural cooperation. The League functioned through six committees, a Council, and a Secretary-General. To the latter post was named Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha of Egypt. The League formally opened headquarters in Cairo in January, 1946, amid the festivities attending the visit of King Ibn Saud to King Farouk. Its leaders concentrated attention on supporting Egypt in its quarrels with Britain and on fighting Zionism, boycotting Zionist goods, and denouncing all efforts to establish a Jewish State in Palestine. Whether the League could become anything more than a narrowly nationalistic and fanatically sectarian anti-British and anti-Zionist association was uncertain in 1948. No inspiring vision of creative effort had yet emerged from its deliberations.7

In the subtle interplay of motives in the Near East after World War II, few things were fixed and certain. Among these few, however, was the assurance that the kings and nobles of the Arab lands would never become pro-Soviet or willingly enhance Russian influence in their realms, despite much

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threatening talk for purposes of wresting favors from London and money from Washington. The reason lay in the fact that Soviet influence, wherever it is extended, spells the end of feudalism. That it may also spell the end of democracy in the Western sense is here irrelevant, since no democracy in any sense has ever existed in the Arab lands. The 23,000,000 Moslems of the U.S.S.R. have ceased to be serfs and have, in their own eyes, become freemen in enjoying schools, hospitals, factories, and a rich rebirth of native culture. This fact, no less than the existence of a progressive, democratic Jewish Palestine, is a mortal danger to the elites of the near-by Moslem lands, where most of the population still lives in an incredible state of medieval misery and degradation. By the same token, the kings and effendi of Islam must cast their lot with the oil corporations and with those Anglo-American diplomats who believe that their own purposes are best served by buttressing reactionary feudalism as a bulwark against Communism. Such a program will be successful so long as the landlords and princes are secure in their positions of privilege and power. Should the dark masses ever catch the vision of a better life and rise in revolt, the strange alliance of American capitalism and Arab feudalism will fail both partners. Such a failure might well enhance Soviet prestige and influence throughout Islam.9

The Puzzle of Palestine. Except for Lebanon to the north, Palestine is the smallest of the Near Eastern countries, having an area of only 10,000 square miles (about the size of Vermont), much of which is desert. This ancient land was the matrix of Judaism and Christianity and is almost equally sacred to Mohammedans. All these faiths are religions of love and brotherhood. But in the 20th century their holy birthland has been a scene of hatred and violence on a scale unknown since the Crusades.

This paradox is one of many. The residents of Palestine have been under

8 After visiting the U.S.S.R., Col. C. E. Bonsonby, a Conservative M.P., told the Royal Empire and Royal African Societies on May 30, 1945: "Twenty-one years ago the literacy ... in Uzbekistan was 7%, practically the only teaching being in the Mohammedan schools, and very few women could write at all. There were one or two small irrigation schemes on the Tsar's estates—there were no factories and no hydro-electric plants. What is the situation after 21 years? Now 98% of the population can read and write; there are 4,000 schools, two universities and several technical institutes; there are large efficient factories; huge irrigation schemes; 20 hydroelectric plants, and, amongst other things, a wonderful ballet and opera."

9 In a letter to The New York Times, Nov. 26, 1947, Frank W. Buxton, Bartley C. Crum, S. Ralph Harlow, Walter Clay Lowdermilk, James D. McDonald, and Reinhold Niebuhr urged Palestine partition, made a plea for progress in the Near East, and asserted: "The United States is today committed to a policy of stopping the spread of Communism in the world. But Communism cannot possibly be stopped by the support of reactionary and backward medieval potentates, who shamelessly exploit the multitudes of their peoples. On the contrary, hungry and starving masses provide the natural breeding ground for revolution and Communism."
foreign rule for the better part of 25 centuries. They were predominantly Jewish after 1400 B.C. For 30 centuries a large part of the inhabitants, though seldom a majority, has been Jewish. Alien rulers during the past 1,500 years have included Romans, Byzantines, Saracens, Crusaders, Turks, and Britons—who conquered Palestine from the Turks in 1918 when the population numbered c. 750,000, of whom 84,000 were Jews, 77,000 Christians, and 589,000 Moslems. During the ensuing 25 years the population increased to 1,765,000 as prosperous farms and thriving cities blossomed out of the wastelands. This miracle was due to Jewish immigration and to Jewish capital, industry, and enterprise, inspired by Theodore Herzl's vision of a new Zion in which Jewry would again find refuge, nationhood, and a haven of salvation. The Jewish population increased from 84,000 to almost 600,000. The Arabs, sharing in the new prosperity, increased from 600,000 to more than 1,000,000.

This heartening growth was a direct result of British policy from 1918 to 1939. That policy was subscribed to by all the Allied and Associated Powers of World War I and incorporated in the League of Nations mandate agreement of July 24, 1922, which was the legal basis of British authority in Palestine. This compact in turn was the outgrowth of the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, by which the British Government promised to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, leader of the Zionist Movement, the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” This language was repeated in the mandate agreement, which further specified (Article 2) that the mandatory would “secure the establishment of the Jewish national home”; see to it (Article 5) that no Palestine territory “shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed in the control of, the government of any foreign power”; and (Article 6) should “facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage . . . settlement by Jews on the land.” By Article 27 “the consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for the modification of the terms of this mandate.”

All went well until the threat of war caused London to yield to Arab demands, supported by terrorism and rioting, for the abandonment of efforts to fulfill the purposes of the mandate. Arab nationalists contended with reason that Palestine had been predominantly an Arab land for 1,300 years and (with less reason) that a Jewish State or “national home” would be an intolerable affront to Arabs everywhere. By the White Paper of May, 1939, Jewish immigration was limited to 75,000 during the ensuing five years.
and was to be suspended entirely thereafter unless Arab authorities should consent to its resumption. Acquisition of land by Jews was also restricted. These steps, along with the creation of Trans-Jordan as a separate Kingdom, appeared to many a violation of the mandate and of the Anglo-American accord of 1924, since no consent was secured from the League members, the League Council, or the U.S.A. The Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) declared the White Paper a violation of the mandate. Churchill called it a "breach and a refutation of the Balfour Declaration." Herbert Morrison described it as "a cynical breach of pledges given to the Jews and the world." The Labor Party Conference of 1939 said it "violates the solemn pledges contained in the Balfour Declaration and in the mandate"—a position reiterated in April, 1945.

Strangely enough, the Labor Party, after its victory of July, 1945, swallowed its words and continued without change the policy of its predecessors. This result was due less to Ernest Bevin's anti-Semitism than to calculations of political expediency, in which Zionist hopes and the ghastly tragedy of European Jewry received little consideration. Meanwhile, American political leaders consistently supported the policies which their British counterpart had rejected. Woodrow Wilson and all his successors warmly endorsed the Balfour Declaration, Jewish immigration into Palestine, and the establishment of a Jewish national home. In a Resolution of September 21, 1922, the U.S. Congress did likewise—and reiterated its position over two decades in successive resolutions of similar import, passed overwhelmingly by both Democratic and Republican Congressmen. In 1944, President Roosevelt declared that "the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939" and sympathized with those "who seek a Jewish national home...today more than ever in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees." The Democratic platform of 1944 favored unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine and the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. The Republican platform took a similar position and specifically endorsed the Balfour Declaration and the Congressional Resolution of 1922. On August 16, 1945, and frequently thereafter, President Truman asked that the White Paper be rescinded and that Jewish immigrants be admitted freely and at once to Palestine. Cynics held that these statements merely demonstrated that Arab votes were negligible while Jewish votes were locally significant in American elections. Others interpreted them as a solemn enunciation of an American national purpose.

The bitter sequel is too complex to be narrated here in full. Downing Street was trapped between old and contradictory pledges to Jews and Arabs, worried about British defenses in the Near East, anxious over oil supplies,
and eager to avoid offense to the Arab League. *Divida et impera* still seemed a safe guide to British colonial administrators. In Washington the high strategists of the State Department were moved by similar considerations, while the White House and Congress were influenced, ambivalently, by humanitarianism and domestic politics. The result was a continuation into the postwar period of the British policy of 1939, despite the desperation of Europe's surviving Jews, most of whom saw no hope save in Palestine. Commissions, committees, and boards of inquiry met, deliberated, and recommended endlessly. British forces barred "illegal" Jewish immigrants. Something resembling open war broke out in Palestine between the British authorities and the more extreme Zionists.

As the new Armageddon approached its end on the Continent, David Ben Gurian, chairman of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, described the White Paper as a "relic" and announced plans for bringing 1,000,000 European Jews into the country. On March 22, 1945, two Jewish youths were hanged in Egypt for assassinating Lord Moyne, British Minister of State in the Middle East. The *London Times* (August 15, 1945) endorsed partition of Palestine—proposed in vain by the Peel Commission in 1937—as the best solution of a "conflict between two rights." Arab League spokesmen breathed unyielding opposition to a Jewish State or to any form of partition. Violence in Palestine began in October of the year of victory, with 100,000 British troops striving to halt the flow of Jewish refugees whose transit from Europe was carefully planned and financed by Zionists and their sympathizers throughout the world. Jewish terrorists, convinced that only force would produce results, blew up railroads, pipe lines, and public buildings. Arab leaders reconstituted the Higher Committee and passively watched the Anglo-Jewish conflict.

On November 13, 1945, Bevin defended the Arab cause and spoke of a U.N. trusteeship as a possible solution of the problem. At the same time, Washington and London announced the appointment of a 12-man Joint Commission to make recommendations. British police headquarters in Jerusalem were blown up on December 27, with the resulting arrest of 1,500 Jews in the Holy City. When the new year brought no significant change in British policy, the ultra-Zionist "Stern Gang" and "Irgun Zvai Leumi" intensified their terrorist attacks, despite the opposition of the Jewish Agency and its military arm, Haganah. Early in February, 1946, Jamal el Husseini, cousin of the Grand Mufti, returned from exile in Southern Rhodesia and assumed leadership of the Arab Higher Committee in opposing Zionism.

The Joint Anglo-American Commission, after sessions in Washington, London, Cairo, and Palestine, issued its report on April 30, 1946. It recom-
mended immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine and transformation of the mandate into a U.N. trusteeship to the end that Palestine should eventually become an independent State under international guarantees which would safeguard the "rights and interests of Moslems, Jews, and Christians alike." The report was approved by President Truman and welcomed by Zionists, despite their regret at the denial of a Jewish State. The Arab Higher Committee threatened war if further Jewish immigration were permitted and demanded "an independent Arab State of Palestine." Despite Bevin's prior assurance that the report would be accepted, the British Cabinet refused to carry out its recommendations unless the U.S.A. would send troops to Palestine to enforce them. In June, as the pro-Nazi Grand Mufti "escaped" from France to Damascus and established headquarters in Egypt, Bevin told the Labor Party Conference that American agitation for admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine was "because they did not want too many of them in New York."

The summer of 1946 was marked in Palestine by explosions, kidnapings, murders, arrests, and British allegations of complicity between the Jewish Agency, Haganah, and Irgun Zvai Leumi. On July 22, Irgun agents blew up a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, with 91 killed, 45 wounded, and many missing. Half of the British governmental staff was wiped out. Savage reprisals and counterreprisals followed. A Joint Anglo-American Cabinet Committee and a London Conference were without results. The World Zionist Congress, meeting in Basel in December, 1946, denounced British policy and repudiated the conciliatory position of Dr. Weizmann. After further terrorism in Palestine, Bevin told the London Conference on February 14, 1947, that the Cabinet had decided to refer the whole issue to the United Nations.

A special U.N. Assembly was called to consider the British proposal of "constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration of Palestine at the second regular session." The General Committee rejected the proposal of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria for discussion of terminating the mandate and declaring Palestinian (i.e., Arab) independence. The Assembly met April 28 and heard spokesmen for the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee. On May 15 the delegates adjourned after establishing a Special Committee on Palestine (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Jugoslavia) to make proposals not later than September 1.\(^\text{10}\) Through Gromyko, the U.S.S.R. modified its hitherto equivocal position by endorsing the principle of a single Arab-Jewish State

\(^{10}\) For details, see U.N. Weekly Bulletin, May 13 and 20, 1947.
CRIES FOR FREEDOM

SYRIA
PALESTINE
THC PARTITION PLAN OF 1947

SCALE OF MILES
Jewish State
Settlements

PALESTINE
THE PARTITION PLAN OF 1947

SCALE OF MILES

Arab State

Jewish State
& Settlements
or, if this were unrealizable, "the division of Palestine into two independent, separate states—one Jewish, and one Arab."

While the UNSCOP studied, traveled, and discussed, violence in Palestine increased, with hangings of terrorists by British authorities, kidnapings and executions of Britons by terrorists, explosions, riots, and reprisals on both sides. The acme of tragic futility was reached when in the summer some 4,500 Jewish refugees who had vainly sought to enter Palestine aboard the Exodus, 1947, were forcibly deported—not to Cyprus, the customary destination, but to Germany, where they were again put in concentration camps and left to reflect on the strange fate which brought them back as prisoners among people who had murdered millions of their kinsmen. On September 1, 1947, the U.N. Special Committee submitted a 1,500-page majority report urging early termination of the mandate and a transitional regime under U.N. authority involving partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab States (to be independent after September 1, 1949), subject to economic union and a caretaker administration by the British, aided by U.N., who were asked to admit 150,000 Jewish immigrants, permit land purchase within the Jewish State, provide for election of constituent assemblies in both States, and arrange for the conversion of Jerusalem into a U.N. Trust Territory.

On November 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly voted 33 to 13 (2 more than the required two-thirds majority) in favor of the partition of Palestine. A U.N. Commission (Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines) was named to supervise the transition to the new regime. Among the majority were the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—for the first, and almost the only, time united in a U.N. decision. Britain and China were among the 10 abstainers. The 13 negative votes comprised all the Moslem States, including Turkey, plus Cuba, Greece, and India. The vote was preceded by obscure maneuverings in which British spokesmen threatened swift withdrawal from Palestine, disclaimed responsibility for implementing the decision, and reached new heights of diplomatic double talk. All Zionists rejoiced in the result, hailing it as the salvation of Jewry after 20 centuries of "homelessness." The Arab delegates, defiantly walking out of the Assembly, declared that their States would never accept the decision.

No one less wise than Mohammed or the prophets of ancient Israel could be certain, on the 1947th anniversary of the birth of the Carpenter of Nazareth, that the U.N. action would "solve" the problem of Palestine. After 30 years of evasion, a restoration of a Jewish State, albeit limited to a tiny area, was promised. The vigorous Jewish community had the will and the means of defending itself, unless attacked in force by all the Arab States. The leaders of Arab nationalism were lush with oil royalties and loans and were desperately fearful of the impact of a new democracy in Palestine on
the archaic feudalism from which they derived their privileges. Their spokes-
men fumed. Their agents in Palestine resorted at once to murder, arson, and
rioting. The Syrian Parliament voted compulsory military service and pledged
aid to the Palestinian Arabs. The Council of Ulemas of Cairo's 1,000-year-
old El-Azahar University, shrine of Moslem learning, proclaimed a jihad,
or holy war. Mobs marched in Cairo, shouting "Long live Hitler, assassin
of the Jews!" Abdul Azzam promised arms. Troops gathered. Threats multi-
plied. Dangers without end increased as Israel prepared for statehood.

The outcome was certain to depend on the extent to which policy makers
in London and Washington were determined to give effect to the U.N. de-
cision. Whether the dynasts, emirs, and effendi could thwart by violence
the creation of a Jewish State depended almost entirely on the disposition
of Anglo-American diplomats, strategists, and oil companies to say "yes"
or "no." The ultimate answer was still in doubt at the dawn of 1948. But
Israel, crushed and bleeding from the most savage persecution of all time,
had at least won a moral victory. That its belated triumph should have be-
come a focus of fear and hatred for all the spokesmen of the rulers of Islam
was a new chapter of an ancient tragedy.

Violence in Java. From Jerusalem to Jokjakarta, as the plane flies, is
almost 3,000 miles. These two communities might appear to have little in
common. In fact both exhibit in extreme form the paradoxes and frustrations
of modern imperialism. Both were loci of rebellion after World War II. Both
are predominantly Moslem lands, for the faith of Allah flowed into
the East Indies between the 13th and 15th centuries and displaced the Hindu
creed previously accepted by these tropic peoples. Almost all the Javanese
are Moslems. Their remote ancestors appear to have been a racial blend of
Malays, Mongols, and Melanesians.

The Netherlands East Indies, ruled by Dutchmen for the past 300 years,
are perhaps the best example in the modern world of a white colonialism
which combined benevolence and exploitation in dealing with the little
brown brothers. The exploitation has been systematic and constant, the
benevolence sporadic and sparse. Dutch administration was long praised
as a model of tolerance and efficiency. That its effects were in no sense lethal
is shown by the fact that the Javanese increased from 5,000,000 in 1816 to
48,000,000 by 1942, when Japan assumed control. With 850 people to the
square mile, Java holds the world's record for population density in any
area of comparable size. Another 24,000,000 natives live in the islands of
Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Sunda, Bura, Ceram, Amboina, Halmahera,
New Guinea, etc. The non-Indonesian inhabitants include 1,250,000 Chinese
and 230,000 Dutchmen.
THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN

The economics of imperialism is here displayed in peculiar form. Most colonies do not “pay.” The Netherlands East Indies have always “paid.” The identity of payers and payees has never been in doubt. In recent decades these “Spice Islands” have produced 90% of the world’s quinine, 80% of its pepper, 75% of its kapok, 40% of its rubber, 33% of its copra, 30% of its tin, 23% of its sisal, 20% of its palm oil, 17% of its tea, 7% of its bauxite, 6% of its sugar, and 3% of its petroleum. The answer to the ancient riddle of political economy—who gets what?—is quite clear: 90% of the natives are illiterate; in a population of 72,000,000, no more than 8,000 attend high school; no university exists; native wage earners receive less than $50 per year; and Dutch investments, in the order of $1,000,000,000, netted c. 14% annually before World War II. In 1938, exports exceeded imports by $300,000,000, of which $38,000,000 went to Indonesians and $262,000,000 to the white masters of the Archipelago.11 Through adroitly devised arrangements of landownership, taxation, wage scales, and tariffs, some hundreds of thousands of Netherlanders, both in the islands and in the homeland, lived well off the labor and resources of threescore millions of Indonesians.

The well-oiled machinery of exploitation began to creak and rattle when Indonesian agitators capitalized upon the natives’ growing sense of outrage. Between 1908 and 1938, various nationalist groups emerged. Dutch concessions to their demands were grudging. Here, as elsewhere in eastern Asia, the Japanese conquerors of 1942 were widely welcomed as liberators. With good effect, Tokyo promised independence and preached “Asia for the Asiatics.” The pledge was not kept until the eve of surrender, and then only to embarrass the victors. On August 11, 1945, Field Marshal Count Juichi Terauchi in Indo-China granted “independence” to the Indonesians, represented by Dr. Achmed Soekarno and Dr. Mohammed Hatta. On August 17, 1945, the Republic of Indonesia was formally proclaimed. A native government established itself at Batavia. The restored Kingdom of the Netherlands was unable, unaided, to reassert its authority. British forces, assisted by Japanese troops, endeavored to “restore order”—i.e., Dutch sovereignty. Dutch troops, equipped with American “lend-lease” weapons and supplies and in part trained by the U.S.A., strove by force to reestablish the status quo ante bellum. Dutch civil administration was partly restored in Sumatra. But, in Java, Soekarno’s new regime assumed effective control of most of the island and demanded recognition of independence.

11 Dr. A. K. Gani, Minister of Economics of the Republic of Indonesia, to the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, Nov. 28, 1947. Although A. B. Speekenbrink of the Netherlands delegation charged “gross misrepresentation of facts,” these figures would appear to be substantially accurate.
In October, Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachower, Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, resigned and was replaced by Dr. Hubertus J. van Mook. Tedious negotiations were inconclusive. Imperial demands for "sovereignty," however disguised by formulas of "autonomy" and "reform," admit of no compromise with colonial demands for "independence," however disguised by professions of moderation and conciliation. Native extremists committed acts of terrorism, including the killing of hostages and the murder of British Brigadier A. W. S. Mallaby. British forces retaliated by shelling native villages, butchering their inhabitants, and, at November's end, capturing Surabaya after weeks of savage battle. When Soekarno protested against the use of U.S. tanks, guns, and airplanes, Byrnes requested the British and Dutch to remove American labels from the lend-lease weapons they were using to crush the rebellion.

These events did not impress the native leaders of Asia with the sublimity of the Atlantic Charter or the sincerity of the founders of U.N. Since Dutch authorities refused to deal with Soekarno on the ground that he was a "Japanese collaborationist," he entrusted the Premiership to Sutan Sjahrir, youthful Socialist, while he retained the Presidency (November 18, 1945). Washington urged negotiations for a peaceful settlement, but British and Dutch officials meeting in Singapore in December decided on "drastic action" to suppress "anarchy and disorder" in Java. The result was local guerrilla warfare, accompanied by protracted parleys during 1946. A truce was concluded at Linggadjati in October. At Cheribon on November 12, 1946, an agreement was reached providing for a United States of Indonesia, to consist of three autonomous States: the Republic of Indonesia (Java, Madura, Sumatra, etc.), Dutch Borneo, and the "Great East"—i.e., Celebes, Molucca, Sunda, etc. The proposed federation was to be completed and to receive international recognition by January 1, 1949. A Dutch-Indonesian Union "among equals" would decide on foreign policy, defense, finance, and economic and cultural affairs.

Despite further hostilities, the Cheribon Pact was formally signed, March 25, 1947. But the Dutch authorities charged that the native regime was obstructing exports and delaying the restoration of foreign-held properties to their owners, while Republican leaders accused the Dutch of bad faith and of trying to restrict the Republic to narrow territorial limits, lop off portions under pretexts of local autonomy, and undermine and destroy the Republican government at Jokjakarta. Early in July, Sjahrir was succeeded as Premier by Socialist Amir Sjahriroedif, who rejected Netherlands proposals for a joint Dutch-Indonesian gendarmerie to police Republican territory. Having no desire to relinquish so precious a prize and having now succeeded
in assembling, arming, and transporting almost 100,000 troops to the islands, the Dutch authorities launched a major offensive on July 21, 1947. In conformity with the time-honored verbiage of colonial conquerors, The Hague told Washington that it had no choice but to resort to "police action of a strictly limited character, designed to create conditions under which the common man once again will be able to follow in freedom his lawful pursuits." The International Bank early in August loaned the Netherlands $195,-000,000. When asked whether such a loan would not finance the Dutch war on the Indonesians, Bank President John J. McCloy replied, "Well, it may, indirectly."

Australia and India carried the issue to the U.N. Security Council, which appealed for peace (August 1), Britain, France, and Belgium abstaining from voting. The Netherlands held the matter to be within "domestic jurisdiction" and outside of U.N. purview. A U.S. offer of mediation, clearly designed to by-pass the U.N., was later withdrawn when the Indonesians refused to accept conditions favorable to the Dutch cause. By the end of August, Governor General van Mook was belittling U.N. action, denouncing "terrorists," and demanding that the Dutch "put an end to the authority" of the Republic of Indonesia. After conferring with Marshall and Lovett in Washington, he expressed confidence that the U.S. now had a "better understanding" of the problem. Indonesian leaders embarked upon guerrilla warfare and a "scorched earth" program amid a chaos of arson, murder, atrocities, and inconclusive battles. Whether the Indonesians would succeed in defending their independence or Dutch troops would destroy the Republic with fire and sword was still undetermined early in 1948. All that was certain was that ancient evils were being reenacted and that the lofty championship by the Atlantic democracies of "freedom," "self-determination," "peace," and "justice" had become a mockery in the eyes of the native peoples of the East Indies.

Terror in Indo-China. Northwest of Indonesia and west of the Philippines lies the rich French colony of Indo-China, comprising the territories at the delta of the Mekong and between the river and the South China Sea. Its regions—Cochin China, Annam, Cambodia, Laos, and Tonkin—embrace an area larger than Texas with a population of 24,000,000, of whom not more than 75,000 are French. The Annamites, who are Confucianists and probably Chinese in origin, make up three-quarters of the natives. The Cambodians and Laotians are Buddhists and much influenced by Hindu culture. Of rice, the principal crop, Indo-China produces 8% of the world's supply and of rubber 5%. Gold, tungsten, tin, zinc, iron, manganese, chrome, and coal are all to be found.

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When Christian missionaries and Western capitalists refused to leave the land in the 1830’s at the request of the native Governments, some of the unwelcome visitors became victims of violence. Between 1861 and 1883, French colonial forces, ever solicitous of the fate of capitalists and Christians, imposed protectorates on the native Kingdoms and, in 1884-85, fought an undeclared war with China, which now lost its loose sovereignty over these realms. During the ensuing three decades the Indo-Chinese were ruled with an iron hand by French officials and shamelessly exploited by investors, concessionaires, and fortune hunters. By design, 90% of the population was kept illiterate. Not until the middle 1920’s, in the face of nationalist agitation for independence, did Paris make any gestures toward native participation in administration. A peasant uprising in 1930-31 was drowned in blood. A later inquiry revealed that thousands of prisoners, delivered to the police by French Catholic missionaries, had died in prisons and concentration camps from disease, starvation, and torture. In the light of these experiences, it was not surprising that the people of Indo-China offered no resistance to the Japanese when the Vichy regime in 1940-41 delivered the colony to Tokyo—and thereby precipitated the contest of wills between America and Japan which led to Pearl Harbor.

With the collapse of Japan in 1945, Chinese troops began occupying northern Indo-China while British troops moved into the south. Annamite nationalists took up arms to prevent a restoration of French rule. On September 7, 1945, the Nationalist Party, or Viet Nam, issued a declaration of independence and established a coalition Government at Hanoi under Premier Ho Chin Minh. Bevin and Ambassador Massigli signed an accord in London on October 10 recognizing French rights and asserting that British forces would ultimately be withdrawn. A French-Chinese accord of February 28, 1946, provided for the withdrawal of Chinese troops. Meanwhile, during the autumn and winter, French troops poured into Saigon, many of them carried in American vessels. Guerrilla warfare with the defenders of the Viet Nam Republic, coupled with famine and floods, took thousands of lives. On March 6, 1946, however, an agreement was signed by which Paris recognized the Republic as “a free State within the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union.” But negotiations over implementing its terms bogged down as more and more French troops arrived and French officials resorted to every device of bribery, trickery, intimidation, and wedge driving in the arsenal of imperialism. By December, 1946, open warfare had broken out in Hanoi.

Early in January, 1947, Premier Leon Blum sent Marius Moutet, Minister of France Overseas, ostensibly to negotiate a settlement with Ho Chin Minh.
THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN

In Hanoi, however, Moutet announced: “Before there is any negotiation it will be necessary to get a military decision. There is nothing left but military action.” Some 75,000 French troops, with tanks, guns, bazookas, flame throwers, and airplanes (many of them American), were reinforced by Foreign Legionnaires, most of whom were Nazi Germans from French prison camps. Despite overwhelming superiority in arms, the invaders made little headway in the confused and savage fighting which continued throughout 1947—for the defenders of Viet Nam had widespread popular support and developed techniques of ambush, arson, raids, and evasion which rendered it probable, in the absence of a negotiated settlement, that at least half a million European troops would be needed to crush the Republic.

These blood-stained annals of southeastern Asia in the aftermath of World War II lent new poignancy to the words spoken in Chungking on October 7, 1942, by Wendell L. Willkie:

This war is not a simple, technical problem for task forces. It is also a war for men’s minds. We must organize on our side not simply the sympathies but the active, aggressive, offensive spirit of nearly three fourths of the people of the world who live in South America, Africa, eastern Europe, and Asia. We have not done this, and at present we are not doing this. We have got to do it. . . . Asia is a continent where the record of the Western democracies has been long and mixed, but where people—and remember there are a billion of them—are determined no longer to live under foreign control. . . . This war must mean an end to the empire of nations over other nations . . . And we must say so now, not after the war. . . . After the war, the changes may be too little and too late.12

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O Krishna, I see no good in slaying my own people in this strife. I desire neither victory, nor kingdoms, nor pleasures. . . . These warriors I do not wish to kill, even though I am killed by them, not even for the dominion over the three worlds, how much less for the sake of this earth.—The Grief of Arguna, The Srimad Bhagavad-Gita.

In this age of democracy, in this age of the awakening of the poorest of the poor, you can redeem this message with the greatest emphasis. You will achieve complete conquest of the West, not through vengeance because you have been exploited, but with real understanding. I am sanguine that if all of you put your hearts together—not merely your heads—to understand the secret of the message that these wise men of the East (Zoroaster, Buddha, Jesus, Moses, Mohammed, Krishna and Rama) have left to us and if we really become worthy of that great message the conquest of the West will be completed. This conquest will be loved by the West itself.—MAHATMA GANDHI to the Asian Relations Conference, March, 1947.

12 One World (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1943), pp. 75-76.

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The subcontinent of India, home of one-sixth of the human race, has long been the largest single exhibit on earth of modern colonial imperialism at its worst and best and of native rebellion, at its best and worst, against the white man's rule. India is also a vast museum of races and cultures, its peoples embracing all types of all epochs and places, from the primitive savages of the hill tribes, the 40,000,000 outcasts, or untouchables, of the Hindu caste system, and the multimillioned masses of abysmally poor and ignorant peasants to graduates of Oxford and Cambridge, native magnates in textiles and steel, and medieval princes of fantastic wealth.

The Census of 1941 revealed a total population of 389,000,000, of whom, in terms of religion, 255,000,000 were Hindus, 94,000,000 Moslems, 6,300,000 Christians, 5,700,000 Sikhs, 230,000 Buddhists, and the balance pagans or worshipers of less well-known gods. In terms of language, over 200 are spoken, but the major tongues in the north—Hindi, Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati, etc.—are all similar and all derived from Sanskrit, while the Dravidian languages of the south—Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Kanarese, etc.—have a comparable kinship. In terms of race, all is unclear save that the present population of India is a mixture of stocks (like all other populations) and that most of the remote ancestors of today's children, despite dark skins, were Caucasians rather than Negroids or Mongoloids. In terms of administrative areas, almost 296,000,000 people live in the 11 Provinces of "British India," while 93,000,000 live in the 562 States of the Princes, where native autocrats and local aristocracies held sway as in days of old. In terms of literacy, only 12.2% of India's people could read and write any language in 1941, compared with 6.9% in 1931. In terms of income, the average yearly earnings of each Indian is about $23.

This appalling spectacle of human degradation is further documented by the fact that the annual birthrate on the eve of World War II was 33 per thousand people (compared with 18 in the U.S.A.), the death rate was 22 per thousand (compared with 11 in the U.S.A.), infant mortality was 160 per thousand live births (compared with 47 in the U.S.A.), and the life expectancy of Indians was 27 years (compared with 61 years for the white population of the U.S.A.). Between 1931 and 1941 the population of India increased by 51,000,000—i.e., more than the total population of any of the States of Europe save Germany and the U.S.S.R. This growth was due to decreased morbidity and mortality under the slow impact of modern sanitation, unaccompanied by birth control or any alternative means, apart from famine and pestilence, of halting the increase. Life for the impoverished, debt-ridden, and ever-expanding peasant masses was a nightmare of exploitation, misery, hunger, and early death—alleviated only by the fact that
most of its victims knew no other life and were too deeply immersed in illiteracy, superstition, and black ignorance to have any inkling of any other design for living.\textsuperscript{13}

The pursuit of these themes, although of the essence of "Mother India" in all her dignity, squalor, beauty, ugliness, and frustration, must be left to other commentators. All politics is meaningless without reference to economic and social structure. But the present account must be limited to the surface phenomena of public affairs. The central political fact, obviously, is that the disunities and schisms of Indian society, coupled with ignorance of Western science and technology, spelled military impotence, of which the Western Powers were quick to take advantage. In India, as in America, British arms prevailed over French in the War of 1754-63. In 1858, British rule of India through a private trading company gave way to British rule of India through agents of the Crown, after the crushing of the great Sepoy Rebellion. Slowly and painfully the literati imbibed Western ideas of nationalism and put forward demands for Swaraj (self-government) with increasing frequency and urgency. The first "India National Congress" met in 1885 as a gathering of upper-class Hindus to criticize British rule and agitate for larger native participation in the government. In 1912 the Moslem League was established for a similar purpose. By 1918 both groups were cooperating in pushing a program of self-rule.

When unrest in Bengal assumed the form of bomb throwing and assassination of officials during the Administration of the high-handed Viceroy, Lord Curzon, appointed in 1905, the British Government began to make concessions. The "Morley-Minto" Constitution of 1909 made natives eligible to posts in the Viceroy's Executive Council and in the councils of the provincial governors. It likewise enlarged the "legislative councils," but they remained undemocratic and purely advisory, with power to propose and criticize but no power to control the Administration. The Montagu-Chelmsford report of 1918 declared that the 1909 arrangements had become obsolete and recommended changes, which were incorporated into the Government of India Act of 1919. This new charter established a central legislature, consisting of a Council of State of 60 members and a Legislative Assembly of 144, with a majority of native representatives in both Houses.

The 1919 Constitution was regarded by the leaders of the independence movement as a miserable makeshift. Under the inspiration of Mohandas Gandhi, the demand for Swaraj was intensified. In Gandhi's view, "... the Government established by law in British India is carried on for the ex-

\textsuperscript{13} See India Today by Raleigh Parkin (New York, John Day, 1946), probably the most objective and informative single book of recent vintage on Indian society and politics.
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exploitation of the masses. No sophistry, no jugglery in figures can explain away the evidence which the skeletons in many villages present to the naked eye. I have no doubt whatsoever that both England and the town dwellers of India will have to answer, if there is a God above, for this crime against humanity which is perhaps unequaled in history.\(^{14}\) The 1919 arrangements gave voting rights to less than 1,000,000 people, out of the 247,000,000 of the British Provinces. Representation was on a class basis. Under the "diarchy" principle, certain "transferred subjects"—education, agriculture, public health, etc.—were placed under the control of officials responsible to the native councils, and certain "reserved subjects"—law, order, police, justice—were left in the hands of the appointed British governors, uncontrolled by the legislature. The Nationalists were not content to remain half slave and half free. Gandhi advocated nonviolent noncooperation, i.e., passive resistance, civil disobedience, an economic boycott of British goods, and a political boycott of the elections. His asceticism and his Tolstoyan doctrines made him a Mahatma, or holy man, in the eyes of millions of Hindus. The prospect of tariff protectionism against British goods in an independent India caused Bombay manufacturers to give financial support to the movement. Though Gandhi preached against violence, the British officials whose authority was defied by his followers necessarily resorted to force.

When several thousand unarmed natives assembled to hold a mass meeting at Amritsar on April 13, 1920, General Dyer ordered them mowed down with machine guns. This savage slaughter spurred the Nationalist Movement to new efforts. Noncooperation was intensified. British cloth was boycotted, and Gandhi urged a return to the spinning wheel, the hand loom, and cottage industry. The Mopla Rebellion of the fanatical Moslems of Madras was crushed in 1921. Other disorders were followed by similar repressions. When the "civil disobedience" campaign was launched, Gandhi was arrested and sentenced to a six-year prison term in March, 1922. He was released two years later, with his influence temporarily diminished by factional differences between Hindus and Moslems, extremists and moderates, in the National Congress. In April, 1926, Lord Irwin (later Lord Halifax, Foreign Minister) succeeded Lord Reading as Viceroy. Great Britain slowly began to yield before Nationalist pressure. In 1928 the Simon Commission arrived to investigate the desirability of extending the principle of responsible government. Its report (1930) was cautiously conservative but recommended greater independence for the local governments and the creation of a federal government for India as a whole. A "Council of Greater India" was contemplated, in which representatives of the native States would

join with representatives of the British Provinces in discussing matters of common concern.

In March, 1930, Gandhi commenced another civil disobedience campaign by marching with his followers from Ahmadabad to Dandi to make salt from sea water, thus defying the government monopoly and evading the salt tax. Riots and disturbances spread once more, as the British police clubbed the noncooperationists with their lathes, and British troops battled border tribesmen on the northwest frontier. Gandhi and the other leaders of the Congress Executive Committee were arrested once more. On November 12, 1930, the first Round Table Conference opened in London to prepare the new Federal Constitution, with some 80 Indians present, representing the more important races, religions, classes, and parties—save the Congress, which boycotted the proceedings. The Conference adjourned inconclusively on January 19, 1931, pending further discussions. On March 4, 1931, Lord Irwin and Gandhi (again released from prison) signed a truce providing for the discontinuance of civil disobedience and of the boycott in return for the withdrawal of repressive ordinances and the freeing of arrested Nationalists. Moslem-Hindu riots continued, however, and the British continued to use religious cleavages as an excuse for making haste slowly with constitutional reform. After much vacillation, Gandhi agreed to attend the second Round Table Conference, which met in London September 14-December 1, 1931. There, amid imperial splendors, his gaunt figure, clad only in a loin cloth and a sheet, seemed to the West to be a grotesque symbol of futility and to the East to be an inspiration and an embodiment of the silent power of the Oriental masses. The Conference agreed on a federal structure, but Moslem-Hindu differences made an accord impossible on the question of minority representation in the legislatures.

Gandhi described the Conference as a “complete failure.” Terrorism and repression began once more in Bengal, and the holy man was again arrested. While more than 30,000 political prisoners languished in jail and while Hindu-Moslem riots continued sporadically, the British authorities went forward with their plans for a federal State and an enlarged electorate, despite the failure of Gandhi’s followers to cooperate. In October, 1932, Gandhi secured more favorable treatment of the “untouchables” by a sensational hunger strike. The new Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, and his colleagues proceeded to make plans for a third Round Table Conference, despite continued Nationalist resistance. The third Round Table Conference opened in London on November 17, 1932. The Nationalists refused to cooperate in any way. On December 23 the Conference closed with a report which was to be made the basis of a new constitution.

On August 2, 1935, the Cabinet approved a new Government of India Act,
passing by a large majority in Parliament over the opposition of Laborites, who demanded greater concessions and die-hard Tories, who demanded fewer. On August 6 the Marquess of Linlithgow was appointed Viceroy of India. He succeeded the Earl of Willingdon on April 18, 1936. The Act created a federation embracing British India and the native States, with considerable autonomy for the 11 Provinces established by the statute. The Viceroy had a Council of Ministers answerable to a national legislature; but he had a broad veto power and could administer independently the “reserved” Departments, including Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finances, Internal Law and Order, and all the decisive spheres of power. In short, the new India had neither Dominion self-government nor a Parliamentary regime responsible to the electorate. The new legislature consisted of an Upper House, or Council of State of 156 elected representatives of the Provinces and 104 representatives of the native States, and a Lower Chamber, or House of Assembly of 250 representatives of the Provinces and 125 of the States elected indirectly on a basis of “communal voting” whereby minority groups receive separate representation, with the effect of perpetuating religious and caste divisions. The franchise in the 11 Provinces was increased from 7,000,000 votes to 35,000,000, including those of 6,000,000 women—or about 14% of the population, selected on the basis of property and educational qualifications.

Far from satisfying Nationalist demands for self-rule, the new Constitution was resented by many native patriots. The new President of the Indian National Congress, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, elected in May, 1936, represented the more aggressive and extreme wing of the movement, which tended to reject Gandhi’s plea for nonviolence. “Our members must fight, not spin,” declared Nehru. From his retirement, Gandhi asserted, “My life work is ruined . . . Still, in two or three years’ time, this excitable and enthusiastic young leader will return to me. . . . India loves me. India trusts me. India needs me. I feel, therefore, that my life mission is not yet ended. I still hope to see India free from the domination of the foreigner.”

By the time Britain drew the sword in 1939 to battle for its life and that of its Empire against Hitler’s Reich, the riddle of India had received no answer. Between 1936 and 1939, membership in the National Congress grew from 457,000 to 5,000,000. The Congress rejected the Constitution of 1935 and refused to cooperate in putting it into effect. In the provincial elections of 1937, its candidates won almost half the seats, gaining absolute majorities in Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces, and Orissa and emerging as the strongest single party in Bengal and Assam. The new Constitution was formally inaugurated on April 1, 1937. In July, Congress Ministries were formed in 7 of the 11 Provinces of British India. During the ensuing two years, these Ministries, though possessed of no
genuine autonomy, enacted a series of moderate reform measures and brought
about a relaxation of British military and police control. The Congress con-
tinued to demand independence and rejected uncompromisingly the federal
section of the Constitution. Subhas Chandra Bose, Congress President in
1938, was reelected in 1939 with the support of Left Nationalists, Socialists,
and Communists against a moderate candidate favored by Gandhi. The Ma-
hatma reasserted his leadership, however; and in April, 1939, Bose resigned.
He later violated Congress discipline and was disqualified from holding
office.

This growing split between moderates and radicals within the independence
movement strengthened the hopes of some Britishers that acquiescence in
the new dispensation would be forthcoming. But it also foreshadowed the
possibility of a grave crisis. When the Viceroy made India a belligerent by
executive action and sanctioned the Defense of India Ordinance of Septem-
ber 3, 1939, authorizing the central Government to rule by decree, the Con-
gress boycotted the Legislative Assembly and demanded self-determination.
Increasing friction led to the arrest of Nehru and other radical leaders in the
autumn of 1940. Gandhi had no desire to play into the hands of the Fascist
Triplce by crippling Britain’s fight for survival, but he was equally in-
sistent that self-government for India should be made a part of Britain’s
war aims. As in 1914-18, the demand was evaded with phrases.

It is altogether probable that Britain would have lost India in World War
II save for two extraneous circumstances: the Soviet defense of Stalingrad
and the American offensive against Japan. The former precluded a Nazi
invasion of western India. The latter delayed a Japanese invasion of eastern
India until too late. The two together prevented any fusion of enemy forces
in the subcontinent, where most of the natives, as in Burma, Indo-China,
and Indonesia, saw no reason to defend British imperialism against Japa-
nese imperialism. The political deadlock was not broken by the Cripps
Mission of March-April, 1942, which proposed a postwar constitutional con-
vention to frame a charter for an Indian Federal Union which might hope
for Dominion status or full independence. During hostilities, Britain would
control defense and maintain the status quo. This first definite British pledge
of freedom for India was rejected by both the Congress Party and the Moslem
League, since it promised independence only after the war and was made
only after the loss of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma.

The grave crisis of 1942 was precipitated by the resolve of Gandhi, Nehru,
and the Congress Party to wrest concessions from London during the war
through threats of a new campaign of civil disobedience. In a hazardous
decision which turned out to be safe, London decided to resist. On August 9,
1942—at which time Gandhi was asking for negotiations and no overt act
of disobedience had yet occurred—the British Government of India declared the Congress illegal and arrested Gandhi, his wife, Nehru, Azad, and other leaders, all of whom were accused by Leopold Amery of wicked folly, a stab in the back, and betrayal of the Allies' cause. The Congress leaders, apprehensive lest the more extreme of their followers should support Subhas Chandra Bose (who had become a propagandist and prospective puppet for Tokyo and Berlin), assumed that resistance to Britain would result in significant concessions. Downing Street assumed that in a test of force the Congress could be crushed. Both assumptions proved wrong, though the Congress leaders were more in error than British policy makers in their estimates of the balance of power.

Widespread rioting, reprisals, murders, arrests, and repressions during the summer and autumn of 1942 did not produce the mass-revolutionary situation which the British feared and the Congress hoped for. Shadows of events to come were sharply cast when Mohammed Ali Jinnah, President of the Moslem League, asserted on September 13, 1942, that the Congress civil disobedience campaign was as much a declaration of war on the Moslem League as on the British Raj and that his followers would enter no provisional government unless their demands for "Pakistan"—i.e., an independent Moslem State—were granted. In December President Roosevelt sent William Phillips as his personal representative to India to work for peace and unity. Phillips arrived in January, was denied permission to see Gandhi and Nehru in jail, came home in disgust, and in May, 1943, made a secret report to the President (released September 2, 1944) in which he denounced British policy and urged a pledge of Indian independence. "A generous British gesture in India . . . will produce not only a tremendous psychological stimulus to flagging morale throughout Asia and facilitate our military operations in that theater, but it will also be proof positive to all peoples—our own and the British included—that this is not a war of power politics, but a war for all we say it is."

Such advice was vain. Churchill asserted that he "had not become the King's First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." Toryism triumphed in India. But its victory proved Pyrrhic and transitory. Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell was named Viceroy in June, 1943. Famine in Bengal took 3,000,000 lives in the winter of 1943-44. Mrs. Gandhi died in prison on February 22, 1944. On May 6, Gandhi was released from jail on grounds of health. He conferred with Jinnah in September on plans for partitioning India, but no accord was reached. As the war approached its end, British policy makers, both Conservative and Laborite, wisely decided that conciliation was preferable to defiance. A White Paper of June 14, 1945, renewed the Cripps proposal and suggested that the Viceroy's Execu-
tive Council be reconstituted as an All-India body, made up equally of spokesmen for the Congress and the Moslem League, to be selected by the Viceroy. Gandhi rejected parity. A Conference at Simla (June-July, 1945) ended in failure after Jinnah insisted that he must name all the Moslem members of the proposed Council.

In September, 1945, the Congress leaders agreed to further parleys—and Hindu-Moslem rioting broke out in Bombay. These violent manifestations of the "communal problem" had long had the character of a pretext or policy (\textit{divida et impera}) through which British rule could be perpetuated on the ground that its termination would spell anarchy. But the new disorders were clearly a reflection of the irrational, brutish clash of religious fanaticisms in a land where mass misery caused many to welcome every opportunity for looting, arson, and murder. In December, 1945, Lord Pethwick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, announced plans for Dominion status and for new discussions through an all-party Parliamentary delegation. By February, 1946, further rioting left no doubt but that Moslem nationalism had become more anti-Hindu than anti-British and that Hindu nationalism had become less anti-British than anti-Moslem. As Jinnah threatened civil war, Attlee professed willingness to grant full independence if the major Indian parties could agree on a form of government. A British Cabinet mission, headed by Pethwick-Lawrence, Cripps, and H. V. Alexander, reached New Delhi in March. It arranged another Round Table Conference at Simla in May, which again ended in failure.

A new British White Paper of May 16, 1946, rejected Jinnah's demand for a sovereign State of Pakistan and proposed a Federal Union of a United India. The Congress and the Moslem League, for once in agreement, accepted the plan as a basis of discussion. Nehru, who assumed formal leadership of the Congress Party, conferred with Jinnah in August, while thousands died in frenzied Hindu-Moslem rioting in Bombay and Calcutta. On August 24 Wavell announced the first All-India Executive Council, headed by Nehru. Jinnah boycotted its sessions and continued an ambivalent policy of negotiation and instigating violence. Despite the failure of another Round Table Conference in London, a Constituent Assembly of 209 members, with the Moslem League absent, met in New Delhi on December 9 and asserted its determination to proclaim India an independent sovereign republic. Attlee announced on February 20, 1947, that Wavell would be replaced as Viceroy by Lord Louis Mountbatten and that H.M. Government had decided to "effect the transference of power into responsible Indian hands not later than June, 1948"—either to a united regime, if agreement could be reached, or to other authorities if need be. This contemporary British masterpiece of illogical moderation may fairly be regarded as having served British inter-
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ests better than any available alternative. It also furthered the “liberation” of India, though at horrifying costs.

Despite Churchill’s grief at “Operation Scuttle” and his impassioned denunciation of this “clattering down of the British Empire with all the glories and services it has rendered to mankind,” Commons endorsed the

Labor Cabinet’s decision on March 6, 1947, by a vote of 337 to 185. The complex negotiations which ensued led to momentous decisions: a Viceroy’s address and a White Paper of June 2-3, 1947, asserted (now with Churchill’s approval) that Britain would transfer power during the current year to Indian authorities; since Moslem-Hindu agreement on union appeared impossible, two States, India and Pakistan, would be envisaged, both with Dominion status and with the right to decide whether they should remain inside or outside the British Commonwealth; both the Congress and the

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Moslem League had accepted the plan; the Princely States would make their own choice.

Commons voted the new India Bill on July 10, 1947. Lord Louis Mountbatten became Governor General of the Dominion of India with Nehru as Prime Minister. Jinnah became Governor General of the Dominion of Pakistan with Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan as Prime Minister. The new order was formally inaugurated at New Delhi on August 15. Long and agonizing negotiations followed over frontiers, since no definition of boundaries could place all Moslems in Pakistan and all Hindus in India. Exchanges of population uprooted no less than 8,000,000 people. Throughout these painful discussions and migrations, during most of the year 1947, mobs of fanatics, both Hindu and Moslem, looted, burned, murdered, and massacred in an orgy of violence in major cities and throughout the countryside which had no modern counterparts save in the wholesale crimes of the German Hitlerites. In both cases, despite vast differences in the ideological contexts of atrocities, men hated and slaughtered their fellows because of their fears, bred of desperate insecurities. How many hundreds of thousands of Indians perished in this frightful bloodletting may never be known. It stained with shame and grief the beginnings of the new Dominions.

The chances seemed good, early in 1948, that both new realms would choose continued Dominion status rather than complete independence. The ultimate destiny of Pakistan would depend on whether Pan-Islamic sentiment or Indian nationalism would finally prevail in the hearts of India’s Moslems. The ultimate role of India was likewise contingent on the global rivalry between Moscow and Washington. An India dominated by landlords, moneylenders, princes, and industrialists would, if it could, support the American colossus against the Kremlin. An India moved to new departure by demands of the underprivileged, the dispossessed, and the outcasts for “social justice” and a new life might well act otherwise. Despite his immense services as a political and spiritual leader, Gandhi was a voice of the past. His advocacy of nonviolence, vegetarianism, puritanism, and handicraft industry had no relevance to the new time, entirely apart from the fact that he would be eighty years old in 1948. Nehru, 20 years his junior, was “Western,” liberal, humanist, and socialist. His outlook on Indian and world affairs might conceivably result in a creative program of progress—if the propertied classes did not forbid social change. Other and younger leaders would emerge from the birth agony of India’s freedom. Their aspirations, it was safe to assume, would not be contrary to those expressed by Nehru in his inaugural address as President of the Council of the Inter-Asian Relations Conference (March 23, 1947), which represented the first major effort of all Asiatic peoples to build unity:
THE TRAGEDY OF CHINA

We stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period of history. . . All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavour. . . We have no designs against anybody; ours is a great design of promoting peace and progress all over the world. . . In this atomic age Asia will have to function efficiently in the maintenance of peace. . . Peace can only come when nations are free and also when human beings everywhere have freedom and security and opportunity. . . We have, therefore, to think in terms of the common man and fashion our political, social and economic structure so that the burdens that have crushed him may be removed and he may have full opportunity for growth. . . We seek no narrow nationalism. . . The freedom that we envisage is not to be confined to this nation or that, or to a particular people, but must spread out over the whole human race. That universal human freedom also cannot be based on the supremacy of any particular class. It must be the freedom of the common man everywhere. . .

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Of the best rulers, the people know only that they exist. The next best they love and praise. The next they fear. And the next they revile. When they do not command the people’s faith, some will lose faith in them. And then they resort to oaths! But, of the best, when their task is accomplished, their work done, the people all remark, “we have done it ourselves.”—LAO-TSE, The Book of Tao, c. 540 B.C., translation by Lin Yutang.

The rising flood of revolt in China has beaten, not against a single foreign conqueror, but against the whole array of imperial Powers which detached from China its outlying possessions, imposed upon it a status of political and juristic inferiority and subjected it to successive indignities and humiliations, leaving little of its theoretical sovereignty intact. China, like India, is a vast land of many peoples, with an area of 4,277,000 square miles and a population in excess of 450,000,000. China, like India, has undergone such a prolonged process of cultural and political disintegration under the impact of Western civilization that it seems doubtful to many whether there is any alternative to complete foreign domination or anarchy. Unlike India, China has from time immemorial exhibited a large degree of cultural unity. Unlike India, China has never been subjected as a whole to any one of the Western Powers. For countless millennia China—the great human sea that salts all rivers flowing into it—has absorbed all her conquerors, for they were for the most part roving barbarian nomads swallowed up in a rich and ancient culture. The Mongol hordes of Jenghis Khan overran the country in the 13th century, much as the Mongol Turkish conquerors later subdued India and created the Mogul Empire. In the 17th century the Manchus imposed

15 India Today, India League of America, April, 1947.
their power upon China and established the Manchu Dynasty (1644-1911). In both cases the victors were largely assimilated by the vanquished. Only with the coming of the Western white man and his machines did China become helpless.

Soon after the Celestial Empire was first compelled to open its doors to the West, antiforeignism emerged out of traditional isolationism and aloofness. The great Taiping Rebellion of 1850-64 was directed more against the Manchu Dynasty than against the alien. It was suppressed with foreign assistance. The partial dismemberment of China followed. In the Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1900 the Government made common cause with the rebels in attempting to expel the Westerners. The more farsighted spokesmen of the new Chinese nationalism soon perceived that China could resist the West only with the weapons of the West, and they began to advocate the adoption of Western technology, Western economics, Western political ideas and institutions. Their pleas were entirely academic until economic and social changes increased the numbers of the Chinese business classes and urban working classes to a point where they furnished a fertile field for revolutionary agitation. Sun Yat Sen (1866-1924) became the spiritual father and the political organizer of the Chinese Revolution. The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement was at first directed against the corrupt and decrepit Manchu Dynasty. It later aspired to the political and social regeneration of China as a means of resisting imperialistic aggression.

In 1911 the Manchus were overthrown—but the Presidency of the new Republic passed, not to Sun Yat Sen, who retired to Canton, but to the opportunist adventurer, Yuan Shih Kai, who aspired to become Emperor. Followers of Sun, organized into the Kuomintang, or National People’s Party, were committed to a Western bourgeois program of parliamentary democracy, tinctured with socialist elements. Yuan’s subservience to foreign bankers, his surrender to Japan in 1915, and his assumption of royal honors in the following year led to a new revolution and to the commencement of an epoch of prolonged civil war. This state of affairs was due to the impotence of the Central Government, the uncontrolled greed of the semi-independent provincial tuchuns, or “war lords,” the emergence of a mass of undisciplined mercenary soldiery, and the progressive disintegration of all the social and economic bases of political unity and cohesion.

Only the international aspects of these endless disorders can be outlined here. In June, 1916, Yuan Shih Kai died amid a ferment of revolutionary disturbances. There followed years of turmoil, marked by chronic struggles for the control of the Central Government among the war lords: Wu-Pei-fu of the Chihli clique, Chang Tso Lin of Manchuria, Feng Yu-hsiang, the “Christian general” of Shansi, and other lesser feudal chieftains. Chang’s
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sphere of power was Manchuria, and he was at all times dependent upon the whim of Japan for the continued rulership of his satrapy. Feng centered his power in Mongolia and looked toward Moscow. While the north was torn by these internecine conflicts, the Kuomintang followers of Sun Yat Sen remained in power at Canton and prepared themselves for the mission of unifying China on the basis of Sun’s “three principles”: people’s nationalism, people’s democracy, people’s livelihood. In 1921, Sun was “elected” President of the Republic by a group of 1913 rump parliamentarians at Canton, but he encountered constant resistance from the militarists and led a most precarious existence. In his search for foreign aid, Sun received much sympathy from the antiimperialist rulers of Communist Russia.

In September, 1923, Michael Borodin arrived from Moscow to act as the chief adviser of the Kuomintang. His leadership, strengthened by a naval demonstration on the part of the Western Powers against Sun’s threat to seize the Canton customs receipts, initiated a four-year period of successful Soviet-Kuomintang cooperation. Russian military officers trained the new Nationalist Army. The Kuomintang was reorganized on the model of the Russian Communist Party as a rigidly disciplined brotherhood designed to assume dictatorial power and thus to achieve the purposes of the revolution. In 1924 the Chinese Communists, who were increasing in numbers, were admitted to the Party. With this, there began the internal struggle between the bourgeois elements and the peasant-proletarian elements, which was later to lead to disaster. For the moment, however, the movement was greatly strengthened by this alliance with Soviet advisers and native Communists. It launched upon a career which offered a brief hope of uniting the entire country under its rule.

Despite Sun’s death in April, 1924, Chiang Kai-shek, with the assistance of Borodin, assumed control in Canton after a period of disorder. He continued the Communist-Kuomintang alliance. A political and military campaign was now launched to convert and conquer the entire nation. This campaign was directed as much against Chinese and foreign bourgeois interests as against the northern war lords. By March, 1927, the Yangtze Valley and the Shanghai area had fallen to the southerners. But success brought the inevitable break between Chiang and Borodin, each of whom had sought to use the other for his own ends. While Chiang now summoned anti-Communist, bourgeois, and militarist elements to his aid, the Communist left wing of the Kuomintang occupied Nanking and began a general assault upon foreign interests which led to the bombardment of part of the city by American and British war vessels. Chiang now allied himself with the merchants and bankers of Shanghai. In April, 1927, he purged Shanghai and Canton
of Russians and Communists by wholesale arrests and executions. Feng Yu-
hsiang now joined the right-wing Nationalists.

In July Borodin retired to Russia, after thousands of labor leaders, peas-
ants, students, and radicals had been put to death by the now thoroughly bourgeois Kuomintang under Chiang’s military domination. Borodin’s Chi-
inese followers, including Mme Sun Yat Sen, now denounced Chiang as a renegade and a betrayer of the social and agrarian revolution. Chiang him-
self retired in August, 1927, in the face of new rivalries and disorders. The “retirement” of Chinese leaders from public life is never to be taken seri-
ously, however. Chiang has “retired” repeatedly but remained master of a “purified” and reactionary Kuomintang. He returned to power in January, 1928, and set up a personal dictatorship at Nanking, while the closing of Soviet consulates and the slaughter of Communists continued in the prin-
cipal cities of the south. The Nationalist armies now moved on Peiping, controlled by Chang Tso-lin; but they were delayed by an armed clash with Japanese troops at Tsinan. In June the Manchurian war lord, under Kuo-
mintang pressure and on the advice of the Japanese Minister, left Peiping for Mukden. He was killed by a bomb explosion during the journey and was succeeded by his son, Chang Hsueh-liang. At the same time Yen Hsi-shan’s troops occupied Peiping in the name of the Kuomintang, and all of China was seemingly united under the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking.

This unity, however, was entirely illusory and transitory. The Party pro-
gram of abrogating the unequal treaties, abolishing extraterritoriality, oc-
cupying the foreign concessions, and ousting foreign interests was soon paralyzed by new dissensions within the ranks and by the stubborn refusal of the innumerable war lords to be reformed. In October, 1928, an Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China was promulgated, providing for the indefinite perpetuation of the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang. But all efforts to demobilize the predatory armies of the tuchuns failed. In February, 1929, civil strife broke out in Shantung and Hunan. Chiang waged war on the Wuhan-Kwangsi faction and sent a punitive expedition against the now rebellious Feng, who “resigned” shortly afterward. In July, 1929, young Marshal Chang seized the Chinese Eastern Railway, with the result that Soviet forces under General Blücher, formerly Borodin’s colleague and military adviser at Canton, entered Manchuria and compelled the war lord to observe established treaties. This incident led to the final rupture of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Nanking.

The unstable balance of power among independent war lords, self-seeking provincial governors, and rival Kuomintang factions could not long be main-
tained. Mutinies, riots, and coups d’état brought the Nanking Government
to the verge of destruction by the end of 1929. Early in 1930 a large-scale civil war broke out between Chiang on the one side and Feng and Yen Hsi-shan on the other, allied in a new northern coalition. By October, Chiang was again victorious, after tens of thousands of lives had been lost, much property destroyed, and the country reduced to bankruptcy. Chang Hsueh-liang cooperated with Chiang in crushing Feng and Yen, but he was removed from the scene by the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and the setting up of the new State of Manchukuo in 1932 in what had formerly been his domain. The Sino-Japanese hostilities which accompanied these events brought no unity to the country. Though Japanese trade was ruined by a nation-wide boycott, the Chinese Government was helpless against Japanese military power. Chiang was more interested in keeping himself in power than in organizing the nation for resistance. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were resumed, but the days of Soviet-Kuomintang collaboration had long since passed. By the end of 1932, half a dozen new civil wars had broken out, and the restoration of peace and order seemed as remote as ever. Chiang’s passivity in the face of new Japanese aggression generated a widespread demand among patriots, students, and intellectuals for war against Tokyo in the spring of 1936. This movement culminated in the rebellion of several southern war lords, dependent upon Canton; but the uprising soon collapsed in the face of the bribery of the leaders and the mobilization of overwhelming force against them.

Protests continued, however. Chiang’s annual crusade against the Communists, whose local Soviets ruled some 50,000,000 people in scattered provinces, were costly and futile enterprises that precluded any possibility of national unity in the face of Japanese aggression. When he visited Sianfu in Shensi, Chiang Kai-shek found himself “kidnaped” (December 12-24, 1936) by followers of Chang Hsueh-liang, who released him only on condition that he cease his wars against Red China, work for an anti-Japanese “United Front,” and cooperate with the Communists and the northern military leaders against Japan. When it appeared that genuine unity might develop on this basis, the Japanese Army leaders launched a new and murderous assault upon China in July, 1937. The resulting conflict dragged on through dark and bloody years and finally became part of World War II. Subsequent developments will be reviewed below in connection with Japanese policy. The new aggression not only brought death to hundreds of thousands of Chinese and left millions homeless but resulted in a new Kuomintang-Communist coalition, in the emergence of a Peoples’ Army, in the growth of cooperative industry and agriculture in the interior provinces, and in a genuine national regeneration of the Chinese masses. Despite the seizure of the coastal cities and the Yangtze Valley, the invaders were balked
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by peasant partisans and by the ill-clad and ill-armed divisions which Chiang's Government at Chungking was able to muster.

Subsequent revelations indicated that China at war was not quite what it seemed to be. On the face of things the Japanese invaders controlled Manchuria, the northern provinces, the coastal cities, and most of the Yangtze Valley under the puppet regime of Wang Ching-wei (d. November 10, 1944), while the Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek at Chungking, loyally allied with the Communist partisans of the north, offered staunch resistance in the rest of the land. In fact, matters were different. Most of the “Japanese-occupied” provinces were held and effectively administered by the Chinese Communists, who gave the invaders no peace and no chance to consolidate their conquests. In the south the shape of reality is suggested by family relationships among the holders of power. Sun Yat Sen and Chiang Kai-shek had married sisters, both daughters of “Charlie” Soong, Americanized Methodist, who begat three girls and three boys and made a fortune selling Bibles. The eldest daughter, Ai-ling Soong, married “Yaleman” H. H. Kung, who devoted himself to amassing riches. The second daughter, Ching-ling Soong, became the wife of Sun Yat Sen. The youngest daughter, Mei-ling Soong, wed Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. The first was devoted to wealth, the second to liberty, and the third to power. Chiang’s first loyalty was to power and privilege, as was that of his brother-in-law, T. V. Soong, who was made Foreign Minister in December, 1941. The ambitions of the Kungs and Soongs symbolized the corruption and nepotism of the Kuomintang, which consisted for the most part of a venal bureaucracy of civil and military spoilsmen, interested only in “squeeze”—i.e., graft. The well-advertised “heroization” of Chiang Kai-shek as a noble statesman and great commander cannot alter this judgment in view of the incontrovertible evidence of reliable witnesses and inexorable events.

Chiang’s “war” against Japan was largely mythical. Constant communiqués reporting “battles” and “victories” were largely the work of fiction writers. No less than 400,000 of Chiang’s troops went over to Wang Ching Wei and the Japanese—for they consisted of miserable peasants lacking funds to buy freedom from conscription, forced into the Army at gunpoint, and there condemned to disease, starvation, and death while their officers pocketed the funds meant for their sustenance. Chiang and his aides had no wish and no means to wage effective war. They represented the feudal landlords and the most benighted and corrupt elements of the business community. Their task was to maintain the social status quo by fighting its Red enemies and damning all liberals, democrats, and reformers as “Communist.” Chiang’s best troops were used to blockade the real Communists north of the
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The Yellow River. These in turn, for all their Marxist fanaticism and totalitarian intolerance, promoted agrarian reform, rural democracy, and common honesty in government. They also waged war against the Japanese. The Kuomintang Government, by contrast, wallowed in reaction, indifference, and greed. Out of this schism was born China's misery during and after the years of sorrow.

During the decade following 1937 the Chinese Communists, led by Chou En-lai and Mao Tso-tung, extended their authority from a few million peasants in the north to a population of 100,000,000 souls and their armed forces from 100,000 to 1,000,000 regular troops and 2,000,000 peasant partisans. This miracle was not a product of Soviet aid but was due almost entirely to the fact that in the eyes of the masses of Chinese peasants, workers, and even many businessmen the Communists, for all their sins, represented a hopeful alternative to the graft, feudal despotism, and brutal terrorism of the Kuomintang. The Communists' economic program was one not of Communism or even of socialism, save in the far future. It was, above all, one of dividing up large estates into individual peasant holdings, reducing rents, preventing exploitation, and assessing and collecting taxes honestly. It was also one of promoting mass literacy and education, fostering cooperatives, encouraging better methods of cultivation, and treating peasants as human beings. At no time did the Japanese invaders succeed in crushing the will or ability of the Communist forces to resist. But the enemy campaigns of 1942 isolated Chiang Kai-shek's China from America and Britain and raised the question as to how Chungking could be kept in the war at all, even in a formal sense.

Washington and London gave such encouragement and aid as they could, but the better advisers in the Western capitals knew that reform was the prerequisite of any effective war effort. On March 19, 1942, Lt. Gen. Joseph W. ("Vinegar Joe") Stilwell was made Commander in Chief of the Fifth and Sixth Chinese Armies fighting the foe in Burma. The colony was lost. "I claim," said Stilwell, "that we took a hell of a beating." He remained U.S. military adviser to the Kuomintang regime and Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek. With no ideological preconceptions but with earnest concern for honesty and efficiency, he strove to reform Chiang's barbarous, feudal, and corrupt military system and to foster interest in social progress and democratic policies as a means of winning popular support for the war. The U.S. and U.K. gave up extraterritoriality in China by the treaties of January 11, 1943. Mme Chiang visited Washington in February, addressed Congress, and charmed all her auditors with eloquent talk of democracy, freedom, and justice, none of which Stilwell could discover in the China of Chiang.

The inevitable crisis came in the autumn of 1944. In his manner of meet-
ing it, President Roosevelt may perhaps be held by later commentators to have made the gravest single error of his career. For the final decision condemned China to civil war and wove a pattern of American policy pointing toward World War III—both results which F.D.R. would have given his all to avoid. By summer, Japanese forces were overrunning much of South China, seizing all the forward bases of the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force, and demonstrating that they could take Chungking if they thought it worth the effort. Stilwell saw no hope without a complete reorganization of the Army and bureaucracy and an honest effort to meet mass aspirations. Donald M. Nelson and Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Secretary of War under Hoover, reached Chungking in August on special mission for F.D.R. Hurley’s assignment was to persuade Chiang to make Stilwell Commander in Chief of all Chinese forces, to promote administrative and military reform, and to effect a genuine accord between the Kuomintang and the Communists for a democratic coalition regime and full cooperation against Japan. In all these tasks he failed, partly out of ignorance and brashness (said his less charitable critics), but more because Chiang’s pride, avarice, lust for power, and love for the status quo led him not merely to reject all advice but finally to demand Stilwell’s recall.

To this demand F.D.R. yielded on October 28, 1944—probably against his better judgment and out of anxiety lest Chiang abandon the war entirely. Stilwell was relieved of his posts as Chief of Staff to Chiang, Deputy to Lord Louis Mountbatten, and U.S. Chief of Staff in the China-Burma-India theater. His successor was Maj. Gen. Albert G. Wedemeyer, who had no passion for reform and who, with Hurley, now became the chief American figure on the Chinese scene. Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss resigned in protest and was succeeded by Hurley on November 27, 1944. In December, T. V. Soong assumed the premiership. Chiang rejected Communist proposals for a democratic coalition. Hurley came to share Chiang’s views. United States aid was denied to Chinese Communist troops, who were fighting the Japanese, and increased to Chiang, who kept it to fight the Communists. The design for the mournful events to come was here drawn.

F.D.R. explained the rift between Stilwell and Chiang as “personal,” which was considerably short of the truth. As the realities of the situation began to leak out, Thoburn Wiant of the Associated Press reported from London (Oct. 31, 1944) what he had been unable to report from Chungking—viz., that Chiang’s regime was a miasma of corruption, greed, incompetence, secret dealings for profit with the Japanese, and determination to use American supplies only for purposes of graft and of fighting the Communists. “The Generalissimo and his party leaders are primarily interested in perpetuating themselves. Democracy does not exist in China. . . . There is no freedom of speech, or of press, or of much of anything else. There are secret police, concentration camps and firing squads for those who dare to speak or write out of turn. . . . Stilwell did everything humanly possible. . . .”
With the Japanese surrender, open civil war in China became imminent. Hurley flew to Yenan, the Communist headquarters, in August, brought Mao Tse-tung back to Chungking, and fostered prolonged negotiations in the autumn. The U.S.A., which had already persuaded Chungking to accept the Yalta accord,\textsuperscript{17} could doubtless have compelled a compromise, but only by withholding aid to Chiang. In fact, U.S. ships and airplanes carried tens of thousands of Chiang’s troops to North China, ostensibly to accept surrender of Japanese forces, but actually to prepare war against the Communists, an enterprise in which Chinese puppet troops and even Japanese units were welcomed. Despite some local truce agreements, civil war was under way by November, the U.S.A. openly aiding the Kuomintang. Moscow gave no aid to the Communists but made extensive removals of machinery from Manchuria and finally withdrew troops in April, 1946, save for garrisons at Dairen and Port Arthur, under circumstances which enabled the Chinese Communists to occupy most of Manchuria and secure various stores of Japanese arms and supplies. Meanwhile Hurley resigned with a bang on November 27, 1945, charging that he had been betrayed by “Communist sympathizers” in the Foreign Service and by “subversives” in the State Department—meaning all who were dubious about giving unlimited aid to Chiang to destroy the “Red menace.”

President Truman now appointed Gen. George C. Marshall as special envoy to China and announced on December 15 that the U.S.A. favored peace and unity, a democratic regime, nonintervention, and material aid and loans to the National Government if unity and peace could be attained. On January 10, 1946, with Marshall as mediator, Gen. Chang Chung for the Kuomintang and Gen. Chou En-lai for the Communists signed a general truce agreement, while Chiang promised land reform and plans for a coalition regime and a democratic constitution. Marshall reported to Washington in March. When he returned to Chungking in April, the truce had broken down, the political compromise had collapsed, and local fighting had been renewed. Each side accused the other of bad faith. Chiang and his most reactionary advisers, still certain of U.S. aid, saw no need of compromise and launched all-out war against their Communist foes and democratic critics. Profs. Li Kung-po and Wen Yi-tu, both leaders of the Democratic League, which was the only truly liberal political group in China, were assassinated in Kunming in July. Mme Sun Yat Sen declared bitterly that China was on “the road to disaster” and that U.S. troops and U.S. aid to the reactionaries were ensuring civil war.

On August 10, 1946, Marshall and Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart de-

\textsuperscript{17} See p. 233.
clared that peace between the Kuomintang and the Communists “appears impossible.” A few weeks later, agreements were concluded for the transfer to the National Government of almost $1,000,000,000 worth of surplus American equipment in China and the western Pacific. “It is inconceivable,” said Chou En-lai on September 1, “that American peace envoys can mediate in China while the U.S.A. Government and the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force give full assistance to the Kuomintang to wage war.” Stuart expressed hope in October for “another internal revolution” in China against the “narrowly partisan or selfishly unscrupulous or ignorantly reactionary forces among her own people.” Chiang, after securing a comprehensive treaty of friendship and commerce with the U.S.A. (November 4), summoned a National Assembly in Nanking, which the Communists and the Democratic League refused to attend, and obtained from it a new Constitution, to go into effect December 25, 1947. Truman (December 18, 1946) issued another ambiguous statement on American policy in China. That policy, in truth, was one of criticizing but condoning reaction and corruption, praising liberals but doing nothing to lighten their task, giving support to Chiang to wage war on the Communists, and calling the whole a program of “nonintervention” and beneficent solicitude for China’s welfare.

General Marshall’s carefully balanced report issued on January 7, 1947, deplored the “almost overwhelming suspicion” between the Communists and Kuomintang; assailed the “dominant role of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government”; praised the Communists, among whom “it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at corruption”; denounced the Communists for ruthlessness, “vicious propaganda,” hatred of America, “pure fabrication,” and “deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the action, policies and purposes of our Government”; and regretted military influence in Nanking.

Between the dominant reactionary group in the Government and the irreconcilable Communists, who, I must state, did not so appear last February, lies the problem of how peace and well being are to be brought to the long-suffering and presently inarticulate mass of the people of China. The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted upon substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interests are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government. . . . The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals. . . . Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government.
Fire and blood were the fruits of this failure of a mission, with 271 U.S. Navy vessels going to Chiang in April and 130,000,000 rounds of ammunition in June, some 6,000 American troops remaining in China throughout 1947, and material aid estimated to have a value of $3,000,000,000 going to the Kuomintang since V-J day. In January, 1947, the State Department ended all efforts at mediation. At the Moscow Conference of March, Marshall rejected Molotov’s proposal for a three-Power discussion of China. On March 19, a week after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, Kuomintang troops took Yenan, long the Red capital. Other troops, with American weapons and supplies, presently wrested the main cities of Shantung from the enemy and clung precariously to the towns and railways of southern Manchuria. But those who supposed that Chiang could now do what he had failed to do in 20 years of trying were soon disenchanted. By the close of 1947 the Chinese Communists, through a program of daring raids, evasive tactics, peasant mobilization, and adroit combinations of political and military warfare, had retaken most of Shantung, swept the countryside in most of the provinces north of the Yangtze, crossed the river at several points, and brought under their control more of the territory and population of China than ever before.

Chiang’s regime, like that of the Bourbons, learned nothing and forgot nothing. In the inner circle the “Political Science Group,” headed by Wang Shih-chieh and Gen. Chang Chung (who became Premier in mid-April, 1947), vied for power with the “C.C. clique,” headed by the brothers Chen Kuo-fu and Chen Li-fu. Corruption, repression, and currency inflation brought all the realm to the brink of ruin. When the “liberated” Formosans protested at abuses in February, thousands of them were butchered by Chiang’s troops. In July President Truman sent General Wedemeyer back to China on special mission. In a statement of August 24, Wedemeyer commented on Chinese “apathy,” “lethargy,” and “defeatism.” He appealed to the Communists, if “truly patriotic and interested primarily in the well being of their country,” to “stop voluntarily the employment of force in their efforts to impose ideologies”—and to the Government to remove “incompetent and corrupt people who now occupy many positions of responsibility.” “To regain and maintain the confidence of the people, the Central Government will have to put into effect immediately drastic and far-reaching political and economic reforms. Promises will no longer suffice. Performance is absolutely necessary. It should be accepted that military force in itself will not eliminate Communism.”

Premier Chang replied that “Chinese policy is fixed and will not be changed.” The Democratic League was suppressed in October, and most of its leaders were arrested. Wedemeyer’s final report was kept secret by the
State Department and the White House but was rumored to contemplate further aid to Chiang Kai-shek, perhaps in return for naval and air bases. In elaborating the Marshall Plan to Congress, the Secretary of State spoke of the possible grant of $300,000,000 to China . . .

By 1948 the Chinese tragedy, like every other major problem in a disordered world, had fallen under the spell of the global conflict between Moscow and Washington. The men of Moscow had not openly intervened on behalf of the Chinese Communists, nor had they any need to—for most of the American arms and supplies sent to the Kuomintang passed into Communist hands through capture or graft. The Government at Nanking, consistently aided by Washington, left nothing undone to promote the steady expansion of Communist influence and power throughout the provinces. America was not yet prepared to wage total war against the Chinese Communists, despite the voices (e.g., those of Walter Judd, Freda Utley, William C. Bullitt, et al.) raised in support of policies which would lead toward such a decision. The end of such a war, if launched, might be no different from that of the anti-Communist crusades carried on for most of a generation by Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese war lords. Should a different ending appear probable, the Kremlin would embark upon counterintervention. Moscow could not safely permit the establishment of a Fascist China, supported by American money and arms. Washington could not safely permit the establishment of a Communist China, supported by Soviet favors and force. The policies of both and the nature of China's agony appeared to preclude any early hope for an independent, democratic China. Therefore . . .?

Despite a black present and a possibly blacker future, eternal China would somehow go on and would doubtless exist as a culture and a community long after America and Russia had atom-bombed each other to limbo. China's current plight is old. Its essence was never better put than by Confucius, 2,400 years ago:

What is the need of killing off people on the part of the ruler of a country? If you desire what is good, the people will become good also. The character of a ruler is like wind, and the character of the common people is like grass, and the grass bends in the direction of the wind. . . . When the ruler himself does what is right, he will have influence over the people without giving commands, and when the ruler himself does not do what is right, all his commands will be of no avail. . . . If a ruler rectifies his own conduct, government is an easy matter, and if he does not rectify his own conduct, how can he rectify others? 18

“Very true,” said the Duchess: “flamingoes and mustard both bite. And the moral of that is—‘Birds of a feather flock together.’”

“Only mustard isn’t a bird,” Alice remarked.

“Right, as usual,” said the Duchess: “what a clear way you have of putting things!”

“It’s a mineral, I think,” said Alice.

“Oh, I know!” exclaimed Alice, who had not attended to this last remark. “It’s a vegetable. It doesn’t look like one, but it is.”

“I quite agree with you,” said the Duchess; “and the moral of that is—‘Be what you would seem to be’—or, if you’d like it put more simply —‘Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise.’”

—Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.

The “white man’s burden” in the 20th century is promising to break the back of the bearer. The imperial nation-states have come into increasingly acute and disastrous conflict with one another over control of backward regions. The revolt of the colonial peoples has threatened the destruction of the empires. The efforts of the empire builders to meet this double danger have assumed a variety of forms, ranging from a deliberate repudiation of imperialism and the grant of complete or partial independence to subject populations, to belated attempts on the part of rival imperial governments to compose their differences and evolve common programs of cooperative action.

Among the earlier efforts to diminish international frictions arising out of imperial rivalries were proposals to “internationalize” areas of tension, with economic opportunities open on equal terms to the nationals of all States, or to partition such areas in some mutually satisfactory fashion. The port of Tangier, commanding the western entrance to the Mediterranean, was long a focal point of international rivalries. The “Convention Regarding the Organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone,” signed December 18, 1923, left “sovereignty” in the hands of the Sultan of Morocco (controlled by France), but placed the government of the city in the hands of a Committee of Control and an international Legislative Assembly. The seizure of the zone by Franco’s Spain in June, 1940, temporarily terminated these arrangements. In 1906, joint Anglo-French control was established over the
New Hebrides, with a Joint High Commission, a Joint Court, and a Joint Naval Commission. The Samoan Islands were under a joint Anglo-German-American condominium from 1889 to 1899, when they were partitioned. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was under the joint administration of Britain and Egypt. International control of this type is almost always unsatisfactory and is usually unsuccessful in the long run. Either one of the participating States secures a controlling voice in the administration, as at Tangier and in the mandates, or the checks and balances provided for lead to endless friction in which the interests of the natives are forgotten.

The "Open Door" represents an alternative solution which may be applied either to the possessions of colonial Powers or to the regions of imperialist competition which are still independent. As an abstraction, it means simply equality of economic opportunity in backward regions and equal treatment to nationals of all States without favors or discriminations. It is to trade and investment in colonial areas what most-favored-nation treatment is to the commerce among the Western States. As a concrete policy, the Open Door was championed most vigorously by States fearing the exclusion of their merchants and investors from some lucrative field of profit making. In principle, it was accepted by most States, since each State desires to prevent others from barring out its nationals from attractive preserves. In practice, it was ignored by most States in certain areas where the profits of special privilege and discrimination were large. In theory, it tends to minimize political friction arising out of economic rivalries for markets by keeping such markets open on a basis of equality to all—"open" here meaning that customs tariffs, port duties, taxes, railway, steamship, and telegraph rates, judicial procedure, and law enforcement shall afford equal privileges for, and impose equal burdens upon, the nationals of all countries. Markets will then be conquered by price and quality, rather than by the sword or by political and economic favors and discriminations. But the policy was accepted less because of its theoretical advantages than because each State, in its quest for power and profits, had a tangible interest in keeping open trading opportunities in the colonies of other States and in preventing its rivals from converting independent areas into spheres of monopolistic exploitation.

Various efforts have been made to ensure by treaty the observance of the Open Door in colonies. The General Act of Berlin of 1885 provided for the maintenance of equality of economic opportunity in the Congo Basin. Originally no tariff duties whatever were permitted in this area. In 1890 a 10% ad valorem tariff was permitted by international agreement. In 1919 all limitations on the height of tariff walls were removed, subject to the condition that duties must be applied equally and in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
At the same time an effort was made to apply the Open Door to other parts of Africa, but without success. In 1885 Germany and Great Britain agreed to observe the Open Door in their possessions on the Gulf of Guinea, and in 1898 Great Britain and France made a similar agreement for West Africa. The Anglo-German agreement of 1886 guaranteed the Open Door in the Pacific possessions of the two Powers. The Anglo-German-American agreement of 1899 contained a like provision for Samoa. But such arrangements are frequently violated, either openly or through various subtle favors and discriminations contrary to the spirit of the Open Door.

In the backward regions which are not colonies but are still held by native States, the scramble for markets and concessions led to the setting up of “spheres of influence” by the imperial Powers, in order that their nationals may enjoy exclusive opportunities for profit making in these areas. International agreements for the creation of such spheres usually contemplate the closing of the door to nationals of outside States. The Anglo-Russian compact of 1907 over Persia, the Franco-German agreement of 1914 relating to Turkey, the inter-Allied secret treaties of 1915-17 dealing with the Near East, and sundry agreements concerning Africa and the Pacific were of this character. The pressure of outside States and the interests of the participating States have led, in some of these situations, to treaties for the preservation of the Open Door. The German-Russian agreement of 1910 pledged the parties to observe the Open Door in their respective spheres in Persia and Turkey. The Anglo-Franco-Italian agreement of 1906 over Ethiopia pledged equality of treatment in harbor and railway matters and cooperation in the acquisition of concessions. The Act of Algeciras of 1906 provided for “economic liberty without inequality” in Morocco. The U.S.A. was a party to this Act. It has been the most consistent champion of the Open Door everywhere, save in the Caribbean and in its own possessions. The geographical position of the U.S.A. long made it difficult for the American Government to acquire exclusive spheres of interest for its nationals in Africa or Asia. In order to prevent their exclusion from the spheres of other Powers on these continents, it has striven to secure general recognition of the Open Door principle in treaties.

In recent decades the most acute diplomatic controversies over the Open Door have centered in China. In the 19th century the problem was primarily one of trading privileges. When such privileges were forcibly wrested from China by the European Powers in the First and Second Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1858-60), the U.S.A. secured the same favors for its own citizens by the simple device of concluding most-favored-nation commercial treaties with the Chinese Government, obliging it to grant to American nationals as favorable treatment as had been granted, or might in the future be granted,
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to those of other States. American commerce in China was protected in this fashion by the Cushing Treaty of 1844 and the Burlingame Treaty of 1868. Later the outlying dependencies of the Empire—the Amur River provinces, the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, Hongkong, Korea, Annam, Tonkin, etc.—were detached and annexed by more powerful neighboring States. Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, there began that scramble for leaseholds and concessions which seemed to foreshadow the partitioning of the entire country into colonial possessions or spheres of foreign influence. Within each of these a particular Power would monopolize opportunities for trade, investment, and railway construction for its own mercantile and financial groups. Under these circumstances, the U.S.A. could hold itself aloof and thus lose its Chinese market, it could participate in the scramble—which would have been difficult in view of its inability to exercise its power effectively in the Far East—or it could seek to induce all the Powers to accept the Open Door principle. It chose the latter course for obvious reasons. In spite of her Oriental possessions and spheres of influence, Great Britain had a similar interest in blocking French and Russian monopolistic designs on China. In 1898 the British Associated Chambers of Commerce dispatched a mission to China, headed by Lord Beresford, who subsequently championed the Open Door and the territorial integrity of China in his speeches in the U.S.A. American commercial interests engaged in Chinese trade likewise brought pressure to bear upon the State Department.

On September 6, 1899, Secretary of State John Hay issued his famous circular letter, calling upon the Powers to subscribe to the principle that they would not interfere with Chinese tariff duties, harbor dues, or railway

19 Caleb Cushing's instructions declared, "You will signify in decided terms and in a positive manner that the Government of the United States would find it impossible to remain on terms of friendship and regard with the Emperor if greater privileges or commercial facilities should be allowed to the subjects of any other government than should be granted to citizens of the United States." The Treaty of Wang-hsia of July 3, 1844 (Article 2), provided, "Citizens of the United States . . . shall in no case be subject to other or higher duties than are or shall be required of the people of any nation whatever. . . . And if conditional advantages or privileges, of whatever description, be conceded hereafter by China to any other nation, the United States and the citizens thereof shall be entitled thereupon to a complete, equal, and impartial participation in the same." Secretary of State Fish commented on the Burlingame Treaty of 1868, "The general principle which underlies the articles of July, 1868, is the recognition of the sovereign authority of the Imperial Government at Peking over the people of the Chinese Empire and over their social, commercial, and political relations with the Western Powers. . . . While it confirms the international jurisdiction conferred by former treaties upon European and American functionaries over the persons and properties of their countrymen, it recognizes at the same time the territorial integrity of China and prevents such a jurisdiction from being stretched beyond its original purpose."
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rates or with treaty ports or vested interests in their spheres of influence in China. Great Britain agreed at once, with France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and finally Russia following suit. On March 20, 1900, Hay announced that the American Government would regard the acceptance of the principle as "final and definitive." On July 3, 1900, following the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion, Hay dispatched a second circular note to the Powers in which he urged action to "bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." In the Root-Takahira agreement of November 30, 1908, Japan and the U.S.A. agreed to maintain the status quo and to "preserve the common interest of all Powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire." American friction with Japan over these issues became acute after 1914. The Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 3, 1917, reiterated the principles already agreed upon; but the U.S.A. recognized that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries" and that "Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." This admission was withdrawn in 1923, following the Washington Conference. Here Washington was successful in securing for the first time the incorporation of the Open Door doctrine into a general treaty to which China itself was a party. The Nine Power Pact of February 6, 1922, entered into by Japan, the U.S.A., the U.K., France, Italy, China, Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands, declared (Article I):

The contracting Powers, other than China, agree: (1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

The Powers also agreed (Article III) not to support their nationals in seeking monopolies or preferences prejudicial to nationals of other Powers or "any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China" or (Article IV) "any agreements . . . designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the
enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.” The treaty of the same date relating to the Chinese customs tariff likewise provided for equality of treatment. The resolutions of the Conference set up a Board of Reference to which questions arising out of these obligations might be submitted (third resolution) and provided for publicity of all treaties, agreements, and private contracts for concessions, franchises, and other privileges in China (tenth resolution). These agreements did not invalidate existing concessions and spheres or pass judgment as to whether they were in conformity with the Open Door principle. The Board of Reference was to deal only with future concessions and contracts. The publicity provisions were ineffective, and general abstract principles were not translated into definite and specific engagements accompanied by adequate international machinery to ensure observance of the Open Door.

It soon became clear that the future of the Open Door in China was by no means safeguarded by these treaty arrangements and that the door was in process of being gradually pushed shut in the Japanese sphere and, to a lesser degree, in the British and French spheres. The Japanese seizure of Manchuria and the creation of the puppet State of Manchukuo were regarded at Washington and Geneva as a violation of the Nine Power Pact. The Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition of agreements, situations, or territorial gains achieved by force was motivated as much by a desire to protect the American conception of the Open Door in China as by regard for the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The only ultimate safeguard of the Open Door is China’s own power to protect herself from aggression and to keep her territories open on equal terms to nationals of all States.

The Mandate System. The most significant international efforts to deal effectively with the double problem of imperialism—that of protecting native interests and that of keeping the peace among the empire builders—are to be found in the Mandate System, devised at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and administered by the League of Nations, and in the Trusteeship System of the United Nations.

Out of a complex background of “self-determination,” “rights of small nations,” political expediency, and humanitarian sentiments, there emerged the ideas which were subsequently incorporated into Article 22 of the League Covenant and into the mandate agreements. On December 16, 1918, Gen. Jan Smuts of South Africa published a scheme for the international control of certain regions formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary and Turkey. He had no expectation that his plan would be applied to the former German colonies in Africa, since it was contemplated that these would be annexed by the victors. President Wilson enlarged upon this plan in his second draft of the Covenant (January 10, 1919) and argued vigorously for
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its general application to the outlying possessions of the defeated Powers. In his Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918, Wilson had declared that "the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined" (fifth point) and that "the nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development" (twelfth point).

At Paris, however, these proposals encountered the annexationist aspirations which had been incorporated into the secret treaties negotiated during the war. Under the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, and other inter-Allied commitments of the same period, the former Turkish possessions in the Near East were to be partitioned between Great Britain and France. These Powers had likewise agreed to the division of the German African colonies which their military forces had occupied, and Japan had secret treaties of February-March, 1917, with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, whereby she was promised the German Pacific islands north of the Equator. But outright annexation was precluded by the pledges made during the war to certain native chieftains, notably in Arabia, and by the idealistic verbiage in which Allied war aims had been clothed. Complete independence for these regions was never seriously contemplated, and their restoration to Germany and Turkey was of course inconceivable. The distribution of the territories was already provided for in the secret treaties, and these would be followed in any case. The only question was the form in which the victors should take control. France desired to recruit black troops in the new African territories allotted to her. The British Dominions sought to close their new territories to foreign trade and immigration. Wilson secured general acceptance of the mandate principle only by yielding to the British Dominions on the Open Door, to France on the recruitment of native soldiers, and to all the Allies on the maintenance of the territorial allocation provided for in the secret treaties.

Article 22 of the League Covenant in its final form referred to the former enemy territories, "which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." To these territories was to be applied the principle "that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant." The "tutelage" of such peoples was to be entrusted to the "advanced nations" best able to assume this responsibility and was to be "exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League."

By Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was compelled to renounce her colonies to the principal Allied and Associated Powers. Dur-
ing the Peace Conference, they were distributed with few departures from the terms of the secret treaties. On May 7, 1919, the Pacific islands were divided among Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, subject to an informal reservation by President Wilson regarding the island of Yap, which he thought ought to be an internationalized cable center. German South-West Africa was assigned to the Union of South Africa, German East Africa to Great Britain, and Togoland and Cameroons were partitioned between Britain and France. The French Government originally insisted upon full sovereignty but finally contented itself with annexing that portion of Cameroons ceded to Germany in 1911. France insisted, however, upon her right to recruit troops in her African mandates for general war purposes, in spite of Article 22 of the Covenant. Belgium objected to the transfer of all of East Africa to Britain and on May 30, 1919, was granted Ruanda-Urundi by the British Government. Portugal demanded a mandate but received merely recognition of her sovereignty over Kionga, a small territory adjacent to Mozambique which she had recognized as belonging to Germany in 1894. The Turkish territory was distributed at San Remo on April 25, 1920.
British and French Governments failed to cooperate with Wilson in his efforts to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. He had sent the King-Crane Commission to the Near East in June-July, 1919. Its report revealed that Arab sentiment favored an independent united Syria, including Pales-
nexations. But following the Turkish Nationalist victory over the Greeks these regions were restored to Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.

The actual "mandates" in the legal sense were the agreements concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers under the direction of the Supreme Council. It was here that the A, B, and C classification was made, in conformity with the three categories mentioned in Article 22 of the Covenant. Japan objected to the Closed Door in the British Pacific mandates. The U.S.A. objected that British oil interests had been granted exclusive privileges in Palestine and Iraq. It expressed its regret over the San Remo oil agreement of December 23, 1920, whereby Britain granted France a 25% share of the oil resources of Mesopotamia. The American Government reasserted the Open Door principle and declared that although it was not a member of the League it would not submit to the exclusion of its nationals from the benefits of equality of treatment. Lord Curzon agreed in principle to these contentions in February, 1921, but declared that American policy in the Philippines, Haiti, and Costa Rica was not consistent with the Open Door. In November, 1925, American oil interests (Rockefeller, Sinclair, and Doheny) were granted 25% of the shares of the Turkish Petroleum Company, which secured from Iraq an exclusive concession for the exploitation of the oil resources of the Bagdad and Mosul areas. The U.S.A. likewise objected to the omission of the Yap reservation in the Japanese mandate. Washington subsequently concluded treaties with Japan, France, Britain, and Belgium, safeguarding the rights of American nationals to equal treatment. These negotiations delayed final action on the mandate agreements. All these instruments were subject to confirmation by the League Council. The C mandates were confirmed by the Council on December 17, 1920. The B mandates were similarly confirmed on July 20, 1922.

Additional delays occurred before the A mandates were finally approved. The Palestine mandate was objected to by the Papacy, the Moslems, the Jews, and the British House of Lords—all for different and mutually incompatible reasons. Italy objected to confirmation of both the Palestine and the Syrian mandates. These mandates were tentatively confirmed by the Council on July 22, 1922, and subsequently given full approval with the announcement of a Franco-Italian agreement on September 29, 1923. The Arabs of Mesopotamia revolted against the British mandate, with the result that Great Britain recognized the Kingdom of Iraq, with Feisal, son of King Hussein of the Hejaz, as its ruler. A British-Iraq Treaty of October 10, 1922, to be in effect for four years, defined British power in the new State and raised doubts as to whether Iraq was still a mandate or not. On September 27, 1924, the Council approved a document which made Iraq a British mandate but accepted the new treaty provisions, along with supplementary British
pledges defining the mandatory’s obligations. The boundary dispute over the Mosul district between Iraq and Turkey was submitted to the League Council by the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923. The Council award granting the district to Iraq was contingent upon Britain’s remaining mandatory for 25 years, unless Iraq should be admitted earlier to the League. On March 11, 1926, the Council ratified the Mosul award, following a new British-Iraq Treaty of January 13. On June 5, 1926, Turkey recognized the new boundary in return for the neutralization of the frontier and 10% of the Iraq oil royalties. A third British-Iraq Treaty of December 14, 1927, was not ratified; and on November 4, 1929, the British Government announced that it would recommend Iraq for admission to the League in 1932. On October 3, 1932, Iraq became the fifty-seventh member of the League of Nations by a vote of the Assembly and thus began its career as an independent State under British protection.

In these final arrangements, the original principle of the Mandate System was “mutilated in details and sullied by the spirit of barter.” 20 The essential

20 Quincy Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations, 1930, p. 63.
purposes of the secret treaties were carried out. The wishes of the population
were ignored in Palestine and Syria and not even consulted elsewhere. In
Togoland and Cameroons, France was permitted to use native troops for
general war purposes outside the territory. The Open Door, formerly main-
tained by Germany in the C mandates, was closed by the mandatories. It
was protected in the A mandates neither by the Covenant nor by the man-
date agreements, but only by subsequent treaties, negotiated largely at the
insistence of the United States. Only in the B mandates was there a definite
obligation laid upon the mandatories to maintain the Open Door. The Powers
seemed to regard the mandates as annexations, as shown by the “compensa-
tions” granted to Italy in Jubaland (Kenya Colony), in the Jarabud oasis,
in Egypt, and in a strip of eastern Tunis. For all practical purposes, the C
mandates were treated as annexations, and the B mandate administration
was scarcely distinguishable from what would have been established after
outright conquest. The A mandates were also under the effective control
of the mandatories.

In all these regions save Iraq, the aspirations of the inhabitants toward
independence and self-determination were crushed with the same ruthlessness
which has characterized imperialism everywhere. When, in 1922, the Bondel-
swarts tribe in Southwest Africa resisted governmental measures designed
to further the economic interests of the white settlers at the expense of the
natives, South Africa replied with machine guns and bombing planes, which
slaughtered scores of men, women, and children in the native villages. In
Palestine the chronic friction between Arabs and Jews, engendered by British
and Zionist efforts to create a Jewish settlement in what is preponderantly
a Moslem country, led to rioting and strife, the British authorities (in the
eyes of the Arab leaders) acting in accordance with the ancient principle
of divida et impera. The Syrians were subjected to French control against
their wishes, and they indulged in insurrections almost annually until 1927.
The Jebel Druse revolt of 1925 was repressed with the utmost severity by
the French military forces, which attempted to terrorize the population into
submission by destroying with artillery the whole central area of the ancient
city of Damascus, with the loss of thousands of lives. Other disorders in Iraq,
Western Samoa, and elsewhere were likewise dealt with by punitive expedi-
tions and violent reprisals, as seems inevitable where white imperialists rule
natives, regardless of the form of administration. Africans and Polynesians
were unable to distinguish the new modes of oppression and exploitation
from the old. The Moslem leaders of the Near East waxed indignant over
the new dispensation. Imperialist diplomats condemned the system as in-
volving all the obligations of annexation, with few of the advantages. Ger-
mans, Americans, Turks, Russians, and Arabs jeered at the mandate prin-
principle as a hollow mockery. The mandatory Governments usually refused to spend any more money on the mandates than they collected in local revenue, and they tended to treat the mandates as outright conquests. In the light of these circumstances, cynics and pessimists concluded that the System was a hypocritical sham, designed to disguise old imperialistic wolves in new sheep's clothing.\textsuperscript{21}

Regardless of these shortcomings, the Mandate System represented a significant adventure in international supervision over backward areas.\textsuperscript{22} The whole procedure of League supervision centered in the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC). In accordance with the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, this body was established by the Council to advise it on mandate questions. It was originally composed of 9 members, with a majority of nationals of nonmandatory Powers. In 1924, M. Rappard, formerly head of the Mandates Section of the Secretariat, was made an "extraordinary member" and provision was also made for an advisory member from the International Labor Office (ILO). In 1927 the number of regular members was increased to 10, in order to provide a place for a German national.

The observations of the PMC were purely advisory, but in practice it became the agent of the Council, through which international supervision was exercised. The PMC received its information from the annual reports of the mandatory Powers, from questioning their representatives, and from petitions submitted by the inhabitants of the mandated regions. Such petitions, however, could be submitted only through the mandatory Government, and the Commission refused to consider petitions opposing the mandate itself. In March, 1927, the Council decided that petitioners should not be granted oral hearing. The PMC also received information from other League bodies, but it never visited the mandated areas nor dispatched investigators to them.

A survey of the Commission's proceedings leads to the conclusion that it was primarily dependent upon the mandatory Powers for information and that the native populations, in whose interest the whole System was presumably established, had little opportunity for the independent presentation of grievances or for a full and impartial hearing. The Commission did serve to mobilize opinion and, by its suggestions, influenced the conduct of the mandatories to some degree and made a beginning of establishing inter-

\textsuperscript{21} See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 64-98, "The Reception of the System," for a résumé of favorable and unfavorable evaluations.

\textsuperscript{22} At the conclusion of an exhaustive discussion of the legal aspects of the Mandate System, Quincy Wright concludes that "sovereignty of the areas is vested in the League, acting through the Covenant-amending process, and is exercised by the mandatory with consent of the Council for eventful transfer to the mandated communities themselves" \textit{(ibid., p. 530).}
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national standards of colonial administration. But it cannot be said that the
PMC acted vigorously as a bold and independent agency determined to
protect native interests, regardless of the prestige of the mandatories. Whether
international friction in the backward regions was greater or less, whether
the natives were better off or worse off than would have been the case under
some alternative arrangement, no one can say with any degree of certainty.
The collapse of the League and the war of 1939, which was, among other
things, an “imperialist war,” brought the system to an abrupt and ignoble end.

In the last analysis, the essential nature of imperialism constitutes a stub-
born obstacle to the complete success of the efforts reviewed above. Im-
perialism is the imposition by force and violence of alien rule upon subject
peoples, despite all moralizings and pretensions to the contrary. The empires
of today are maintained by holding dissatisfied backward peoples in sub-
jection. The empires of the future will be created by the same process. Force
to the utmost has been and still is the final arbiter in disputes between sub-
ject peoples and imperial governments and among the imperial States them-
selves. Those who are ruled submit willingly to forcible control by rulers
when they feel that the rulers represent themselves, or symbolize certain
common interests of the whole community, or are acting disinterestedly on
behalf of the welfare of their subjects. They resent coercion, and resist it
when they have the means, in every situation in which the rulers are set
apart from themselves by race, language, culture, or cleavages of economic
interests. The first and most elementary defense reaction on the part of
imperial governments in the face of resistance from their subjects is to crush
such resistance by force and to adopt policies designed to enfeeble their
victims and to destroy their identity.

The U.N. Trusteeship System. The replacement of the League by the
United Nations in the wake of World War II was accompanied by the
substitution of a new international Trusteeship System for the old mandate
arrangements. The novelty was more formal than factual. On the basis of
the preliminary agreement reached at Yalta, the Charter made provi-
sion for trust territories, in which the United Nations would undertake
responsibilities of government for the purpose of promoting peace and
security, the progress of the inhabitants toward self-government, and respect
for human rights, freedom, equality, justice, etc. The new System was to
be applied, via trusteeship agreements, to mandated territories, territories

23 See p. 229.
24 See Chaps. XII and XIII (Arts. 75-91) of the Charter, Appendix I.
detached from enemy States, and other territories voluntarily placed under supervision. The terms of trusteeship, including any subsequent alteration, “shall be agreed upon by the States directly concerned” (Article 79), subject to approval by the Security Council for “strategic areas” and by the General Assembly for ordinary “trust territories.” This new dichotomy replaced the League classification of mandates as A, B, and C. Strategic areas (Article 82) might be designated in any trusteeship agreement to include part or all of any trust territory. In both the administering authority might make use of local military resources, human and material, for local defense, maintenance of law and order, and fulfillment of obligations toward the Security Council for the “maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 84).

A Trusteeship Council, consisting of member States administering trust territories, plus those of the Big Five not in this category and an equal number of other States elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly, was empowered to consider reports from the administering States, accept and examine petitions “in consultation with the administering authority,” provide for periodic visits “at times agreed upon with the administering authority,” and prepare questionnaires on the political, economic, social, and educational advancements of the inhabitants—on the basis of which each trustee would make annual reports to the General Assembly.

These arrangements were supplemented by a general injunction (Chapter XI) that all member States administering non-self-governing territories, whether or not under trusteeship, should “recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount” and should therefore promote progress, justice, freedom, self-government, peace, security, development, research, cooperation, good-neighborliness, etc.—and should submit data relevant thereto to the Secretary-General, “subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require” (Article 73). The new System, judged by the criterion of effective international supervision over the control of subject peoples, was a step backward with respect to local fortifications and recruitment of native troops for overseas service and maintenance of the Open Door, which had been required in the A and B mandates but was not specified in the U.N. Charter. It was a step forward in that the Trusteeship Council was a body of governmental delegates rather than independent experts, as was the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), although some authorities doubted whether this was an improvement. The Trusteeship Council may also arrange local visits of inspection, as the PMC could not. Conversely, the Council’s powers with respect to strategic areas are so limited and vague as to be meaningless.
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In practice, the changes effected are scarcely calculated to convince colonial peoples or anyone else that any revolutionary reformation has been brought about in the arts of imperialism. Although the Charter made possible the transfer to the new dispensation of nonmandated territories and the establishment of joint trusteeships over other non-self-governing areas, no such steps had been taken up to the time of writing, except for Nauru.25 The General Assembly created an ad hoc Committee (over the opposition of the colonial powers) which met in August-September, 1947, to examine the Secretary-General’s summary and analysis of information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter (q.v.). But it was not apparent in 1948 that anything new would emerge from this procedure. As regards the submission of trusteeship agreements, no proposals were made for territories other than League mandates. Among the former A mandates, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Trans-Jordan were already independent. The status of Palestine has been discussed above. Britain, Belgium, and France submitted agreements on the B mandates: Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, Togoland, and Cameroons. As for the C mandates, Australia and New Zealand submitted agreements for New Guinea and Western Samoa, respectively. Nauru remained in doubt until Australia, New Zealand, and the U.K. submitted a draft on September 27, 1947, providing for joint administration. The curious instance of the former Japanese mandates will be considered below. The Union of South Africa in 1946-47 stubbornly refused to submit South-West Africa to the Trusteeship System and insisted instead on outright annexation—a position comparable to the Union’s refusal, despite Indian protests and U.N. resolves, to modify its discriminatory legislation against its Hindu residents.

The General Assembly on December 13, 1946, approved the eight agreements already submitted after 229 proposals for modification had been made and, for the most part, rejected. The U.S.S.R. voted against the agreements on the ground that they violated the Charter, since “the States directly concerned” had not been consulted, and that the drafts contained provisions indistinguishable from annexation and provided for military bases without the consent of the Security Council. The Trusteeship Council, which the U.S.S.R. boycotted until April, 1948, met for the first time March 26, 1947. It consisted of the U.S.A., France, Britain, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, China, Mexico, and Iraq—the latter two being elected by the Assembly. Francis B. Sayre was elected President and Sir Carl Berendson of New

25 See “Regionalism and Spheres of Influence” by the author in Peace, Security and the United Nations, Hans J. Morgenthau, editor (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946), in which the possible extension of the Trusteeship System to Germany and Japan was urged as a desirable means of strengthening the U.N., promoting international cooperation, and preventing the subjugated states from becoming pawns of power politics.
Zealand Vice-President. Its first task was to draw up rules of procedure. It also heard petitions from Tanganyika and Western Samoa, where local demands for self-government were investigated during the summer. The Trusteeship Council held its second session in November, 1947, by which time petitions had arrived from Togoland and Cameroons. The Philippines and Costa Rica were now members, by election in the General Assembly on November 13 to preserve the required balance between administering and nonadministering members. That the Council would be instrumental in assuring better treatment of the inhabitants of the territories submitted to its supervision than they would otherwise be likely to secure was not to be doubted by any disinterested observer.

The limitations of these arrangements, as well as the impact upon them of the imperatives of power politics, is illustrated by the case of the former Japanese mandates in the western Pacific—i.e., the Carolines and the Marshall and Marianas Islands (Micronesia) with a total area of less than 1,000 square miles and a population of c. 50,000 scattered over an expanse of sea measuring roughly 500 by 2,600 miles. Between January and October, 1944, American forces, at large cost in lives and treasure, captured the major islands from their Japanese defenders. All passed under the administration of the U.S. Navy. On November 6, 1946, President Truman asserted that the U.S.A. was prepared to place them under U.N. trusteeship. A draft agreement was submitted to the Secretary-General on February 17, 1947, with the request that it be placed on the agenda of the Security Council. This procedure was due to the fact that the U.S.A. proposed that all the islands should be a "strategic area." New Zealand and India requested, and were granted, participation in the discussion. Australia vainly proposed that the disposition of the islands be confirmed at the final peace conference with Japan. In the subsequent debate the U.S.A., represented by Warren R. Austin, asserted that, if amendments unacceptable were adopted, the agreement would be withdrawn, with American administration of the territories continuing in any case. On April 2, 1947, the Security Council, faced with this "take it or leave it" attitude, confirmed the agreement, which was approved in Washington, July 8, 1947.

The U.S. trusteeship agreement was for all practical purposes an instrument of annexation, tempered with expressions of benevolence. The U.S.A. as trustee was authorized to apply "such of the laws of the U.S. as it may deem appropriate" (Article 3); to erect fortifications and naval, military, and air bases, station troops in the territory, and use local volunteer forces and facilities (Article 5); to limit most-favored-nation treatment to na-

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tionals of states other than the U.S.A. (Article 8); to convert the territories, at its option, into a customs, fiscal, or administrative union with the U.S.A. (Article 9); and to bar all U.N. supervision in "areas which may from time to time be specified [by the U.S.A.] as closed for security reasons." 27 In short, the U.S.A., long the champion of the Open Door elsewhere and the apostle of international control, disarmament, and eventual self-government for colonial territories, here insisted successfully on the "Closed Door" (i.e., preferential commercial treatment for U.S. nationals), exclusive control, militarization, and unadulterated colonial administration for the territories of which it was trustee. No other trustee dared go quite so far in identifying trusteeship with old-fashioned annexation. Here, as always, hypocrisy was the tribute paid by vice to virtue. This agreement is in itself a sufficient commentary on the extent to which the U.N. Trusteeship System is likely to bring about meaningful changes in the old colonial order.

The Retreat of the Empire Builders. In most other respects it is beyond dispute that the U.S.A. (until recently, and then in a wholly different form and for the best of purposes) has taken the lead in the efforts of the modern imperial Powers to relinquish control over less advanced peoples. Its greatest renunciation has been the Philippine Islands, conquered from Spain in 1898 and promised ultimate independence in the Jones Act of 1916. In a mixture of motives which characterizes all politics in complex societies, it is true that in this instance the interests most concerned with emancipation could scarcely be accused of unselfish purposes—if, indeed, any such ever exist in the political process. In the 1930's the American Federation of Labor was concerned with barring Filipino workers from the U.S.A. Sellers of beet sugar and cottonseed oil were equally anxious to exclude cane sugar and coconut oil produced by the Islands. The Hawes-Cutting Bill of January 7, 1933, passed over President Hoover's veto, provided for independence within 10 years. But the Philippine Legislature, insistent on immediate freedom, declined to accept its terms. The Tydings-McDuffie Bill of March 31, 1934, provided for independence in a decade, with the number of Filipinos admissible to the U.S.A. annually during the transition period limited to 50 and with Filipino goods to be gradually subjected to American tariff duties while American goods should be admitted duty-free to the Islands pending full independence. These terms, though harsh, were accepted by the Philippine Legislature on May 1, 1934. A Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth, effective in 1935, provided for a popularly elected President

27 For text, see State Department Bulletin, Nov. 17, 1946; for official explanation, see ibid., Mar. 6 and May 4, 1947. See also International Conciliation Pamphlet 435, November, 1947.
and a unicameral National Assembly, the U.S.A. to retain financial and diplomatic powers, a right of intervention, and authority to review legislation and judicial decisions. On November 15, 1935, Manuel Quezon was inaugurated as President, while Frank Murphy ceased to be Governor General and became High Commissioner.

The speedy conquest of the Islands by Japan in 1941-42 and their slow reconquest by American forces, from the invasion of Leyte in October, 1944, to the fall of Manila (February 24, 1945) did not alter the plans already made. Quezon died in exile, August 1, 1944. On March 8, 1945, President Sergio Osmeña swore in a Cabinet of resistance leaders. By July all the Islands had been liberated. Communists and peasant agitators of the “Hukbalahaps” threatened to upset the social status quo, but the propertied classes succeeded in restoring their ascendancy with little difficulty. On April 24, 1946, Manuel A. Roxas, although under suspicion as a Japanese collaborator, defeated S. Osmeña for the Presidency in a national election. He invited the investment of American capital, pledged solidarity with the U.S.A., and guaranteed the perpetuation of American bases in the Philippines.

President Truman proclaimed the independence of the Philippine Republic on July 4, 1946. While the Roxas regime suppressed labor and peasant unrest, negotiations in Washington and Manila, largely conducted by Ambassador Paul V. McNutt, eventuated (March 14, 1947) in the signature of a 99-year Mutual Aid Pact, providing for U.S. bases and military missions. Said President Roxas on July 4, 1947: “The Philippines is truly master of its own destiny. . . . Colonialism is crumbling rapidly everywhere. . . . Free elections are guaranteed. We also guarantee to suppress all attempts to gain through force or illegal means any change in our system of government or social order. . . . Organized resistance to the Government has practically ceased. While other nations are wasting their substance in a struggle over new ideologies and problems of human existence, we are well on the road to recovery and progress.”

Washington had meanwhile taken notable steps elsewhere to terminate obsolete forms of imperial influence. The long and unhappy tale of “dollar diplomacy” and military intervention in the Caribbean is now a memory.

In March, 1930, the J. Reuben Clark Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, subsequently reiterated by Hoover and Stimson, Roosevelt and Hull, asserted that the Doctrine would not henceforth be used to justify intervention by the U.S.A. in Latin America. When the President-Dictator of Cuba, Gerardo Machado, was overthrown by revolution in August, 1933, the American Government refrained from landing marines, though it withheld recognition from the radical regime of Grau San Martin, established in September.
When the more conservative Carlos Mendieta became President in a new overturn, Washington granted recognition on January 23, 1934. On May 29, 1934, a new treaty abrogated the “Platt Amendment” Treaty of May 22, 1903, and abolished all American rights of intervention or of military or fiscal control. The Commercial Reciprocity Treaty of August 24, 1934, sought to restore the American market to Cuban exports. Dr. Miguel Gomez was elected to the Cuban Presidency on January 10, 1936, Col. Fulgencio Batista, the reactionary head of the Army, remaining the real power behind the scenes. When Gomez refused to yield to Batista’s demands for the militarization of Cuba’s rural schools, Batista forced him out of office through impeachment proceedings and replaced him on December 24, 1936, with President Laredo Bru, who was a pliant tool of the Army. In 1940, Batista elevated himself to the Presidency. American “nonintervention” in Cuba thus had the somewhat paradoxical consequence of maintaining in power a semi-Fascist military dictatorship—until the election of Grau San Martin to the Presidency in 1944.

Haiti, to the east of Cuba, was under American military occupation after 1915. Following the rejection by the Haitian National Assembly of a Haitian-American treaty of September 3, 1932, by which the 1915 arrangements were terminated and the U.S.A. relinquished control of the Black Republic, the two Governments accomplished the same result by an executive agreement of August 7, 1933. The last of the marines withdrew on October 15, 1934, though American fiscal control was continued to ensure payment due on $14,150,000 worth of Haitian bonds, largely held by the National City Bank of New York. A Haitian-American trade agreement of March 28, 1935, promised to restore profitable commercial relations. American marines were similarly withdrawn in January, 1933, from Nicaragua, where they had supervised the elections of 1928, 1930, and 1932, officered the Nicaraguan National Guard, and fought the rebel forces of Gen. Augusto Sandino. With the American marines gone, Sandino laid down his arms, only to be murdered in February, 1934, with the connivance of Nicaraguan officials. The U.S.A. had never imposed on Nicaragua a formal treaty giving it a general right of intervention. But here as elsewhere in the Caribbean the Good Neighbor policy meant an abandonment of intervention, a restoration of authority to the local government, and a return to a de facto policy of recognition.28

28 “In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors” (Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 4, 1933).
The new dispensation was motivated by a desire to regain Latin-American good will and thereby to restore shrinking markets for American exports. These gestures of withdrawal have not modified American political and strategic interests in the regions in question, nor do they necessarily imply any surrender of American economic and financial interests. Over half of the foreign trade of Central America is with the United States. American private capital investments remain impressive: in Cuba $1,000,000,000; in Mexico $700,000,000; in the Central American Republics $234,500,000; in Venezuela $232,500,000; in Colombia $124,000,000. This economic stake can be protected and increased without a resumption of the more obvious forms of imperial control only if internal stability and security prevail in the Caribbean States. This in turn is largely dependent upon that prosperity which can be provided only by a restoration of a profitable market in the United States for Caribbean products. Since no other Great Power threatens the position of the United States, Washington can afford to experiment with policies of moderation and cooperation. For the present the velvet glove of friendship has replaced the mailed fist of intervention on the hand of American diplomacy in the lands of the southern sea. The demands of the unhappy Puerto Ricans for "self-determination" had not yet been granted in 1948, nor were the issues of statehood for Hawaii, and ultimately for Alaska, resolved. But in these areas, also, changes in the old order were in prospect.

In the wake of World War II, comparable colonial reforms were adopted or proposed by other imperial Powers. Britain had granted qualified independence to Egypt as early as 1922 and, in return for an alliance, had terminated military occupation (save for the Suez Canal area) by the 20-year Treaty of August 26, 1935. But London resisted demands in 1946-48 for complete evacuation and for cession of the Sudan to Egypt. Burma was separated from India in 1937 and granted limited self-government under the Government of Burma Act of 1935. On December 20, 1946, Attlee proposed independence—an offer which was discussed and partly implemented during 1947, despite the propensity of Burmese politicians to settle issues with bullets instead of ballots.

In 1942 Britain and the U.S.A. established a Caribbean Commission, later joined by France and the Netherlands, to promote improved living standards throughout the islands of the "American Mediterranean." A similar South Pacific Commission was established at Canberra in February, 1947. The French Constitution of 1946 provided for a "French Union," comprising metropolitan France and overseas departments and territories, plus the associated territories and States (Tunisia, Morocco, and Indo-China). Its High Council and Assembly, however, have only advisory powers. French
plans for colonial reform have been impeded by open rebellion in Indo-
China and Madagascar and by widespread unrest in North Africa.29

To assume that these developments foreshadow a new era in which all
or most colonial peoples will presently attain “independence,” “sovereignty,”
and Western standards of living would be to ignore the political and eco-
nomic realities of the Western State System in the 1950’s. The cruder forms
of domination and exploitation, to be sure, are passing away under the
pressure of native demands for self-rule and metropolitan insistence on new
departures in dealing with imperial domains. But the imperatives of power
and profit are no less inexorable now than in the past, for they remain the
controlling motives of national governments everywhere. Hitler’s Reich re-
duced most of Continental Europe to a “colonial” status. Tojo’s Japan did
likewise in eastern Asia. The new two Power world of the victorious United
Nations was dedicated, as of 1947-48, to a planetary struggle for hegemony
between America and Russia. In such a world the lesser peoples, including
many never hitherto thought of as “colonial,” tended to become pawns in
the battle of the titans.

Through money, diplomacy, and military missions, the U.S.A. imposed
its will in new forms and by novel techniques on the Latin-American Re-
publics, eastern Asia, western Europe, Greece, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
etc. Moscow cried “imperialism,” without changing the result. Through force,
trade accords, and local Communist Parties, the U.S.S.R. imposed its will
on eastern Europe, the Balkans, and as much of the Near and Far East
as it could influence. Washington cried “imperialism,” without changing the
result. The rulers of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain did what they could to save their empires by coming to terms with
the stronger of the rival giants.

Verbal stereotypes of “freedom,” “self-determination,” and “sovereignty”
—equally dear to the symbol makers of Washington and Moscow—could
not alter the fact that under these conditions few of the less powerful polities
of the world could hope to attain or preserve such elements of genuine
independence as they had acquired or were striving for. The ultimate loy-
alties of the dark millions of Asia, Africa, and other colonial areas would
depend less on the semantic magic practiced by the policy makers of the
great States than on their own dim guesses as to whether their deepest
aspirations toward justice and a decent life could better be served by West-

29 On these and similar developments elsewhere see Vernon McKay, “Empires in
Transition,” F.P.A. Report, May 1, 1947; J. Russell Andrus, “Burma,” ibid., Dec. 15,
Virginia Thompson, “France’s Colonial Stake in West Africa,” ibid., June 15, 1944;
and the additional references in these Reports and in the bibliography at the end of
this chapter.
ern democracy and capitalism or by Soviet totalitarianism and socialism. The choice was still in doubt as the century approached mid-point. In the end there could be no finale to the savage drama of imperialism save in One World, so ordered and governed as to afford some semblance of liberty and justice to all. Such a world could scarcely be a Soviet world or an American world. Any effort, by fraud or force, to make it conform to either pattern threatened ruin to all. Only the ideal of the United Nations, cleansed of hypocrisy and fashioned into an effective tool of action, offered promise and hope. That ideal was dying as these words were written. That it might somehow find rebirth and new life was the prayer of all the spokesmen of the oppressed and the miserably poor of the earth who knew what their people had suffered and who knew also that salvation and liberation were not to be found in the replacement of selfish alien colonialisms by narrow native nationalisms.

For in John Donne's words, it is strangely true, however much men may deny it, that “all mankinde is of one Author, and is one volume. . . . No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine. . . . Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.”

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As I walked through the wilderness of this world . . . I saw a man clothed with rags, standing in a certain place, with his face from his own house, a book in his hand, and a great burden on his back. I looked, and saw him open the book, and read therein; and, as he read, he broke out with a lamentable cry, saying . . . “I am for certain informed that this our city will be burned with fire from heaven; in which fearful overthrow, both myself, with thee my wife, and you my sweet babes, shall miserably come to ruin, except (the which yet I see not) some way of escape can be found, whereby we may be delivered. . . .” And as he read, he burst out crying: “What shall I do to be saved?”—JOHN BUNYAN, Pilgrim’s Progress, 1678.

Book Four

NEW HORIZONS

In times like the present, men should utter nothing for which they would not willingly be responsible through time and in eternity. . . . The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves. . . . Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. . . . No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope of earth.—ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1862.
INTRODUCTION TO BOOK FOUR

The foreign policy of each Great Power is a formula for survival in an anarchic community wherein politics is a competition among "sovereignties" and a struggle of each against all. It consists of the attitudes and practices (and of the words which evoke them) whereby each State seeks to protect and promote "national interests." Diplomacy is the pursuit of power by bargaining and threats. War is the pursuit of power by overt violence designed to coerce rivals into compliance. The Powers whose leaders understand the stakes and rules of the game and comprehend the ever-changing chessboard on which the game is played usually achieve success. To play well is to survive and to win. To play badly or to resolve not to play is to court disaster; for as long as some States play, all States are forced to play or forfeit their fortunes. The game itself must go on until anarchy gives way to order—either through one Power subjugating all its rivals or through the establishment of an enduring union of Powers with the will and the means to act as one.

The following chapters survey the recent foreign policies of the Powers. A brief analysis of determinants, purposes, and consequences is attempted. These pages, it is hoped, will contribute to an understanding of the diplomatic history of the Western State System in our own time and possibly furnish a more accurate insight into the social dynamics of Democracy, Fascism, and Communism than has been displayed of late by most politicians, pressmen, and parliaments in the Atlantic world.

To the disintegrating and decivilizing consequences of international anarchy, national megalomania, and imperialistic rivalry for power has been added since World War II the fury of atomic energy—for the first time at man's disposal for his self-destruction or salvation. This fact is the central fact of world politics in our age. For it poses to contemporary civilization a final choice between life or death. The nature of that choice and the strategy and diplomacy of nuclear fission are the themes of the concluding chapter of this study.
CHAPTER X

THE POWERS OF YESTERDAY

1. JAPAN: FROM GLORY TO THE GRAVE

“There's glory for you!” “I don’t know what you mean by 'glory,'” Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don't—till I tell you. I meant, 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!'” “But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,'” Alice objected. “When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be Master—that's all.”—LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking-glass.

The Rising Sun. Within the life span of people still alive, Japan emerged from the status of an ancient kingdom of feudal barons and cherry blossoms, shielded from the world by voluntary isolation, and became a great State of industrial magnates and battleships, holding the reins of power in the western Pacific. Prior to the middle of the 19th century, the realm of the Mikado was a mysterious and picturesque medieval empire, remote from the centers of Western power and determined to safeguard itself from contamination. But the dynamic impact of the industrialized West was not to be resisted. In 1853-54, Commodore Perry, bearing gifts and letters, led an American squadron into Tokyo Bay and in accordance with his instructions from Washington induced the Japanese authorities, partly by persuasion, partly by threats, to conclude a treaty opening the Empire to American commerce. Other Powers took advantage of the opportunity thus created to secure trading privileges for their own nationals. In 1867 the nobility, perceiving the wisdom of adopting Western ways if Japan was to escape the fate already overtaking China, overthrew the Shogun, or Regent, restored full power to the young Emperor Mutsu Hito, and embarked upon a program of transforming the country into a State capable of coping with the Western nations. All of the technological paraphernalia of the West were introduced: railways, telegraph lines, steamships, factories, and a modernized Army and Navy.
THE POWERS OF YESTERDAY

Once supplied with the technical prerequisites of power, Japan proceeded to exert her new might over the mainland. In 1894 the Japanese Government sent troops into the "Hermit Kingdom" of Korea, a dependency of the Chinese Empire, earmarked for seizure by the forces of the Mikado. War with China followed, and in less than a year Japan had overrun Korea and South Manchuria and was threatening Peiping. By the Peace of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895, China was compelled to recognize the independence of Korea, pay an indemnity of $150,000,000, and cede to Japan Formosa, the Pesca-dores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula, key to Manchuria and gateway to the Gulf of Pohai and the Chinese capital. At this point, Russia, Germany, and France intervened and obliged Japan to give up the Liaotung Peninsula in return for an increased indemnity. Japanese expansion was thus thwarted by rival Western imperialisms. If Japanese power was to be extended over Asia, Japan must be prepared, not merely to participate in the dismemberment of an impotent and disorganized China, but also to defy the Western Powers. Russia was the first obstacle to be overcome. In 1902, Japan strengthened her position by concluding an alliance with Great Britain, Russia's hereditary enemy in Asia. In 1904, after appropriate preparation, Japan challenged the Muscovite giant to combat. The soldiers of Nippon captured Port Arthur and routed the Russian armies at Mukden, while the new Japanese fleet destroyed the Russian squadrons sent against it. By the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905, Japan acquired southern Sakhalin, as well as Russia's leaseholds to Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula, and Russian railway and coal mining rights in South Manchuria.

Victory in the Russo-Japanese War enabled Japan to achieve the status of a Great Power without qualification and to prepare the way for a further extension of her Empire. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed in 1905, and by agreements with France and Russia in 1907 Japan became practically a fourth member of the Triple Entente. Japan achieved a free hand in Korea and South Manchuria; and if an occasion presented itself in war between Germany and the Entente, she could displace Germany in Shantung as she had already displaced Russia farther north. The U.S.A. had acquired the Philippines in 1898, and America came across the Pacific out of the east as the champion of the Open Door and Chinese territorial integrity. Here was a possible new rival to Japan in the Orient. But in July, 1905, Theodore Roosevelt, in a secret memorandum, agreed not to oppose Japan in Korea and to cooperate with Japan to maintain peace in the Far East in return for a Japanese disclaimer of any designs on the Philippine Islands. In the Root-Takahira agreement of November, 1908, the two Powers agreed to respect one another's possessions, maintain the status quo in the Pacific, and preserve the Open Door and the independence and integrity of China.
In 1910, Japan annexed Korea. In 1913, Russia and Great Britain took advantage of the Chinese Revolution to detach Outer Mongolia and Tibet from Chinese control. Further disintegration of China appeared imminent. Japan was already well along on the road to empire when World War I broke out and provided an opportunity for further enhancement of Japanese power.

On August 15, 1914, Japan advised Germany to withdraw all her warships from the Far East and to deliver the Kiaochow leased territory to Japan "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." In the absence of a reply, Japan declared war on Germany on August 23 and seized the area in question. On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Minister presented to the President of China 21 demands embodying Chinese acceptance of any disposition Japan might make of Kiaochow and Shantung, the granting to Japan of a 99-year lease on Port Arthur and Dairen, along with mining, railway, and financial concessions in South Manchuria and eastern, or Inner, Mongolia and participation in the Hanyehping Company, the great Chinese iron and steel concern on the Yangtze. China was also asked to agree "not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbor, bay, or island along the coast of China." Group V of the demands provided for Japanese supervision of Chinese political, financial, and military affairs, a joint Sino-Japanese police force in important places in China, the purchase of at least half of China's munitions from Japan, and the granting to Japan of a sphere of influence in Fukien, opposite Formosa. Under threats of coercion, the Chinese Government yielded. The first 16 demands were incorporated in treaties and notes on May 25, 1915. The preoccupation of the other Powers in the conflict in Europe enabled Japan to have her way. The Allies secretly agreed to support the Japanese claims at the Peace Conference; and even the U.S.A., in the Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917, recognized that "territorial propinquity" gave Japan "special interests" in China. In 1918, new concessions were wrested from China by the Japanese Government, despite the fact that China had entered the war on the Allied side.

By the close of World War I, Tokyo had secured control of Shantung, Fukien, all of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and the German islands north of the Equator. Revolution and civil war in Russia enabled Japan to extend her conquests to the north. In cooperation with the Allies and the United States, Japan launched upon a program of military intervention in Russia in the summer of 1918. Although the other intervening Governments were interested primarily in aiding the counterrevolutionary White Armies and consummating the overthrow of the Soviet regime, Japan appeared to be concerned more with territorial acquisitions. Northern Sakhalin was occupied. Seventy thousand Japanese troops were poured into eastern Siberia,
where they entrenched themselves with the apparent object of retaining permanent control of the Maritime Provinces, and perhaps of the whole vast area east of Lake Baikal. Friction developed between the American and Japanese forces in Siberia and between Tokyo and Washington, but Japanese power was predominant in eastern Asia and the diplomatic representations of other States were unavailing.

Retreat and Compromise. Japan, however, had overreached herself in various directions and was subsequently obliged to abandon much of the territory which her troops had occupied. At the Peace Conference in 1919, she was persuaded, under American pressure, to agree to retain only economic rights in Shantung, though the treaty transferred German rights in this province to Japan. The U.S.A. protested against the continued Japanese occupation of Siberia and denounced Japan’s retention of Shantung. Anti-Japanese sentiment increased in America, China, Russia, and Canada as well. The U.S.A. had embarked upon a naval program with which Japan could not hope to compete. The intervention in Russia had failed, and Soviet troops were again east of Lake Baikal. At the Washington Conference of 1921-22 the U.S.A. and Britain cooperated to bring Japan to terms. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was terminated. The Japanese Government found it expedient to compromise. By the Four Power Pacific Pact the U.S.A., Britain, Japan, and France agreed “to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean” and to communicate with one another in the event of any threat of aggression. In the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, Japan was granted 315,000 tons of capital ships as against 525,000 tons each for Britain and the U.S.A. The Powers agreed to maintain the status quo as regards naval bases and fortifications in the western Pacific. At the London Naval Conference of 1930 Japan achieved the right to maintain a naval strength in cruisers and auxiliary vessels in the ratio of 7:10:10 as compared with Britain and the U.S.A. Japan was thus recognized as the third greatest naval Power. Washington renounced all ambitions of establishing its naval supremacy in the western Pacific. Japanese predominance in this area was assured. Japan was obliged to agree to the restoration of Shantung to China, however, and to sign the Nine Power Pact of 1922 for the preservation of the Open Door and Chinese territorial integrity. She also gave informal assurances regarding Siberia, and in 1925 northern Sakhalin and the Maritime Provinces were restored to the Soviet Union. Although the Japanese Government had surrendered much, it had achieved as much as the existing state of power relationships in the Far East permitted.

These developments constituted a postponement, not a renunciation, of efforts to enhance Japanese power on the Asiatic mainland. Japan, like all
the other Great Powers in the Western State System, sought to extend its
domination over as wide an area as possible. Japan’s theater of action in
eastern Asia was remote from the centers of power of other great States.
Japan—Westernized and militarized—found the huge disintegrating hulk of
the Celestial Empire an easy prey. She was able to dominate the western
Pacific with her naval power and to dominate the Asiatic mainland with her
Army. The specific objectives of her quest reflected the interests of her ruling
classes: the new bourgeoisie, the old nobility, and the military, naval, and
diplomatic bureaucracy. The goals were the usual goals of imperialism
everywhere in the age of competitive capitalism: markets for goods and
investments, leaseholds, concessions, and other profit-making opportunities.
“Surplus population” was a plausible rationalization of expansionist am-
bitions, for Japan was densely populated and America and the British
Dominions closed their doors to Japanese immigration. Though China could
furnish no outlet for Japan’s millions, Australia and New Zealand contain
enormous expanses of empty land. But Japanese policy was long directed
more toward profitable economic opportunities for entrepreneurs and in-
vestors than toward land for peasants and workers.

The Great Depression created economic and social insecurities in Japan
comparable with those experienced by other States with small margins of
wealth and resources. It led, as elsewhere, to political extremism, to des-
perate efforts to recapture shrinking markets, and to a resurgence of militant
imperialism. Industrialists and financiers, dominating a capitalistic economy
which from the beginning had been highly monopolistic rather than competi-
tive, tended to control the Minseito Party; the feudal landed aristocracy,
closely linked with the Army leaders (as in Prussia), was better represented
in the Seiyukai Party. Neither group had been firmly attached to the ideals
of Western liberalism. The new lower middle class was long inarticulate in
politics. The impoverished peasantry, heavily indebted to the landlords,
demanded relief but did not embrace radicalism or lose its traditional rever-
ence for the Emperor and the established social order. The growing urban
proletariat was influenced somewhat by Communist doctrine, but did not
become a significant factor in Japanese social politics.

The Way of Fascism. After 1929, Army leaders, with some support from
industrialists, aristocrats, and peasants, leaned toward Fascist ideals and
methods and repeatedly challenged the civil authorities and the Parlia-
mentary system. Just as Japan’s fighting power was greater than was war-

1 It is estimated that eight Zaibatsu families—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Asano, Sumitoma,
Shibusawa, Yasuda, Okura, and Suzuki—controlled over one-quarter of Japan’s insur-
ance reserves, almost half of the bank deposits, and three-quarters of all trust properties.
They dominated effectively the industrial, commercial, and financial life of the Empire.
ranted by her resources because of her geographical position and the large proportion of the national income devoted to armaments, so the domestic political influence of the militarists was greater than was warranted by their numbers or wealth because of their social position and the great respect in which they were held by all patriots. They assailed the Minseito Cabinet in 1930, demanding an end of the “corrupt” alliance between politicians and capitalists and insisting on political leadership by the Army, a “strong” foreign policy, the crushing of all radical agitation, and a kind of national socialism to control industry and relieve agriculture. Liberal Baron Shidehara, Foreign Minister during the 1920’s, was committed to compromise with the Western Powers and conciliation of China as the best means of enlarging markets and promoting prosperity. Japanese bankers and merchants supported him. But the militarists, following more heroic gods, were interested less in welfare than in power. They denounced Shidehara’s “weakness” and determined to achieve their ends by fair means or foul. Premier Hamaguchi was shot on November 14, 1930. Following a Seiyukai victory in the election of February, 1932, and Premier Inukai’s assassination by patriotic terrorists, Adm. Makato Saito formed a coalition Cabinet in May, which was replaced by the Okada Cabinet in July, 1934. Both adopted much of the militarist-Fascist program in domestic and foreign affairs.

The internal struggle for power between the Army leaders and the more liberal politicians and industrialists continued, with military extremists attempting to intimidate civil authorities by propaganda and terrorism. During 1935, moderate elements seemed in the ascendancy in the Army. In December the liberal Saito succeeded the equally liberal Makino as Keeper of the Privy Seal and adviser to Emperor Hirohito. In the election of February, 1936, the Minseito Party and its allies, supporting the Okada Cabinet, were victorious, the Seiyukai and the Fascist groups were repudiated, and the proletarian Shakai Taishuto, though still small, doubled its popular vote. Incensed at this defeat, the Army terrorists attempted an armed coup on February 26. The rebels were beaten, but they murdered Saito, Finance Minister Takahashi, and General Watanobe. Makino was attacked but was unhurt. Okada escaped death by ruse but resigned the Premiership to Koki Hirota, who also became Foreign Minister in a coalition Cabinet. The assassins were repudiated by the Army command and executed, but the prestige of the militarists was not markedly reduced. Unless their demands were granted, they remained ready to oppose the Cabinet, to plot rebellion, and to encourage the assassination of liberal leaders.

The prime weapon of the militarists, however, was war. To precipitate conflict abroad is always the best means of promoting temporary unity at
home and increasing the influence of ultrapatriots and professional warriors. Japan's foreign wars since 1931 have been less instruments of national policy than weapons of domestic politics in the hands of the war lords. Any war with any foreign foe could be made to serve their purposes at home, provided only that it were not too dangerous. Army leaders, looking northward and westward, envisaged the U.S.S.R. as their logical enemy. Navy leaders, looking southward and eastward, considered the U.S.A. to be their divinely appointed target. In either case the strategic prerequisite of greater things to come, whether by land or by sea, was control of Manchuria and domination of China. To strike once more at China would stir the Japanese masses to mystic patriotism, exalt the militarists, discredit the moderate businessmen and bankers, and pave the way for a domestic war economy. The adventure would be safe; for China was weak, and the Western Powers would not act in unison. Some of their leaders could easily be persuaded that Tokyo's ultimate victim was the Soviet Union and that action against China was designed only to "save Asia from Communism." They would therefore applaud the saviors and denounce those who might seek to restrain Japanese aggression.

The Road of the Manchus. It was in this context that a bomb exploded on the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden on the night of September 18, 1931. Local Japanese commanders utilized the "outrage" as a pretext for occupying the cities of southern Manchuria. Three days later China appealed to the League of Nations. Geneva asked Washington to cooperate in an investigation. In view of the temper of American opinion and the isolationist propensities of President Hoover, Secretary of State Stimson was reluctant to agree to joint action with the League. He believed, moreover, that the "civil" authorities in Japan would restrain the militarists if provocation were avoided by the Western Powers. (This illusion was to be carefully cultivated by Japanese and other aggressors in the years to come; for it was always useful, along with loud outcries of "anti-Communism," for paralyzing the Western States.) Stimson declined the League invitation. When it appeared, however, that Tokyo was ignoring all pleas from both Washington and Geneva, the United States joined the League Powers in invoking the Kellogg Pact, although declining all suggestions of cooperation in possible League sanctions against the aggressor. When this step likewise produced no results, Stimson formulated his "nonrecognition" doctrine and appealed to Sir John Simon to cooperate in a joint invocation of the Nine Power Pact. But Sir John was persuaded that Japan was merely fighting "Communism" and preparing to attack the U.S.S.R. He therefore refused to act.
Appeals from Geneva led to a truce at Shanghai, where thousands of civilians had already been slain by Japanese bombs and shells, and to Japanese evacuation of the city in May, 1932. But neither Washington nor Geneva nor the leisurely Lytton Commission was able to bring about any withdrawal from Manchuria. Shidehara was gone. The Tokyo militarists were climbing into the saddle. In March, 1932, they had set up as “Regent” (later “Emperor Kang Teh”) of “Manchukuo” the forgotten Henry Pu-Yi, last of the Manchu rulers of China, who at the age of four had succeeded
the Dowager Empress Tzu Hsi shortly before the Revolution of 1911. By September Japan had recognized Manchukuo and made it a Japanese protectorate in defiance of the Western Powers.2

This resumption of Japanese aggression on the Asiatic mainland was engineered by Army leaders in quest of land and glory. It was acquiesced in by business groups interested in markets and by patriots devoted to power and prestige. The seizure of Manchuria was followed by the penetration of China itself. During 1933, Jehol was annexed to Manchukuo. Japanese troops occupied Chahar to the west early in 1935. By summer, Chinese military forces were compelled to retire temporarily from the Peiping-Tientsin area. In November, 1935, the North China demilitarized zone was partly taken over by the independent “Autonomous Federation for Joint Defense against Communism” with its capital at Tungchow, 12 miles east of Peiping. Japanese pressure led to the establishment in December of an “autonomous” regime embracing Peiping, Tientsin, and Chahar, along with Hopeh and Shantung. During 1936, Manchurian forces with Japanese assistance invaded and occupied much of Suiyuan in Inner Mongolia, west of Chahar, and sought to establish here another “autonomous” regime, partly encircling Outer Mongolia. Japanese military and civil officials meanwhile ignored Chinese customs regulations and fostered the smuggling of Japanese goods into North China on a large scale, thus conquering new markets and further reducing the revenues of Nanking. During the course of protracted and inconclusive negotiations in the autumn of 1936, Japan endeavored to compel Chiang Kai-shek to “cooperate” through acceptance of Japanese advisers and Japanese Army support in fighting the Chinese Communists, the granting of economic privileges to Japanese concessionaires, and the suppression of all anti-Japanese agitation. The objectives of Tokyo

2 The protocol signed at Changchun Sept. 15, 1932, by Gen. Nobuyoshi Muto, representing the Emperor of Japan, and Cheng Hsiao-hsu, Premier of Manchukuo, was as follows: “Whereas Japan has recognized the fact that Manchukuo, in accordance with the free will of its inhabitants, has organized and established itself as an independent State, and Whereas Manchukuo has declared its intention of abiding by all international engagements entered into by China in so far as they are applicable to Manchukuo; Now the Governments of Japan and Manchukuo, each respecting the territorial rights of the other, and also in order to secure the peace of the Far East, agreed as follows: (1) Manchukuo shall confirm and respect, in so far as no agreement to the contrary shall be made between Manchukuo and Japan in the future, all the rights and interests possessed by Japan or her subjects within the territory of Manchukuo by virtue of Sino-Japanese treaties, agreements or other arrangements, or through Sino-Japanese contracts, private as well as public. (2) Japan and Manchukuo, recognizing that any threat to the territory or peace and order of either of the high contracting parties constitutes, at the same time, a threat to the safety and existence of the other, agree to cooperate in the maintenance of their national security, it being understood that such Japanese forces as may be necessary for this purpose shall be stationed in Manchukuo.”
were clearly to detach from Chinese control as much of the northern portion of the country as possible and to subject the remainder to Japanese domination more complete than was contemplated in the 21 demands of 1915.

On Saving Civilization from Communism. The aftermath of the Manchurian adventure had meanwhile turned out as the war lords of Nippon had hoped. Tokyo rejected the report of the Lytton Commission in February, 1933. When the League Powers, with the independent concurrence of Washington, endorsed its recommendations, Tokyo gave notice (March 27, 1933) of withdrawal from the League. Britain and France did nothing to impede the march of the Japanese soldiery south of the Great Wall. Secretary of State Hull sent mild notes of protest. In April, 1934, Tokyo announced a “Japanese Monroe Doctrine” to the effect that henceforth Japan alone would be “guardian of the peace of the Pacific.” The Japanese fire-eaters were encouraged by the Philippine Independence Act of March, 1934, and by the first of the new U.S. “neutrality” bills, enacted in August, 1935. When Japanese demands for naval parity with Britain and America were refused, Tokyo declined to renew the Naval Treaties of 1922 and 1930. As the new naval race got under way, Rome and Berlin borrowed a leaf from Tokyo’s book and initiated new adventures in conquest in Africa and Europe. Many leaders of the Western Powers continued to look favorably on Fascism as a bulwark against Communism. The conquerors were quite willing to encourage this hallucination. On November 25, 1936, Germany and Japan signed the “Anti-Comintern” Pact, which Italy joined a year later, followed by Hungary, Manchukuo, and Franco’s Spain. The warriors of the Rising Sun thus

3 On Nov. 28, 1936, Japan and Italy agreed to reciprocal recognition of Manchukuo and the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Three days previously, Berlin and Tokyo announced an agreement to cooperate against the “Bolshevist menace.” This was obviously a screen to mask a pretended alliance against the U.S.S.R. and perhaps also to conceal a German-Japanese agreement to divide the Dutch East Indies into spheres of influence, preparatory to future conquest and partition. The text of the published accord was as follows:

“The German Government and the Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist International known as the Comintern is directed at disrupting and violating existing States with all means at its command and convinced that to tolerate the Communist International’s interference with the internal affairs of nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being but threatens world peace at large, animated by a desire to work in common against Communist disruptive influences, have arrived at the following agreement:

1. The high contracting parties agree to mutually inform each other concerning the activities of the Communist International, to consult with each other concerning measures to combat this activity, and to execute these measures in close cooperation with each other.

2. The two high contracting States will jointly invite third parties whose domestic peace is endangered by the disruptive activities of the Communist International to

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further befuddled the Western Powers and won potential allies for despoiling them of their empires.

These developments, coupled with the effects of the Great Depression, admirably served the domestic purposes of the Japanese militarists. The problems of depression were in part met by a foreign-trade boom achieved by depreciating the yen. The Minseito Government's return to the gold standard early in 1930 resulted in severe deflation. Following British abandonment of gold in September, 1931, and the fall of the Minseito Cabinet, Japan followed the British example in December. By the summer of 1935 the yen had depreciated 66% below gold parity—a greater decline than had been experienced by any other great commercial State. Japanese goods, already cheap because of low wages and the extensive rationalization and cartelization of industry, were thus further cheapened in world markets. Between 1931 and 1935, Japanese exports increased 71% in volume and 118% in yen value. Japanese textiles, toys, and other goods flowed into China, India, Africa, and the Americas. This expansion led to increased Japanese imports of raw materials from other countries; but this circumstance did not silence the outcries of American, British, Italian, and other

embark upon measures for warding these off in accordance with the spirit of this agreement or to join in it.

"3. For this agreement, both the German and Japanese texts are regarded as original versions. It becomes effective the day of signing and is in force for a period of five years.

"The high contracting States will, at the proper time before expiration of this period, arrive at an understanding with each other concerning the form this cooperation is to take.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL

"A. The competent authorities of both high contracting parties will cooperate most closely in connection with the exchange of information concerning the activities of the Communist International, as well as in connection with publicity and defense measures against the Communist International.

"B. The competent authorities of both high contracting parties will, within the framework of existing laws, take strict measures against those who, at home or abroad, directly or indirectly, are active in the service of the Communist International or lend a helping hand to its disruptive work.

"With a view to facilitating the cooperation of the competent authorities of both high contracting parties, specified in (A), a Permanent Commission will be created. In this Commission the further defensive measures necessary for combatting the disruptive work of the Communist International will be considered and deliberated upon.

"Berlin, Nov. 25, 1936; that is, the Nov. 25 of the eleventh year of the Showa Period. RIBBENTROP, MUSHAKOJI"

It may be noted that Section B of the Protocol afforded a cloak for joint interventionist activities in the internal affairs of any state—China, Spain, Czechoslovakia, the Dutch East Indies, etc.—whenever Tokyo and Berlin chose to allege that a "helping hand" was being given in such States to "agents" of the Comintern.

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producers whose markets were progressively invaded. The boom brought
temporary gains to Japanese business but did not relieve agriculture or
bring satisfaction to the peasantry, the landlords, and the militarists.

Following sharp criticism of its policies in Parliament, the Army, led
by General Terauchi, overthrew the Hirota Cabinet on January 23, 1937,
by refusing to supply a Minister of War. The militarists demanded an end
of rule by “politicians” and declined to approve a new Cabinet headed by
the moderate Gen. Kazushigi Ugaki, named by the Emperor to replace
Hirota. Ugaki gave up his efforts on January 29, asserting that “Japan is
now standing at the crossroads of Fascism or Parliamentary government.”

On February 2, 1937, General Senjuro Hayashi formed a compromise
Cabinet approved by the Army. The political parties were powerless. Mili-
tarist influence was in the ascendency. The Cabinet dissolved the Diet on
March 30. In the national election of April, 1937, all the major parties
opposed Hayashi. The Minseito lost 26 seats but retained 179 and was still
the largest party group. The Seiyukai, with a total of 175, gained 1 seat,
the Independents increased their numbers from 25 to 34, and the anti-Fascist
Shakai Taishuto, or “Social Mass,” Party increased its representation from
18 to 37. In the new House of Representatives, 421 of the 466 seats would
be filled by anti-Hayashi candidates. The General-Premier nevertheless at-
ttempted to keep office with Army support. On June 3, however, he gave
way to Prince Fumimaro Konoye, who made Koki Hirota his Foreign Min-
ister and announced cryptically that “our external policy will seek peace
based upon justice, which is not the same thing as the mere maintenance
of the status quo.”

Under these circumstances the war lords had urgent need of a new diver-
sion abroad to rally to their support an electorate which had repudiated
their leadership. To attack the Western Powers would be unsafe until they
should be effectively immobilized by Japan’s allies in Europe. To attack
the U.S.S.R. was a constant temptation, since the West would give its bless-
ing and the propertied classes of both Japan and China would rally to the
cause. On June 20, 1937, Japanese forces clashed with Soviet detachments
along the Amur, 70 miles south of Blagoveshchensk. A Japanese ultimatum
to Moscow of June 29 demanded Soviet evacuation of several disputed
islands. But in the end the Tokyo militarists decided not to risk a large-
scale test of force with the Red giant. In the years which followed they
conducted successive military experiments along the Soviet frontiers. Like
all wise conquerors, they were eager to expand in directions where resistance
was likely to be least effective. All the experiments, however, had an identical
outcome.
The Far Eastern Red Army defeated the Japanese on the Amur in June of 1937. On July 20-23, 1938, Japanese troops stormed the heights of Changkufeng (on the Manchurian border near Posieta Bay), claimed by Tokyo but occupied by Red troops on July 11. On August 11, however, after Soviet forces had retaken most of the territory, fighting was terminated by an armistice, which Litvinov and Ambassador Shigemitsu had signed in Moscow the day before. In early February, 1939, inconclusive hostilities broke out on the Argun River, northeast of Manchouli. In September, 1939, a fourth experiment was attempted. Japanese troops attacked Soviet detachments on the Manchu-Mongol frontier near the Khalka River. In the course of several weeks of heavy fighting the Japanese were once more defeated, with numerous casualties. To fight those who are willing to fight and who fight too well to be beaten is always inexpedient if other and easier victims are at hand. The would-be conquerors in Tokyo, like those in Berlin and Rome, decided to leave the U.S.S.R. in peace.

Meanwhile the Tokyo war lords had temporarily solved their domestic problem by launching a new assault upon China. On July 7-8, 1937, a battalion of the Japanese North China garrison went out for "night maneuvers" southwest of Peiping, near Lukouchiao. At the Marco Polo Bridge over the Yungting River they clashed with part of the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army. Local truces, skirmishes, negotiations, and sieges followed in bewildering disorder. Japanese troops poured into North China from Manchukuo. Tokyo refused to negotiate with the Chinese Government at Nanking and demanded that the authorities in North China withdraw all troops, suppress all anti-Japanese activity, and "cooperate against Communism." On July 27, Foreign Minister Hirota told the Diet that a new buffer State would be established south of the Great Wall. "The Japanese policy in east Asia is directed solely toward the realization of stability through conciliation and cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China and by stopping the Communist invasion of the Orient." By the end of the month, general hostilities were in progress in the north. Japanese fliers slaughtered thousands of helpless noncombatants in Tientsin and harried the near-by provinces with fire and sword in a campaign of terrorization.

Chiang Kai-shek had no option but to resist. He declared on July 29, "It is obvious that the Peiping-Tientsin warfare marks the beginning of a war of invasion. . . . I am sure that our people, finding the fatherland at this crucial point, will fight to the finish like one man. I am confident that final victory will be ours." A month later, he announced a Nonaggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. In September the Chinese Communist Party announced the dissolution of the "Soviet Republic of China," which had governed peas-
ant Soviets in scattered provinces, and the establishment of a united front with the Kuomintang in resistance to Japanese aggression.

In the appalling bloodshed which ensued, the invaders took city after city and province after province only to find that they had at last aroused the slumbering Chinese masses to fierce patriotism. Victories in the field over the ragged troops of Chiang Kai-shek and brutal massacres of Chinese civilians were alike futile in inducing surrender so long as a trickle of military supplies continued into central China from the Western world and the Soviet Union. Months and years of horror followed. A new Japanese attack on Shanghai was launched on August 13, 1937. While the Japanese fleet enforced a pacific blockade along the whole length of China’s coast, Japanese warships, bombing planes, and land artillery turned much of the native city of Shanghai into a flaming charnel house. By mid-November Chinese troops were compelled to quit the vicinity of China’s greatest port. The capital was moved from Nanking to Hankow and later to remote Chungking in Szechwan Province. On December 10-15, 1937, Japanese troops, coming up the Yangtze, occupied Nanking. They pillaged and burned much of the city. They raped thousands of women. They slaughtered the aged, the infirm, the helpless, and even the children. They butchered thousands of disarmed soldiers and noncombatants with machine guns and artillery. In the gutted capital, they set up a provisional puppet regime, modeled after the one already established in Peiping.

When these evidences of loving-kindness produced no capitulation, Tokyo sought through Nazi good offices to negotiate a peace with Chiang Kai-shek on the basis of Chinese repudiation of “Communism” and of the Soviet Nonaggression Pact, recognition of Manchukuo, payment of the costs of the war, and appointment of Japanese “advisers.” When Chungking refused to yield, Konoye announced in January, 1938, that Tokyo would have no further dealings with Chiang Kai-shek but would look forward to the establishment of a new Chinese regime.

The spring campaign of 1938 revolved about Japanese efforts to take Suchow in Kiangsu, junction of the Peiping-Nanking and Sian-Haichow Railways. Chinese forces, aided by thousands of guerrillas operating all over North China, inflicted defeats on the foe near Taierchwang in early April and again in May but were obliged to evacuate Suchow on May 20. Further south the invaders took Amoy (May 13) and slew thousands in air raids on Canton. But their efforts to take Chingchow, west of Suchow, and to cut the Peiping-Hankow Railway were halted with heavy losses by the breaching of the dikes of the Yellow River. Foiled in the north, they resumed the invasion in the south, occupying Canton on October 21 and Hankow on October 25. On February 10, 1939, the island of Hainan was
seized and on March 31 the Spratley Islands. These conquests menaced Indo-China and Singapore but inflicted no injury on the Chinese armies. Savage air raids on Chungking merely steeled the Chinese will to fight on. The summer of 1939 registered no further Japanese gains. In October the Chinese won a victory north of Changsha. In November the invaders took Nanning in Kwangsi in the far south.

Following the rejection of a new appeal to Chungking to surrender, Tokyo announced the establishment in March, 1940, of a new puppet regime at Nanking under the traitor, Wang Ching-wei, who had been expelled from the Kuomintang in January, 1939. On November 30, 1940, Tokyo recognized this regime as the “Government” of China and concluded with it a series of treaties making China a Japanese protectorate. But Wang Ching-wei had no authority. The Japanese puppet Mayor of Shanghai was assassinated in his bed, despite a score of guards. On October 25, 1940, Chinese forces recaptured Nanning and subsequently drove the invaders from Kwangsi and from much of Kwantung. Japanese troops held most of the Chinese coast, all the principal railways, and all the chief cities. With trucks, tanks, airplanes, guns, oil, and munitions largely purchased from British and American exporters, they had slain several million Chinese, made 50,000,000 homeless, and inflicted such bestial outrages upon their helpless victims as no one had supposed possible among civilized peoples. But no victory was in sight. Free China refused to yield and looked to Moscow and the West for aid. By the close of 1940 the Chinese war had become part of World War II, and its outcome was clearly contingent upon the fortunes of battle in Africa, Europe, and the Atlantic.

The Way of Appeasement. This astonishing conquest of much of eastern Asia, to be followed by still greater triumphs, was made possible by the policies of the Western democracies in dealing with Japanese aggression. Moscow resisted by arms every encroachment on its own territories or areas of influence. Paris, London, and Washington, by praising the conqueror with faint damnns and permitting him to supply his war machine with needed goods from their own markets, facilitated their own undoing. This strange departure from the usual injunctions of balance-of-power politics is partly explicable in terms of widespread pacifism and isolationism in the Atlantic communities. But here and elsewhere the root cause of “appeasement,” as practiced by the democratic Powers toward the war lords of Fascism, lay in the fact that many members of the propertied elites who were most influential in shaping policy in the Western capitals openly or

4 At the close of 1940, Japanese Army sources estimated that since July, 1937, 100,000 Japanese had lost their lives in China, that 1,800,000 Chinese dead had been counted, and that 3,500,000 Chinese had been slain.
secretly admired Fascism as "insurance" against Communism. They welcomed the progress of the "anti-Comintern" crusaders in the hope, often unacknowledged and even unconscious, that property and privilege would everywhere be buttressed thereby—and that the new conquerors would ultimately slay the "Red dragon" in Muscovy itself.

This process was first displayed in the aftermath of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in September, 1931. The efforts of Secretary of State Stimson to invoke the Nine Power Pact against Japanese aggression were repeatedly thwarted by Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary. During February, 1932, Stimson telephoned Simon four times to plead for cooperation. Each time Simon refused. "I finally became convinced," wrote Stimson later, "that the British Government felt reluctant to join in such a démarche. . . . My plan was therefore blocked. . . . I seemed doomed to inaction, while a great tragedy was following its predestined course." 5

The result of British policy was to enable Japan to retain Manchuria in defiance of the other signatories of the Covenant, of the Pact of Paris, and of the Nine Power Pact. Secretary Stimson felt that America could not act alone. He was forced to limit himself to a futile gesture in the form of the nonrecognition doctrine linked with his name. When Japanese aggression was renewed in 1933 and again on a larger scale in 1937, more verbal protests came from the Western Powers, but no action save futile resolutions

5 The Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 164-165. The Tory press in Britain fully approved Simon's stand. Thus the Morning Post, Nov. 16, 1931: "Nothing could be more foolish than any attempt on the part of the League Council to invoke against Japan the 'economic sanctions' stipulated in Article 16 of the Covenant. . . . A policy which risked embroiling the world for the sake of peace would be a mockery. What is at issue is something more important than the dignity of the League of Nations." And again, Jan. 30, 1932: "For our part, although we do not believe in peace at any price, we value it enough to beware of entering into superfluous danger in a doubtful cause. Japan, broadly speaking, is the only element making for order and good government in the Far East." Also the Daily Mail, Nov. 5, 1931: "Japan's presence in Manchuria has been a benefit to the world. . . . Not for a moment would the people of this country permit an attitude of hostility toward Japan." Nov. 21, 1932: "The Japanese reply to the Lytton Report re Manchuria was issued last evening. It is an exceedingly able document which will convince all reasonable people that Japan has right on her side. . . . It would be an outrage on humanity to bring about such a solution [as the Lytton Report] in order to save the face of the League of Nations. But the misguided idealists who have so openly taken sides with the Chinese war lords and Communists mean to make strenuous efforts to force Great Britain into some wild scheme of economic and financial boycott of Japan which they hope would drive Japan from Manchuria." Dec. 10, 1932: "Japan is rendering good service to civilization by restoring law and order in Manchuria. . . . Fortunately Sir John Simon's wise and moderate policy prevailed with the Assembly of the League of Nations." Feb. 27, 1933: "Any embargo of arms to the combatants must be applied equitably to both sides. But any embargo would mean ominous interference with British industry." These and other excerpts are to be found in Norman Angell, Peace with the Dictators? (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1938), pp. 141-144.
at Geneva and at Brussels, where a conference of signatories of the Nine Power Pact (other than Japan) assembled in futility and adjourned in despair in November, 1937. With no interference from their Government, American citizens continued to supply the Japanese war machine with some 60% of its imports of oil, scrap metal, airplanes, trucks, and other equipment. With no interference from their Government, British subjects continued to supply another 20%. Downing Street and Washington continued to protest to Tokyo at violations of the Open Door. The Japanese military leaders continued to ride roughshod over British and American interests wherever their power reached and to harry China with fire and sword—with both swords and fire made in America or in Britain.

In the fighting at Shanghai in August, 1937, several Americans were killed, several American ships were damaged, and the British Ambassador, Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hughesson, was machine-gunned and gravely wounded by Japanese fliers. London and Washington sent notes of protest which evoked apologies but were otherwise without results. Despite Chinese complaints over such action, President Roosevelt on September 14, 1937, forbade vessels owned by the U.S. Government to ship arms or munitions to China or Japan and warned that privately owned vessels so engaged would be given no protection. Wordy protests at bombing outrages and eloquent pleas for "quarantining" aggressors (President Roosevelt, Chicago, October 5, 1937) were empty so long as Tokyo knew that neither Britain nor America would run any risks to aid China or even to protect their own interests. Following a new epidemic of political paralysis at Geneva, London made the proposal on October 4 which Stimson had made (and London had rejected) six years previously: that the Nine Power Pact be invoked against Japan. Washington assented and followed the League in denouncing Japanese aggression. In November, 1937, the signatories of the Pact (sans Japan) met at Brussels in despair and adjourned in futility. No one would take action or assume responsibility. On December 13, 1937, Japanese aviators bombed and sank three American oil tankers on the Yangtze, along with the American gunboat U.S.S. Panay. Roosevelt protested to Emperor Hirohito and ultimately accepted an apology and indemnity. During 1938, Chamberlain furiously appeased Tokyo as well as Rome and Berlin. Washington sent periodical notes of protest in the name of humanity, international law, and the Open Door. In June, 1939, Japanese forces blockaded the British concession in Tientsin, demanding the surrender of four Chinese, accused of murder, who had taken refuge therein. In August, London yielded. The outbreak of war in Europe enabled Tokyo to threaten Britain, France, and the U.S.A. with greater impunity. The fall of France in 1940 enabled Tokyo
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to impose an accord on French Indo-China (September 22) giving Japan military and air bases in the northern part of the colony.

Only at the twelfth hour did London and Washington move to thwart the march of Japanese conquest. On December 15, 1938, the Export-Import Bank authorized a credit of $25,000,000 to finance American exports to China. On July 26, 1939, Washington denounced its commercial treaty with Japan of 1911. On October 19, 1939, Ambassador Joseph Grew told the American-Japan Society in Tokyo, "straight from the horse's mouth," that American opinion "deeply resented" Japanese activities in China and was "profoundly shocked" by bombings of noncombatants. On September 25, 1940, another $25,000,000 credit to China was announced in Washington. On October 17 the Burma Road, which had been closed to trade in arms with China by London's decision of June 17, was reopened. Partial embargoes on exports of oil and iron to Japan went into effect in the United States. By this time, Tokyo was already installed in Indo-China, was cooperating with Siam, and was openly menacing Singapore, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies.6

Totalitarian Tripplice. The staggering costs to the Japanese people of what was delicately termed "the China incident" are too incalculable to be reviewed here. Suffice it to say that the war drove the militarists ever farther along the road toward totalitarianism and that the businessmen, workers, and peasants of Japan, thanks to their acquiescence in the rule of the war lords, became dehumanized cogs in a machine which brought them neither glory nor wealth but much misery. In February, 1938, following police raids on the headquarters of both the Minseito and Seiyukai, the Konoye Cabinet was bitterly criticized in a disorderly session of the Diet. Baron Kichiro Hiranuma and General Araki continued their efforts to promote a totalitarian State in the name of "Great Japanism." A "National Mobilization Bill," passed by the Diet in March, foreshadowed the more complete subordination of the industrialists to the will of the war lords. In May, Ugaki re-

6 In the course of developing and implementing his policy of appeasement, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain told Commons on Nov. 2, 1938, a month after Munich, that there was no need to fear any Japanese monopoly of Chinese trade because "China cannot be developed into a real market without the influx of a great deal of capital, and the fact that so much capital is being destroyed during the war means that even more will have to be introduced after the war is over. It is quite certain that it cannot be supplied by Japan." On July 24, 1939, Chamberlain announced to Commons that H.M.'s Government agreed that "the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in the regions under their control and that they have to suppress or remove such causes or acts as will obstruct them or benefit their enemies. H.M. Government have no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above mentioned objects by the Japanese forces."
placed Hirota as Foreign Minister while Araki became Minister of Education. A week later the bellicose Sugiyama was succeeded by the more bellicose Itagaki as Minister of War. But the "Quick Victory" Cabinet brought no victory. In the wake of acrimonious disputes over state control of corporation funds, Konoye resigned on January 4, 1939. Hiranuma assumed the Premiership with Arita as his Foreign Minister. A month later the "Social Mass" Party merged with the ultraimperialist Tohokai. Official consternation over the Nazi-Soviet Pact led to the resignation of the new Cabinet on August 28. General Abe became head of an interim Cabinet, which resigned in turn on January 14, 1940, Adm. Mitsumasi Yonai succeeding as Premier and Arita displacing Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura at the Foreign Office.

On July 16, 1940, Prince Konoye returned to the Premiership in a purely militarist Cabinet, which included Yosuke Matsuoka as Foreign Minister. The new Premier now announced a program of undiluted totalitarianism. The Minseito was the first of the major parties to decree its own dissolution in the interest of a one-party system. In Japan, however, the monolithic party of 20th-century despotism was slow in taking shape. No self-made Caesar emerged as the counterpart of the Führers, Duces, and Caudillos of other tyrannies. Yet it was clear that the last vestiges of democracy and parliamentary government in Japan were doomed, that the new business elite and the old aristocracy had been ousted from the seats of power by the war lords, and that Japan was irrevocably committed to a militant "national socialism" whose apostles would brook no compromise between world power and national ruin.

The warriors of Nippon were not in doubt as to how to meet belated counterthreats from the West. The obvious formula was to make an alliance with Italy and Germany and to menace Britain and America with war in two oceans. After much urging from Berlin, Tokyo accepted the formula in the autumn of 1940. Earlier reluctance was due to hopes that Hitler might, after all, attack the U.S.S.R. and thereby create new opportunities for Japanese aggrandizement. Premier Hiranuma had said on January 13, 1939, "We will shake hands with those who agree to the establishment of a New Order in East Asia by Japan, but we cannot shake hands with those who oppose such a policy." War Minister Itagaki, April 17, 1939: "I wish to express heartfelt homage to Germany and to Italy for their spirited endeavors in the cause of a projected New Order in Europe." But on May 3, 1939, Hiranuma asserted, "There is a totalitarian bloc and there is a democratic bloc. Japan confronts neither." He expressed approval of the Axis alliance but declined to make Japan a signatory. The chagrin evoked by the Hitler-Stalin accord on the eve of Armageddon slowly waned with a realization of the opportunities which Nazi victory over the West would present to
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Tokyo. Doubts faded with the fall of France, the warnings from Washington to respect the status quo in the East Indies, the Anglo-American destroyer deal of September 2, and the visit of Ribbentrop's special envoy Heinrich von Stahmer, bearing the gift of French Indo-China as advance payment. On September 27, 1940, Ribbentrop, Ciano, and Ambassador Saburo Kurusu attached their signature in Berlin to a new Triple Alliance:

The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a New Order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.

Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavors along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized.

Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:

1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a New Order in Europe.
2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a New Order in Greater East Asia.
3. Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.
4. With the view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions, members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay.
5. Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia.
6. The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force ten years from the date of its coming into force. At the proper time before expiration of said term the high contracting parties shall at the request of any of them enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed hereto their signatures.

Done in triplicate at Berlin, the 27th day of September, 1940, in the eighteenth year of the Fascist era, corresponding to the 27th day of the ninth month of the fifteenth year of Showa [the reign of Emperor Hirohito].

Emperor Hirohito explained that Japan's mission was

... to enhance justice on earth and to make the world one household. ...

We fervently hope for a cessation of disturbances and hope a restoration of peace will be realized as swiftly as possible. Accordingly we commanded our Govern-
ment to deliberate on the matter of mutual assistance and cooperation with the Governments of Germany and Italy, which share the views and aspirations of our Empire. We are deeply gratified that a pact has been concluded between these three Powers.

Kurusu opined:

The final aim of this Pact is the establishment of general and lasting world peace based on right and justice. It is self-evident that we cannot deny our collaboration to those countries who share our views and endeavors, nor does this Pact in any way affect the present political situation existing between Japan, Germany and Italy on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other.

The chivalrous spirit of Japan was originally symbolized by the sword, but the essential principle of the proper handling of the sword does not consist in unthinkingly killing human beings but in protecting them with the sword.

I feel impelled to express the hope that this Pact, in the hands of the champions of justice in Japan, Germany and Italy, may become a sword in the hand of the righteous warrior and will thus contribute to the reestablishment of universal peace.

The “peace” to come was obviously to be built upon the graves of China and the British Empire, with the United States and the Soviet Union immobilized and ultimately rendered ripe for defeat by threats of battle on two fronts. Moscow professed indifference and continued its aid to China. London retaliated by reopening the Burma Road. On October 8,7 Wash-

7 Prior to this order Japanese spokesmen displayed no timidity in threatening the U.S.A. with war.

Thus Prince Konoye declared on Oct. 4: “If the U.S. refuses to understand the real intention of Japan, Germany and Italy and persists in challenging those Powers, in the belief that the Pact is a hostile action, there will be no other course open to it than to go to war.” On the same day, Suma, the Foreign Office spokesman, asserted that recent moves by the U.S. in the Far East “clearly indicate that it is taking step after step in a direction that may precipitate it into the vortex of armed conflict.” Also on Oct. 4, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in a news interview, stated that Japan would declare war “if the U.S. entered the European struggle. I fling this challenge to America. If she in her contentment is going to stick blindly and stubbornly to the status quo in the Pacific, then we will fight America. For it would be better to perish than to maintain the status quo.”

Hsin Min Pao, a Japanese-owned paper published in Peiping: “The American Army is weak and the quality of her soldiers poor. They know more about comfort than about fighting and are, moreover, not brave enough to die. . . . As to the talk of America hampering Japan’s policy in East Asia, that is a pure joke. . . . Should America, with her usual hypocrisy, attempt to interfere with the reconstruction of East Asia, we peoples of East Asia will fight her with all our resources and to the last man. It will be very unfortunate for her should she lightheartedly venture to embark on a trial of strength with us. After all, what have we to fear from her?”

After: On Oct. 9, Suma declared: “There is no reason to be so nervous. We wish Americans would understand that there is nothing to be alarmed about.” Matsuoka, Oct. 10: “The Tripartite Pact was not entered into with the intention of directing it ‘against’ the United States, but was directed, if at all, ‘for’ the United States.”

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Washington alarmed Tokyo by calling home all Americans in the Far East. President Roosevelt at Dayton on October 12 declared, "No combination of dictator countries will stop the help we are giving. . . . Our decision is made." Tokyo spoke more softly, blackmailed Indo-China and the East Indies, and recognized Wang Ching-wei on November 30. Washington at once took counteraction by extending a loan of $100,000,000 to China, moving warships and bombers west of Hawaii toward Manila, and secretly warning of worse to come if Japan did not desist.

In this game of thrust and parry the stakes were now quite simple. The crucial question for Tokyo, and still more for London and Washington, was: To be or not to be. Several broad alternatives confronted the war makers who owed fealty to Hirohito, the "Son of Heaven," whose legendary ancestors had divinely ruled Japan for 26 centuries. China could not be crushed so long as any outside support was to be had by her defenders unless, as seemed possible early in 1941, a new civil conflict broke out between the Kuomintang and the Communists. China could be subjugated and all of "Greater East Asia," including Australia, New Zealand, and India, could be conquered if Britain were defeated by the Axis and Washington and Moscow were immobilized by the triumphant hosts of the Caesars. Tokyo could not run the risk of contributing directly to this outcome so long as the American Navy and the Far Eastern Red Army were free to move against Japan, for both were superior to Japan's own forces.

Tokyo, therefore, moved southward with caution. Japanese diplomats imposed a truce at the end of January, 1941, in the undeclared border war between Siam and Indo-China. They pressed Vichy to yield Laos and Cambodia, east of the Mekong River, to Bangkok. They strove to bring Siam under their domination. Japanese strategists occupied Cam-Raninh Bay and Saigon, concentrated war vessels in the Gulf of Siam, and threatened Anglo-Dutch-American outposts south of the China Sea. But this game of bluff and blackmail in cooperation with the Axis could not be pressed too far or too rapidly. Nomura, sent as new Ambassador to Washington, was received coldly. Australian troops moved to Singapore and up the Malay Peninsula to meet a possible attack by land through Siam. Bombing planes moved from California and Hawaii toward the East Indies. The Powers, opined Matsuoka, should cede all of "Oceania" to Japan. Tokyo waited upon events in Europe.

The Year of Indecision. The problem confronting Tokyo in 1940-41 was one of special difficulty. Hitler had conquered most of Europe. But whether he could conquer Britain was doubtful, the more so in view of American aid. China was still unconquered, despite years of effort. The U.S.S.R. was the only Great Power still neutral in fact as well as in form.
and was therefore a force which acquired treble potency because of uncertainty as to how it might ultimately be used. In August, 1940, the Nazi High Command had secretly decided to attack Russia. That such an assault, if successful, would make the world position of Britain (and of America) all but hopeless and would vastly enhance Japanese opportunities for further aggrandizement was plain to the veriest novice. But if the onslaught should fail, Tokyo's prospects would be dismal indeed. Japanese political and military leaders, experienced in Russian ways, doubted the success of any such endeavor. Their estimate of Soviet fighting capacity was more accurate than that of the war lords of Berlin. Ideally, Germany should ignore the Soviet Union and concentrate all efforts at subduing England, while Japan should liquidate British power in the Far East and India and, if need be, attack the U.S.A. But the ideal was difficult of realization, since the Nazi madmen were not amenable to reason ...

Premier Konoye sent Foreign Minister Matsuoka on a mission to Europe in the spring of 1941. Its purpose, apparently, was to dissuade Hitler from attacking Russia or, failing this, to assure Japanese neutrality in any Axis-Soviet war. Matsuoka visited Moscow, Berlin, and Rome, where he told the Pope that Japan's sole purpose was the salvation of Asia from Communism. On his way home he stopped again in Moscow. Here was signed on Easter Sunday, April 13, 1941, a five-year Soviet-Japanese Nonaggression Pact, pledging the parties to "peaceful and friendly relations." Should either "become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict." Moscow and Tokyo agreed, reciprocally, to respect the integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia. Not until the end of March, 1944, was the fact revealed that Matsuoka had paid a heavy price for a pledge of Soviet neutrality in future complications. He agreed to terminate Japanese coal and oil concessions in northern Sakhalin. Matsuoka was the beggar and Molotov the chooser. Nippon's envoy paid much for something that might prove to have little value. Its final value would depend upon Japanese power. Its immediate value flowed from the fact that Hitler had already decided to invade the Soviet Union, against Japanese advice. Under such conditions Tokyo desired noninvolvement and security in the north in order to move freely toward the south and east.

Despite foreknowledge in Tokyo, the Nazi invasion of Russia in June, 1941, caused a Cabinet crisis. Matsuoka had belated doubts as to what Japan's best course should be. On July 18, Gen. Hideki Tojo came to the War Ministry and Vice-Adm. Terjero Toyada to the Foreign Office. "Now

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that I am a free man," said Matsuoka, who was dropped, "I shall devote myself to reading." Tokyo speedily occupied southern Indo-China. London, the Hague, and Washington took countermeasures, including further economic pressures and the recall of Gen. Douglas MacArthur to active service to command U.S. forces in the Philippines. Tokyo hesitated. Doubts were increased by the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting in the Atlantic in August. Wrote the newspaper Asahi: "Jews are conspiring to overthrow the world-ruling Powers. Jews want bases in the Atlantic and Pacific, at Burma, and bases in China from which to bomb Japan...." Said Lt. Gen. Teiishi Suzuki: "The essence of total war is to live and die for the State. Let us live with a conviction of race and elevate ourselves to a more glorious history with a light heart...." On October 18, 1941, Konoye resigned in favor of Tojo, who assumed the Premiership and the War and Home Ministries and named Shigenori Togo as Foreign Minister.

Meanwhile a decision had been reached to make a final attempt at a settlement with the U.S.A. with a view toward persuading Washington to grant Tokyo a free hand in eastern Asia. Konoye vainly sought a personal conference with Roosevelt. Ambassador Nomura was reinforced in October by Saburo Kurusu. In exchange for an end of trade restrictions, assurance of oil supplies, and American approval of "peace" with China, they offered to withdraw Japanese troops from southern Indo-China and to pledge Tokyo, reciprocally with the U.S.A., not to dispatch armed forces to any regions of southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific—except for Indo-China. The U.S.A. offered economic inducements and proposals for multilateral accords for nonaggression and reciprocal trade on condition that Japan "withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indo-China" and cease supporting a Chinese puppet regime (final U.S. note of November 26). Tokyo was asking America to abandon China and accept the new status quo achieved by Japanese arms in return for a promise, in which no confidence could be placed, that Japan would abstain from further aggrandizement. Washington was asking Japan, in return for commercial concession, to give up all the conquests of a decade and restore the status quo of 1931.

Neither Power could yield to the other's demands, since yielding would fatally diminish its capacity to resist future demands. On December 6, President Roosevelt appealed to Emperor Hirohito for peace, asking specifically for evacuation of Indo-China and proposing that all Powers agree to respect the integrity of the French colony. At 2:30 P.M., Sunday, December 7, 1941, Nomura and Kurusu delivered a final message to Secretary Hull, rejecting his proposals and accusing the U.S.A. of conspiring with Britain to keep Japan and China at war and obstruct the New Order in East Asia. Said Hull later: "In all my 50 years of public service, I have
never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortion on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

Blitz out of Asia. American diplomats and strategists were likewise incapable of imagining other things. On November 27 a task force of cruisers and six small aircraft carriers, under Vice-Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, left Etorofu Island and steamed across the North Pacific. It was never intercepted or even seen by any American observers on either leg of its fateful voyage. When it reached a point 200 miles north of Hawaii, it launched 105 airplanes, all but 20 of which safely returned. In less than two hours on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, in what was perhaps the most damaging single blow ever delivered in the practice of the art of preatomic war, Nippon's winged Davids struck down the great Goliaths which had hitherto been the giants of sea power. Half the capital ships of the U.S. Navy were put out of action—viz., the Arizona, Oklahoma, California, Nevada, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Tennessee, in addition to the Utah, three cruisers, three destroyers, various smaller vessels, and most of the Army and Navy airplanes on Hickham and Wheeler Fields. General Marshall was taking a horseback ride in Washington. Admiral Kimmel and General Short, in command at Pearl Harbor, were taken completely unaware. American casualties were 2,343 dead, 1,272 wounded, and 960 missing.

The Tokyo war lords had almost (but not quite) won their war by the first blow. So fantastic was their triumph that a relatively small expeditionary force could probably have occupied the Hawaiian Islands and gained a strategic mastery of the entire Pacific which America could have recovered only with the utmost difficulty. But no such plans had been made. The program was rather to demolish American and British naval might in the great ocean, seize and consolidate all of Greater East Asia, and cut off China from any possibility of support by the Atlantic Powers. On December 9, H.M.S. Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk off the coast of Malaya by land-based bombers. War was declared on Britain, America, and the Netherlands. Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany declared war on the U.S.A. on December 11. All the wars already raging were now one war, save that Japan and the U.S.S.R. paradoxically remained at peace.

The grand strategy of the Triplce was well conceived. By severing the supply routes between America and Britain on the one hand and China and Russia on the other, the masters of Continental Europe and eastern Asia could reasonably hope to beat down Chinese and Soviet resistance and thus leave the Atlantic Powers so isolated and helpless as to have no option but to sue for peace. The calculation was in error in only three respects, all of them foreseen by Karl Haushofer. China—i.e., primarily the Com-
Communist peasant partisans of the north—could not be conquered. The Soviet Union, as was already becoming apparent in the autumn of 1941, could not be conquered. The gigantic productivity of the U.S.A. could not be crippled. With its colossal output of ships, tanks, airplanes, and guns, America was to rebuild its naval strength, keep open the sea lanes, and send over them such quantities of weapons and troops as would in the end overwhelm the aggressors.

This is not the place to retell the oft-told tale of the Pacific war. It is enough to notice that within a few months Hirohito’s war machine swept over Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippines, Siam, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch Indies, and even the western Aleutians like an irresistible monster. A vast realm of sea and land, comprising well over 500,000,000 people, passed under the flag of the Rising Sun. Not until the Battle of Midway (June 3-6, 1942) did the tide begin to turn, and then only slowly. The Anglo-American decision to defeat Germany first gave Tokyo respite. But in spite of, and in part because of, the conquest of almost half a world, Japan’s economic and strategic position steadily deteriorated after 1943 until the debacle.

From Victory to Sunset. The agonies of ultimate disaster were rendered excruciating by the invincible power which America was able, finally, to hurl against Japan and by the fanaticism of its doomed defenders. Patriotism was here merged with the cult of Shinto, whose devotees believed that the Emperor was a god, that Nippon was yet destined to rule the world, and that death for the cause was the noblest act of life. Hence the refusal of Japanese troops to surrender on scores of lost island bases where, with few exceptions, all the defenders died and none was made prisoner. Hence also the frenzy of the “Kamikaze” aviators who gladly volunteered to smash their airplanes against American ships. Hence the stoic endurance and mad defiance of millions of civilians, serving a hopeless cause. In late 1943 Tojo and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association strove for increased airplane production, reduced civilian consumption, further mobilization, and total totalitarianism.

The token bombing of Tokyo by Jimmy Doolittle’s fliers of April 18, 1942, was followed after June, 1944, by systematic raids on Japanese centers of power throughout the “Coprosperity Sphere” by B-29 Superfortresses, flying from bases in Saipan, China, and India. From Saipan, where Nagumo died in a vain defense, U.S. squadrons rained ruin and death on Tokyo’s 7,000,000 people. Island after island was lost as Nippon’s far-called Navy slowly sank under blows too mighty to be fended off. Japanese admirals died by scores. Hundreds of merchant ships fell prey to U.S. submarines. Transfers of military and civil personnel reflected the ever-mounting crisis. On July 19,
1944, General Tojo resigned: "The Cabinet is filled with trepidation and apologizes for its weakness to the men on the fighting front and the hundred million people at home who continue to work toward certain victory. . . . Therefore it has been decided that the Cabinet be dissolved." Gen. Kuniaki Koiso became Premier.

The change brought no surcease from sorrow. American Superforts, now using improved incendiary bombs, all but wiped out 44 of Japan's 206 cities and destroyed a third of the buildings in 37 others. Almost a third of a million civilians perished, while 9,000,000 were left homeless. In the great fire raid on Tokyo of March 9, 1945, no less than 279 bombers poured 1,667 tons of explosives and incendiaries on the capital, leveling many square miles and killing thousands of residents. Japan still had a large Army for defense of the homeland. But its Navy was gone, its merchant fleet shattered, its war industries crumbling, and its defeat certain. With Italy and Germany vanquished, all hope of victory was gone. Leaders and people alike, however, would undoubtedly have continued a war of desperation, resisting invasion at great cost to the invaders, except for the weird and terrifying event of the summer of 1945.

The Face of Defeat. At Yalta the U.S.S.R. secretly agreed to declare war on Japan three months after the capitulation of the Reich. On April 5, 1945, Molotov informed Ambassador Naotake Sato that the Soviet Government was denouncing the Neutrality Pact of 1941 because Japan had aided Germany against the U.S.S.R. and "is fighting the U.S.A. and Britain, which are allies of the Soviet Union." Koiso at once resigned and gave way to a new Cabinet headed by Adm. Kantoro Suzuki. Tokyo vainly offered to make a bargain with Moscow, involving the evacuation of Manchuria and North China. Tokyo put out peace feelers in various capitals, hoping, again in vain, to use Moscow as a mediator.

On July 26, 1945, Truman, Churchill, and Attlee, with the approval of Chiang Kai-shek and in the presence of Stalin, proposed a program for ending the war. They threatened "the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland" unless Japan, "brought to the threshold of annihilation" would "follow the path of reason." The terms demanded the elimination "for all time" of the "authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest. . . . Points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objective we are here setting forth. . . . We do not intend that the Japanese shall be en-

9 See pp. 232-233.
slaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals [and] just reparations [will be exacted].” Under the Cairo Declaration Japanese sovereignty would be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku “and such minor islands as we determine.” Japanese forces would be disarmed. Civil liberties and democracy must be established. Allied troops would be withdrawn with the attainment of these objectives and the establishment, “in accordance with the freely expressed wish of the Japanese people, of a peacefully inclined and responsible Government. We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.”

Tokyo rejected these demands. The prospect of Soviet entry into the war would mean the loss of Manchuria, Korea, and North China. But this by itself would not have compelled abandonment of plans for fierce defense of the home islands in the hope of more favorable terms. The final decision was the result of the intervention of a new Power—at the time allied only with the U.S.A., whose leaders hastened to make use of its mighty forces in order to end resistance, justify the secret expenditure of $2,000,000,000, and minimize the Soviet share in final victory. The new Power was an inhuman demon, conjured up out of primordial chaos by physicists and engineers in the service of Mars. Its name was the Atomic Bomb. 10

On August 6, 1945, the Superfortress Enola Gay obliterated the city of Hiroshima with the new missile. On August 8, the U.S.S.R. declared war on Japan. On August 9, a second atomic bomb destroyed Nagasaki. On August 10, Tokyo offered to accept the terms of July 26 on condition that the prerogatives of the Emperor would not be prejudiced. Washington replied that the Emperor would be retained but would be subject to orders from the Allied Supreme Commander, General MacArthur. On August 14, V-J Day, Tokyo surrendered. Said Hirohito to his people:

The enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but it would lead to total destruction of human civilization. . . . Cultivate the ways of rectitude.

Hirohito named as Premier his cousin, Prince Naruhiko Higashi-Kuni. On September 1, 1945, almost 14 years after the Mukden incident, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and Gen. Yoshijiro Umezh signed their names

10 See Chap. XII for an account of what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and for a discussion of the politics of atomic energy.
to Articles of Surrender aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay. MacArthur signed for the United States, along with agents of the U.S.S.R., U.K., China, France, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. American troops occupied Tokyo on September 8. MacArthur established a U.S. military administration, pending Allied agreement on the problems facing the victors. On October 5 the Prince-Premier resigned and was replaced by Baron Kijuro Shidehara. Prince Konoye took his own life in mid-December.

The End of an Empire. The far-flung imperium built by the war lords of Tokyo was now a thing of shreds and patches. The painful issues posed by the termination of Japanese rule in the East Indies, the Philippines, Micronesia, Indo-China, and China have been reviewed in the preceding chapter. Formosa and Manchuria reverted to Chinese sovereignty, with qualifications in the north imposed by the U.S.S.R. Moscow also acquired southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the Kuril Islands.

The vexed question of Korea gave rise to much grief. Independence “in due course” was promised at Cairo. At Yalta and Potsdam it was agreed that Soviet forces should assume control north of 38° and American forces south of this parallel. After 35 years of exploitation and despotic administration, Japanese rule was at an end on V-J Day. Soviet troops were already invading North Korea. Tokyo appealed to MacArthur to “defend” the south and pleaded with Korean leaders for moderation. On September 6, 1945, a “People’s Republic” was proclaimed in Seoul under a provisional regime headed by liberal Lyuh Woong Hyung. While the Russians in the north encouraged local people’s committees to assume governmental power and began the expropriation of Japanese property, American forces in the south, under Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, ignored the “People’s Republic” and set up a military administration which at first used Japanese officials as its agents. The American Military Government leaned heavily on the wealthy class, most of whose members were political conservatives or pro-Japanese reactionaries. Abuses by the police led to rioting in 1946. “The national police administration which we foster,” declared one American observer, “is run by anti-Communists, terrorists of the Right, and police officers trained largely in Japanese methods. The latter still operate under Japanese law.” An Interim Legislative Assembly, half elected and half appointed, was founded late in 1946, on the basis of indirect elections. Almost all seats went to extreme conservatives. American policy combined civil rights and advocacy of democracy, in a land which had no practice in the art, with constant cooperation with the moneyed and landowning class. Rightist lead-

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11 See p. 235.

ers denounced the U.S.S.R., worked with Washington, and advocated immediate independence. The Left won a following by sponsoring agrarian reform but was hampered by American disfavor and by its links with Moscow. Dr. Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, both ultrareactionaries, gained influence in the American zone. In July, 1947, Lyuh Woong Hyung was assassinated. In the Soviet zone a Communist regime was established under Kim Il Sung, with a minimum of civil rights but a maximum of popular participation (Soviet style), agrarian reform, economic planning and recruitment of a "people's militia."

These cleavages made impossible any transformation of Korea into a transitional four-Power U.N. trusteeship, as was originally contemplated. They also frustrated the decision of the Moscow Conference of December, 1945, for the establishment of a free and independent Korea. A Joint American-Soviet Commission met in Seoul on March 20, 1946, but was soon deadlocked over the issue of what Korean political groups should or should not be consulted in fashioning a provisional government. In July, 1947, the deadlock became complete as Soviet delegates were attacked by mobsters and American supported Korean police arrested leftist leaders wholesale. Moscow rejected U.S. proposals for nation-wide elections under U.N. supervision. Washington rejected Soviet proposals for military evacuation of both zones on January 1. Marshall referred the whole issue to the U.N. General Assembly on September 17, 1947. The Assembly chose an Electoral Commission—in which the U.S.S.R. refused to participate. By 1948 it was clear that Korea, like Austria and Germany, would remain divided into separate zones so long as Moscow and Washington were unable to make peace between themselves.

MacArthur, the God-King, and the Ways of Righteousness. The American-Soviet cleavage bedeviled Japan less than Korea only because the occupation, under the forms of international direction, was a purely American enterprise. In September, 1945, Washington proposed the creation of a 10-nation Far Eastern Advisory Commission to consult with the U.S. military administration but to have no powers of decisions. Australia, China, and the U.S.S.R. objected. In December, at Moscow,\textsuperscript{13} agreement was reached to set up an Allied Council for Japan, consisting of representatives of the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and China, under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP)—\textit{i.e.}, General MacArthur. It was further decided to establish in Washington a Far Eastern Commission of 11 States—\textit{i.e.}, the 4 above, plus France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines—to formulate policies on

\textsuperscript{13} See pp. 247 ff.
the fulfillment of surrender terms, review directives, offer advice, etc. Mac-
Arthur complained that he had not been consulted. "[The Allied Council is] in my opinion not acceptable . . . but it is my firm intent to try to make it work." In practice, it worked very well. The Far Eastern Commission, having no real power, modestly contented itself with quiet approbation of the policies of SCAP and refrained from raising any major controversial issues. The Allied Council was often the scene of noisy disputes between Soviet and American spokesmen, and occasionally between others. But here, too, SCAP had its way. Its way was the American way.

In terms of public statements of purpose, the American occupation was designed to disarm Japan, to foster a democratic State in a democratic society, and to promote a viable Japanese economy, stripped of war industries and monopolistic controls. These objectives were to be achieved through minimum disturbances of the political and social status quo and maximum use of the Emperor, the established machinery of government, and the traditional ruling classes. War criminals were brought to trial. Notorious fire-eaters in political circles were barred from office. The emancipation of women and the emergence of an independent trade union movement were encouraged. The Zaibatsu, or great business combinations, were broken up, slowly and partially, into smaller units. Limited agrarian reform was introduced. Shinto was disestablished as the State religion. These changes, while sweeping, effected no revolutionary transformation in the economy, society, or polity of Japan. In carrying them out the occupation authorities encountered no resistance and much obsequious cooperation from their hosts. The war lords were discredited and deposed. Fascism as a doctrine and habit of governance was displaced by the forms of democracy. But the elites of land and money remained largely intact. The total balance of indulgences and deprivations in the social hierarchy remained much as it had been before.

The retention of Hirohito was viewed with alarm by many critics of U.S. policy, by Japanese Communists (at first), and by a few Japanese liberals. That it facilitated the tasks of administration is unquestionable. An Imperial Rescript of New Year's Day, 1946, explained to the masses that the divinity of the Emperor was "a false conception," as was the notion that "the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world." On February 19, MacArthur restored extraterritoriality for U.N. nationals. He and Hirohito approved the draft of a new Constitution, carefully prepared in consultation with Allied authorities, which the Shidehara Cabinet made public on March 6, 1946. The proposed charter stripped the Emperor of

14 See pp. 178-179.
all governmental power, aside from his role as constitutional monarch and "symbol of the State and of the unity of the people." Responsible Parliamentary government was provided for. The old House of Peers was converted into an elective House of Councilors which was made subordinate to the Diet. The elaborate Bill of Rights was based on the American model. The most novel feature of the document was the provision that "war, as the sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force, is forever renounced as a means of dealing with other nations. The maintenance of land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be authorized. The right of belligerency of the State will never be recognized. . . . We have determined to rely for our security and survival on the justice and good-will of the peace-loving peoples of the world. . . ."

Politics under SCAP. The real relationship between the verbal symbols of government and the social realities of power, always a fascinating problem in all the cultures and communities of men, was here a peculiarly elusive issue because of the balance of forces within Japan and throughout the entire arena of world politics. The first election under the occupation was held on April 10, 1946, after MacArthur had rejected proposals for delay from the Far Eastern Commission, whose members felt that Japanese reactionaries were still in the ascendancy. The results of the polling confirmed this view. Out of 466 seats in the Diet, including subsequent shifts and by-elections, Shidehara's "Progressives" (i.e., ultraconservatives) won 110; Ichiro Hatoyama's "Liberals" (reactionaries) won 148; the Social Democrats (liberal and faintly socialist) won 96; the Cooperative Democrats 45; and the Communists 6, the balance going to "Independents" and minor groups. One-third of the votes cast were women's; 38 women were elected. The semantic confusion of Japanese public life was not alleviated when the extreme conservatives calling themselves "Progressives" changed their name within a year to "Democrats."

Shidehara proposed to remain in office, since no party had won a majority. Outcries of opposition forced his resignation on April 22. Hatoyama was about to succeed when MacArthur barred him from the Diet under the purge directives, since his record was that of a Fascist. When Tetsu Katayama, Christian leader of the Social Democrats, failed to secure Progressive and Liberal support for a coalition Cabinet, Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida assumed leadership of the Liberals and formed a conservative Ministry on May 15.

The new Constitution was debated and approved by the Diet in August, confirmed in October and officially promulgated on November 3, 1946, in an Imperial Rescript. Inflation and food shortages bred popular discontent. In the face of a perceptible drift of public sympathy away from the con-
servatives toward the Social Democrats, Yoshida praised Hatoyama while MacArthur and George C. Atcheson, Jr., his deputy on the Allied Control Council, denounced radicalism and engaged in verbal dueling with Lt. Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko, the Soviet representative. In view of labor unrest, SCAP on August 29 told the Government that “strikes, walkouts, or other work-stoppages which are inimical to the objectives of the military occupation are prohibited.” Yoshida charged that the strikes were the result of “leftist plots” to oust the Cabinet.

The political pendulum during 1947 swung slightly leftward—a movement which SCAP viewed with mixed feelings. “If we can bring democracy to Japan and make it work,” declared MacArthur, “all of Asia will look toward this land. History shows that democratic nations do not wage wars of aggression.” History, of course, shows nothing of the kind. In the election of April 25, 1947, the Social Democrats won 143 seats, the Liberals 132, the Democrats (consisting in the main of the old “Progressives”) 122, the Cooperatives 31, and the Communists only 4. Despite the Socialist victory, the two conservative parties still dominated the Diet. MacArthur hailed the defeat of Communism. After a long Cabinet crisis, Tetsu Katayama became Premier May 23 in a Cabinet consisting of Socialists, Democrats, and Cooperatives. Yoshida’s Liberals held aloof, alleging that the left-wing Socialists had “Communist ties.” This unstable coalition was still carrying on as best it could early in 1948.

Problems of Peacemaking. Despite the debacle of 1945, Japan, with a population expected to exceed 80,000,000 by 1950, was still a factor in the politics of power. This circumstance was not much altered by programs of demilitarization and reparations designed to reduce the Japanese war potential. Following protracted discord over the question of whether the booty removed from Manchuria by the U.S.S.R. should or should not be deducted from the Soviet claims, the U.S.A. in May, 1946, urged the members of the Far Eastern Commission to prepare a program of allocating reparations. Edwin W. Pauley, U.S. Reparations Commissioner, proposed that the Japanese iron and steel industry be limited to an annual capacity of 2,750,000 tons; that all aluminum, magnesium, and synthetic-oil plants be removed; that the machine-tool industry be cut down to less than a third of its former size; that the merchant marine be limited to 1,500,000 tons, with no ships over 5,000 tons, etc.—with surplus facilities to be divided as reparations. No final agreement had been reached by 1948.

In Japan, as in Germany, such proposals evoked less and less official enthusiasm in America as supporters of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall

15 George C. Atcheson, Jr., was killed in an air crash off Honolulu on Aug. 16, 1947.
16 See pp. 353-354.
Plan perceived that the resources formerly at the disposal of the war lords had value as units of power against the U.S.S.R. American occupation costs, running half a billion dollars annually in 1947, were another potent argument in favor of strengthening rather than weakening the Japanese economy. Local conservatives were not slow to grasp the opportunity thus presented. In a plea for the retention of U.S. forces in Japan, Premier Yoshida asserted on March 19, 1947: "We are having our battles with the Communists too and we have a very dangerous enemy to the north." Original Allied purposes continued to be reiterated. MacArthur opined that "Japan could not rearm for modern war within a century." But since Japan was currently in the American orbit in the global crusade to checkmate Red Muscovy, new departures were called for. A group of American industrial engineers began a study of the industrial rehabilitation of Japan in the summer of 1947. On July 23, 1947, the Prefectural Assembly of Hokkaido petitioned MacArthur to secure the restoration to Japan of the Soviet-held Kuril Islands.

These complications and calculations entangled in endless snarls all efforts at concluding a peace treaty. On March 17, 1947, MacArthur told the press that peace talks should be initiated and that the controls required after American evacuation should be provided by U.N. "If the U.N. are ever to succeed this is the most favorable opportunity ever presented. Japan would be willing. If the U.N. cannot provide these mild controls, it cannot meet anything." Since the United Nations were no longer united, this recommendation fell on deaf ears. On July 16, 1947, the State Department announced that it had proposed to the other 10 Governments on the Far Eastern Commission the holding of a peace conference "as soon as practicable," preferably on August 19 in Washington or San Francisco, to discuss a treaty for Japan. Moscow rejected the proposal, accused the U.S. of unilateral action, and urged that the Council of Foreign Ministers (for this purpose limited to the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and China) should make preparations for a peace conference. Washington rejected this counterproposal and intimated that it would proceed with plans for a general conference, regardless of the Soviet attitude. But Nanking, fearful of American designs to strengthen Japan, agreed with Moscow on the necessity of unanimity among the Big Four, despite the American pleas for a conference which should act by two-thirds vote, with no veto. Moscow proposed that the conference be held not in America but in China, preferably in January, 1948. By the Treaty of August 14, 1945, both China and the Soviet Union were pledged

not to make a separate peace with Japan. At the end of 1947 the deadlock was still unbroken.

In the absence of a general Soviet-American settlement, the prospects were favorable for a "rump" conference with the U.S.S.R. absent, to draw up a treaty which would ultimately restore Japanese sovereignty over the home islands of the Empire but leave the U.S.A. with decisive influence. The "war criminals" of 1931-41 had all appealed for American understanding of Japan's mission: "the salvation of Asia from Communism." Such pleas had gone unheeded by the Roosevelt Administration. They were renewed in 1947 and thereafter and received with sympathetic interest by many influential Americans. Suzuki San, the "Joe Doakes" of Japan, had no desire to see his land become a battlefield between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. But he knew little of the issues, and his voice was small, even under the new democracy. The men of land and money in Nippon saw new possibilities for political reaction, economic rehabilitation, and relations of honor, intimacy, and profit with the American colossus. Later, perhaps, revanche . . . ? Such calculations were possibly based on an underestimation of Communist power on the Asiatic mainland. Yet they flourished and offered a portent that the ruling groups in the Empire of the Rising Sun, though momentarily under a cloud, were not yet relegated to outer darkness in the game of global power.

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ITALY: THE MISERY OF THE IMPOTENT

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2. ITALY: THE MISERY OF THE IMPOTENT

Insatiable Italy, with furtive glances, roves restlessly hither and thither, instinctively drawn on by the odor of corruption and calamity —always ready to attack anybody from the rear and make off with a bit of plunder. It is outrageous that these Italians, still unsatisfied, should continue to make preparations and to conspire in every direction.—CHANCELLOR OTTO VON BISMARCK.

The Fascist State is a will to power and an empire. The Roman tradition is the idea of force. In the Fascist doctrine, the imperial idea is not only a territorial, military, and mercantile expression, but also one of spiritual and moral expansion. For Fascism, the tendency to the imperial idea means expansion of the nation and is a manifestation of vitality.—BENITO MUSSOLINI in Popolo d'Italia, August 4, 1932.

A Prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking others . . . because if he conquers, you are at his discretion.—NICCOLÒ MACHIAVelli.

When weighed in the scales of the arts and the skills of gracious living, Italy has long stood in the forefront of Western civilization. This was acknowledged by all during the glory of the Renaissance. This was also so, even if not so widely realized, during the Risorgimento and after the establishment of the House of Savoy in 1861 as the reigning family of a united nation. In the scales of power, however, the Kingdom of Italy was from the outset the weakest of the Great Powers. The ambitions of her patriotic and imperial politicians were often beyond attainment with the meager components of fighting capacity at the disposal of the new Rome. Italy's only military asset was a teeming population. Numbers count for little without coal, iron, capital, control of seaways, and possession of bases—and in these things Italy is poor. Italians, moreover, have always been (to their credit) the least bellicose of peoples. The peasantry of the south was long content with its colorful folk life and with the blessings of illiteracy and superstitious religiosity. The townspeople of the north have ever worshiped not at the bloody and barren altar of Mars but at the cheerful shrines of joy and
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beauty. Twenty years of imitation Prussianism, imposed upon them by a blind plutocracy and aristocracy and enforced by a boastful tyrant, did not change their character.

Under these conditions the inevitable quest of Italian diplomats and strategists for martial glory and the gaudy baubles of empire has ever had about it something incongruous and pathetic. From Bismarck's day to the present, Italy's role in Realpolitik has been that of jackal, attacking only the small and weak, mauling those already mortally wounded, or snatching bones from the feasts of the great carnivores. Italy was inferior to other Powers in the economic and strategic prerequisites of an effective role in power politics. She was consequently reduced to adroit maneuverings and complex bargainings to achieve her purposes—and she repeatedly met with failure and frustration.

Sacro Egoismo. The foreign policy of Italy after 1870 was pulled alternately in two directions by two sets of irreconcilable ambitions: the desire to secure Italia Irredenta, and the desire to create an African empire. The first could be achieved only at the expense of Austria, the second only at the expense of France. The French seizure of Tunis precipitated Italy into the waiting arms of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance of 1882. But Italy remained an unreliable ally, for nationalistic aspirations in the north and in the Adriatic were more powerful driving forces behind foreign policy than hopes of imperialistic aggrandizement in Africa. France, for a price, was prepared to approve the fulfillment of at least a portion of these hopes. In 1896, Italy at last recognized the French protectorate in Tunis, in return for commercial concessions. In 1899 a commercial convention put an end to the long Franco-Italian tariff war. In 1900, France extended assurances that she harbored no designs on Tripoli, and Italy acquiesced in French designs on Morocco. By the agreement of 1902, Italy, acting contrary to the spirit if not the letter of her compacts with her allies, agreed to remain neutral in the event of an attack upon France, even if France should be obliged to take the initiative in a declaration of war. In 1909, Italy agreed to view with benevolence Russia's designs upon the Straits and Constantinople, in return for Russian approval of her project of seizing Tripoli (Libya) from Turkey, Russia's hereditary enemy and satellite of Italy's allies, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Libya was accordingly seized in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911. But in form Rome retained its commitments to Berlin and Vienna. Italy thus had a foot in both camps and was prepared to bargain for terms in the event of a crisis in which each of the great coalitions should seek her support.

In 1914, Italy remained neutral on the specious plea that the war was aggressive and not defensive on the part of her allies and thus did not in-
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volve the *casus foederis*. With her long, open coast line exposed to attack by the British and French fleets, Italy had more to lose than to gain by joining the Central Powers, even if eventual victory might enable her to seize a large portion of the French African colonies. During the winter of 1914-15 the Italian Government, acting frankly on a policy of *sacro egoismo* ("holy selfishness"), bargained with both coalitions for promises of territorial compensation and agreed to enter the war on the side which promised most. Though Germany and Austria-Hungary were lavish with promises of French territory in Africa, they were unwilling to surrender Trieste, the Tirol, and Trentino as the price of Italian aid. The Allies, on the other hand, promised Rome all these territories and part of the Dalmatian coast besides, plus compensations in the Near East and "rectifications" of the African frontiers. These terms were embodied in the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915. On May 24, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. Italy's military contribution to the Allied cause was not impressive; and when the Italian front collapsed in the disaster of Caporetto in the autumn of 1917 and most of Venetia fell into the hands of the enemy, British and French divisions had to be sent to the Piave to stem the German invasion. In the summer of 1918, however, the Italian armies checked an Austrian offensive and counterattacked with sufficiently telling effect (Vittorio Veneto) to claim a share in the glory of final victory.

At the Peace Conference, Italy found her claims thwarted by Wilsonian idealism, by Serbian aspirations in the Adriatic, and by French and British reluctance to permit Italy to dominate the Mediterranean. "Rectifications" of the Libyan frontiers were secured, but they were not of sufficient magnitude to satisfy Italian colonial hopes. In the north, *Italia Irredenta* was indeed acquired, plus the Austrian Tirol south of Brenner Pass, which was demanded for strategic reasons. Fiume was likewise seized, as well as Zara and the island of Lagosta. But the Italian acquisitions included territory claimed by Serbia on grounds of language and self-determination. Italy was faced across the Adriatic by an embittered and resentful Jugoslavia in alliance with France. In the Near East, Italy gained nothing save the Dodecanese and the confirmation of her occupation of Rhodes. While Kemal Pasha's Turkish Nationalists frustrated Italian aspirations in Anatolia, France retained Syria and Great Britain acquired Iraq and Palestine. All Italian patriots felt that Italy had won the war but had lost the peace. Italy, despite her gains, emerged from the Conference an unsatisfied State.

The New Caesarism. This thwarting of patriotic ambitions played its part in the discrediting of parliamentary government, the rise of Fascism, and the establishment of a new despotism. The Fascist revolution was at bottom a resort to force on the part of the bourgeoisie and the landed pro-
prietors to meet the threat of a peasant-proletarian social revolution under Communist and extreme Socialist leadership. The armed Black Shirts of Mussolini were subsidized by the industrialists of the north and the aristocrats of the south and at first even supported by the weak Cabinet at Rome in their assaults upon Socialist and Communist Party headquarters, their destruction of working-class papers, and their suppression of labor unions and cooperative organizations. In October of 1922, when the instrument for the suppression of the social revolution had become more powerful than its creators, the Fascist militia marched on Rome and Mussolini became Premier. In 1925, all the opposition parties were suppressed, and the Italian Government became a despotism in which all power was monopolized by the Fascists.

Since the raison d'être of Fascism is still widely misunderstood, despite the agonies of World War II, it is appropriate to note its nature and meaning in the land of its origin. Modern industrial societies condemn millions of middle- and lower-class people to insecurity. Benito Mussolini was the son of a blacksmith. His mother was a country schoolteacher. Like his father, he became a Socialist. He hoped to be a teacher—i.e., to rise from proletarian to bourgeois status. After a short term as a substitute pedagogue, he went to Switzerland in 1902 (aged nineteen) and worked as a hod carrier. "I chafed with the terrible rage of the powerless." As vagrant and beggar he became a Marxist agitator and returned to Italy a revolutionist, to be hounded, deported, arrested, and jailed for his pains. He stormed against power. The quest for power therewith became his passion. "I am possessed by this mania," he said later. "It inflames, gnaws and consumes me like a physical malady. I want to make a mark on history, like a lion with his claws."

This twisted man was a national leader of Italian Socialism by 1912 and editor of Avanti, which screamed defiance at God, King, Pope, Fatherland, and the bourgeoisie. In 1914, he broke with his party over the issue of Italian neutrality. He was expelled by his comrades as a traitor and warmonger. He accepted French bribes to found the interventionist Popolo d'Italia. But his hunger was for power, not wealth. Mussolini's Fascismo recruited its followers from the ranks of disillusioned veterans and worried burghers, filled with morbid fear and hate toward unruly workers and peasants and their Marxist leaders. Mussolini's Fascismo acquired money and means to conquer Rome from nobles and plutocrats, anxious to use it to smash the organized rebels of factory and farm and to distract the petty bourgeoisie. To assert that the servants of the masters later became the masters of the servants is too simple. The social meaning of the Fascist State was that big business, the feudal aristocracy, and the higher clergy
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subsidized and used a weapon of political gangsterism and fanaticism to enhance their privileges, powers, and profits (in which the gang leaders necessarily shared) by political devices to make the poor poorer and the rich richer. This formula could be made to work only by persuading the poor that they were engaged in a holy crusade against sin and by preventing the otherwise inevitable prostration of the national economy through vast public spending on preparations for war. Such a program gave excitement and jobs to the poor and security and profits to the rich. Its final bankruptcy could be averted only through conquest and plunder abroad.

The Fascist movement made its appeal, not merely to the economic and social interests of the propertied classes, but to the nationalistic emotionalism of all ardent patriots. Its symbols were, those of the Rome of the Caesars. Ancient glories were to be restored. Il Duce was to be the new imperator and conqueror. Italy was to be made strong, powerful, respected. A new empire was to be won. All other interests were to be subordinated to the supreme end of the power of the Fatherland. In the name of national solidarity, the old trade unions were dissolved and the right to strike suppressed. Italian economic life was rigidly regimented, as a means of securing industrial peace and prosperity. In the name of unity and power, Italian youth was indoctrinated with a fervent antiforeign, militaristic patriotism. In the name of unity and power, the tyranny was defended, rationalized, and sanctified. In the name of unity and power, the Italian State concluded its long struggle with the Papacy and by the Treaty and Concordat of 1929 restored the temporal authority of the Pope and recognized the Vatican City as the new Papal State.

The foreign policy of Fascist Italy was frankly directed toward territorial expansion at the expense of her neighbors. "Population pressure" was advanced as the chief justification for territorial demands. During the four-year period before 1914, 3,500,000 Italians emigrated to foreign lands; and at present over 10,000,000 Italians live abroad. Italian immigration to the United States was later shut off by American legislation. Though Italians continued to go to France, South America, and elsewhere, emigration was no solution of the problem. In any case, il Duce desired to retain the sons of Italy, for Italy "must appear on the threshold of the second half of the century with a population of not less than 60,000,000 inhabitants. If we fall off . . . we cannot make an empire." 18 Empire building involves war. War requires man power. Man power requires, not emigration or birth control, but a population which will grow to the bursting point. More colonies must be acquired at all costs. Italian power must be extended over

18 Mussolini to Parliament, May 26, 1927.
the Mediterranean. Only in this way can Italy attain that “place in the sun” to which she has so long aspired.

Italy, however, could afford to use force only against small or weak States. When an Italian general was assassinated by Greek patriots near the Albanian frontier, Italy bombarded and seized the Greek island of Corfu on August 31, 1923, and defied the League of Nations to say her nay. An indemnity and an apology were exacted from Greece, but Corfu was evacuated under British pressure and Italy gained no conquests. By the Treaty of Tirana, November, 1926, Albania became definitely an Italian dependency, to the alarm of Jugoslavia and Greece. But against the prospective enemy in the Adriatic, Jugoslavia, Italy was obliged to proceed cautiously, for Jugoslavia was the ally of France and a member of the Little Entente. Fascist Italy was long obliged to modify Theodore Roosevelt’s advice to “speak softly and carry a big stick,” by speaking loudly and recognizing that the Italian big stick was ineffective against the bigger stick of French hegemony over the Continent.

Mussolini was nevertheless impelled by the gradual impoverishment of the Italian masses under Fascism to counteract popular unrest by fulfilling long-deferred promises of war and glory. The Nazi revolution in Germany indirectly furnished him with his opportunity, though its immediate effect was dangerous to Italian interests. He sponsored the futile Four Power Pact of July 15, 1933, whereby Italy, France, Britain, and Germany agreed to consult one another to promote peace and disarmament. He blocked Hitler’s designs on Austria by subsidizing the Austrian Heimwehr and supporting the Dollfuss regime against Germany. He secured British and French diplomatic support against Berlin in championing Austrian “independence.” In May, 1934, following the bloody suppression of the Austrian Social Democrats, he formed an “Italian bloc” by concluding a series of political and economic agreements with Hungary and Austria.

The March of the Conqueror. But glory had to be sought in other fields. Fascist Rome turned eyes toward Africa, calculating that Britain and France, out of fear of Germany, would consent to Italian expansion. An Anglo-Italian-Egyptian agreement of July 20, 1934, extended the frontiers of Libya at Egypt’s expense. By the Laval-Mussolini accord of January 7, 1935, 44,500 square miles of the Tibesti Desert were ceded to Libya and a strip of French Somaliland was added to Eritrea, all in fulfillment of the Treaty of London of 1915. Laval and his successors blessed Italian designs against the ancient empire of Haile Selassie in the hope of securing continued Italian support against the Reich—at the cost of destroying the League of Nations as an agency of collective security. In October, 1935, the invasion of Ethiopia was launched. As it approached completion the following spring,
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Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland caused London and Paris to desert Ethiopia and the League completely in the hope of bringing Mussolini back into the “Stresa Front” of 1935. By July of 1936, Mussolini could celebrate the establishment of a new Italian empire and victory over Britain and the League as well as over Ethiopia.

This successful aggression placed Italy in a far stronger international position than she had hitherto enjoyed. Having effectively played off Berlin against Paris and London, Mussolini could retain a foot in both camps and bargain with each for concessions under threat of joining the other. The Austro-German accord of July 11, 1936, represented, at least on paper, an abandonment of Nazi designs against Vienna in return for Italian diplomatic support against France. The Italian-German accord of October 25, 1936, was appropriately negotiated by the husband of Edda, il Duce’s daughter, Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, who had won his laurels by bombing Ethi-
opians in the African war. It foreshadowed an alliance between the Fascist Powers. Austria became a bridge instead of a barrier between Rome and Berlin. Hungary’s regent, Admiral Horthy, as well as Premier Julius Goemboes, was committed to a policy of cooperation with Italy, Germany, Austria, and Poland against the Little Entente. Goemboes’s death on October 6, 1936, brought no change of Hungarian orientation. Foreign Minister Kanya continued to act in unison with the Fascist Powers in return for support of Hungarian irredentist ambitions. Italy alone could not dominate the Balkans through her ties with Austria and Hungary, but she might achieve much through the alliance with the Reich. Such a combination could split or defy the Little Entente and destroy French power in eastern Europe. Cooperation with a strong ally, however, often means subordination. To play Hitler’s game was almost as dangerous for Italy as for Poland. But Fascism glorified danger. Mussolini was prepared to take the risk.

Italy’s increased prestige in the Mediterranean offered opportunities in other directions. The British route to India through Suez and the Red Sea now seemed at the mercy of Italian bombers and cruisers. The Sudan and the headwaters of the Nile lay adjacent to Italian Ethiopia. French communications with North Africa could be severed by Italian air power, particularly in the event of cooperation with a Fascist Spain. Intrigues against Britain and France in Palestine, Syria, and Arabia offered hope of further weakening the influence of London and Paris in the Near East. Perhaps the Mediterranean could, after all, be made once more a Roman lake. Perhaps Libya and Italian East Africa could be united over the ruins of British imperial power. Perhaps, in the coming European war, German support of Italy would make possible the conquest of Corsica, Nice, and Savoy. Yemen, Turkey, and Greece were among the other prospective victims of Fascist imperialism.

Despite assertions that the conquest of Ethiopia had made Italy a satiated State, Mussolini was driven forward to new adventures by the economic dilemma of Fascism and by the psychological compulsion of a dictatorship obliged to give the masses circuses instead of bread. On August 30, 1936, il Duce declared, “We can mobilize 8,000,000 men. . . . We reject the absurdity of eternal peace, which is foreign to our creed and to our temperament. We must be strong. We must be always stronger. We must be so strong that we can face any eventualities and look directly in the eye whatever may befall.” And on November 1, at Milan: “Collective security never existed, does not exist and will never exist. . . . The League of Nations can perish. . . . Today we raise the banner of anti-Bolshevism. . . . For us Italians the Mediterranean is life.”
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Appeasing Fascist Imperialism. Simon and Chamberlain were the principal architects of the appeasement of Japan. The comparable process which enabled Mussolini's Italy to conquer a new empire and threaten the Western Powers was the contribution to the diplomacy of decadence made by Pierre Laval, Sir Samuel Hoare, and Lord Halifax. Following the failure of the initial Italian attempt (approved by Britain and opposed by France) to conquer Ethiopia in 1896, a stable balance of power had emerged in East Africa with each Power able and willing to protect its interests. By the accord of December 13, 1906, Britain, France, and Italy agreed to maintain the status quo and to make "every effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia." By the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, Italy was promised "compensations" in the event of British and French acquisitions in Africa at the expense of Germany. The failure of the Allies at the Peace Conference to fulfill this pledge embittered all Italian imperialists. The small British cessions to Eritrea in 1924 and the larger Anglo-Egyptian cessions to Libya in 1934 were deemed wholly inadequate. Mussolini made it clear that more was expected and that no Italian cooperation with France and Britain against the Reich need be expected unless Paris and London paid in African real estate.

Pierre Laval, butcher's son from the Auvergne and Foreign Minister of France after the death of Barthou, fell into Caesar's trap. He admired Fascism. He hated Communism. He could see only one means to make France secure against Germany: an alliance with Italy. For such a bargain, no price seemed to him too high to pay. On January 5-7, 1935, he conferred with il Duce in Rome. The result was the signature of elaborate accords, pledging peace, friendship, and consultation and "settling" all issues. Laval got no alliance but only a vague pledge to "consult" in case of any threat to Austrian independence or any danger of unilateral modification of disarmament obligations. Laval gave much more than he got, and more than the world then knew. The published accords called for collaboration in developing African colonies and Italian participation, to the extent of 7% of the shares, in the French-owned railway from Djibouti (French Somaliland) to Addis Ababa, capital of Ethiopia; for a redefinition of the status of the Italian nationals in Tunisia; and for the cession by France to Italy of 44,500 square miles of desert in the Tibesti region south of Libya and of 309 miles of desert south of Eritrea. These concessions were accepted as a "definitive" settlement of Italian claims under the Treaty of London. The ceded deserts had no resources and almost no inhabitants. Those who were astonished at the modesty of Italian demands did not know that Laval had

also agreed to acquiesce in Mussolini's projected conquest of Ethiopia. "Of course," said Laval privately to Jules Romains, "I gave him Ethiopia." Despite his repeated public denials, Laval had given to il Duce precisely such a pledge—as became clear from the secret Maffey Commission Report of the British Foreign Office, dated June 18, 1935, and later stolen and published in Italy. Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Secretary after June 7, 1935, secretly agreed with Laval that Caesar should be served at Ethiopia's expense, despite the desire of the British electorate to uphold collective security through the League.

The steps whereby Laval and Hoare sought to carry out their unholy bargain have already been reviewed. Ethiopia was the least of the victims. The League of Nations was the major victim—and ultimately France and Britain as well. Like all tyrants and would-be conquerors, Mussolini despised weakness and respected strength. Having induced Paris to grant him Ethiopia in exchange for an alliance with France against Hitler, he took Ethiopia and at once made an alliance with Hitler against France. Il Duce added insult to injury by withholding ratification of the Laval-Mussolini accord, though the French Chambers, including even the Socialists, had promptly approved them. He hinted that French recognition of Italian title to Ethiopia was a prerequisite. The last leaders of the French Republic were like the Bourbons: they learned nothing and forgot nothing. Bonnet joined Halifax in betraying Ethiopia and the League anew at Geneva in May, 1938. After Munich, French Ambassador André François-Poncet was transferred from Berlin to Rome. He brought the gift of recognition of Italy's title to Haile Selassie's realm. The Italian deputies replied on November 30, 1938, with loud outcries of "Tunisia! Nice! Savoy! Corsica! Djibouti!"

The Ambassador was even more distressed when Ciano on December 17 handed him a note to the effect that the French attitude toward Italy had invalidated the accords which had "been rapidly outdated by the events that followed the application of sanctions. Further, creation of the Empire has established new rights and new interests of fundamental importance." Bonnet complained in his reply of December 26 that France had fulfilled all its pledges (to betray Ethiopia and the League) and that Mussolini's attitude savored of base ingratitude. Even this blow produced no change of heart at the Quai d'Orsay. Bonnet sent Paul Baudouin as his confidential agent to Rome in February, 1939, to offer Caesar more concessions in spite of Daladier's loud defiance. Bonnet failed, but he persisted in his fatuous hopes even after the signature of the formal Axis alliance of May 22, 1939.

21 Text in the author's Night over Europe, pp. 84-87.
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Last-minute efforts to bribe Mussolini with further colonial promises also failed, since *il Duce* was now playing “winner take all.”

British policy toward Italian imperial ambitions was, if possible, even more disastrous. Hoare was forced out of the Cabinet (for a brief six months) by the public and Parliamentary storm which broke when the Hoare-Laval deal of December, 1935, became known. His successor, Anthony Eden, spoke eloquently about collective security and then cooperated with Paris in destroying Ethiopia, the League, and the Spanish Republic. Chamberlain’s eagerness to appease both Germany and Italy, however, finally drove Eden to resign on February 20, 1938, along with his Parliamentary Undersecretary, Viscount Cranborne, rather than approve new negotiations with Rome. “Agreements that are worth while,” he declared, “are never made on the basis of a threat. Of late the conviction has steadily grown upon me that there has been a too keen desire on our part to make terms with others rather than that others should make terms with us.” Cranborne was succeeded by Richard A. Butler, Eden by Lord Halifax. After Munich, Eden observed, “We are constantly giving and they are constantly taking.”

Britain’s Ambassador in Rome was the Earl of Perth—formerly Sir Eric Drummond, first Secretary-General of the League of Nations. This mild-mannered Roman Catholic Scotsman and bureaucrat was entrusted the task of giving to Caesar what Caesar said was his. After coming home for new instructions, he opened prolonged negotiations with Ciano, eventuating in the signature of eight agreements on April 16, 1938. Britain agreed to acquiesce in Italian victory in the Spanish war and to take steps at Geneva to secure general recognition of Italian title to Ethiopia. Italy agreed to reduce troops in Libya to peace strength and to sign the Naval Treaty of 1936. Britain and Egypt signed a “Good Neighbor” agreement to prevent Ethiopians in the Sudan, Kenya, or British Somaliland from crossing the frontier to oppose Italian control of their native land. Rome and London pledged themselves to define frontiers and exchange information on their military, naval, and air forces in the Near East. They agreed to respect the integrity and independence of Yemen and Saudi Arabia and to prevent any third Power from acquiring privileges within these States. The two Arab kingdoms, although not consenting to the bargain, thus became joint Anglo-Italian protectorates. Rome recognized London’s protectorate over Hadhramaut east of Aden and British water rights in Lake Tana. The Suez Convention of 1888 for unrestricted use of the Canal was reaffirmed.

The victims of this compact were Spain, Ethiopia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the League of Nations—and ultimately Great Britain. London at once pressed

Paris and Prague to “cooperate.” Czechoslovakia recognized Italian title to Ethiopia on April 20. War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha visited Rome. Daladier and Bonnet went to London to be told what to do. At the one hundred and first meeting of the League Council in May, Halifax urged “facing facts.” On November 16, 1938, Britain recognized Italian title to Ethiopia. Chamberlain and Halifax visited Rome in January, 1939, but all their efforts to buy peace from Caesar at French expense were vain—not because Bonnet was unwilling, but because Caesar had been permitted to taste blood and would be sated with nothing less than everything.

**Rehearsal in Iberia.** Meanwhile, the next adventure in aggression had been launched. In Rome, as in Berlin, it was obvious to the tyrant in power that his ambitions could be furthered by converting Spain into a Fascist ally or vassal. To threaten Gibraltar from Algeciras and Ceuta, to menace French communications from the Balearic Islands, to control the coasts of Spain would enable the Axis to levy further blackmail against France and Britain and perhaps ultimately to destroy them. The means for the enterprise were at hand in the determination of the Army officers, industrialists, feudal grandees, and priests of reactionary Spain to destroy the liberal Spain of the “People’s Front” which won the election of February 16, 1936. Although there were neither Socialists nor Communists in the People’s Front Cabinet, the Axis crusade could be readily disguised in terms of “saving Spain from Bolshevism.” Mussolini and Hitler assumed correctly that most men of property and piety in France, Britain, and America would be deceived by this slogan and would therefore acquiesce or even cooperate in the destruction of the Spanish Republic.

As early as March, 1934, Spanish monarchist leaders were received by Mussolini and Balbo in Rome and encouraged to hope for Fascist support against the Republic. In the spring of 1936, Spanish generals and plutocrats made repeated visits to Rome and Berlin and laid their plans for a military uprising with Axis support. Gen. Francisco Franco, dispatched to the Canaries because his loyalty to the Republic was suspect, conferred before his departure with Generals Mola and Varelo, millionaire Juan March, Colonel Yagüe, and José Primo de Rivera, son of the former Spanish dictator and leader of the Fascist Falange Española. On July 15, 1936, a private British airplane arrived at Las Palmas in the Canaries. On the same day a squadron of bombers of the Royal Italian Air Force was ordered to be ready for duty in Spain. On July 17, Franco received a wire from Yagüe in Tetuán, Spanish Morocco. “The troops in Africa revolted on the 16th at 11 A.M.” Franco boarded the airplane, reached Tetuán on July 19, took command of the revolting Moors and Foreign Legion, and proclaimed that Spain was “saved.” But this Nazi-Fascist putsch failed in its immediate
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purpose. General Sanjurjo, flying from Lisbon, was killed in an air crash. General Goded, flying from the Balearic Islands, was captured and shot. Mola was subsequently killed and Rivera executed. Army uprisings were successful in the south and in the north but were crushed in Madrid, Barcelona, and other centers by a hastily organized People’s Militia which rallied to the defense of the Republic. What was to have been a military coup became a “civil war.”

In reality this “civil war” at once assumed the form of an Axis invasion of Spain. Italian bombers were immediately placed at Franco’s disposal. Nazi agents, technicians, and aviators poured into Rebel territory from German ships and from Portugal. Italian troops landed in Seville and at other points. The first joint diplomatic action of Rome and Berlin, following their secret agreement of October 25, was simultaneous recognition of Franco as ruler of Spain on November 18, 1936. The better to lend plausibility to the enterprise, Germany and Japan concluded the “Anti-Comintern” Pact of November 25. Italy adhered on November 6, 1937, and Franco’s Spain on March 27, 1939. Britain and France in the name of “nonintervention,” followed by the United States in the name of “neutrality,” forbade their citizens to sell arms to Spain and thereby cooperated with the Axis Powers in the murder of Spanish democracy. An international “Nonintervention” Committee was set up in London with Lord Plymouth as chairman to supervise the enforcement of the obligations assumed. These obligations were well observed by France and Britain and systematically violated by Italy, Germany, and Portugal—and also, in retaliation for Fascist intervention, by the U.S.S.R. After the event, when all need for subterfuge was gone, Musсолini’s Popolo d’Italia boasted, “We have intervened from the first moment to the last.” In June, 1939, Italian and German troops returned to their homelands and enjoyed triumphal receptions in Rome and Berlin. Ciano and Goering revealed that Axis soldiers, sometimes disguised as “tourists,” had gone to Spain at the outset of the rebellion and had been prepared for action long in advance.

The courageous struggle of the Spanish people to defend their liberties in the face of the united opposition of the Vatican, the Caesars of the Axis, and the appeasers and isolationists of Paris, London, and Washington was foredoomed to failure. No government, save only that of the U.S.S.R., would give or even sell them arms to resist their enemies. By mid-August, 1936, Franco’s mercenaries had taken Badajoz, where they massacred several thousand helpless prisoners, and effected a junction with Mola’s forces in the north. By the end of October they raised the Loyalist siege of the Alcázar in Toledo. In early November, four Rebel columns, supported by Italian and German airplanes, tanks, and artillery, advanced on Madrid, expect-
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In a “Fifth Column” of sympathizers within the city to give them speedy mastery of the capital. But the Loyalist “International Brigade,” assisted belatedly by Soviet arms, smashed the assault and compelled the invaders to lay siege to Madrid. On January 2, 1937, as German and Italian cruisers fired on Loyalist shipping, Ciano and Perth exchanged letters pledging re-

pect for the status quo in the Mediterranean and the territorial integrity of Spain. Under the new “nonintervention” plan of February 16, 1937, designed to “prohibit” volunteering and arms exports to both sides, Axis warships “patrolled” the Loyalist coasts while British and French vessels did likewise off Rebel ports. The United States imposed its own unilateral arms embargo upon Spain on January 8, 1937. “President Roosevelt,” declared Franco, “behaved in the manner of a true gentleman.”

On March 13, 1937, an Italian armored column seeking to outflank Madrid from the north via Guadalajara was crushingly defeated by the defenders. Rome refused to withdraw its “volunteers.” The London Commit-
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tee and its local observers were at no time able to detect any violation of
the “nonintervention” agreements. In May, Loyalist planes bombed the
Italian cruiser Barletta at Palma and the German pocket battleship Deutsch-
land at Iviza. Hitler retaliated by ordering a naval bombardment of Almeria
on May 31. Rome and Berlin announced their withdrawal from the sea
“patrol.” They resumed “cooperation” on June 16. Nazi dive bombers mean-
while destroyed Guernica, holy city of the Roman Catholic Basques, on
April 26. Italian forces occupied Bilbao on June 19. On June 23, Mussolini
and Hitler alleged further Loyalist outrages against their ships and with-
drew permanently from the naval patrol, simultaneously demanding bel-
ligerent rights for Franco. The hypocritical tergiversations of the London
Committee now became incredibly complex. Italian efforts to blockade Re-
publican Spain by torpedoing merchant ships all over the Mediterranean
were abruptly halted by a Conference at Nyon in September, 1937, where
it was agreed by nine Powers (not including Italy and Germany, which
refused to attend) that “unknown” submarines should be attacked and
destroyed on sight as pirates.

Despite these setbacks, il Duce and der Führer were enabled by Paris,
London, and Washington to achieve their goal of victory for Caudillo
(“Chief”) Franco. Almost 100,000 Italian troops were operating in Spain.
Rome acknowledged 40,000, A League Assembly resolution of October 2,
1937, declared “there are veritable foreign army corps on Spanish soil.”
It urged “immediate and complete withdrawal.” Rome and Berlin refused
to withdraw “volunteers” unless the Western Powers should grant Franco
belligerent rights and thus enable the Axis navies to impose an effective
blockade upon Loyalist ports. Downing Street and the Quai d’Orsay were
willing to negotiate forever over this question while the Fascist conquest of
Spain continued. Santander fell to the invaders on August 22 and Gijón in
the Asturias on October 21, 1937. The summer offensive of the Loyalists
in Aragon failed. The Republican capital was moved from Valencia to
Barcelona on October 20. On St. Patrick’s Day, 1938, Axis bombers raided
Barcelona twelve times in 24 hours. The slain victims included 245 women
and 118 children. In New York, Patrick Cardinal Hayes publicly prayed
for a Franco victory. The Earl of Perth negotiated amiably with Ciano in
Rome.

Franco’s forces reached the Mediterranean at Vinaroz on April 15, 1938.
On the following day, Ciano and Perth signed the pacts whereby Britain
agreed to recognize Italian title to Ethiopia and accepted an Italian pledge
to withdraw volunteers from Spain only after the end of the “civil war.”
Chamberlain and Mussolini exchanged congratulatory telegrams. Roosevelt
expressed “sympathetic interest.” Daladier and Bonnet approved. Early in
May, Hitler visited Rome to return Mussolini’s visit to Berlin of the preceding September. Austria was dead. Spain was dying. The Axis was “steel.” In mid-May, Alvarez del Vayo, Loyalist Foreign Minister, infuriated Halifax and Bonnet at Geneva by indelicately recalling the Assembly resolution on the withdrawal of volunteers. During June, British ships and French towns were “accidentally” bombed by Franco’s allies. Chamberlain went fishing. On July 5, 1938, the London Committee adopted an 80-page “formula” for the withdrawal of volunteers. Franco rejected it. Il Duce and der Führer laughed. In the aftermath of Munich, Britain put into effect (November 16, 1938) the Ciano-Perth accord which had specified that “a settlement of the Spanish question” was “a prerequisite of entry into force” of the agreement.

The nature of this “settlement” was no longer in doubt. Chamberlain and Daladier were as eager for Fascist victory in Spain as were Hitler and Mussolini. The final Rebel offensive against Catalonia was launched two days before Christmas, 1938. Chamberlain and Halifax conferred with Mussolini, Ciano, and Pius XI in Rome, January 11-14, 1939. On January 18, Chamberlain and Daladier declared that “nonintervention” must continue to the end. On January 26, Barcelona fell to the Rebels. Mussolini shouted to cheering crowds outside the Palazzo Venezia, “Our enemies are biting the dust!” Early in March a group of defeatists and appeasers in Madrid, headed by Gen. Sigismundo Casado, repudiated the authority of Loyalist Premier Juan Negrin, raised the banner of “anti-Communism,” and asked Franco for peace terms. He demanded unconditional surrender. Casado fled. The Fifth Column in Madrid took over the ruined capital. Rebel forces entered on March 28, 1939. Bloody vengeance was visited on thousands of Loyalists. Half a million refugees were grudgingly admitted to France, there to be herded wretchedly into concentration camps and condemned to misery. Since Franco and his executioners, trained by the Gestapo and blessed by the bishops, would grant no amnesty, the fugitives could not be repatriated.

On February 27, 1939, Chamberlain and Daladier granted de jure recognition to the Franco regime. London sent as Ambassador to Burgos Sir Maurice Peterson, one of the authors of the Hoare-Laval plan to give Mussolini Ethiopia. Paris sent eighty-three-year-old Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, clerical reactionary and favorite hero of the French Fascist leagues. The United States recognized Franco on April 1 and lifted the arms embargo. The democratic Powers hoped to appease Franco with loans. The Caudillo’s brother-in-law and Minister of the Interior, Ramón Serrano Suñer, leader of the Falange (who was to become Foreign Minister in October, 1940), hinted broadly that the new Spain would aid the Axis to destroy
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France and Britain and to combat the United States in Latin America. "Our enemies," declared il Duce, "are too stupid to be dangerous."

Pact of Putty. But victory in Spain was not an undiluted blessing for the Caesar of Rome. Italian losses had been heavier than in the Ethiopian campaign. No territories had been won. Fascist Spain was dominated more by Germany than by Italy. Franco was in no position to make an alliance for war in aid of the Axis. A million Spaniards had been slain. The vanquished were starving, sullen, bitter. The country was in ruins. Yet Mussolini had again demonstrated that the class prejudices of the Anglo-French ruling groups incapacitated them for defending the interest of their States. He had likewise improved his opportunities for blackmailing the French Republic and further weakening British power.

Mussolini sought solace by seizing Albania and concluding a formal military alliance with the Reich. On April 7-8, 1939, Italian troops drove King Zog and Queen Geraldine out of their backward Balkan kingdom. On April 15, King Victor Emmanuel assumed the Albanian crown. Although this action was a flagrant violation of the Ciano-Perth accord, France and Britain took no counteraction beyond extending guarantees to Greece and Rumania on April 13 and concluding an alliance with Turkey on May 12. On April 15, Roosevelt addressed an appeal to Hitler and Mussolini to refrain from attacking their neighbors. Der Führer replied at length on April 28 with bitter and effective sarcasm. Il Duce contemptuously refused to be moved by "Messiahlike messages." Ribbentrop conferred with Ciano at Milan on May 6. On May 22, 1939, the two Foreign Ministers affixed their signatures at Berlin to an apparently unlimited military alliance threatening the Western Powers with war should they continue to oppose Axis demands.23

23 "The German Reich Chancellor and His Majesty the King of Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia, consider that the moment has come to bear testimony by a solemn act to the close relationship of friendship and community of interests existing between National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy.

"Now that a secure bridge toward mutual aid and support has been constructed by the common frontier, fixed for all time between Germany and Italy, both Governments declare anew their faith in the policy, the foundations and aims of which have already at an earlier date been agreed upon and which has proven successful as well for the advancement of the interests of both countries and for rendering secure the peace of Europe,

"Firmly bound to each other through the inner relationship of their philosophies of life and the comprehensive solidarity of their interests, the German and Italian peoples are determined in the future also to stand side by side and with united strength to render secure their space for living [Lebensraum] and for the maintenance of peace.

"Proceeding along this path pointed out to them by history, Germany and Italy desire in the midst of a world of unrest and disintegration to serve the task of rendering safe the foundations of European culture."

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But this "pact of steel" was in part compounded of ersatz. Ciano admitted in December that Rome had told Berlin at the time of its conclusion that Italy would not be ready for war for three years. Hitler had agreed not to raise issues likely to lead to armed conflict during this period. In the summer crisis of 1939, Rome sought to avert an open test of force. Mussolini was not favored with any advance information regarding the German-Soviet Pact. When a general conflagration appeared imminent, Mussolini and Ciano cooperated with Bonnet in efforts to localize the Ger-

"In order to formulate their principles in a treaty there have been designated as plenipotentiaries:

"By the German Reich Chancellor, the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop.

"By His Majesty the King of Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo, who, after an exchange of their credentials which were found to be in good and proper form, agreed upon the following provisions:

"1. The contracting parties will remain in constant contact with each other in order to arrive at an understanding on all matters touching their common interests or the general European situation.

"2. Should the common interests of the contracting parties be endangered by international events of any sort whatsoever they will immediately enter upon consultations concerning the measures to be taken for safeguarding these interests.

"Should the security or other essential interests of one of the contracting parties be threatened from the outside the other contracting partner will give the threatened party his full political and diplomatic support in order to remove this threat.

"3. If contrary to the wishes and hopes of the contracting parties it should happen that either of them should become involved in military entanglements with one other Power or with other Powers, the other contracting party will immediately rally to his side as ally and support him with all his military resources on land, at sea and in the air.

"4. In order in any given case to make sure that the duties of an ally undertaken in accordance with Article 3 shall be carried out speedily, the Governments of the two contracting parties will further deepen their cooperation in the realm of the military and in the realm of war economy [Kriegswirtschaft].

"In a similar manner the two Governments will also constantly arrive at understandings concerning other measures necessary for the practical execution of the provisions of this act.

"The two Governments will form standing Commissions for the purposes indicated above under Articles 1 and 2. These Commissions shall be under the jurisdiction of the two Foreign Ministers.

"5. The contracting parties obligate themselves now, in the event of war conducted jointly, to conclude an armistice and peace only in full agreement with each other.

"6. The two contracting parties are conscious of the importance which attaches to their common relations to Powers with whom they are on terms of friendship.

"They are determined in the future, too, to keep up these relationships and jointly to give them a form consonant with the mutual interests that bind these powers.

"7. This Pact becomes effective immediately from the moment of signature.

"The two contracting parties are in agreement to fix the first period of its effectiveness for ten years.

"They will come to an understanding in sufficient time [rechtzeitig] before expiration of this period concerning the extension of the effectiveness of the Pact."
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man-Polish conflict and to arrange an armistice and a conference. Their plans foundered on German refusal to halt the blitzkrieg and British refusal to negotiate unless it were halted. If Mussolini contemplated joining Germany in hostilities, he was dissuaded by his Chief of Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, by the King, and perhaps even by Hitler, who realized full well that Italy as a belligerent would soon crack under the full brunt of Anglo-French attack. Much greater advantages were to be had by retaining the benefits of neutrality while cooperating secretly with the Reich. This policy presupposed that the Western Munichmen would be too timid and blind to force an immediate showdown with Rome. The assumption was correct.

On September 1, 1939, the Italian Government accordingly announced that it "would take no initiative whatever toward military operations." The Fascist formula was "nonbelligerency," which meant in practice all aid to Germany short of war and blackmail against the Allies. Early in March, 1940, Britain yielded on the issue of Italian imports of German coal. Ribbentrop conferred in Rome with Mussolini, Ciano, and Pius XII on March 10 and 11. Hitler and Ribbentrop conferred with Mussolini and Ciano at Brennnero on March 17. Sumner Welles, departing from Rome on March 19 after a tour of the belligerent capitals, declared that he had neither received nor conveyed any peace plans and was not carrying any home to the President. The Popolo d'Italia asserted early in May, "Italy has been in the war from the beginning. When she changes her policy of waiting is a matter which concerns only him who has the responsibility of guiding and safeguarding the interests of the Italian people." The answer to the question of when depended upon calculations of safety. To attack while the Allies could still counterattack would be too soon. To attack after the Reich had won complete victory would be too late. To attack after the Allies had been decisively defeated but before they had capitulated would be to attack at the right moment.

As the moment seemed to be approaching in the wake of Allied disasters in the north and west, efforts were made from Paris, London, and Washington to bribe or cajole il Duce into continued neutrality. Reynaud made proposals. They were rejected. Laval went to Rome and returned empty-handed. On May 16, 1940, Churchill sent a secret message of good will, coupled with a plea and a warning. "Whatever may happen on the Continent, England will go on to the end, even quite alone as we have done before; and I believe, with some assurance, that we shall be aided in increasing measure by the United States and, indeed, by all the Americas. I beg you to believe that it is in no spirit of weakness or of fear that I make this solemn appeal, which will remain on the record. . . . Hearken to it, I beseech you in all honor and respect, before the dread signal is given. It
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will never be given by us.” Mussolini replied weakly on May 18 with references to “grave reasons of a historical and contingent character which ranged our two countries in opposite camps [e.g., sanctions and Mediterranean “servitude”]. . . . The same sense of honor and of respect for engagements assumed in the Italian-German Treaty guides Italian policy today and tomorrow in the face of any event whatsoever.”

President Roosevelt through Ambassador William Phillips offered to Mussolini his good offices to adjust Anglo-Italian differences. “I proposed that if Italy would refrain from entering the war I would be willing to ask assurances from the other Powers concerned that they would faithfully execute any decision so reached and that Italy’s voice in any future peace conference would have the same authority as if Italy had actually taken part in the war as a belligerent.” Rome rejected all overtures.

The Delusion of Victory. By early June, Mussolini and his advisers had decided that France was doomed and that Britain would be crushed by the end of the summer. On June 10, 1940, il Duce informed a cheering throng in the Piazza Venezia that Italy had declared war on France and Britain and that hostilities would begin at 12:01 A.M., June 11. “The hour destined by fate is sounding for us. The hour of irrevocable decision has come. . . . We want to break the territorial and military chains that confine us in our sea. . . . It is a conflict between two ages, two ideas. . . . Now the die is cast and our will has burned our ships behind us. I solemnly declare that Italy does not intend to drag other peoples bordering on her by sea or land into the conflict. Switzerland, Jugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Egypt take note of these words of mine. . . . We will conquer in order, finally, to give a new world of peace with justice to Italy, to Europe, and to the universe.” On the same day, at the University of Virginia, Roosevelt asserted, “The hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor.”

The calculation behind this decision was right as to France and wrong as to Britain. For his rightness, il Duce got small reward. For his wrongness, his subjects were to suffer grievously. On June 16, 1940, Pétain telephoned Madrid to seek an armistice from Hitler. Il Duce and der Führer met in Munich on June 18. On June 22 the French-German armistice was signed. A French-Italian armistice was made a condition of its execution. On June 23, Ciano, Badoglio, and Cavagnari met French emissaries near Rome. At 7:15 P.M., June 24, an agreement was signed. Hostilities in France ceased at 12:35 A.M., June 25, 1940. The 26 articles of the Italian armistice required French demilitarization of a 50-kilometer zone on the European

24 This exchange of communications was first revealed by Churchill in his broadcast of Dec. 23, 1940.
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frontier and of comparable zones in Tunisia, Algeria, and French Somaliland, as well as disarmament of the French naval bases at Toulon, Bizerte, Ajaccio, and Oran. Italy secured control of Djibouti and the French railway to Addis Ababa. But Rome got nothing more. In the interest of “collaboration” with Vichy, Berlin denied to Mussolini the pleasure of immediate annexation of French territory. Despite Laval’s intrigues, the French fleet did not pass to the Axis. The British Navy remained master of Mare Nostrum. Nazi assaults on England in the summer and autumn failed of their purpose.

Mussolini sought to solve his problem by joining Germany and Japan in the Triple Alliance of September 27, 1940, and by invading British Somaliland, Kenya, the Sudan, Egypt, and Greece. Only the first of these invasions attained its objective. With the evacuation of Berbera on August 19, British Somaliland passed into Italian hands. Attempts to invade Kenya and the Sudan from Ethiopia achieved only local successes. Marshal Rodolfo Graziani’s Libyan Army of 250,000 invaded “nonbelligerent” Egypt in mid-September in a drive aimed at Alexandria and Suez. It quickly reached Sidi Barrani, some 75 miles from the border, only to be stalled on the narrow coastal plain pending the arrival of stores and equipment which never came in sufficient amounts because of control of the sea by Sir Andrew Cunningham’s battle fleet. On October 28, Hitler and Mussolini conferred in Florence. On the same day the Italian Army in Albania launched an invasion of Greece in an effort to strike toward Alexandria by way of the Aegean, Crete, and Rhodes. This adventure proved disastrous. Il Duce had been deceived by the wily Greek dictator, John Metaxas, who had studied war and politics in Germany, into supposing that “Little John” and King George II would flee at the first blow and deliver Athens into the hands of a pro-Italian Fifth Column. Metaxas and his able Chief of Staff, Gen. Alexander Papagos, had secretly made all preparations for a warm reception of the unwelcome guests.

The Italian ultimatum to Greece of October 28, 1940, asking “free passage” and “control of strategic points” was at once rejected. The invaders were thrown back. Albania was invaded in turn. British air and sea forces now had free access to Greek bases and used them to raid Naples, smash Italian battleships at Taranto (November 11), bomb Valona and Durazzo, and harry communications across the Straits of Otranto. The Greeks took Korçë on November 22, Porto Edda on December 6, and Argyrokastron on December 8. On the next day, Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell’s “Army of the Nile” launched a motorized blitzkrieg against Graziani’s troops, retaking Sidi Barrani on December 11, invading Libya four days later, and taking Bardia, Tobruk, and Bengasi by February. Over 100,000 Italian troops sur-
rendered to the victors. British forces invaded Eritrea and Ethiopia, occupied all of Italian Somaliland and retook Berbera on March 17, 1941.

These events brought Italy to the brink of disaster. Early in December, Marshal Badoglio, who had opposed the Greek adventure, resigned and was replaced by Gen. Ugo Cavallero as Chief of Staff. Adm. Domenico Cavagnari, whose fleet had suffered successive defeats at British hands, was displaced by Adm. Arturo Riccardi. Other shifts of military and political personalities reflected confusion in Rome. On December 23, 1940, Churchill broadcast an appeal to the Italian people:

Our armies are tearing your African empire to shreds. . . . It is all because of one man—one man and one man alone has ranged the Italian people in deadly struggle against the British Empire. . . . After 18 years of unbridled power he has led your country to the horrid verge of ruin. . . . One man has arrayed the trustees and inheritors of ancient Rome upon the side of the ferocious pagan barbarians. There lies the tragedy of Italian history and there stands the criminal who has wrought the deed of folly and shame. . . . The people of Italy were never consulted. The army of Italy was never consulted. No one was consulted. . . . What hard choice is open now? It is to stand up to the battery of the whole British Empire on sea, in the air, and in Africa, and to the vigorous counter-attack of the Greek nation. Or, on the other hand, to call in Attila over the Brenner Pass with his hordes of ravenous soldiery and his gangs of Gestapo policemen to occupy, to hold down and to protect the Italian people, for whom he and his Nazi followers cherish the most bitter and outspoken contempt that is on record between races.

President Roosevelt echoed Churchill on December 29. "... Even the people of Italy have been forced to become accomplices of the Nazis, but at this moment they do not know how soon they will be embraced to death by their allies. . . . I believe that the Axis Powers are not going to win this war."

The Strategy of Nemesis. Mussolini, having lost to Hitler all effective control over the national destiny, obediently followed der Führer in declaring war on the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, and on the U.S.A. in December. Italian divisions accompanied the Wehrmacht in its invasion of Russia and suffered disaster in the sequel. Fascist Italy's role in the war against America was that of anvil, not hammer. Whether Italy's fate would have been more or less grievous had Churchill's advice been followed can never be known. He urged upon Roosevelt and Marshall a massive assault on the Reich through Italy and the Balkans, which he misnamed "the soft underbelly of Europe," in the belief that such a campaign would hit Germany where it was weakest and would forestall an ultimate westward movement by Soviet forces. The actual decision 25 was to ignore the Balkans, drive the

25 See Chap. XI.
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foe from North Africa, and invade Italy from the south, while far more formidable forces were assembled for a later blow across the Channel.

This proved enough to topple the Fascist regime. Rommel's Africa Corps came to the aid of the battered Italian forces fighting the British on the south shore of the middle sea and almost reached Alexandria in the summer of 1942, only to be halted and finally defeated at El Alamein. The Anglo-American landings of November opened a pincers campaign, which ended with the surrender of the last Axis units in Africa in May, 1943. In February, Mussolini dismissed a dozen members of the Government, including son-in-law Ciano, who became Ambassador to the Vatican. Further shifts of personnel followed, amid efforts to purge defeatists and anti-German elements from the Party, achieve more total mobilization, and prepare to resist invasion. On April 17, Carl Scorza became Secretary-General of the Party. In May, a Council of Defense was set up. But with disaster on the horizon the aristocrats and industrialists who had put Fascism in power in 1922 and kept it in power for two decades were now prepared to put it out of power in order, if possible, to ride the crest of the wave of the future—i.e., the imminently victorious United Nations. The plans and hopes of the ruling classes were hampered first by the Wehrmacht and later by the embattled forces of the partisans of a new Italian democracy. But they did what they could. It sufficed to break Fascismo.

The Allied invasion and conquest of Sicily in June-July, 1943, led to il Duce's downfall. On July 16, Roosevelt and Churchill appealed to Italians to overthrow Fascism and capitulate as the only means of averting catastrophe. Scorza breathed defiance. But when Allied airmen bombed Naples and, on July 19, destroyed airfields and railroad yards on the outskirts of Rome, many minds were changed. Mussolini returned from a conference with Hitler in Verona with a Nazi plan to abandon the south and establish a new defense line north of Rome. At a stormy meeting of the Fascist Grand Council on July 24-25, Grandi, Ciano, and others turned against the leader. By a vote of 19 to 5, the Council expressed lack of confidence. On July 25, King Victor Emmanuel rejected the German defense plan, dismissed Mussolini, ordered his arrest, and formed a new Cabinet under Marshal Badoglio.

The sequel unfolded in the best Italian manner. Badoglio demanded and received from Berlin assurances that all of Italy would be defended. He announced that the war would go on and opened secret negotiations with the Allies. The dissolution of the Fascist Party was ordered on July 28. Amid popular rejoicing, the monolithic edifice which il Duce and his followers had so carefully built collapsed into fragments with astonishing speed. But Wehrmacht units and Gestapo agents were scattered throughout
the land. The King and Marshal were obliged to proceed cautiously, despite Churchill’s warning that any continuation of the German alliance would cause Italy to be “seared and scarred and blackened” from end to end. While peace demonstrators in many cities defied the Nazis and called for the ousting of Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio, secret parleys went on in Lisbon. They eventuated in an armistice, signed September 3, 1943, as the British Eighth Army invaded the toe of the peninsula. The fact was not made public until September 8, the day before British air-borne troops seized Taranto and Gen. Mark Clark’s Anglo-American Fifth Army landed at Salerno, south of Naples.

A race ensued between Allied and German forces for such components of power in Italy as each could use against the other. The Germans won on land, the Allies at sea. Most of the Italian Navy surrendered, though Nazi fliers sank the battleship *Roma* off the coast of Corsica as it steamed southward with other units to Allied-held ports. But German forces took Rome on September 10, while King and Marshal fled to the south, and disarmed almost all Italian troops whose commanders attempted to capitulate.

A “Fascist National Government” was set up in the north. On September 12, Mussolini was rescued from jail near Rome by Nazi parachute troops and SS men. He established a “Republican Fascist State” which threatened death to the Marshal, the King, and all “cowards and traitors” and strove to mobilize Italians behind the German lines for continued prosecution of the war. Meanwhile the invaders at Salerno were almost driven into the sea by the Nazi defenders. Naples was finally taken on October 1. But the campaign coded as “Operation Avalanche” turned out to be a slow, costly, and bloody enterprise in which the invaders were halted at the “Gustav Line” during the winter of 1943-44.

**Politics in Purgatory.** The curious story of the Victor Emmanuel-Badoglio regime can here only be outlined. This “Government” declared war on Germany on October 13, 1943, and received the blessings of the U.S.A. and U.K., functioning through their local commanders, the Allied Military Government (A.M.G.), the Allied Control Commission, and the Mediterranean Commission, which later became the Advisory Council on Italy. While-reserving the ultimate right of Italians to choose their form of government, Washington, London, and Moscow accepted the Monarchy as a “cobelligerent” but urged a broadening of the regime to give it a more democratic base.

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26 For a fuller account of postwar Italian politics than is here possible, see *The New International Yearbook* (New York, Funk). See also annual articles on France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and lesser States (some of them written by the author) as supplements to the briefer accounts given below and as sequels beyond 1948.

27 See p. 223.
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ALLIED VICTORY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
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SCALE OF MILES

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At this point, difficulties arose. The popular anti-Fascist parties, emerging from years of darkness, formed a Committee of National Liberation (C.N.L.), consisting of Liberals, Christian Democrats, Actionists, Labor Democrats, Socialists, and Communists. All were agreed that the King should abdicate and that the House of Savoy must go. All refused to take posts in the Badoglio Cabinet so long as Victor Emmanuel wore the crown. He in turn refused to abdicate, feeling certain of the support of Churchill—who, with American aid, set himself the arduous task, motivated as much by social conservatism as by military expediency, of maintaining a monarchy in a land of antimonarchists. The result was almost a war within a war. Count Carlo Sforza, voicing the sentiments of the C.N.L., described the King in January, 1944, as "a stupid, vile, abject, criminal monarch" and his Government as "a putrid little corpse." Crowds in Naples shouted: "Down with the Fascist King!" Churchill denied that the parties of the C.N.L. had any authority. Not until April, 1944, did the King assert his willingness to retire, but not before the liberation of Rome and then only in favor of Crown Prince Umberto, who should be named "Lieutenant General of the Realm."

Badoglio resigned on April 17, 1944, and was asked by the King to form a coalition Cabinet. This he succeeded in doing, with all six parties represented. But when Rome was at last freed of the foe on June 4, the party leaders refused to serve under Badoglio. Despite Churchill's efforts to save the Marshal, a new all-party Cabinet was established under former Premier and former Socialist Ivano Zaghi Bonomi. Among its members were Count Sforza, Alcide de Gasperi (Christian Democrat), Giuseppe Saragat (Socialist), and Palmiro Togliatti (Communist). They moved to Rome on July 15 but soon discovered that they had no power. Many British and U.S. officers and civil officials looked askance at all forms of radicalism or even liberalism; deplored the role of the left-wing partisans who were fighting the Nazis in the north; cultivated, and were cultivated by, aristocrats, industrialists, and cardinals; and tended in varying degree to share the outlook of William C. Bullitt, who wrote from Rome (Life, September 4, 1944) that "Roman circles" and the "Vatican" expected war between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. within a few years and feared that Britain and America might not resist Communism. Meanwhile, for the mass of the liberated, "liberation" meant inflation, unemployment, black markets, and near famine. "Democracy," said many, "is merely Fascism plus mockery."

Along this Via Dolorosa the Bonomi Cabinet picked its melancholy way. On November 26, 1944, it submitted its resignation to Umberto. Churchill now objected to the inclusion in any new Cabinet of Count Sforza, who was an implacable foe of the Monarchy. Washington rebuked London for this
interference, but to no avail. In the new Bonomi Cabinet of December 9 ("Made in England," said its critics), Sforza was dropped. De Gasperi became Foreign Minister. The first rift in the unity of the C.N.L. also appeared. Togliatti’s Communists were willing enough to work with Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Labor Democrats. But the Actionists and the powerful Socialist Party, led by Pietro Nenni, who had fought Fascism in Spain, were now in opposition.

Pseudo Caesar’s Demise. While material misery and political frustration brought woe to a liberated Italy, Mussolini’s rump “Fascist Republic” carried on in the north, under the protection of Nazi bayonets and under guerrilla attack by the partisans. Vengeance was wrought on such of his disloyal colleagues as il Duce could lay his hands on. On January 11, 1944, Count Ciano, Marshal Emilio de Bono, Giovanni Marinelli, and other members of the former Fascist Grand Council were executed. Thousands of Jews, political dissenters, captured partisans, and hostages were also put to death by the new Fascist authorities, the Gestapo, and the Wehrmacht.

If the mills of Mars ground slowly, yet they ground exceeding small. Allied armies at long last reached the Po Valley in April of 1945. Mussolini and his mistress, Clara Petacci, fled northward but were caught by partisans at Nesso on Lake Como on April 26. On the following day both were shot, along with Achille Starace, Roberto Farinacci, Rodolfo Graziani, and other captured Fascists. On April 29, 1945, as Allied troops entered the city, Mussolini returned to Milan, where he had founded Fascismo in 1919 and often harangued the multitude. The battered body lay on the floor of a moving van. After being manhandled by a mob, it was strung up by the feet in the Piazza Loretto, next to the body of Clara—and finally buried on the last day of April in the pauper’s section of the Cimitero Maggiore. Secret sympathizers later dug up the cadaver in April, 1946, and spirited it away. It was found in August in a monastery and at length reburied secretly in Milan in consecrated ground. With these ugly events there came to an end the most sordid and disastrous era in the life of modern Italy.

The Politics of Poverty. Bonomi’s Cabinet meanwhile restored Italy’s diplomatic relations as best it could; undertook the liquidation of Fascism, a process soon transformed from mob violence to judicial action; and struggled desperately with the desperate impoverishment of all lower-class Italians—whose hunger was only partly alleviated by Vatican charity, American supplies, and UNRRA. In accordance with their pledge to step down with the liberation of the north, the Ministers resigned on June 12. A new Cabinet, which now included all six parties of the C.N.L., was headed by Ferruccio Parri, northern leader of the antimonarchist Actionists. An Italian declaration of war on Japan was announced on July 13. Peacemaking was pain-
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fully slow. Bitterness grew over Italy's mass misery and over the question of the Monarchy. Parri resigned on November 24, warning his successors to beware of a resurgence of Fascism and of possible civil war.

Amid much weariness, feeble efforts at Cabinet building were made by such hoary figures of the remote past as Vittorio Orlando and Francisco Nitti. They failed. A new Cabinet, which was the old slightly revamped, was put together on December 9, 1945, under Alcide de Gasperi, Christian Democratic leader. Through many vicissitudes, he was destined to remain head of the Government for more than two years.

As in Japan, the end of Fascism brought political revolution and a new vision of democracy but effected no fundamental alteration of the economic and social system. While workers and peasants endured grim want in face of low wages, rising prices, and a depreciating currency, many members of the old elites of land and money preserved their wealth and even increased it through speculation and black marketeering. The political result was class hatred and fear, breaking out in strikes, riots, and angry altercations. The Fascismo of old displayed new vitality as an underground opposition. Neo-Fascism, dear to the propertied classes, grew from small beginnings to impressive proportions—e.g., Guglielmo Giannini's L'Uomo Qualunque, or "Common Man," Movement. Socialist Pietro Nenni was saying by the end of 1946 that there would be civil war or dictatorship if the Socialists and Communists did not together conquer power in the near future. At the same time the right-wing Christian Democrats were calling for an end of the C.N.L. coalition and a crusade against the "Communist menace."

Amid these growing schisms the "institutional question" was of minor importance. But it was at any rate settled. Victor Emmanuel abdicated on May 9, 1946, in favor of Umberto and sailed away to Egypt. On June 2, the voters expressed their preferences among forms of government and candidates for a Constituent Assembly. The polling resulted in 10,718,000 votes for the Monarchy and 12,719,000 for a Republic. Umberto went to Spain. The Italian Republic was officially proclaimed on June 10, 1946. The Assembly elected Enrico de Nicola as Provisional President.

Among the deputies elected, 207 were Christian Democrats, 115 Socialists, 104 Communists, and the rest scattered. In popular votes the Christian Democrats received almost 8,000,000, the Socialists 4,600,000, and the Communists 4,200,000. The Liberals, Labor Democrats, and Actionists all but disappeared. A new Constitution was slowly elaborated and put into effect on January 1, 1948. It provided for a Parliamentary regime based on universal suffrage for men and women. With Communist approval it made Catholicism the State religion and continued the Concordat of 1929. De
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Gasperi carried on with a Cabinet which was essentially a Christian Democratic-Socialist-Communist coalition. Nenni became Foreign Minister in October, 1946. His Socialist Party cooperated closely with the Communists, much to the disgust of some of its own members and to the alarm of Gasperi's right-wing followers and of all the forces of property, privilege, and clericalism throughout the country.

Pawn of Cyclops. Republican Italy's internal politics, like those of many lands, became more and more a reflection of Italy's external politics as lines of cleavage between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were drawn ever more sharply over the world. So long as the major United Nations were united, the Italian coalition of Left and Right survived. The Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947, was a product of Allied agreement. Though its terms grieved all Italian patriots of all parties, it was not a party issue. Not until America and Russia embarked openly on "cold war" in the spring of 1947 did Italy's fragile unity disintegrate into a bitter internal struggle, the end of which was still unclear in 1948.

In terms of geography, economics, and social structure, the new Italy was from the outset aligned with the American giant, despite the efforts of the Marxist Parties to reverse the verdict. De Gasperi visited the U.S.A. in January and returned with $100,000,000 and promises of more to come. Meanwhile the Socialists split over the issue of cooperation with the Communists, Giuseppe Saragat leading the anti-Communist right wing while the left wing followed Nenni, who was replaced as Foreign Minister in February by Carlo Sforza. In the wake of the Truman Doctrine, De Gasperi formed a new Cabinet on May 31, 1947, which for the first time excluded Communists and Socialists (though the Right Socialists reentered the Cabinet later in the year) in an avowedly anti-Left coalition. Washington in August canceled old claims and made new grants totaling $1,000,000,000. Italian participation in the Marshall Plan promised new American subsidies in 1948 and thereafter.

The enterprise of "saving Italy from Communism" created new problems and tensions. Nenni and Togliatti talked revolution but concentrated their efforts on trying to get their parties back into the Cabinet through creating maximum difficulties for the Government and cooperating in Moscow's effort to wreck the Marshall Plan. As the lira continued to depreciate and wages failed to keep up with rising prices, a wave of strikes swept the country in the autumn of 1947, encouraged by the Marxist agitators and accompanied by numerous clashes between workers and police. With elections postponed to the spring of 1948, the political struggle was stalemated. When American

troops withdrew on December 14, President Truman pledged American action (nature unspecified) should "the freedom and independence of Italy" be "threatened, directly or indirectly."

**Neo-Fascism.** This atmosphere was favorable to the growth of new Fascist movements. Gioacchino Cipola founded an "Italian Anti-Communist Front" in November, 1947, pledged to "God, country, family, freedom, and honor." Giannini's "Common Man" Party was disrupted in October by internal extremists, one of whom, Emilio Patrissi, founded a "National Movement for Social Democracy," with L'Ora d'Italia, the first openly Fascist newspaper since liberation, as its organ. Giovanni Tonelli's "Italian Social Movement" also preached authoritarianism and the "Corporative State." No new Duce had stepped forward by 1948 to unify these forces, but it appeared rather more than likely that one would ultimately emerge.

The strange destiny which made Mussolini more powerful dead than alive and threatened to throttle the new democracy with the new Fascism before the Republic was out of its swaddling clothes was the fruit of forces at work in the world which were quite beyond Italian control. A change in 1948 or thereafter in the political orientation of the U.S.A. and/or the U.S.S.R., promising a global peace, would give Italian democracy a chance to live and grow. Further preparations for an armed struggle for mastery of the planet would permit of no such hope. In this event, American influence would unwittingly foster a new Fascism in Italy, however heavily disguised as "democracy," while Soviet influence would deliberately foster Communism, also disguised as "democracy." Hostilities between the Super-Powers would almost certainly produce civil war in Italy and lead to Soviet occupation of the peninsula. The ultimate prospect of American liberation through atomic bombs was scarcely calculated to be more pleasing to Italians than the initial prospect of Muscovite domination. Peace and democracy in Italy, as elsewhere, depended henceforth on peace between Moscow and Washington.

**SUGGESTED READINGS**

GERMANY: GÖTTERDÄMMERUNG

—— and George La Piana: *What to Do with Italy*, New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1943.

3. GERMANY: GÖTTERDÄMMERUNG

In such a war there will no longer be victors and vanquished, but survivors and those whose name is stricken from the list of nations. Many an apparently invincible Colossus in reality stands on feet of clay and what one or two generations ago was impossible has today already become possible: with a single powerful blow to break a nation’s spiritual backbone, to destroy it forever and trample it in the dust.

Just this is the essence, the numbing aspect of the war of annihilation. The elite lies torn to shreds and poisoned on the battlefields. The survivors, a leaderless, demoralized mob of human beings crushed and broken by nameless horrors and sufferings, by unspeakable terror, stand defenceless and without any will before their victors—clay in the potter’s hands. . . . Their number does not matter. . . . Fifty million trembling fellaheen are not more difficult to bring into subjection than five; for many million times nought is still nought. A nation will no longer want something from its opponent, but will put an end to its opponent—make an end of it, once and for all.—*Deutsche Wehr*, June 13, 1935.

We shall become the terror of our enemies, nothing shall stop us from unreserved recklessness. . . . I want in this Army iron men with a will to deeds. . . . And when the Führer in his Reichstag speech submitted his proud accounting and uttered the proud words that we would no longer tolerate that 10,000,000 German national comrades should be oppressed beyond our borders, then you know as soldiers of the Air Force that, if it must be, you must back these words of the Führer to the limit. . . . We are burning with eagerness to prove our invincibility.—HERMANN GOERING, March 1, 1938.

The problem of “Bolshevism” is once more brought to the fore in all severity and today all of civilized humanity faces anxiously the question whether or not it will be possible, once more, to save Western civiliza-
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tion from being flooded from the Eastern steppes.—DR. PAUL JOSEPH GOEBBELS in Das Reich, “The Great Venture,” May, 1943.

It is heartbreaking to see the weakness of the older cultural group in face of this barbarism; its bewildered, confused retreat. Dazed and abashed, with an embarrassed smile, it abandons one position after another, seeming to concede that in very truth it no longer understands the world. It stoops to the foe’s mental and moral level, adopts his idiotic terminology, adjusts itself to its pathetic categories, his stupid, spiteful and capricious propaganda—and does not even see what it is doing. Perhaps it is already lost.—THOMAS MANN, 1938.

The inner life of nations is often revealed by their symbols of leadership. The history of Germany began with a man symbol, continued with three successive dynasty symbols, and ended with a man symbol: Hermann, the Hohenstauffens, the Hapsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, Hitler. The first of these leaders, called by the Romans Arminius, was the chieftain of the Cheruscis who led his pagan followers out of the long darkness of barbarism to butcher the legions of Varus in Teutoburger Wald (A.D. 9), thereby compelling Imperial Rome to abandon the dream of a frontier on the Elbe. The early dynasties typified the “First,” or Holy Roman, Reich, established in its initial form eight centuries after Hermann by Karl der Grosse (Charlemagne) when the Germanic tribes had long since learned to revere and imitate the great world of ancient Rome which their ancestors had destroyed. Under Hohenstauffen and Hapsburg Emperors, this curious realm endured as a living polity for eight centuries more, symbolizing the catholic universality of medieval Christendom and the common culture of Frenchmen, Germans, Czechs, Poles, Italians, and others—bound together by Church and Empire until the “seamless robe” of unity was torn beyond all mending by Protestantism and nationalism. The life span of the Hohenzollern Dynasty was the life span of the modern cult of the nation-state in Germany—from the Mark of Brandenburg through the Kingdom of Prussia to the German Empire (the “Second Reich”) of 1871-1918. Hitler, the little man of Austria who became tyrant over Europe, symbolized the twilight time of nationalism and Christianity when Germans returned to a debased cult of imperial power, reverted to barbarism and paganism, dreamed of a World State conquered by the sword of a “Third Reich,” and surrendered themselves in their political and social relations to utter formlessness—violent, empty, and touched with the shadow of a long darkness to come.

The foreign policies of the Second and Third Reichs were similar in that a constant pattern of relationships with Russia to the east, Danubia, Balkania, and Italy to the south, and France and Britain to the west posed similar problems demanding similar solutions. The leaders of the Second Reich,
however, pursued limited, national objectives and accepted European civilization and the Western State System as permanent concomitants of their thought and action. The leaders of the Third Reich, on the contrary, repudiated the basic values of European culture, aimed at the destruction of the State System, and worshiped gods who led them to limitless visions of imperial aggrandizement. In both cases the German State was the most powerful single member of the community of nations. European and world politics during the five decades preceding 1918 revolved around the Second Reich. In like manner, European and world politics during the decade following 1933 revolved around the Third Reich.

The Weimar Republic. Between the fall of the Hohenzollern regime and the establishment of the Nazi despotism, 15 years elapsed. These were the years when German Liberalism and Social Democracy belatedly came into their own. They were years of hope and of misery. The hope was always deferred and forever frustrated, since the Democrats and Socialists of the defeated Reich were never able to please patriots or convert to their cause the old ruling classes whose prerogatives they dared not disturb. They fought Communism on the Left (and defeated it in 1919-20) but compromised endlessly with reaction on the Right. French insecurity, enhanced by British indifference and American isolationism, drove Paris to policies of oppression which the German Republic had no means of resisting. Its weakness promoted disloyalty; its hopelessness provoked desperation. For a few brief years (1924-29), British and American loans brought to many Germans a feverish prosperity, but the Great Depression produced misery redoubled. By 1932, 6,000,000 Germans were jobless, and 60,000,000 Germans were more or less convinced that nothing could restore national well-being and prestige save a return to “blood and iron.”

Despite limited and belated diplomatic successes, the Weimar Republic never lived down its early associations with the military debacle, the Diktat of Versailles, indemnities, disarmament, weakness, disgrace, inflation, disaster. In the struggle over reparations between victors and vanquished the Republic lost the first great battle in “the war after the war.” On April 27, 1921, the Reparation Commission fixed the total bill at 132,000,000,000 marks, or about $31,000,000,000. Germany was compelled to accept this total, under threat of the occupation of the Ruhr. But the financial condition of the German Government led to huge budgetary deficits, which were met by inflation, with a resulting depreciation of the mark. A temporary moratorium had to be granted to Germany; but at the end of 1922 the determination of the Poincaré Government in France to use force and seize “productive guarantees” was reflected in the action of the Reparation Commission in declaring Germany in voluntary default on timber, coal, and cattle deliveries.
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In the face of British objections, the French and Belgian Governments ordered engineers and troops into the Ruhr in January, 1923. Germany countered by stopping all reparation payments and organizing passive resistance against the invaders. The forces of occupation resorted to reprisals, arrests, court-martial, and other repressive measures; but coal could not be mined with bayonets, and the occupation was fruitless. The German Government, however, was reduced to bankruptcy, and in August of 1923 Chancellor Stresemann abandoned passive resistance and surrendered.

Germany's efforts to bring about the end of foreign military control and to secure equality in armaments were more successful. The Allied occupation of the Rhineland was terminated in June of 1930, five years before the expiration of the period specified in the Treaty, and the Allied military and financial control commissions were withdrawn. This was a substantial gain and the fruit of the Briand-Stresemann era of rapprochement. By abandoning passive resistance and flirtations with the Soviet Union, by accepting
as permanent the Reich’s western frontier, guaranteed in the Locarno Treaties of 1925, and finally by accepting the Young Plan, Stresemann gained membership in the League of Nations for Germany in 1926 and achieved the end of foreign supervision of German armaments. But this was a negative victory and only a small step toward that equality of military status which was the prerequisite of effective political equality with other Powers. Germany insisted upon the fulfillment of the pledge of the Treaty of Versailles that the unilateral disarmament of Germany would be followed by general disarmament. In the sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference between 1925 and 1929 and in the General Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations which met at Geneva in February, 1932, the German representatives pleaded eloquently for general disarmament to the German level or, as an alternative, the granting to Germany of the right to rearm to the level of her neighbors. France and her eastern allies, with qualified support from Great Britain, stood steadfast against both demands, for the acceptance of either would destroy the strategic bases of French hegemony and enable Germany to challenge the 1919 status quo in other respects.

In the matter of territorial readjustment, the German Republic achieved nothing. In the Locarno Treaties, it accepted the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and of Eupen and Malmédy as permanent. But the loss of Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and Upper Silesia remained a festering wound in the hearts of all patriots, and none could abandon hope of recovering these territories in the future. Their recovery, however, demanded a new dismemberment of resurrected Poland—and behind Poland stood France and the Little Entente, firmly resolved to maintain frontiers as they were. Here was a stake of German diplomacy which could be attained only at the risk of war; and so long as Germany was impotent, war could not be risked under any circumstances. At Locarno, Germany refused to guarantee the eastern frontiers but agreed not to resort to forcible measures of revision. Stresemann and his successors were consequently obliged, like Gambetta, to cherish in silence the memory of the new “lost provinces” and to await a more favorable conjuncture of events before essaying their recovery. As for the lost colonies, the most that Germany was able to attain was a seat on the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. German colonial aspirations remained unfulfilled. Efforts at Anschluss with Austria led to further humiliation, compelling Foreign Minister Curtius to resign under French pressure in 1931 and further weakening Chancellor Brüning, last hope of German democracy.

In summary, Republican Germany’s foreign policy encountered a succession of defeats at the hands of France and attained none of its major objectives. This circumstance helped to discredit democracy. The psychic inse-
curities bred of national defeat and impotence were aggravated by social insecurities engendered by currency inflation and general impoverishment. Even in its early days, the Weimar Republic was bitterly assailed by monarchists, ultrapatriots, and adventurous leaders of disgruntled former soldiers. Liberals and Social Democrats, in the name of freedom, tolerated reactionary enemies of the Republic on the Right and Communist enemies of the Republic on the Left and were denounced by each for tolerating the other. Junkers and industrialists, unconverted to Liberalism and still in possession of much of their old power and prestige, dreamed of glory and profit and schemed with reactionary conspirators against the new regime. The dark years after Versailles created a following for anti-Republican plotters. The Kapp Putsch of March, 1920, was frustrated only by a general strike. In November, 1923, during the French occupation of the Ruhr, an obscure former corporal of Austrian birth, preaching anti-Semitism and the glory of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and leading a “National Socialist German Workers’ Party,” attempted a Putsch in Munich. It was suppressed. He was tried and lightly sentenced. He resumed political activity in 1925 but converted few to his cause so long as the new prosperity of the middle twenties caused the lower middle classes, the proletariat, and the peasantry to turn deaf ears to agitators and fanatics. His name was Adolf Hitler.

When the Great Depression descended upon the Reich, it created potentially revolutionary conditions once more. Jobless workers flocked to the Communist Party. The impoverished peasantry and Kleinbürger tum, terrified at the economic collapse and fearful of Communism, flocked to Hitler’s Nazis, who promised to save them from Bolshevism and the Jews. Industrialists and Junkers perceived an opportunity to use Hitler to destroy the trade unions and the liberal and radical parties. The forces of democracy were paralyzed. The Communists were incapable of undertaking proletarian revolution. The Nazi Messiah appealed to the masses by combining the vocabulary of socialism with the language of impassioned chauvinism and racial hatred. He and his aides cried from the housetops that the German armies were undefeated in 1918 but had been “stabbed in the back” by the Marxists and Jews; that democracy and Communism were destroying German Kultur; that the “Weimar Jew Republic” was shameful and corrupt; that the glories of the Hohenstauffen and Hohenzollern Empires must be recaptured in a glorious “Third Reich,” strong, authoritarian, and ready to restore to Germany her rightful place in the sun.

The Nazi Revolution. With banners, drums, and trumpets the brown-shirted Nazi Stormtroopers, subsidized by businessmen and aristocrats, carried the hakenkreuz flag of anti-Semitism throughout the land and shouted their battlecries: “Freedom and bread!” “Out with the Jews!” “Break the
bonds of interest slavery!” and “Germany awake!” In the Reichstag election of September 14, 1930, they won 6,400,000 votes. In the Presidential election of April 10, 1932, in which the “wooden titan,” Hindenburg, was reelected by a slim margin, 13,400,000 votes were cast for Hitler. In the Reichstag election of July 31, 1932, 13,745,000 Nazi votes were cast—37% of the total. Hitler seemed about to be swept into power by a great mass movement which would give him a majority of the electorate. But business conditions improved slightly in the autumn of 1932. In the Reichstag election of November 6, 1932 (the last free election in Germany), the Nazis polled only 11,737,000 votes—less than one-third of the total. By the end of the year their movement was bankrupt and disintegrating.

The Reich was delivered to Fascism not by an electoral victory but by a conspiracy, entered into against the last Republican Chancellor, Kurt von Schleicher, whose old friend, Franz von Papen, resolved to use Hitler to put himself back in power. Papen, archmuddler of the German reaction, had been head of the “Baron’s Cabinet” which Hindenburg had appointed after ousting Chancellor Heinrich Brüning in May, 1932. In January, 1933, Papen spun his plot. His tools, so he thought, were Hitler, the mob hypnotist; Hugenberg, the ultranationalist publisher; Fritz Thyssen, the steel magnate; the Reichsverband der Industrie; and the Junker Landbund. Hindenburg, who had been reelected to the Presidency nine months previously by the support of Brüning and of all the Liberals and Socialists in order that he might save the Reich from Hitler, was persuaded to “save agriculture” (i.e., the Junkers) from “agrarian Bolshevism” (i.e., an exposure of the use to which they had put State subsidies) by dismissing Schleicher on January 30, 1933, and appointing Hitler Chancellor, Papen Vice-Chancellor, Hugenberg Minister of Economics, and other reactionaries to the remaining posts. Hitler dissolved the Reichstag and ordered an election on March 5, 1933. Six days before the balloting the Reichstag building was burned. Hitler at once accused the Communists of arson and bloody revolution. He posed as the savior of the nation from the “Red menace.” He ordered the arrest of thousands of Communists and Social Democrats, suppressed the campaign activities of the anti-Nazi parties, induced Hindenburg to abolish civil liberties in the name of defense against the Communist peril, and threw the electorate into a panic. His followers polled 44% of the vote. They promptly secured a majority in the new Reichstag by excluding and arresting all the Communist deputies. An “Enabling Act” transferred dictatorial powers to the Cabinet.

The story of how Hitler astutely tricked his non-Nazi colleagues, wiped out all other parties, suppressed the social radicals in his own ranks, and established the Nazi despotism cannot be reviewed here. Suffice it to note
that the multitudes were exalted by the mass pageantry of great festivals, by
the masterly propaganda of Goebbels and by the demagoguery of der Führer.
They were prevailed upon to give the regime almost unanimous support in a
series of referenda. Dissidence was suppressed by the ruthlessness of Goering
and the espionage of Himmler. Heavy industry and the Junkers had paid the
piper and were, to a considerable degree, able to call the tune. On "Bloody
Saturday," June 30, 1934, critics within the ranks were silenced, and old
scores were settled. Among those shot for treason were Gregor Strasser,
Ernst Röhm, Karl Ernst, and other Nazi radicals who resented Hitler's de-
pendence on the propertied classes or who aspired to replace the Junker-
controlled Reichswehr with the Stormtroopers as Germany's new army; the
aides of the incautious Papen, who barely escaped death and was bundled
off to Vienna as German Ambassador; Kurt von Schleicher and his wife;
Erich Klausener, General von Bredow, and scores of others.

With Hindenburg's death on August 2, 1934, and Hitler's assumption of
the powers of the Presidency, der Führer's control of the German State be-
came absolute. Hjalmar Schacht remained his liaison with big business.
Defense Minister Blomberg and the General Staff remained his liaison with
the Junkers. With the trade unions abolished and strikes forbidden, with
the press, radio, motion pictures, theater, and school system shackled, and
with all social organizations "coordinated" under Nazi control, the dictator-
ship was as unlimited as human ingenuity and lust for power could make it.
Popular unrest was deflected into Jew baiting and into hatred of foreign
enemies. Germany thus became a new citadel of Fascist totalitarianism, dedi-
cated to militarism, revenge, and imperial expansion.

The Third Reich pursued the same general diplomatic objectives as the
Weimar Republic but utilized in place of conciliation and compromise the
methods of treaty breaking, threats, and defiance. But to these old objectives
were added new ones far more alarming to Germany's neighbors. Mystical
racial Pan-Germanism contemplated the ultimate "liberation" of all Ger-
mans abroad and the union with the Reich of Austria, German Switzerland,
the Sudeten deutsche of Czechoslovakia, and the Germans of Danzig, the
Corridor, the Baltic States, and other irredentist areas. Beyond these lived
other "Nordics" who ought also, willy-nilly, to join the Reich—the Flemings,
the Dutch, the Scandinavians. The building of this greater Reich in the name
of Deutschtum and Grossraumwirtschaft would require the partition or ex-
tinction of most of Germany's neighbors. In militant National Socialism,
moreover, was a new Drang nach Osten—a dream of controlling the Danube
Valley and the Balkans. And here also, bred of middle-class hysteria and
the fanatical thirst for revenge of Alfred Rosenberg and other Russian
émigrés in the Nazi ranks, was a vision of a great crusade against Bol-
shevism, involving a restoration of the terms of Brest Litovsk, with White Russia, the Baltic States, and the Ukraine in German hands. “To forge a mighty sword,” Hitler had written in Mein Kampf, “is the task of the internal political leadership of a people; to protect the forging and to seek allies in arms is the task of foreign policy.”

That these objectives meant war was fully realized by the Nazi leaders. But quite apart from specific diplomatic goals, German Fascism, like its Italian counterpart, set its face toward war for other reasons. Fascist ideology repudiates pacifism and internationalism and glorifies war as a thing good in itself. The ghosts of barbarian ancestors and the shades of Nietzsche, Treitschke, and Bernhardi here joined hands with the frenzied sadism and masochism of a people driven to desperation by real or imagined sufferings. War became a psychological necessity in the Nazi Weltanschauung. It also became a necessary political expedient to keep the tyranny in power. In order to impose further sacrifices on the population, to deflect mass resentments onto foreign foes, to conquer the markets and raw materials abroad without which the Fascist economic order could not survive, the ultimate unsheathing of the sword became a categorical imperative.

Rearmament. War is seldom embarked upon, however, even by desperate autocrats, unless it offers at least a gambler’s chance of victory. Hitler’s problem was one of building up an overwhelming military force, dividing and weakening his prospective enemies, and finding allies. Rearmament was dangerous because it involved treaty violations and might precipitate a preventive war by the French bloc before the Reich was prepared to resist. Hitler moved cautiously and calculated correctly that French pacifism and British muddlement would prevent any concerted effort to coerce Germany. Amid loud protestations of peace and further pleas for “honor” and “equality,” he announced Germany’s withdrawal from the League and the Disarmament Conference on October 14, 1933. This gesture of protest against the refusal of other Powers to grant arms parity to the Reich won wide approval at home and provoked no retaliation from Paris or London. The second step was taken on March 16, 1935, with the announcement of the “Law for the Reconstruction of the National Defense Forces,” which reintroduced military conscription and greatly enlarged the Reichswehr in open repudiation of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. This led, after considerable fumbling and wrangling, to the Anglo-French-Italian “Stresa Front” of April and to Germany’s condemnation by the League Council on April 17. There were warnings and threats but again no action, save the signature of the Franco-Soviet Pact on May 2 and of the Czech-Soviet Pact on May 16. The united front was soon shattered. On June 18, 1935, Downing Street connived in Hitler’s treaty breaking by accepting his offer of a Naval Pact
limiting the German fleet to 35% of the British. Since Berlin was anxious to conciliate London, the agreement was most satisfactory. A German fleet one-third the size of the British could easily dominate the Baltic and thus aid in the projected crusade against Russia. Within three months, Britain and Italy were at swords' points in the Mediterranean and Hitler could proceed with his plans unhindered. The German General Staff was re-established on October 15 with Gen. Ludwig Beck as its Chief. Unemployment waned and munition profits mounted, as government loans financed an enormous production of guns, tanks, artillery, bombing planes, submarines, and battleships.

The third step toward military domination of the Continent was taken on March 7, 1936, while the Western Powers were hopelessly split over Italy's impending conquest of Ethiopia. Hitler announced the abrogation of the Locarno Treaties of 1925 and the remilitarization of the Rhineland (in violation of Locarno and of Articles 42 and 43 of Versailles), alleging that the Franco-Soviet Pact violated the Locarno engagements. He proposed a 25-year nonaggression pact with France and Belgium, guaranteed by Italy and Britain; the reciprocal demilitarization of the frontier (involving the scrapping of the Maginot Line); bilateral nonaggression pacts with Germany's eastern neighbors (excluding the U.S.S.R.); and other ingenious devices designed to safeguard the western frontier and leave Germany free in the East. Had French armies moved into the Rhineland, the Reichswehr was prepared to withdraw, since it was not yet ready for war. But the French armies did not march. Again protests, warnings, and League condemnation were followed by inaction. Britain pledged France support against German invasion but pledged nothing as to eastern Europe, where conflict would come first. The British memorandum of May 8, designed to discover Hitler's intentions in the East, was judged in Berlin unworthy of a reply. German troops remained in the Rhineland. Paris acquiesced.

Although German strategists perfected a new Schlieffen Plan to crush France through Holland and Belgium, Hitler's professed objective was to keep the peace in the West while he moved forward in the East. A Fascist or conservative France could be expected to abandon Moscow and strike a bargain with Berlin, however suicidal, at Russia's expense. A liberal or socialist France would be sufficiently pacifist to acquiesce in whatever Hitler might do, short of open war. In the event of French military aid to Czechoslovakia or the U.S.S.R., the Reichswehr would remain on the defensive in the West as a means of keeping Britain neutral. Such a defensive strategy, made possible by the refortification of the Rhineland, would render French aid to Prague or Moscow impossible. Britain would scarcely fight unless France or the Low Countries were invaded. With France checkmated and
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British neutrality assumed, the Drang nach Osten could be carried forward until the Western Powers should be outarmed, outmaneuvered, and made ripe for conquest.

On August 24, 1936, German military service was extended from one to two years. The Nuremberg Party Congress of September, 1936, was devoted to denunciations of Bolshevism. Der Führer declared wage increases impossible. He demanded new sacrifices and promised to make the Reich economically self-sufficient within four years. Rosenberg declared, “The Soviet Union’s Government is controlled by Jewish interests and it is money stolen from the Russian people by the Jews which is being used in an attempt to awaken the underworld in all nations to march against European culture and against the holy traditions of all peoples.” Said Goebbels, “Bolshevism must be annihilated. The idea of Bolshevism could have emanated only from the Jewish brain.” Hitler, denouncing Russia and the “Bolshevist Jews” before massed thousands of marching troops, shouted, “We are ready any hour. . . . I cannot permit ruined States on my doorstep.”

Anti-Comintern Axis. By suchouthings of anti-Bolshevism the leaders of the Western Powers were effectively anesthetized to their doom, precisely as the leaders of German Liberalism had been a few years before. So long as the Anglo-French ruling classes could be induced to believe that the Third Reich was “saving civilization from the Reds” and arming only to attack the Soviet Union, so long could Hitler and Mussolini move from victory to victory. Their violations of treaties and their aggressions against the weak were not only tolerated by Downing Street and the Quai d’Orsay but were even encouraged. Der Führer’s threats against the U.S.S.R. were doubtless “sincere” up to the point at which his experimentation convinced him that the Soviet Union, far from being a weak State in process of reduction to helplessness by the “Jewish ferment of decomposition,” was a strong State whose leaders and people were able and willing to fight not only in defense of their frontiers but in defense of their allies. The weak Powers were obviously France and Britain since their Governments, despite the enormous resources at their disposal, had no will to fight and preferred to desert their allies so long as they believed that they could find safety by deflecting the Reich against Moscow. Hitler accordingly prepared for war against the West. For this a mighty sword was needed—and control of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to protect the German rear. For this allies were also needed. Hitler originally dreamed of a coalition with Britain and Italy to crush France before undertaking the conquest of Russia. Experience demonstrated that a formal alliance with Britain was not to be had. Berlin could merely rely on British opportunism to afford a strong likelihood of nonintervention in any war in eastern or Central Europe. As
for Italy, the fly in the ointment was Austria. Mussolini could not tolerate at the Brenner Pass a Germany of 75,000,000 people pushing southward toward Bolzano and Trieste. Therefore he must oppose German designs on Austria. Propaganda from Berlin and Munich converted perhaps 40% of the Austrian electorate to the Nazi faith—and to union with the Reich—during 1933; but the conservative clerical Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, established an Austrian Fascist State to block the Hitlerite menace. Spurning support against the Nazis from the Social Democrats, who controlled the municipality of Vienna and another 40% of the Austrian electorate, he placed himself in the hands of Mussolini and of the reactionary Heimwehr militia, which was subsidized from Italy. At the behest of Rome and of the Heimwehr leaders, Emil Fey and Prince von Stahremberg, Dollfuss crushed the Social Democrats in February, 1934, by accusing them of rebellion, bombarding the apartments of the Vienna workers, and executing or imprisoning their leaders. In May, he signed a series of political and economic Protocols at Rome with Hungary and Italy.

Hitler journeyed to Italy to confer with Mussolini at Venice on June 15, 1934; but the two tyrants could come to no agreement. Seemingly in despair over the prospects of securing control of the Government by peaceful penetration, the Austrian Nazis resorted to force in the Putsch of July 25, 1934. Armed Nazis seized the Chancellery building, shot Dollfuss, and permitted him to bleed to death. But the uprising failed in the provinces. *Il Duce* threatened to send troops over the border if Germany intervened or the Nazis seized Austria from within. Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss and continued to enjoy Italian support.

At last, however, Hitler came to terms on July 11, 1936, and agreed to respect Austrian independence and to reopen German trade and travel with Vienna. In October, Schuschnigg dissolved the Heimwehr and subsequently dropped its representatives from the Cabinet. With the Nazi menace at least temporarily removed, he could afford to dispense with the support of Mussolini’s mercenaries. *Il Duce* acquiesced, for he had fallen into Hitler’s arms. On October 25, Ciano struck a bargain with der *Führer* at Berlin and Berchtesgaden. Germany recognized the conquest of Ethiopia and was promised economic concessions. Italy agreed with the Reich that any new Locarno must be limited to western Europe, that Article 16 should be removed from the Covenant, and that the two Fascist Powers must cooperate against “Bolshevism.” Both Powers expressed their approval of General Franco’s cause in Spain. Both agreed to cooperate in the Danube Valley within the framework of the Protocols of Rome and the Austro-German accord of July 11. This entente apparently signified Italian acquiescence in the German domination of an independent Austria and joint German-Italian support of Hun-
German revisionism, tempered by continued efforts to isolate Czechoslovakia. After the discussions at Berchtesgaden in the Bavarian Alps, Italy was, for all practical purposes, Germany’s ally, even though Berlin would not forget that desertion of allies was an old Italian custom. An ally which might definitely place Britain in the enemy camp, moreover, was dangerous. But this could be risked in order to isolate France.

In other quarters, varying degrees of success were encountered in Nazi efforts to build a coalition. On January 26, 1934, a 10-year Nonaggression Pact with Poland was signed. Claims on the Corridor were deferred in return for Poland’s detachment from the French bloc. But Nazi aggressiveness in Danzig, coupled with the alarming scale of German rearmament and the obvious fact that Germany could attack Russia effectively only through Poland, caused Warsaw to veer back toward Paris in the summer of 1936. Poland remained an incalculable factor. Hungary would be certain to cooperate in any attack on Czechoslovakia if protected against Rumania and Jugoslavia. The murder of Premier Duca of Rumania by pro-Nazi Iron Guardists in December, 1933, the toleration at Bucharest of anti-Semitic and pro-German conspirators, and the dismissal of Titelescu in August, 1936, all encouraged hopes at Berlin that Rumania might be won to the Fascist cause. Bulgaria’s conservative regime, with irredentist ambitions scarcely less passionate than those of Hungary, was sympathetic. If Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria became Germany’s allies, Jugoslavia would be immobilized. The successful Fascist coup d’état of Gen. John Metaxas in Greece on August 5, 1936, placed in power at Athens a regime sympathetic toward Germany. Nazi support of the Fascist Rebels in the Spanish “civil war” was based on the hope that a Fascist Spain could be used to complete the isolation and encirclement of France. In Asia, Turkey remained committed to a policy of friendship with Moscow; but Japan, with designs on Siberia, was prepared to enter into commercial, political, and military understandings with Germany and Italy promising an eventual assault upon the U.S.S.R. from the east and west simultaneously. The German-Japanese agreement of November 25, 1936, ostensibly against the Comintern but actually against the U.S.S.R., was a significant step in this direction, although Ribbentrop secretly envisaged it as so much dust thrown into the eyes of Britain and France to blind them to the blows being prepared against them.

Vienna. The stage was thus set for territorial expansion. Prior to 1938, no “lost provinces” had been recovered save the Saar district, which was restored to the Reich March 1, 1935, following an overwhelmingly pro-German plebiscite in January. Recovery of Danzig and the Corridor required that Poland be first rendered defenseless. This in turn required the liquidation of Czechoslovakia, since German armies in Bohemia and Slovakia
could outflank Poland's Reich frontiers. The reduction of Czechoslovakia to helplessness (and its consequent destruction without war) required German control of Austria in order to outflank the Czech border fortifications. Italian acquiescence in the liquidation of Austria was already assured. Berlin felt confident of British acquiescence following the visit of Lord Halifax to the Reich in November, 1937. The war in Spain had demonstrated that the Western Powers were paralyzed and self-defeated. It had furnished a useful testing ground for the new Nazi arms. It had confirmed Axis hypotheses regarding the best slogans for befuddling London and Paris. Hitler thus began to outline the plot of the third and most terrifying volume of his *Kampf*, destined to be written in deeds rather than words.

In early February, 1938, Hitler made important changes in his entourage. Minister of Defense Gen. Werner von Blomberg, then on his honeymoon with his secretary, was retired in disgrace. Der Führer took his post and named Gen. Wilhelm Keitel as his adjutant. Gen. Werner von Fritsch, Commander in Chief of the Reichswehr (who was to die mysteriously in Poland 20 months later), was replaced by Gen. Walter von Brauchitsch. Baron Constantine von Neurath, Foreign Minister since May, 1932, was replaced by Joachim von Ribbentrop. Hjalmar Schacht was succeeded as Minister of Economics by Walter Funk. Henceforth the Army command, the diplomatic bureaucracy, and the industrialists would be pliant tools in the hands of the Nazi radicals. On February 12 the last Chancellor of Austria, Kurt Schuschnigg, was invited to Berchtesgaden at Papen's suggestion. He was there brow-beaten by Hitler's threats of invasion into granting amnesty and full freedom of action to the Austrian Nazis and admitting into his Cabinet several leaders of the Nazi Fifth Column in Vienna, including Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, Guido Schmidt, and Arthur Seyss-Inquart. On February 20, Hitler denounced Russia before the Reichstag, promised "protection" to all Germans outside the borders of the Reich, demanded a free hand in Central Europe, and condemned British critics of National Socialism, in particular Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. The same night Eden resigned and was replaced by Lord Halifax. Der Führer now felt that he could take Austria with few risks.

On March 9, Schuschnigg announced in desperation that a plebiscite would be held on March 13 on the question of Austrian independence. He was confident of overwhelming support from the older voters. On the same day the French Cabinet fell. Ribbentrop visited British leaders in London as he took his leave as Ambassador. On March 10 the German press and radio shrieked that a "Communist" uprising in Vienna was imminent and that Germany must act to protect its nationals. On March 11, Glaise-Horstenau returned from a visit to Berlin and delivered a Nazi ultimatum to Schuschnigg: Abandon the plebiscite, or face invasion. The same after-
noon a second ultimatum arrived: Resign by 7:30, or face invasion, Nazi rowdies were already attacking Jews and rioting in the doomed capital. Schuschnigg was alone. He announced his resignation that evening. Seyss-Inquart assumed the Chancellorship and invited the Reichswehr to “protect” Austria. On March 12, 1938, after the German Minister in Prague assured himself and the Wilhelmstrasse that Czechoslovakia would not interfere, the German Army poured into Austria, followed by Hitler, who entered Vienna in triumph on March 14, named Seyss-Inquart Statthalter of the Ostmark, and ordered a “plebiscite” on Anschluss on April 10. In both Germany and Austria, 99% of the electors voted “ja.” Meanwhile, Schuschnigg was imprisoned. Fey was found shot to death, along with his wife and dog. Stahremberg survived by virtue of being in Switzerland. The assassins of Dollfuss became heroes. Scores of liberals, Socialists, and Jews committed suicide. Thousands fled the country. More thousands stayed behind to face persecution, imprisonment, or death. Austria was conquered.

Sudetenland. The next victim was Czechoslovakia. Here the leader of the Nazi Fifth Column was Konrad Henlein, leader of the Nazified Sudeten Deutsche Partei, subsidized from Berlin and pretending to represent the 3,500,000 German-speaking citizens of the Czech Republic. The Sudetens had lived within the Bohemian borderlands for centuries and had never been nationals of any North German State. They were perhaps better treated by Prague than any other national minority in Central Europe. But Hitler found it useful to provoke disorders, to raise a great cry of “persecution,” and ultimately to demand the “liberation” (and then the annexation) of Sudetenland in the name of a specious “self-determination.” Chamberlain announced on March 24 that Britain would assume no commitments to defend Czechoslovakia. He intimated that Hitler could have his way if only he would refrain from force. In April, Henlein (i.e., Hitler) demanded “autonomy.” In May, Henlein visited London, and Hitler alarmed Britain and France and precipitated partial Czech mobilization by threatening force. On June 3, the London Times opined that “self-determination” for the Sudetens would afford “a welcome example of peaceful change. . . . It would be a drastic remedy for the present unrest, but something drastic may be needed.”

The fantastic “war crisis” of the summer of 1938 and the even more fantastic “peace” which followed it scarcely admit of brief review. The determining elements, however, were simple. Hitler was resolved to destroy Czechoslovakia. If Prague could be induced to yield Sudetenland, which included all the Czech border fortifications, the rest of the country would be

29 For a detailed and documented account of both, see the author’s Europe on the Eve (New York, Knopf, 1939), pp. 358-489.
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indefensible. President Eduard Beneš, Premier Milan Hodza, Foreign Min-
ister Kamil Krofta, and Gen. Jan Syrovy were determined to fight rather
than surrender. Czechoslovakia was guaranteed by France and the Soviet
Union, allied with Rumania and Jugoslavia, and linked through France with
Britain and Poland. Hitler was at no time prepared to risk war with any
such combination. But he quickly perceived that no Power save the U.S.S.R.
was prepared to come to Prague’s defense. Daladier and Bonnet were grop-
ning for ways of evading French obligations. Chamberlain and Halifax were
resolved to sacrifice Czechoslovakia on the altar of the Nazi Drang nach
Osten. The Nazi bluff could be called and Czechoslovakia protected by ac-
cepting Soviet offers of joint defense. This, however, was the last thing de-
sired by the Anglo-French appeasers. Their calculus was based on the as-
sumption of an eventual Nazi-Soviet conflict, and for this Czechoslovakia
must be sacrificed. To “sell” the sacrifice to the Western Parliaments and
publics, a war panic must be manufactured. Hitler was quite willing to
cooperate. The result was the “Peace” of Munich.80

Both Hitler and Chamberlain played their roles with consummate skill.
On July 18, Hitler sent a confidential message to Halifax through Fritz
Wiedemann, his aide-de-camp. It presumably suggested a nonviolent “solu-
tion” of the Sudeten problem through a four-Power pact. On July 25 it was
announced that Chamberlain was sending Viscount Runciman to Prague as
an “investigator” and “mediator” between Henlein and the Czech Cabinet.
Runciman arrived on August 4, conferred with sundry persons, and pressed
Beneš to yield. He departed on September 16. In a final letter dated Sep-

80 The revelations in the Nuremberg trials do not, in the opinion of the author,
validate the general analysis set forth at length in his Europe on the Eve. The new
data show that Nazi military plans for the destruction of Czechoslovakia were made
as early as June, 1937, and that the operational program, “Case Green,” was agreed
upon in May, 1938. They also show that Hitler was prepared to resort to war in
September, 1938, if his demands were rejected. But the premise of this calculation
was that France and Britain would abandon Czechoslovakia, first by pressing Prague
to accept Hitler’s demands, and second by doing nothing in the event that Hitler was
obliged to invade Czechoslovakia. This premise was correct. It was known to various
European observers in the spring of 1938 and was predicted in the second edition of
the present work, published in the spring of 1937. At no time was Hitler prepared to
wage war against a united coalition of Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet
Union. At no time was any such coalition possible, thanks to the firm conviction of
the Anglo-French Munichmen that the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia would lead to a
Nazi assault on the U.S.S.R. It has also been established since the war that the anti-
Nazi German generals, who regarded Hitler as a madman, were about to launch a
conspiracy for his overthrow in September, 1938, when they were frustrated by Anglo-
French surrender to his demands. See on these problems Pierre de Mendessohn, The
Nuremberg Documents (London, G. Allen, 1946), published by Harper in the U.S.A.
under the title of Design for Aggression; Fabian von Schlabrendorf, They Almost Killed
Hitler; Hugh Gibson (editor), The Von Hassell Diaries, by Ulrich von Hassell (New
York, Doubleday, 1947); and William Shirer, End of a Berlin Diary.

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tember 21 he recommended the immediate cession of the Sudeten areas to the Reich without a plebiscite. He also urged that Prague forbid all anti-German agitation, terminate its alliances, accept a guarantee from the Powers against unprovoked aggression, and conclude a commercial treaty with the Reich on preferential terms. The war panic was meanwhile fully developed. On August 23 the Little Entente committed suicide by granting to Nazi-supported Hungary equality of rights in arms in return for projected non-aggression pacts which were to become effective only after Prague’s “minority problem” was solved to Budapest’s satisfaction. Each day the Nazi press and radio screamed more loudly about “Czech outrages,” “barbarous persecutions,” and the “Red menace.” The Reichswehr gradually mobilized. Armored divisions and bombing squadrons gathered near the Czech borders. On September 6 the London Times unofficially urged the partition of Czechoslovakia. On September 12, last day of the Nuremberg Parteitag, Hitler shrieked terrifying threats and dedicated the Reich to the “liberation” of the Sudetens.

Immediately thereafter, Henlein’s followers attempted a military Putsch in Sudetenland but were speedily dispersed. The leaders fled into Germany where they were received as “refugees” from the “Czech terror.” On September 15, Chamberlain flew to Munich and conferred with Hitler in Berchtesgaden. There he made the “discovery” that Hitler was contemplating an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia unless Chamberlain could promise “self-determination.” The Prime Minister returned to London to confer with Simon, Hoare, and Halifax and then with the full Cabinet. On Sunday, September 18, Daladier and Bonnet flew to the British capital. The King, the Queen, and the Archbishop of Canterbury led England in prayers for peace. On September 19 an Anglo-French ultimatum was presented to Prague, demanding the surrender of Sudetenland and offering in return an international guarantee against unprovoked aggression to what would be left of the Czech Republic. A reply was asked “at the earliest possible moment.” When Prague inquired of Paris whether France would honor its obligations in the event that a rejection of the ultimatum was followed by German aggression, Daladier and Bonnet made no answer. A new ultimatum demanding an immediate decision was presented to Beneš at 2:15 a.m., September 21, by the British and French Ministers, Basil Newton and M. De la Croix, warning that Britain and France would not only abandon Czechoslovakia in case of a German invasion but would even aid the Reich.

Despite all pretense to the contrary, then and later, Anglo-French policy was not dictated by military weakness. With the Soviet Union as ally, the Western Powers could crush the Reich, as Hitler well knew. Chamberlain and Daladier desired to save the Reich and turn its might against Moscow
over the body of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union was not bound to defend Prague after the French desertion, but it nevertheless offered to do so and to compel Poland and Rumania to grant passage to the Red Army. Beneš debated the offer with the party leaders. Rudolf Beran, leader of the reactionary Agrarians, threatened to call in the Nazis and precipitate civil war if Beneš relied on Communist support against Hitler. Brokenhearted, Beneš yielded and accepted the Anglo-French ultimatum. "... Nothing else remained, because we are alone." Said Minister Hugo Vavrecka, "It is a case without parallel. ... We shall not blame those who left us in the lurch, but history will pronounce a judgment about these days."

Munich. The end was not yet, for more panic was needed to secure public acceptance in the West of so base a betrayal. Shame and indignation began to sweep British and French opinion. On September 22, Chamberlain flew to Bad Godesberg on the Rhine, where he conferred again with Hitler and Ribbentrop. He returned with dark hints that Hitler had enlarged his demands and was threatening immediate war unless they were met. The Czech Army was mobilized. Daladier ordered partial mobilization in France. Gas masks were distributed in London. Air-raid shelters were hastily dug in public parks. Hitler's "Godesberg Memorandum" asked military occupation of certain Czech areas by October 1, with plebiscites to follow in others. Daladier, Bonnet, and Gamelin flew to London. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay belatedly pledged defense of Czechoslovakia if Germany at-
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tacked. Chamberlain pleaded with Hitler for a conference. Der Führer breathed blood and fire. “If this problem is solved, there will be no further territorial problems in Europe for Germany. . . . We do not want any Czechs. . . . We are resolved! Let Herr Beneš choose!” Roosevelt pleaded for negotiations. Hitler intimated to Mussolini that he would invade Czechoslovakia on September 28. Chamberlain told the world on September 27 that it was “horrible, fantastic, incredible that we should be digging trenches and fitting gas masks because of a quarrel in a faraway country among people of whom we know nothing. . . . I was taken completely by surprise [by Hitler’s demand for immediate military occupation]. I must say that I find that attitude unreasonable. . . . [But] if we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that. . . . But if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted.”

By September 28 all the democracies were in a frenzy of fear, precisely as Hitler (and Chamberlain) intended. The Commons met at 2:45. The Prime Minister spoke in funereal tones to a House fully expecting immediate war. He reviewed the negotiations lugubriously and revealed that he had appealed to Hitler and Mussolini for a conference to arrange the transfer of Czech territory. At 3:40 a messenger dashed madly to Lord Halifax in the balcony. The message was hurriedly relayed to Chamberlain. He paused, read it, and beamed: Hitler had invited him to Munich the next morning. The whole House burst forth in cheers. Chamberlain and Simon smiled and wept. Continental banking circles had known early the same day that a Four Power Conference would be held in Munich on the morrow. But Parliament, public, and all the Western world were led to believe that war had been averted at the very last moment.

During the afternoon and evening of September 29, 1938, Chamberlain, Hitler, Daladier, and Mussolini conferred in the Munich Führerhaus. Czech representatives were kept waiting in an anteroom. Shortly after midnight all four leaders attached their signatures to a document whereby German forces were to begin occupation of Czech territory on October 1 and continue their advance by stages until October 10. An “international commission” would fix the conditions governing the evacuation, prepare and supervise plebiscites in additional territories, and finally determine the frontiers. An annex declared that Britain and France “stand by the offer” of September 19 “relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.” In bitterness and tears, Prague yielded to what Beneš knew was a death
sentence. He resigned and was presently succeeded by weak and elderly Emil Hacha, with Beran as Premier. Chamberlain concluded his work by signing with Hitler a pledge “never to go to war again.” He came home to announce that he had “saved” Czechoslovakia and brought “peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time.”

The Peace of Munich was the greatest triumph to date of Hitler’s strategy of terror. It was the culmination of appeasement and the warrant of death for the Western Powers. The fate of the last surviving Continental democracy east of the Rhine was the smallest part of the price to be paid for the agreement signed in Hitler’s house. Poland seized 400 square miles of Czech territory with a population of 240,000, including 160,000 non-Poles. Hungary seized 5,000 square miles with 1,000,000 inhabitants, including 250,000 non-Magyars. The “international guarantee” of the rump “Czechoslovakia” never materialized. The “international commission” became a farce. Ambassadors Henderson, François-Poncet, and Attolico yielded at once to Nazi demands (going far beyond even the “Godesberg Memorandum”) as presented by Count Ernst von Weizsäcker, leaving Dr. Mastny, the Czech representative, helpless. Berlin groomed Carpatho-Ukraine as the nucleus of the Great Ukraine which was to be carved out of Poland and the U.S.S.R. Bonnet signed a Nonaggression Pact with Ribbentrop in Paris on December 6—interpreted in Berlin to mean that France had renounced all interest in eastern Europe. The Munichmen of Paris and London comforted themselves with the happy thought that the Third Reich would now strike toward Kiev and the Black Sea and clash with Moscow. In this assumption, which was the whole meaning of Munich, they were completely and tragically mistaken.

Hitler’s genius lay in his ability to persuade the hollow men of the West that they should grant him the means wherewith he could bring the Western Powers to ruin. Munich left Poland more helpless before the Reich than Anschluss had left Czechoslovakia. Munich reduced the French-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact of 1935 to waste paper and compelled Stalin to seek new roads toward safety. Munich left Hitler free to complete the economic and military domination of the Danube and the Balkans, to blackmail Warsaw, and to make a bargain with Moscow to protect his rear for the war against the West. He assumed that the Western Munichmen would be too blind to conclude a new Russian alliance even when they should awaken to their danger. He assumed that the enfeebled democratic Powers could be driven from surrender to surrender or, if they resisted belatedly, could be defeated in arms at small cost. That most of these things were to come to pass was the measure of Hitler’s astuteness and of the incredible folly of the Western appeasers.
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Prague. Whatever Ukrainian dreams were entertained by der Führer were abandoned or indefinitely postponed during the winter of 1938-39. He likewise decided to liquidate the pitiable remnant of "Czecho-Slovakia." The technique was already perfected. Nazi agents fanned separatist sentiment in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. When Prague sought to hold the State together by curbing such agitation, the separatists appealed to Berlin against "Czech persecution." When Hacha on March 9 dismissed the Slovak Cabinet, ordered the Fascist "Hlinka Guards" disarmed, and discharged from his post Father Josef Tiso, pro-Nazi Premier at Bratislava, Tiso flew to Berlin to confer with Ribbentrop and Hitler. On March 14 he returned and proclaimed the "independence" of Slovakia. On the same day Hitler summoned President Hacha and Foreign Minister Frantisek Chvalkovsky to Berlin while German armored divisions gathered in Sudetenland. In the Chancellery building shortly after midnight, Hacha was given a document to sign placing Czecho-Slovakia under German "protection." When he refused, Goering declared that Prague would be destroyed by Nazi bombers at 6 A.M. Hacha fainted and was revived by injections. The Nazi officials hounded him around the table with threats and imprecations. At 4:30 A.M. he signed.

German troops were already across the frontiers. They entered Prague at 9:15 A.M., March 15, followed by the Schutzstaffel (Black Guard) and the Gestapo. Hitler came in the afternoon and proclaimed from Hradčany Castle that Czecho-Slovakia was part of Germany's Lebensraum. Bohemia and Moravia were annexed, with Neurath as "Protector." Budapest was covetous of the Carpatho-Ukraine and a common frontier with Poland. Pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic Premier Bela Imredy had resigned in February on discovering that he had "Jewish blood." On March 16, with Berlin's consent, his pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic successor, Paul Teleki, announced the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary. "Independent" Slovakia was obliged to sign a treaty on March 23 making it a German protectorate. On the preceding day the Reich occupied Memel and signed a Nonaggression Pact with Lithuania.

Toward War. These events led to the belated abandonment of appeasement by London and Paris and to Anglo-French guarantees to Poland, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey. Hitler retaliated on April 28, 1939, by denouncing the Anglo-German Naval Accord of 1935 and the Polish Non-aggression Pact of 1934. On May 22 he concluded his treaty of alliance with Italy. When the Western Powers in the course of prolonged negotiations with Moscow declined to pay Stalin's price for an alliance against Germany (i.e., Soviet military control of the Baltic States and access to eastern Poland), Hitler secretly offered Stalin a nonaggression pact on the same terms. On August 23, 1939, the world was shocked by the signature in
THE POWERS OF YESTERDAY

Moscow by Molotov and Ribbentrop of a 10-year Pact of nonaggression and neutrality between the Third Reich and the U.S.S.R. The self-appointed savior of European civilization from Bolshevism proclaimed his friendship with Stalin. He thus rejected, at least for the immediate future, Alfred Rosenberg’s wild visions of conquering Russia and returned to the Bismarck tradition of “reinsurance” in the East as a means of avoiding the danger of war on two fronts which had brought the Second Reich to disaster.

The fate of Poland was therewith sealed. Immediately after Munich, on October 24, 1938, Ribbentrop had asked Ambassador Josef Lipski to submit to Foreign Minister Josef Beck and Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz a German proposal for the return of Danzig to the Reich and the creation of a German extraterritorial highway and railway across the Corridor. A reciprocal guarantee of the new frontiers was offered as a quid pro quo. The Polish leaders, who fancied that their State was a Great Power, refused. In January, 1939, Beck visited Berchtesgaden and Ribbentrop visited Warsaw without result. After the fall of Prague, Berlin became more insistent. Ribbentrop repeated the German proposals to Lipski on March 26. The first British guarantee to Poland of March 31 was inspired by fear of a swift Nazi blow at Danzig and the Corridor. Beck breathed defiance in his address to the Diet of May 5. Poland would not yield. Neither would Poland con-

31 “TREATY OF NONAGGRESSION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AUG. 23, 1939

“Guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and basing themselves on the fundamental stipulations of the neutrality agreement concluded between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in April, 1926, the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have come to the following agreement:

“1. The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive act and any attacks against each other undertaken either singly or in conjunction with any other Powers.

“2. If one of the contracting parties should become the object of warlike action on the part of a third Power, the other contracting party will in no way support the third Power.

“3. The Governments of the two contracting parties will in future remain in consultation with one another in order to inform each other about questions which touch their common interests.

“4. Neither of the two contracting parties will join any group of Powers which is directed, mediatily or immediately, against the other party.

“5. In case disputes or conflicts on questions of any kind should arise between the two contracting parties, the two partners will solve these disputes or conflicts exclusively by friendly exchange of views or if necessary by arbitration commissions.

“6. The present agreement is concluded for the duration of ten years with the stipulation that unless one of the contracting partners denounces it one year before its expiration, it will automatically be prolonged by five years.

“7. The present agreement shall be ratified in the shortest possible time. The instruments of ratification are to be exchanged in Berlin. The treaty comes into force immediately it has been signed.”
consider any defensive arrangement with the only Power which could possibly protect Poland: the U.S.S.R. The Polish colonels and feudal gentry feared and hated Bolshevism no less ardently than Beran, Bonnet, Daladier, Halifax, and Chamberlain. Suicide was preferable to salvation at the hands of Moscow.

Hitler, no less than Stalin, drew the necessary conclusions. Der Führer's well-known "patience" was now "exhausted." Beyond Danzig and the Cor-

ridor, he had again "no further territorial demands" to make. He discovered that the German minority in Poland was being outrageously persecuted. In Danzig the Nazi Senate President, Arthur Greiser, and the Nazi Gauleiter, Albert Forster, kept up a running fire of controversy with Warsaw while the Nazi press and radio fabricated a campaign of hatred and fear even more impressive than that unleashed against Prague a year before. Hitler doubtless assumed at the outset that a new Munich was possible. The Anglo-French Munichmen were already crying that "Danzig is not worth a war." Chamberlain and Daladier toyed with new appeasement schemes. Given half

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82 The Nuremberg documents reveal that the Nazi decision to invade Poland ("Case White") on, or after, Sept. 1, 1939, was reached on Apr. 3, 1939. All the later "negotiations" were therefore fraudulent.
a chance to compel Poland to yield, they might have cooperated with Berlin once more. But in the end Hitler decided that the time had come to strike Poland down and to seek a reckoning by arms with the Western Powers. The Anglo-French leaders were neither able to defend Poland nor willing to make a bargain with Moscow whereby it might have been defended. Under these circumstances the Nazi war lords concluded that der Tag had arrived.

The war crisis of August, 1939, began with a Danzig-Polish controversy over customs duties on herring and margarine and ended with an Anglo-German dispute over diplomatic etiquette and the meaning of "negotiations." Amid the scurryings of the diplomats the central issue for Berlin was whether the Allies would compel Warsaw to yield to German demands. For London and Paris the issue was whether Berlin would abstain from force and refrain from jeopardizing Polish independence. Berlin half hoped that the announcement on August 21 of the impending Soviet pact would lead to capitulation, since Poland was now obviously beyond the power of the Allies to defend. Chamberlain addressed a letter to Hitler on August 22, however, declaring that "no greater mistake could be made" and that Britain would fight if Poland were attacked. But Britain was prepared to do all it could to promote a negotiated settlement. Hitler told Henderson that "he was 50 years old: he preferred war now to when he would be 55 or 60." He was really an artist, he said, and wanted to retire in peace to his studio. In his reply to Chamberlain, he insisted that Germany must have Danzig and the Corridor. He had always wanted Anglo-German friendship. If the Reich's just demands led to war with Britain, it would be Britain's fault. On August 25, he asked Henderson to fly to London with an offer of an alliance. On the same day the tentative Anglo-Polish Pact was converted into a binding commitment of mutual defense. On August 28, Henderson returned with a reply: the prerequisite condition of any Anglo-German understanding was a settlement of German-Polish differences which would not endanger Poland's independence. An effort should therefore be made for a negotiated solution to be guaranteed by the Powers. Warsaw was "prepared to enter into discussions on this basis." Hitler and Ribbentrop told Henderson on August 29 that they were quite ready for negotiations, provided that a Polish plenipotentiary should arrive on Wednesday, August 30. The Ambassador commented that this "sounded like an ultimatum." Hitler denied it. He stressed the urgency of the moment and accused Henderson of not caring "how many Germans were being slaughtered."

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83 For a detailed and documented account, see the author's Night over Europe (New York, Knopf, 1941), pp. 285-376.
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Halifax replied that it was “unreasonable” to expect Britain to produce a Polish plenipotentiary on Wednesday. Beck recalled the fate of Schuschnigg and Hacha and refused to go to Berlin. Warsaw ordered mobilization on August 30. London urged negotiations but did not envisage them in terms of acceptance of a Nazi ultimatum. At midnight of August 30, Henderson saw Ribbentrop again in a stormy interview. The Foreign Minister declared that everything was now too late, since the time limit had expired. But to show German good faith he hurriedly read a 16-point proposal which was amazingly moderate. Danzig should be forthwith returned to the Reich. The Corridor should be placed under international supervision and a plebiscite held a year later. If the residents (as of 1918) voted to remain Polish, Germany should be granted an extraterritorial traffic zone to East Prussia. If Germany won, Poland should be granted a similar zone to Gdynia. All this was quite reasonable and implied neither a new Munich nor the destruction of the Polish State. But Ribbentrop declared contemptuously that the proposal was “outdated” since no Polish plenipotentiary had arrived by midnight. He refused to transmit a copy of it to either Henderson or Lipski. “I returned to the Embassy that night,” wrote Henderson, “convinced that the last hope for peace had vanished.”

The 16 points were never officially delivered to Warsaw or to London. Lipski saw Ribbentrop at 6:30 P.M., August 31, not as a “plenipotentiary” but as Ambassador come to say, on Beck’s instructions, that Warsaw was examining favorably British suggestions for direct German-Polish negotiations and would give its reply in a few hours. He did not ask for the 16 points. Ribbentrop did not offer them. When Lipski tried to telephone Warsaw in the evening, he found the wires cut. At 9 P.M. the 16 points were printed in the evening extras in Berlin and broadcast over the German radio as evidence of Nazi moderation. Weizsäcker told Henderson that der Führer had “now waited for two days in vain for the arrival of an authorized Polish delegate” and could not but regard his proposals “as having been once more virtually rejected.” In the small hours of September 1, Halifax wired Warsaw to urge that the Polish Government receive German proposals, provided that they were not accompanied by any ultimatum. The British Ambassador replied later in the day that this would be useless since Poland had been invaded at dawn.

Warsaw. Hitler had in fact launched his blitzkrieg. At 4 A.M. of Friday, September 1, 1939, Forster issued a decree proclaiming the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich. German troops had already entered the Free City. By 5 A.M. the German cruiser Schleswig-Holstein was pouring shells into the Polish fortifications on the Westerplatte. By 5:30, German bombs were falling on Polish air bases. Into the Corridor raced 29 German divisions,
into southern Poland 40 divisions, all preceded by *Panzerdivisionen* of tanks and armored cars which tore through the Polish defenses and the half-mobilized Polish armies like deadly scythes. Goering’s Air Force carried raids deep into Polish territory, destroying airdromes, railways, and mobilization centers and terrorizing noncombatants with fire, bullets, and bombs.

There was no “front.” The German High Command had devised the means of breaking the stalemate of 1914-18. Mobile warfare was restored. The superiority of the attack over the defense was reestablished. Western strategists, hypnotized by the outdated doctrines of Liddell Hart and Maginot, drew no conclusions from the Polish blitzkrieg until their own vastly superior armies fell victims to identical tactics in the following spring.

Poland crumpled like a deflated balloon. Within two weeks, all the western provinces were lost, Warsaw was surrounded, and the Cabinet was fleeing
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toward Rumania. The Polish capital was besieged and all but demolished by artillery and dive bombers. Its defenders surrendered on September 27. How many scores of thousands of Poles perished in the holocaust may never be known. In a war of machines against men the casualties of the aggressor were negligible. A nation of 34,000,000 people with an army of 1,500,000 was completely conquered in three weeks at a cost of 10,572 German dead, 30,322 wounded, and 3,404 missing.

Britain and France had meanwhile declared war on the Reich on September 3. Moscow ordered the Red Army to enter eastern Poland on September 17. Ribbentrop again flew to Moscow on September 27. On September 28 the Reich and the U.S.S.R. reached an agreement to partition Poland between them, Germany taking the Polish-speaking industrial areas of the west, the Soviet Union taking the agrarian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian regions to the east. So perished the State whose leaders had appeased the Reich, spurned all cooperation with the U.S.S.R., and eagerly joined in the partitioning of Czechoslovakia.

That the war in the West remained stalemated for the next eight months was a result of Allied inability to penetrate or even attack the German West Wall. The Nazi war lords had means at their disposal for smashing the Maginot Line, as events were to show, but they wisely preferred to demoralize their victim with peace overtures and military inactivity which would cause Allied soldiers and civilians to wonder why they were fighting (or not fighting) and cause commanders to sink ever deeper into the fatal morass of a purely defensive strategy. Der Führer and his fanatic followers had no doubts as to the outcome of the fearful miracles of war they were preparing.

Oslo. On April 9, 1940, Hitler struck his first great blow at the West. It was an operation of outflanking and diversion. Before dawn, strange events took place all along the far-flung coast of Scandinavia from the Arctic Circle to the Danish frontier. German troops poured into Denmark and at once occupied the whole kingdom without resistance. German bombers roared over Oslo. The Blücher brought troops up Oslo Fiord to capture the Norwegian King and his Ministers and occupy the capital before anyone should know what was afoot. By a mere accident in plans laid with meticulous care, the Blücher and several other vessels were fired upon and sunk. King Haakon and his Cabinet had time to flee to the north. German planes brought 1,500 soldiers to the Oslo airport. Without opposition, they occupied the capital and installed a puppet regime under the Norwegian Nazi leader, Maj. Vidkun Quisling. At Kristiansand, Bergen, Stavanger, and Trondheim, German warships emerged out of the morning mists. German troops materialized as by magic from German “freighters” at the docks and from the
THE CONQUEST OF THE NORTHLANDS
1940

TAKEN BY ALLIES, MAY 28, ABANDONED JUNE 9

SEIZED BY NAZI FORCES APRIL 9

ALLIED LANDINGS APRIL 15-19

EVAUCATED BY ALLIES MAY 2

JUNCTION OF NAZI COLUMNS APRIL 30

ADmits TRANSIT OF NAZI TROOPS TO ATTACK USSR JUNE 25, 1941
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ranks of German “tourists.” Traitors and Fifth Columnists gave them aid.
At Narvik a dozen German destroyers came out of a snowstorm, torpedoed
two Norwegian gunboats, seized British vessels in the harbor, and landed
2,000 men. Ribbentrop explained that Norway had been “unneutral” and
that Germany was acting in the nick of time to forestall a British invasion
of Scandinavia. Between dawn and midday of April 9 the Reich conquered
two kingdoms.

The Allied counterattack was brief and inglorious. The Swedish Army
could have ousted the invaders from their foothold. But Stockholm preferred
neutrality. Small and ill-equipped British forces made landings along the
Norwegian coast between April 15 and 19. A blow at Trondheim was
planned and then abandoned. Nazi columns penetrated inland from the
coast to join other columns from Oslo ascending the Gudbrandsdal and
the Osterdal. The feeble Norwegian Army scattered before them. On April
25 the British rescuers were obliged to abandon everything south of Namsos.
Five days later the invading forces effected a junction. Early in May the
Allied forces quit Namsos and Aandalsnes. On May 28-29, Narvik was in-
deed wrested from the Nazis, but on June 9 the enterprise was abandoned.
German naval units sank the aircraft carrier Glorious off the northern coast;
the vestiges of the Norwegian Army capitulated; the King and his Ministers
fled to London; the last Allied troops departed from the ruins of Narvik,
threaded their way through the wreck-strewn harbor, and sailed for home,
where their cause was already all but lost.

Rotterdam. On May 10, 1940, the German war machine struck directly
at the West. Before dawn, German forces occupied Luxemburg without re-
sistance. Before dawn, German bombers by hundreds raided the Netherlands,
Belgium, and northern France, striking at airdromes and dropping para-
chute troops to cooperate with spies, traitors, Fifth Columnists, and German
“tourists.” Ribbentrop explained that Belgium and the Netherlands were
about to cooperate with the Allies in invading the Ruhr. The fearful wonder-
work of destruction and conquest which followed was truly unique in the
annals of warfare, thanks to the genius of the German High Command and
the prevalence of blindness, treason, and unmitigated ineptitude among those
who led the Allied forces.

The Netherlands was subjugated in five days. The Hague was attacked
by German agents inside the city. German motorized divisions, guided by
traitors behind the Dutch lines, poured across the lowlands and decimated
the small Dutch Army before it could resist, open the dikes, or even destroy
roads and bridges. At Rotterdam, German troops concealed in “freighters”
joined the followers of the Dutch Nazi leader, Anton Mussert, in disorganiz-
ing the defenses of the city. When surrender was delayed, Goering’s dive
bombers went into action to terrorize all Holland into surrender. On May 14 a quarter of Rotterdam was laid in ruins within a few hours. Scores of thousands of helpless inhabitants were burned, crushed, or blown to death in the flaming wreckage of homes, apartments, offices, and factories. Ger-

man cameramen filmed the spectacle, as they had filmed the agony of Poland, for the terrorization of other peoples who might contemplate resistance to the Nazi Juggernaut. Later the same afternoon, Gen. Henrik Winkelman ordered his troops to cease fighting, save in Zeeland and at sea. The Hague fell on May 15. Zeeland surrendered. The Government fled to London. Seyss-Inquart became Nazi Commissar over the vanquished. From
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her English exile, Queen Wilhelmina resolved to carry on and lamented the fate of her people:

At this immensely grave moment in the history of mankind, black silent night has settled on yet another corner of this earth. Over free Holland the lights have gone out, the wheels of industry and the plows of the fields that worked only for the happiness of a peace-loving people have come to a dead stop. The voices of freedom, charity, tolerance and religion have been stilled. Where only two weeks ago there was a free nation there is now the desolation and stillness of death, broken only by the bitter weeping of those who have survived the extinction of their relatives and the brutal suppression of their rights and liberties.

Belgium suffered a like fate. Allied efforts to rescue the State whose King and Cabinet had insisted upon neutrality proved disastrous not only to Belgium but (as Brauchitsch intended) to the Allied cause in France as well. The invaders smashed through the Dutch province of Limburg to attack Maastricht and swarm across the heavily fortified Albert Canal, where bridges fell mysteriously into German hands. The Rexist followers of Léon Degrelle, apostle of Belgian National Socialism and self-appointed defender of “Christ the King,” played the roles which their Nazi patrons had designated for them. The tide overwhelmed Namur, Malines, and Louvain, where the library burned in 1914 was burned once more. Brussels fell on May 17 and Antwerp on May 18. On May 19, Hitler proclaimed the reannexation of Eupen, Malmédé, and Moresnet to the Reich.

Gen. Maurice Gamelin and the Allied High Command in France fell into the trap which Hitler’s generals had set for them. Allied divisions were rushed from behind the “Little Maginot Line” to the defense of Belgium. The Sedan-Montmédy sector along the Meuse was stripped of defenders on the assumption that the Forest of the Ardennes, just across the Belgian frontier, was impenetrable. Gen. André Corap’s Ninth Army had not yet occupied the evacuated positions when the invader appeared on the hither side of the Ardennes in the hideous guise of shrieking dive bombers, flame-throwing tanks, and 80-ton armored monsters made at the Skoda Works in Pilsen, which Chamberlain and Daladier had delivered into Hitler’s hands in the name of “peace for our time.” Sedan was taken on May 14. The Ninth Army was destroyed. Corap’s successor, Gen. Henri Giraud, blundered into German forces and was captured with his staff. Panic reigned in Paris, for nothing stood between the enemy and the capital. Documents were burned at the Quai d’Orsay. The Cabinet prepared to flee. But the invader had other plans.

Instead of descending on the French capital, the German armored divisions crossed the Meuse and descended the valleys of the Aisne and the Somme until they reached Abbéville on the Channel on May 21. The entire
Belgian Army, most of the British Expeditionary Force, and numerous French divisions were thus trapped in the north. The Flanders pocket was hemmed in on three sides by Reichswehr divisions possessed of immense superiority of fire power, motorized units, heavy tanks, and air squadrons. King Leopold III, whose closest advisers were of ambiguous allegiance, ordered the surrender of the Belgian Army on May 28, despite the opposition of his Cabinet, which had taken refuge in London. The Belgian capitulation left the B.E.F. in a hopeless position. The armored divisions which had reached Abbeville tore up the Channel coast to cut off its only avenue of retirement. By a miracle of courage and organization, 335,000 British troops were safely evacuated from Dunkirk before its fall on June 3. All their arms and equipment were lost. Belgium was lost. Flanders was lost. France was also lost. Paris. Before dawn of June 5, 1940, the Reichswehr attacked the hastily improvised "Weygand Line" along a 100-mile front south of the Somme. The new French Generalissimo, Maxime Weygand, was bewildered by what he called "means of war of a hitherto unknown formula." Reynaud hoped for a "miracle." But the battle was lost before it was begun. The armored divisions with their escorts of dive bombers, acting as mobile artillery, cut the French armies to ribbons. By June 12, Weygand had given up hope. "All is lost." Vice-Premier Pétain agreed. "There are no more military possibilities." The invaders took Paris on June 14. A week later, Adolf Hitler toured the lost capital and visited Napoleon's tomb. Italy entered the war in order to be in on the "kill." At Bordeaux a new French Government sued for peace on June 16. The entire western campaign had cost the Third Reich no more than 30,000 dead and 120,000 wounded. France was prostrate under the conqueror's heel.

In Compiègne Forest near Rethondes, 45 miles northeast of Paris, stands a monument bearing the inscription, "Here on November 11, 1918, perished the criminal arrogance of the Imperial German Reich, defeated by the free peoples whom it sought to enslave." Near by was a railway coach in which Foch and Weygand had accepted the German capitulation. Here on June 21, 1940, Hitler, Keitel, Goering, Raeder, Hess, and Ribbentrop received the French armistice delegation. At 6:50 p.m., June 22, the document was signed. Hostilities ceased at 12:35 a.m., June 25, six hours after notification of the signing of an armistice with Italy. The terms defined the occupied territory and provided for French demobilization and disarmament. Vichy was required to pay the costs of the German forces of occupation and to surrender on demand all military and civil prisoners, as well as German anti-Nazi exiles still within its jurisdiction. Almost 2,000,000 French prisoners re-
mained in German camps. A definitive peace was to wait upon the expected defeat of Britain. Berlin decreed the reannexation of Lorraine in November. Nazi "New Order." Hitler now proceeded to organize the conquered Continent for war against Britain, much as Napoleon had once sought to do. Hitler spoke confidently to his subjects on September 4:

Whatever may come, England will break down. I recognize no other termination than this one alone. The people of England are very curious and ask: "Why in the world don't you come?" We are coming. . . . All of England's allies will not help her—neither Haile Selassie, nor King Zog, nor King Haakon, nor even Queen Wilhelmina. . . . In the East we stand on the river Bug. In the North we stand at North Cape and Narvik, and in the South on the Spanish frontier. The fight is for existence or non-existence, to decide whether in the future a situation can be created in which it is possible for one nation to get a stranglehold on Europe. Both Germany and Italy will take care that this will never occur again.

Whatever the ultimate shape of the "new order" might be, its immediate purpose was to bring about British defeat. If this objective could not be achieved by frontal attack and invasion, it must be attempted by isolating and blockading Britain, by organizing as many Continental States as possible as the Reich's allies, by rescuing Italy from the full brunt of British attack in the Mediterranean, by attacking the life line of the Empire overland via France and Spain in the West and the Balkans and Turkey in the East, and by immobilizing the Soviet Union and the United States. These tasks were far more difficult of accomplishment than what had gone before, for they required sea power, which was lacking, and involved risks of a clash with Moscow or Washington, or both. The first step was German seizure of Rumania. In anticipation of such a move the U.S.S.R. occupied Bessarabia and northern Bucovina on June 28. On August 21, Bucharest agreed to restore southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. The Axis "mediated" between Hungary and Rumania on August 30, granting northeastern Transylvania to Budapest and "guaranteeing" what was left of the Rumanian State. On September 6, Hohenzollern King Carol II abdicated and fled with his mistress Magda Lupescu. His son Michael took the tottering throne, and Gen. Ion Antonescu, with the support of the Iron Guard, invited German "collaboration." On October 8, German troops began pouring into Rumania to "protect" the oil fields. As Iron Guardists indulged in an orgy of mass murder to avenge their murdered leader, Corneliu Zelea Codrianu, more and more Nazi divisions arrived through Hungary to menace Bulgaria, Jugoslovakia, and Turkey and to warn the U.S.S.R. to acquiesce in Axis domination of the Balkans.
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By the close of 1940, year of victory, this campaign in the southeast had not yet reached its goal. The Triple Alliance of September 27, 1940, designed to deter Moscow and intimidate Washington, led to increased American aid to Britain and increased Soviet opposition to the Axis. Berlin and Rome intimated that most of the Continental States would sign the new alliance. Hungary did so on November 20 and the remnant of Rumania on November 23. The enlistment of new signatories was temporarily halted, however, with the wholly unimpressive adherence of Slovakia on November 24. Bulgaria hesitated to join. Molotov’s visit to Berlin, November 12-14, 1940, was followed by Soviet encouragement to Bulgaria and Turkey to resist Axis pressure and by heavy concentrations of Red troops along Rumania’s shrunken frontier. Hitler’s initial efforts in the West met with no better fortune. Franco did not dare take his sullen subjects into war and expose his famished land to the British blockade until he was convinced that British defeat was imminent. Laval’s intrigues to take what was left of France into the war against Britain were impeded by his dismissal from office at the hands of Pétain on December 13. Weygand remained in North Africa with still formidable military forces at his disposal. Open German coercion of Vichy might set these forces in motion against Italian Libya, already invaded by the British from Egypt. Der Führer hesitated in the face of his difficulties. But he promised new triumphs for 1941. As the new year opened, he poured still more troops into Rumania, induced Hungary to mobilize, and made plans for a frontal assault on the British Isles. Following the conclusion of an ambiguous Turkish-Bulgarian Nonaggression Pact in February, King Boris, Premier Bogdan Philov, and Foreign Minister Ivan Popov yielded to the Axis and made Bulgaria the seventh signatory of the Triple Alliance on March 1, 1941. German troops immediately swarmed over Bulgaria to rescue Italy by threatening Turkey and Greece and jeopardizing the British position in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Hour of Decision. The Nazi High Command, it was later revealed, had already decided on a course which, if successful, would spell conquest of the world and, if unsuccessful, would mean the ruin of the Reich. The decision, like Napoleon’s in 1812, was to crush Russia before invading England, lest the latter enterprise be frustrated by Russian attack from the rear. Elaborate preparations were made for the invasion of England (coded as “Operation Sea Lion”), including infantry campaign plans to take London. But they could not be executed without the initial destruction of British air power. The Nazi leaders for a time contemplated an invasion of England prior to the conquest of Russia. When the R.A.F. defeated the Luftwaffe over English skies in mid-September, 1940, the former operation was postponed and then abandoned in February, 1941. The initial decision to invade
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Russia was reached in August, 1940, with the timing left to later discrimination.34

Development in the Balkans caused delay. The Yugoslav Cabinet signed the Triplice Pact and agreed to cooperate in der Führer's plans—but was ousted two days later in a patriotic coup d'état on March 27, 1941. To attack Russia while centers of resistance remained in the Balkans was unthinkable. On April 6, to the tune of the usual denunciations of "British plots," Berlin declared war on Yugoslavia and Greece. Hungary's Premier Paul Teleki put a bullet through his head rather than connive in the assault. Another blitzkrieg subjugated Yugoslavia and Greece in a matter of days. Belgrade, bombed into ruins, fell in a week. The hakenkreuz was flying over the Acropolis by April 27. Ten more days sufficed to wrest Crete from British hands.

These astounding triumphs indicated the direction of the Wehrmacht's road to all but certain victory. Britain had no effective means of defending Greece or Crete or the Near and Middle East. Vichy men in Syria and pro-Nazi Arab leaders in Iraq were ready to do Berlin's bidding and did, in fact, take action in May and June. The British Isles, to be sure, could not be invaded. The Luftwaffe was still no match for the R.A.F., nor was Nazi naval power equal to the task. On May 24, 1941, the new battleship Bismarck, cruising between Iceland and Greenland, met and sank the Hood, largest vessel in the British Navy. But four days later the Bismarck was tracked down, stopped by aerial torpedoes, and destroyed by the shells of British dreadnoughts. Yet the whole British position in the Levant was so vulnerable that an all-out Nazi attack in the spring of 1941 would almost surely have smashed it and left open for easy conquest the roads to Egypt, Arabia, and India. The assault was never attempted. Nazi divisions were already being concentrated in Poland. The decision to invade Russia in June had long since been reached.

This resolve, which was to prove fatal, was based not only on a disastrous underestimation of Soviet fighting power35 but on an overestimation

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34 James F. Byrnes in Speaking Frankly (pp. 288ff.) attributes the Nazi decision to attack the U.S.S.R. to Molotov's proposals in Berlin, Nov. 12-13, 1940, for a new regime for the Straits and a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual air pact. Byrnes derives this revelation, he writes, from the Nuremberg documents. These documents, however, show beyond question that the Nazi decision to attack Russia was reached in August and that the subsequent "negotiations" were as meaningless as the "negotiations" over Poland in the summer of 1939.

35 In the non-Soviet world the only correct estimates of Soviet war potential in the period before 1941-42 were those made by Japanese militarists and diplomats, by Col. Philip Faymonville, U.S.A., and by Max Werner, who in 1939 in his Military Strength of the Powers forecast accurately the downfall of France before the Wehrmacht and the ultimate defeat of the Wehrmacht by the Red Army. Almost all other "experts,"
of the possibility of evoking a resumption of British appeasement in the name of a world crusade against Communism. On May 10, 1941, Rudolf Hess, Nazi No. 3, flew a Messerschmitt 110 from Augsburg to the estate of the Duke of Hamilton near Glasgow. He lost his way, bailed out, broke an ankle, and was captured and turned over to the police by a Scottish farmer. Even had he reached his goal, it is utterly improbable that any Anglo-German "peace" could have been arranged as a prelude to the assault on Russia.\[^{36}\]

The failure of this enterprise produced no change in Nazi plans. Hitler met Mussolini at Brennero early in June. If \textit{il Duce} had doubts of \textit{der Führer}'s wisdom, he no longer had any choice but to follow the leader. On June 18, Ambassador Franz von Papen and Foreign Minister Shukru Saracoğlu signed a 10-year German-Turkish Pact of friendship, neutrality, and nonaggression, despite the fact that Turkey was still on paper Britain's ally. The Turkish rulers had no thought of provoking Hitler and much relish in the thought of the destruction of Russia by Nazi arms. All was now in readiness. The evidence presently available indicates that there were no negotiations, no Nazi demands on Moscow, no warning, and no ultimatum. \textit{Der Führer} and his aides had no intention of wresting concessions from the Kremlin through threats. Their purpose was annihilation.

\textbf{Preventive War.} Before dawn on Sunday, June 22, 1941, Nazi bombers struck at Soviet airfields while three gigantic armies, filled with the fervor of invincibility, poured over the frontier, one aiming at Leningrad, another at Moscow, and a third at Kharkov, Rostov, and the Caucasus. Hitler and official and nonofficial, were then insisting that the French Army was the best in the world, that the Nazi Reich could not fight a war of any duration, and that the U.S.S.R. was negligible as a military power.

\[^{36}\]It is to be noted, however, that Hess did receive a "peace feeler" before his flight, though the possibility is not to be excluded that the whole affair was arranged by the British Intelligence Service as "bait" to lure Hess to England. Albrecht Haushofer, in a secret report to Hitler immediately after Hess's departure (revealed by Allied sources on Jan. 3, 1946), indicated that he had first written to the Duke of Hamilton in September, 1940, advising Hess of the fact, in order to establish "contacts" which led to discussions of an Anglo-German peace in terms of a limitation of German and Italian colonial demands, restoration of the States of western Europe, recognition of British hegemony in Greece, and British disinterestedness in the rest of eastern Europe. "If," wrote Haushofer in May, 1941, "there is anyone in London eager for peace, then it is the native element of the plutocracy, which is able to calculate when it will be destroyed, together with the native British tradition, while the foreign—above all Jewish—element already has effected a junction with America and the dominions across the sea. . . . If the war continued every possibility would disappear of the same elements in England forcing Churchill to make peace, because then the Americans would be in a position to dictate the overseas activity of the Empire. If once the rest of the native English aristocracy were deprived of its power then it would be impossible to speak one sensible word with Roosevelt and his circle."

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Ribbentrop denounced Bolshevism and accused the victim of aggressive intent. Britain and America at once rallied to Russia’s defense, though their means of extending aid were as yet insignificant. Italy, Slovakia, Croatia, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland, along with Vichy France and Franco’s Spain, joined der Führer in his holy war. All across the steppes there was re-enacted on an immense scale what Churchill had described a year previously in Flanders and Picardy: “The German eruption swept like a sharp scythe to the rear of the armies of the north. Behind this armored and mechanized onslaught came a number of divisions in lorries, and behind them again plodded comparatively slowly the dull brute mass of the ordinary German Army and German people, always ready to be led in the trampling down
in other lands of liberties and comforts they have never known in their own.” Berlin reported fantastic victories, involving the slaughter or capture of millions of Soviet troops. The assault indeed seemed irresistible as German armor pushed onward over incredible distances, destroying all in its path. “This enemy,” proclaimed der Führer on October 3, “is broken and will never rise again.” Almost everyone in the Atlantic communities agreed. To crush Russia was to win the world. This vision was within Hitler’s grasp by midautumn of 1941.

The vision crumpled before the guns of the defenders of Leningrad and Sevastopol, who chose starvation and death in preference to surrender. The vision died under the shells of the defenders of Moscow, who in a series of gigantic battles during October and November halted the Wehrmacht—for the first time in World War II—and then slowly pushed it back. Nazi spokesmen complained that Soviet soldiers had been too “brutalized” by Communism to fight fairly, were already too demoralized by Marxism to be intimidated, and were altogether too stupid to know when they were hopelessly defeated. At November’s end the first general counteroffensive by the Red Army was launched with the recapture of Rostov on the Don and the destruction of Von Bock’s divisions, almost within sight of the Kremlin.

“I go my way,” said der Führer once upon a time, “with the assurance of a sleep-walker, the way which Providence has sent me.” Hitlerian intuition had led the Reich to the conquest of all Europe and then to the same enterprise which had brought Bonaparte to ruin. The Corsican had won the capital of Muscovy, all to no avail. The Austrian corporal was never to win it—and in failing was to make his war a universal conflagration. The Axis decision of December, 1941, was the result, not of anticipated victory in Russia, but of fear of defeat. If Russia could not be crushed by blitz, Russia must be bled to death in a war of attrition. And, in this case, supplies from America (still a trickle, but destined to become a flood) must be cut off. If Japan could decimate U.S. naval power and seize all of Greater East Asia, Nazi U-boats in the Atlantic could, it was hoped, close the sea lanes between America and Britain and sink such supply ships as might get through to the northern routes to Murmansk. Then Russia could be conquered. Then Britain. . . . Then America . . . ?

Pearl Harbor marked the realization of part of the dream. On December 11, 1941, the Reich declared war on the U.S.A. “A historic revenge has been entrusted to us by the Creator,” said Hitler to the Nazi Reichstag, “and we are now obliged to carry it out. There is a world-wide gulf between the outlook of President Roosevelt and myself. It does not impress me very much if Roosevelt sees fit to call me a gangster. I cannot be insulted by Roosevelt, because, just as with President Wilson, I consider Roosevelt to
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be insane. We know of course that the Eternal Jew is behind all this. Our
patience has come to the breaking point."

On the same day a new pact was signed as a supplement to the Tripartite
accord of September 27, 1940. It pledged Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo to con-
duct war jointly against Britain and America, abstain from any separate
armistice or peace, and collaborate after victory “in order to realize and
establish an equitable new order in the world.” By midsummer of 1942,
Japan was master of East Asia, and the Wehrmacht, in its second all-out
attempt to conquer Russia, had reached the Volga. All might yet be won . . .

Retribution. The fearful tale of how all was finally lost need not here
be retold. Russian valor, American war production, British fortitude,
and the secret war of the Underground in the conquered lands denied to the
rulers of the Reich their chance of global victory. The R.A.F. was able to
bomb Berlin with 400 planes on November 7, 1941. On May 30, 1942, a
thousand planes dropped 3,000 tons of bombs on Cologne. On the next day,
another thousand blasted the Krupp Works in Essen. By the summer of 1943,
hundreds of American bombers were leveling German cities by day while
the R.A.F. continued its work by night. Despite death and ruin from the
skies the German war lords succeeded in maintaining and even increasing
production in 1943, while the Luftwaffe, though unable to defend the Reich,
kept its active strength unimpaired and took a heavy toll from the enemy.
Early in 1944, Allied bombing was concentrated on aircraft plants. On
March 8, 1944, over 2,000 American planes smashed Berlin—which by war’s
end was a hollow shell with all its central area reduced to rubble.

But the Nazi monster, badly crippled by an ever-mounting crescendo of
aerial assault, was to suffer its mortal wound from other blows. Events to
come were forecast by the surrender on February 1, 1943, of Von Paulus’s
Sixth Army, trapped at Stalingrad by the second major Soviet counteroffen-
sive. In an all-out propaganda campaign of “heroization” and “strength
through gloom,” Goebbels strove, not without success, to stir a desperate
people to new miracles of work, fanaticism, and savagery in defense of
“Fortress Europe.” The Nazi leaders preached and prayed for a schism be-
tween the U.S.S.R. and the Atlantic Powers. Their prayers were to be an-
swered, but too late to save their cause. The failure of the U-boat campaign,
the loss of North Africa, the defection of Italy, the Normandy invasion in
June, 1944, the remorseless advance of Soviet forces toward the Dnieper,
the Vistula, the Oder, the sweep of Anglo-American armies to the Rhine
and beyond, all heralded a grim finale.

That there was no yielding short of complete collapse was due less to
the Allied policy of “unconditional surrender” than to the fact that all
efforts within the Reich to depose the Nazi leadership proved futile. So
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effective was Goebbels's machine for manufacturing fanatics, Himmler's apparatus of terror, and Hitler's "charismatic" spell over the demented multitudes that no mass movement of protest was possible, much less a genuine Underground or an overt revolution. Initial Soviet hopes of rallying German workers to the anti-Fascist cause came to nothing, even at the very end. Expectations of middle-class or peasant opposition were equally vain. The class structure and the mechanics of despotism in the Nazi State were such that rebellion could come only from within the circle of the elite—i.e., the Junker aristocrats and the industrialists who had put Hitler in power. In the Reich, as in Rome, the old ruling classes which had used Fascism for their own purposes were prepared to dismiss their mercenaries when it became clear that the alternative would be total national defeat. But the new condottieri were more powerful than their original paymasters.

In August, 1943, Heinrich Himmler, still head of the Gestapo and the SS, was named Minister of the Interior, Chief of the Reich Administration, and successor designate to Hitler, after Goering. Der Führer declared that all "criminals," "cowards," and "defeatists" would be "eradicated without mercy." In his New Year's message of 1944 he called for "fanatical hatred" and sang old hymns of rage with new fury: "In this war there will be no victors and vanquished, but only survivors and annihilated. . . . The necessity of preserving Europe against the Bolshevist danger depends exclusively on the existence of one dominating Continental Power." "Either Germany will be victorious on behalf of the whole of Europe," shouted Hitler on the eleventh anniversary of his appointment as Chancellor, "or Soviet Russia will be the victor. . . . If the Reich is crushed, no other State in Europe could put up resistance to this new invasion of Huns." More "total mobilization" followed.

The Fall of Valhalla. On July 20, 1944, Radio Berlin canceled a scheduled program on "The Extermination of Rats" to announce that der Führer had been the target of assassins. Col. Count Claus von Stauffenberg had placed a brief case near Hitler's chair during a staff conference at headquarters in the east. The time bomb which it contained killed several officers, wounded a dozen, but inflicted only slight burns and bruises on Hitler. He rushed to the microphone to deny reports of his death, as the plotters sought to seize public buildings in Berlin. "In sacred anger and unbounded fury," said Grand Adm. Karl Doenitz, "we will get even with these traitors" and destroy this "mad, small clique of generals." The conspiracy was widespread in military circles and included such diplomats as Ulrich von Hassell and Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenberg, last Ambassador in Moscow, and such industrialists as Karl Goerdeler.

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A new "blood purge" followed. Among those who died by suicide, hanging, or shooting were Gens. Friedrich Olbricht and Ernst Hoepner, the alleged leaders; Gens. Ludwig von Beck and Kurt Zeitzler, both former Chiefs of the General Staff; Rommel, Helldorf, Hassell, Schulenberg, Goerdeler, Witzleben, Albrecht Haushofer, and scores of lesser figures. This outcome meant war to the end, waged with insane frenzy by a Wehrmacht now retreating on all fronts toward the German frontiers and by a new Volkssturm, or Home Army. George H. Earle, U.S. naval attaché in Istanbul, was approached by Nazi agents with an offer to surrender on condition that the Russians be kept "out of Europe" with the aid of the Wehrmacht under Allied command. Favorably impressed, Earle sent the proposal to Roosevelt, who made no reply except to transfer Earle to Samoa. In his message of November on the anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler said: "Sovietism, supported by the democracies, is endeavoring to destroy the Reich and exterminate our people. The Jew is the wire-puller of democracy as he is the creator and inciter of the Bolshevik world-beast. . . . Our people have been hit by treachery after treachery. . . . [But] as long as I am alive, Germany will not suffer the fate of European States that have been overrun by Bolshevism."

In its last agonies the doomed Wehrmacht in December, 1944, struck back at the Russians in Hungary and broke through American lines in Belgium and Luxemburg. The former blow, while heavy, failed to lift the siege of Budapest. Rundstedt's surprise offensive in the Ardennes smashed the American First Army and almost reached the Meuse. But by mid-January the "Battle of the Bulge" was lost, as the Red Army launched its final offensive in central Poland. As the invaders closed in, the Nazi leaders stormed, exhorted, and threatened. At the death of Roosevelt, Hitler rejoiced that "fate has taken the greatest war criminal of all times from this earth." Plans were made for a defense of an "Alpine Redoubt," for an organization of "Werewolves" behind Allied lines to kill collaborators, for such final paroxysms of violence as can only be guessed at.

All of this was of no avail. Vienna fell to the Russians on April 13, Munich to the Americans on April 30. Zhukov's armies opened their final assault on Berlin on April 22 to the relentless thunder of thousands of guns, tanks, and airplanes. Three days later Russians and Americans met joyfully on the Elbe at Torgau. In the doomed capital the Reichstag building was burned once more—this time actually by Communists, who had fought their way from the Volga to taste this day of triumph. On April 29, at Caserta, a million German troops in Italy and Austria laid down their arms. Berlin fell on May 2. On May 4 the Wehrmacht units in Holland, Denmark,
and North Germany yielded to Montgomery. To capitulate to the Russians was unthinkable, but this, too, was not to be avoided.

On May 7, 1945, at 2:41 A.M. in a schoolhouse in Rheims, General Jodl for the German High Command signed a simple document of unconditional surrender. On May 8 an identical document was signed in Berlin by Keitel, Friedeburg, and Stumpf for the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe and by Zhukov, Tedder, and Spaatz for the victors. Within another week the last German forces still fighting were cut to pieces west of Prag. Der Führer's Reich, which was to have lasted a thousand years, was at an end.

Himmler had left Hitler in his bunker below the Chancellery building in Berlin and, from his northern headquarters, had offered through a Swedish intermediary to surrender to the Western Powers while continuing the war with Russia. When the offer was ignored, he sought safety in flight but finally took poison to avoid capture. Martin Bormann vanished. Goebbels, who remained with Hitler, committed suicide. On April 29, Hitler, who refused to leave the bunker, was married to Eva Braun, allegedly his mistress, exploding Soviet shells supplying the wedding music. On April 30, it is believed, he shot himself as his bride took poison. The bodies were supposedly burned in the courtyard. But no remains were ever found.

It is therefore possible, albeit unlikely, that the kleiner Mann from Braunau-am-Inn, turned into devil by the fevers of a sick civilization and by the collective neuroses of a frustrated and frenzied people, may yet be alive—perhaps hiding in Franco's Spain—awaiting a general resurgence of the mass madness of Fascism. Whether alive or dead, Hitler still lives as a symbol of infamy and of the depth of barbaric dementia to which the human psyche can be reduced by the breakdown of an acquisitive culture, dedicated to national tribalism and the cult of violence. He also lives as a portent of times to come. For his predictions of new conflict between "Bolshevism" and the "plutodemocracies" have come to pass—not in time to save the Third Reich but perhaps in time to build the Fourth, and assuredly in time to give Fascism in many lands a new lease on life and, it may well be, new opportunities for "wedge driving," conspiracy, war plans, and another saturnalia of fear-driven, hate-crazed massacre and annihilation . . .

Incident at Flensburg. On May 1, 1945, Admiral Doenitz melodramatically asserted over the North German radio network that Hitler had died "a hero's death," fighting the Bolsheviks to the last and before he "fell for Germany" had designated the Admiral as his successor. Like Himmler, Doenitz sought to effect an accord with the Western Allies for a continuation of the Russian war. Failing this, he formed a "Cabinet" and announced on May 8 that "the unity of State and Party no longer exists," since the Party had disappeared, and that it would depend on the occupation forces as to
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whether "I and the government formed by me will be able to continue in office."

This ghost regime was neither confirmed nor dismissed by the Allies for several weeks, despite Soviet demands for its liquidation. It functioned in temporary headquarters near the Danish frontier, under British occupation. But the hour was at once too late and too early for London and Washington to sponsor a separate German government. On May 23, British military police arrested Doenitz, Jodl, Scherin von Krosigk, and their colleagues and dissolved the Flensburg "Cabinet." Doenitz later appeared in the dock at Nuremberg.37

Unlike Italy or Japan, the vanquished Reich had no government. Deutschland had suffered total defeat in the most disastrous of all wars. Its cities were largely in ruins, its economy prostrate, its people in a coma of poverty and self-pity, its fatal leadership gone, its power ended. But 63,000,000 Germans survived within their shrunken frontier, still comprising the largest nationality on the Continent west of Russia. Their crippled industrial plant was still the largest and potentially the most productive in the world outside of the U.S.A. Their social hierarchy was still intact, save in the east. With few exceptions their racial fanaticism, national megalomania, and ideological lunacy were not much modified by defeat or "de-Nazification" or revelations of atrocities or trials of war criminals. In most German eyes, the Nazi crime was not that of starting the war but that of losing it, and not that of butchering Jews and Slavs but that of not having slain enough. Germany lost the war of arms but won the war of genocide by a wide margin.

The abyss between Russia and the West had made possible the Nazi effort at world conquest. Since the chasm was certain to reopen, after the fragile bridges of the wartime alliance had broken down, many Germans could assume, not unreasonably, that with patience and cleverness in playing off Moscow and Washington against one another der Tag would arrive once more. In any event, the components of power represented by the Reich were by no means to be ruled out of all reckoning in the days to come in the new game of global rivalry now played by the victors against one another. Doenitz was a premature anti-Communist and Russophobe. Other times would come. New possibilities would emerge.

The Occupation: First Stage. On V-E Day the major United Nations had already arrived at accords regarding many questions posed by joint occupation, including the zoning of the Reich for purposes of administration.38 In the final military operations American troops in Thuringia entered part of

37 On the trials of war criminals and the ultimate fate of the major Nazi leaders, see pp. 178-182.
38 See pp. 230ff.
the Soviet zone, while Soviet forces did not everywhere reach the limits of the area assigned to them. Readjustments followed. On June 5, 1945, Washington, London, Paris, and Moscow announced that they "hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command, and any state, municipal, or local government or authority." They likewise confirmed that Germany, as it existed on December 31, 1937, should be divided into four zones (finally defined in August), whereby the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S.A. each was allotted c. 40,000 square miles and France c. 20,000, with the area east of the Oder-Neisse line under Polish control by the Potsdam accord. Berlin was divided into four urban zones, under a four-Power Kommandantur. Another statement of June 5 specified that "supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their Governments, by the Soviet, British, U.S., and French Commanders in Chief, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole. The four Commanders in Chief will together constitute the Control Council . . . whose decisions shall be unanimous."

The Council first met in Berlin on June 5, with the victors represented by Eisenhower, Montgomery, Zhukov, and Maj. Gen. Jean de Lattre. The Kommandantur was set up on July 11. At Potsdam, accords were reached on reparations, disarmament, industrial demilitarization, de-Nazification, etc. It is noteworthy that these agreements reflected to a considerable degree, without accepting wholly, the "Morgenthau Plan" for the deindustrialization of Germany, endorsed by Roosevelt and Churchill in September, 1944. They left open the question of Soviet claims to $10,000,000,000 in reparations (out of a proposed total of $20,000,000,000, part of which was to come out of current German production over a period of years), which Roosevelt (but not Churchill) accepted at Yalta as a basis of discussion.

The problems of inter-Allied cooperation which arose in the summer and autumn of 1945 were often irksome but seldom serious. The question of de-Nazification in Bavaria led to much controversy. Under Gen. George S. Patton, the A.M.G. in Munich appointed Friedrich Schaeffer, a leader of the conservative-clerical Bavarian People's Party, as Minister-President. He included in his "Cabinet" various Nazis, among them Chief of Police Hans von Seisser, who had originally condoned the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. Most of these appointees were dismissed in July and August, following widespread criticism. But on September 22 Patton opined that "far too much fuss has been made regarding de-Nazification of Germany. This Nazi thing is just like a Democratic and Republican election fight." Patton was ousted as
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Military Governor of Bavaria on October 2 by Eisenhower, who reiterated his resolve to "uproot Nazism in every shape and form." Schaeffer was dropped in favor of Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner, a Social Democrat. In November, when Eisenhower became Chief of Staff in Washington, Gen. Joseph T. McNarney became U.S. Commander in Chief and representative on the Control Council. He predicted that the occupation would last 10 years or more but would be turned over to civilian authorities in June, 1946—an eventuality which did not materialize.

The Riddle of the Reich. The problem of "what to do with Germany" was to prove to be beyond the capacity of contemporary statesmanship to solve in any fashion conducive to peace, plenty, and freedom rather than war, want, and despotism. A creative solution called for new departures in statecraft and political economy by Allied Powers united for common purposes. Such innovations presupposed progress toward world federation and the transitional establishment of a U.N. trusteeship for Germany, pending its eventual "independence" as a democratic State in a world where govern-
ment would replace anarchy among nations and where, in consequence, the needs of men and women everywhere would be considered by policy makers in terms of human welfare rather than in terms of power politics. No such approach materialized. All such suggestions were ignored by the "hard-headed," "practical" realists who represented the four Powers in the Reich or made decisions in their respective capitals.

In terms of such "realism," it was easier and preferable to accept as permanent the ancient and anarchic pattern of interstate relations; to foster the governance of Germans by Germans with a minimum of external control; to meet the issues of disarmament and de-Nazification in simple terms of forbidding weapons, reducing heavy industry, and fostering procedural democracy; to maintain the social status quo; and to move as rapidly as possible toward the restoration of a German national government with which a peace treaty could be signed to put an end to the occupation. With local variations, all occupying Powers talked and acted in these terms in 1945-46. The result not only failed to "solve" a puzzle which was by its nature insoluble in these terms but failed even to preserve any unity of purpose among the occupants, despite lip service to common goals.

In the post-Hitler Reich there was no political, moral, economic, or social basis for a national government which could by any proper use of words be termed "democratic." A nondemocratic (i.e., antidemocratic) regime could be only a dictatorship of the Left or of the Right. The former was intolerable to the Western democracies, since it would add to the power of the U.S.S.R. against the West. The latter was intolerable to the Kremlin, since it would add to the power of the West against Moscow. A new German democracy, which might bridge the gap, was impossible because democracy, to be viable, requires something more than civil liberties, equal suffrage, the secret ballot, and free elections. It requires a belief in democracy, and some skill in its practice, on the part of a decisive segment of the electorate. Such belief, never strong in the Reich, vanished in 1931-32. Such practice disappeared in 1933. The democratic faith does not thrive on disaster, defeat, want, and fear. To build democracy in a community most of whose members repudiate it in principle and action is like trying to make an omelet without eggs.

No informed person in 1945 or 1950 pretended that the German national community had in fact been de-Nazified or reeducated. The mass of the Kleinbürigertum was still afflicted with a madness which was to be cured, not by semistarvation or by exhortation, but, if at all, only by economic rehabilitation, hope for the future, occupational therapy, and relief for a long period of years of all responsibility for managing its own affairs on anything beyond a local level. The maintenance of the old economic and
social structure, moreover, was an insuperable obstacle in the way of any progress toward democracy. The Junkers and monopolistic industrialists who foisted Fascism on the Reich had first to be got rid of—not as individuals but as elite groups wielding influence out of all proportion to their numbers. The Junkers, to be sure, were dispossessed as a class in the Soviet and Polish zones of Germany. Some industrialists were brought to trial and others subjected to decartelization. But the traditional distribution of wealth, income, and deference was not fundamentally altered.

Allied inability or reluctance to alter it, and Allied recognition that like causes produce like results in the future no less than in the past, led to an initial resolve to dismantle much of German heavy industry, which, here as elsewhere, had been greatly expanded by the war. To socialize and internationalize German industry was anathema to Washington. To revert to the prewar status quo was anathema to Moscow. To foster a truly competitive, free-enterprise capitalism was anathema to London and Paris and was, in any case, a practical impossibility. To "agrarianize" Germany seemed, on paper, simpler. In fact, it was also quite impossible without contemplating new forms of genocide. At least 25,000,000 Germans live, directly or indirectly, through manufacturing. As in Britain and the U.S.A., such businesses in the absence of complete socialization (and conceivably even then) are dependent for their profitability and thus for continued operation either on larger foreign markets or on an insatiable war machine whose military masters, with the enthusiastic support of all true patriots, will pay handsomely for all the excess output of factories, mills, and mines.

War having been outlawed, armaments having been damned, foreign markets not being available or being preempted by others, and sweeping socialization and internationalization of the German economy being vetoed, the experiment of occupation necessarily went from bad to worse. The Allied Control Council agreed in January, 1946, that the maximum capacity of the German steel industry should be 7,500,000 tons annually, with actual production limited to 5,800,000 tons. The Russians and French wanted 3,000,000 tons, the British 10,500,000, and the U.S. 9,000,000. In February and March the Council agreed to prohibit German production of synthetic gasoline, rubber, ammonia, aluminum, magnesium, roller bearings, heavy machine tools, etc., and, except for 200,000 tons of coastal and inland shipping, to divide among the Allies the entire seagoing German merchant fleet of 1,189,000 tons. Under the level-of-industry plan announced in March,

40 During most of the period here under consideration the representatives on the Council were Gen. Vassily D. Sokolovsky, Gen. Pierre Koenig, Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, and Lt. Gen. Lucius Clay as McNarney's deputy, with Robert Murphy as his political adviser.
total German industrial production was to be reduced to c. 50% of its 1938 volume.

This appearance of agreement soon faded. Under the Potsdam dispensation, all four zones were to be treated as an economic unity. But Paris refused to cooperate without assurance of the separation from the Reich of the Ruhr and Rhineland—a demand unacceptable to London and Washington. Moscow also refused to cooperate without assurance of four-Power control of the Ruhr and $10,000,000,000 in reparations—demands which Bevin and Byrnes categorically rejected. On May 25, 1946, Clay suspended reparation shipments from the American zone to the U.S.S.R. In the Soviet zone, the occupational authorities first made extensive removals of equipment and then fostered increased industrial production, much of it under Soviet ownership, out of which substantial reparations were collected from current output. When London protested at this practice, Moscow resumed removals in the autumn and began recruiting (or conscripting) German workers for labor in the U.S.S.R. Anglo-American protests at these arrangements were dropped when Moscow produced a forgotten Allied proclamation of August 18, 1945, authorizing such use of German labor.

Deadlock. The issues here posed had found no solution by 1948. On the contrary, they led to recurrent crises and increasing bitterness. On April 29, 1946, Byrnes sought to allay French and Soviet fears about security by proposing a 25-year (or 40-year) four-Power pact to keep Germany disarmed. Past experience with such documents evoked no enthusiasm in Moscow. Since the Soviet zone was largely self-supporting and was an asset, rather than a liability, for Soviet economy, the Kremlin was in no haste to push a final German settlement. It insisted, moreover, on internationalizing the Ruhr and on large reparations from current output as a condition of raising the level of industry. The U.S.A. and the U.K., conversely, were obliged to spend almost $1,000,000,000 a year in feeding the population of the western zone. They were therefore anxious to promote economic unity and a final settlement but were wholly unwilling to grant reparations to the U.S.S.R. from current output, since they held that the Western Powers would, in effect, be paying for them. An American loan to the U.S.S.R., comparable with those extended in 1946 to Britain and France, might have modified the Soviet view on reparations. But this was opposed by the State Department for reasons of power politics and was unthinkable for a Congress, press, and public dedicated increasingly to a crusade to "save civilization from Communism"—an enterprise in which Hitler had had far more experience than any American leaders. When continued American pressure for economic unification met with continued Soviet and French
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opposition, London and Washington moved in July to merge their two zones and to set up joint German economic agencies for "Bizonia."

Meanwhile the vanquished "master race," whose fortunes were the source of bickering and haggling among the victors, had resumed political activity on a local level. Four major parties emerged: the old-line Social Democrats and Communists, a right-wing "Liberal Democratic" Party, and a new "Christian Democratic Union" (or "Christian Social Union" in Bavaria), which was a Protestant-Catholic middle-class grouping of heterogeneous elements ranging from Christian Socialists to pre-Hitler Centrists and conservative business interests. In the Soviet zone, favors shown to the Communists did not prevent their most bitter enemies, the Social Democrats, from gaining a wide following in an electorate which was now far more anti-Communist and anti-Soviet than it had been in 1932. Russian pressure was brought to bear for a merger of the two groups, which would be largely under Communist control. Despite resistance to this maneuver throughout Germany, Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht for the Communists and Otto Grotewohl for the Social Democrats established the "Socialist Unity Party" (S.E.D.) in Berlin in April, 1946. Other Socialists expelled Grotewohl. In none of the western zones did they agree to any merger. Here the S.E.D. was barred by the Western Powers. The Social Democrats as an independent party were barred in the Soviet zone by Moscow.

In municipal and communal elections in the Soviet zone in early September, 1946, the S.E.D. won majorities in all regions: Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. But in the election of state constituent assemblies on October 20, 1946, the S.E.D. lost its absolute majorities, winning only 47.7% of the votes cast, with the balance divided between the Christian Democrats (24.3%) and the Liberal Democrats (24.7%). In a Berlin municipal election on the same day the Socialists won a thumping victory (48.6%), even in the Russian sector, while the S.E.D. got only 19.8%, the Christian Democrats 22.2%, and the Liberal Democrats 9.4%. The Soviet effort at merging the two fiercely hostile Marxist parties thus led to no real unity but rather to a strengthening of Socialist and other anti-Communist groups.

In elections of June 30, 1946, in the American zone for state constituent assemblies, the voters of Bavaria, Greater Hesse, and Württemberg-Baden gave the Christian Democrats 47.9%, the Socialists 33.6%, the Communists 7.9%, and the Liberal Democrats 7.7%. On October 13, the corresponding figures of votes cast in the British zone for city and district councils were 36.9, 37.4, 8.1, and 6.7%. Similar elections in the French zone on October 13 gave 55.6, 26.8, 7.7, and 7.1% to the Christian Democrats, Socialists, Communists, and Liberal Democrats, respectively. Other local elections in 1947
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did not much change these ratios. Local and Länder governments in the western zones were in almost all cases Christian Democratic-Socialist coalitions, with both groups staunchly anti-Soviet. Conservative Karl Adenauer emerged as leader of the Christian Democrats. Kurt Schumacher of Hanover became national spokesman for the Social Democrats. His appeals to German nationalism and self-commiseration were accompanied by warnings to Russia that Germany must remain democratic and to the West that Germany must become socialist.

Under these circumstances the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. were alike unable to resist the temptation to curry German favor by appealing to patriotism and seeking to use it as a weapon, each against the other. Molotov told the Council of Foreign Ministers on July 10, 1946, that he rejected German dismemberment and deindustrialization, favored economic and political unity, preferred a unitary to a federal national structure, and felt that a treaty should be concluded when it was clear that the Reich would ensure reparations deliveries and “extirpate the remnants of Fascism.” He later condemned the proposed merger of the British and U.S. zones as a “backstairs agreement,” aimed at “a revival of the economic might of the aggressive forces of German imperialism.” At Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, Byrnes disclaimed all desire to perpetuate an “alien dictatorship” over the German economy or polity, urged a speedy peace settlement, and proposed a provisional government in the form of a National Council of the Minister-Presidents of the states and provinces, who should prepare a Federal Constitution. The Ruhr and Rhineland should be under German control. The Saar should go to France. But the final settlement of the Polish-German frontier should restore to the Reich part of the lost provinces. Molotov retorted that the Oder-Neisse line was fixed and final.

Toward Partition. These themes were rendered anew during 1947 with only minor variations. Moscow wooed Germans by championing unity under a strong central government but alienated many by insisting on reparations, internationalization of the Ruhr, and perpetuation of the new eastern frontiers. Washington wooed Germans by vetoing reparations and internationalization and proposing frontier revisions in the East but alienated many by championing federalism and rejecting socialization of industry. The Moscow Conference of March brought no accord. The London Conference of December intensified discord. By the dawn of 1948, American spokesmen were accusing the U.S.S.R. of trying to exploit Germany at U.S. expense, promoting poverty and chaos, obstructing peace as a means of fostering Communist world conquest, and plotting the imposition of a new totalitarianism on a

41 See pp. 254-255.
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Reich which would otherwise be democratic and oriented toward the Western Powers. Soviet spokesmen in turn accused the U.S. and Britain of "capitalistic exploitation" of the Germans, of "imperialistic ambitions," and of conspiring to rebuild the Reich as a new arsenal for war against Russia. All of this, in a familiar phrase, was "just what the doctor ordered"—the doctor in the case obviously being the late Dr. Goebbels.

Anglo-American "Bizonia" became a reality in January, 1947, with much talk of steps to restore German industry. British plans to socialize the Ruhr were deferred. General Clay, who succeeded McNarney as U.S. Commander in Chief, declared on January 29 that Social Democrat Victor Agartz, who became chairman of the German Bi-zonal Economic Committee, "will not be allowed to use his office for the purpose of introducing socialism." At the same time the Bi-zonal Export-Import Agency signed its first contract with the Norsk Aluminum Co. of Oslo, which was wholly owned by I. G. Farbenindustrie, one of the major prewar private monopolies. Later in the year Byrnes urged that "the control of German industries should be turned back to the owners." 42 While much was said, and little done, about decartelization, it was clear, despite Socialist hopes, that the new economy of Bizonia would, so far as possible, be patterned after the American free-enterprise system. "The policy of our Military Government in Germany, fully supported by the War and State Departments," said Brig. Gen. William H. Draper, Jr. (January 10, 1947), head of the Economic Division of OMGUS and former Vice-President of Dillon, Read & Co., "is to return German foreign trade as quickly as possible to normal commercial and banking channels." The enterprise, it appeared by January of 1948, would cost the U.S.A. almost $1,000,000,000 annually, since America, with British approbation, assumed economic control of, and financial responsibility for, Bizonia.

Herbert Hoover, sent by President Truman on a special economic mission to Germany and Austria, reported on March 18, 1947, that the German level of industry must be raised, removal of plants for reparations must stop, Soviet ownership of industry in the Russian zone must be ended, the Rhineland and Ruhr must be part of the Reich, and economic recovery must take precedence over decartelization and de-Nazification. In May the German Economic Council for Bizonia was formally set up in a form easily convertible into a political government. New directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Clay in July called for measures to increase industrial production so as to "enable Germany to make a maximum contribution to European recovery." Washington herewith repudiated finally the Morgen-

42 Speaking Frankly, p. 195. The "owners," some of whom were then on trial in Nuremberg as war criminals, had helped to put Hitler in power. See the author's The Nazi Dictatorship and Richard Sasuly's I. G. Farben (New York, Boni & Gaer, 1947).
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thau-Roosevelt approach in favor of the Hoover approach, which was wel-
come to all advocates of reduced public spending, since it promised a self-
supporting western Germany in four years (at a cost, to be sure, of per-
haps $5,000,000,000), and was equally welcome to strategists who hoped
to rebuild German industrial power as a counterweight to Russia.

In the course of tripartite parleys in August, 1947, Paris failed to obtain
assurances of large shipments of Ruhr coke but secured agreement that
“disarmament, demilitarization and democratization remain indispensable
to security” and that priorities should not be given “to the rehabilitation of
Germany over that of the democratic countries.” On August 29, plans were
announced to raise the level of industrial output in Bizonia to the 1936
level, with steel production to be increased to 10,700,000 tons.43 Clay ex-
plained in September that American devotion to democracy required post-
ponement of all socialization of industry above a local level until the whole
German people, under a national government, could be consulted.

By December, 1947, Anglo-American plans were well advanced to set
up a separate German government in the West, to include, if possible, the
French zone. Molotov’s denunciations of such proposals at the London meet-
ing of the Council of Foreign Ministers evoked denials which were scarcely
convincing in view of numerous “leaks” and subsequent events. The Council
broke up in failure when Marshall and Bevin again urged revision of the
Polish frontier and rejected Soviet “demands” for large reparations from
current production. American and Soviet authorities in Germany were al-
ready engaged in an all-out propaganda war in which each sought to dis-
credit the other in the eyes of the German public. At the turn of the year
the prospects for 1948 favored a partition of the Reich into a Soviet Ger-
many, with an area of 46,000 square miles and a population of 17,300,000,
and a western “Trizonia,” with 95,800 square miles and 45,400,000 people.
Each would have its own government—the one in Berlin (from which the
U.S.S.R. threatened to expel western troops and officials) and the other in
Frankfort. Each would be under pressure from its sponsors to blame the
“enemy” for the failure of German unification and to participate actively
in the “cold war.” In the West, Communism would be suppressed in the
name of “democracy” (Western style). In the East, all rivals of the S.E.D.
would be suppressed in the name of “democracy” (Soviet style). In the

43 The Society for the Prevention of World War III, Inc., pointed out on Sept. 6, 1947,
that in 1936 “Germany was already spending most of her income on the development
of her industrial war potential and had increased, by c. 50%, her investments in heavy
industry” and asserted that the “Germany First” advocates had succeeded in shelving
plans for the economic disarmament of the Reich “in favor of dangerous schemes of
the cartellists who have been in the past the accomplices of Germany’s industrial war-
lords and who hope to resume their economic ties.”
Underground the forces of neo-Fascism would win an ever larger following by demonstrating to Germans, with the greatest of ease, the folly of “Bolshevism” and “plutodemocracy” alike.

Beyond this confession of failure, the emerging design for conflict was not wholly clear. Hoover and Byrnes favored a separate peace treaty with western Germany, under the terms of which steps should be taken to rescue Prussia from the Russians and compel Soviet evacuation of the East. Since Moscow would never consent to any such steps, this proposal, if accepted and pressed, was a simple formula for World War III. Other Americans pointed out that such an arrangement would play into Communist hands, since the German irredentas were in the East and could be used by the Kremlin for bargaining purposes to win a unified Germany to the Soviet side if worst came to worst in the struggle of the giants. Britain and France were increasingly passive, albeit worried, spectators of the unfolding of American purposes. If Hitler still lived, the German scene in 1948 undoubtedly gave him immense satisfaction. For it represented the belated fulfillment of all his forecasts and hopes after Stalingrad. For those with long memories, this (in motion-picture parlance) is “where we came in.” That the effort of the Eastern and Western Powers to cope with the German problem should thus have come back, in most of its essentials, to the situation of 1924 in economics and of 1938-39 in diplomacy was a portent, the meaning of which is best ignored by all who base their hopes for peace on wishes rather than realities.

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Sad tidings bring I to you out of France, Of loss, of slaughter, and
discomfiture; Guienne, Champagne, Rheims, Orleans, Paris, Guyors,
Poictiers, are all quite lost. . . . "How were they lost? What treachery
was us'd?" No treachery but want of men and money. Amongst the
soldiers this is muttered—That here you maintain several factions, And
whilst a field should be dispatch'd and fought, You are disputing of

4. FRANCE: FROM MASTERY TO WEAKNESS

Sad tidings bring I to you out of France, Of loss, of slaughter, and
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your generals. One would have lingering wars with little cost; Another would fly swift, but wanteth wings; A third thinks, without expense at all, By guileful fair words peace may be obtain'd. . . . Cropp'd are the flower-de-luces in your arms; Of England's coat one half is cut away.


Great nations are seldom struck down by foreign conquerors unless they are first self-defeated by disunity within. Napoleon's amazing victories were made possible not merely by a superior military technique but by the disruption of the other States of the Continent through class conflict between aristocrats andburghers. Hitler's career as "aggrandizer of the Reich" was similarly made possible not only by superiority of arms and strategy but by inner conflict among his victims. During the years of democratic retreat, influential elements among the propertied classes of all countries were favorably disposed toward Fascism as an imagined bulwark against proletarian radicalism. Conversely, many workers and some peasants and smaller business people suspected the political spokesmen of the wealthy and wellborn of being envious of the depotisms at Rome and Berlin and more than willing to sacrifice national safety upon the altar of class interest—narrowly defined and stupidly served. Such suspicions were justified. In capitalist democracies, most gentlemen and ladies of means were well fed but worried lest they lose their privileges as the result of economic depression, war, and incipient social revolution. They therefore tended to be secretly sympathetic with the cause of the Caesars who had cured unemployment, outlawed trade unions and strikes, "put labor in its place," and loudly proclaimed their own devotion to property and profits and their determination to save "civilization" from "Bolshevism."

The result was democratic appeasement, pacifism, paralysis, and more often than not connivance in Fascist aggression up to the point at which catastrophe became inevitable. Decadent ruling classes frequently embrace their destroyers under the delusion that they are saviors. People of property in Italy, Germany, and Japan delivered themselves into the hands of a new military elite which they mistakenly believed they could control in their own interests. They thereby lost all political influence. Far from profiting from this spectacle, the people of property of France, Britain, and a dozen lesser States dealt with the Fascist Caesars in precisely the same fashion with similar results. Hitler and his agents assiduously spread the poisons of anti-Semitism and anti-Communism in every country earmarked for conquest. They profited richly from the bitter wrangling in the democracies between "isolationists" and "interventionists." They achieved their purposes through capitalizing on fear of labor, hatred of Russia, de-
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lusions of Fascist “protection” among men of property, piety, and privilege. The resulting disunity and confusion made the work of the Wehrmacht easy.

The Third French Republic died in 1940, as the Second French Empire had died in 1870, because of incredible blindness on the part of its diplomats and strategists and because of appalling corruption and an incurable schism within French society. In the earlier instance, the consequence was the debacle of Sedan, followed by national defeat and the bloody class war of the Paris Commune of 1871. In the later instance, the consequence was a long period of inner strife between Munichmen and “bellicistes,” reactionaries and liberals, rich and poor, pro-Fascists and anti-Fascists—followed by the second debacle of Sedan, the capitulation at Bordeaux, and the establishment of the defeatist Vichy regime. France was betrayed from within, partly by isolationist stupidity, partly by malice prepense on the part of the well to do, long before France was crushed from without by the hereditary foe. The latter result was the product of the former cause. In this there is perhaps no “moral.” In Hegel’s phrase, the only lesson which history teaches is that history teaches no lessons. Degenerate elites (e.g., the European aristocracies at the end of the 18th century, and the European plutocracies in the middle of the 20th) typically learn nothing and forget nothing. The anatomy of disaster is nevertheless worthy of dissection.

The French nation-state is, with the possible exception of England, the oldest of the Great Powers in the Western State System. It was the first State of Continental Europe to attain political unity under its medieval kings. It was in France that royal absolutism and centralized power first triumphed over feudal anarchy and medieval particularism. It was in France, some three centuries later, that bourgeois democracy first triumphed over absolutism and the landed aristocracy. Corresponding changes had taken place earlier in England, but England was across the Channel and was no longer able to act effectively on the Continent after her knights and barons were driven out of Normandy, Aquitaine, and other “French” provinces in the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453). The same conflict which ousted England from the mainland launched France on her career as the largest, richest, and most populous State of Europe. For three centuries—roughly from 1500 to 1815—French kings, statesmen, and patriots took pride in the fact that la belle France was ranked first among the nations in military might, in diplomatic influence and prestige, and in the arts of civilization.

From the point of view of the traditional position of la grande nation, it was the tragedy of the 19th century that France ceased to be the most powerful State of western Europe. French policy under the Second Empire
of Napoleon III (1852-70) was directed toward imperial expansion and toward preventing the political unification of Germany. The effort to fore-
stall this misfortune failed. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 spelled the end of French supremacy on the Continent. In the dust of Sedan and the agony of besieged and captured Paris, there perished the possibility of retaining in the hands of the Quai d'Orsay the reins of power which those hands were no longer strong enough to hold. The Rhine frontier was lost. Alsace-Lorraine was lost. Germany was a united nation. And Italy to the south was also a united nation. French foreign policy after 1871 sought to recover for France what had been lost and to reestablish traditional French hegemony over Europe. How this goal—seemingly impossible of realization—was attained and how French soldiers and diplomats finally achieved and for a time preserved a new position of uneasy preponderance over the Continent in the post-Versailles period need not here be told. It will suffice to suggest how and why that preponderance was thrown away and France was brought to ruin.

Lost Fruits of Victory. In 1918, after four years and three months of unprecedented bloodshed and destruction, France achieved the goal which her diplomats and soldiers had pursued since 1871. Only a world in arms against the Central Powers enabled France to achieve victory. The Republic's Russian ally had been ground to pieces by the enemy and was in the throes of social revolution. Britain, Italy, the U.S.A., and a host of lesser allies stood in the way of a purely French peace. They opposed French annexation of the Rhineland. They opposed outright annexation of the German colonies. They refused to conclude an alliance against Germany for the future. But much had been gained despite these obstacles. Austria-Hungary was destroyed. German military and naval strength was reduced to impotence by the Treaty of Versailles. The French Army became the most powerful force on the Continent. French power and prestige were restored almost, if not quite, to their old status. French hegemony was successfully reasserted. A new distribution of territory and power, embodying the realities of this hegemony, was written into the public law of Europe. If Poincaré and other extreme nationalists were bitter over the "leniency" of the Peace Settlement, at least the new Europe offered ample opportunities for the permanent humiliation of Germany and the perpetuation of French ascendancy.

Post-Versailles French foreign policy was directed almost exclusively toward the attainment of this end, although differences of opinion developed as to the best means thereto. "Security" became at once the guiding slogan of the Quai d'Orsay. "Security" meant assurance against invasion from the east. Assurance against invasion was not to be had, in the opinion of most patriotic Frenchmen, unless the prospective invader were kept in
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a position of political inferiority and military helplessness. No chances were to be taken with German goodwill, for France had been twice invaded in 50 years. Germany, moreover—defeated, truncated, disarmed—still possessed 63,000,000 people to France’s 40,000,000 and a magnificent industrial establishment for the making of modern war. There could be no security unless the Republic possessed overwhelming power. Since the Treaty afforded a large measure of such security, it was natural that the French Government not only should insist upon its preservation intact but should interpret it as liberally as possible from the point of view of French interests.

The attainment of security, i.e., the maintenance of hegemony over the Continent, required that Germany be kept weak and that France be kept strong. To achieve this goal, the dismemberment of the German federal State was at first contemplated. “Separatist” intrigues in the Rhineland were indulged in extensively between 1918 and 1925 and were then abandoned when it appeared that the Rhineland was not detachable. But the territorial clauses of Versailles were kept inviolate, and any union, political or economic, between the Reich and German Austria was prevented. Germany was kept disarmed, for a rearmed Germany, bent upon a counter-revanché, would be a formidable foe. Germany was kept diplomatically isolated, for if she gained allies she might conceivably at some future date undo the verdict of 1919, as France, with the aid of allies, was able earlier to undo the verdict of 1871. And Germany was kept economically and financially prostrate, for without capital and productive capacity no State can achieve military power or diplomatic influence. With this end in view, Paris, between 1918 and 1924, insisted upon the full execution of the economic and financial clauses of the Treaty. A weak Germany could perhaps pay no reparations, but a strong Germany could threaten French security. Poincaré and his supporters preferred security to reparations. When payments were defaulted in 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr Valley, the industrial heart of Germany, as a means of coercing the Reich.

If these and similar measures were adopted to keep Germany impotent, corresponding measures were devised to keep France powerful. New fortifications were erected along the eastern frontier, and the French Army, though reduced in numbers, was maintained at what was believed to be the highest possible level of technical efficiency. The French Government steadfastly refused to reduce its armaments further, except in return for an international police force or some alternative arrangement which would afford an equal degree of security. New allies were sought to replace the old. Tsarist Russia was gone, and French efforts during the Russian Civil War to bring about the overthrow of the Soviet regime were fruitless. But Belgium and Poland became allies of France, for both would be menaced
even more directly by a German *revanche* than would France. In the southeast the Little Entente—Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania—was no less resolved to maintain the *status quo*. All its members became allies of France, and under French guidance and with the aid of French loans they resolved to oppose all efforts to modify the existing distribution of territory and power, whether from Germany to the north, from Hungary or Austria within their midst, from Italy to the west, or from Russia to the east. These common interests stretched a broad cordon of French power around Germany's frontiers.

Not content to rely only upon this bulwark, the Quai d'Orsay sought overseas assistance from every possible source. In 1919 the French Cabinet reluctantly abandoned its plan for annexation of the Rhineland in return for a pledge of a Franco-Anglo-American security pact which never materialized. French interest in the League of Nations was largely motivated by the hope that it could be utilized to ensure enforcement of the peace treaties and place the power of all its members behind the victim of any aggression. Paris attempted, without success, to secure a general British guarantee of European frontiers. Nothing would have been more welcome to it (or more improbable of attainment) than a pledge of American diplomatic and military support, in the event of any forcible effort at treaty revision. Despite failures and disappointments, postwar France and her eastern allies established such a preponderance of power on the Continent that the old equilibrium between opposing coalitions disappeared and, for 15 years, no aggregation of power emerged which could hope to challenge French ascendancy.

But this "security" was as uneasy as that of the proverbial head that wears a crown. Seventy million Germans remained in Central Europe, and should they ever become politically united and armed, they could overwhelm Poland and Czechoslovakia. Should they ever secure Russian or Italian assistance, they could sweep through all barriers. It consequently seemed expedient to placate Germany to a certain degree. Following the failure of the Poincaré policy of coercion, the Herriot Cabinet of 1924 consented to the so-called "Dawes Plan" of reparation payments and to the evacuation of the Ruhr. Reparation obligations were further reduced in the Young Plan of 1930 and, in the face of world-wide economic collapse, were abandoned entirely in the Lausanne agreements of July 8, 1932. Under the leadership of Briand, a "new era" of Franco-German relations was inaugurated by the Locarno Pacts of October, 1925, and by the admission of Germany into the League in 1926. The Rhineland was evacuated in 1930, five years before the required time. Extreme French nationalists condemned these concessions as an indication of weakness, a menace to security, and
an invitation to Germany to make new demands for treaty revision. More moderate Frenchmen defended them as necessary steps toward security via conciliation and rapprochement. The "Locarno epoch" closed with the deaths of Briand and Stresemann. New friction developed over Anschluss, armaments, and treaty revision in 1931-32. In any case, French conciliatory gestures stopped at the point where equality in armaments and frontier revision began, for no French Government could permit any such enhancement of German power. Security demanded peace. Peace demanded the preservation of the status quo in its broad essentials. Preservation of the status quo demanded the maintenance of French hegemony; and, paradoxically, France was prepared to fight to maintain peace, i.e., French ascendancy, rather than yield the fruits of victory.

The Physiology of Paralysis. The year 1933 inaugurated a new and disastrous epoch in French diplomacy. Refusal to make larger concessions to the German Republic contributed to the collapse of liberalism across the Rhine and to the rise to power of Hitler's Nazis, committed to a belligerent program of treaty revision and revanche. As German truculence increased and German military power grew, French willingness to resort to force to maintain the status quo diminished. French opinion was so firmly attached to peace that it would no longer approve recourse to preventive violence to meet the menace of the new militarism now dominant in the Reich. French refusal to act against the Third Reich drove Pilsudski into his Non-aggression Pact with Hitler in January, 1934.

An unstable balance between political extremes in Parliament rendered difficult the development of any strong and consistent policy. A desire to secure British and Italian support against Germany inhibited action likely to alienate London or Rome. The rise of Fascism in France, represented in the Croix de Feu of François de la Rocque, in the followers of the renegade Communist Jacques Doriot, and in a variety of other groups, was a further source of confusion, as was the delayed but nevertheless damaging impact of the Great Depression on French economy. The great issue before the Republic was no longer that of keeping a weak Germany in subjection but that of preserving the remnants of security and checkmating a strong, re-armed, and defiant Reich. Could liberal France prevent the establishment of Nazi hegemony over the Continent? Could liberal France protect itself from domestic Fascism? Upon answers to these questions depended the future of the French position in the game of power politics and the future of the Republic itself as a democratic State form.

La grande nation moved hesitantly and without clear guidance amid its new difficulties. Some positive steps were taken toward an affirmative answer to the questions posed. The "Maginot Line"—a wall of steel and con-
crete, dotted with subterranean batteries and machine-gun nests—was rushed to completion along the German frontier. The Fascist riots in Paris of February 6, 1934, drew the powerful Socialist and Communist Parties together into an anti-Fascist coalition, joined in January, 1936, by the large liberal party of the Radical Socialists. This “People’s Front” frustrated the internal Fascist danger, at least temporarily. In the diplomatic field, Foreign Minister Louis Barthou had moved earlier to counterbalance the possible defection of Poland and the new might of Germany by a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. In May, 1935, Franco-Soviet and Czech-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pacts were signed. In the elections of April and May, 1936, the People’s Front Parties won a sweeping victory and put in power a Left Cabinet headed by the Socialist leader, Léon Blum. French democracy was apparently saved. French security was apparently assured. In August, 1936, General Gamelin, Chief of the French General Staff, visited Warsaw. In September, Gen. Edward Rydz-Smigly, who had succeeded Marshal Piłsudski (d. May 12, 1935) as dictator of Poland, visited Paris. The alliance was reaffirmed in the face of Polish fears of Nazi militarism and French promises of new loans. Perhaps Poland was to be saved for the French bloc. The U.S.S.R. was a new ally. Belgium and the Little Entente seemingly remained bulwarks of French power.

Counterbalancing these favorable developments was a series of diplomatic and strategic blunders which were ultimately to prove fatal. On October 9, 1934, Barthou and King Alexander of Jugoslavia were assassinated at Marseille by a Croatian terrorist. This tragedy left France’s ally on the Adriatic with a boy king, Peter II, and removed from the scene the only French Foreign Minister of great ability during the period of crisis. The retirement in 1933 and the death on November 22, 1934, of Philippe Berthelot, long Secretary-General of the Quai d’Orsay, removed another able diplomat from the helm. Barthou’s successor, Pierre Laval, hesitated to ratify the Soviet Pact until Germany’s démarche in March, 1936, compelled such action. Laval sought to conciliate Britain and Italy on the assumption that these Powers could be counted upon for support against Berlin. In order to placate Downing Street and “preserve peace,” he acquiesced in German rearmament and supported Britain in imposing sanctions on Italy. In order to placate Rome and “preserve peace,” he acquiesced in Italian designs on Ethiopia and undermined the League system of collective security. In the execution of this devious course, Paris fell between two stools. Rome and London were both alienated, Berlin was strengthened, and French power and prestige were diminished.

**Toward the Abyss.** When on March 7, 1936, Hitler repudiated Locarno and remilitarized the Rhineland, the French General Staff perceived that
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effective military aid to Czechoslovakia or the U.S.S.R. in the event of Nazi aggression would be rendered impossible if Berlin were allowed to fortify the Rhine frontier. It urged French military occupation of the Rhineland, as was permitted by the Treaty of Versailles. But such a step would require expensive mobilization and would seem to threaten war. It would be highly unpopular in France and might lead to an open break with London. Gamelin did not insist. The Sarraut Cabinet consequently took no military action but limited itself to protests in accordance with the example set a year previously, when the French Government acquiesced in Hitler’s repudiation of the military clauses of the Treaty. The Blum Cabinet continued the same policy, hoping that French inaction in the Rhineland and French support of British initiative in deserting Ethiopia and abandoning sanctions against Italy would at least preserve an Anglo-French-Italian common front against Germany. Again the hope was vain. Britain refused to accept any commitments in Central or Eastern Europe. Mussolini at once reached an understanding with Hitler. The Quai d’Orsay was again betrayed by its own illusions.

The Little Entente was weakened by Czechoslovakia’s relatively defenseless position and by growing German influence in the Balkans. On August 29, 1936, Nicholas Titulescu, for many years Rumanian Foreign Minister and a staunch advocate of solidarity with France, was forced out of office. The Jugoslav Government was also passing out of the French into the German orbit because Germany could supply a market for Jugoslav exports as France could not. Despite the efforts of President Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente continued to languish. Belgrade and Bucharest, united to Prague only by fear of Hungarian revisionism, began to spin a web of pro-German and anti-Soviet intrigue. French power on the Danube was rapidly becoming a memory. That it survived at all was due to Mussolini’s championship of Magyar dreams of revanche. Meanwhile, Belgium was also lost. On October 14, 1936, King Leopold, in response to pressure from Flemish sources and from the Fascist followers of the “Rexist” leader, Léon Degrelle, announced the termination of Belgium’s military alliances and her return to prewar neutrality. A Belgium rendered defenseless by French acquiescence in Nazi remilitarization of the Rhineland could scarcely be expected to remain France’s ally. The French bloc thus seemed on the point of collapse before the Fascist diplomatic offensive.

Beneš had been Foreign Minister since the establishment of Czechoslovakia. He was elected to the Presidency on Dec. 18, 1935, following the retirement of the distinguished and venerated founder of the Republic, Prof. Thomas Masaryk. Kamil Krofta succeeded as Foreign Minister.
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If Laval epitomized the blindness of the conservative French plutocracy in the face of mortal danger from the Caesars, Blum epitomized the paralysis of French liberals and radicals in the face of the same danger. The Right would do nothing to halt the aggressors because it feared the Left more than it did the aggressors. It hoped to make appeasement the means of protecting the class interests it represented. The Left would do nothing to halt the aggressors because its spokesmen were pacifists more interested in "social reforms" than in national security. Their enemies, moreover, were not above threatening civil war if the Left ventured either to attack the privileges of the wealthy "200 families" or to translate its anti-Fascist convictions into diplomatic and military action. On June 4, 1936, Léon Blum, leader of the French Socialist Party, became Premier in a "People's Front" Cabinet of Radical Socialists and Socialists, supported in Parliament by these parties plus their Communist allies against Fascism. When the Spanish "Popular Front" was violently attacked by the generals and the propertied classes, aided by the Axis, the Socialist deputies in the French Chamber declared their solidarity with the Loyalists on July 24. On the next day, however, Blum and Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos persuaded the Cabinet in the name of "peace" and "nonintervention" to forbid all arms shipments to Spain. In deference to Tory Britain and the pro-Franco parties of the Right, Blum appealed to the Powers on August 1 to adopt "common rules of nonintervention." On August 15, Britain and France put a formal arms embargo into effect at once. Other States adhered with a variety of qualifications. The farcical London "Non-intervention" Committee was set up. The betrayal of the Spanish Republic was launched. Blum's own followers protested bitterly and demanded, "Planes for Spain!" But Blum was imper turbable. He told them on September 6:

There is not a single piece of circumstantial evidence to show that the [non-intervention] agreement has been violated. . . . Do you think my heart is not torn when I think what is happening down there in Spain? . . . Undoubtedly the legal government that has arisen from the expression of universal suffrage, the Government of the Spanish Republic, would assure us complete security on our Pyrenees frontier, while it is impossible to foresee the ambitions of the Rebel generals. On the one hand, safety; on the other, danger. . . . But should we undertake a competition of armaments on Spanish soil? . . . If certain Powers furnish arms and planes to the Rebels, should France furnish them to the Popular Front? . . . No.

This decision was fatal not only to the Spanish Republic but to the French Republic. France was to fall, not because of the People's Front "reforms," but because the diplomacy of the People's Front was identical with that of the extreme Right. The ensuing collaboration with the Axis
in conquering Spain drove more nails into the coffin of France's eastern alliances and left *la grande nation* discredited and weakened. It also strengthened enormously the pro-Fascist element within France. In the autumn of 1937 a series of outrages revealed the existence of a “Secret Committee of Revolutionary Action,” popularly known as the “Cagoulards” (“Hooded Men”), who were securing arms and money from Berlin and Rome to set up a Fascist Directory—to be headed by Jacques Doriot, Jean Chieppa, Pierre Laval, Maxime Weygand, and Henri Philippe Pétain. Exposure of the plot was hastily hushed up. Too many “respectable” personages in the Army and in high finance were implicated. Blum had been succeeded in the Premiership in June, 1937, by anti-Socialist Camille Chautemps of the Radical Socialists. To the Finance Ministry went the sly and sinister figure of Georges Bonnet. The Chautemps Cabinet fell on March 10, 1938. Blum tried in vain to form a new Ministry. On March 12, Hitler took Austria. Blum formed a Cabinet on March 13—and did nothing. On April 8, he resigned once more. He was succeeded by the weak and ignoble leader of the Radical Socialists, Edouard Daladier, who, like so many French politicians, began his public life as a radical (he was a baker’s son) and finally acquired wealth and “wisdom” and therewith became first a conservative and later a reactionary. Daladier was to remain Premier of France until March, 1940. Although brought to power by the People’s Front, he kept power with the support of the Right. His Foreign Minister (April 8, 1938-September 13, 1939) was Georges Bonnet. The two men were destined to bring France and the Republic to destruction.

Descent into Night. Munich was the symbol of their folly. They made the Quai d’Orsay completely subservient to Chamberlain’s designs. They dreaded war or threats of war to save Czechoslovakia because any such war would have to be fought against Fascism in the name of democracy and the People’s Front and, *horrible dictu*, in alliance with Moscow. Bonnet publicly pledged support of Prague and privately worked for an entente with Hitler at Prague’s expense. He denied (falsely) that France could rely on British support. He exaggerated the weakness of the French Army to London. He alleged (falsely) that Litvinov was abandoning Beneš. He cooperated with Pierre-Etienne Flandin (who sent Hitler a congratulatory telegram after the “peace”) and with the defeatist press of the Right, much of it in the pay of the Axis. Bribed journalists denounced Prague and Moscow and shouted over and again to a befuddled public, “No war for Czechoslovakia.” On his return from Munich, Daladier feared that the crowd at the airport might denounce him for betraying France. But it had come to cheer the “savior of peace.” He was joined by Bonnet and Gamelin. All were praised as heroes for having thrown away the victory of 1918 for which
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1,500,000 Frenchmen had died. Gamelin was silent when a visitor remarked, “General, you have just lost 35 divisions!”—i.e., the Czech Army. “I accept my popularity,” declared Daladier, “with the modesty that is only one of the forms my duty takes.” Blum, in a mood he admitted was “cowardly relief,” rejoiced that “peace was saved.” Winston Churchill’s judgment was more accurate: “France and Britain had to choose between war and dishonor. They chose dishonor. They will have war.”

Bonnet and Daladier moved after Munich to surrender the Continent to Hitler’s fancied Drang nach Osten, to wage war at home against “Communism,” and to undermine the social reforms of the French “New Deal.” Labor resisted and ordered a one-day general strike on November 30. It was broken. Daladier declared he had saved France from Bolshevism. On December 6, 1938, Bonnet signed with Ribbentrop a declaration of “pacific and good neighborly relations.” “It is the struggle against Bolshevism,” wrote Bonnet a week later, “which is essentially at the basis of the common German and Italian political conception and, without saying so formally, Ribbentrop perhaps wished to give us to understand that there is no other objective to be attributed to it. . . . In regard to Spain, it is again the struggle against Bolshevism which alone has inspired the German effort from the beginning.” Ambassador Robert Coulondre in Berlin agreed: “To secure mastery over Central Europe by reducing Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary to a state of vassalage and then to create a Great Ukraine under German control—this is what essentially appears to be the leading idea now accepted by the Nazi leaders” (French Yellow Book of 1939, No. 33). Bonnet and Daladier were willing.

When Hitler yielded Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary on March 16, 1939, immediately after the occupation of Prague, the last leaders of a doomed nation awakened belatedly to their error. “Will the Führer,” asked Coulondre on March 19, “be tempted to return to the idea expressed by the author of Mein Kampf which, be it said, is identical with the classic doctrine held by the German General Staff, according to which Germany cannot accomplish her high destiny in the East until France has been crushed and, as a consequence, Britain reduced to impotence on the Continent? . . . The Reich will first turn against the Western Powers” (ibid., No. 80). Paris joined London in belated effort to reconstruct the coalition which had been thrown away. The result was reaffirmation of the Polish alliance, support of Britain in guaranteeing Rumania and Greece, and the conclusion on June 23, 1939, of a French-Turkish alliance, paid for by the cession of Hatay to Ankara. But many of the Rightists were furious at such moves. “Danzig,” wrote Flandin on May 7, “is merely an episode of the revision of the Peace Treaty. . . . If there were a new world war, in which Germany would doubtless be
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defeated, the German people would probably become Communist. . . . If
the present crisis continues, revolution will come.” The Quai d’Orsay, no
less than Downing Street, was unwilling to pay Stalin’s price for a new
alliance against the Reich. The result was the collapse of the “peace front,”
the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the coming of war.

At the end, Bonnet made one last effort to arrange another Munich. On
September 1-2, 1939, he accepted Italian proposals for “peace” through a
conference, with German troops remaining where they were on Polish soil.
He declined to join London in a common warning to Berlin and insisted
upon separate action. Daladier vacillated but told Parliament on Saturday
afternoon (September 2) that France must not abandon its ally. The Cham-
bers voted a war budget and gave the Cabinet implied authority to declare
war. Halifax insisted that there could be no conference without a cessation
of the blitzkrieg and German evacuation of Poland. The French Cabinet
agreed. Bonnet reluctantly assented. Ciano replied that, since Hitler was
unwilling to accept the condition, no further action could be taken. At
10:20, Sunday morning, Bonnet wired Coulondre of “the decision of the
French Government” and instructed him to present an ultimatum at noon
and to inform the Wilhelmstrasse in the event of a negative reply that Paris
would be “compelled to fulfill as from today September 3 at 5 P.M. the
engagements France entered into towards Poland.” The British ultimatum
was delivered at 9 and was followed by war at 11 A.M. At 11:20, Ribbentrop
submitted a contemptuous note of rejection to Henderson. At 12:30 the Nazi
Foreign Minister received Coulondre and told him that if France attacked
the Reich “this would be on her part a war of aggression.” At 5 P.M., Sep-
tember 3, 1939, war began between France and Germany. Bonnet had failed.
He was obliged to yield the Quai d’Orsay to Daladier 10 days later and con-
tent himself with the Ministry of Justice.

Débacle. The Third French Republic entered upon its last war under
leaders who were utterly inept. Its citizens were confused, baffled, and hope-
lessly divided against themselves. “Passive defense” was thought to be cheap
in money and lives and was expected to save the State. No one was en-
thusiastic for war against the foe across the Rhine. Daladier, however, devel-
oped much enthusiasm for war against radicalism at home. On September
26, he decreed the dissolution of the Communist Party and thereafter de-
\voted much energy to combatting the “Reds.” Bonnet schemed with Laval
and Adrien Marquet to end the war and resume appeasement. After the
outbreak of fighting in Finland, Daladier, Gamelin, and Weygand laid plans
for war—not against Germany, but against the U.S.S.R. The failure of
Allied policy in Finland, however, led to a Parliamentary vote of nonconfi-
dence on March 19, 1940. Daladier resigned but retained the Defense Min-

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istry in the new Cabinet of Paul Reynaud. Bonnet was out. Reynaud had long been an anti-Munichois and therefore anathema to the Right and to many of the Radical Socialists. "I have come too early," he remarked. He secured a majority of only one vote in his first test in the Chamber on March 21. He nevertheless decided to carry on.

In reality, Reynaud had come too late. Even he was self-defeated. He realized Gamelin's incompetence but was obliged by political considerations to keep Daladier in the Cabinet—and Daladier insisted on Gamelin's retention. His friend, the Countess Hélène de Portes, moreover, was a defeatist and a friend of Munichman Paul Baudouin. Reynaud and Daladier quarreled violently during the Nazi conquest of the northlands and the Low Countries. Gamelin had no plan for meeting the blitzkrieg save "Win or die." All his calculations were based on the belief that the Maginot Line was impregnable. Years before, Reynaud had urged in vain the thesis of Charles de Gaulle, an obscure officer who had been denied promotion by the conservative General Staff, that German tanks and airplanes could break through the line near Sedan and that France must have armored divisions and a powerful air force to meet the threat. They were not available. On May 18, Reynaud formed a new Cabinet, putting Daladier at the Quai d'Orsay and appointing as Vice-Premier Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, aged eighty-four. He also took into the Cabinet the ultra-Rightists Louis Marin and Jean Ybarnégary, Vice-President of the Fascist Croix de Feu. On May 19, he dismissed Gamelin and made Gen. Maxime Weygand (aged seventy-three) Commander in Chief. These men were all clerical reactionaries, Anglophobes, anti-Bolsheviks, enemies of the Republic, and warm admirers of Franco and Mussolini if not of Hitler. If France was to be saved, it would not be by such artisans of disaster as these.

But France was now beyond saving. On June 5, as the full force of the invaders struck south from the Somme, Reynaud dropped Daladier and named Charles de Gaulle as Undersecretary at the War Ministry. Hélène persuaded him to name Baudouin as Undersecretary at the Quai d'Orsay. Weygand was baffled. His armies were overwhelmed. "A modern retreat," he observed, "has no limits." The Cabinet fled to Tours (June 11-14) and then to Bordeaux. Weygand alleged (falsely) that Communists were "rioting" in abandoned Paris prior to the German occupation and that the Cabinet must surrender to "save France from Bolshevism." Pétain, Chautemps, Baudouin agreed, as did Bonnet, Laval, and Flandin. To move to London or to North Africa, to carry on the war with the fleet and the colonies and the unbroken might of the British Empire would have been quite feasible. But the Munichmen gave Britain up for lost and preferred surrender for reasons of class interest. Reynaud appealed in vain for im-
mediate American aid and asked Churchill to release France from the engagement of March 28 not to make a separate peace. Churchill asked that the French fleet should first be dispatched to British ports. On June 16, he offered “Union Now” to Reynaud. But the capitulators won a majority in the Cabinet at Bordeaux the same evening. Reynaud resigned. He was later injured and Hélène killed in a motor accident. In August, he was arrested and imprisoned, along with Daladier, Gamelin, Blum, Mandel, and others, to be tried for “treason” by those who had betrayed France. Meanwhile,
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President Albert Lebrun named Pétain Premier, Baudouin Foreign Minister, and Laval Minister of Justice. They sued for peace at once through Franco.

The Shame of Vichy. In the aftermath the Republic died and France perished as a Power and as a free State. De Gaulle fled to London and became leader of a “Free France” in exile which carried on the war and secured control of part of the French colonial empire in central Africa and in the Pacific. Pétain authorized the signature of an armistice with Germany on June 22 and with Italy on June 24. At Vichy, to which the Cabinet moved, a rump Parliament committed suicide in favor of a projected “totalitarianism.” Pétain assumed the powers of the President and became “Chief of State” with Royalist trappings. Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité were outlawed. The very name “Republic” was abolished. Laval became Vice-Premier and successor designate in a triumvirate with Weygand and Marquet. He was committed to full “collaboration” with the Axis. Fearing the worst with good reason, Churchill ordered the British fleet to destroy the principal units of the French Navy at Oran, Morocco, on July 3. Vichy severed diplomatic relations with London. On October 22, 1940, Hitler and Ribbentrop conferred with Laval near Paris and on October 23 with Franco near the Spanish frontier. Pétain, accompanied by Laval, conferred with Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Keitel near Tours on October 25. On the next day, Pétain made Laval Foreign Minister and announced “collaboration” with the Reich.

Thanks to continued British resistance, however, there were difficulties. Laval overreached himself and failed to convert Pétain and Weygand (who went to North Africa) to his view that Vichy should join the Axis in war against Britain. On December 13, Pétain dismissed Laval from all his posts and named Flandin Foreign Minister. Otto Abetz, German Commissioner to France, went to Vichy to demand “explanations” but received little satisfaction despite threats of a Nazi military occupation of all of France. Berlin had ample means of carrying out such a threat but hesitated to do so lest the remnants of the French fleet and the French forces in Africa might openly join the British cause. By February, 1941, Pétain was yielding to German demands. Laval was not reinstated. Adm. Jean Darlan became Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister. But the aged Marshal and the men around him had staked their fortunes on a Nazi victory over Britain and were prepared to do all they dared to do to ensure British defeat.

“What we ask at this moment,” said Churchill in a broadcast to the French people on October 21, 1940, “in our struggle to win the victory which we will share with you, is that if you cannot help us, at least you will not hinder us. . . . Remember, we shall never stop, never weary, and never give in, and that our whole people and Empire have bowed themselves to the task
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of cleansing Europe from the Nazi pestilence and saving the world from a new Dark Ages.” In secrecy the men of Vichy pursued their devious course. But at least the aged Pétain and the scarcely less aged Weygand were beginning to learn that “peace with honor” was not to be bought by surrender or “collaboration”—and the people of property who had brought France to defeat were learning that Hitler was no respecter of property and no safeguard against radicalism. Vichy was but an interim regime. If the Axis should win its war, France would be partitioned, exploited, enslaved, and crushed to earth beyond all hope of resurrection. If the Axis should lose and the Third Reich should crumble, a new France would rise and share in the rebuilding of Europe and the world. It seemed probable, however, that no such destiny could be achieved unless France again became a united nation with a national will and a leadership worthy of its mighty past. Such a transformation, in turn, might well require civil war before the contest for mastery of the French soul should be resolved and a new opportunity created for the development of a healthy society and a viable and enduring State. Meanwhile, in the words of Baudelaire’s *Flowers of Evil*, “wandering spirits whine mournfully without a Fatherland while vanquished Hope weeps vainly, and Anguish, atrocious and despotic, plants on bowed and weary heads its flag of night.”

The Two Frances. The problem of the Vichymen during the black years of occupation was not that of how far they wished to go in aiding the Fascist Caesars but of how far they dared to go without provoking widespread popular resistance. Laval favored war against Britain. Pétain was dubious. Clericalism, anti-Semitism, and totalitarianism became the pillars of the regime. “Economic collaboration” with Hitler was the basis of foreign policy. London and Washington had no intention of recognizing the De Gaullists as a government in exile of the true France. The U.S.A. maintained full diplomatic relations with Vichy in a mixed program of appeasement, cajolery, and threats. Ambassador William Leahy pleaded and warned. Robert Murphy visited Weygand in North Africa and offered inducements to resist Nazi demands.

In April, 1941, Pétain told his countrymen that “honor” forbade action against “our former allies.” But Darlan conferred with Nazi envoys and returned with “concessions”—viz., a 25% reduction of occupation costs and the release of 100,000 of the 2,000,000 French war prisoners held by the Reich. The *quid pro quo* was soon obtained. Fernand de Brinon said that any American effort to occupy Dakar would be resisted. Vichymen in Syria welcomed Nazi fliers on their way to Iraq. Darlan championed “collaboration” in the New Order. Laval warned America not to enter the war. But full support of Hitler was still politically difficult. When the Axis attacked
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Russia in June, 1941, Vichy broke relations with Moscow and fostered the recruitment of "volunteers" to help in "saving Europe from Bolshevism." In July, under Nazi pressure, southern Indo-China was surrendered to Tokyo, with ultimate results that led to Pearl Harbor.

But in France, as elsewhere, the Russian war evoked the first stirrings of an "Underground," partly because the Communists, who had hitherto looked benevolently on the Nazi-Soviet entente, now became fanatical anti-Hitlerites, and partly because all anti-Fascists saw in Russian resistance to the Wehrmacht their first hope of the ultimate defeat of the Caesars. Revolution was impossible. Recourse was had to sabotage, assassination, the sudden blow, the quick escape. In August, 1941, Petain, pleading for "unity" and "obedience," made Darlan Minister of National Defense. Party meetings were forbidden. Masons were banned from public office. Special political police units and courts were created. Riots followed. On August 26, 1941, at a rally in Versailles of the "French Legion of Volunteers to Combat Bolshevism," Paul Colette from Normandy emptied his revolver at the speakers. Laval and Marcel Deat were wounded. Firing squads and guillotines were soon at work. The Vichy regime henceforth was a fraud, maintained only by force and by favors shown to, and received from, the conquerors.

Popular hopes gathered more and more around the tall, gaunt figure of Charles de Gaulle, the soldier from Lille who was thrice wounded in World War I while serving in Pétain's regiment before Verdun. After fighting the Bolsheviks in 1920 as a member of Weygand's forces, he taught at St.-Cyr and L'Ecole de Guerre, where he rejected current military theory and predicted precisely how and where the Nazi legions would outflank the Maginot Line and conquer France. As leader of the "Free French," he was condemned to death in absentia by Vichy. He rallied most of the French colonies to his cause. He gathered under his banner (the tricolor, with Jeanne d'Arc's double-barred cross of Lorraine) most of the French Underground.

The strange and awkward figure of le grand Charlie was to have a curious destiny. For millions of Leftist Frenchmen he became the symbol of liberation, though his own sympathies were with the Right. Because he cooperated with Radicals, Socialists, and Communists in exile, he earned the dislike of Churchill and was denounced as a "Communist" by the Hearst press and by other American reactionaries. Because he was in fact a Rightist and a weird personality who fancied himself the new incarnation of the Maid of Orleans and Napoleon, he won little sympathy among Anglo-American liberals. Of him, Roosevelt was to say in 1943: "He is out to achieve one-man government in France. I can't imagine a man I would distrust more." De Gaulle nevertheless became the symbol of the new France. Then, in his
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dislike for the forces of the Left, he retired—to reemerge, paradoxically, as
the Messiah of French neo-Fascism. In this Nemesis is doubtless a moral for
all societies unable to reconcile liberty and authority, equality and property,
fraternity and privilege in the face of threats to Freedom from the Right
and from the Left. But the moral must be drawn, later, by others.

The Struggle for Liberation. The complex events of the years of dark-
ness cannot here be related. The broad pattern was simple. As the prospects
of the Nazi New Order faded into the twilight foreshadowing defeat, the
fortunes of the Vichymen declined stage by stage toward ultimate demisc.
But Allied victories confronted the Free French with more difficulties than
opportunities, since London and Washington had no confidence in De
Gaulle. In spite of these suspicions, he and his followers finally triumphed,
only to face political frustration in the aftermath of victory.

When Allied forces invaded North Africa in November, 1942, their lead-
ers ignored De Gaulle and made a deal with Darlan, who deserted Vichy,
slid France, and assumed control of the liberated colonies. On November
11, the Nazis canceled the armistice and occupied the entire country. Pétain
remained a loyal collaborator. When German forces moved toward the naval
base at Toulon (where Adm. Jean de Laborde sought to yield the fleet to the
Nazis), the sailors blew up most of the war vessels in the harbor in the
greatest naval suicide on record. In North Africa, Admiral Darlan, with
Anglo-American support, reigned supreme, while Free French partisans
were persecuted and jailed, to the bewilderment of the Russians and of
many others. On Christmas Eve of 1942, Darlan was assassinated. He was
succeeded by Gen. Henri Giraud, who was persuaded by Roosevelt and
Churchill to meet De Gaulle at Casablanca in January. An uneasy modus
vivendi was arranged between the two generals. Only slowly were political
prisoners (mostly De Gaullists) released in North Africa and Vichymen
dropped from public posts.

On June 3, 1943, De Gaulle’s aides proclaimed the creation of a “French
Committee of National Liberation,” with De Gaulle and Giraud as co-Presi-
dents. The C.N.L. set up headquarters in Algiers. A “Cabinet” was ap-
pointed. De Gaulle gradually asserted his ascendancy over Giraud and re-
ceived qualified recognition by Washington and London (and full recog-
nition by Moscow) on August 26, 1943. Meanwhile, Pétain hedged in his
support of the Reich. Laval became the chief tool of Nazi rule in the face
of rising opposition, now directed by a “Council of Resistance.” The C.N.L.
won the support of the Underground, which operated against the Nazis
through the “French Forces of the Interior” (F.F.I.)—organized locally as
“Le Maquis” (“The Underbrush”). In countless deeds of heroism, despera-
tion, and implacable hatred, the Maquis struck at the enemy at the cost of

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fearful vengeance in the slaughter of hostages, the torture and execution of prisoners, and savage reprisals of all kinds, organized by Berlin and Vichy. These activities helped to pave the way for liberation. They also prepared an ultimate schism between the Resistance and De Gaulle, for the Underground, under ultra-Left leadership, repudiated any compromise with the prewar forces of conservatism.

De Gaulle's fight for leadership of the liberation was arduous. Giraud was forced out of the co-Presidency of the C.N.L. on November 9, 1943. The following April, De Gaulle, defying Giraud and London and Washington alike, appointed two Communists (Fernand Grenier and François Billoux) to the C.N.L., which he now called the "Provisional Government of the Republic," and forced Giraud out of office by himself assuming command of the armed forces. London and Washington registered opposition, particularly when the C.N.L. began a purge of collaborationists. After bitter discussion, Eisenhower announced agreement (June 4, 1944) "on the military level" with the C.N.L., but no accord was reached regarding De Gaulle's demands that the C.N.L. be recognized as the Government and that only De Gaullists should be used for civil administration.

The great invasion of Normandy (June 6, 1944) was thus launched with no genuine understanding between the C.N.L. and the British and American Governments. On June 14, for the first time in four years, De Gaulle set foot in Metropolitan France and was hailed in Isigny and Bayeux behind the Allied lines. He came to Washington in July and arrived at limited agreements for cooperation with Roosevelt and his advisers. American and Free French forces landed on the Riviera on August 19 and advanced rapidly up the Rhone Valley. On August 20, De Gaulle arrived in Cherbourg from Algiers. Following the victories of Anglo-American forces over the Wehrmacht and a popular insurrection in the capital, De Gaulle entered Paris on August 26. Eisenhower was authorized to deal with the C.N.L. as the de facto Government of France. In a Mass at Notre Dame, De Gaulle declared: "We will not rest until we march, as we must, into enemy territory as conquerors. France has rights abroad. France is a great nation and will know how to make herself heard. France is a great World Power. . . ."

The Grandeur of Victory. On August 30, 1944, the Algiers regime of the C.N.L., now installed in Paris, announced a "Provisional Government" under De Gaulle as President, with representatives of the C.N.L. and of the Resistance joined in a coalition of the Center and Left. In September, Georges Bidault, Underground leader of what was to become the Mouvement Républicaine Populaire (M.R.P.), was named Foreign Minister. Radicals, Socialists, and Communists made up the balance of the new Government. A Provisional Consultative Assembly met in November. On October 23,
Washington belatedly extended recognition, as did the other major United Nations. Jefferson Caffery became the first U.S. Ambassador to liberated France.

The Provisional Government at first enjoyed almost unanimous popular support. It met public demands for social reform and a purge of Fascists. It offered a program of purified democratic capitalism, strongly tinctured with socialism. The F.F.I. were absorbed into the Army, though Communists protested at the disarming of Leftist partisans. In November, 1944, Churchill and Eden accepted invitations to visit Paris. The initial foreign policy of the new Republic was stated by De Gaulle in Algiers on May 7: “Toward the West the French want to be a center of direct and practical cooperation, while they want to be permanent allies in relation to the East—that is to say, first in relation to cherished and powerful Russia.” Bidault restated this directive in November. De Gaulle granted a pardon to the French Communist leader, Maurice Thorez, who was thus enabled to return to France from Moscow. On November 14, De Gaulle was invited to the Soviet capital. Accompanied by Bidault, he conferred with Stalin, Molotov, and other Soviet leaders.

The result of this visit was a revival of the French-Russian alliance of other days. On December 10, 1944, Bidault and Molotov signed a 20-year Pact of mutual aid against German aggression. “The high contracting parties undertake not to conclude alliances and not to participate in any coalitions directed against either of them.” This Treaty was a result of French pique against Anglo-American criticism and neglect. But it was in larger part a fruit of the conviction that now, at long last, Free France must rely for security against the Reich on a stable alliance with the Great Power of the East rather than upon vague assurances from London and Washington. The lesson of 1914 was not forgotten. The lesson of 1933-40 was remembered. The lesson of 1943-44 was burned into the souls of all French patriots. If it was later to be lost once more, the cause lay in forces and pressures outside France.46

46 “The Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
“Resolved to pursue together, and until the end, the war against Germany;
“Convinced that, once victory has been achieved, the re-establishment of peace on a stable basis and its maintenance for a lasting future require the existence of close collaboration between them and with all the United Nations;
“Resolved to collaborate with a view to creating an international system of security, making possible an effective maintenance of general peace and guaranteeing the harmonious development of relations between nations;
“Desirous of confirming reciprocal commitments resulting from an exchange of letters on September 20, 1941, relating to joint action in the war against Germany;
“Certain of meeting, through the conclusion of an alliance between France and the
The Fascist regime at Vichy had meanwhile come to an end. Its last spring was a season of befuddledness for Pétain, fear for Laval, and frenzied sadism for Joseph Darnand, the "French Himmler." In August all the surviving Vichymen fled to the Reich. All were ultimately captured or gave themselves up. On August 15, 1945, the High Court of Justice sentenced U.S.S.R., the feelings as well as the interests of the two nations, the demands of war as well as the requirements of peace and of economic reconstruction in full conformity with the aims adopted by the United Nations;
"Have resolved to conclude a Treaty and to this effect have appointed as their pleni-
potentiaries:
"The Provisional Government of the French Republic, M. Georges Bidault, Minister
of Foreign Affairs; the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Soc-
alist Republics, M. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs. Their appointments having been recognized as being fully valid, they have
agreed on the following provisions:
"1. Each of the high contracting parties will continue to fight by the side of the
other and of the United Nations until final victory over Germany. Each of the high
contracting parties undertakes to afford to the other help and assistance in this struggle
by all the means at its disposal.
"2. The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiations
with Germany or to conclude, without mutual consent, an armistice or a treaty of
peace with either the Hitlerite Government or any government or authority set up in
Germany with the aim of prolonging or maintaining the German policy of aggression.
"3. The high contracting parties undertake to adopt in complete agreement, at the
end of the present conflict with Germany, all measures necessary to eliminate any new
threat on the part of Germany and to oppose any initiative of a nature capable of
making possible a new attempt at aggression on her part.
"4. If one of the high contracting parties should find itself involved in hostilities with
Germany either as the result of an aggression committed by Germany or as the result
of the provisions of the above Article 3, the other high contracting Power will imme-
diately give the contracting Power so involved all the help and assistance in its power.
"5. The high contracting parties undertake not to conclude alliances and not to par-
ticipate in any coalition directed against one of them.
"6. The high contracting parties agree to give each other all possible economic
assistance after the war in order to facilitate and hasten the reconstruction of the
two countries and in order to contribute to the prosperity of the world.
"7. The present Treaty in no way affects the commitments previously undertaken
by the high contracting parties toward third parties by virtue of published treaties.
"8. The present Treaty, of which the French and Russian texts are equally valid,
will be ratified and instruments of ratification thereof will be exchanged in Paris as
soon as possible. It will take effect immediately on the exchange of instruments of
ratification and will remain in force for twenty years. If this Treaty is not denounced
by one of the high contracting parties at least one year before the expiration of this
period, it will remain in force without limitation as to its duration, each one of the
high contracting parties being then able to terminate it by means of declaration to this
effect subject to one year's notice.
"The plenipotentiaries above named have hereunto set their hands and seals.
"Made in Moscow in duplicate on December 10, 1944.

Bidault
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Molotov
Commissar for Foreign Affairs'
Pétain to death, with the recommendation of clemency. De Gaulle commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. On October 14, 1945, Laval, after an abortive attempt at suicide, died before a firing squad. Darnand was also executed. Others were jailed. The purge trials of collaborators, while tempered and retarded to some degree by De Gaulle, went on for two years until almost all the outstanding defeatists and Naziphiles were consigned to infamy.

The new France signed the U.N. Declaration on New Year's Day of 1945. Washington extended substantial lend-lease aid. The French contribution to the closing campaigns of the war in the West, while in no sense decisive, was not negligible. On V-E Day, De Gaulle broadcast to his countrymen:

This is victory. It is the victory of the United Nations and of France. . . . While the rays of glory once again lend brilliance to our flags, the country turns its thoughts and affections first of all toward those who died for her and then toward those who in her service struggled and suffered so much. . . . Honor to the United Nations, which mingled their blood, their sorrows and their hopes with ours and who today are triumphant with us. Vive la France!

The Misery of Victory. But the new France was impoverished, confused, and dazed, with no components of power at its disposal (aside from a colonial empire rocked with rebellion) to enable it to resume its role as a Great Power. Normandy was devastated. The Nazi occupation was estimated to have cost almost $100,000,000,000. Prices climbed. Wages lagged. The poor faced semistarvation. The middle class was reduced to poverty. Some of the rich became poor, while others became richer in the black market. British pressure and native revolt led to the loss of Syria in June, 1945. De Gaulle came to Washington in August to beg for a loan. On December 6, 1945, the Export-Import Bank extended $550,000,000 to the French Government. On May 28, 1946, the U.S.A. extended further credits totaling $1,400,000,000—which, however, were rapidly spent for necessary imports without effecting any full restoration of French productivity or any equilibrium in the French balance of payments.

The resumption of democratic politics at home revolved around weakness, want, and fear. The coalition of Socialists, Communists, and the new liberal Catholic Party of the M.R.P. nevertheless struggled with the difficult tasks confronting it, not without some success so long as the spirit of the Resistance and the joy of liberation promoted unity among divergent groups. The first general election took place on October 21, 1945, and included a referendum as to whether the new Assembly should frame a new Constitution and, if so, whether it should elect a President and act as a legislature pending the completion of the charter. The voters answered "yes"
to both questions by overwhelming majorities, thus endorsing De Gaulle's own view. Of the 586 deputies chosen, the Communists elected 142, the M.R.P. 140, and the Socialists 133. The old Right virtually disappeared, as did the prewar center party of the Radical Socialists.

De Gaulle was unanimously elected President (in practice, Premier) of the Provisional Government on November 13, 1945. He established a coalition Cabinet of the three major parties, after refusing to permit the Communists to control the Ministries of War, the Interior, or Foreign Affairs. All large banks were nationalized in December. But De Gaulle’s demand for larger military appropriations than the Socialists and Communists deemed justified, along with their opposition to his insistence on a strong, independent Executive in the new Constitution, caused him to resign on January 20, 1946. He went into seclusion for a time but resumed political speaking in the summer and autumn to denounce the new Constitution and inspire the “Gaullist Union,” established by René Capitant, which declared itself “resolutely above political parties.” His break with Socialists, Communists, and the M.R.P. was now complete. All viewed him as a dangerous reactionary, appealing to the remnants of the Vichymen and the prewar Right.

Socialist Felix Gouin became Premier in January, 1946, in a three-party Cabinet in which Georges Bidault (M.R.P.) remained Foreign Minister. In April the Socialists and Communists in the Assembly, with the M.R.P. opposed, adopted a draft Constitution providing for a unicameral Parliament. In the referendum of May 5, it was rejected by 10,584,000 votes to 9,453,000. In a new Constituent Assembly elected June 2, the voters gave the M.R.P. 160 seats, the Communists 146, and the Socialists 115. Another three-party Cabinet was formed on June 19 with Bidault as Premier-President. A second draft Constitution provided for a Parliament of two chambers; but since the Upper House, or Council of the Republic, which was indirectly elected, could only delay legislation and could not oust the Cabinet, the National Assembly was the dominant branch. On October 13, the electorate approved the draft, 9,200,000 to 7,790,000. In the election of November 10, 1946, for the first National Assembly, the Communists emerged again as the largest party, with 5,475,000 popular votes and 169 seats, compared with 163 for the M.R.P. and only 103 for the Socialists. Of the 33 women elected, 21 were Communists. Socialist losses meant that the two Marxist parties no longer controlled a majority in the Assembly.

The Cabinet crisis which followed marked the beginning of the end of the postwar coalition. The M.R.P. was sufficiently radical to endorse sweeping nationalization of industry. The Communists were sufficiently conservative to champion patriotism, condemn strikes, and renounce all advocacy
of proletarian revolution and dictatorship. Further practice in the arts of compromise and illogical moderation might have preserved and enhanced the unity of 1944-45, to the great good of the nation, whose grave economic problems scarcely admitted of solution without collaboration for common purposes on the part of the three chief parties. But this was not to be. By December, 1946, many Popular Republicans were hoping for a Cabinet from which the Communists would be excluded, while many Communists favored the exclusion of the M.R.P. The Socialists, caught in the middle, refused (temporarily as it turned out) to join either of their allies against the other.

In the face of a hopeless deadlock, in the course of which Bidault and Thorez both failed to win a majority of the deputies, Léon Blum, aged seventy-four, formed a stopgap, all-Socialist Cabinet on December 16, 1946. His party had been twice rebuffed by the voters. But he had won new laurels by negotiating the American loan. He had been unable to unite the M.R.P. and Communists, "whose simultaneous presence in the Government," as he put it, "is both indispensable and impossible." A new coalition, he hoped, would emerge with the election of a President by the Assembly. De Gaulle announced that he would not be a candidate, since he had no desire "to preside, impotent, over the impotence of the State. . . ."

Unity and Schism. On January 14, 1947, the Assembly elected Socialist Vincent Auriol as first President of the Fourth Republic. When Blum resigned on grounds of health, Auriol asked Socialist Paul Ramadier to form a Cabinet. He succeeded in reuniting the three major parties—for the last time. All were represented in his Ministry, along with the Radicals. Price reductions decreed by Blum and continued under Ramadier offered new hope to an inflation-haunted populace.

The promise of a new time, which was to be pathetically short-lived, was voiced by the venerable Edouard Herriot on January 22, as he succeeded Auriol as President of the Assembly and as Ramadier announced the new coalition. France, said he, "cannot be governed against the people or without them." The martyrs of the occupation, he recalled, often went before Nazi firing squads singing *La Marseillaise*. "They went to their death united, the unbeliever and the priest, the civilian and the soldier, the bourgeois and the worker, the city dweller and the peasant. It is that *Marseillaise* that they sang on the way to their sacrifice that speaks to us now, and that we must apply in the work before us. It is that *Marseillaise* that says to us now: *Allons, enfants de la Patrie!*"

Such aspirations were partly realized, albeit all too briefly, in the hard winter and welcome spring of 1947. Blum's visit to London early in January led to the signature at Dunkirk on March 4 of a 50-year Anglo-French
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Treaty of alliance against future German aggression. Since both Powers were allied with the U.S.S.R., which was allied with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia, security seemed assured even without the Byrnes-Marshall project of a four-Power treaty to guarantee German disarmament. At home and abroad the prospects for unity, peace, and ultimate prosperity seemed brighter than they had been since the flight of the Nazis from the City of Light—and brighter than they were ever to be again in the life of the Fourth Republic.

The ultimate source of the death of the dream, and of a dismal awakening to a dawn of doubt, fear, and hate, lay in the global schism between America

47 “His Majesty, the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India, and the President of the French Republic,

“Desiring to confirm in a Treaty of alliance a cordial friendship and close association of interests between the United Kingdom and France;

“Convinced that the conclusion of such a treaty will facilitate the settlement in a spirit of mutual understanding of all questions arising between the two countries;

“Resolved to cooperate closely with one another as well as the other United Nations in preserving peace and resisting aggression in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in particular with Articles 49, 51, 52, 53 and 107 thereof;

“Determined to collaborate in measures of mutual assistance in the event of any renewal of German aggression, while considering most desirable the conclusion of the Treaty between all these powers having responsibility for actions in relation to Germany with the object of preventing Germany from becoming again a menace to peace;

“Having regard to Treaties of alliance and mutual assistance which they have respectively concluded with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

“Intending to strengthen economic relations between the two countries to their mutual advantage and in the interests of general prosperity, have decided to conclude a Treaty with these objects and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries;

“His Majesty, the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India:

“For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., His Majesty’s principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Right Hon. Alfred Duff Cooper, His Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris;

“The President of the French Republic:

“For the French Republic, His Excellency, M. Georges Bidault, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and His Excellency, M. René Massigli, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at London, who, having communicated their full powers bound in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

“1. Without prejudice to any arrangements that may be made under any treaty concluded between all the powers having responsibility for action in relation to Germany under Article 107 of the Charter of the United Nations, for the purpose of preventing any infringement by Germany of her obligations with regard to disarmament and demilitarization and generally of insuring that Germany shall not again become a menace to peace,

“The high contracting parties will, in the event of any threat to the security of either of them arising from the adoption by Germany of a policy of aggression, or from action by Germany designed to facilitate such a policy, take, after consulting with each other and where appropriate with the other Powers having responsibility for actions in relation to Germany, such agreed action which, so long as the said Article 107 remains
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and Russia. The frictions and feuds of 1946 culminated in the Truman Doctrine of March, 1947, and in the "Cominform" of September. In firm resolve to "save civilization" from "Communist intrigue" and "Soviet imperialism," Washington was willing to use for its purposes all the forces of anti-Communism throughout the world. In grim determination to "save civilization" from "American imperialism" and "capitalist exploitation," Moscow was prepared to use as weapons all Communist Parties and their sympathizers in other lands. In France, as in Italy and elsewhere, the consequence was the final shattering of the unity bred of defeat, suffering,

operative, shall be action under that article) as is best calculated to put an end to this threat.

"2. Should either of the high contracting parties become again involved in hostilities with Germany, either in consequence of an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, by Germany against that party, or as a result of agreed action taken against Germany under Article 1 of this Treaty, or as a result of enforcement action taken against Germany by the United Nations Security Council, the other high contracting party will at once give the high contracting party so involved in hostility all the military and other support and assistance in its power.

"3. In the event of either high contracting party being prejudiced by the failure of Germany to fulfill any obligation of an economic character imposed on her as a result of the instrument of surrender, or arising out of any subsequent settlement, the high contracting parties will consult with each other, and where appropriate with the other powers having responsibilities for action in relation to Germany, with a view to taking agreed actions to deal with the situation.

"4. Bearing in mind the interests of the other members of the United Nations, the high contracting parties will, by constant consultation on matters affecting their economic relations with each other, take all possible steps to promote the prosperity and economic security of both countries and thus enable each of them to contribute more effectively to the economic and social objectives of the United Nations.

"5 (a). Nothing in the present Treaty should be interpreted as derogating in any way from the obligation devolving upon the high contracting parties from the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or from any special agreement concluded in virtue of Article 43 of the Charter.

"(b). Neither of the high contracting parties will conclude any alliance or take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party: nor will they enter into any obligation inconsistent with the provisions of the present treaty.

"6 (a). The present Treaty is subject to ratification and the instruments of ratification will be exchanged in London as soon as possible.

"(b). It will come into force immediately on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and will remain in force for a period of fifty years.

"(c). Unless either of the high contracting parties gives to the other notice in writing to terminate it at least one year before the expiration of this period, it will remain in force without any specified time limit, subject to the right of either of the high contracting parties to terminate it by giving to the other in writing a year's notice of his intentions to do so.

"In witness whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed thereto their seals.

"Done in Dunkerque the fourth day of March, 1947, in duplicate in English and in French, both texts being equally authentic."
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belated liberation, and shared desire to work together, despite differences, toward shared goals.

On May 4, 1947, after Communist Ministers and deputies voted against the Government on the issue of the wage demands of workers in the RenaultMotor Plant, Ramadier dismissed the four Communists in the Cabinet. In form, the Communist leaders thus voted themselves out of the Ministry. In fact, compromise would have been possible had Ramadier, Blum, and other Socialist leaders not reversed their position of 1945-46 and decided to assume leadership in governing without, and against, the Communists. The reward came quickly. On May 9, the World Bank made its first loan: $250,-000,000. The penalty developed more slowly in a spreading wave of strikes, directed by the Communist-controlled Confédération Générale du Travail (C.G.T.) and in intensified and costly colonial warfare in Indo-China and Madagascar.

With food prices increased tenfold since 1938 and wages only sixfold, Communist agitators, increasingly bitter over the rejection of all efforts to restore the coalition, had little difficulty in persuading French workers to down their tools unless their meager pay was raised. The first announcement of the Marshall Plan found all French railway workers on strike. The Soviet decision first to abstain from participation in the Plan and then to thwart its realization by all available means gave the French Communists a new incentive to capitalize on the grievances of wage earners. By year’s end all hopes of price fixing, wage freezing, and budget balancing were gone, with the Cabinet having no choice but to beg for further American funds and to recognize that here, as always, who pays the piper may call the tune.

The crisis of the autumn of 1947 was attributed by French conservatives and by almost all American commentators to a Communist effort to pave the way for a revolutionary seizure of power. But the party of Thorez, Duclos, and Casanova had other purposes in mind, some of which have already been suggested and others of which are best discussed in connection with the U.S.S.R. and the world Communist movement. As the strike fever mounted ever higher, Ramadier, already repudiated by the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party, sought to fight Communism by accusing Soviet officials in France of subversive activity and by arresting and deporting the Soviet Repatriation Mission. Moscow at once retaliated. In a sharp exchange of protests and insults during November and December the two allies came close to a rupture. Meanwhile, at the demand of his own party, Ramadier resigned on November 19. Blum’s efforts to form a new Cabinet failed.

On November 23, 1947, former Finance Minister Robert Schuman (M.R.P.), formed a Rightist Cabinet of Popular Republicans, Socialists,
and Radicals. Two days later, another general railway strike began. By the end of the month over 2,000,000 French workers were out. Schuman asked the Assembly for emergency powers to punish strike agitators, to increase penalties for sabotage, and to use troops against labor disorders. Early in December, despite a Communist filibuster, the Assembly granted his request—as John Foster Dulles, Marshall's aide in London, came to Paris to confer with all anti-Communist political leaders and to congratulate them on “the magnificent effort which the French people are making to resist foreign penetration.” In the face of a Government ultimatum, the C.G.T. called off the strikes on December 9, not without winning concessions. The C.G.T. was subsequently split by a secession of anti-Communist elements. The Fourth Republic was thus saved from the Communist menace, at least for the moment. But that its future rulers would be Republicans seemed increasingly doubtful early in 1948.

De Gaulle and the New Anti-Comintern. Aside from the reduction of the Communists, still the largest party in the Assembly, to a role of implacable opposition, the most significant result of the fateful decisions of 1947 was the rebirth of the French Right and the rise and spread of neo-Fascism in reactionary and clerical circles, representing property, privilege, and piety. Followers sprang from the now desperate quest of the frightened bourgeoisie and of part of the peasantry for a savior and a new myth of salvation, promising “law and order,” the breaking of the power of the unions, and the suppression of social unrest. In June, 1947, the Ministry of the Interior announced the arrest of a number of officers, industrialists, and priests who, as monarchists, Cagoulards, Vichymen, and organizers of the secret “Black Maquis,” were said to be plotting a coup d’etat. It was to have been featured by a “march on Paris,” following distribution of a forged manifesto proclaiming a “Communist revolution”—from which the conspirators would “save” the country by overthrowing the Republic and setting up a military Fascist dictatorship.

More important was the decision of De Gaulle, immediately after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, to resume his political speeches, now devoted to denouncing the Constitution, condemning Communism, asserting his identity of aims with those of Truman, and preaching solidarity with the U.S.A. against Moscow. On April 8, 1947, the “Rassemblement du Peuple Français” (R.P.F.) was founded in Strasbourg. Among its leaders were former Leftists Jacques Soustelle, André Malraux, Jacques Baumel. But it had only one Leader. The R.P.F., like earlier movements across the Alps and the Rhine, was not a program, but a Man, symbolizing ultrapatriotism, anti-Communism, order, hierarchy, discipline. In October, 1947, the R.P.F. put up candidates in municipal elections throughout France. The result was
a landslide. De Gaulle’s supporters won 6,000,000 votes, or c. 40% of the total, thus becoming at one blow the largest party in the country, with the Communists in second place. The M.R.P. was shattered, emerging as a poor fourth.

De Gaulle called on the Government to resign and order new Parliamentary elections, but he bided his time, pending the descent of his unhappy land into an ever deeper morass of inflation and bankruptcy. That Vichyite collaborators, no less ardent in their anti-Communism than De Gaulle, should still be tried and executed was now a paradox. Fernand de Brinon declared on April 15, as he stepped before the firing squad: “It will soon be recognized that I was a good traitor.” De Gaulle called for the suppression of the Communist Party and for an Anglo-French-American alliance against the Soviet Union. Such sentiments were not distasteful to Jefferson Caffery, or to John Foster Dulles, who visited the General in December, nor to most members of the American Congress, which voted emergency funds to France before Christmas, pending consideration of long-term Marshall grants in 1948.

Under these circumstances liberated France approached the mid-century in a domestic mood and an international atmosphere which offered feeble hope for a stable democracy, a creative socialism, a prosperous economy, or a place of dignity and safety in Europe and the world. By virtue of its desperate need and the decisions of its worried leaders, the Republic was all but compelled to follow a course of foreign policy determined not in Paris but in Washington. By virtue of the impact of that course upon French political trends at home, the Republic was all but certain to fall into the power of its enemies on the Right in the name of escaping its enemies on the Left. As the specter of civil war raised its ugly head, men made calculations of power. America would support the Right, possibly by arms, as in Greece, Turkey, and China. Russia would support the Left, but doubtless not with arms since this would mean World War III. France in 1948-49 might conceivably become what Spain had been in 1938-39. If Soviet troops made no move, the Right would win, whether the contest were waged by ballots or bullets. If Moscow marched, its divisions would overrun France and set up a Communist regime, regardless of what America might do. Thereafter would come another “liberation,” perhaps with atomic bombs . . . ?

With such dismal thoughts as these, the people of France looked forward fearfully to a future in which nothing was certain—save that France was no longer a Power and that its destinies depended almost entirely on whether the Super-Powers were to make peace or wage war. Just as there was no effective “third force” in France itself to stand staunchly between De Gaull-
ism and Communism, so there was little prospect of France alone, or all of western Europe together, becoming a strong citadel of democratic socialism whose defenders could act independently and thereby preserve a balance and keep the peace between Atlantica and Muscovy. The fortunes of those who wistfully sang La Marseillaise were no longer in the hands of Frenchmen. With what wisdom, insight, and justice or with what folly, blindness, and violence others would wield the power that had passed to them, none could foresee.

Suggested readings

Blum, Léon: For All Mankind, New York, Viking, 1946.
Chambrun, René de: I Saw France Fall, New York, Morrow, 1940.
Cot, Pierre: Triumph of Treason, Chicago, Ziff-Davis, 1944.
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Romains, Jules: *Seven Mysteries of Europe*, New York, Knopf, 1940.
CHAPTER XI

THE POWERS OF TOMORROW

1. U.S.A.: THE ATLANTIC SPHERE

It is very difficult to ascertain, at present, what degree of sagacity the American democracy will display in the conduct of the foreign policy of the country; and upon this point its adversaries, as well as its advocates, must suspend their judgment.—Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1839.

That the United States of America is in final distillation and essence still run by the propertied class in the broadest sense of that term is, it seems, the biggest single factor making for national unity. Also the fact that this class has failed in many of its duties, responsibilities, and obligations is the greatest single impediment to unity and the chief force making for discontent.—John Gunther, Inside U.S.A., pp. 913-914.

It would be inconceivable—it would, indeed, be sacrilegious—if this nation and the world did not attain some real, lasting good out of all these efforts and suffering and bloodshed and death. . . . The men in our armed forces want a lasting peace.—Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 7, 1943.

The Meaning of America. In the mid-20th century the most populous member of the World State System was China. The most extensive, in contiguous territory, was the Soviet Union. The largest in overseas lands and peoples was the British Commonwealth. But the biggest, best, richest, most productive, most powerful, most gigantic, stupendous, titanic, and supercolossal was, beyond all question, the United States of North America.

The nature, purposes, and destiny of the great American Republic might be supposed to be obvious to the average reader of these pages, since he or she will, almost certainly, be a citizen and resident of the nation between the Lakes and the Gulf, extending from the rock-bound coast of Maine to the sunny shores of California. But few peoples know themselves as well as they know, or imagine they know, others. Americans, moreover, are for the most part descendants of Europeans, who came eagerly to the New World in quest of freedom and fortune, and of Africans, who were brought as chattel slaves to the land of liberty, where human servitude persisted longer
than anywhere else in the North Atlantic communities. America grew from a rude frontier society of pioneers into the most mechanized and magnificent urban civilization of all times. The period of its maximum growth, however, coincided with the autumn time of Western culture, marked by a decline of creativity in religion and the arts and by a vast efflorescence of science, technology, plutocracy, suburbanism, colonial empires, democracy, world wars, Caesarism, and all the other phenomena of a late expansiveness in the purely material aspects of living.

The ultimate import of America to its own people and to the world can be defined only by those who are naively dogmatic or innocently ignorant. For America is in its essence protean, flexible, and all things to all men. This judgment has been validated anew by tortured efforts to devise "loyalty tests" and to formulate an orthodox definition of "Americanism." Among sensitive observers, aware of their lack of omniscience, America has long been and will long remain a pluralistic land of paradoxes. For here, cheek by jowl, are revolutionary radicalism and reactionary conservatism; political democracy and economic oligarchy; a melting pot of nations and a cesspool of racial hatred; a fortress of freedom and an arena of witch burning; a dream of liberty and a stronghold of privilege. In the U.S.A. have flourished, successively and often simultaneously, universal education and mass illiteracy; tiled bathrooms and tar-paper shacks; wholesale immigration and deportation delirium; charitable foundations and the "robber barons"; Christian tolerance and the "Christian Front"; Walt Whitman and Edgar Guest; the I.W.W. and Rotary International; Thomas Paine and Calvin Coolidge; New Harmony and the New York Stock Exchange; trust makers and trust busters; Eugene Debs and Joseph Pew; fervent pacifism and 100% Americanism; Andrew Volstead and John Barleycorn; soap operas and new symphonies; Justice Holmes and Martin Dies; burlesque shows and clerical puritanism; Jack London and Adolphe Menjou; fantastic greed and incredible generosity; Paul Bunyan and George F. Babbitt; lynching mobs and community chests; etc., ad infinitum.

To resolve or explain this bewildering and ever-shifting kaleidoscope is, happily, no part of the present task. It is enough to emphasize that America, seldom defined by Americans save in the slogans of hucksters, is still indefinable. Its world mission, belatedly perceived, may yet bring to its people, and to all their neighbors over the earth, infinite weal or endless woe. American politics, flowing from English models, French inspiration, and native experience, has ever been an exalted epic of debate among free men in search of truth and a petty comedy of provincial prejudice and greedy self-seeking. Foreign critics are wholly right in asserting that Americans worship at the altar of Mammon and are devotees of games of chance,
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unearned income, pecuniary emulation, and conspicuous waste. Foreign admirers are equally right in affirming that Americans cherish liberty and justice above all other values. Each American is pulled asunder by the conflicting motives of his multivalent culture. All Americans together work out, by trial and error and compromise, courses of common action, sometimes feckless, sometimes hopeful. As judged by the timeless standards of the Jewish-Greek-Christian tradition, which America, along with all the West, has inherited from a remote past, the American dream is at times a nightmare of ignorant avarice and at others a vision beyond the stars, summoning all mankind to climb a stairway into heaven.

Foreign policy, like all policy, is a mirror of these competing purposes and pressures, conditioned by the fixed facts of geography and the fluid facts of power relationships in an unstable State System. The definition of American national purposes in dealing with other sovereignties has, through half a dozen generations, reflected the interests and cherished symbols of successive elite groups: the wealthy and the wellborn, the slavocracy, the merchant princes, the factory owners, the bankers, the industrial monopolists, the stockbrokers, the brain trusters, and the brass hats. It has also reflected the aspirations, usually more vaguely defined, of sub-elite groups challenging the current elite: pioneers and artisans, frontiersmen and farmers, workers and consumers, small businessmen and sharecroppers, "economic royalists," and seekers after peace. Only the results can be noted here, not the baffling processes of democracy by which they were reached.

Those results, viewed in retrospect, reveal a loom of popular preferences and public policies in coping with the outer world over which experience has woven a pattern of "principles," slowly embroidered into almost sacred symbols. Three became major guides to future action: (1) Americans should do business with Europeans but should abstain from involvement in European power politics. (2) Europeans should do business with Americans but should abstain from power politics in the Americas. (3) Americans and Europeans alike should do business with Asiatics but should jointly abstain from power politics in Asia. The first injunction received classic expression in Washington's Farewell Address and Jefferson's Inaugural, the second in the Monroe Doctrine, and the third in the Open Door policy. All three served American interests well in the 19th century. All three failed of their purposes in the 20th, since the world changed more rapidly than did American formulas for dealing with it. In consequence, America was pushed or dragged into extensive interventions, by diplomacy and by arms, in Europe, Africa, and Asia, and compelled, willy-nilly, by considerations of security, prosperity, and self-interest and by the sheer fact of its own overwhelming power, to assume a role of "world leadership." At the time of writing, the
final character, if any, of that role was still unclear, for it had already undergone several major metamorphoses in less than three decades.

Isolationism and Realpolitik. All people possess some capacity to learn from experience. But when lessons once learned are embalmed in magic phrases which stir emotions deeply and thereby inhibit rational adjustment to new problems, then the products of experience are obstacles rather than aids to new learning. They render more difficult the task of facing emergencies and achieving that progressive adaptation to environmental change which is the prerequisite of survival for all living things. Still more is this the case when the magic phrases are not only irrelevant today and dangerous tomorrow but false as descriptions of yesterday.

In terms of techniques of communication, transportation, travel, and war, the entire planet on which Americans somewhat reluctantly found themselves in 1940 was a far smaller place than the 13 states of the Union in 1790. It is simple to say that America’s dilemma of the 1930’s was the result of the persistence of attitudes toward the world which were relevant and adequate 100 years and more before but had ceased to be safe guides to action (or inaction) after the revolutionary transformation of the world society effected by science and technology. In terms of Realpolitik, however, “isolationism,” with its corollary of security through nonintervention and nonentanglement, was never a reality. America was settled by Europeans and was continuously a part of the European State System since the days of Columbus. The U.S.A. won its independence only because the rebels of 1776 made a military alliance with France (February 6, 1778) and because Spain and Holland also entered the fray. The Latin-American Republics likewise won their independence in consequence of a European war. They preserved their freedom less because of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 forbidding further European colonization, intervention, or interposition in the Western Hemisphere than because Britain, for commercial reasons, favored independence and opposed attempts by Continental Powers to reassert their sovereignty over the New World. After 1815, following the failure of the American attempt to conquer Canada, there was uninterrupted peace between the U.S.A. and the U.K.—and a tacit agreement to abandon all efforts to play the game of power against one another.

For a century thereafter all Americans, North and South, were the beneficiaries of a world balance of power which was unique and temporary but was confused in most American minds (when they were aware of it at all) with the unchanging pattern of the cosmos. The elements of that balance were three: (1) the preponderance of British naval might in the Atlantic and in most other seas; (2) the maintenance of a stable equilibrium on the European Continent by which no one Power could successfully threaten
the others with subjugation or seriously endanger the British Empire; and (3) the inability of all Continental or Asiatic Powers, singly or in combination, to challenge the U.S.A. or menace Latin America. The first element involved no danger to the Americas; for British "capitalism" and "imperialism," far from harboring territorial designs in the Western Hemisphere or cherishing any desire to compete for power, were inspired by solicitude for Anglo-American collaboration on the basis of a common interest in preserving the world balance and keeping open the world channels of trade and investment. British sea power was therefore a shield between America and Europe rather than a sword pointed toward the New World. The second element in the balance was in part a product of a long-standing British policy of preventing the domination of the Continent by any one Power. The third element was a direct result of the first and second.

So long as Britain stood firm, Americans were safe in "splendid isolation." They could therefore engage safely in the periodic recreation of "twisting the lion's tail." and they could fancy that their security and prosperity were products not of the world balance but of their own wisdom in "minding their own business" and avoiding "foreign entanglements." They could imagine that the Monroe Doctrine kept Latin America free from the impact of European and Asiatic imperialisms. They could define American interests abroad in negative terms of neutrality and abstention from power politics and in positive terms of promoting commerce by championing neutral trading rights, freedom of the seas, most-favored-nation treatment, and the Open Door in the Orient. The underlying facts of power relationships which made these policies practicable were seldom perceived and little appreciated. The verbiage employed was harmless so long as the facts remained unchanged. It was potentially disastrous should the facts be altered and should Americans suppose that their safety was a result of the verbiage rather than of the facts.

1917 and After. The first serious Continental challenge to Britain since Napoleon put the issue to its first major test. The outbreak of hostilities between the two European coalitions in 1914 caused the U.S.A. to proclaim its neutrality, as it had done in 1793 and in all subsequent European wars. An immensely profitable trade in munitions at once developed with the Allies. The effective Allied blockade of Germany prevented this trade from going to both sets of belligerents. But the continuation of this commerce was threatened by the efforts of the warring Governments to injure one another economically by cutting off trade between the enemy and the outside world. America, in defending the liberty of its traders to do business of this kind, reverted to the principles of neutral rights and freedom of the seas, which it had evolved under comparable circumstances between
1793 and 1812. It protested the British contraband list, the British blockade, and the British interpretation of the doctrine of continuous voyage. It likewise protested the German submarine blockade of the Allies and was soon involved in acrimonious controversy with both sides.

In the sequel, Washington leaned more and more toward the Allies, and this not for humanitarian or sentimental reasons expressed in war slogans, but for very tangible considerations connected with business and power politics. American capitalists made huge loans to the Allied Governments. American exporters sold, at great profit, huge quantities of goods to the borrowers. Allied defeat would mean Allied bankruptcy. American business had little to lose and everything to gain from Allied victory. A victory of the Central Powers would not only imperil these economic interests but would completely upset the balance of power and give Germany such a position of overwhelming preponderance on the Continent and throughout the world that even American security might eventually be endangered. Circumstances permitted these economic and political interests to be presented on a high moral plane. Germany was an "autocracy," and the Allies and the United States were "democracies." The Allied cruiser blockade of Germany menaced American property and American legal rights, but the U-boat blockade of the Allies endangered American lives as well. Germany was ruthless, lawless, uncivilized. The Allies were considerate, law-abiding, and virtuous. When Germany announced the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, on February 1, 1917, President Wilson severed diplomatic relations. On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany. Other American States were induced to follow suit. The U.S.A. became an "Associate" of the Allies, not an "Ally." A large Army was conscripted, trained, and sent to France. A strengthened American Navy joined the Allied squadrons. Billions of dollars were raised and loaned to the Allied Governments. America's immense economic power more than overbalanced the defection of Russia, and its support was sufficient to turn the scales. Neutrality had failed to protect American interests. Isolation was abandoned in favor of active participation in the European contest. Victory came in 1918. America shared in the glory thereof.

The disillusioning aftermath produced a violent popular reversion to extreme isolationism. Wilson went to the Paris Peace Conference, participated actively in the making of the Treaty, took the initiative in the creation of the League of Nations, and committed his country to cooperation with other Powers in preserving peace and dealing with postwar problems. On his return home he found himself a prophet without honor in his own country. The Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the Senate, with the Covenant of the League as the chief target of attack. Wilson and all his works were
repudiated by Congress and the electorate. He retired from public life a defeated and broken man. The narrow partisanship of some Republicans and the personal animosity of Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr. (who had urged American membership in a league of nations in 1916) were primarily responsible for his defeat, along with his own obstinacy and the doubtful wisdom of the founding fathers in requiring approval of treaties by two-thirds of the Senate. On March 19, 1920, the final vote on the ratifying resolution was taken. It showed 49 Senators for and 35 against. The Covenant thus fell short by 7 votes of securing the necessary two-thirds.

In the election of 1920 the Democratic candidate, James Cox, was overwhelmed by the Republicans under Warren Gamaliel Harding, and the way was prepared for 12 continuous years of Republican rule. In foreign policy, Republican rule meant isolationism with a vengeance. A separate peace was made with Germany on August 25, 1921. The League was first ignored, then recognized as a stubbornly irreducible fact, and later used, through its Conferences and Commissions, as an agency of cooperation—timidly at the outset and later with more confidence. American entrance into the World Court was pledged, but the pledge remained unfulfilled. The ill-fated intervention in Russia of 1918-20 was abandoned, but diplomatic recognition was sternly refused to the Soviet Government, even after all the other Great Powers had recognized it. High moral and legal principles were found to justify this attitude, but at bottom it reflected the deep hostility of the business-men’s government of the most capitalistic of modern States toward proletarian Communism. Immigration was cut off, and almost insurmountable tariff walls were erected, for isolationism and economic nationalism were opposite sides of the same coin. The Allies were required to sign on the dotted line for the repayment of their war debts. American dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean was continued in the best tradition, but Latin-American sensibilities (which had a relationship to profitable trade) were soothed with assurances that neither Washington nor Wall Street had imperialistic designs and that the Monroe Doctrine was not what it seemed to be. The Open Door policy in Asia was reiterated. In short, the exclusive pursuit of American national interests was again couched in terms of long-established principles and policies.

During the 1920’s the United States, as the most powerful of the Great Powers, helped to make impossible the establishment of a viable world order to supersede the politics of power. Its nonmembership in the League was not in fact, whatever it seemed to be in form, a merely negative policy. America had fought four wars in defense of the right of its citizens to trade with belligerents. Should the League Powers commit themselves to an economic boycott of an aggressor, they would face the alternatives of seeing the
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boycott broken by American ships and goods or of provoking sharp controversy with Washington by challenging the right of Americans to trade with a lawbreaker. Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes and British Ambassador Sir Esme Howard discussed the issue in January, 1925, in connection with the implications of the Covenant, the Geneva Protocol, and the Locarno Treaties. Hughes declared "that there was one thing he believed could be depended upon, and that was that this Government from its very beginning had been insistent upon the rights of neutrals and would continue to maintain them. The Secretary did not believe any Administration, short of a treaty concluded and ratified, could commit the country against assertion of its neutral rights in case there should be occasion to demand their recognition." 1 Under these conditions, it was easy for Anglo-French isolationists to repudiate, and later to betray, collective security on the ground that sanctions against aggressors would mean conflict with America. 2

Despite this obstructionism, the Republican Administration made various gestures in the direction of peace, disarmament, and international cooperation. In 1921 at the Washington Conference, it secured naval parity with Britain in capital ships, in return for a general reduction of naval armaments. It likewise secured a new recognition of the Open Door principle and Japanese withdrawal from Shantung and Siberia, in return for the abandonment of its bid for naval supremacy in the Pacific. In 1927, it sought to promote further naval disarmament in the abortive Coolidge Conference at Geneva. In 1928, it sponsored the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the outlawry of war. In 1930, it participated in the Five Power Naval Conference in London, where it acquired complete naval parity with Britain but no substantial reduction of naval armaments, because of Anglo-American differences regarding cruisers and Franco-Italian naval rivalry in the Mediterranean. In 1931, it cooperated with the Council of the League in the Manchurian crisis, though without tangible results. In 1932 the Hoover moratorium proposal for a one-year suspension of all reparation and debt payments was presented as a generous move toward world economic and financial rehabilitation. The U.S.A. likewise participated in the General Disarmament Conference of the League and eloquently urged armament reduction, without being willing to commit itself to consultation or coopera-

1 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925 (2 vols.), U.S. Department of State, December, 1940.

2 It was this situation which caused Nicholas Murray Butler to write in 1927 in The Path to Peace, "Unhappily, the policies as to international affairs—or perhaps the lack of policies—that have been pursued by our Government since the armistice, have made this nation of ours a dangerous derelict adrift on the high seas of international intercourse, and lying straight across the path of every ship that sails laden with the precious cargo of international friendship and concord."
tion with other Powers in the interests of peace. By all of these moves, national interests, moral principles, and humanitarian ideals were simultaneously served. And if none was served wisely or well in the long run, the cause lay in the refusal of Congress and the country either to implement patriotic power interests with Machiavellian diplomacy or to implement idealistic aspirations with concrete political arrangements contrary to past tradition.

The New Deal. The diplomatic problems of the first Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt necessarily centered in the tasks of restoring commerce in a world sorely afflicted with economic maladjustments and of promoting peace in a world drifting toward war. As a satiated Power, America championed peace—and was willing to make minor sacrifices for its preservation within the limits of the isolationist tradition. As a commercial Power and a creditor nation, America championed a restoration of international trade—within the limits of tariff protectionism. In both cases the gap between hope and achievement was due in part to conditions abroad over which Washington had no control and in part to attitudes and vested interests at home which made impossible a larger degree of cooperation with other States.

In the quest for prosperity, the abandonment of the gold standard and the subsequent depreciation of the dollar by 41% stimulated exports and discouraged imports from countries still on gold. Efforts to secure an international reduction of trade barriers at the London Economic Conference of June and July, 1933, failed because other Powers were unwilling to reduce tariffs without a guarantee against further depreciation of the dollar, while Washington was unwilling to accept any agreement for currency stabilization. The abandonment of gold by France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in September, 1936, was accompanied by provisional Anglo-French-American cooperation to prevent wide currency fluctuations, but no permanent stabilization was achieved. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, under authority of the Tariff Act of 1934, meanwhile negotiated a series of reciprocity agreements for mutual reduction of duties with the benefits extended to all States not discriminating against American goods and having unconditional most-favored-nation clauses in their treaties with the United States. International trade recovered gradually from the low point of 1932. Total American foreign trade declined from $9,640,000,000 in 1929 to $2,935,000,000 in 1932 and then increased to $4,280,000,000 in 1935 and to approximately $5,000,000,000 in 1936.

The quest for peace was more difficult. Logic posed three alternatives. The U.S.A. could protect its interests abroad in an insecure world by overwhelming armaments; it could abandon these interests or refuse them pro-
tection and retire into economic as well as political isolationism; or it could cooperate with other Powers interested in maintaining peace, either through alliances against potential aggressors or through participation in international organization and collective security. Unilateral protection of interests by force meant an arms race and eventually war. Complete abandonment of interests abroad was economically and politically impossible. Cooperation with other Powers was rendered difficult by the isolationist tradition and by the inability of other Powers to cooperate among themselves. Circumstances therefore dictated a policy of illogical compromise among the three possible courses.

Cooperation for peace was promoted by continued advocacy of general disarmament and occasional lip service to the Kellogg Pact and the Stimson Doctrine, all without tangible results. The U.S.A. became a member of the ILO in 1934, but Administration efforts to achieve membership in the World Court were defeated by the isolationists. Membership in the ILO was achieved by a Joint Congressional Resolution of June 19, 1934, authorizing the President to accept membership provided that no obligations were assumed under the League Covenant. Since no formal treaty was necessary, it was impossible for one-third of the Senators to obstruct action. For 12 years, every President, every Secretary of State, and a large majority in both Houses of Congress favored American membership in the Permanent Court of International Justice. But the isolationist Senators, loudly applauded by the Hearst press, the Chicago Tribune, Father Coughlin, and sundry superpatriots, attached five reservations to the Protocols in January, 1926. The last of these forbade the Court to "entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest." Since this proviso, if interpreted broadly, would have given the U.S.A. a special veto enjoyed by none of the members of the League Council, whence requests for advisory opinions came, efforts were made by Elihu Root and others to secure agreement on an interpretation which would give America only a position of equality. The "Root formula" of 1929 solved the problem. The isolationists, however, had no desire to see it solved. On January 29, 1935, the final Senate vote showed 52 in favor of ratification and 36 opposed. The Protocols failed to secure the required two-thirds by a margin of 7 votes. Father Coughlin declared, "Our thanks are due to Almighty God that America retains her sovereignty. Congratulations to the aroused people of the United States who, by more than two hundred thousand telegrams containing at least one million names, demanded that the principles established by Washington and Jefferson shall keep us clear from foreign entanglements and European hatreds."
Despite this victory for the forces of obfuscation, the Administration found it possible to take certain limited steps toward joint action with other Powers. An obstacle to cooperation was removed by belated recognition of the U.S.S.R. On November 16, 1933, Litvinov and Roosevelt exchanged notes at Washington by which recognition was accorded. The two Governments agreed to refrain from hostile propaganda. The religious and civil rights of Americans in the U.S.S.R. were elaborately safeguarded. Moscow waived all counterclaims arising out of American military activities in Siberia. Other claims were left for subsequent settlement. It was understood that American claims against the Soviet 8 would be met by increased interest payments on credits extended by the U.S.A. to finance increased trade. William C. Bullitt became the first American Ambassador to Moscow. Alexander Troyanovsky came to Washington. In January, 1935, however, the claims negotiations which were expected to eventuate in a commercial treaty collapsed, owing to Moscow’s refusal to meet claims except through repayments on a long-term loan and Washington’s refusal to grant a loan on terms satisfactory to the U.S.S.R. But on July 13, 1935, Litvinov and Bullitt signed a one-year trade agreement which stipulated that Moscow would spend $30,000,000 for American goods. On August 25, 1935, and again on August 31, the U.S.A. protested emphatically that the Comintern Congress in Moscow was a violation of the propaganda pledge. The Narkomindel replied that it was not responsible for the activities of the Comintern. Despite this controversy, the trade agreement was renewed from year to year, with questions of loans, claims, and propaganda left in abeyance.

Widespread sentiment in favor of withdrawing diplomatic and military protection from American private interests abroad found expression in the “Good Neighbor” policy and in the neutrality legislation. Americans were in effect told that their trade and investments in Latin America would not be protected by interventionist activities. They were forbidden to make loans or to sell arms to countries at war. But the enormous economic interests of Americans in the Latin-American Republics to the south made the first policy a gesture rather than a reality, although imperialism was renounced and protectorates over Cuba, Haiti, and other States were relinquished. The difficulties in the way of severing all economic ties with belligerents were found to be insuperable. Americans were left free to carry on trade in nonmilitary goods with States at war. The development of new economic ties with belligerents was thus not prevented. Curiously enough, no steps were taken toward withdrawal of protection of American economic

8 In November, 1933, the private claims for confiscated property and defaulted obligations were estimated at $623,000,000. In addition, Russia owed the United States $192,000,000 in war loans, with accumulated interest at 4½% since 1917.
interests in the Far East, where trade and investments were negligible as compared with Europe and Latin America. In practice, this meant continued insistence on the Open Door in China and therefore friction with Japan.

The failure of disarmament led to intensified preparations for defense and promised to precipitate a naval race in the Pacific. The Vinson Act of March 27, 1934, contemplated building the American Navy up to full Treaty strength. The naval appropriation for 1936 was over $500,000,000 and constituted the largest peacetime appropriation to date in the history of the Republic. The Army and the Air Force were likewise enlarged. Total expenditures in preparation for war were approaching $1,000,000,000 annually by 1937. The Anglo-French-American Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936, provided for qualitative limitation but not for reductions or even quantitative limitation of fleets. On December 31, 1936, the Washington and London Naval Treaties expired. No new agreement could be reached because of American unwillingness to grant Japanese demands for parity. In the naval race which ensued, it was clear that America could easily outbuild Japan. American possessions west of Hawaii, however, remained within the sphere of effective action of the Japanese fleet, and any effort to render them defensible would also make them available for American offensive operations in Japanese waters. There was danger that Japan might seek to meet this "threat" by sudden attack before being hopelessly outbuilt. In the absence of any new American-Japanese understanding, the danger of war lay less in prospects of involvement in a European conflict than in an armed clash with Japan. The Japanese-German-Italian entente necessarily made impossible any separation of the problems of Japanese-American relations from those of European politics.

In Quest of Continental Solidarity. The position of the U.S.A. in the Western Hemisphere gave promise of developing to a point at which all the American Republics might evolve common policies toward Europe and Asia. Latin-American resentment against the "Colossus of the North" was mitigated by the new orientation at Washington. Latin America's disposition to seek a counterweight to the U.S.A. by giving vigorous support to the League of Nations was weakened not only by the failure of League efforts to end the Chaco War but by the costly futility of sanctions against Italy and by the manifest unwillingness of other League members to create a system of collective security capable of preventing aggression. Brazil had withdrawn from Geneva in 1926, and Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua did likewise in 1936. Argentina's Foreign Minister, Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas, presided over the 1936 Assembly but was disappointed that no effective steps were taken toward League reform. The Latin States responded favorably to President Roosevelt's invitation of January 30, 1936, to meet
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in an Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. The Conference program was approved by the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union on July 22. The delegates assembled in Buenos Aires on December 1, 1936, the American President and Secretary of State both addressing the Conference in person. Inter-American peace machinery was clarified and further developed. A joint neutrality policy, based on the Argentine Anti-War Pact and the legislation of the U.S.A., began to take shape. Commercial and cultural relations were strengthened. With Asia and Europe slipping toward the morass of war, Pan-Americanism breathed a new breath of life and offered new hope of pacific cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.

These aspirations were realized only in part. Friction developed between Washington and Mexico over expropriation of foreign-owned oil properties in 1938, although the U.S.A. scrupulously refrained from any threats of intervention. Franco’s victories in Spain evoked sympathetic echoes among the propertied classes of the Latin-American Republics. The establishment of a “totalitarian” dictatorship in Brazil by President Getulio Vargas in 1937 was not reassuring. Nazi and Fascist agents sowed the seeds of anti-Semitism, anti-Communism, and Yankee-phobia. The Eighth International Conference of American States met in Lima, Peru, in December, 1938. The U.S.A. sent a dozen delegates, including Secretary of State Hull and Alfred M. Landon, Republican Presidential candidate in 1936. Hull declared that “an ominous shadow falls athwart our own continent” and pleaded for common measures to resist either military or ideological invasion. Foreign Minister Cantilo of Argentina, which had a large Italian population and was dependent upon European markets, opposed any binding commitments or formal treaty. Since unanimity was deemed essential, Washington compromised. The “Declaration of Lima” affirmed “continental solidarity” and “collaboration” but provided only for “consultation” among the Foreign Ministers, meeting “when deemed desirable and at the initiative of any one of them” whenever the peace, security, or territorial integrity of an American Republic should be threatened. They would use “the measures which in each case the circumstances may make advisable. It is understood that the Governments of the American Republics will act independently in their individual capacity, recognizing fully their juridical equality as sovereign States.”

Despite suggestions from Washington, no action was taken in the direction of consolidating and simplifying the confusing array of inter-American peace treaties, such as the Gondra Conciliation Treaty of 1923, the Kellogg Pact, the Pan-American Conciliation and Arbitration Treaties of 1929, the Argentine Anti-War Pact of 1933, the Convention of Montevideo of 1933, and the Buenos Aires Conventions of 1936. Questions of defining aggression...
and organizing sanctions were also sidetracked. The Stimson Doctrine was reaffirmed, but all hopes of a Pan-American league or court went glimmering. Sundry innocuous resolutions were passed, but the record of positive achievement toward a genuine solidarity of interests and of deeds, rather than of words, was not impressive.

Following the outbreak of war abroad the Foreign Ministers met for the first time at Panama in late September, 1939. Sumner Welles asserted that the 21 American Republics could not permit “their security, their nationals, or their legitimate commercial rights and interests to be jeopardized by belligerent activities in close proximity to the shores of the New World.” He proposed the establishment of a “safety zone.” On October 3 a Final Act was approved, embodying 16 declarations and resolutions. Most of them were clichés (e.g., “maintenance of international activities in accordance with Christian morality”) or routine pledges of collaboration. But the “Declaration of Panama” set up a “neutrality zone.” The ignominious failure of this fantastic and quite illegal experiment has been reviewed above.

The “Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics” met in Havana, Cuba, July 21-30, 1940, on the initiative of Washington. In the face of the conquest of the northlands, the Low Countries, and France, accompanied by an alarming increase of Nazi activities in Latin America, the delegates were moved to consider countermeasures. On June 17, Hull had informed Berlin and Rome that “the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of the Western hemisphere from one non-American Power to another non-American Power.” Congress had passed a “hands off” resolution, reaffirming the Monroe Doctrine and contemplating immediate consultation with the other American Republics on measures to protect common interests. Washington bespoke economic collaboration and urged common action to thwart all activity arising from non-American sources likely to imperil American economic or political freedom.

The Havana Conference approved a Convention and a Supplementary Act “continentalizing” the Monroe Doctrine and declaring that “when islands or regions in the Americas now under the possession of non-American nations are in danger of becoming the subject of barter of territory or change of sovereignty, the American nations . . . may set up a regime of provisional administration,” pending eventual independence (“provided they are capable of self-government”) or restitution to their previous status, “whichever of these alternatives shall appear the more practicable and just.” The Convention of July 29, moreover, authorized any one of the Republics

4 See p. 155.
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to act individually or jointly with others in an urgent emergency in order to safeguard its own defense and that of the continent. Somewhat sketchy resolutions were passed for further economic and financial collaboration. The widely publicized project for an intercontinental marketing cartel was dropped in favor of credits from the Export-Import Bank for industrialization, agrarian diversification, and holding or marketing of Latin-American surpluses.

Latin-American attitudes toward North Americans and Europeans are products of a century of experience. “Yanquis” and Britishers in the southlands have usually been traveling salesmen, unsympathetic with Spanish and Indian ways, living apart and eager to go home. Or they have been bankers or executives or technicians who touch native life either too lightly or too harshly to win good will. They have often symbolized foreign exploitation and “Yankee imperialism.” Millions of Germans and Italians lived in Latin America as farmers, workers, businessmen, and members of the professions. They were respected by Latin Americans, for they made themselves useful citizens of the countries where they lived and worked. The native ruling classes, moreover, were insecure in the face of Anglo-American pressures from abroad and social unrest at home from the ranks of the Indian peasantry and proletariat. Despite lip service to democracy, they took kindly and quickly to totalitarian doctrines as conforming to their interests and needs. The preachers of anti-Communism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Yankee-ism, whether they were native Fascists, Axis agents, or local members of the Spanish Fascist Falange, received a ready hearing. What ensued during and after World War II will be considered below in due course.

The New “Neutrality.” In the first years of the Roosevelt era (1933-45), most Americans permitted themselves to be persuaded that they could escape involvement in “other people’s quarrels” by running away, by “minding their own business,” and, if need be, by abandoning business which might “drag them into war.” A few voices were from time to time raised in favor of abandoning “freedom of the seas” and “neutral trading rights” in such fashion as to cooperate with, or at least not impede, other Powers which might impose economic sanctions against States resorting to force in violation of the League Covenant or the Kellogg Pact. But all proposals to discriminate between law enforcers and lawbreakers were shouted down by the champions of “impartiality,” who urged restrictions on trade with all belligerents in the interest of avoiding “entanglements.” That such a program would be based upon a complete misconception of the position and interests of the U.S.A. in the world of the mid-20th century did not prevent it from being eagerly sponsored by millions who wished to believe that war could be escaped by a formula for abandoning rights instead of enforcing
them and for insulating America from dangers rather than organizing the world for peace.

Discussion of these problems was revived by the diplomatic crises of 1935 and by the growing conviction that war abroad had become inevitable. The result was the emergence of a “new” American neutrality policy, largely dictated by isolationists and designed, not to facilitate American cooperation with the League States or with the signatories of the Kellogg Pact in preserving peace and restraining aggression, but to ensure American noninvolvement in war when it should come. The complexities, confusions, and frustrations encountered in the course of this effort revealed the impossibility of achieving isolation in a world in which American trade and investments were scattered over the five continents and the Seven Seas.

The neutrality legislation of 1935-39 was in part an outgrowth of the investigation of the munitions industry by a Committee of seven Senators, headed by Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, pursuant to a Senate resolution of April 12, 1934. The investigators revealed, among other things, that private arms interests had repeatedly defied or circumvented governmental action designed to control the arms traffic, often promoted sales through bribery of officials, employed officials to secure contracts abroad, sold arms to both sides simultaneously in war, armed both factions in civil wars, stimulated armament races, organized lobbies to oppose arms embargoes and to work for larger military and naval appropriations, reached agreements with foreign competitors for the division of markets and profits, and indulged in sundry other practices designed to enrich the “merchants of death.” These revelations stimulated Congressional and public interest in the double problem of the arms trade and neutrality, which were linked together in a somewhat artificial fashion.

The hidden civil war within the Western soul which paralyzed France and Britain during the Great Depression and rendered them ripe for conquest had its counterpart in the North American Republic. Fear of Communism on the part of people of property was no less acute than in the Western European democracies, despite the political insignificance of the noisy American section of the Communist International. Admiration for Fascism was less widespread, doubtless because of the absence of any aristocratic tradition in American society and the greater devotion of all classes to democratic ideals of tolerance. The cleavage between “isolationists” and “interventionists,” however, was deeper than in western Europe—with a significant reversal of roles. Anglo-French isolationists tended to be political conservatives or reactionaries, speaking for blue blood and large bank accounts, whereas proponents of collective security and world order were more frequently liberal or radical spokesmen for workers, peasants, and
small businessmen. In America, on the other hand, “big business” was largely “internationalist” or “interventionist” whereas those who claimed to speak for urban workers, western farmers, and the lower middle class followed a tradition of liberalism or “Progressivism” which was heavily charged with xenophobia, isolationism, and fear of foreign entanglements.

It was generally assumed by Congress, press, and public that the U.S.A. becomes involved in war by virtue of damage to American interests resulting from hostilities among other States. This was the case in 1798, 1812, and 1917 but not in 1846 or 1898. The possibility that the country might become involved directly in war with Japan in consequence of the new arms race received almost no discussion, all attention being concentrated on keeping out of the next European war. It was assumed, second, that Americans become involved in European wars by virtue of the machinations of munition makers, bankers, and exporters bent upon making blood money out of the world’s woes and determined to make their own profits a national interest for which Americans must fight. This thesis, though in part valid, is too simple an explanation of 1917 or 1812. The U.S.A., like other Powers, becomes involved in war when its interests abroad are jeopardized or injured. These interests are economic, financial, political, social, religious, and humanitarian. If they have any common denominator, it is not profits but power. All nations fight for stakes which are valued because they are envisaged as essential components of power and prestige. Such stakes are often economic in character. But the Nye Committee did not succeed in demonstrating that American entanglement in World War I was attributable directly or primarily to J. P. Morgan & Co., the DuPonts, and other corporate interests. It was assumed, in the third place, that the price of peace was the sacrifice of profits and that insurance against war was to be had by the abandonment of trade and investments abroad. It was assumed, finally, that true “neutrality” implied complete impartiality between belligerents, with no distinctions drawn between aggressors and victims of aggression.

These assumptions influenced decisively the new orientation of American policy and, since they were false and unworkable, produced complications scarcely appreciated at the outset. The Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935, hastily formulated in the face of what looked like impending war in Africa and Europe, reflected the beginnings of confusion. The Senate and House resolved “that upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between, or among, two or more foreign States, the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States, or possessions of the United States to any port of such belligerent States, or to any neutral port
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for trans-shipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent country. . . . The President may from time to time, by proclamation, extend such embargo . . . to other States as and when they may become involved in such war." Violators were to be punished by forfeiture of property and by a $10,000 fine and/or five years' imprisonment (Section 1). The Act further established a National Munitions Control Board (N.M.C.B.), consisting of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, and Navy, with which all manufacturers, exporters, and importers of arms were obliged to register their names, goods, and places of business. A $500 fee was required for a five-year registration certificate. All arms exports from the United States were to be licensed by the Board (Section 2). American vessels were forbidden under penalty to carry arms to belligerents (Sections 3 and 4). The President was authorized at his discretion to close American ports to belligerent submarines (Section 5) and to warn American citizens that travel on belligerent vessels was at their own risk (Section 6).

The public registration and licensing of arms exporters gave rise to no immediate problem. There were difficulties, however, as to Section 1. Far from cutting off all trade with belligerents as a means of keeping the U.S.A. at peace, the Act only banned arms exports, narrowly defined. This arms embargo, moreover, was to be applied “impartially” with no distinctions among aggressors, victims of aggression, and sanctionist States that might become involved in hostilities in their efforts to uphold international law through the League. It involved a virtual repudiation of the Kellogg Pact. If all belligerents were to be treated identically regardless of whether they had observed the Pact or violated it, then the Pact and its corollary, the Stimson Doctrine—already quite sufficiently emasculated through lack of implementation—would cease to have any concrete meaning whatever. America seemed once more on the point of disowning its child. In July, 1935, in response to an appeal from Ethiopia, President Roosevelt had declared that “my Government would be loth to believe that either [Italy or Ethiopia] would resort to other than pacific means as a method of dealing with this controversy or would permit any situation to arise which would be inconsistent with the commitments of the Pact.” Thus the Executive was clinging to the Pact, though not prepared to protest in its name against Mussolini’s aggression, while Congress was destroying any practical value it might have by proposing to treat the lawless and the law-abiding alike.

On October 5, 1935, two days after the Italian invasion was launched, the President proclaimed that a state of war existed, that exports of American arms, munitions, and implements of war to both belligerents were illegal, and that Americans would henceforth travel on belligerent ships
only at their own risk. He further warned that all transactions of any character with either belligerent was at the risk of the trader (caveat mercator) and thereby implied, though Congress had not expressly authorized such a step, that the U.S.A. would not defend its right as a neutral to trade with Italy in the event of a League blockade. But no mention was made of the fact that Italy had obviously violated the Pact as well as the Covenant. Since Ethiopia had no ships and carried on little trade with America, it was assumed that the President's warnings would redound only to the disadvantage of Italy. The arms embargo, however, was a benefit to the aggressor. Ethiopia was penalized for having been attacked. A lively war trade with Italy soon sprang up in commodities other than arms. Congress had not banned such trade. The warnings issued during October and November by President Roosevelt, Secretaries Hull, Ickes, and Roper, and other officials had little effect since exporters not trading in arms were not subject to punishment. American exports to Italian Africa jumped from a monthly average of $25,403 in 1934 to $367,789 in October and $583,735 in November, 1935. Crude-oil exports to Italy increased 600% and rose over 1,000% for Italian Africa. Exports to Ethiopia declined. “Moral suasion” failed. Mussolini floated to victory on a sea of oil, much of which came from the United States. American business, as usual, was in the war for profit, and its activities were aiding the aggressor. Congress had obviously failed to build an adequate economic cyclone cellar into which America could flee from foreign hostilities.

Since the Neutrality Act was scheduled to expire on February 29, 1936, Congress began reconsidering it in January. The Administration surrendered to the isolationist forces in Congress on the issue of Executive discretion. On February 18 the Senate, following similar action by the House, adopted a joint resolution signed by President Roosevelt on February 28, 1936, amending the Act of the previous summer and extending it to May 1, 1937. The amendments left the President no opportunity for exercising judgment. “Whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of war between foreign States, he shall proclaim an arms embargo and he “shall” (instead of “may”) extend such embargo to other States later involved in the conflict. The new Act also forbade all long-term loans and credits to belligerents and further specified, “This Act shall not apply to an American Republic or Republics engaged in war against a non-American State or States, provided that the American Republic is not cooperating with a non-American State or States in such war” (Section 1B).
This Act left the situation even more confused than before. The U.S.A. would ban arms, ammunition, implements of war, and loans to all belligerents, but all other trade would go on unimpeded and would presumably create all the old problems again in the event of a general and prolonged conflict abroad. Aggressors, victims of aggression, and sanctionist belligerents would be treated alike. But should a Latin-American State become involved in war with a non-American State, either as an aggressor or as a victim of aggression, Washington would impose its embargo only against the non-American belligerent—unless the Latin-American States were cooperating in a League war in the enforcement of sanctions, in which case it would receive no preferential treatment. The States injured by such a policy might be tempted to undertake reprisals. To old sources of conflict, new ones would be added. Far from ensuring peace the new policy seemed likely to promote war and to throw the economic weight of America into the scales on the side of Covenant-breaking and Pact-breaking aggressors. In December, 1936, at Buenos Aires, Secretary Hull attempted, without success, to commit all the American Republics to a similar policy. “Make the world safe for aggression” might well have been the slogan of the new legislation. This result—which appeared far more likely to drag the United States into war than the traditional American neutrality policy—was the work not of a belligerent Executive but of a peace-seeking Congress, not of internationalists enamored of foreign entanglements but of isolationists who swore by Washington’s Farewell Address.

On January 8, 1937, by special amendment sponsored by the Administration, the existing legislation was amplified to extend the arms and loan embargoes to foreign States afflicted by “civil strife.” The occasion for this move was the effort of some Americans to sell arms to the Spanish Loyalists. The sensitivity of the Administration to the desires of Downing Street and of the Vatican, reinforced by the sensitivity of Congress to isolationist demands for strict “nonintervention,” led to a statutory prohibition on the lending of money or the selling of arms to either side in the Spanish conflict. The Republican regime, whose rights under treaty and customary international law were thereby ignored, was thus deprived of the means of defending itself. The Rebels received all the arms they required from Germany, Italy, and Portugal. When Drew Pearson pointed out a year later that American arms were being sold freely to Germany and that this was a violation of the German-American Peace Treaty of 1921, and therefore of the Neutrality Act, which forbade arms sales contrary to Treaty terms, Hull replied weakly that the sales to the Reich were small and that the Treaty merely forbade Germany to import arms from America without forbidding Americans to export arms to Germany. By May of 1938 even Senator Nye
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was appalled at the consequences of the “new neutrality” for Spain. He proposed that the Spanish embargo be lifted. But the Administration, more anxious than ever to placate Chamberlain and Rome, declined to act. The destruction of Spanish democracy was a direct consequence of “nonintervention” by the European democracies and of a specious “neutrality” on the part of the United States.

Meanwhile the new dispensation had been put into “permanent” form. On May 1, 1937, the President, then fishing in the Gulf of Mexico, signed a new Act passed unanimously in the House and by a vote of 41 to 15 in the Senate, following prolonged debate productive of much heat and little light. As before, Americans were forbidden by an impartial and mandatory embargo to sell arms or make loans to foreign belligerents or to factions in civil strife. Travel on belligerent vessels was banned. The arming of American merchant vessels was prohibited. The American Republics were favored. The N.M.C.B. was continued. Section 2, which expired on May 1, 1939, without renewal, gave the President discretionary authority to place trade with belligerents in commodities other than arms on a “cash-and-carry” basis—i.e., specified goods might be sold only on condition that title passed to the purchaser in advance of shipment and that transport be in foreign vessels. This section was never applied, but it furnished a formula for later use. The Act was not applied to the undeclared war between Japan and China resumed in July, 1937, since its application would obviously injure China more than Japan. In the event of war in Europe, all belligerents would be denied American arms and loans. America would thus (in theory) avoid the “deadly parallel” and the “tragic fallacy” of 1917.

The Failure of Neutrality. Critics of the new course at once pointed out that if the Axis attacked Britain and France the application of the “neutrality” statute would be of incalculable assistance to Hitler and Mussolini. Their heavily armed States would be prevented from securing American arms by the British fleet but would have no need of them in any event. France and Britain might well have desperate need of weapons and money from America but would be prevented from securing either by American legislation. The U.S.A. would thus once more become the economic ally of the aggressors and would contribute to the possible defeat of the Western European Powers, whose survival against the Reich had been deemed a major American interest, well worth fighting for, 20 years previously. The President, in his memorable “quarantine” address in Chicago in October, 1937, warned of some of these dangers but evoked no public enthusiasm for a change of course.

In January, 1939, Roosevelt urged repeal of the arms embargo and resort to methods “short of war” but “stronger than words” to deter aggres-
sion. Legislative progress toward this goal was impeded, however, by loud outcries over the accidental revelation that the President had released to a French purchasing mission certain types of aircraft intended for the Army. Hiram Johnson cried, "Good God, do you not, Gentlemen, think the American people have a right to know if they are going down the road to war?"

Herbert Hoover in Chicago on February 1 denounced the President for "his proposal that we make effective protests at acts of aggression against sister nations. . . . The distinction between legitimate expansion and wicked aggression becomes confused." We must not "set ourselves up as an oracle of righteousness." We must not risk war by playing "world-wide power politics." Soon afterward, Roosevelt was quoted in other quarters as having said that the American frontier was on the Rhine. For three days the Anglo-French press rejoiced, only to have the President issue a denial. Moves in Congress to repeal the arms embargo lagged during February and March.

On March 21, Senator Key Pittman moved to amend the Neutrality Act by putting all exports to belligerents, including munitions, on a cash-and-carry basis. Increased military and naval appropriations were voted. Senate hearings on the neutrality legislation opened April 5. Borah argued that aggressors were not violating the Kellogg Pact. Amid confusion worse confounded, il Duce struck down Albania. Hull announced on April 8 that "the forcible and violent invasion of Albania is unquestionably an additional threat to the peace of the world. . . . It is scarcely necessary to add that the inevitable effect of this incident, taken with other similar incidents, is further to destroy confidence and to undermine economic stability in every country of the world, thus affecting our welfare." At the end of June the House approved an amendment retaining the impartial and mandatory arms embargo. Hull appealed belatedly to Congress, but the President acknowledged defeat on July 18, 1939. If war came in Europe, the U.S.A. would aid the aggressors and penalize their victims. Undeclared war was raging in Asia. Despite notice to Tokyo on July 26 of abrogation of the Commercial Treaty of 1911, the invaders of China continued to purchase 65% of their imported oil, 65% of their motorcars, 77% of their aircraft, and 90% of their copper, scrap iron, and steel from American suppliers. The aggressors concluded that the world was quite safe for further aggression.

The outbreak of hostilities in Europe found almost all Americans passionately devoted to two desires which were to prove incompatible: Allied victory and American neutrality. On September 5, 1939, the President issued a traditional neutrality proclamation along with a second proclamation under the Neutrality Act imposing an embargo on exports of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to Germany, Poland, France, Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa (September 8), and Canada.
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(September 10). On September 8, he proclaimed a "limited" national emergency under the National Defense Act. Some $80,000,000 worth of war materials, ordered by Britain and France and already licensed for export, was held up in American harbors by the proclamation. On September 13 the President called Congress into special session. He deemed it expedient to ignore the central issue of aiding the Allies by "methods short of war." When the lawmakers assembled on September 21, the President appealed to the traditional American policy and to the international law which had been departed from in the "neutrality" statute. "I regret that Congress passed that Act. I equally regret that I signed that Act." He held that the arms embargo was "most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security, and American peace." He proposed repeal of the embargo and the substitution of prohibitions on travel by Americans in belligerent vessels, on entry of American vessels into war zones, on lending by Americans to belligerents, and on exports of arms other than those paid for in cash and carried away in foreign vessels.

These proposals were not at all a "return to international law." They constituted a complete abandonment of "freedom of the seas" and "neutral rights" for which America had fought in 1798, 1805, 1812, and 1917. Since isolationists and pacifists chose to believe that America had been "dragged into war" in 1917 by virtue of private loans to the Allies and German destruction of American goods, ships, and lives, the way to peace was obviously to ban loans and to keep American goods, ships, and lives out of danger. The President yielded to this sentiment and sought to make possible the shipment of arms to the Allies by agreeing to prohibit loans, shipping, and travel in the name of "cash and carry." The resultant legislation would aid the Allies so long as they had no need of American money and American shipping. Should Hitler's foes later require funds and vessels from the United States, their rights under customary international law to secure these services would be denied by statute, to the immense advantage of the Reich. Under the conditions of September, 1939, however, the President felt that he could secure no more than "cash and carry."

The Senate discussion was tedious. Its low point was reached when Senator Lundeen of Minnesota urged that while the Allies "were pretty busy on the western front" the U.S.A. should demand prompt payment of the war debts and, failing compliance, should seize the British and French West Indies. "Not a shot would be fired. . . . Let us show that there is some red blood in us." The isolationists talked their case to death. Senator Nye agreed with Borah that "there is nothing ahead of America but hell if we repeal the arms embargo." He averred that "the assumption that the British fleet is our first line of defense" was "conceived in the brain of the Mad Hatter."
He repeated his favorite thesis that munition makers had pushed America into World War I, but this argument provoked a belated counterattack, joined by Senator George Norris, lone survivor among the Senators who had voted against war in 1917. Congressman Ludlow pleaded vainly for a total embargo on all trade with the belligerents. Senator Clark of Missouri branded Britain and France as “aggressors” for refusing to make peace on Hitler’s terms and thus driving the Germans “into the bosom of Communism.”

The President denounced those who were tearing their hair over “American boys dying on European battlefields” for indulging in “a shameless and dishonest fake.” The Bill was amended to lighten the restrictions on American shipping. On October 27, the Senate passed the Bill 63 to 30. Eight Republicans joined 54 Democrats and 1 Independent in voting affirmatively, and 12 Democrats joined 15 Republicans, 2 Farmer Laborites, and 1 Progressive in the opposition. The House assented. After further minor revisions, the Senate voted approval on November 3, 55 to 24, and the House 243 to 172. This result was hastened by the capture of the British-bound American freighter City of Flint by the Deutschland on October 9. The captors took the vessel to Norway, then to Murmansk, and finally back to Norway, where the local authorities interned the prize crew and released the ship. Such incidents would be made impossible by the new statute.

The Act which the President signed on November 4, 1939, following adjournment of Congress, was entitled “Joint Resolution to Preserve the Neutrality and Peace of the United States and to Secure the Safety of Its Citizens and Their Interests.” Its preamble asserted that the United States “waives none of its own rights and privileges, or those of any of its nationals, under international law.” Its text abandoned neutral rights and freedom of the seas. The President was required to issue a proclamation naming belligerent States “whenever the President, or the Congress by concurrent resolution, shall find that there exists a state of war between foreign States, and that it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States” (§ 1). “It shall thereafter be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any passengers or any articles or materials to any State named in such proclamation,” subject to a fine of $50,000, five years’ imprisonment, or both. “It shall thereafter be unlawful to export or transport, or attempt to export or transport, or cause to be exported or transported, from the United States to any State named in such proclamation, any articles or materials (except copyrighted articles or materials) until all right, title and interest therein shall have been transferred to some foreign government, agency, institution, association, partnership, corporation or national. . . .
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No loss incurred by any such citizen in connection with the sale or transfer of right, title and interest in any such articles or materials or in connection with the exportation or transportation of any such copyrighted articles or materials shall be made the basis of any claim put forward by the Government of the United States. . . . No insurance policy issued on such articles or materials, or vessels, and no loss incurred thereunder or by the owners of such vessels shall be made the basis of any claims put forward by the Government of the United States.” Etc.

Twenty-two years previously America had gone to war rather than accept German terms which would have allowed one U.S. vessel each week to go to Britain. Now America itself forbade all its vessels and citizens to go to any European belligerent port or war zone at any time during hostilities, thereby inviting the Reich to sink all neutral shipping on sight without fear of protest from Washington. Berlin at once took advantage of this opportunity. The Nazi leaders realized that the new statute was by no means an unmixed blessing for their enemies. Had it been applied to the wars in Finland and China, it would have aided the cause of the Soviet and Japanese aggressors. Wherever it might be applied, it sounded the death knell of the rights of neutrals to lend, sell, and ship goods to belligerent States—despite ardent defense of these rights by America for over 150 years.

In the terrifying spring of 1940 the fall of Copenhagen, Oslo, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris confronted Washington with the necessity of making choices not foreseen in the formulas of 1939. Each new victim of Nazi aggression was dutifully punished for the crime of being weak and neutral by Presidential proclamations barring American ships, citizens, and money from its territory. At the same time the American bank balances of the victims were impounded, lest the victors seize the foreign assets of the vanquished. To Rome and Tokyo went warnings and pleas, necessarily unimplemented since Congress and public forbade “commitments” or “entanglements.” Rome replied on June 10, Tokyo later. On April 13, five days after the event, Roosevelt condemned the German invasion of Denmark and Norway: “If civilization is to survive, the rights of the smaller nations to independence, to their territorial integrity, and to the unimpeded opportunity for self-government must be respected by their more powerful neighbors.”

On April 17, Hull issued a statement declaring that America had an interest in the rubber and tin of the East Indies and that any violent alteration of the status quo would be prejudicial to the “stability, peace, and security” of the “entire Pacific region.” He recalled that Japan had promised to respect the rights of the Netherlands. He urged that “policies of force be abandoned.” These lofty statements of aspiration produced no visible effect. On May 12 the President warned the American Republics that until recently
“too many citizens believed themselves safe.” A “definite challenge” had to be faced. “Can we continue our peaceful construction if all the other continents embrace, by preference or by compulsion, a wholly different principle of life?” The President’s personal answer to his own question was clear. But his political answer had to be different, since millions of his fellow citizens firmly refused to face the question or insisted upon answering it in a fashion more consonant with spiritual comfort than with mental clarity or moral courage.

On May 16 the President went before Congress to ask for huge defense appropriations and a plane-building capacity of 50,000 units per year. There was no notable dissent until Col. Charles A. Lindbergh three days later demanded by radio that America “stop this hysterical chatter of calamity and invasion. . . . No one wishes to attack us and no one is in a position to do so.” There was little response, however, to the appeals of the man who had aided Hitler to prepare the “Peace” of Munich and had subsequently accepted the Service Cross of the Order of the German Eagle with Star, second highest decoration in the Nazi Reich. The President had asked for $1,000,000,000 for arms. A few days later, he asked for another $1,000,000,000. The Senate voted almost $2,000,000,000 to the Army and $1,500,000,000 to the Navy, 74 to 0. The House approved, 400 to 1. Wendell Willkie commented on May 29 that Allied victory would save America “billions of dollars, billions of tons of armament, billions of hours of wasted and unfruitful work. Just on the most selfish basis, it is enormously to our advantage to have them win.” Vandenberg demanded “insulation” but soon urged full aid to the Allies, “short of war” and “within international law.”

The “Arsenal of Democracy.” The collapse of France led to the first step. William Allen White’s “Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies” grew by leaps and bounds throughout the country and exercised vast influence in arousing the public and mobilizing pressure on Congress, despite the outcries of a few Congressmen that it was a “committee to get America into war.” Under its auspices, Gen. John J. Pershing made a radio plea on June 8 for “unlimited quantities” of aircraft, guns, and munitions to the Allies. But Senator Claude Pepper’s motion to authorize the immediate dispatch of Army airplanes was voted down in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 22 to 1. Senator Key Pittman urged a month later that the British Government “end Hitler’s ambition for world conquest” by abandoning the British Isles. After reflection and a talk with the President, however, he opined that an “understanding” between the British and American fleets might “localize Hitler in Europe.” On June 6 a trickle of Army airplanes to the Allies began by virtue of Presidential exercise of statutory authority to exchange old airplanes for new ones, with the manufacturers
willing enough to sell the traded-in goods to new customers. In his address at the University of Virginia on June 10, denouncing il Duce’s “stab in the back,” Roosevelt stated a new policy:

In our American unity, we will pursue two obvious and simultaneous courses: we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. All roads leading to the accomplishment of these objectives must be kept clear of obstructions. We will not slow down or detour. Signs and signals call for speed—full speed ahead. . . . I call for effort, courage, sacrifice, devotion. Granting the love of freedom, all of these are possible. And the love of freedom is still fierce, still steady in the nation today.

Col. Henry L. Stimson declared on June 18 that the world “cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.” When Roosevelt on June 20 named Stimson as Secretary of War and another distinguished Republican, Col. Frank Knox, editor of the Chicago Daily News, as Secretary of the Navy, the Republican National Committee “read out” both men from the Republican Party.

In his plea to Roosevelt on June 10, Reynaud pledged continued resistance in the provinces and French possessions and asked for all aid “short of an expeditionary force.” In his reply, released June 15, the President extended admiration and sympathy and promised “redoubled efforts” to give material aid. But “only the Congress” could make military commitments. Congress would commit itself to do nothing beyond frantic rearmament. Most Republicans and many Democrats in both Houses gave aid, not to the Allies, but to the obstructionists, who were bent upon preventing aid to the Allies. The President’s efforts to transfer a number of small torpedo boats were abandoned after the Attorney General cast doubt on their legality, and the Senate Naval Affairs Committee introduced a measure (passed June 28, 1940) designed to forbid any executive transfer of naval vessels. Democratic Chairman David I. Walsh of Massachusetts asked, “Who in God’s name thought that these contracts for our own protection would be modified or changed in order to assist one side or the other, or all sides, of belligerents at war? . . . The Committee has inserted into the bill . . . every possible safeguard to see that there is not in the future any attempt made to lessen our defenses so far as the Navy is concerned.”

The President could either do nothing, apart from urging measures of defense which he knew could never by themselves defend America, or he could exercise his executive discretion without regard for Congress. He chose the latter course. On August 18 the President and Prime Minister

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Mackenzie King of Canada, attending Army maneuvers in northern New York, announced their agreement "that a permanent joint board on defense shall be set up at once by the two countries" to "commence immediate studies relating to sea, land, and air problems" and "consider in the broad sense the defenses of the northern part of the Western Hemisphere." Since public response was favorable, Roosevelt took another step, which was kept secret until completed. On September 3 he sent a communication to Congress:

I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Secretary of State on Sept. 2, 1940, under which this Government has acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Antigua and in British Guiana; also a copy of an opinion of the Attorney General dated Aug. 27, 1940, regarding my authority to consummate this arrangement.

The right to bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda are gifts—generously given and gladly received. The other bases mentioned have been acquired in exchange for fifty of our over-age destroyers.

This is not inconsistent in any sense with our status of peace. Still less is it a threat against any nation. It is an epochal and far-reaching act of preparation for continental defense in the face of grave danger.

Preparation for defense is an inalienable prerogative of a sovereign State. Under present circumstances this exercise of sovereign right is essential to the maintenance of our peace and safety. This is the most important action in the reinforcement of our national defense that has been taken since the Louisiana Purchase. Then, as now, considerations of safety from overseas attack were fundamental.

Lothian's note defined the leaseholds on the Avalon Peninsula, on the south coast of Newfoundland, and in Bermuda, granted "freely and without consideration," as well as the West Indies bases, granted "in exchange for naval and military equipment and material." All the leases were for 99 years and "free from all rent or charges" save compensations to owners of private property needed for the bases. Hull's note "gladly" accepted these "generous" proposals and agreed to transfer fifty 1,200-ton destroyers. Robert Jackson's opinion was a masterpiece of legal casuistry, interpreting statutes to mean things never intended by them and finding the transaction consonant with international law by the simple expedient of ignoring the distinction between private and governmental transfers of arms from neutrals to belligerents. A simultaneous exchange of communications conveyed renewed assurances that the British fleet would not be surrendered or scuttled if the British Isles became untenable. This pledge was of dubious value since a successful invasion of England would bring into power a Pétain or
a Laval who would do the victor's bidding, and the demoralized seamen might be expected to do what was needful for the safety of their families rather than for the defense of a remote and neutral America.

Congress was outflanked, for the bargain was an "executive agreement," requiring no legislation or appropriations. The anguished outcries of America's Munichmen were less loud than expected. Willkie endorsed the purpose of the agreement but found it "regrettable" that the President had not obtained prior approval from Congress. Britain registered joy, although
Churchill warned that "it would be a mistake to try to read into the official notes more than the documents bear on their faces." The Axis press interpreted the bargain as a further step in the disintegration of the British Empire. No formal protest was made to Washington, despite the flagrant violation of traditional conceptions of neutrality, lest interventionist sentiment in America be increased.

The Caesars retaliated at once by threatening war against the U.S.A. in the Triple Alliance Treaty of September 27, 1940. Immediately following the signature of the Pact of Berlin, Hull asserted that the Alliance "does not, in the view of the Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years." On September 25 the Export-Import Bank announced another loan of $25,000,000 to China. On September 26 the President imposed an embargo, to be effective October 16, on all exports of scrap iron and steel except to Britain and the Western Hemisphere. Sumner Welles, however, declared in Cleveland on September 28 that the way was still open for an "equitable settlement" with Japan. "There is no problem presented which could not be solved through negotiation, provided there existed a sincere desire on the part of those concerned to find an equitable and fair solution which would give just recognition to the rights and the real interests of all concerned."

America declined to be intimidated by the threats of the Triplice. Although both major candidates were in substantial agreement on foreign policy, President Roosevelt's unprecedented reelection to a third term was interpreted abroad as an endorsement of the policy of aid to Britain. He moved cautiously to give further effect to the program laid down and to formulate national purposes in a more forthright fashion. Before the close of 1940, Congress had approved the expenditure of over $12,000,000,000 for defense. By the President's "rule of thumb," half the new production of arms was allotted to Britain. The Compulsory Military Service and Training Law of September 16, 1940, introduced conscription for the first time during "peace" in the history of the Republic. The "Two Ocean Navy" Bill of July 19 authorized a 70% increase in sea forces. Early in the new year the Navy was reorganized into an Atlantic squadron, a Pacific squadron, and an Asiatic squadron in an unmistakable gesture of warning to Tokyo and the Axis. On January 6, 1941 (two days before proposing a 1941-42 budget of $17,485,528,000, of which $10,811,000,000 would go for armaments), President Roosevelt told Congress,

I address you, the members of this new Congress, at a moment unprecedented in the history of the Union. I use the word "unprecedented" because at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today. . . .

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When the dictators, if the dictators, are ready to make war upon us they will not wait for an act of war on our part. They did not wait for Norway or Belgium or the Netherlands to commit an act of war. . . .

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world. . . .

This nation has placed its destiny in the hands and heads and hearts of its millions of free men and women; and its faith in freedom under the guidance of God. Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights and keep them. Our strength is our unity of purpose.

To that high concept there can be no end save victory.

The Administration followed this appeal by the introduction of a "British Aid" Bill (House Bill 1776) giving the President emergency authority to make America the "arsenal of democracy" and to "sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend or otherwise dispose of" or cause to be manufactured defense materials "for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States." Wendell Willkie endorsed the principle of the Bill and carried greetings from Roosevelt to Churchill on his visit to bomb-battered London at the end of January. The Bill was attacked, on the ground that it would "lead to war" and create a "dictatorship," by an incongruous congeries of isolationists, Communists, super-patriots, Nazis, socialists, pacifists, and Fascists.

After leisurely hearings and prolonged debate, the "Lend-Lease" Bill was approved by the Senate, 60-31, and by the House 317-71, with the addition of minor amendments. The Act was signed by the President on March 11, 1941. He therewith received the authority he sought, "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law," subject to termination on June 30, 1943, or earlier by concurrent resolution of Congress. The Act declared that it did not authorize the convoying of ships by naval vessels or their entry into combat areas. But Congress and public opinion were now clearly dedicated to the defeat of the Axis. All necessary means to the end in view would follow as a matter of course. The President at once requested and received an appropriation of $7,000,000,000 to give effect to the new policy, in addition
to the $1,300,000,000 worth of defense articles, procured from funds hitherto appropriated, which he was authorized to transfer by the Act itself.\(^6\)

**Trial by Battle.** De Tocqueville’s doubts regarding the capacity of American democracy to conduct foreign policy with wisdom and foresight were confirmed anew in the months between Lend-Lease and Pearl Harbor. A policy of all-out aid to victims of Fascist aggression in 1937 would in all probability have halted the war lords in Tokyo, Berlin, and Rome at a time when they could not have dreamed of risking war with Great Powers. They would therefore have been discredited and their regimes would have disintegrated, since they could survive only by preparing and waging successful war. But such a program was impossible not only because of Anglo-French policies but because most Americans sought safety by running no risks. Those who were “premature anti-Fascists” were looked at askance and suspected of “Communism.”

By the same logic, though now at greater risk, the U.S.A. could have stopped war in 1939 by asserting decisively that America would come to the support of any State attacked by Mussolini or Hitler. Paris and London were now willing, but popular befuddlement in the Great Republic precluded any such course, as did general fear of Communism and secret admiration for Fascism. By 1941, the terms of the problem had changed completely. American security now called for immediate and open war on the Triplce, embarked upon as soon as possible and prosecuted with all the power at America’s command. But all such proposals were indignantly shouted down by a people who preferred to misunderstand the dynamics of Fascism and to suppose that security could still be had cheaply. The most that could be done was to do that which would have averted war in 1937 but could not possibly keep America at peace in 1941.

Lend-Lease was quite incompatible with the obligations of “neutrality.” It could be legally justified only by reference to such empty symbols as the Kellogg Pact. It was strategically justified, and indeed imperatively necessary, because the Fascist Caesars, even if they would, could not halt their march of conquest short of world dominion. This consideration, highly relevant to the issue of 1941, called for war, not for measures “short of war,” since the enemy would not and could not desist until his power was utterly crushed. But Americans drew a different conclusion. The same Americans in 1947-48 applied the same logic (irrelevantly and falsely, for reasons to be explored hereafter) to the U.S.S.R. and clamored for war in a

\(^6\) By March, 1941, defense appropriations were approaching a total of $35,000,000,000 for the preceding 12-month period, a figure comparable with American war expenditures in 1917-18.
situation in which a stable and secure peace was possible. In 1941, they clamored for peace in a situation in which only war was possible.

American policy toward the belligerents was less a policy than a muddle. Money, arms, and airplanes flowed to Britain by edict of a Government which sternly forbade its citizens to lend money or sell arms or airplanes to Britain on any basis other than cash and carry. American ships were forbidden to transport the goods, and the U.S. Navy (up to a point) was forbidden to ensure their arrival. On the other hand, the “Neutrality” Act was not applied to the U.S.S.R., to which lend-lease aid was also extended after the Nazi assault in June. In Asia the Government which aided China against Japan encouraged its citizens to aid Japan against China. The President explained (July 24) that “if we had cut the oil off, the Japanese probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies. The policy has worked for two years.” Despite this caution, Burton K. Wheeler accused Roosevelt of plotting to “plow under every fourth American boy” in the interests of Britain, Jewry, and Wall Street. All pro-Fascists, most reactionaries, and many Roosevelt haters concurred. So also did Norman Thomas, spokesman for socialism and “internationalism.” So also (until June 23, 1941) did American Communists, for whom the wicked “imperialist” war did not become an anti-Fascist crusade for the liberation of mankind until Hitler invaded Russia.

In more influential quarters a vigorous campaign to “keep out of war” was launched by “America First, Inc.” under Gen. Robert Wood; by Herbert Hoover, Robert Taft, and David I. Walsh; by Colonel Lindbergh, Knight of the German Eagle; and by Col. Robert R. McCormick of the Chicago Tribune. Bedfellows make strange politics. The Administration nevertheless acquired bases in Greenland; seized German, Italian, and Vichy vessels in U.S. ports; and proclaimed an “unlimited national emergency.” Although the fact was kept secret at the time, the U.S.S. Niblack, while rescuing survivors from a torpedoed Dutch freighter off the coast of Iceland, attacked an approaching Nazi U-boat with depth bombs. The date was early: April 10, 1941. When the Robin Moor, first American vessel sunk by the enemy, went down in the South Atlantic on May 21, Washington protested sharply to Berlin and presently closed all German and Italian consulates in the U.S.A.

On July 1, bases were acquired in Iceland. Economic warfare against the foe was intensified. In August, Hoover, Dawes, Lowden, Hutchins, John L. Lewis, and others warned that “in so far as this is a war of power politics, the American people want no part in it.” On August 12, the House voted to

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extend compulsory military service for another 18 months. In the face of General Marshall's warnings, the Republican members voted 21 for and 133 against. The total vote was 203 to 202. Roosevelt quoted Lincoln's words of 1862: "The people have not yet made up their minds that we are at war. They have no idea that the war is to be carried on and put through by hard, tough fighting, that it will hurt somebody; and no headway is going to be made while this delusion lasts."

The Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, symbolized Anglo-American solidarity. Said F.D.R. on Labor Day: "We shall do everything in our power to crush Hitler and his Nazi forces." On September 4, the first American tanker reached Vladivostok, and the U.S.S. Greer, bound for Iceland, was attacked by a U-boat. Three American merchant ships were sunk between Greenland and Iceland. The President issued a "shoot-first" order. Naval convoys began protecting shipping. On October 17, the destroyer Kearny was torpedoed. On October 30, the destroyer Reuben James was sunk, with the loss of over 100 lives. In mid-November, Congress amended the "neutrality" laws to permit the arming of American merchant ships and to allow them to sail to belligerent ports. America was in fact at war. But most Americans supposed they were still at peace.

The problem of the Administration, as Henry L. Stimson put it, was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." The problem was solved, though at enormous danger. Those who later denounced the "deceit" of the enterprise were at the time advocating policies which, if adopted, would have made the danger fatal. The Japanese-American negotiations in the autumn of 1941 were unreal, since the Administration in Washington was irrevocably committed to the defeat of Hitler, while Tokyo was irrevocably committed to victory in alliance with Hitler. American "cracking" of the Japanese naval code enabled those "in the know" to be aware that the American note of November 26 meant war. Where the first blow would fall was implied by the "winds" code signal of December 4. Yet an incredible maze of bureaucratic muddling, in which General Marshall was necessarily involved, led to the absence of all reasonable precautions. The result was the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor. General Short and Admiral Kimmel were later made scapegoats. Ultimate responsibility lay in the inability of a great democracy to play the game of power with vision, skill, and resolution. Japan declared war on Sunday. The Senate concurred, 82 to 0, and the House, 388 to 1, on Monday.

"It will not only be a long war," said the President to the nation on Tuesday evening, "it will be a hard war. The U.S. can accept no result save

8 See p. 636.
victory, final and complete. . . . We are going to win the war, and we are
going to win the peace that follows. And in the dark hours of this day—and
through dark days that may be yet to come—we will know that the vast
majority of the members of the human race are on our side. Many of them
are fighting with us. All of them are praying for us. For, in representing our
cause, we represent theirs as well—our hope and their hope for liberty under
God.” Hitler and Mussolini declared war on Thursday, December 11. The
Senate and House concurred, unanimously. Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua at once followed Washington’s example in voting declarations
of war . . .

Song of Victory. What followed may perhaps be judged by future com-
mentators to have been, next to the Soviet war effort, the most grandiose
example in human annals of a whole nation acting as one to repel attack
and ultimately to bring the enemy to unconditional defeat. The prodigies of
accomplishment achieved by American political leaders, strategists, field
commanders, G.I.’s, sailors, airmen, merchant seamen, businessmen, bureau-
crats, wage earners, and common civilians may not here be told. Despite
the disaster with which hostilities began, the Japanese foe was halted and
then slowly driven back toward his homeland, island by island and battle
by battle. A gigantic output of ships, airplanes, guns, and tanks made pos-
sible a vast offensive against the Axis, beginning with aid to Britain and
Russia and proceeding to the reconquest of North Africa, the invasion of
Sicily and Italy, the belated creation of a Second Front in France, and—
after more than three years of toil and blood—the annihilation of the
Wehrmacht. Throughout the ordeal the Commander in Chief gave voice to
the dreams and hopes and purposes of all freemen everywhere of crushing
the new barbarians and building a new world of order, justice, plenty,
and peace.

Yet along with the enthusiasm of national unity and the catharsis of
collective self-sacrifice, World War II was for most Americans an experience
subtly fraught with doubt and guilt. The cause lay in two circumstances
quite beyond American control. One was the fact that the American home-
land was never invaded or bombed by the foe, while the number of Ameri-
cans who died or suffered wounds or mourned their dead was negligible
in comparison with all the other peoples of Europe and Asia fighting for
the common cause. The other was the fact that America grew rich. The
fifty billions of lend-lease aid and the hundreds of billions of war expendi-
tures represented “sacrifices” only on paper, in spite of high taxes, ration-
ing, shortages, and inconveniences of all kinds. Almost every dollar spent
inevitably found its way into the pockets of G.I.’s, officers, officials, factory
managers, stockholders, wageworkers, farmers, and local merchants. Corporate profits soared. National income, not yet restored to pre-Depression levels, was more than doubled with full employment and a vast expansion of productive capacity. For innumerable Americans the worship of Mars begot the magic of Midas. Though none could alter the process, and few would if they could, its results troubled the American conscience.

The full political effects of this "schism in the soul" were to become visible only after the war. During the fighting they found expression in a final renunciation of isolationism, in lofty statements of national purpose, and in a curious "war within the war," waged in Washington and abroad, between those who envisaged the ordeal as a revolutionary reformation of the world society and those whose slogan was: "Come weal, come woe, my status is quo!" In the end, the disciples of orthodoxy prevailed. But before the end, much was said and done to create the illusion that a victory of the United Nations was contingent upon, and would inexorably lead toward, a new world order dedicated to federalism, freedom, and the end of fear and want for most of the children of Adam.

These prospects, if they were ever to materialize even in moderate measure, depended upon unity of purpose in war and peace between the Atlantic democracies and the Soviet Union. Effective cooperation for war was attained. Cooperation for peace was infinitely more difficult. That it finally failed to come to pass is all the more reason for reviewing, briefly, the efforts toward its accomplishment. During 1942 the two major camps of the United Nations achieved sundry statements of common purpose, an Anglo-Soviet alliance, and a working program of military and diplomatic collaboration.¹ The chief source of friction was not the divergencies of postwar plans but the issue of a "Second Front" in Europe.

Ambassador Standley's criticism in March, 1943, of alleged Soviet "in-gratitude" for U.S. aid led Adolf A. Berle, Jr., then Assistant Secretary of State, to reaffirm inter-Allied solidarity and deny that the U.S.S.R. had "huge imperial plans" or that the Western Powers were planning a new anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire. In May, Roosevelt sent Joseph E. Davies on a special mission to Moscow. On May 23, the Communist International decreed its self-dissolution. Yet suspicion continued because of Moscow's championship of Communist-controlled groups in European Undergrounds and Anglo-American support of feudalism, clericalism, monarchism, and reaction in North Africa, Italy, Jugoslavia, Greece, Poland, and elsewhere. On July 21, 1943, Moscow announced the establishment of a "Free Germany Committee," made up of émigrés, exiles, and captured officers and pledged

¹ For texts of relevant documents, see pp. 218 ff. and 851-852.
to a program not of Communism in the Reich but of "democracy," private property, and free enterprise.

This step precipitated a crisis in Washington. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles took the view that a comprehensive understanding with Moscow must be reached at once to obviate the danger of an irreparable rupture and a possible separate peace. Hull dissented and was supported by Berle, James Clement Dunn, Breckenridge Long, and William C. Bullitt. Hull demanded Welles's dismissal. F.D.R. proposed that he be sent on special mission to the Kremlin. Welles declined and resigned in mid-August. Moscow announced that Ambassador Litvinov would not return to Washington. In the sequel Roosevelt persuaded the reluctant Hull to do substantially what Welles had advised—for which Welles lost his post and Hull was hailed as a hero. The Secretary of State went to Moscow in the autumn for the first conference of Foreign Ministers among the Big Three. His mission paved the way for Teheran and for a series of accords, promising unity to win the war and the peace.¹⁰

In this, as in later decisions, F.D.R. was praised by all those, including Wendell Willkie and Henry A. Wallace, who believed that stability and peace in the postwar world depended on concord among the Super-Powers.¹¹ He was denounced by others for "appeasing Stalin," betraying Christianity, capitalism, and civilization, and "surrendering eastern Europe to Communism." As he saw it, there was no irreconcilable conflict between democratic capitalism and Soviet socialism. Compromise and accommodation, he hoped, would result in a viable postwar balance and concert of power on the basis of which an enduring structure of peace could be reared. Those who came after were to dispute bitterly as to whether this hope was right or wrong, with those holding it wrong winning an easy and speedy victory. While he lived, the President pursued his course in the conviction that no other could save mankind from woes even worse than those experienced in World War II. On his return from Yalta ¹² he reported to Congress on March 1, 1945:

Never before have the major Allies been more closely united—not only in their war aims, but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to continue to be united—to be united with each other, and with all peace-loving nations—so that

¹⁰ See documents, pp. 220ff.
¹¹ Wendell Willkie, Roosevelt's rival for the Presidency in 1940, died in November, 1944. He once stated his faith as follows: "If a man is not, deep in his belly, in favor of the closest possible relations with Britain and Russia, then it does not matter what else he is. Such a man will be anti-labor . . . he will be anti-business . . . This is the touchstone of a man's entire position in politics today. He has to be on fire with it. You cannot be wrong on this issue and right on any other."
¹² See pp. 227ff.
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the ideal of lasting peace will become a reality. . . . It cannot be just an American peace, or a British peace or a Russian or a French or a Chinese peace. It cannot be a peace of large nations—or of small nations. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world. . . .

Queer ideas of “spheres of influence” are incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. . . . The major Powers of the world [must] continue without interruption to work together and assume joint responsibility for the solution of problems which may arise to endanger the peace of the world. . . . I am happy to confirm to the Congress that we did arrive at a settlement—and incidentally, a unanimous settlement. . . . The U.S. will not always have its way 100%, nor will Russia nor Great Britain. We shall not always have ideal answers. . . . But I am sure that under the agreements reached at Yalta, there will be a more stable political Europe than ever before. . . .

We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict. . . . I am confident that the Congress and the American people will accept the results of this conference as the beginning of a permanent structure of peace upon which we can begin to build, under God, that better world in which our children and grandchildren—yours and mine, the children and grandchildren of the whole world—must live.

This hope was bright with promise in the spring of 1945. Not only had Roosevelt come to terms with Stalin and Churchill, but he had persuaded both to come to terms with one another. In the autumn of 1944, Churchill and Eden in Moscow had agreed with Stalin and Molotov that Greece was to be largely under British influence, while Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, and Rumania were to be largely under Soviet influence.13 Such arrangements were not inconsistent with Roosevelt’s denunciation of “spheres” so long as the Powers, by respecting one another’s security interests in particular areas, were able and willing to act together for common purposes in a context affording maximum opportunities of independent life for the lesser States. As experience had often demonstrated, and was to demonstrate again, the absence of accords on security zones produces not peace and freedom for small communities but a rivalry for power in which the pygmies become the pawns of the giants.

F.D.R.’s firm belief that Anglo-American-Soviet concord was both possible and essential to victory and to a lasting peace was not shaken by controversies in 1944-45 arising out of British policy in Italy and Greece (objected to by the U.S.A. but not by the U.S.S.R.) and Soviet policy in Rumania (objected to by the U.S.A. but not by the U.K.). The President resented Stalin’s suspicion that negotiations for the surrender of Kesselring’s army in Italy contemplated the transfer of German divisions to the East and a “soft peace” for the Reich. Stalin apologized. The incident was closed.

13 See p. 227.
on April 11. On the next day the President, at Warm Springs, Ga., advised Churchill, in response to an inquiry, to minimize the “Soviet problem” in his utterances “because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day, and most of them straighten out. We must be firm, however, in our course, and our course thus far is correct.” He also prepared a radio address to be delivered on April 13, Jefferson’s birthday. But that afternoon Franklin Delano Roosevelt died. In his last unspoken message he said:

Today this nation which Jefferson helped so greatly to build is playing a tremendous part in the battle for the rights of man all over the world. . . . But the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed, which made this horror possible. . . . Let us move forward with strong and active faith.

The New Look. In 1940, Roosevelt had strongly supported Henry A. Wallace as his running mate. In 1944, he made no recommendation. In the Democratic Convention, despite strong labor and liberal endorsement of Wallace, southern conservatives and city bosses successfully supported Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri, who accordingly became President on April 12, 1945.

Although they were both of one party, the transition from Roosevelt to Truman was in some respects reminiscent of that from Wilson to Harding in 1921. There was not, to be sure, any repudiation of “internationalism” in favor of “isolationism.” Foreign policy was now “bipartisan.” Both Parties in both Houses of Congress had endorsed American membership in the proposed U.N. Organization by the Fulbright and Connally Resolutions of 1943. The San Francisco Conference met on schedule and completed its work in June. The Potsdam Conference registered new inter-Allied agreements. Overwhelming military victory was won in both Europe and Asia. The work of establishing U.N. and negotiating peace treaties began auspiciously despite new controversies.

The change in the temper of the Administration was no sharp break but a slow drift toward a new orientation. The new President, at first humble before the magnitude of his task and eager to do what F.D.R. would have done, slowly gained self-confidence and surrounded himself with advisers who had little in common with the New Deal. The Roosevelt Cabinet was gradually replaced by a Truman Cabinet of wholly different complexion. In a quest for “normalcy,” public controls of the American economy were abandoned as rapidly as possible. In an effort to use American resources as weapons of diplomacy, Lend-Lease was abruptly terminated after V-J Day and UNRRA was ended in June, 1947. The Roosevelt policies opposed by most businessmen and hailed by most labor leaders gave way to new meas-
ures (e.g., the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947) denounced by labor and hailed by business.

Effective influence in Washington gradually passed into the hands of investment bankers and military career men. Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, for example, was former President of Dillon, Read & Co., in which Undersecretary of the Army William L. Draper was Vice-President. Wallace's successor as Secretary of Commerce, W. Averell Harriman, millionaire by inheritance, was a founder of Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co., in which Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett was a partner. Assistant Secretary of State Charles Saltzman had been Vice-President of the New York Stock Exchange. Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder was a St. Louis banker. The Presidential envoy to the Vatican, originally appointed by F.D.R., was Myron Taylor, chairman of the Board of U.S. Steel. By January, 1948, the following posts, which would ordinarily be held by civilians, were held by professional specialists in the arts of war: Presidential Chief of Staff (William D. Leahy), Secretary of State (George C. Marshall), Assistant Secretary of State (Charles Saltzman), Secretary for the Army (Kenneth C. Royall), Undersecretary for the Army (William H. Draper), Governor of Germany (Clay), Governor of Japan (MacArthur), Governor of Austria (Geoffrey Keyes), Special Envoy to China (Wedemeyer), Ambassadors to the U.S.S.R. (Walter Bedell Smith), Panama (Frank T. Hines), South Africa (Thomas Holcomb), Belgium (Allen G. Kirk), etc.

Truman's America, two years after the end of hostilities, was spending $10,000,000,000 annually on armaments and moving toward peacetime conscription. Its business system was earning larger profits than ever before. In so far as particular interest groups could be said to exercise more influence over Administration and Congressional policies than other groups, the Republic was ruled by big businessmen and military specialists. The former, with few exceptions, had the outlook of their counterparts in the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover Administrations. The latter, who were newcomers to American public life, had in common, in the words of one observer, "the habit of command and discipline and the mental outlook of years of military training—a tendency to apply the yardstick of physical power." 14 To say, with some critics of the new regime, that America had

14 Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Military Moves in," Harper's Magazine, December, 1947. Mr. Baldwin, a graduate of Annapolis, had been for almost 20 years military editor of The New York Times. Despite his impeccable conservatism, he felt obliged by the climate of opinion to preface his analysis of the militarization of the Government of the U.S.A. with the statement that "I must emphasize that I am not a follower of Henry Wallace—nor, of course, a Communist, nor a fellow-traveller. To me Russia is a totalitarian dictatorship. I agree with the Truman-Marshall Policy and believe the spread
become, at least temporarily, a plutocratic "garrison-state" would be an 
overstatement, resented and denied by most bankers, industrialists, generals, 
and admirals in federal office. Yet the shift in the loci of power since the 
passing of F.D.R. was as obvious as was the new direction of national policy 
at home and abroad. Much that followed in foreign affairs is unintelligible 
if these changes in personnel and purposes are ignored.

The Great Fear. The leitmotiv of American public life in the years fol-
lowing V-J Day were Russophobia and anti-Communism, both growing from 
small voices of suspicion in 1945 to a thundering crescendo of denunciation 
by 1948, joined in by almost the entire press, pulpit, and radio and by 
leaders of both Parties in and out of government. The flavor of this flood 
of invective, matched at every point by Soviet counterinvective, is best sug-
gested by a few samples, chosen at random out of millions of similar utterances:

George H. Earle, April 26, 1946:

Soviet Russia is a menace far greater than the Nazis. The U.S. must prepare in 
self-defense to wipe out every town, city and village in Russia. [Again, October 
10, 1947:] One nice little atomic bomb dropped on the Kremlin and the Russian 
people of 165,000,000 would fly to pieces with centrifugal force. . . .

John Foster Dulles, Life, June 3, 1946:

Since, to the Soviet leaders, the world is one and since peace is indivisible, 
peace and security are considered by them to depend upon eradicating the non-
Soviet type of society which now dangerously divides the one world into incom-

of Communism must be stopped. Since I have been caricatured in Red Star, insulted 
in Pravda and condemned in The Daily Worker, I do not think I need to labor this 
point."

On the question of the "rulers of America," it is of interest to recall James W. 
Gerard's list of 40 men, drawn up in 1930—consisting, with the exception of two labor 
leaders, of multimillionaire industrialists, bankers, and publishers. For a broader list 
of those deserving, in the opinion of John Gunther, to be regarded as rulers in 1947, 
see his article "The 64 Who Run America," in '47, The Magazine of the Year, Septem-
ber, 1947.

In an address in Los Angeles on November 18, 1946, Robert M. Hutchins, also a 
conservative, felt justified in saying: "Our economy is a picture of organized competi-
tion in greed. . . . The motto of American life is, 'Get All You Can.' When labor 
unions see a chance to get more, they take it. They would be un-American if they did 
not. Criticism of their attitude comes with bad grace from those who by precept and 
example have taught them the lesson that you should get all you can, that the more 
power you have the more you will get, and that justice is the interest of the stronger. 
We hear that labor will never be satisfied. Why should labor be satisfied, when nobody 
else ever has been? . . . If there is no standard of economic life except that each man 
shall desire more than he has thus far obtained, then there is little hope of community 
behind him, and none of community on a world scale. . . . Violence, inequality, hatred, 
and frustration—these are the consequences if our motto is, 'Get All You Can.' . . .
Other civilizations were destroyed by barbarians from without. We breed our own."

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patible halves. . . . By bringing such [i.e., Soviet] governments into power throughout the world, the leaders of the Soviet Union would create world harmony, a great political calm which will be the Pax Sovietica. . . . It can be taken as certain that as the full implications of the Soviet system come to be better understood by the American people, it will revive in them the spirit which led their forebears to pledge their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor to secure their personal freedoms. We must act on the assumption that the Soviet program, if persisted in, will not peacefully succeed.

Francis Cardinal Spellman, American Magazine, July, 1946:

America is infected with the germs of Communism. . . . Today Communists, suppressing truth, are intimidating men and infecting despotism on America. . . . There is no middle course between democracy and Communism. . . . In our country's concepts, the dignity of each man depends upon his spiritual independence, while Communism's concept is seeded in materialism and rooted to tyranny. . . . Wherever Communism appears, slavery reappears. America and Americans need only to look at the record and the wreckage of those bigoted governments and peoples who became gods and laws unto themselves, in order to be convinced of the nobility of our own free and democratic government and life.

J. Edgar Hoover, to the House Committee on Un-American Activities, March 26, 1947:

The Communists have developed one of the greatest propaganda machines the world has ever known. . . . Their objective, of course, is to overthrow The American Way of Life. . . . I would have no fears, if Americans realized the menace of Red Fascism. I do fear for the liberal and progressive, who has been duped into joining hands with the Communists. I confess to real apprehension so long as Communists can get ministers of the gospel to promote their evil work. . . . I do fear so long as school boards and parents let Communists and fellow-travelers, under the guise of academic freedom, teach our youth a way of life that will destroy the sanctity of the home, undermine faith in God and respect for constituted authority, and sabotage our Constitution. I do fear so long as American labor groups are infiltrated with the virus of Communism. . . . Communism is not a political party; it is an evil and malignant way of life—a disease that spreads like an epidemic, and quarantine is necessary to keep it from infecting the nation.

Hon. Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, a former minister of the gospel, Chairman of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs, American Magazine, August, 1947:

Americans are such good people that they are slow to recognize wickedness, even when they see it. . . . We owe nothing to Russia today. . . . Compromise with Russia seems impossible. . . . They have no morals and no religion. . . . Russians are Slavs, which means captives or slaves. . . . But we still have the atomic bomb. . . . Once kicked out of decent society, Russia must either seek to
regain good standing or be disciplined by the military action of the union of decent nations.

In this campaign a high point was reached at Fulton, Mo., March 5, 1946, when Winston Churchill, introduced and applauded by President Truman, declared:

It is not our duty at this time, when difficulties are so numerous, to interfere forcibly in the internal affairs of countries which we have not conquered in war, but we must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man. . . . Fraternal association . . . should carry with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all naval and air force bases in the possession of either country [America and Britain] all over the world. . . . A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist International organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. . . . From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent. . . . Police governments are pervading from Moscow. But Athens alone, with its immortal glory, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. . . . Communist Parties or Fifth Columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization.

Administration spokesmen became more vehement in their rendering of these themes after the Republicans in November, 1946, won a majority in both Houses of Congress, largely by accusing the President's party of appeasing Stalin and coddling domestic Reds. American politics thereafter became a keen competition among candidates to see who could outdo his rivals in saving the nation from the "Red menace." With striking unanimity the American press agreed that the survival of civilization, religion, liberty, and free enterprise depended upon crushing Communism and defeating Soviet imperialism. If any degrees of distinction were possible in a field in which all competitors covered themselves with glory, top honors would doubtless go to The New York Times, the Hearst press, and the publications of Henry Luce, apostle of "the American century." The current mood was well depicted in the Washington Post in early December, 1947, by cartoonist Herblock in "Preview of 1948." He showed the Democratic donkey and Republican elephant as small boys scribbling on placards, the former writing: "I'm more anti-Communist than everybody in the whole world all put together, that's what!" while the latter wrote: "I'm a hundred trillion times more anti-Communist than anybody! So there! Too!"

These attitudes posed no problem of explanation to those sharing them, since in their view it was clear beyond debate that the U.S.S.R. was embarked upon a program of world conquest which must at all costs be resisted if freedom was to live. All Communists elsewhere—and indeed all
who associated with them, shared any of their purposes, or even expressed doubts regarding the new crusade—were *ipso facto* agents of the Kremlin, traitors, dastards, and sons of Satan. The extent to which and the sense in which these evaluations might be equated with an accurate analysis of Soviet policy and Communist purposes are matters best discussed elsewhere. What is significant is that the scope and intensity of the American response to the challenge of Communism in 1946-48 were disproportionate to the power at the disposal of those making the threat, even on the worst of assumptions as to motives. In almost all components of fighting capacity, the U.S.S.R. was hopelessly inferior to the U.S.A. The American Communist Party, moreover—self-dissolved in 1944 but revived in 1945—had so little appeal to the electorate that it had never won more than one-fifth of 1% of all votes cast in a national election, and this only in 1932. The image of a monstrous Russian Juggernaut, poised to crush out liberty everywhere in the world, nevertheless persisted and impressed itself swiftly and frightfully on the public mind, as did the stereotype of a formidable conspiracy of alien agents and native renegades to overthrow the Republic—as, for example, by infiltrating insidiously into public posts, pulpits, cinema studios, and academic halls, there to poison the populace against democracy, liberty, and the blessings of free enterprise.

These familiar symptoms of psychic insecurity had parallels in Japan and Italy in the 1920's, Germany in the 1930's, China, Greece, France, and Latin America in the 1940's. The question of what Americans feared and why they were afraid could not be adequately answered in terms of Soviet purposes and Communist acts. Fear flows not only from external dangers but from inner doubts and guilts. In a land relatively unhurt by war, rich beyond the dreams of avarice, more powerful than the realm of Jenghis Khan, blessed with liberty, swimming in plenty, and presumably facing a future of infinite hope, the sources of inner fear were not superficially apparent. American democracy, however, was not, for all its glory, quite the palladium of freedom for all its peoples that its champions pretended it was. American foreign policy, conceivably, was not in every respect a magnificent gesture of unselfish charity and spotless rectitude. The American economy, moreover, gave vast riches to its major beneficiaries and the highest living stand-

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15 See pp. 901ff.
16 See p. 417.
17 With apparent inconsistency, President Truman in a letter of Feb. 28, 1947, wrote to George H. Earle: "People are very much wrought up about the Communist 'bugaboo' but I am of the opinion that the country is perfectly safe so far as Communism is concerned—we have too many sane people. Our Government is made for the welfare of the people and I don't believe there will ever come a time when anyone will really want to overturn it."
ard on earth to most of its people but brought to few of them an assurance of stability, a conviction of righteousness, or a sense of social purpose. In the past every “boom” had been followed by “bust” . . .

To admit such doubts was painful. To do anything relevant to change the circumstances which gave rise to them was politically impossible in an institutional context in which vested interests sat in the seats of power and brooked no infringement of their prerogatives, even in the name of saving from threatened collapse the system from which they benefited. Frustrations and aggression were turned outward against enemy symbols rather than inward on the national self or on the bewildering problems of political economy calling for solutions. To indict Russia was politically effective. To damn Communism was emotionally satisfying. To maintain full production and employment by spending billions on armaments, rehabilitation schemes, and anti-Communist crusades was lucrative to entrepreneurs, wage earners, and farmers alike, since they pocketed in enhanced profits and wages a comfortable margin of the money spent. While so doing, they readily persuaded themselves that they were engaged in a self-sacrificing enterprise of charity and defense of freedom, unprecedented in its magnanimity. Amid such pleasant experiences, few were troubled by anxiety as to how the inflation would terminate, what would follow if “cold war” became hot, and who would pay the piper in the end. All doubts were resolved by reference to Communist vice and Soviet sin.

Byrnes, Bevin, and Balkania. If future historians should perchance conclude that the foreign policy of the U.S.A. after midsummer of 1945 was formulated and administered with somewhat less wisdom, realism, and efficacy than its framers then attributed to it, part of the explanation of this state of affairs will doubtless be sought in the climate of opinion described above. Despite the curious fact (not strange to psychoanalysts) that Mr. Byrnes in his 300-page book made no mention of the matter, the definitive break between the Roosevelt policy toward Russia and the new dispensation began on August 18, 1945.

On this day the Secretary of State announced that his Government was “not satisfied that the existing provisional Bulgarian Government is adequately representative of the important elements of democratic opinion” or that the proposed election “will allow and insure the effective participation therein, free from the fear of force and intimidation, of all democratic elements.” Two days later Bevin, in his first speech as Foreign Secretary to Commons, asserted that “we” must “prevent the substitution of one form of totalitarianism for another. . . . The forms of government which have been set up [in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary] do not impress us as sufficiently representative to meet the requirements of diplomatic rela-
The question of secret police in Poland has still got to be cleared up. [But] the question of the [Franco] regime in Spain is one for the Spanish people to decide. H.M. Government is not prepared to take any step which would permit or encourage civil war in that country.

This "Byrnes-Bevin Doctrine" initiated a campaign which was to be pursued with great persistence. Its immediate purpose was not achieved, despite the postponement of the Bulgarian elections, and was in part abandoned with the recognition of the Governments in Sofia, Bucharest, and Budapest and the conclusion of peace treaties. Its ultimate purpose was couched in terms of ensuring fulfillment of the Yalta pledges of "democracy" and "free elections." These pledges, however, presupposed common agreement and action by the Big Three, not dictation by Moscow to London and Washington or by London and Washington to Moscow in the event of discord. In the absence of common definitions of "democracy," "freedom," and "Fascism," charges on both sides of "violations" of the Yalta accord had little validity in law or logic. Democracy is not something carried around in brief cases or wrapped in diplomatic notes. The State Department, keenly solicitous over its promotion in the Balkans, displayed no concern over its absence in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Iran, China, Argentina, Brazil—or Mr. Byrnes's own South Carolina.

The unacknowledged purpose of the new departure was to challenge, and if possible terminate, the Soviet hegemony over Danubia and Balkania which Roosevelt and Churchill had accepted at Yalta in exchange for Soviet recognition of Anglo-American hegemony in Greece, Italy, western Germany, and western Europe generally. Byrnes, to be sure, as late as October 31, 1945 (but never thereafter), could say that "far from opposing, we have sympathized with . . . the efforts of the Soviet Union to draw into closer and more friendly association with her Central and eastern European neighbors. We are fully aware of her special security interests in those countries. . . . America will never join any groups in those countries in hostile intrigues against the Soviet Union." Despite the ephemeral détente achieved in Moscow in December, 1945, the Byrnes-Bevin program was pursued with a tenacity which deserved a better cause and more successful results. Innumerable diplomatic notes were addressed to Moscow, Warsaw, Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia in 1945-47, protesting against repression of opposition and lack of civil rights and free elections.

This campaign failed of its purposes, both actual and ostensible. It produced not less Soviet influence but more, and not more democracy but less.

18 See p. 229.
19 See pp. 246ff.
in the area in question—all of which, comfortably, was a further evidence of Soviet sin, but scarcely a proof of the efficacy of American diplomacy. Despite the eloquent pleas of George H. Earle, Clare Boothe Luce, William C. Bullitt, James Burnham, and others, America was obviously not prepared (as yet) to use force to eject the U.S.S.R. from Balkania. Efforts to achieve this result by diplomacy and economic penalties led only to a consolidation of Muscovite power. When the Byrnes-Bevin Doctrine was supplemented by the “Churchill Doctrine” (Fulton, Mo.) and this in turn by the Truman Doctrine, the Kremlin and its friends made short shrift of leaders blessed by the State Department and Downing Street. Ferenc Nagy was ousted from the Premiership of Hungary on May 30, 1947. Nikola Petkov, Bulgarian Opposition leader, was convicted of treason and executed, September 23, 1947. Juliu Maniu, Rumanian opponent of Communist control, was given a life sentence. Mikolajczyk of Poland fled to England and then to America in November, 1947. A month later King Michael was deposed in Bucharest and the Monarchy abolished. At the dawn of 1948, Washington had, for its pains, only the “Central Committee of the International Peasant Union,” composed of anti-Soviet exiles in America striving, without visible success, to undermine and overthrow the Soviet-supported regimes in their homelands.

All of this, in the judgment of such diplomats as Maynard Barnes and Arthur Bliss Lane (former envoys in Sofia and Warsaw), represented a “moral victory” and a harbinger of triumphs to come over the U.S.S.R. Yet the game of power politics is purely pragmatic. By the test of the facts of power, the American program of 1945-46 to push Russia out of the Balkans was a failure. Here, as always, failure breeds frustration, which is the mother of invention or of desperation.

In the course of the enterprise, Henry A. Wallace, then Secretary of Commerce, submitted a memorandum to President Truman on July 23, 1946. “I have been increasingly disturbed,” he wrote, “by the trend of international affairs since the end of the war, and I am even more troubled by the apparently growing feeling among the American people that another war is coming. . . .” He argued for agreement on the atomic bomb which would obligate the U.S.A. to destroy its bombs at a specific time or under specific conditions. He argued for agreement with Russia, “even at the expense of risking epithets of appeasement,” on the basis of reciprocal respect for security requirements. The President seemed, slowly, to agree. On September 12, 1946, Wallace delivered an address in Madison Square Garden: “The real peace we now need is between the U.S. and Russia. On our part we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs
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of eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, western Europe, and the U.S. . . ." (On the same day John Stelle, National Commander of the American Legion, declared in New Orleans: "We ought to aim an atomic bomb right at Moscow—and save one for Tito, too!")

The President had endorsed Wallace's speech in advance. When a storm of condemnation broke out, he explained that he had not meant that he approved of the speech but merely that he supported the Secretary's right to deliver it. Byrnes in Paris fumed. Several days later, after a long conference with Truman, Wallace said that he had agreed to make no more foreign-policy speeches during the Paris Peace Conference. Byrnes telephoned and made it clear that he would resign if Wallace remained in the Cabinet. Truman telephoned Wallace and asked for his resignation on September 20. There was, explained the President to the press, a "fundamental conflict" between Wallace's views on foreign policy and those of the Administration. "No change in our foreign policy is contemplated. That is all, gentlemen." After 13 years Wallace left Washington—to be portrayed as a meddler, a fool, and a Communist stooge by most of the press, while Truman and Byrnes received high praise for "getting tough" with Russia.

Truman Doctrine. On March 12, 1947, the President went before Congress to ask $400,000,000 in aid for Greece and Turkey, the former to receive (it appeared later) $150,000,000 for relief and reconstruction and $150,000,000 for military supplies and guidance, the latter to receive $100,000,000 in arms and strategic advice:

... The very existence of the Greek State is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the Government’s authority. ... Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. ... Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the U.S. for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential for the preservation of order in the Middle East. ... We shall not realize our objectives unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the U.S. ... The U.S. has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. ... I believe that it must be the policy of the U.S. to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. ... We must take immediate and resolute action. ... The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedom. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation."

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This plea implied that Greece and Turkey were faced with imminent Soviet invasion or Communist revolution, which the U.S.A. must defeat or suppress. It also suggested that both countries were democracies, entitled to American aid in a global struggle between “freedom” and “totalitarianism.” In fact, the negotiations arising out of Soviet proposals for joint defense of the Dardanelles (i.e., Soviet bases on the Straits) and for possible retrocession to Russia of the districts of Kars and Ardahan had ended inconclusively in October, 1946, with the U.S.A. asserting that any threat or attack against Turkey should be “a matter for action on the part of the Security Council.” In Greece, British forces had supported the Greek Monarchists in fighting and defeating the Communist-led Republican forces of the E.A.M. in December-January, 1944-45. King George II asserted in the autumn of 1946 that guerrillas or partisans resisting the authority of Athens were receiving aid from Jugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Athens appealed to the U.N. in December. The U.N. Commission investigating the matter had not reported in March of 1947. Its later report (May 21), from which a minority of members dissented, held Greece’s northern neighbors partly responsible for the disorders and made proposals for peace. The urgency of the President’s message was due to the British notice of February 24 of impending withdrawal of British troops and of financial support of the Athens regime.

As for “democracy,” the Turkish Government was a one-party dictatorship of the “Republican People’s Party” from 1924 to 1946. The election of July 21, 1946, in which the “Democratic Party” was allowed to participate, was conducted under martial law, with Opposition papers suppressed. Most foreign observers held that the Government’s overwhelming victory was won by pressure and fraud. The Greek Government, installed by British arms, was viewed by its critics as a Royalist-Fascist regime whose electoral victories on March 31 and September 1, 1946 (despite the conclusion of an Anglo-American-French Supervisory Commission that the voting was fairly conducted), were a result of fear of Communism rather than of enthusiasm for “monarcho-Fascism.” Champions of the Athens regime contended, conversely, that it had overwhelming popular support and was the only alternative to the bloody tyranny of a Communist minority.20 Prior to the appro-

20 King George (von Sonderberg-Gluckberg) was barred from the throne by the Allies in World War I as pro-German. He established the Fascist dictatorship of 1936 under General Matakas. His brother Paul, who succeeded him in April, 1947, was head of the Fascist Youth Organization in 1937, which the author saw parading in Constitution Square, giving the Hitler salute. On the other hand, despite the doubtful validity of Churchill’s charges in December, 1944, there can be little question but that the coalition of Leftist parties in the E.A.M. was led and dominated by Communists, who hoped to oust the British and set up an ultra-Left dictatorship with a
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Pristations of the Truman Doctrine, no less than $700,000,000 in foreign funds had gone into Greece since liberation, with little effect in promoting rehabilitation, democracy, or even the relief of desperate mass impoverishment but with much effect in stimulating the black market, imports of luxuries, and the enrichment of a small group of public officials and private profiteers.

In so far as the Truman Doctrine was motivated by considerations of foreign policy (rather than of domestic politics) its raison d'être lay in the strategic calculation that American control of Greece and Turkey was essential to outflank the Soviet position in the Balkans and to safeguard against a possible Muscovite advance the oil reserves of the Near and Middle East. To “contain” the Soviet Union at all points where Soviet pressure might become dangerous became the fixed purpose of the State Department, thanks largely to the logic of George F. Kennan, director of Marshall’s planning staff.21 This reasoning was thought by some to be fallacious, since in an American-Soviet war, whether fought with or without atomic weapons, Soviet armies would at once overwhelm Greece and Turkey whatever the U.S.A. might do—as Secretary of War Patterson conceded in the Congressional hearings. In any case the President could not ask for support of the policy proposed in terms of “power politics,” which are equated in the American mind with sin and are believed to be practiced only by enemy states. He was obliged to put his case in terms of ideological imperatives and moral platitudes.22

pro-Soviet orientation. Moscow, however, seems to have given no aid or encouragement to the rebels, either directly or through Albania, Jugoslavia, and Bulgaria, until after the Anglo-American campaign to oust the U.S.S.R. from the Balkans was launched in August, 1945 (see p. 811). The ruling group in Greece (1945-47) was the Populist (Royalist) Party, led by Constantine Tsaldaris. The establishment under American encouragement in the autumn of 1947 of a coalition with the Liberals, led by Themistocles Sophoulis, produced no discernible change in the policies of the Government or in the prospects of domestic peace. The Greek tragedy was never a simple issue of “freedom” vs. “tyranny,” since there was little of the former and much of the latter on both sides in a land which had had no practice in democracy since ancient times. The most objective account of the background of recent developments is The Greek Dilemma (London, Gollancz, 1947) by William Hardy McNeill.


22 Considerations of power politics, albeit on a somewhat naïve level, did enter into the final decision of Congress. To take but a single example, the following colloquy took place on Mar. 31, 1947, in the hearings before the House Committee of Foreign Affairs.

Hon. Fred L. Crawford of Michigan: I would not start with Greece, I would start with Russia. If you will permit me to speak very plainly, I would take the spokesmen of the U.S. and instruct them specifically to shove their chins right up against the chins of Mr. Molotov, Mr. Stalin and Mr. Vyshinsky and to shove their stomachs squarely up against those gentlemen, physically if you please, and say to them: “You will either

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After prolonged hearings and debate (despite the President’s insistence that the funds must be voted by March 31), the Senate approved, 67 to 23, on April 23, and the House, 287 to 107, on May 9. President Truman signed the bill on May 22, 1947. Republican Dwight Griswold, former Governor of Nebraska, became head of the aid mission in Athens. An American military mission went to Turkey to help modernize the Army and direct the construction of bases from which American bombers could easily reach the oil fields of Soviet Georgia and Azerbaijan. Subsequent developments need not here be reviewed, except to notice that the American purposes proposed had not been realized by the advent of 1948.

The reequipment of the Turkish Army, Navy, and Air Force proceeded without incident, save that local officials urged more generous aid, to cover civilian as well as military needs, while the Ankara regime of President Ismet Inonu and Premier Recep Peker was, after half a year’s American sponsorship, no more “democratic” than formerly. Progress toward democracy, recovery, and peace in Greece was disheartening. President Truman’s first quarterly report to Congress (November 10, 1947) asserted that “Greece is still free” but added that “the continued support of the guerrillas by Greece’s northern neighbors . . . has resulted in an over-all worsening of the military situation. . . . The economic situation has not basically improved. . . . Intensification of military operations has necessitated a transfer of funds from the economic to the military program. . . . Difficulties must be overcome. . . .”

disarm or we will proceed. . . . You are either going to disarm while we hold these things [atomic bombs] in suspense or we are going to use them, because we have the power to do it.” This is the only kind of imperialism I agree with.

MR. CHIPPERFIELD: If Russia refuses, that would mean war.

MR. CRAWFORD: Yes. . . . It would mean that Russia would get licked. . . .

HON. WALTER H. JUDD of Minnesota: We should say to Russia: “Nobody can be arming off behind the hills somewhere in private. Humanity cannot tolerate such a threat to develop. A decent concern for world security makes us give you notice to move out of your chief industrial cities. Next week we are going to drop bombs unless you are willing to come along and join in fully supervised world-wide disarmament.” I agree with the gentleman’s thesis 100%.

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The rulers of Greece resisted proposals for currency stabilization, tax reforms, and price control. They asked instead for further funds to double the Army and the police. In March an armed force of 130,000 had consistently failed to suppress partisans estimated to number 13,000 fighters. By autumn the number of guerrillas had risen to perhaps 25,000. That they were receiving more aid than formerly from across the frontiers was scarcely to be doubted. Equally clear was their redoubled determination to resort to raids, sabotage, and terrorism. But their major allies in recruiting followers were the Greek reactionaries, whose repressive measures, condoned or ignored by U.S. advisers, drove new thousands into the camp of the rebels. Repeated promises of an all-out offensive to annihilate resistance failed to materialize. A general offer of amnesty produced no result, since the rebels expected, from the experience of others, to be exiled, tortured, hanged, or shot if they gave themselves up. Paul Porter, former economic adviser to Athens and an advocate of the Truman Doctrine, wrote in Collier's, September 20, 1947, that the Greek regime intends "to use foreign aid as a way of perpetuating the privileges of a small banking and commercial clique which constitutes the invisible power." When questions were raised in the British Parliament about pictures of severed heads of captured guerrillas, the Greek Cabinet reissued orders against the beating of prisoners and the "display" (not the removal) of heads. Mass arrests and daily executions became routine. In early December the Cabinet outlawed all strikes and decreed the death penalty for strikers.

Under these conditions the rebel cause gained wider support than it had enjoyed before U.S. intervention. American advice to Government commanders produced no striking results. Voices were soon raised for the dispatch of U.S. troops to Greece to put down the rebellion. Such a step seemed likely to strengthen, rather than weaken, the rebel bands. Meanwhile, on Christmas Eve of 1947, in pursuance of threats first made in August, the rebel radio announced the establishment of a "Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece," pledged to continue the "struggle of the Greek people against foreign imperialists and their Greek lackeys," to promote popular justice, land reform, and education, to nationalize industry, hold elections, rally mass support for the battles to come, develop friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. and the Balkan "democracies," etc. Premier, Minister of War, and "General of the Democratic Fighting Forces" was Markos Vafiades, guerrilla commander. Miltiades Porphyrogenis was Minister of Justice. All "Cabinet" members were Communists. Washington warned that any outside recognition of the rebel regime would have grave consequences. . . .

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Marshall Plan. Meanwhile the Truman Administration had embarked upon a new and more ambitious program of solving its problems. On June 5, 1947, Secretary Marshall spoke at Harvard:

...Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help; or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character. ... It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piece-meal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.

The precise import of these suggestions, which initially represented no considered decision on the part of policy makers, was unclear. Paris and London, however, at once seized upon them, Bevin opining that "the speech may well rank as one of the greatest in the world's history." Here again the U.N. was by-passed, though it had in active operation a European Recovery Commission, including all U.N. members on the Continent. Bevin and Bidault met in Paris on June 17 and agreed that a series of committees should study assets and needs. On June 18, Molotov was invited to join them. What followed is suggestive of the Nemesis which preceded 1914 and 1939 and doomed to frustration all constructive efforts at building a global community of peace and plenty. The Marshall Plan, as it slowly took shape,
impressed many as an imaginative use of American resources to recreate One World whose people would be self-supporting, self-respecting, and confident in the future. The enterprise was to be wrecked on the rock of American-Soviet discord, with Americans blaming Moscow and Russians blaming Washington.

Warsaw and Prague expressed interest and willingness to collaborate. Bevin, Bidault, and Molotov met in Paris on June 27. Molotov, speaking for a Power more fearfully devastated by war than any other and, thus far, sternly denied any American loan, asked what aid the U.S. proposed to render and on what terms. No one knew. Bevin defied the Soviet Foreign Minister and insisted that the European Governments should first draft a program and ascertain later what Washington would do. On July 1, Marshall denounced as "a malicious distortion" Soviet hints that the U.S.A. was seeking "imperialist" control over the policies of the recipient States. On July 2, the Paris meeting broke up. Molotov rejected Anglo-French proposals, alleging that such a program, in the absence of knowledge of American intentions, would jeopardize "the economic independence and sovereignty" of European countries. He expressed concern lest inclusion of Germany in the Plan might mean the restoration of the Reich with no reparations to its victims. The Anglo-French Plan, he argued, would "lead to no good result" but would enable the U.S.A. to "make use of some European countries against others in whatever way certain strong Powers, seeking to establish their domination, should find it profitable to do so." Bevin called this "a complete travesty." Molotov went home. The U.S.S.R. and all its satellites refused to participate.

On Anglo-French invitation, representatives of 16 States, including the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Iceland, Eire, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey, met in Paris on July 12, with Bevin as chairman. As committees were appointed, it was bruited about, without denial, that the revival of the Ruhr, plus (perhaps) a European customs union, would be the "core" of the whole program. By the end of August, in response to pressure from Will Clayton, George S. Kennan, et al., the Executive Committee agreed to reduce estimated four-year needs from $30,000,000,000 to $20,000,000,000. Bevin hinted vaguely that Washington should resume Lend-Lease or "redistribute" gold. On September 22, the 16-nation Committee signed its report, which proposed net aid from America of $19,330,000,000 through 1951 to achieve a self-supporting European economy—on the assumption of a large expansion of trade between western and eastern Europe, which in turn was said to depend on Poland's ability to rehabilitate her coal mines by procuring from abroad "including the U.S., a substantial volume of mining
equipment” and upon “the progress of reconstruction in the U.S.S.R. and an increased flow of capital goods to the U.S.S.R.”

The paradox and doubtful future of the Marshall Plan (presently rechristened the European Recovery Program, or E.R.P.) was here made plain to all with eyes to see—a group whose numbers on both sides of the Atlantic were politically negligible. Urban and industrial western Europe was dependent for its high living standards on foodstuffs and raw materials from eastern Europe in amounts which could not be supplied from the U.S. or elsewhere. The predominantly agrarian Soviet bloc had need of, but was not dependent upon, American or western European supplies to maintain its low living standards or even to improve them. Soviet cooperation was therefore essential to make the program successful, both in terms of its short-run economic viability and in terms of its long-run constructive purposes. The withholding of such cooperation was attributed by the American press to Soviet sin. It was actually due to the fact that no American aid to the U.S.S.R. or its satellites was conceivable, thanks to the line of the State Department, the temper of Congress, and the climate of opinion in a land embarked upon an anti-Soviet crusade. The E.R.P. had therefore to be presented in Washington as a program of “defense against Communism” and as another move in the strategy of thwarting the evil designs of the Kremlin. The Harriman Committee, in its report of November 8 recommending the scaling down of European requirements to $17,000,000,000, argued for aid to “prevent World War III” by winning the “first major battle” of liberty against totalitarianism. In appealing to a special session of Congress on November 10 for $597,000,000 in interim winter aid to France, Italy and Austria, Marshall also denounced the U.S.S.R., which had meanwhile “declared war” on the whole program.

The economic success in western Europe of any program of recovery was contingent upon peace and prosperous trade between East and West. But the political success in Washington of any program was contingent upon portraying it and administering it as another campaign in the “cold war” against the “Red menace.” Congressmen demanded an embargo against

25 Representative of public appeals in the U.S. for support of the E.R.P. was the full-page statement in various papers, Sept. 22, 1947, of James H. McGraw, Jr.: “While we delay—Russia drives for the Atlantic: In the struggle to keep western Europe west of the Iron Curtain it is later than you think. . . . Russia grasps for dominion over all Europe. . . . In France the Communists drive to overthrow the Government. In Italy they do likewise. In Greece, Russia kills the U.N. Investigating Commission. . . . To date Herbert Hoover alone has had the courage and vision to state a program. . . . We insist that those countries which receive our aid work hard enough to get results. To this end, continued aid should be on an installment plan, each installment conditional on getting results. . . .”
the U.S.S.R. Strategists dreamed of restoring Germany as a bulwark against Muscovy. Communists everywhere vowed to defeat the E.R.P., while invective and insult between Washington and Moscow rose to new heights of vituperation. Congress, moreover, attached conditions which provoked foreign resentment and facilitated Communist propaganda.

Despite Marshall’s plea the Interim Foreign Aid Bill sent to the President on December 15, 1947, provided only $522,000,000 for France, Italy, and Austria up to March 31, 1948, and, as an anti-Communist gesture, granted an additional $18,000,000 to China, though the Administration had made no such request. It further provided that specific agreements would be made with recipient States, obligating them “to make efficient use” of the commodities furnished; to deposit equivalent local currency in a special account, to be used “only for such purposes as may be agreed to between such country and the Government of the U.S.”; “to give full and continuous publicity by all available media (including Government press and radio) . . . to inform the ultimate consumers as to the purpose, source, character and amounts of commodities made available”; to furnish detailed information on distribution, use, receipts, and prices charged and “such other information as may be requested by the President”; to promote local production; to refrain from exporting similar commodities without the consent of the U.S.; to permit American inspectors, including Congressional committees, “to observe, advise and report” on distribution, and allow American press and radio representatives to observe and report as well on distribution and utilization of commodities and use of the special fund. The President could terminate aid in case of violation of terms or “changed conditions” making aid no longer “desirable” or “no longer consistent with the national interests of the U.S.” All commodities furnished were to be stamped indelibly so as to “indicate to the people of the country of destination that such commodities have been furnished or made available by the U.S.A.”

These terms for the first installment of E.R.P. aid seemed entirely proper to most members of Congress. They elicited almost no comment in the American press, even when the Quai d’Orsay made timid objections before signing an accord. What would be left of the dignity and “economic sovereignty” of the recipients, should the terms be broadly interpreted, was not explained. In his detailed request for $17,000,000,000 in long-term aid (of which $6,800,000,000 was to be made available by June 30, 1949), the President reiterated these conditions, included a requirement that recipients facilitate sales of strategic materials to the U.S. for stockpiling, and proposed that the program be under “the direction and control of the Secretary of State.” The sums proposed would not suffice to maintain a “favorable” American balance of trade of $1,000,000,000 a month unless price levels
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should be stabilized and western Europe in fact made self-supporting and prosperous by 1951. For reasons already suggested, neither condition was likely to be realized.

Marshall and Molotov had meanwhile put an end to the last hope of peace treaties between the major United Nations, Germany, and Austria. On November 19, in Chicago the Secretary of State denied all "imperialist" ambitions or "passion for war"; denounced the U.S.S.R.; asserted that "patient" and "God-fearing" Americans had "been virtually driven into a state of active resentment" by "brazen and contemptuous" propaganda; urged the restoration of Germany, and particularly of the Ruhr, under safeguards of demilitarization; and promised resistance to "the campaign which is being directed against us as one of the bulwarks of Western civilization." Before his departure, Marshall conferred with Byrnes, who had openly urged a separate treaty with western Germany and U.S. initiative to support U.N. in expelling the Russians from eastern Germany under threat of "measures of last resort." The final conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London (November 25-December 15, 1947) was adjourned by General Marshall, halfway through its agenda, when Molotov assailed the integrity of American purposes in dealing with the German problem. Despite bad manners and unwarranted charges, Molotov had offered concessions to the American view: a higher level of German steel production; German imports to be a "first charge" against exports, ahead of reparations; a slight reduction in Soviet claims on "German assets" in Austria; and reparations from current German production to be spread over 20 years and to be based on a level of industry far beyond that anticipated at Potsdam.

But Molotov "demanded" such reparations, pleaded for German unification and the abolition of Bizonia, and insisted on four-Power control of the Ruhr—and these demands Marshall, like Byrnes, held to be wholly unacceptable on the stated ground that the U.S.A. would be paying the bill and on the unstated ground that Soviet economy must at all costs be weakened, not strengthened, by any general European settlement. Whether Molotov hoped to reach any settlement at London is doubtful. There is no convincing evidence that Marshall went to London with any intention of reaching a settlement, save on terms of unconditional surrender.

Greater America. The U.S.A. of the Truman era was a land vastly richer than all other lands on earth, happy in its prosperity, proud of its charity, united in its new "internationalism," and buoyant in its overwhelming power.

26 On Oct. 16, 1947, the London Times wrote that Byrnes's proposals were "little better than a simple recipe for war." The News Chronicle said he "has talked deplorable and dangerous nonsense." The Daily Mirror: "Mr. Byrnes is so frank as openly to advocate war with Russia. Is this wickedness, idiocy, or a mixture of both?"
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It was also a land whose workers feared further inflation and deflation, whose rulers felt guilt at fabulous profits and failure to win the peace, and whose people as a whole transmuted their doubts and fears into hatred of the other Super-Power which challenged their way of life.

Whatever it had been in the past or might become in the future, the U.S.A. in 1948 stood over the non-Soviet world like a colossus whose will was law. This fact was less a product of common purpose than of the enormous wealth, productivity, and military might of the American giant. Power entails responsibilities. Power also engenders its own peculiar dynamic in a world in which power is split among rival sovereignties rather than united for joint purposes. Such dynamism is "imperialistic" only when displayed by enemies, never when exhibited by one's own fair land, which, by definition, is invariably just, generous, altruistic, and beneficent in its exercise of influence. That these qualities characterized the use of American power in the late 1940's was not doubted by many Americans, whatever foreigners might believe. Whether this evaluation was correct, only future judges could say in the light of events as yet unborn.

The power of the U.S.A. revealed itself in its most enlightened form in relations with the Republics of Latin America. A survey of their internal and international politics would require another volume. Here it is enough to observe that Washington increased its influence by abstaining from the "Yankee imperialism" of earlier days and adhering to the precepts of non-intervention, good-neighborliness and continental solidarity in a family of (theoretically) equal sovereignties. The Americas to the south remained, as before, essentially "colonial" lands—i.e., they lived by the sale of oil, coffee, sugar, minerals, meats, grain, wool, and hides to more industrialized areas, while their social structure conformed closely to a feudal pattern. Small minorities of great landowners and enterprisers ruled over illiterate and impoverished masses of peons, tenants, peasant debtors, and sharecroppers, eking out a scant sustenance from their arduous and primitive labors.

The mass was largely Indian in Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay. In the Caribbean islands, Central America, and Brazil it was white, Negro, and Indian. In Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile it was largely white. Nowhere, save in Argentina, was there any considerable middle class between the very rich and the very poor. Politics was the prerogative of the former and always hazardous for the latter. Only in Mexico, with its "Institutional Revolutionary Party," had a qualified social revolution, much moderated in its later phases, effected agrarian reforms and sponsored popular education and democratic practices, not always by democratic means. The APRA of Haye de la Torre in Peru reflected mass demands for socialism and Indian emancipation from ancient evils. Liberals
and radicals elsewhere, with a strong infusion of Communists, aspired toward social innovations. But in general the era of the caudillos (chieftains) gave way, under the stresses and hopes of more recent times, not to democracy as North Americans and western Europeans know it—since its prerequisites are still lacking—but to political instability, occasional mass movements for reform, and an uneasy balance between classes and masses and among rival factions within the elite. Such societies invariably breed radicalism—and also generate reactionary and repressive dictatorships.

British and American capital has long controlled most of the industry and much of the agriculture and transport of Latin America. United States power is irresistible in relation to any power which any or all of the Latin communities could bring to bear against it. That power is no longer wielded in terms of a unilateral Monroe Doctrine, government-supported investments, and intervention by the marines. At Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the Foreign Ministers of all the American Republics met in January, 1942, and agreed jointly to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Triplice Powers. All complied, save Argentina. Sumner Welles, then the State Department's mentor in Latin-American matters, carefully refrained from pressing for declarations of war, though most of the Republics subsequently took this action. A revolution in Bolivia in December, 1943, brought to power a group alleged to be pro-Nazi, but Washington and London extended recognition next June. In Argentina a conservative regime was ousted by the Army on June 4, 1943, in an overturn which made Juan B. Perón the focal point of effective power, exercised after February, 1944, through President Farrell, whom Washington refused to recognize. The new Argentine Government was ultranationalistic, pro-labor, anti-U.S., militarist, expansionist, anti-Communist, and quasi-Fascist. In the latter respect it resembled the dictatorship (1930-45) of Getulio Vargas in Brazil. But Rio cooperated with Washington, while Buenos Aires often did not.

On February 21, 1945, the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace opened in Mexico City. Argentina was not invited, though requested to sign the final agreement: the “Act of Chapultepec” of March 3. This instrument reiterated the principles of nonrecognition of territorial conquest, nonintervention, conciliation, arbitration, consultation, solidarity against external aggression, etc. It also recommended the conclusion of a general treaty by which any threats or acts of aggression against any American Republic should be met by collective sanctions, ranging from recall of envoys to economic penalties and use of force. Argentina hedged but was admitted to the San Francisco Conference and to the U.N. on the initiative of the U.S., despite early characterization of the Argentine regime by Roosevelt and Hull as “Fascist.” Spruille Braden, sent as Ambassador to Buenos
Aires in 1945, devoted himself to criticizing tyranny and praising democracy. These activities contributed to Perón’s triumph in February, 1946, in a relatively free election in which the Perónistas won patriotic approval by evoking echoes of Yankee dictation. Ambassador George Messersmith subsequently appeased and courted President Perón. Braden quit the State Department. Señora Eva Perón, in her travels abroad, was enthusiastically hailed by Franco, the Pope, and other notables.

In August, 1947, after many delays, an Inter-American Defense Conference met at Rio to give effect to the Act of Chapultepec. Because of concessions to Argentine dissent, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Act of Petropolis), approved August 30, 1947, did not establish any obligatory system of collective security. War was (again) renounced, pacific settlement was prescribed, and any attack by any State against an American State, within a defined area of land and sea between the North and South Poles, “shall be considered as an attack against all the American States” (Article 3). Sanctions were provided, but “no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent” (Article 20). The parley ended on September 2, after a triumphant reception for President Truman. Along with Marshall and Vandenberg, he bespoke peace, solidarity, and high resolve to aid friends in need. Various statements contrasted the success of the Rio Conference with deadlocks in U.N. and in treaty making, and upheld Pan-American unity as a model for all the world to follow.

Such a view is a mirror of confusion between shadow and substance. The sovereignties of the 20th century are not, and can never be, equal in power, whatever verbal rituals their spokesmen may indulge in to reaffirm their equality in law. The Pan-American State System is a constellation of small planets around a huge sun. The central star may at times scorch the lesser bodies revolving around it—e.g., U.S. policy, 1904-28. At other times it may shed its beneficent refulgence upon them and be adored as a deity instead of being reviled as a devil. In either case the positions and motions of the spheres are fixed by forces beyond conscious control. Washington’s problem in dealing with Latin America has never been simple. On the one hand, huge investments and trading interests must be protected, and global strategic plans must be furthered. On the other hand, local elites and masses must be conciliated or coerced into cooperation.

Force is cheap but in the end wasteful. Fraud is dangerous. Favors, including bribes, subsidies, and material emoluments of all kinds, are wasteful but in the long run cheap—perhaps. Their efficacy is limited by the fact that in a dishonest epoch those who are bought often do not stay bought. Not to bribe the elites is to risk their disfavor. To bribe them is to risk resentment from the masses. To bribe the masses is to antagonize the elites.
Happily in most of Latin America the masses are so illiterate and so wrapped in dark ignorance and local folkways as to know nothing of what goes on beyond their farms, factory, or neighborhood. Yet ferments of unrest must be guarded against by words and works of social amelioration, without filling the elites with fear of loss of privilege.

Policy makers in Washington, picking their way precariously among these pitfalls, have on the whole done well within the necessary limits of the desirability of what is possible and the possibility of what is desirable. Since the coming of Dwight Morrow in 1927, the hard problems posed by the Mexican Revolution called out the highest qualities of wisdom, sympathy, and forbearance in U.S. policy, with no real sacrifice of interests. Sumner Welles similarly typified broad vision and statesmanship in dealing with Latin-American issues as a whole. Attitudes and habits have now been established which promise to ensure a final end of the iron fist of crude Yankee domination and a persistent use of the velvet glove of Good Neighborly friendship. In a time when the disparity of power between the southern Republics and the “Colossus of the North” is far greater than it has ever been in the past, the power of the titan seems likely to be exercised through symbols and dollars rather than bullets and bombers.

The efficacy of such influence was enhanced by the campaign against Communist infiltration and Soviet imperialism initiated in Washington in 1946-47. The men of land and money in Latin America have ever been staunchly opposed to social radicalism and are ever prepared to resist the evil machinations of Moscow out of their devotion to justice and freedom. Gen. Enrico Gaspar Dutra of Brazil, who succeeded Vargas (deposed by an Army coup in 1945), promptly suppressed the Communist Party in 1947 when it became a dangerous mass movement, having won 600,000 votes by 1945 and 800,000 in 1946. He likewise reorganized Brazilian trade unions to eliminate Red agitation. When the Soviet press asserted that Dutra was under U.S. influence and had accepted Nazi decorations (both of which insults were the more intolerable for being true), Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Moscow on October 21, 1947—no expressions of regret being recorded in Washington. In 1946, Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, elected with the aid of Communist votes, put three Communists in the Cabinet of Chile. But he expelled them in April, 1947. When 17,000 coal miners struck in October, the Chilean Government decreed martial law, sent troops to break the strike, and arrested and deported Communists and labor leaders. After expelling the Jugoslav chargé, Santiago suppressed the Communist Party and severed relations with Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. (October 21, 1947)—again without regret in Washington. President Videla’s proposal of a solid Pan-American front against Communism was to be discussed at
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the Ninth International Conference of American States, held in Bogotá early in 1948. A new peak of solidarity and fraternal collaboration in resistance to alien totalitarianism was thus reached in Inter-American relations.

But the American domain in 1948 was not limited to the American continents. The U.S.A. had more than a dozen military missions in Latin-American capitals, was developing a program of arms standardization, and was contemplating further financial grants to its southern neighbors. Such occasional expressions of ingratitude as the rejection by Panama in December, 1947, of agreements for U.S. control of air bases were exceptions proving the rule. (J. Parnell Thomas offered to make things right by exposing Communism in Panama.) Comparable plans for military cooperation with Canada were well advanced, although Ottawa declined to join the Pan-American security system. The Super-Power of the West had troops in Japan, China, Korea, Germany, and Austria. It counted Liberia as a friend and enjoyed a monopoly of the output of uranium ore from the Belgian Congo. It controlled the key Pacific islands, had bases from Greenland to Antarctica, and was the patron of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other remote kingdoms. Greece, Turkey, and Iran occupied a relationship to the U.S. which would once have been described as that of "protectorates." 27 The National Government of China benefited in the Far East from American resolves to support freedom against totalitarianism, while massive financial aid, with appropriate safeguards to ensure its efficient use, was provided to Britain, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Eire, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, western Germany, Switzerland, and Portugal.

The only remaining obstacle to American leadership of all the world along the paths of democracy, peace, and prosperity was the Soviet Union and its puppets and the dark forces of international Communism, aiming everywhere, as all Americans knew, at the replacement of liberty by tyranny.

27 On Oct. 6, 1947, Ambassador George Allen and Iranian War Minister Mahmoud Djan signed an accord, to be enforced until Mar. 20, 1949, by which the U.S.A. dispatched a military mission to Iran "in conformity with the request of the Government of Iran" with a view toward "enhancing the efficiency of the Iranian Army." Members of the mission were not to concern themselves with "tactical and strategical plans of operations against a foreign enemy" and "will not concern themselves with secret matters except when it is essential to their duties and then only with the approval of the Ministry of War." Iran will refrain from engaging "the services of any personnel of any other foreign government for duties of any nature connected with the Iranian Army." The Iranian Army and gendarmerie after the close of World War II were directed by Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police. The accord of Oct. 6 was put into effect at once and registered with U.N. on Dec. 22, in accordance with the U.S. policy of "open diplomacy." See also Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, "American Political and Strategic Interests in the Middle East and South Eastern Europe," Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 23, 1947.
SUGGESTED READINGS

That America would spare no expense and, if need be, no cost in treasure and blood to thwart this design and to remove the obstacle was a foregone conclusion 20 years after victory in World War I and 3 years after victory in World War II—unless American minds were changed by doubts, or by diminished enthusiasm for World War III, or by some vision of a different road into the future. When Henry A. Wallace on December 29, 1947, announced his candidacy for the Presidency on a platform of peace, he was denounced by the press as a crackpot and at once condemned by “Americans for Democratic Action,” PM, and most labor leaders, all of whom held him to be the dupe of a “Communist plot.” The American mood in 1948, though mixed, was firmly and belligerently militant. Almost all Americans summoned freemen everywhere to follow the leadership of the Great Republic in ensuring the global defeat of vice by virtue and the ensuing inauguration of the millennium. “From Greenland’s icy mountains, From India’s coral strands, Where Afric’s sunny fountains Roll down their golden sands, From many an ancient river, From many a palmy plain, They call us to deliver Their lands from error’s chain. . . .”

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2. U.K.: BRITANNIC DILEMMA

This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle, This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars This other Eden, demi-paradise, This fortress built by Nature for herself Against infection and the hand of war, This happy breed of men, this little world, This precious stone set in the silver sea, Which serves it in the office of a wall Or as a moat defensive to a house, Against the envy of less happier lands,—This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England, This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings, Fear'd by their breed, and famous by their birth, Renowned for their deeds as far from home, For Christian service and true chivalry,
As is the sepulchre in stubborn Jewry Of the world’s ransom, blessed
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Mary's Son: This land of such dear souls, this dear dear land, Dear for her reputation through the world, Is now leas’d out—I die pronouncing it—Like to a tenement or pelting farm. England, bound in with the triumphant sea, Whose rocky shore beats back the envious siege Of watery Neptune, is now bound in with shame, With inky blots and rotten parchment bonds; That England, that was wont to conquer others, Hath made a shameful conquest of itself. Ah, would the scandal vanish with my life, How happy then were my ensuing death!—WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, King Richard the Second, Act II, Scene 1.

The United Kingdom no longer exists. It had its origin in the Act of Union of 1800. Ireland was then formally united with “Great Britain”—consisting of England, Wales, and Scotland, joined in a personal union under James I (James VI of Scotland) in 1603, and united “forever” in more substantial form by the Act of Union of 1707. The phrase “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland” was omitted from royal proclamations in 1927 in deference to the Free State Act of 1921, by which only northern Ireland (Ulster) remained under the Parliament of Westminster. But the Act of 1800 was never repealed. To abolish anything, however obsolete, is un-English. “United Kingdom” is therefore a term still used in everyday parlance and even in official documents.

This realm has been “ruled” since 1936 by George VI of the House of Windsor—i.e., Hanover, patriotically renamed in 1917. His official title is “George VI by the Grace of God, King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India.” His Kingdom, Empire, and Commonwealth cover one-quarter of the land surface of the globe, inhabited by a quarter of the world’s population.

Yet in the wake of World War II, Greater Britannia was not first among the Big Three, but a poor third. That part of its population which is European in language and origin numbers c. 75,000,000, of whom 48,000,000 live in the U.K. This total is more than half that of the U.S.A., over a third that of the U.S.S.R., and appreciably larger than the populations of either Germany or Japan. Britain nevertheless emerged wounded and weakened from its most perilous ordeal of a thousand years. Its people were inspired by a new vision of comradeship and social justice, but anxious—amid a poverty dignified as “austerity” and an enfeeblement disguised as “realism”—lest national impotence should lead to a loss of command over their own destiny.

This unhappy posture of adversity, distressing to all men everywhere who still revered the land which has ever been the prime citadel of freedom and the “Mother of Parliaments” in the modern world, was in some degree the consequence of causes over which Englishmen had no control. But it was
in larger degree the result of the actions and inactions of British leaders during the hollow years of the long armistice. In Britain, as in France, the middle and lower classes followed the political guidance of the wealthy and wellborn. That guidance, as it expressed itself in foreign policy, proved disastrous—wherefore it was vigorously repudiated in the aftermath of tragedy, despite the magnificent leadership in the darkest days of Winston Churchill, symbol of victory. The quality and direction of that guidance therefore deserve initial examination.
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Devices of Colonel Blimp. If Waterloo was "won on the playing fields of Eton," it was no less true a century and a quarter later that Madrid, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, Oslo, Amiens, and Dunkirk were lost there. The myopia of the upper classes and of the sons of riches who came from the "public schools" was far more responsible for what befell the realm than the ignorance or provincialism of the masses. In England there was not, as in France, any colorful Communist movement to frighten people of means. The Labor Party remained politically impotent after its abandonment by Ramsay MacDonald. The forces of political liberalism were feeble. During all of a dismal decade, Britain's destiny was entrusted by a confused electorate to the ultra-Tory wing of the Conservative Party, which dominated without challenge the catastrophic "National Government" of 1931. This regime of blind men made way for other leadership only on the brink of utter ruin in May, 1940.

The central error of Tory politics was to ignore a principle which all wise British statesmen had adhered to for many centuries: that of preserving a balance of power on the Continent by giving diplomatic and military support to the neighbors and possible victims of the most powerful Continental State. To permit any one Power to control the Continent had always been deemed highly dangerous to the British Isles and to its far-flung colonies and dominions. To prevent any such development, England had waged war upon, and raised successive coalitions against, the Spain of Philip II, the France of Louis XIV and Napoleon I, and the Germany of Wilhelm II. Only when a stable equipoise of rivals prevailed across the Channel could Britain safely follow a course of "splendid isolation." Such was the case between 1815 and 1904. When the growing power and ambition of the Second Reich threatened domination of the Continent, Britain joined forces with France and Russia to checkmate Berlin. This combination, even when joined by Japan and Italy, proved inadequate to defeat Imperial Germany. Only the addition of the United States made possible the victory of 1918. In the 20 years which followed, the leaders of Britain threw that victory away and finally permitted the Third Reich to enhance its power to a point at which it was able to conquer the Continent and menace Britain with destruction.

The question of why Britain's leaders so completely forgot the lessons of the past and brought upon their people so painful an aftermath of folly admits of various relevant answers, none of them having much relationship to the "explanations" offered by the chief actors during the years of retreat. In terms of Realpolitik, Britain after Versailles could have found security either by putting an end to the Continental and world balance of power through giving full support to an effective League of Nations or by revert-
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ing to a policy of supporting the weaker Continental Powers against the stronger. The former policy would have required the assumption of far-reaching commitments and a firm resolve to honor all such obligations. The latter policy would have required enforcement of the military clauses of Versailles to prevent the rebuilding of a German war machine or, if this was not to be, then at least full British support of France, Poland, and the Little Entente and a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. as a means of check-mating the Axis. Downing Street followed neither of these courses. It supported the League in a halfhearted manner and finally sacrificed it on the altar of appeasement. It supported Republican Germany in feeble fashion against the France of Poincaré and subsequently supported the Third Reich against the France of Barthou and Blum, meanwhile alienating the Soviet Union and firmly declining all obligations to defend Vienna, Prague, or Warsaw.

This policy, which was clearly suicidal in its consequences and apparently mad or muddled in its motivation, was not primarily a product of popular isolationism or pacifism, although these sentiments won public support for a program which otherwise might have been repudiated. The Tory line had a logic of its own in Realpolitik, albeit one seldom acknowledged. That logic presupposed that the great protagonists of the future would be Japan and the U.S.S.R. in Asia and the Reich and the U.S.S.R. in Europe. If these Powers were likely to checkmate one another and ultimately engage in a death grapple, Britain could well afford to stand aloof and to protect itself from involvement by pressing France to abandon the allies which stood in the way of the German "Drive to the East." If world revolutionary Communism, moreover, was the gravest of menaces to the British ruling classes and to the integrity of the Empire and if the Fascist Tripple promised to hold the menace in check, Britain could well afford to boycott the U.S.S.R. and lend comfort to Hitler, Hirohito, and Mussolini.28 If the Tripple should attack and conquer the Soviet Union, it might, to be sure, become a danger to the Empire. But this danger was envisaged as negligible by comparison with the danger to the Empire of any extension of Communism beyond the Soviet frontiers or any major enhancement of the power of the Soviet State. Hence the wisdom of appeasement.29

28 This view was put forward as early as 1921 by Viscount D'Aberton, post-Versailles British Ambassador in Berlin. Cf. The Diary of an Ambassador: Versailles to Rapallo, 1920-1922 (New York, Doubleday, 1929), pp. 21ff.

29 The reasoning behind this view may be suggested by the following quotations:

In 1934 Mr. L. Lawton wrote in the Fortnightly Review: "Whereas formerly German statesmen looked both to the East and to the West, Hitler at present looks to the East only... No one who studies the map of eastern Europe can doubt that there are immense possibilities of a German-Polish compromise at the expense of others.
The only difficulty with this logic was that its premises were tragically false. If it be asked how so experienced and astute a group of men as ruled the world’s greatest empire from Downing Street could have been so completely mistaken in their basic presuppositions about world politics, the only answer is that this group had come by the 1930’s to reflect, not the high political wisdom which had so often in the past enabled Britain to survive and prosper, but rather the narrow provincialism, class prejudices, and naïve ignorance of Tory squires, international financiers, and businessmen from the Midlands. David Low’s immortal cartoon character, Colonel Blimp, thought of Weltpolitik as a cricket game or a bargain counter. That it might be a fox hunt with himself as the fox never occurred to him. He was for “peace,” against “foreign entanglements,” apoplectic about Russia, half

The idea of including Ukraine within the Western European System, and moving Russia on towards the East is certainly tempting. . . . With Ukraine as part of a democratic federated system there would, it is hoped, come into existence a grouping of States with which Great Britain could be on friendly terms. The moment is long overdue for the creation of some such grouping in eastern Europe.”

Mr. L. S. Amery, former Colonial Minister, wrote in The Forward View (1935): “The first condition of European peace today is the frank acknowledgment that Germany’s armaments are now her own affair and nobody else’s [p. 71]. . . . The time has come for such a revision of the Covenant as will get rid of all those clauses (more particularly 10 and 16) which give an encouragement to the Super-State theory of the League [p. 272] . . . . The doctrine of the inevitable contagion of war is, of course, pure nonsense [p. 283] . . . . We do not regard ourselves as one of the nations of Europe [p. 285] . . . . It would be no concern of ours . . . to prevent Japanese expansion in eastern Siberia [p. 288].”

The Marquess of Londonderry, owner of many mines and large estates, differed from most of his collaborators in a somewhat naïve propensity to state his convictions in print, with the aid of Lady Desborough and Mr. G. Ward Price. Thus:

“Our Foreign Office appears to condone the associations with Communism and Bolshevism through our affiliation with France, while paying but little regard to the robust attitude of Germany, Italy, and Japan which wholeheartedly condemn Communism and Bolshevism. Bolshevism is a world-wide doctrine which aims at the internal disruption of all modern systems of government with the ultimate object of what is termed World Revolution. That Germany, Italy, and Japan condemn Bolshevism is an attitude of mind which is not properly appreciated in this country. . . . We fail to recognize that the present condition of Spain is mainly the result of Red machinations. We console ourselves with the reflection that, owing to the conservatism of the French peasant, Bolshevism will not prevail to any serious extent among the urban industrial population of France, although the Communist representation in the Chamber has increased to the number which Herr Hitler personally prophesied to me over two years ago. Belgium is showing signs of Bolshevism. And Germany sees herself surrounded by Bolshevist countries and militarily and economically hemmed in with what may well be disastrous consequences. We watch this movement with strange equanimity. We throw in our weight under ‘non-intervention’ on the side of the Reds in Spain. Belgium and France do the same. And we wonder why Germany and Italy appear more truculent and challenging as their strength and prestige increase [pp. 21-22].

“I was at a loss to understand why we could not make common ground in some form or other with Germany in opposition to Communism. . . . The anti-Communist plat form was (and still is) invaluable [p. 129]” (Ourselves and Germany, 1938).
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envious of Mussolini and Hitler, contemptuous of all "nonsense" about "collective security," and wholeheartedly devoted to "muddling through," Scotch and soda, and "business as usual." He loved pudgy Stanley Baldwin with his pipe and pigs. He respected lank and cadaverous Neville Chamberlain, who left his father's screw business in Birmingham to bring balm to a troubled world. He stoutly and stubbornly denounced all those who argued that these attitudes would spell the ruin of his nation and his class in a world vastly changed and increasingly dominated by ruthless demagogue-despots whose fondest secret dream was the destruction of the British Empire.

Colonel Blimp found the atmosphere congenial in such places as Cliveden, country estate of Lord Astor who owned the Observer (edited by J. L. Garvin), whose brother Maj. John Jacob Astor owned the Times, and whose wife, Lady Nancy, sat in Commons and entertained other lords and ladies, along with "interesting" foreigners and intellectuals, at luncheon parties and pleasant week-end gatherings. Sir Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, was of like mind. So were many of the greater industrialists of the Midlands and the financiers of the City. So were the magnates of the yellow press, Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere. (The latter for a time openly championed Sir Oswald Mosley's British Black Shirts.) So were Dean Inge of St. Paul's, the Archbishop of Canterbury, many Anglo-Catholics (High Churchmen), many Catholics, and a host of others. "I often think," sighed Lord Halifax, "how much easier the world would have been to manage if Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini had chanced to have been at Oxford." Multitudes of "Little Englanders" and isolationists cherished a picture of the world which led to similar conclusions. Such Laborite pacifists as George Lansbury and James Maxton helped to educate the masses to the necessity of seeking peace with tyrants through appeasement. Of such materials was Britain's bitterest tragedy fabricated.

Collective Insecurity. The devious and dishonorable course of British diplomacy in the 1930's, from Sir John Simon's connivance in the rape of Manchuria to Chamberlain's betrayal of Ethiopia, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, was the product of the Tory mind at its worst. The second Labor Cabinet, constituted in 1929 with Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister, disintegrated in the financial crisis of August, 1931, and gave way to a coalition "National Government," predominantly Conservative but still headed by MacDonald and his "National Laborites." The latter had no following and were expelled from the Labor Party as traitors, with Labor and part of the Liberals going into opposition. The National Government won an overwhelming victory in the election of October, 1931, and carried on with the renegade MacDonald at its head. He resigned on June 7, 1935,
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and was replaced by the Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin. The new Cabinet was a coalition in form, but for all practical purposes was a Conservative Government. The death of George V and the succession of Edward VIII on January 30, 1936, were without consequence for foreign policy, as was the constitutional crisis of the autumn, precipitated by the Cabinet’s refusal to approve the King’s projected marriage to the twice-divorced American, Mrs. Wallis Simpson. Edward abdicated on December 10, 1936, and was succeeded by his brother as George VI. Neville Chamberlain succeeded Baldwin as Prime Minister on May 28, 1937. Eden continued as Foreign Minister until his disgust at appeasement led him to resign on February 20, 1938. His place was taken by Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, third Viscount Halifax, who (as Baron Irwin) had been Viceroy of India (1926-31). Chamberlain’s principal advisers, aside from Halifax and such confidants as Sir Horace Wilson, were Hoare and Simon.

The leitmotivs of appeasement have already been suggested. In the end the British public acquiesced in this policy in the mistaken conviction that it provided the only hope of escape from the war which the policy itself had made inevitable. But the electorate had not at the outset sponsored any such course and was in fact tricked into supporting those who did. In 1934-35 the British League of Nations Union, under Lord Robert Cecil, conducted a “National Peace Ballot” in which no less than 11,500,000 votes were cast, giving an overwhelming majority for support of the League and disarmament and a heavy majority in favor of economic and military sanctions against aggressors. Accepting this result as an accurate index of what British voters wanted, Baldwin declared, “We value this support. . . . The League of Nations remains, as I said in a speech in Yorkshire, ‘the sheet-anchor of British policy.’” The National Government’s election manifesto of November, 1935, asserted, “The League of Nations will remain as before the keystone of British policy. . . . We shall continue to do all in our power to uphold the Covenant. . . . There will be no wavering.” An election poster of the Conservative Party showed Baldwin’s fist squarely planted on the Covenant over the caption, “Our Word Is Our Bond.” In the polling of November 15, 1935, the Government won 431 out of 615 seats in Commons. This was a popular endorsement not of appeasement but of collective security, to which the Government had pledged itself. The voters did not know that Hoare and Laval had made a secret pact at Geneva in September to betray Ethiopia and the League and that an even more shameful bargain between them was to leak out three weeks after the election. It is fair to say that for the next four years a group of leaders, placed in power by a public convinced it was supporting the cause of world order and resistance

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to Fascist aggression, pursued a policy of connivance in aggression which was certain to produce world anarchy. These leaders progressively "sold" this policy to the public in the name of "peace."

The precedent established in dealing with Japan in China was faithfully followed in dealing with Italy in Ethiopia, Germany in the Rhineland, and the Axis in Spain. At each step, one eloquent voice was raised in protest and warning. Each time it was ignored by those who knew better. It was the voice of one of the rarest of animals, a Tory dissenter—Winston Churchill. At each step the appeasers told Parliament and public that their decisions would ensure peace. Once the new St. George had slain not the dragon but the Abyssinian maid and the League which might have protected her from the dragon, the Tory leaders explained that the League was "too weak" to be relied upon. Finally they argued that support of the League was not to be thought of since it might mean "war"—i.e., Mussolini might "attack" the British Empire, France, Jugoslovakia, Greece, Turkey, et al. "Is it not apparent," asked Chamberlain on June 10, 1936, "that the policy of sanctions involves a risk of war? . . . There is no use for us to shut our eyes to realities." Eden announced the abandonment of sanctions on June 18, 1936, one hundred and twentieth anniversary of Waterloo and first anniversary of the Simon-Hoare-Ribbentrop naval accord by which Britain had granted to the Reich 35% parity in sea power and full parity in submarines. Simon asserted, "I do not think there is a single member of the League which is prepared to use force. . . . I am not prepared to see a single ship sunk even in a successful naval battle in the cause of Abyssinian independence." Government supporters shouted at the Labor Opposition, "Do you want war?" Lord Cecil wrote in the Times, "We cannot escape war by running away from it. . . . There is no escape from blackmail by submission." But his voice was as lonely as Churchill's.

The formula thereafter was "no commitments" and "no entanglements." A clear indication was given to Berlin that Downing Street would not resist.

30 Thus Churchill, writing on Dec. 30, 1938, wrote (Step by Step, New York, Putnam, 1939, p. 274), "The bulk of the Conservatives admire General Franco; all the forces of the Left are ardent for the Republic. The difference between the Duchess of Athol and the Scottish Tories in the Perth by-election began about Spain. The dominant element in those parts regarded her vehement sympathy for the Spanish Government as proof that she was almost ready to carry Bolshevism into Britain, to confiscate their property, pollute their churches and, if necessary, cut their throats. Nothing has strengthened the Prime Minister's hold upon well-to-do society more remarkably than the belief that he is friendly to General Franco and the Nationalist cause in Spain. But these sentiments on either side may be pushed beyond the bounds of British interest. It would seem that today the British Empire would run far less risk from the victory of the Spanish Government than from that of General Franco." Cf. also the author's Europe on the Eve, pp. 332-346.
German expansion to the east by Anthony Eden’s address to his constituents
at Leamington on November 20, 1936:

These [British] arms will never be used in a war of aggression. . . . They may, and if the occasion arose they would, be used in our own defense and in the defense of the territories of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They may, and if the occasion arose they would, be used in the defense of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression in accordance with our existing treaty obligations. They may, if a new western European settlement can be reached, be used in the defense of Germany were she the victim of unprovoked aggression by any of the other signatories of such a settlement. These, together with our Treaty of Alliance with Iraq and our projected treaty with Egypt, are our definite obligations. In addition our armaments may be used in bringing help to a victim of aggression in any case where, in our judgment, it would be proper under the provisions of the Covenant to do so. I use the word “may” deliberately, since in such an instance there is no automatic obligation to take military action. It is, moreover, right that this should be so, for nations cannot be expected to incur automatic military obligations save for areas where their vital interests are concerned.

On March 3, 1937, in Lords, Lord Halifax asserted that, although the Government did not disinterest itself in these areas, “we are unable to define beforehand what might be our attitude to a hypothetical complication in Central or eastern Europe.”

Eden and Halifax were thus in agreement, at a time when Eden was Foreign Minister and posing as the champion of collective security, that Britain should assume no commitments to defend victims of aggression in eastern or Central Europe. This was the only assurance which the leaders of the Third Reich required. It meant that, so far as London was concerned, they had a free hand in the East. Then and later, the only stipulation insisted upon by Downing Street was that Nazi imperialism must achieve its purposes without war, since war might involve Britain by involving France. The Tory carte blanche to Hitler with respect to the Drang nach Osten was thus given in the autumn of 1936—and by none other than Anthony Eden!

“Peace for Our Time.” By 1938, more than passivity was required. Eden resigned. After Anschluss, which had been passively sanctioned by persistent British refusal to come to Austria’s defense, Halifax cried, “Horrible, horrible, I never thought they would do it!” But when Litvinov warned on March 17 that Czechoslovakia was in danger, London declined his proposal for a conference of League members and the United States to consider collective means of “checking the further development of aggression and eliminating an aggravated danger of a new world massacre.” Chamberlain spoke to Commons on March 24, 1938:
I cannot imagine any events in Europe which would change the fundamental basis of British foreign policy, which is the maintenance and preservation of peace. However, that does not mean nothing would make us fight. . . . Our existing commitments which might lead to use of our arms for a purpose other than our own defense were, first of all, defense of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression. Britain also has treaty obligations to Portugal, Iraq, and Egypt.

The question now arises whether we should go further. Should we forthwith give assurance to France that in the event of her being called upon by reason of German aggression on Czechoslovakia to implement her obligations under the Franco-Czech Treaty we would immediately employ our full military force on her behalf? Or should we at once declare our readiness to take military action in resistance to any forcible interference with the independence of Czechoslovakia and invite any other nations which might desire to associate themselves with us in such a declaration? . . . His Majesty’s Government feel themselves unable to give the prior guarantee suggested. . . . [But] His Majesty’s Government will at all times be ready to render any help in their power toward the solution of questions likely to cause difficulty between the German and Czechoslovak Governments. In the meantime there is no need to assume the use of force, or, indeed, to talk about it. Such talk is to be strongly deprecated. Not only can it do no good; it is bound to do harm.

There followed in logical order the Ciano-Perth accord of April 16 for appeasing Italy, Mr. Chamberlain’s friendly gestures toward Japan, the Runciman mission to Prague, the ultimatum of September 19 to Beneš, and the “peace” at Munich. Chamberlain, like Daladier, was welcomed on his return from the Führerhaus as a conquering hero. Only one member of his Cabinet resigned in protest, Alfred Duff-Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, who said in Commons, “It was not for Serbia or Belgium we fought in 1914, though it suited some people to say so, but we were fighting then, as we should have been fighting last week, in order that one Great Power should not be allowed, in disregard of treaty obligations and the laws of nations and against all morality, to dominate by brutal force the Continent of Europe. . . . I tried to swallow the Munich terms, but they stuck in my throat. I have perhaps ruined my political career . . . but I can still walk about the world with my head erect.” Churchill also spoke: “We have sustained a total, unmitigated defeat. We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude which has befallen Great Britain and France. Do not let us blind ourselves.” No one cared. By a vote of 366 to 144, Commons upheld the Prime Minister, who went to Scotland to fish. Mahatma Gandhi commented, “Europe has sold her soul for seven days of earthly existence.”

The early events of 1939 did not change Chamberlain’s view of the future. He observed with some anxiety the Japanese occupation of Hainan and the Spratley Islands. Earl Plymouth warned Tokyo in December of the “in-
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calculable consequences” of closing the Open Door and paved the way for the granting of credits to China in March. Downing Street welcomed the reciprocal trade agreement of November 17, 1938, with the United States and looked with approval on the death of the Spanish Republic. Mussolini’s demands for French territory, which Chamberlain and Halifax failed to satisfy by their January journey to Paris and Rome, were disturbing. Also disturbing were German proposals to build submarine tonnage up to the British level. Yet this, obviously, was a means of meeting the “Soviet menace.” The Wilhelmstrasse said so. The Nazi leaders, however, were slow in showing gratitude for appeasement. “I am still waiting for a sign,” said Chamberlain in mid-December, “that they are prepared to make their contribution to peace.” They were still slower in pushing toward the Ukraine. Montagu Norman visited Schacht early in January, but the safe and conservative President of the Reichsbank was unfortunately displaced a few weeks later by Walter Funk. Yet Chamberlain still had hopes.

His hopes were not at once shattered by Hitler’s seizure of Prague in the Ides of March. This was doubtless the first step toward Kiev and the Caucasus. Halifax asked the press on March 13 not to “propagate rumors or spread distorted views.” Bonnet and Sir Eric Phipps in Paris agreed that the Anglo-French “guarantee” to Czechoslovakia did not apply. “The proposed guarantee,” explained Chamberlain, “was one against unprovoked aggression. No such aggression has yet taken place.” When Ellen Wilkinson asked in Commons whether it was “unprovoked aggression for a country to provoke secession,” the Speaker ruled her question out of order. On Wednesday, as Hitler entered the Hradčany in triumph, Chamberlain declared that this had not been contemplated by any of the signatories of the Munich agreement, but “I do not wish to associate myself today with any charges [of bad faith]. It is natural that I should bitterly regret what has occurred. But do not let us on that account be deflected from our course.” Simon urged sympathy toward Czechoslovakia but said the guarantee did not apply. “It is really essential that we should not enter into any extensive, general and undefined commitment.” The Daily Mail opined, “The final disintegration of Czechoslovakia was almost inevitable. . . . It was due to an internal split up, not external aggression.”

Bricks without Straw. On Thursday, March 16, Hitler gave Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary. On Friday, at Birmingham, Chamberlain publicly denounced him for a breach of faith. Munich had been right, but der Führer was now violating Munich and the principle of self-determination.

Is this the last attack upon a small State or is it to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an effort to dominate the world by force?
... I am not going to answer [these questions] tonight but I am sure they will require grave and serious consideration. ... While I am not prepared to engage this country by new and unspecified commitments operating under conditions which cannot now be foreseen, yet no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that because it believes war to be a senseless and a cruel thing, this nation has so lost its fibre that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if it ever were made.

There followed belated and hesitant efforts to rebuild a coalition against the Reich upon the ruins of appeasement. On March 31, 1939, Chamberlain informed Commons that the British Government, pending the conclusion of the extensive negotiations under way, would give Poland all the support in its power “in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces.” At the conclusion of Beck’s visit to London (April 3-6), it was announced that “the two countries were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance.” Meanwhile Poland would consider itself “under an obligation to render assistance to H.M. Government under the same conditions as those contained in the temporary assurance already given by H.M. Government to Poland.” For the first time in 20 years, Downing Street had entered into a bilateral pledge of mutual defense with an eastern European State. On August 25, 1939, a formal five-year Anglo-Polish alliance was signed, pledging the parties to give one another all the support in their power in case of either “becoming engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party” or in consequence of a direct or indirect threat to the independence of either, requiring resistance. Provision was made for military consultation. In the event of hostilities, the signatories would conclude no armistice or peace save by mutual consent.

On April 13, 1939, following the Italian annexation of Albania, Chamberlain told Commons that he was “disappointed” but that “nothing that has happened has in any way altered my conviction that the policy of H.M. Government in signing the Anglo-Italian agreement a year ago was right.” He announced, however, that the Government was prepared to lend Greece and Rumania all the support in its power “in the event of any action being taken which clearly threatened the independence of either, and which the Greek or Rumanian Governments respectively consider it vital to resist with their national forces.”

On May 12, Chamberlain told Commons that, pending the conclusion of a definitive alliance with Turkey, “H.M. Government and the Turkish Government declared that in the event of aggression leading to war in the Medi-
On October 19, 1939, Turkey signed a 15-year Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France, who pledged aid to Ankara in case of attack by any European Power. All agreed to aid one another in case of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean. By Article 3:

So long as the guarantee given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Rumania by the respective declarations on April 13, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the United Kingdom, and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees.

This presumably meant that Turkey was pledged to keep open the Straits if France and Great Britain should be obliged to go to Rumania's aid. But a supplementary protocol asserted, "The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot require that country to take action having as its effect or involving as its consequence entry into armed conflict with the U.S.S.R." Moscow was thus left with a veto over Turkish policy if it chose to threaten war. Should Italy enter the war, Turkey would aid the allies, but only on condition that the guarantees to Greece and Rumania remained in force and that aid involved no conflict with Russia. This last success of Allied effort to complete the "peace front" was to prove as futile as earlier steps. The Italian declaration of war coincided with the collapse of France and the Rumanian repudiation of the British guarantee. Turkey, therefore, remained neutral.

On other fronts, this intended coalition failed completely of its purpose. It neither deterred the Axis from risking war nor did it afford to the Western Powers any allies sufficiently powerful to save them from defeat. Poland was to be crushed like an eggshell. Rumania and Greece had assumed no reciprocal obligations to come to the aid of France and Britain. The Allied guarantee to Bucharest proved wholly illusory. The Kingdom was partitioned and its remnant occupied by the Reich without resistance in the autumn of 1940.

The central difficulty in the projected coalition was that it bore no relationship to the obvious rules of arithmetic in the game of power politics. Poland, Rumania, and Turkey could be protected against the Reich only by the U.S.S.R. The considerations which prompted Chamberlain to guarantee Warsaw and Bucharest before opening negotiations with Moscow and to refuse Stalin's price for an alliance until it was too late were legacies of "appeasement" which proved fatal to the whole enterprise. As failure be-
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came apparent in the summer of 1939, the Tory leaders, far from adopting a more realistic program, sought to revert to appeasement. British spokesmen reiterated their willingness to settle all differences through “negotiation.” In May, Chamberlain and Simon permitted the Reich, through the Bank of International Settlements, to secure control of some million pounds in Czech gold held in London. In July, Sir Horace Wilson and Robert S. Hudson entered into discussion with Hitler’s economic adviser, Dr. Helmuth Wohlthat, for a British “disarmament loan” of £1,000,000,000 sterling. Chamberlain declared the discussions wholly “unofficial.” Nothing came of them, but they revealed a state of mind which brought no comfort to those who hoped for the establishment of a firm and powerful anti-Nazi coalition. Downing Street, moreover, would not even lend money to Poland unless Warsaw agreed to spend it in Britain.

That the British negotiations with the only Power which could have served as an adequate counterweight to the Axis should have come to nothing was not unnatural, given such leadership as this. Lloyd George, Churchill, and other realists issued repeated warnings during the last spring of peace that all the Cabinet’s efforts would be vain unless the Soviet Union were enlisted in the coalition. But Chamberlain and Halifax could never bring themselves to a realization of the urgency of securing Moscow’s collaboration. They were therefore unable to overcome their chronic anti-Soviet prejudices and strike a viable bargain with the Kremlin. Litvinov’s plea of March for a conference was rejected, as his similar plea after Anschluss had been. Not until mid-April were any negotiations undertaken. London desired no alliance and no offense to the anti-Comintern Powers. Litvinov’s resignation on May 7 produced no awakening.

In the tedious discussions, which dragged through five months, Moscow demanded a binding alliance for mutual defense against any attack on the signatories or any attack or indirect aggression against the Baltic States. Moscow also demanded, as an elementary strategic necessity, military access to Polish territory if the U.S.S.R. was to assume obligations to defend Poland. Chamberlain and Halifax, however, having lightly sacrificed China, Ethiopia, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania to the Fascist aggressors, now became inflexible champions of the “rights of small nations.” Since the Baltic States wanted no guarantee, London would make no pact with Moscow granting them one. Since Poland’s leaders would rather see their State perish at the hands of Hitler than accept military aid from the hands of Stalin, London could not or would not meet the terms of Molotov and Voroshilov. When the diplomatic discussions got nowhere, Chamber-

81 For detailed account, see the author’s Night over Europe, pp. 216-284.
lain sent as special envoy to assist Ambassador Sir William Seeds one of his most devoted Munichmen, William Strang. When the Strang nach Osten also produced no results, an Anglo-French military mission (of wholly undistinguished personnel) was sent in August. In all cases, however, London and Paris would not meet Stalin's terms. But beggars cannot be choosers. Stalin, not being a beggar, had no need to conclude a pact with the Western Powers on conditions he regarded as strategically unworkable and highly dangerous to the U.S.S.R. Hitler was quite willing to grant him, in exchange for mere neutrality, what Chamberlain would not grant in exchange for an alliance. Despite their denials, Chamberlain and Daladier knew this early in May and throughout June. They still preferred to reject the Kremlin's terms. Stalin therefore made the obvious choice. His Nonaggression Pact with Berlin of August 23 left the Western Powers isolated in the face of a formidable foe.

Catastrophe by Chamberlain. Never did modern Britain embark upon a war under such perilous circumstances as prevailed in 1939. The cause had already been all but lost at Madrid and Munich and Moscow. To fight the Reich with no allies save a feeble Poland ruled by a Beck and a defeated France ruled by a Daladier and a Bonnet was to invite disaster. Yet not to fight was to invite destruction, for even a Chamberlain was now dimly aware of Hitler's objectives and methods. After two days of doubt, due primarily to Bonnet's intrigues to desert Warsaw, the Prime Minister did what had to be done. At 11:15 A.M. on September 3, Halifax delivered a note to German Chargé Kordt, informing him that, since no reply had been received to the British ultimatum, the two Powers were at war as of 11:00 A.M. Chamberlain told Commons:

... This is a sad day for all of us, and to none is it sadder than to me. Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything that I have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins. There is only one thing left for me to do; that is, to devote what strength and powers I have to forwarding the victory of the cause for which we have to sacrifice so much. I cannot tell what part I may be allowed to play myself; I trust I may live to see the day when Hitlerism has been destroyed and a liberated Europe has been reestablished.

This was not to be. The man from Birmingham was not to survive the fearful misery he had brought upon his country. Whether his nation would survive was doubtful. Poland perished at once. For eight months thereafter the Tory Munichmen clung tenaciously to their posts and directed the war under the slogan of "business as usual." In the War Cabinet of September were included two major critics of their policies: Anthony Eden as Dominion Secretary, and Winston Churchill in his 1914 post of First Lord of the
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Admiralty. But no Liberals or Laborites would serve in any government headed by Chamberlain. Save for the displacement of Leslie Hore-Belisha by Oliver Stanley as War Secretary in January, 1940, no major changes took place in the Cabinet until the advent of catastrophe. The armaments with which Tory leadership had supplied Britain fell as far short of the requirements of waging effective war as Tory diplomacy had fallen short of the requirements of defending peace. Only the Navy remained in a high state of efficiency. The Royal Air Force (R.A.F.), though qualitatively excellent and growing in size, was pitibly small. As for the Army, conscription had not been introduced until April, 1939. The British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) in France was to find that it had no armored divisions capable of coping with the blitzkrieg and no commanders who would have known how to use them had they existed. Yet Chamberlain expressed imperturbable confidence and held that Hitler had “missed the bus.”

The debacle of British arms in Norway foreshadowed what was to come. On May 7, 1940, the Prime Minister weakly defended his course in Commons. But it was clear that he was losing the war as he had lost the peace. Leopold S. Amery, rebel Conservative, drew cheers when he quoted Oliver Cromwell: “You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say. Let us have done with you. In the name of God, go.” But Chamberlain had no desire to go. His Tory majority, as always, voted “confidence.” But the vote was 281 to 200. A majority of 81 was a defeat in a house normally conservative by a margin of 210. For two days Chamberlain sought in vain to persuade the Labor leaders to join the Cabinet. At dawn of May 10 the Nazi hosts struck at the Low Countries with irresistible force. Chamberlain resigned that night. He remained in the new Cabinet as Lord President of the Council but fell ill and resigned on October 3. On November 9, 1940, he died.

Rescue by Churchill. If England still lived, the credit for survival was due to Winston Churchill and to the millions of men and women whom he rallied to devotion and sacrifice in a cause they had all but forgotten under Churchill’s puny predecessors. In the Ministry of May, Eden became War Secretary and Alfred Duff-Cooper Minister of Information. Liberal Sir Archibald Sinclair and Laborites Clement Attlee, Albert Alexander, Herbert Morrison, Ernest Bevin, and Arthur Greenwood all were included. Churchill told Commons on May 13, “I have nothing to offer but blood, tears, toil, and sweat. . . . Our policy? It is to wage war by land, sea, and air. War with all our might and with all the strength God has given us, and to wage war against a monstrous tyranny never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime. . . . Our aim? It is victory. Victory
at all costs—victory in spite of all terrors—victory, however long and hard
the road may be, for without victory there is no survival.”

On June 18, 1940, 125 years after Waterloo and immediately after the
fearful debacle on the Continent, Churchill warned his countrymen:

What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. The Battle of
Britain is about to begin. On this battle depends the survival of Christian
civilization. Upon it depends our own British life and the long continuity of
our institutions and our empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very
soon be turned upon us. Hitler knows he will have to break us in this island or
lose the war.

If we can stand up to him all Europe may be freed and the life of the world
may move forward into broad sunlit uplands; but if we fail, the whole world,
including the United States and all that we have known and cared for, will sink
into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister and perhaps more prolonged
by the lights of a perverted science.

Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty and so bear ourselves that if the
British Commonwealth and Empire last for a thousand years, men will still say
“This was their finest hour.”

After a summer lull in which military operations paused and obscure
peace overtures came to nothing, Goering’s Luftwaffe opened an all-out assa-
sault on London in the hope of “softening England for invasion.” Endless
relays of hundreds of bombers made day and night hideous, slaying thou-
sands and tens of thousands of civilians, burning whole blocks of houses,
smashing factories, schools, churches, palaces, tenements, and many of the
architectural treasures of the centuries. The world’s greatest city suffered a
fate far worse than that of Barcelona. Coventry was blasted as completely
as Guernica and probably by some of the same aviators. Manchester, Liver-
pool, Southampton, Birmingham, and a dozen lesser towns knew horrors
hitherto known only to the people of Shanghai, Addis Ababa, Madrid, and
Warsaw. British aircraft production and shipbuilding were retarded. But the
people of Britain refused to be terrorized into submission. Their re-
sistance hardened to steel, for they followed a great leader who promised
them no comforts and told them no lies.

To such summons the people of Britain and of all the Empire (save only
neutral Eire) responded with a vigor and courage which caused Axis jour-
nalists to wonder anxiously whether their last unconquered foe consisted of
“47,000,000 Churchills.” Faith begot works. Faithful work, inspired by new
foresight and able leadership, begot local victories which might ultimately
prove important. Graziani’s Libyan Army was ejected from western Egypt.
Haile Selassie returned to Africa to reconquer his kingdom with British aid.
The Munichmen slowly faded from the political scene—Hoare to Madrid,
Simon to Lords, Halifax to the British Embassy in Washington in January,
1941, to replace the late Marquess of Lothian. Eden resumed his old post as Foreign Minister.

The Strategy of Triumph. Despite the eloquence of Churchill and the deeds of work and valor performed by his people, the position of Britain in the spring of 1941 was still one which offered little hope of defeating the foe. The Kingdom stood alone, with no Great Power as ally, in a struggle against a coalition which had conquered the Continent. In East Africa, il Duce’s empire was brought to an end between February and June. But so long as America and Russia were neutral, British arms could do little more than safeguard the homeland against invasion and stand elsewhere on the defensive.

Even this negative task was doubtful of accomplishment. The R.A.F., to be sure, defeated the Luftwaffe in mid-September of 1940, although as late as the following May Nazi bombers over London destroyed the Chamber of the House of Commons and wrecked Westminster Abbey. U-boats were now sinking over half a million tons of shipping each month. The Near East was almost lost. Churchill took comfort in American aid “short of war” and could say in early June to the leaders of the allies in exile: “Lift up your hearts, all will come right. Out of depths of sorrow and sacrifice will be born again the glory of mankind.” Yet none knew better than he that the mission of passing to the offensive was beyond British power and that nothing less than a Grand Alliance could win the war.

That such a coalition would have materialized had the enemy left Russia and America at peace is improbable. Happily for British fortunes, Hitler and Hirohito solved the problem. The alliance between Democracy and Communism which could have prevented disaster was beyond consummation by Communists and Democrats. But it was brought into being by Nazi fury—and if it was not to last to win the peace, yet it sufficed to win the war. When the Wehrmacht struck at Russia on June 22, 1941, Churchill, without revising his views regarding Communism, at once proclaimed solidarity with the U.S.S.R.: “Any man or State who fights against Nazism will have our aid. Any man or State who marches with Hitler is our foe. We shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people. . . . The Russian danger is our danger and the danger of the United States, just as the cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe.”

The first joint Anglo-Soviet military enterprise was the occupation in late August, 1941, of Iran, where the Shah and Premier, both pro-Axis, were forced out of power and an essential supply route to the U.S.S.R. was made secure. The aftermath of Pearl Harbor led to the loss of most of the Empire
in southeastern Asia. The subsequent course of the Allies, as they traversed
what Churchill called "the long, stern scowling valley of war" has been
sketched elsewhere in these pages. By the nature of the case the British
contribution in absolute terms was small in comparison with that of the
U.S.A. and of the U.S.S.R., though, in proportion to population and re-
sources, far larger than that of America and almost comparable with that
of Russia. The British Isles, as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," made pos-
sible the aerial campaign against the Reich. They were equally indispensa-
able as a secure base for mounting "Operation Overlord," which poured Anglo-
American divisions into Normandy, across France, and over the Rhine for
the kill. In the final campaign, as in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, British
sailors, soldiers, and airmen in British ships, tanks, and airplanes played
parts which, if unplayed, would have spelled defeat for America and
Russia, no less than for Britain.

The major Anglo-American-Soviet conferences and agreements have al-
ready been reviewed. Embattled Britain concluded a preliminary alliance
with the Soviet Union in July, 1942, and a 20-year Pact, signed in London
by Eden and Molotov, May 26, 1942. Five years later victorious Britain

32 See pp. 218ff.
33

"Part One

"I. In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford
one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in war against
Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in
Europe.

"II. The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with
the Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly
renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual
consent, any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated
with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

"Part Two

"III. 1. The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-
minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist
aggression in the post-war period.

"2. Pending adoption of such proposals, they will after termination of hostilities take
all measures in their power to render impossible the repetition of aggression and viola-
tion of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression
in Europe.

"IV. Should either of the high contracting parties during the post-war period be-
come involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article
III, Section 2, in consequence of the attack by that State against that party, the other
high contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hos-
tilities all military and other support and assistance in his power.

"This article shall remain in force until the high contracting parties, by mutual agree-
ment, shall recognize that it is superseded by adoption of proposals contemplated in
Article III, Section 1. In default of adoption of such proposals, it shall remain in
concluded a 50-year alliance with France. Aside from the U.N. Charter, no long-term political treaty was concluded between the U.K. and the U.S.A.

Little England. The glory of victory in 1945 was dimmed by realizations that Britain had emerged not only as a feeble Power in comparison with America and Muscovy but as a nation confronted with a problem of survival as desperate as any ever posed by foreign foes. Most of Britain’s people had always lived, since 1800 at least, not by the local produce of their “earth of majesty” but by importing great quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials in exchange for exports of manufactures, shipping services, and capital. British foreign trade, for a century and more larger in value and volume than that of any other nation, had always exhibited an “unfavorable” balance which was in fact highly advantageous, since it meant that more commodities came into Britain than went out. The difference was paid for chiefly by (1) global shipping services, carried on by the world’s largest merchant marine, totaling almost 21,000,000 tons in 1939; and (2) foreign investments all over the planet, totaling over £5,000,000,000 in 1939 and bringing in dividends which were in turn available for the purchase of im-

force for a period of twenty years and thereafter until terminated by either high contracting party as provided in Article VIII.

“V. The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.

“They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

“VI. The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

“VII. Each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.

“VIII. The present Treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible.

“It comes into force immediately on the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom signed at Moscow, July 12, 1941.

“Part One of the present Treaty shall remain in force until the re-establishment of peace between the high contracting parties and Germany and the powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

“Part Two of the present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years. Thereafter, unless twelve months’ notice has been given by either party to terminate the Treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until twelve months after either high contracting party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

“In witness whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

“Done in duplicate in London on the twenty-sixth day of May, 1942, in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.”

84 For text, see pp. 759-760.
ports, the expansion of manufacturing, and the enrichment of the investing classes, the lower orders sharing in the fruits through jobs, consumers' goods, and returns on savings.

This delicately balanced system of exchange, which was the sine qua non of Britain's economy, was gravely damaged by World War I and all but wrecked by World War II. Concentration on war production between 1939 and 1945 reduced British exports to 30% of their prewar volume. Over 2,500 British merchant vessels, totaling over 11,000,000 tons, were destroyed by enemy action and only partly replaced by new shipbuilding. Almost four-fifths of British investments abroad were liquidated to help finance the war, with a corresponding decline of interest payments accruing to British creditors. During hostilities, British debts owed abroad increased from £760,000,000 to £3,335,000,000. After victory the U.K. was for the first time a debtor nation. Quite apart from the problem of meeting long-term obligations, the maintenance of anything resembling prewar living standards required an increase of exports by 75% over the 1938 level.

Only a people who had stood alone against the most formidable foe of all time could even contemplate the possibility of victory in the new battle of production and trade in a blasted world where, save in the U.S.A., all production was shattered and all trade was paralyzed. By Herculean efforts British businessmen and workers, alike inspired by a sense of desperate national urgency, did succeed, in the two years following victory, in more than doubling shipbuilding (as compared with 1938), almost doubling truck production, increasing the generation of electricity by half, and raising by a quarter or more the output of steel, gas, chemicals, and rayon. Coal and textiles lagged. The end of Lend-Lease in August, 1945, produced a situation so dangerous that negotiations were opened in Washington in September for new U.S. aid. Will Clayton, chairman of the American delegation, strove with only partial success to obtain the abandonment of British imperial tariff preferences as the price of new grants. An accord of December 6, 1945, provided for a loan of $3,750,000,000 (net), to be repaid by A.D. 2001 with interest at 2% to begin in 1951. Lend-lease obligations were reduced to $650,000,000, to be repaid in similar fashion. The U.K. agreed to scale down sterling debts and to relax import and exchange restrictions.

These arrangements soon proved wholly inadequate to the exigencies of the crisis. During 1946, British exports expanded to a point beyond the prewar level. But the severe winter of 1946-47 led to a coal shortage, which occasioned losses of production and reductions of exports costing the national economy the equivalent of almost $1,000,000,000. Inflation in America reduced the value of the original loan by almost 25%. London had agreed to make sterling freely convertible into any currency after July 15, 1947—
on the assumption that people throughout the world with money in the bank would prefer to leave it in sterling rather than exchange it for more doubtful currencies. The assumption proved wrong, not because depositors preferred other money to pounds but because they preferred goods to any currency in a time of world-wide shortages and general depreciation of the value of all money. People with pounds hastened to change them for local money or dollars in order to buy commodities which could not be bought in Britain. In consequence, the equivalent of $700,000,000 was lost to the U.K., whose position was now as bad as it had been before the American loan was granted. This calamity was a reality not in A.D. 2001, but in the summer of 1947.

London resorted to a variety of expedients to meet its problems. In August it suspended the free convertibility of the pound, thereby causing Washington to block transfer of the balance of the American credits—until complex negotiations evolved a compromise which was meaningless because irrelevant to the fundamentals of the issue. In other areas of policy, where cognizance of weakness was the essence of realism, London made concessions to colonial demands for emancipation—notably in India, Burma, Ceylon, and Egypt—while consolidating British influence elsewhere by remaining in occupation of the Italian colonies, ousting France from Syria, appeasing the Arab League, aiding the Dutch to suppress rebellion in Indonesia, and projecting new economic and strategic plans in central Africa. Meanwhile the British position in the Mediterranean was buttressed by close relations with Fascist Portugal, toleration of Fascist Spain, adroit diplomacy in Italy, and armed intervention in Greece, all in loose cooperation with the U.S.A., to which financial, diplomatic, and military responsibilities were passed with the greatest of ease.

Salvation through Socialism. Between V-E Day and V-J Day a peaceful political revolution had taken place at home. Its import was perhaps less revolutionary than it appeared to be. Any Cabinet of any political complexion or purpose would have been obliged to push exports, reduce imports, preach and practice “austerity,” undertake extensive economic planning, and make concessions to the colonial subject peoples. The “revolution” nevertheless reflected popular revulsion against the Tories, who had promised peace and brought war and had forecast victory and brought the realm to the verge of irreparable defeat.

The Parliament which had sat for almost 10 years was dissolved on June 15, 1945. At the time of dissolution, the Conservatives held 358 seats, the Laborites 164, and the National Liberals 26. The vigorous campaign which followed was marked by eloquent efforts on the part of Churchill to portray Harold Laski as a national calamity and to demonstrate that a Labor
victory would mean a Gestapo and the advent of totalitarianism. The London Economist opined on July 7 that "the Conservatives have resorted to stunts, red herrings, and unfair practices to an extent that has disgusted many of their friends and followers." In the polling of July 5, 1945 (with results announced on July 26), the Labor Party won by a landslide. With 393 seats, it now had a majority of 157 over all other parties combined. The Tories elected only 198 members of Commons. The National Liberals emerged with 13 seats and the Liberals with 11. In popular votes, the Laborites won 12,000,000, the Tories 9,000,000, and the two Liberal groups 2,330,-000. Labor's victory was not a "proletarian revolution." In England, as in other mature industrial societies, urban wage earners are a minority of the community. The significance of the election was that millions of middle-class people voted for Socialism, or at least voted against Toryism. Churchill at once resigned. Col. Clement R. Attlee became Prime Minister in a Cabinet including Herbert Morrison, son of a London policeman, Walter J. Edwards, Navy stoker, and Ernest Bevin, odd-job boy and union leader. Aristocracy, plutocracy, and the "old school tie" were (almost) out. This result was the nearest approach to a social revolution that contemporary Britain, with its traditions of class deference and political continuity, was prepared to attempt. The change was not catastrophic. Attlee had attended Hailbury School and gone to Oxford. Yet the new leader was the spokesman of Socialism—assuredly not of the totalitarian Soviet variety, nor yet in the mood of the Continental Social Democrats, but still deriving from Marx and Engels, plus (or contra) William Godwin, the Chartists, the Fabian Society, G. B. Shaw, H. G. Wells, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and sundry other disciples of a new millennium. The creed of the faithful was well put by Attlee in his address to the American Congress on November 13, 1945:

I think that some people over here imagine that Socialists are out to destroy freedom, freedom of the individual, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of the press. They are wrong. The Labor Party is in the tradition of freedom-loving movements which have always existed in our country; but freedom has to be striven for in every generation and those who threaten it are not always the same. Sometimes the battle of freedom has had to be fought against Kings, sometimes against religious tyranny, sometimes against the power of the owners of the land, sometimes against the overwhelming strength of moneyed interests.

We in the Labor Party declare that we are in line with those who fought for Magna Charta and Habeas Corpus, with the Pilgrim Fathers and with the signatories of the Declaration of Independence.

Let me clear your mind with regard to some of these freedoms that are thought to be in danger. In the ranks of our party in the House of Commons are at least forty practicing journalists. There are several clergymen, many local preachers,
plenty of Protestants, some Catholics and some Jews. We are not likely, therefore, to attack freedom of religion or freedom of the press.

As to freedom of speech, believe me, as a leader of our party for ten years I have never lacked candid critics in my own ranks and I have been too long in the Opposition not to be a strong supporter of freedom of speech and freedom of the individual.

You may think that the Labor Party consists solely of wage earners. It is our pride that we draw the majority of our members from the ranks of wage earners and many of our ministers have spent long years working with their hands in the coal mines, the factory or in transportation.

But our party today is drawn from all classes of society—professional men, businessmen and what are sometimes called the privileged classes. The old school tie still can be seen on the Government benches. It is really a pretty good cross-section of the population.

You may ask, why do people from the well-to-do classes belong to our party? May I refer to my own experience? Forty years ago as a young man studying law, just down from Oxford University, I visited for the first time my constituency, Limehouse—a very poor district in East London. I learned from it first hand the facts of poverty in our great cities. I became convinced that we must build our society on a juster foundation.

The result was that I joined the Socialist Movement and eventually, after many years of striving, I find myself Prime Minister of Great Britain. The reasons that impelled me to join the Labor Movement are the same that actuated so many of the members of my party, especially the great number of young men from the fighting services.

These aspirations were not "academic"—which, in American vocabulary at least, means irrelevant, inconsequential, impracticable, and crackpot. The Labor Government moved toward Socialism, not by dictatorship and expropriation, but by a democratic and carefully planned program of transferring major industries from private to public ownership, with compensation to the original proprietors. The Bank of England was nationalized in February, 1946, the coal industry in July, civil aviation in August, telecommunications in October, and railroads later, with iron and steel still under study at the time of writing. In the new economy, key industries would be under State ownership and operation while lesser and local businesses would remain in private hands. This mixed design for security and plenty, woven out of partial socialization and regulated capitalism, evoked contempt in both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., for opposite reasons. Whether economic order, freedom, and progress would in fact accrue from the great experiment depended less upon British deeds than upon the evolving pattern of American-Soviet relations.

From Blimp to Bevin. If the Attlee Cabinet's domestic program was a sharp break with the past, its foreign policy seemed to many indistinguishable from that of Churchill—who, for all his anguished outcries over social-
ism at home and the liquidation of imperial commitments abroad, frequently expressed approval of the diplomacy of the new regime. This continuity was startling to many and was hotly resented by left-wing Laborites. It was due in part to the pressure of custom and habit, operating through the permanent Foreign Office staff and its agents overseas. It was attributable also to the ancient circumstance that, in all faiths, heretics are hated more than infidels. The half-century-old schism of the Marxist movement into bitterly hostile factions had echoes in England. The British Communist Party was insignificant, with only 1 seat in Commons. But Laborites, like Social Democrats across the Channel, tended to look upon the Communist rulers of the U.S.S.R. as betrayers of socialism and artisans of despotism. The men in the Kremlin, conversely, regarded Western Socialists as renegades, traitors to the proletariat, and opportunistic "lackeys of the bourgeoisie." Since Tories and Communists go to different churches, they can often cooperate more easily than can Socialists and Communists, who profess to share the same faith, and therefore detest each other as apostates.

The post of Foreign Secretary would doubtless have gone to Sir Stafford Cripps, who had had extensive diplomatic experience, save that he was a heretic who had once broken with the Party leadership. Rotund, bumbling Ernest Bevin, hot-tempered and loudmouthed, was more anti-Bolshevik than any Tory. He delighted in contrasting his own impeccably proletarian origin with Molotov's middle-class background and in baiting the Soviet Foreign Minister. He welcomed every opportunity to side with Byrnes and later with Marshall against the views of the Kremlin. As hostility mounted steadily between Washington and Moscow, Bevin came under increasing domestic criticism from those who felt that the U.K. should not irrevocably align with the U.S.A. against the U.S.S.R.

In February, 1946, after Anthony Eden expressed concern in Commons over the deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations, Bevin offered reassurances and expressed willingness to amend the Treaty of Alliance and prolong it for 50 years. In October, following adverse comments on his course during the Paris Peace Conference, he asserted, "We are not ganging up with anybody, either with one side or the other." But the Cabinet's plans for a German settlement resembled Washington's rather than Moscow's. On November 12, 1946, rebellion raised its head when 59 Labor M.P.'s signed a proposed amendment to the King's speech, expressing "the urgent hope that the Government will so review and recast its conduct of international affairs as to afford the utmost encouragement to and collaboration with all nations and groups striving to secure full Socialist planning and control of the world's

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resources” and thus “provide a democratic and constructive Socialist alternative to an otherwise inevitable conflict between American capitalism and Soviet Communism in which all hope of world government would be destroyed.” After sharp debate, in which Attlee pleaded for loyalty to the Party, the amendment offered by the insurgent Laborites was lost on November 18, 353 to 0. But no less than 122 Labor M.P.’s were absent or refrained from voting. This rebuke, however, produced no change in Bevin’s course, nor any move by Attlee to replace him in the Foreign Office.

When Bevin on December 22 asserted that Britain “does not tie herself to anybody except in regard to her obligations under the Charter,” Pravda asked whether he had forgotten the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, was renouncing it, or merely wished to show that his proposals to prolong it were “not serious.” On January 19, 1947, London protested strongly to Moscow at this “misinterpretation” and insisted that Anglo-Soviet ties were as firm as ever. But no progress could be made toward genuine amity so long as Soviet spokesmen accused Britain of playing America’s game, British spokesmen accused the U.S.S.R. of imperialism and suppression of freedom in eastern Europe, and American spokesmen took it for granted in their denunciations of Russia and Communism that Britain was, de facto if not de jure, the ally of the Power of the West against the Power of the East. Angry exchanges continued during 1947 between Bevin and the Laborite rebels, with no results. The failure of the Moscow and London meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers led to further exacerbation of American-Soviet relations and therefore to new bitterness in Anglo-Soviet relations.

Unhappy Third. Sober reflection on Britain’s parlous plight in 1947-48 would bring little satisfaction to anyone, in or out of the “sceptred isle,” regardless of political outlook—save only native Fascists and anti-Semites, who resumed organized activity during a bleak time of trouble. To survive mortal danger and resume a role of leadership in charting new roads to freedom for all mankind is an old English custom. But the grim dilemmas of the postwar years posed problems to the Kingdom which were graver than those posed by the Luftwaffe and the V-2’s. The dream of combining socialism with democracy was faced with disenchantment by virtue of Britain’s poverty. The imperative necessity of preventing World War III was a feckless hope so long as poverty obliged Britain to bow to Washington and defy Moscow—and so long as Moscow and Washington were moving toward war. The possibility of assuming vigorous leadership of a western European bloc, committed to democratic socialism and capable of acting as a balance between the colossi, was precluded by Bevin’s conception of British interests and by the frustrations and contradictions afflicting all the forces of anti-Fascist and anti-Communist liberalism in the Atlantic com-
munity. The Truman Doctrine, damned with faint praise by Britain’s new rulers, was the direct outcome of their own approval of Churchill’s policy in Greece and their subsequent decision to withdraw—though it is noteworthy that the “withdrawal” originally threatened for March 31, 1947, had not materialized by summer of 1948. The Marshall Plan, hailed with boisterous enthusiasm by Bevin, also evolved (with Soviet aid) into an instrument of war rather than peace.

The new economic crisis, aggravated by the severe winter of 1946-47, reached its climax in midsummer. On August 7, Commons voted drastic emergency measures, 318 to 170. They included taxes of 75% on the earnings of foreign films; other import curbs, particularly on goods purchased for dollars; pledges of further reduction of the armed forces and promises of further socialization, both as concessions to the Laborite rebels; reduction in output of consumers’ goods in the interest of exports; and power to direct workers into essential industries. Attlee called for national unity and common sacrifice. Churchill cried havoc, compared Attlee to Hitler, and accused the Cabinet of “totalitarianism.” Rations were cut. Wartime restrictions on travel, motoring, and restaurant menus reappeared. On September 29, 1947, Cripps, as Minister of Economic Affairs, became “economic dictator.” Arthur Greenwood was dropped from the Ministry. James Harold Wilson was given Cripps’s former post as President of the Board of Trade. Tory gains in municipal elections in November led Churchill to demand that the Government resign and dissolve Parliament. Attlee refused. Misery was rendered the more dismal by dreadful doubts about the future, only partly mitigated by hopes for an ultimately prosperous “cooperative commonwealth.” The British people tightened their belts, looked askance at the humiliation of American charity, and resolved to achieve, somehow, their own salvation by their own efforts.

The central fact in Britain’s world position was one little commented upon in England and almost altogether ignored in the U.S.A. That fact was that the U.K. would never be the ally of the U.S. in war against the U.S.S.R. The considerations pointing to this conclusion had nothing to do with ideology, institutions, traditions, or language, all of which suggested a different result. They had to do only with the stark facts of strategy in the atomic age. For centuries, Britain, secure in its insularity against invasion, could intervene at will in European conflicts or avert or direct them by joining the weaker coalition against the stronger. For decades, Britain’s rulers could act on the safe assumption that in the worst event they could defend the homeland pending the arrival of material and military support from America against the strongest Continental Power.
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This traditional political and strategic posture, like Britain's traditional economic position, is now at an end. The Luftwaffe killed 50,000 Britons and wrought vast ruin on British cities. The belated assault in 1944-45 of V-2 rocket weapons from the Continent confronted the Kingdom for the first time with a cross-channel threat against which there was no defense. Salvation was had only by the conquest of the bases of attack by the land armies of Montgomery and Eisenhower. The U.S.S.R. is the only Great Power left on the Continent. In event of war with America, its forces will occupy all of Europe. These forces were the first in the twentieth century to experiment successfully with rocket weapons. They will have V-2's at their disposal. Should the war come after 1950, these missiles will have atomic warheads. "In an alliance with America," declared Prof. N. F. Mott, British atomic physicist, on September 17, 1947, “nothing that this country could do would save us if war should break out against a Power capable of occupying the Channel ports and equipped with atomic bombs. . . . Fifty of these missiles, launched with V-2 weapons in the present stage of development, could kill a quarter of the population of London and make the city uninhabitable. . . .”

These inexorable facts, in no way changed by ignorance on the part of diplomats, strategists, and journalists, spell British neutrality in World War III, not by choice but by necessity. No American threats or inducements are likely to persuade any British Government, whatever its politics, to embark upon a course of action which will literally mean national suicide. Nothing short of an American restoration of sufficient French and German military might to hold the Russians at the Elbe can change this prospect. As of 1948, nothing seemed less probable. The United Kingdom is therefore constrained by the facts of physics to a role of peace—a conclusion no less valid in the end for Americans and Russians, but one certain to be realized first and most vividly by Englishmen.

By all the customary calculations of power, this circumstance spells British impotence. In the new time, however, it may well be that all calculations of power spell death. The conviction that England, if it is to live, must remain at peace may supply a potent incentive to a new diplomacy far more relevant to the exigencies of the atomic age than the diplomacy of Washington or Moscow. That diplomacy, happily, had to face at the outset only a negative task: that of convincing Americans that Britain would never be their ally in war against Russia. There was no need to convince Moscow that Britain would never be Russia’s ally in war against America, since this was understood by all. Without a British alliance, America could not fight Russia with any hope of victory. Appreciation of this fact among American
policy makers—in so far as rational calculations of probability might con-
tinue to influence their judgment—would in the years to come constitute the
greatest hope for British safety and global peace. It might also, assuredly,
constitute a temptation to the more bitter and ambitious men of Moscow
to embark upon dangerous ventures.

Britain’s safeguard against the latter peril, if any safeguard was to be had,
lay in a reversal of Bevin’s original program of Anglo-American
solidarity against Muscovy and in the development of new relations of con-
cord and mutual advantage. This necessity was realized early by the Labor-
ite rebels. It dawned on the Foreign Office during 1947. On December 27,
an Anglo-Soviet trade accord was signed in Moscow by Soviet Trade Min-
ister Anastasi Mikoyan and Ambassador Sir Maurice Peterson. By its terms
(which would have been more advantageous to Britain had Downing Street
accepted Soviet proposals in the summer), London agreed to reduce the
interest rate on British grants to the U.S.S.R. in 1941 and thereafter from
3% to one-half of 1% and to extend the repayment period to 15 years.
London also agreed to supply Russia with sawmill machinery, rails, electric
equipment, other manufactures, wool, rubber, aluminum, cocoa, and coffee
in exchange for 750,000 tons of grain from the 1947 harvest. That American
voices would be raised in protest against these arrangements, which were
to be amplified during 1948, went without saying. That they represented
British realism, in the best sense, also went without saying.

Beyond these decisions, British destinies were doubtful. A new world
war, with Britain as belligerent, meant the end. Such a war with Britain neu-
tral would mean the end of urban civilization elsewhere. In either case,
Britain was doomed, for Britain’s life and livelihood—whether socialist or
capitalist—depended, more than that of any other nation of the Western
State System, on the maintenance and development of those relations of
commerce, investment, and mutually advantageous interchange of goods and
services which are possible only in a world society living at peace. Britain
alone could not keep the peace. But British influence, if exercised with
imagination and daring, might prove decisive in aiding others to keep the
peace.

The best British traits of mind and character would be needed to cope
with the crises to come. They still were there. Their nature was never better
put than by Winston Churchill in 1940: “Death and sorrow will be our
companions on the journey, hardship our garment, constancy and valor our
only shield. We must be reunited, we must be undaunted, we must be in-
flexible. Our qualities and deeds must burn and glow through the gloom of
Europe until they become the veritable beacons of its salvation.”

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SUGGESTED READINGS

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—-: *The Unrelenting Struggle*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1942.

—-: *The End of the Beginning*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1943.

—-: *Victory*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1946.

——: *The Gathering Storm*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1948. This volume, unlike the preceding titles which are compilations of speeches, is the first of five projected volumes of war memoirs. It was serialized in *Life* and in *The New York Times*, in the spring of 1948.


A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exercise this spectre: Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies. Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communistic by its opponents in power? . . . It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the spectre of Communism with a manifesto of the party itself.

The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles. . . . The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!—KARL MARX, FRIEDRICH ENGELS, The Communist Manifesto, 1848.

The peoples of the U.S.S.R. are sincere in their desire that the U.N.O. . . . should speedily become a really effective organization. . . . The Soviet Union has never threatened anyone. It has always respected the rights and liberties of other nations, a policy which stems from the very essence of the Soviet State. In the U.S.S.R. there are no classes or groups that could have an interest in enmity among nations or in the acquisition of foreign territory. That is why the U.S.S.R., which came forward as the main force in the struggle against Hitler Germany, is also the mightiest bulwark for the freedom, peace and independence of nations and their universal progress.—Izvestia, July 11, 1945.

After Moscow and London, after China and Greece, after the Cominform and the Communist operations in eastern Europe, in Italy and France, there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union has embarked on a new career of aggrandizement and world revolution, and that the policy of hostility toward its erstwhile "capitalist" allies, first announced by Stalin in February, 1946, has hardened during the past year into open, if still largely political and propagandistic, warfare.—The New York Times, December 31, 1947.
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The Romanovs. The old Russian State, stretching in its immensity from the Arctic wastes to the tropic deserts of Turkestan, and from the Baltic and Black Seas across the steppes of Eurasia to the far Pacific, was created by a process of territorial conquest and accretion on the part of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. Always bearing upon its face the imprint of the Tartar conquest, always half Asiatic and half European, the Russia of the Romanovs remained backward, primitive, isolated from the main currents of Western culture, despite its efforts to secure "windows to the West" and to fashion itself after Western models. In its political and economic institutions and its social life, it was almost medieval. Its government was an arbitrary and unlimited autocracy until 1905, and the Duma, or parliament, which was the fruit of the first revolution, was a debating society without authority. Its ruling class was a feudal, land-owning aristocracy and a corrupt and irresponsible bureaucracy. The great mass of its population—the "dark people"—consisted of illiterate peasants steeped in ignorance and superstitious religiosity, and living in a status of serfdom until 1861. The Industrial Revolution did not come to Russia until the seventies and eighties of the 19th century. The urban bourgeoisie which it brought in its wake pleaded for democracy and parliamentary government but was given little voice in public affairs. The urban proletariat, recruited from the peasantry, lived in misery under the pressure of ruthless exploitation and had no voice, except through terrorism and revolutionary violence. While the workers sought salvation in the Western gospel of international Marxian Socialism and the bourgeoisie in the gospel of democratic and patriotic liberalism, the peasantry remained dumb and inert, moved only by blind land hunger and hatred of the landlords.

The foreign policy of this State reflected the interests and attitudes of a ruling class which was aristocratic, religious, and mystically loyal to Holy Russia and to the cult of racial patriotism known as Pan-Slavism. In its quest for power, Tsarist Russia strove for diplomatic stakes expressed not so much in terms of the profit motives of its merchants and industrialists as in terms of the demand for land on the part of its semifugal oligarchy of nobles. Some of its nobles were capitalists, and some of its non-noble capitalists were politically influential—and these groups had eyes open for concessions, leaseholds, and markets on the Asiatic fringes of the empire. But Russian economy imported capital and manufactured goods from abroad and exported grain and raw materials. Its imperialism was not a commercial and naval imperialism but a military and agrarian imperialism of population. As early as the 17th century, it reached out across Siberia. In the 18th century, it struck Sweden to the north, Poland to the west, Turkey to the south, and extended itself over large areas formerly controlled by

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these States. In the 19th century, it penetrated Central Asia, impinged upon Persia, Afghanistan, and China, and encountered the rival imperialisms of Britain and Japan. Friction with Britain led to the Crimean War of 1854–56, in which the progress of the Russian steam roller toward Constantinople and the Straits was temporarily halted. Continued Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia contributed to the decision to enter into the Dual Alliance with France in 1894. Conflict with Japan led to defeat in Manchuria in 1904–05 and to internal revolution as the aftermath of defeat. In the years which followed, the continued drive toward the Straits and toward control of the Slavic States of the Balkans made Austria-Hungary and Germany the new enemies—and against these Powers an advantageous combination could be made with France, Britain, and even Japan.

The War of 1914 was precipitated by the Tsardom with the approval of the Quai d'Orsay. The Franco-Russian alliance had already been "Balkanized," and French support of Russian Balkan policies was secured. Izvolsky, Russian Foreign Minister until 1910 and Russian Ambassador to Paris subsequently, smarted under the diplomatic defeat of 1908 arising out of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina without compensation to Russia. He was spokesman for those at the Russian Foreign Office determined to acquire the Straits and to block the Teutonic Drang nach Osten. In Poincaré, he found a fitting helpmate for the realization of these ambitions. By 1914, Russian military preparations, financed from France, were sufficiently advanced to enable St. Petersburg to risk war over these issues. Russia accordingly championed Serbia in the Austro-Serbian conflict of July, 1914. It was the mobilization of the Russian Army against Austria-Hungary and Germany on July 30 which made a general war inevitable; for it was understood in the Franco-Russian alliance that "mobilization means war," and this was no less clear to Berlin and Vienna. Germany responded to this threat by an ultimatum which remained unanswered. A declaration of war followed on August 1. On September 5, 1914, Russia agreed with Britain and France not to conclude peace separately. The inter-Allied secret treaties of 1916 and 1917 promised to the Tsardom, in the prospective division of the spoils, all that it had been striving for and more besides.

But the impact of the German military machine upon Russia brought overwhelming disaster to the entire economic, social, and political structure of the Romanov State. During 1915 and 1916, Galicia and Russian Poland were lost to the enemy, and the ill-equipped and badly led Russian Army was driven back in defeat with enormous losses. The transport system collapsed. Food riots broke out in the cities. Mutiny raised its head at the front. "Dark forces" appeared at the court, favoring peace with Germany
to save the autocracy. Their spokesman, the mad monk Rasputin, was assassinated by patriotic liberals, but the process of economic and social disintegration went on. The political authority of the reactionaries who surrounded the Tsar was reduced to a nullity as revolution spread throughout the country. In mid-March of 1917, following numerous strikes and revolts, Nicholas II was obliged to abdicate and give way to a “Provisional Government” composed of Duma members of a liberal bourgeois and mildly socialistic persuasion. This Government, under Kerensky’s leadership, sought to continue the war and to pave the way for a Constituent Assembly which would solve all problems and make Russia a middle-class Parliamentary democracy. But as it deliberated and debated, peasants seized the estates of the nobles, workers occupied factories, and soldiers deserted from the front to share in the new freedom. Real power throughout the country passed to spontaneously organized councils, or “soviets,” of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies, who spoke for the war-weary masses and insisted upon an end of the imperialist war, the partition of the landed estates, and the socialization of industry.

The Revolution. There ensued the most revolutionary and far-reaching social upheaval of modern times, demolishing utterly the existing economic and social fabric of Russia and shaking all of Western society to its foundations. Under the leadership of the revolutionary Bolshevik wing of the Social Democratic Party, the trade unions demanded that the political revolution be transformed into a social revolution and that power be transferred to the soviets. The impotent Kerensky regime tottered to its doom, unable either to carry on the war or to withdraw from it, helpless either to avert social revolution or to accept it. With their slogans of “All Power to the Soviets” and “Peace, Land, and Bread,” the Bolshevik leaders secured ascendancy in the soviets and organized the new proletarian revolution. On November 7, 1917, the Provisional Government was overthrown by the armed workers of Petrograd, and the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved the creation of a Council of People’s Commissars, of which Lenin became President. The Soviet Government, thus established, proceeded to expropriate the landlords and the bourgeoisie, to abolish private property in real estate and the means of industrial production, to distribute the land to the villages, to establish workers’ control in the factories, mills, and mines, and to lay plans for a socialized economy. In 1918 the Bolsheviki changed their name to “Communist Party,” in order to distinguish themselves from the Reformist Socialists. The former ruling classes were deprived of their wealth and power and replaced by workers and peasants, under the leadership of the most class-conscious section of the urban proletariat, organized by the Communists. The Party brushed aside the Constituent Assembly, as-
assumed a “monopoly of legality” and ruled in the name of the “dictatorship of the proletariat”—a form of political authority intended to prepare the way for a Communistic economy and a classless society.

The foreign policy of the new Republic led to immediate friction with the bourgeois Governments, which were the allies of the old Russia. The Communists regarded their revolution as but a step toward a world revolution of the international proletariat, leading to the universal overthrow of capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism. The bourgeois Governments regarded the Communists as dangerous fanatics, whose subversive assault on the existing order must be met by ruthless suppression at the hands of the “sane” elements in Russia, i.e., the expropriated classes, aided by the outside world. Quite apart from this class conflict across national frontiers, there were specific grievances which impelled the Allies to move against the proletarian dictatorship. The Soviet Government at once opened peace negotiations with the Central Powers. When the Allies refused to participate, the Communists published the secret treaties, in order to reveal to the masses the imperialistic war aims of the Entente. An armistice was concluded on the eastern front in December, 1917; and in March, 1918, the humiliating peace of Brest Litovsk took Russia out of the war. The Soviet Government, moreover, repudiated the public debts contracted by the Tsarist and Kerensky regimes, including both the prewar government bonds, held in enormous quantities by French and British investors, and the large war loans extended by the Governments of Britain, France, and the U.S.A. It likewise confiscated foreign property and private investments in Russia, along with the holdings of the Russian bourgeoisie. It summoned the workers of the world to revolt against the war and to overthrow the capitalistic governments which were directing it. The Central Powers seized upon the opportunity presented by the Revolution to make an advantageous peace in the east. But between the Soviets and the Allies there could be no peace.

In August, 1918, Soviet Russia was subjected to an Allied blockade and to military intervention, participated in by Czechoslovakian, British, French, American, Japanese, and other Allied troops. The intervention coincided with counterrevolutionary uprisings within Russia, subsidized and supported by the Allied Governments, and with the beginning of the civil war. The moderate Socialist enemies of the Communist dictatorship played into the hands of the counterrevolution and were soon swept aside by Tsarist reactionaries, or “Whites,” who rallied to their cause the former landowners and business classes. Blockade, intervention, and revolt were supplemented by terrorism and sabotage as weapons against the Soviets. In Finland the Workers’ Government was drowned in blood by White terrorists, with German support. In the north, Allied and American troops seized Archangel.
and advanced southward toward Vologda and Moscow. In the Caucasus and the Ukraine, Denikin’s White Army, with Allied financial and military support, prepared to invade central Russia. In Siberia, Kolchak’s White Army, with Allied financial and military support, prepared to do likewise, while Japanese, American, and British troops occupied the Maritime Provinces. In Estonia, Yudenitch’s White Army, with Allied financial and military support, prepared to take Petrograd.

The Soviet Government was assaulted on all sides from without and menaced by counterrevolution from within. It met these threats to its existence by suppressing the opposition parties, inaugurating the Red Terror as a reply to the White terrorism of its enemies, and organizing the Red Army to defend the Revolution. In March, 1919, the Communist, or Third, International was established, with its headquarters at Moscow, as an international federation of revolutionary Communist Parties throughout the world. It was designed to replace the Second International of the moderate Socialist Parties and to serve as the general staff of the “world revolution” which would attack from the rear the bourgeois governments seeking to strangle the Russian proletarian dictatorship.

The civil strife which followed was long and bloody and characterized by unprecedented savagery and destructiveness; for it was not only an international conflict between Soviet Russia and the Allied and Associated Powers but a class war between the Russian nobility and bourgeoisie on the one hand and the proletariat and peasantry on the other. The details of the campaigns need not be reviewed here. Suffice it to say that the Red Army, under the direction of Trotsky and his comrades, finally proved more than a match for its enemies, domestic and foreign. Kolchak’s forces were driven back from Kazan in the spring of 1919. The Allied and American invaders from the north were finally stopped and later compelled to withdraw. In October, 1919—darkest month of the Revolution—Denikin’s divisions approached Moscow from the south, while Yudenitch, with British support, advanced on Petrograd. Both offensives were beaten back. Kolchak’s army was crushed in central Siberia, and he was captured and executed in February, 1920. The other White armies were similarly destroyed, despite desperate Allied attempts to save them. Peace seemed in sight in the spring of 1920, when the armies of the new Poland invaded the Ukraine in an endeavor to restore the Polish frontiers of 1772. Kiev fell to the invaders; but in the summer of 1920 the Polish forces were pushed back, and the Red Army approached the gates of Warsaw and threatened to carry revolution into Central Europe. British and French assistance enabled the Poles to counterattack successfully under the direction of Gen. Maxime Weygand.
The war closed in October. Meanwhile, a new White leader, Baron Wrangel, had seized the Crimea, invaded the Ukraine, and secured diplomatic recognition and military and financial support from France. His troops were speedily dispersed by the Red Army in the winter of 1920-21. The Civil War came to a close with the defeat of intervention and counterrevolution.

The year 1921 marked a sharp turning point, both in the internal policies and in the foreign relations of the Soviet Government. The end of the assault from abroad left Russia economically prostrate as a result of six years of almost uninterrupted hostilities. Lenin executed a temporary "strategic retreat toward capitalism" in the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) of March, 1921, which permitted a certain amount of individual trade for private profit. At the same time, Britain granted de facto recognition to the Soviet regime by concluding a trade agreement. The blockade was broken. The cordon sanitaire was at an end. A truce prevailed between the proletarian dictatorship and the bourgeois States, and the Communists could turn at last to the difficult task of laying the foundation of the new social order.

The restoration of trade relations with the outside world was an integral part of the process, for economic rehabilitation required the importation of machinery, manufactures, and foreign technical skill to be paid for by the export of grain, oil, timber, and other Russian raw materials. At the Genoa Conference of 1922, Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, met the representatives of the other European Powers in a general conference for the first time. They demanded payment of Russia's debt and compensation to expropriated investors as the price of recognition, credits, and trade relations. Their bill of $13,000,000,000 was met by a Soviet counterclaim of $60,000,000,000 for damage done during the intervention. Neither side would yield, and no general agreement was possible. But a bargain was struck with the new Germany in the Treaty of Rapallo, whereby all claims were canceled and mutually advantageous commercial relations were restored. Other States could not afford to ignore the Soviet market. Britain extended de jure recognition in February, 1924. France, Italy, Japan, and a dozen lesser States followed suit within the next 18 months, the U.S.A. alone among the Great Powers persisting in its refusal to restore diplomatic relations until 1933. The revolutionary outcast was received again into the community of nations, and a growing foreign commerce hastened the work of internal reconstruction.

The "Socialist Fatherland." Meanwhile the frontiers of the new Russia had been redefined and a territorial reorganization of the Soviet State effected. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk was liquidated by the defeat of Germany and by the express provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. During the
intervention, Britain and France sought to acquire spheres of influence in southern Russia, for reasons of strategy, oil, and high politics, while Japan seized eastern Siberia, and Poland cast covetous eyes on the Ukraine. America opposed these territorial acquisitions by championing the integrity of Russia—of a capitalistic "national" Russia, which Washington hoped would emerge. But the Red Army ousted the invaders, and Moscow pursued its own policies. In accordance with its principles of national self-determination, the Soviet Government was quite prepared to recognize the independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, with boundaries corresponding to the lines of language. The Baltic States became independent. Their boundaries were fixed in a series of treaties of 1920 and 1921. Poland and Rumania, however, were determined to seize Russian territory. Rumania occupied Bessarabia in 1918, with the approval of the Allied Powers, and held it thereafter in the face of the persistent refusal of Moscow to concede the legality of this action. The Polish invasion of 1920 was driven back; but the boundary drawn in the Treaty of Riga of March, 1921, was a compromise which transferred several million Ukrainians and Byelorussians to Polish rule. Still unsatisfied, Poland seized Vilna from Lithuania in October, 1920; but, in this chronic quarrel between her Western neighbors, Soviet Russia took no sides save for a certain moral support given to the Lithuanian claims. In the Caucasus, Kars and Ardahan were lost to Turkey. On the Pacific coast the continued Japanese occupation was met by the creation of the "Far Eastern Republic," a semi-independent Soviet buffer State which was reabsorbed in 1922. In 1925, Japan extended full recognition to Moscow and evacuated all former Russian territory in return for oil and fishing concessions. The agreements with China of 1924 provided for joint ownership and management of the Chinese Eastern Railway across North Manchuria. Outer Mongolia became a Soviet dependency, and Chinese Turkestan was penetrated by Soviet influence. Within Soviet jurisdiction, cultural autonomy was granted to the linguistic minorities; and under the Constitution of 1923, creating the U.S.S.R., the Soviet State became a federation of seven units.

The power interests of the U.S.S.R. in international politics, like those of all other States, are intelligible by reference to the attitudes and values of its ruling class. While "capitalistic" States were dominated politically by nationalistic businessmen or landowners, moved by patriotism and by profit motives, these classes were destroyed in Russia and replaced by a new political elite speaking in the name of the proletariat. Social and political cohesion in Soviet society was at first achieved, not through the symbols of national patriotism, but through those of revolutionary internationalism. For the Communists, lines of cleavage and conflict based on language, race,
and nationality are effaced by the universal class war between the workers of the world and their exploiters. The Soviet State is composed of numerous linguistic and national groups. It was regarded by its builders, not as a national entity, but as the socialist fatherland, as the citadel of the world proletariat, as the precursor of that world federation of Soviet Republics which was to follow the world revolution. Its historic mission was the creation of a socialist society and the organization of the class-conscious workers of all countries for the revolutionary seizure of power on a world scale. Its foreign policy was necessarily dominated by the exigencies of this mission.

In view of the “temporary stabilization of capitalism” following World War I, the U.S.S.R. directed its energies toward building socialism on firm foundations in Russia, rather than toward working for immediate world revolution. The view of 1917-19 that a single socialist State could not survive in a hostile capitalistic world was abandoned in favor of the view that political and economic relations with the bourgeois States could be advantageously employed to contribute toward the immediate task in Russia. The world revolution seemed imminent in 1919, with Soviet Governments established in Bavaria and Hungary, with all of Central Europe in turmoil, and with working-class unrest prevalent throughout the world. By 1921, these hopes had faded. Soviet support was given to the Kuomintang, or revolutionary, Nationalist Party, in China, but the Party came to be dominated by bourgeois and militarist elements and expelled its Soviet advisers in 1927. The Communist movement in China was driven underground, but the seeds which had been sown flowered later in an indigenous Communism among Chinese peasants and workers. Lenin’s disciple, Stalin, and his fellow rulers of the Soviet Union now held that the final cataclysm of capitalism was in the future and that the world proletarian revolution would perhaps come only in the wake of the next great war. The Communist International and its national sections—the Communist Parties of the various countries—continued to lay their plans in anticipation of this final event. But, for the present, the greatest service to the international proletariat was envisaged as the strengthening of socialist economy in the U.S.S.R.

The decision to “build socialism” in one country was not reached without sharp conflicts of views among the Soviet leaders, reflected later in foreign policy and in the strategy of the Comintern. The disastrous famine of 1921-23 and the restoration of productivity achieved by the N.E.P. led to general acceptance of Lenin’s tactics of retreat. Following his death in January, 1924, Stalin and Trotsky became rivals, the latter insisting on world revolution, the immediate liquidation of the kulaks, or wealthy peasants, and the suppression of all private trade. Stalin’s control of the party machine and
Trotsky’s infractions of party discipline led to the latter’s dismissal and exile in 1927. He denounced Stalin as a betrayer of the Revolution and sought to organize ultrarevolutionary Communists abroad into an anti-Stalinist “Fourth International.” After the restoration of production to its pre-war level, Stalin launched the first Five Year Plan in 1928. The N.E.P. was abolished. A huge program of industrialization was embarked upon. Private trade was suppressed. The kulaks were liquidated with the collectivization of agriculture in 1931-33. This gigantic agrarian revolution, which abolished individual peasant farms in favor of cooperative collectives and state farms, led to much injustice and suffering, approaching the proportions of famine in some areas; but it was ruthlessly pushed through to a successful conclusion. Industrial and agricultural production rose steadily and paved the way for the second Five Year Plan (1933-38).

With land in process of socialization and bread of dubious quantity and quality during the transition, Moscow’s greatest desire was for peace. Foreign Commissar Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov, his able aide and successor after 1930, bent all their energies toward ensuring peace, securing recognition, fostering trade relations, and forestalling dangers of new attacks on the U.S.S.R. These objectives seemed at times to create a divergence of purposes between the Soviet Foreign Office (the Narkomindel) and the Comintern. Soviet diplomats offered cooperation, but Comintern agents preached revolution. Acute friction with Britain in 1927-29, controversies with France in 1929-30, and continued nonrecognition by the U.S.A. were in part results of this dualism of Moscow’s attitude toward the world. After the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, no Congresses were held for seven years. Trotsky’s fulminations in exile went unheeded. Litvinov gave qualified diplomatic support to the German Republic and to Turkey, Hungary, Italy, and the “revisionist” cause in general against the French bloc, preferring to aid weak potential enemies against strong ones. He championed disarmament, hailed the Kellogg Pact (which the Soviet Union ratified before any of the other Great Powers), and negotiated a series of neutrality and non-aggression agreements with other States.

Against Fascism. The triumph of Fascism in Germany in 1933 altered fundamentally the peace problem of the U.S.S.R. The German Communist Party, largest in the world outside of Russia, had gone down to defeat without a struggle. To the end, it had fought bitterly the largest of Socialist Parties. Both had been destroyed, along with German Liberalism and the Weimar Republic. The Nazi leaders were loudly committed to conquest in

86 Trotsky was assassinated in his home near Mexico City on Aug. 21, 1940, by an alleged follower, who was at once accused by Trotskyites of being a “Stalinist agent.”
the East and to an armed crusade against Bolshevism.® Militant Fascism threatened Moscow with armed attack and promised to destroy Communists, Socialists, and liberals in other States. To prevent assault from Berlin, Moscow must arm to the teeth and find allies. To prevent destruction of the Communist movement throughout the world, Moscow must cooperate with Socialists and liberals against Fascism. The Narkomindel and the Comintern faced the new task realistically. The result was a revolution in Soviet diplomacy and a reorientation of international Communism.

The Franco-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of November 29, 1932, was supplemented by a Commercial Treaty of January 11, 1934, following a diplomatic, commercial, and military rapprochement during the year of the Nazi seizure of power in the Reich. Agreements of April and May with Poland and the Baltic States extended these Nonaggression Pacts to 1945. Closer relations were cultivated with Turkey and Britain. In June, 1934, Czecho- slovakia and Rumania, on the advice of Louis Barthou, recognized the U.S.S.R., following the example of Hungary in February. On September 18, 1934, the Soviet Union became a member of the League of Nations. Efforts to conclude a nonaggression pact with Berlin and to induce the Reich to enter into an “eastern Locarno” failed. Litvinov strove for a defensive mutual assistance pact with France and the Little Entente, including Germany if she would enter, against Germany if she refused. Tukhachevsky, Vice-Commissar of Defense, announced in January, 1935, that the Red Army had been increased from 562,000 to 940,000 and that airplanes, tanks, and artillery had been multiplied manyfold. Under the impact of Hitler’s repudiation of the disarmament clauses of Versailles, Paris signed a Mutual Assistance Pact with Moscow on May 2, and Prague followed suit on May 16, 1935. The U.S.S.R. thus became the ally of France and Czecho- slovakia, within the framework of the League, to resist Nazi aggression.

In midsummer, 1935, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern met at Moscow. The old slogan of world revolution—“Turn imperialist war into civil war”—was replaced by a call for union against Fascism. The Comintern resolved to discontinue, or at least defer, its assaults on Socialists and liberals

® The most popular Nazi philosophical work, The Myth of the Twentieth Century, by the Russian émigré, Alfred Rosenberg, contained such passages as the following: “‘From West to East’ is now the direction from the Rhine to the Vistula, ‘from West to East’ must resound from Moscow to Tomsk. The ‘Russian’ who cursed Peter and Catherine was a real Russian. Europe should never have been forced upon him. In the future, after the separation of the non-Russian territories (the western provinces, the Ukraine, the Caucasus) he will have to be content to transfer his center of gravity to Asia. . . . Let him turn his ‘word’ to the East where there may be room for it, having first cleansed it of that admixture of ideas of Baboeuf, Blank [sic], Bakunin, Tolstoi, Lenin, and Marx, called Bolshevism. In Europe, which is alien to him and which he hates, there is no room for him any more” (Munich edition of 1930, p. 601).
and its efforts to overturn bourgeois democratic governments. The new policy of the “United Front” contemplated a strategic retreat toward the Right and loyal cooperation not only with Socialist parties but with bourgeois groups opposed to Fascism. Even the Roman Catholics in Germany were invited to join in opposing Nazi rule. An appeal was addressed to the Second International of Socialist Parties at Amsterdam to participate in the new alliance. This policy met with bitter condemnation on the part of Trotsky and his disciples as a fresh betrayal of the world revolution and a new compromise with capitalism. By Socialists and liberals, it was greeted with suspicion, since the plea of the “United Front” (from below) had been made before for the purpose of “boring from within” and seeking to place the organizations which cooperated under Communist domination. Amsterdam spurned fusion with Moscow or even general collaboration. British Laborites as well as Socialists in Czechoslovakia and America likewise declined to cooperate. But in France and Spain, liberals and Socialists joined Communists in Popular Front movements to resist Fascist attacks on democracy.

The new dispensation was accompanied by plans for liberalizing the Soviet regime. In July, 1934, the O.G.P.U., or secret political police, was abolished and its functions transferred to the Commissariat of Internal Affairs. After long deliberation a new Union Constitution was announced in June, 1936, and adopted in November. It created a parliament, or Supreme Soviet, of two chambers, one—the Council of the Union—elected by direct and secret ballot every four years with the franchise restored to the former “enemy” classes, and the other—the Council of Nationalities—consisting of elected delegates from the constituent Republics, which were increased from 7 to 11. An elected judiciary was also provided, and more adequate protection of individual rights was pledged. This evolution away from dictatorship, however, was transitory. On December 1, 1934, Sergei Kirov, aide of Stalin, was assassinated in Leningrad. Within a few weeks thereafter, 117 persons were executed as terrorists. Zinoviev and Kamenev, former Soviet leaders and once supporters of Trotsky, were implicated in the plot and sentenced to prison. In August, 1936, they, along with 14 others, were charged with conspiring with Trotsky, in his Norwegian exile, to slay Kirov, Stalin, and other Communist functionaries in a Trotskyite-Fascist murder plot. The accused confessed. Trotsky denied all. The defendants were found guilty and shot. Paradoxically, this act—representing a complete break between the Stalin leadership (which was committed to democratization of the regime, to the United Front, and to the soft pedaling of world revolution) and the Trotsky opposition (still bent on proletarian revolt everywhere)—antagonized foreign liberals, who otherwise were sympathetic with Stalin rather
than Trotsky. As in all dictatorships, ruthless means were held to be justified by ideal ends, but to critics the ends seem to be destroyed by the means.

In January, 1937, in a further trial of Trotskyites (who confessed to attempted assassination, sabotage, espionage, counterrevolution, and conspiracy with Trotsky to aid Germany and Japan in war on the U.S.S.R.), Karl Radek and Gregory Sokolnikov were sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and 13 other defendants were executed, including Gregory Piatakov and L. Serebriakov, both former prominent officials. Trotsky, then in Mexico after expulsion from Norway, again denied all and cried “frame-up.” In April, Henry Yagoda, head of the “reformed” G.P.U., was arrested. In June, Marshal Tukhachevsky and 7 other high officers were court-martialed and shot for treason. In December, Leo Kharakhan and other diplomats were executed for allegedly treasonable dealings with Tokyo. In March, 1938, Bukharin, Yagoda, Rykov, Krestinsky, and 14 other former leaders were tried, found guilty, and put to death, while Christian Rakovsky and two other defendants were given prison terms. All internal opposition to Stalin’s leadership was thus drowned in blood. All alleged agents of the Axis were “liquidated.”

Other defensive measures had long since been devised to meet the danger of Japanese attack in the East. Recognition by Washington on November 16, 1933, was to some degree motivated by common suspicion of Japan. Moscow made repeated but vain efforts to conclude a nonaggression pact with Tokyo. As further conciliatory gestures the U.S.S.R. sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo in March, 1935, and in the autumn of 1936 proposed to extend Japanese fishing and oil concessions in eastern Siberia—until the announcement of the German-Japanese anti-Communist accord of November 25 caused a reversal of policy. Japanese penetration of Inner Mongolia, which might place Japanese forces in a position to attack Ulan Bator Khoto and the Lake Baikal area, was met by a Mutual Assistance Pact with Outer Mongolia, in force since 1934 and incorporated in a formal agreement on March 12, 1936. More important, a self-sufficient Far Eastern Army of 250,000 troops under General Bluecher was established in the Maritime Provinces ready to invade Manchukuo should Japan attack. A thousand war planes were poised at Vladivostok to give Tokyo pause. The Trans-Siberian Railway was double-tracked and supplemented by a road north of Lake Baikal to Khabarovsk. Fears of a combined Nazi-Japanese attack, with possible Finnish and Polish support, led to strengthening frontier fortifications in the East and the West. By January, 1936, the Red Army numbered 1,300,000 men and had some 6,000 tanks and 7,000 airplanes. Every effort was made to increase the output of mechanized armament. In reply to Hitler’s verbal assaults at Nuremberg, Defense Commissar Voroshilov de-
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declared on September 17, 1936, "When the enemy attacks the Soviet Ukraine or Soviet Byelorussia or any other part of the Soviet Union, we will not only prevent his invading our own country, but will defeat him in the territory whence he comes."

The Failure of the "Popular Front." These developments had consequences in terms of the hidden calculations of the Fascist Caesars which were misunderstood by most Western statesmen and commentators. They demonstrated to Hitler and to the war lords of Tokyo that the U.S.S.R. was not a weak State but a strong one. They demonstrated that Stalin was prepared to crush internal dissent and to liquidate Nazi and Japanese "Fifth Columnists" and "Trojan Horses" with a ruthlessness worthy of _der Führer_, _il Duce_, and the Army terrorists of Japan. They demonstrated that the one firm center of vigorous resistance to Fascist aggrandizement was the Soviet Union—not because Communists were converted to "democracy," but because defense of the "Socialist Fatherland" (whether a democracy or a dictatorship or a tyranny ruled by a Red Caesar) was the prime purpose of Communists everywhere. This purpose obviously required opposition to Fascism so long as the Fascist Powers menaced the U.S.S.R. The result was a slow and secret abandonment of Nazi and Japanese dreams of conquest at the expense of the Soviet State and a reorientation of aggressive designs against the Western Powers, whose leaders and peoples no longer understood the world. Since these leaders continued to practice appeasement on the assumption that a Fascist-Communist clash was "inevitable," the Caesars found it advantageous to denounce Moscow on all occasions. With each passing year, they took their own threats less seriously, and the Kremlin became less concerned with them. Fascist mouthing of "anti-Bolshevism" were intended for ears in London, Paris, and Washington where they were taken quite seriously—to the ruin of the Western Powers.

Under these conditions, Soviet hopes of a "United Front" with the West against the Triplce, and Communist hopes of a "United Front" with Socialists and liberals against Fascism, were alike doomed to frustration. Without the support of the Western Powers, Moscow could not thwart Fascist aggression. Without the support of Western democrats, Moscow could not combat Fascist tactics of disintegration in other States. When the U.S.S.R. sought to use the League to save Ethiopia from Mussolini, London and Paris preferred to save Mussolini at the cost of destroying Ethiopia and the League. When the U.S.S.R. sought to save the Spanish Republic by observing the "nonintervention" agreement only in the measure to which it was observed in Rome and Berlin, the Western appeasers preferred to cooperate with the Axis in destroying the Republican regime. The Spanish People's Front died. The French People's Front followed it to the grave.

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After Anschluss, Litvinov proposed a conference to consider ways and means of halting Hitler. Downing Street and the Quai d’Orsay refused. When Litvinov proposed joint defense of Czechoslovakia in 1938, Chamberlain and Halifax, with the support of Daladier and Bonnet, preferred to abandon Prague. After Munich the Journal de Moscou asked, “What now is the value of France’s word? . . . What now is the value of the French-Soviet Pact since France has just torn up her treaty with Czechoslovakia—a treaty that bound her much more strongly?” Immediately after the fall of Prague, Litvinov proposed a conference to consider joint action to halt aggression. London and Paris refused.

Correct conclusions were drawn from these events in Rome and Berlin. Correct conclusions were also drawn in Moscow. On March 10, 1939, Stalin spoke at length to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. He ridiculed the Western Munichmen and bespoke friendship with the Caesars:

The majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of “neutrality.” . . . The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union . . . Cheap and easy! . . . Take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then they began to lie vociferously in the press about “the weakness of the Russian Army,” “the demoralization of the Russian Air Force,” and “riots” in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them: “Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right.” . . .

The hullabaloo raised by the British, French, and American press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some seven hundred thousand, and that not later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over thirty million, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.

It is quite possible, of course, that there are madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough strait jackets for them in our country. But if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and
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foolish seriously to talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? ... Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery, and so on. It would be naïve to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics is politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them. ...

1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

2. We stand for peaceful, close, and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state.

3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.

4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.

Within a week thereafter, Hitler liquidated Czecho-Slovakia, gave Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary, and finally convinced the Western Munichmen that their States, rather than the U.S.S.R., were "on the list and would never be missed" after the Reich should strike. They accordingly sought to rebuild a coalition against Germany. The enterprise required Soviet collaboration. Moscow was willing to be wooed and even to be won—for a price. But most of the Western leaders were still motivated by abhorrence of Bolshevism and were by no means convinced that the Nazi threat was so grave as to require acceptance of Moscow's terms. This attitude confirmed the Kremlin's distrust. In the absence of mutual respect and of an equal sense of common danger and a willingness to compromise in order to face it, the obvious logic of Realpolitik led nowhere. British willingness to guarantee Poland and even Rumania and Greece before coming to terms with the U.S.S.R. evoked contempt in Moscow. Pravda's cartoon of April 4, 1939, showed a silk-hatted British lion in a boat extending a rock-loaded life belt to small nations struggling in a stormy sea swarming with sharks.

When Anglo-Soviet negotiations were initiated in mid-April, Moscow asked a binding alliance. London refused, preferring some more "flexible" formula which would not offend the "anti-Comintern" States and would leave Britain and France free if the Reich after all should attack the U.S.S.R. On May 3, Litvinov resigned his post as Commissar for Foreign Affairs in
favor of Premier Vyacheslav Molotov. Chamberlain drew no conclusions from this event, although four days later the French Ambassador in Berlin began a series of ominous reports on the possibility of a Soviet-Nazi rapprochement to be followed by a new partition of Poland (French Yellow Book of 1939, No. 123ff.). British counterproposals of May 8 contemplated Soviet aid to Britain and France should they be obliged to fight in defense of Poland or Rumania. Moscow asked Anglo-French aid to the U.S.S.R. should it be attacked or be obliged to fight in defense of the Baltic States. All three Powers should agree to defend one another and should guarantee all the border States between the Reich and the Soviet Union, as well as the border States (Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands) between the Reich and the Western Powers. Churchill and Lloyd George urged acceptance of Molotov’s terms. Chamberlain and Halifax refused. The Baltic States worshiped “neutrality” and desired no international guarantee participated in by the U.S.S.R. Downing Street would not guarantee States unwilling to be guaranteed. It proposed “consultation” in the event of any Nazi aggression in the Baltic. But Moscow knew that this was a formula to evade any commitment.

At the end of May, Molotov publicly declared that Moscow would make no pact save on the basis of “reciprocity and equality of obligations” and that this required (1) a binding alliance, (2) a joint guarantee of all European countries bordering the U.S.S.R., and (3) a concrete agreement for mutual aid and defense of the guaranteed States in the event of attack by aggressors. London and Paris now accepted (1) but balked at (2) and (3). The negotiations dragged on inconclusively. At the end of June, Andrei Zhdanov, Leningrad Party leader, wrote in Pravda that he did not believe that the British and French Governments desired an equal treaty with the U.S.S.R. At the end of July, Chamberlain announced that Anglo-French military missions would go to Moscow to initiate staff talks, pending conclusion of a definitive agreement which had been held up by differences of views on the proper definition of “indirect aggression.” The missions were of wholly undistinguished personnel. They made a leisurely trip to the Soviet capital. Molotov, Voroshilov, and Stalin expected that they would have authority to sign a pact giving the U.S.S.R. the right to decide when the Baltic States were threatened, to act to meet the threat, to have necessary military access to the Baltic States and Poland, and to summon Britain and France to its support. They had no such authority. Deadlock was complete.

“Neutrality” and “Defense.” A complete revolution in Soviet diplomacy followed the failure of these discussions. Ribbentrop came to Moscow on August 23 and signed a German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. Voroshilov declared that the U.S.S.R. could not defend Poland unless the Red Army were
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permitted to enter Polish territory. Neither Warsaw, Paris, nor London had been willing to grant such permission. Molotov told the Supreme Soviet on August 31, when the Pact with Hitler was ratified, that the Western Powers had “plotted to involve us in war” without being willing to see the Soviet Union strengthened. Germany had dropped its anti-Soviet policy. The U.S.S.R. had no need to join either side. It would remain at peace. After several weeks of confusion, due to obvious ignorance of the Kremlin’s new decision, the Communist Parties of France, Britain, and America dropped all slogans of “People’s Front,” “Unity against Fascist Aggression,” and the like; denounced as an “imperialist war” the new conflict which Hitler unleashed by his invasion of Poland; and developed a line of “revolutionary defeatism” which admirably served the purposes of Stalin—and of Hitler.

The Kremlin’s policy after the outbreak of hostilities was strict neutrality, tempered by a firm determination to sell neutrality to Hitler at a price which would greatly strengthen the defenses of the U.S.S.R. against the Reich. The first step was to seize the former Russian territories of Poland and to reach new agreements with Berlin on the division of the carcass of the victim of the blitzkrieg. On September 17, 1939, Moscow declared that the Polish State had “virtually ceased to exist” and that the Red Army must undertake the protection of its abandoned “blood brothers,” the Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Soviet troops were already on the march. They rapidly occupied all eastern Poland not yet in the hands of the Reichswehr. Ribbentrop flew again to Moscow. On September 28 a new German-Soviet accord partitioned Poland along the ethnographic frontier, the Reich taking the Polish areas and the U.S.S.R. the Byelorussian and Ukrainian areas, including western Galicia, which had been part of Austria-Hungary before 1914. Details of the frontier were defined more precisely by accords of October 5, 1939, and January 10, 1941. This extension of Bolshevism 250 miles westward was but the first of Stalin’s victories and the initial installment of the price paid to Moscow by Berlin for “reinsurance” in the East.

The Kremlin’s next step was the imposition of protectorates on the Baltic States. Hitler acquiesced not only in Soviet military control of the ancient realm of the Teutonic Knights but in the “voluntary” evacuation to the Reich of the Germans who had lived on the Baltic shore for seven centuries. By a combination of trumped-up accusations, invitations, and threats of invasion, Moscow induced Estonia (September 28), Latvia (October 5), and Lithuania (October 10) to sign Mutual Assistance Pacts pledging common defense “in the event of a direct aggression or threat of aggression on the part of any European Great Power” against the Baltic frontiers of the signatories. Moscow acquired the right to establish garrisons on Baltic territory and to maintain naval and air bases at Paltiski, Oesel, Hiiumaa, Libau,
and Ventspils. The Baltic Republics secured in return a short-lived “protection” of their “integrity” and their “sovereign” rights. Lithuania was granted the long-coveted city and region of Vilna.

Moscow now gave moral support to Berlin’s bid for “peace” in October, 1939. This attitude, far from being indicative of the Soviet desire to see the Reich win the war, was inspired by the conviction that a “negotiated” settlement on the basis of the new status quo would leave the U.S.S.R. secure in its new outposts. Such a development would also save the Western Powers from possible destruction and compel their discredited leaders to seek a new rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. on Moscow’s terms as the only means of future protection against the victorious Reich. These strictly Realpolitik desiderata were rationalized by Communists everywhere in terms of stereotyped eulogies of peace and denunciations of Anglo-French “imperialism.” But London and Paris were committed to restoring the status quo ante bellum and would neither recognize Moscow’s title to the new Soviet territories nor consider peace with Hitler. Stalin therefore considered what further measures he should take to strengthen his State against the bourgeois Powers.

War in Finland. Efforts to negotiate a mutual assistance pact with Turkey failed in the autumn of 1939 because of Ankara’s reluctance to meet Soviet terms and Turkish determination to remain faithful to the Western Allies. Moscow acquiesced in the Turkish refusal. But when Finland rejected Soviet demands, the Kremlin resorted to force. In mid-October Molotov received a Finnish delegation in Moscow and asked a 30-year lease for a Red naval base at Hangö and cession to the U.S.S.R. of part of the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad, several islands in the Gulf, and a strip of coast near Petsamo on the Arctic in exchange for a larger area of central Karelia midway between Lake Ladoga and the Arctic. Helsingfors refused, since the proposals involved the abandonment of the Mannerheim line of fortifications on the Isthmus. Each side was willing to compromise. But Moscow would not relinquish demands for Hangö, for the removal of the alleged “threat” to Leningrad, and for effective military control of the Gulf of Finland and the entire northwestern frontier. Helsingfors would not yield to demands which it regarded as incompatible with Finnish security, “neutrality,” and “independence.” The result was deadlock.

On November 26, 1939, Molotov alleged that Finnish frontier guards had fired on Soviet troops. He demanded that Helsingfors withdraw its forces on the Isthmus a distance of 20 to 25 kilometers. Finland denied the charge and agreed to withdraw troops from the frontier only if Moscow did likewise. Molotov retorted by denouncing the Soviet-Finnish Nonaggression Pact of 1932 and ordering Soviet troops and air forces to attack Finland.
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on November 30. On December 1, Moscow granted diplomatic recognition to a "People's Government of the Democratic Republic of Finland," established in the isthmian frontier village of Terijoki and headed by Otto Kuusinen, a Communist refugee from Finland. The U.S.S.R. herewith committed an act of flagrant aggression motivated by strategic considerations regarded as paramount. It sought to imitate the Fascist technique of intimidation and disintegration through support of a puppet regime. The expectation apparently was that Helsingfors would yield at the first blow or that the Finnish masses would rally to Kuusinen, with whom Moscow concluded a Treaty of Mutual Assistance (December 2) granting all the Soviet military and territorial demands.

These assumptions were completely mistaken. The Finns rallied to the defense of their country and inflicted heavy losses on the inferior Soviet troops sent against them. Over 100,000 lives were lost in bitter fighting in subzero weather amid the frozen marshes and forests of the subarctic wilderness. During December and January the defenders more than held their own. Early in February, however, the invaders launched a frontal offensive against the Isthmus fortifications with first-class troops under Gen. Gregory Stern. Marshal Gustav Mannerheim's "line" was broken by massed artillery and tanks. His troops were forced out of the island stronghold of Koivisto on February 26 and out of the suburbs of Viipuri (Viborg) on March 5. He had estimated in January that successful defense against the Red giant could be continued if 30,000 foreign troops were available by May. In February, he felt he would need 50,000 foreign troops by April. By early March, he conceded that 100,000 reinforcements were needed at once. Since they were nowhere to be had, he and his colleagues decided to sue for peace.

Meanwhile Finland had appealed to the Western Powers and to the League. On December 14, 1939, the Assembly and Council at Geneva condemned Soviet aggression and for the first time (and the last) expelled an aggressor from membership. Moscow scoffed. The League died. As for aid to Finland outside of the League, Sweden gave generously of arms, supplies, and volunteers but always within the limits of "neutrality." The U.S.A., with nothing to fear, was likewise hypnotized by its own mythology. Private relief funds of more than $1,000,000 flowed from American pocketbooks to Finland. All Americans loved Finland as the only one of the war debtors to meet its obligations in full. All Americans hated Bolshevism. On December 10 the Export-Import Bank (created, by a curious irony, to help finance Soviet-American trade) opened a $10,000,000 credit for Finnish purchases. But the Finns were permitted to buy only "nonmilitary" supplies. Congress failed to act upon the President's plea for further credits until it was too late, when $20,000,000 was made available—also for "nonmilitary" supplies.
of which the Finns had little need. Although the "Neutrality" Act was not applied, Congressional solicitude for "neutrality" forbade any effective assistance.

London and Paris were paralyzed for other reasons. The Munichmen relished the thought of fighting the U.S.S.R. far more than that of fighting the Reich. Gamelin and Weygand, then in Syria, made plans for bombing the Baku oil fields, less to aid Finland than to interrupt German imports of Soviet oil. But Turkey would not cooperate. Chamberlain and Daladier made plans for an expeditionary force to cross Scandinavia and go to Finland's support. But Norway and Sweden would not cooperate, lest this departure from "neutrality" provoke a German invasion to forestall Allied control of Scandinavia. After long hesitation the Allied Governments on March 2 formally requested Norway and Sweden to permit passage of Allied troops. Oslo and Stockholm both refused. While Chamberlain and Daladier, primarily for the purpose of cutting the Reich off from iron-ore shipments, via Narvik, from the mines of northern Sweden, contemplated forcible measures to induce compliance, the Finnish Government decided that its situation was hopeless. It asked Moscow for terms. Stalin recognized the error of his original calculations. He had no desire to be involved in hostilities with the Allies. He therefore agreed to drop Kuusinen and grant peace on "moderate" terms. Even after the peace in Finland, the Allied High Command toyed with plans for bombing Baku until the western blitzkrieg put an end to all such schemes.

On March 12, 1940, a Finnish delegation in Moscow signed a peace treaty with the U.S.S.R. Helsingfors was obliged to cede without compensation the entire Karelian Isthmus and the shores of Lake Ladoga, most of the Gulf islands, and a strip of northern territory near Petsamo, not including the port, however, or the near-by nickel mines. Moscow secured the right to build a railway in the north, along with free passage to Norway and Sweden. Hangö was leased for 30 years at an annual rental of $330,000. Molotov reaffirmed Soviet neutrality and denounced the Anglo-French "imperialists."

The Kremlin's Dilemma. The Scandinavian and western blitzkriegs of the spring produced a slight but visible shift of Soviet policy in the direction of new defensive measures against the Axis. Allied defeat per se would cause no Soviet tears to flow, but German victory over the West would confront the U.S.S.R. with a formidable and probably invincible rival who would undoubtedly follow the precepts of Mein Kampf and move against the Ukraine. On June 15-17, 1940, Soviet troops abruptly occupied all of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Following local "elections," the three Baltic Republics were formally incorporated into the U.S.S.R. in August. On
June 28 the Red Army occupied Bessarabia and northern Bucovina after Rumanian acceptance of a Soviet ultimatum.

These further enhancements of Soviet power had perforce to be "approved" with good grace by the Fascist Caesars so long as Britain was unbeaten. Moscow would make no direct contribution to the defeat of Britain. Stalin, unlike Mussolini, knew that an alliance with a stronger Power to despoil a third can lead only to ruin. He was confident, moreover, that the U.S.A. would not permit British defeat. On this assumption, he could afford to pursue "neutrality" with a vengeance, meanwhile taking care that the Reich did not install its forces in areas where they might prove menacing to the U.S.S.R. Despite its saving clause in Article 5, the Triple Alliance Pact of September 27, 1940, was not comforting to the Kremlin. The swift German occupation of Rumania in early October apparently caught Moscow unawares. A Tass communiqué asserted that reports abroad to the effect that the U.S.S.R. had been consulted and had approved in advance of the German action "did not correspond to the facts." Later reports that Moscow had approved Hungarian adherence to the Triplice elicited the comment that they "did not correspond to the facts to any degree."

Molotov's visit to Berlin, November 12-14, 1940, led to no immediate clarification of the Soviet's future role. Moscow buttressed Bulgaria and Turkey in their refusal to join the Triplice or admit German troops. The Kremlin offered a mutual assistance pact to Bulgaria, but Berlin objected. In the Far East the U.S.S.R. now spurned the projected nonaggression pact with Japan which it had earlier solicited, and continued to aid Chungking against Tokyo. China might become a vehicle of Soviet-American collaboration, just as Turkey might become a bridge between Moscow and London. But so long as Britain and her Allies could win victories in Albania and Africa and so long as American aid to Britain was being constantly increased, Moscow felt no anxiety about British defeat and therefore felt no need to change its course. Any change of course, moreover, postulated reciprocity. Despite the presence of Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps in Moscow and the displacement of Halifax by Eden at Downing Street in December, Britain and the U.S.A. refused to recognize Soviet title to Russia's recovered provinces and declined to release the shipping, bank deposits, and other assets of the Baltic States in their territories to the U.S.S.R. In anxious Washington and beleaguered London, anti-Bolshevism was still a more powerful sentiment than the dictates of Realpolitik. Moscow accordingly signed a new trade agreement with the Reich on January 10, 1941, and reaffirmed neutrality and Soviet-German friendship. But when Nazi threats forced Bulgaria on March 1, 1941, to sign the Triple Alliance and to admit
German troops for the coercion of Greece and Turkey, Moscow made an oblique and belated protest to Sofia.

The Nazi decision to attack the U.S.S.R. was reached in August of 1940. It was known to Moscow, with the probable date of invasion, by January, 1941. Yet neither side dared hint to the other or to the world what it intended, what it knew of the other’s intent, or what it suspected of the other’s knowledge of its own intent. Behind a façade of deception, a strange diplomatic duel ran its appointed course. Molotov in Berlin in November, 1940, apparently protested at the German “guarantee” to Rumania and at Nazi penetration of Finland and asked German acquiescence in a Bulgarian-Soviet Mutual Aid Pact and in a new regime for the Straits, possibly including Soviet bases. Hitler and Ribbentrop refused and in turn asked Moscow to join the Tripartite Pact. Molotov refused.88

88 On Jan. 22, 1948, the State Department released a 357-page volume of 260 documents on Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office), selected and translated from material in the archives of the German Foreign Office, captured by U.S. forces in Germany in 1945. This allegedly “sensational” publication was presented in the American press as further evidence of Soviet “deceit,” “perfidy,” and “imperialism” and as a powerful reply by Marshall and Truman to Soviet charges of U.S. “imperialism.” In fact the “revelation,” albeit a fascinating record of German-Soviet relations as reflected in Nazi documents (which may or may not be reliable), revealed little not already known or suspected from other sources. In several respects, however, these documents supplement or correct the diplomatic narrative in the present work, the body of which was written before this volume was available.

It now seems established, for example, that Matsuoka informed Ribbentrop and Hitler in March, 1941, of his intention of concluding a Nonaggression Pact with Moscow and encountered no serious objection from his Berlin hosts, who argued that Japan could best serve the common cause by seizing Singapore. They offered technical military advice to Tokyo and assured Matsuoka that they would declare war on the U.S.A. in the event of a Japanese-American conflict. Matsuoka reported these observations to Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenberg, German Ambassador in Moscow.

The documents also indicate that Berlin began making overtures to the Kremlin in mid-April, 1939; that Ribbentrop, warning that war might come soon, offered a general settlement to Moscow on Aug. 14, 1939; that Stalin conceded favorably; that the Pact of Aug. 23, 1939, had a secret protocol by which Berlin conceded that Estonia, Latvia, and eastern Poland should be in the Soviet sphere while Moscow conceded that Lithuania and western Poland should be in the German sphere; that Moscow was surprised by the swift Nazi victory in Poland and proposed (Sept. 25, 1939) that Berlin waive claims to Lithuania in exchange for a larger share of Poland; and that Berlin yielded to this suggestion but increasingly resented the further development of Soviet policy in 1940-41.

Following his return from Berlin, Molotov is represented in the documents as agreeing (Nov. 27, 1940) to Soviet adherence to a four-Power pact on five conditions: (1) withdrawal of German troops from Finland; (2) signature of a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual-aid pact; (3) a Soviet leasehold for a military base “within range of the Bosporus and Dardanelles”; (4) Tripartite recognition that the area between the Soviet Transcaucasian Republics and the Persian Gulf is “the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union”; and (5) Japanese renunciation of coal and oil concessions in
During the final spring of the Nazi-Soviet truce, the U.S.S.R. resisted Axis domination of the Balkans by veiled words. It was unwilling to hasten a showdown by any stronger measures. The result was Nazi occupation of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary and the speedy conquest of Jugoslavia and Greece. Moscow's only diplomatic victory of the season was the Nonaggression Pact of April 13 with Japan. On May 6, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet relieved Molotov of his duties as Premier, appointed him Vice-Premier, and made Stalin Premier. As late as early June, both the German and Soviet press were still writing of "excellent relations." On June 13, a Tass communiqué denied foreign "rumors" that Germany had made claim on the U.S.S.R.; opined that German troop movements were doubtless "connected with other motives"; asserted that, since the U.S.S.R. was abiding northern Sakhalin. Whether Molotov expected that these terms would be met is unclear. Acceptance of them would have substantially strengthened the strategic position of the U.S.S.R. in relationship to the Axis and Japan. Berlin, having already decided on war, never replied to these proposals.

This record is less a confirmation of Soviet "sin"—a quality common to all practitioners of power politics in the eyes of rival practitioners of power politics—than a striking indication of the continuity of Russian geopolitical objectives in the playing of the game. In the spring of 1939 the Kremlin offered to the Western Powers an alliance against the Reich if they would accept some of these objectives. When London and Paris refused, Moscow suspected that the Western Powers were still gambling on the possibility of a German-Soviet war in which they would be neutral. The U.S.S.R. accordingly made its bargain with the Nazi leaders, who were willing to buy Soviet neutrality at a price which Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay were unwilling to pay for an alliance. But Soviet efforts to ensure full "delivery" and strengthen defenses against the Axis encountered Nazi resistance, culminating in the decision to attack Russia.

In the sequel the U.S.S.R., for three years, bore most of the burden of fighting the Reich. Faced with the exigencies of coalition warfare, Roosevelt and Churchill accepted many of these Soviet aspirations. After victory, Bevin, Byrnes, and Marshall in effect repudiated these accords, alleging Soviet violation, and launched their "cold war," meanwhile accusing Moscow of "aggression." Their objective, like Hitler's earlier, was ostensibly to prevent further Soviet expansion and actually to push Moscovy back, if possible, to its limits of 1939 and, ideally, to strike down the Soviet power. This pattern of relationships demonstrates that the elemental clash between the power purposes of Russia and the West has been a constant factor in world politics for the past half century and has played a decisive role in the precipitation of World Wars I, II, and, prospectively, III.

The selection and editing of the German documents in Nazi-Soviet Relations convey the misleading impression that Hitler attacked Poland because of the Nazi-Soviet pact and decided to attack the U.S.S.R. in December, 1940. Other sources, including Wehrmacht documents used at Nuremberg, make it clear that the Nazi decision to strike down Poland was reached in May, 1939; that the Nazi-Soviet pact was the result, not the cause, of this decision; and that German preparations to invade the U.S.S.R. began in August, 1940. On these and other misrepresentations, see Walter Lippmann, "Propaganda That Backfired," February 12, 1948; "Falsificators of History," Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Washington, D. C., February, 1948; and the author's "Diplomacy by Falsehood," Soviet Russia Today, April, 1948.

89 See p. 635.
by the Nonaggression Pact, all stories of Soviet war preparation were "false and provocational"; and added that, since Soviet maneuvers were intended only for the training of reservists, the view that they were inimical to Germany was "absurd." Moscow thus told Berlin, obliquely, that it knew of Nazi preparations for invasion and was taking countermeasures. When the Axis press failed to publish the Tass statement, the men in the Kremlin knew that the blow would soon fall.

*With Fire and Sword.* The enemy struck on Sunday morning, June 22, 1941. Molotov broadcast to the Soviet peoples:

... This war has been forced upon us not by the German people, not by German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose suffering we well understand, but by the clique of bloodthirsty Fascist rulers of Germany who have enslaved Frenchmen, Czechs, Poles, Serbians, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other nations.

This is not the first time that our people have had to deal with an attack of an arrogant foe. At the time of Napoleon's invasion of Russia our people's reply was War for the Fatherland, and Napoleon suffered defeat and met his doom. It will be the same with Hitler, who in his arrogance has proclaimed a new crusade against our country. The Red Army and our whole people will again wage victorious War for the Fatherland, for our country, for honor, for liberty.

The Government calls upon you, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally still more closely around our glorious Bolshevist Party, around our Soviet Government, around our great leader and comrade, Stalin. Ours is a righteous cause. The enemy shall be defeated, victory will be ours.

Italy, Rumania, and Slovakia declared war later in the day. Finland followed on June 25 and Hungary on June 27. Denmark and Vichy severed relations with Moscow. Both permitted the recruitment of anti-Bolshevist "volunteers," as did Sweden, which also allowed German divisions to cross its territory from Norway to Finland. Franco at once sent troops to aid *der Führer*.

The U.S.S.R. was thus assaulted by all of Fascist Europe, with a population of over 300,000,000 people, compared with the Soviet's 200,000,000, a combined steel production of almost 50,000,000 tons, compared with Russia's 18,000,000, a 3:2 advantage over the victim of attack in available military man power, and a 5:2 advantage in weapons and war machines. The blow of the hitherto invincible Wehrmacht and its sundry allies was the most formidable and lethal onslaught ever hurled against any nation-state in modern times. That the Soviet armies and peoples stood up against it was a miracle of valor, self-sacrifice, and inflexible unity of purpose—and a demonstration that the Soviet polity and economy were capable of bearing burdens heavier than those ever faced by any other modern com-
munity. The cost in death and ruin was appalling. By paying it, the Soviet peoples purchased national survival—and ultimately victory for their cause and for all the United Nations.

Churchill at once proclaimed solidarity with Russia against Hitler—"this bloodthirsty guttersnipe" who "is a monster of wickedness, insatiable in his lust for blood and plunder." Through Sumner Welles, Roosevelt did likewise. Cripps and Molotov signed an accord on July 12, which led later to the Anglo-Soviet alliance of May 26, 1942. Harry Hopkins went to Moscow in August, Harriman and Beaverbrook in October. The New York State Convention of the American Legion accused Stalin of "ruthless murder," while Martin Dies protested "in the name of tens of thousands of voiceless Christian martyrs who have been murdered by the Soviets." But, on November 7, F.D.R. sent greetings to Kalinin and revealed that he had pledged $1,000,000,000 to the U.S.S.R. in lend-lease aid. Ultimate American shipments were impressive, amounting to some $11,000,000,000, out of total lend-lease appropriations of $50,000,000,000, of which half went to the British Commonwealth. The U.S.S.R. received from the U.S.A. 6,800 tanks, 13,300 airplanes, 1,000 locomotives, 406,000 motorcars, 2,000,000 tons of steel, 11,000,000 pairs of shoes, etc. But this flood was the merest trickle in 1941 and was still negligible in 1942 and early 1943. No effective "second front" was established until three years after the Russian war began. Soviet armies bore almost the entire brunt of the struggle against the Reich and, until 1944, fought almost entirely with Soviet-made arms and transport.

On July 1, 1941, a "State Committee of Defense" was set up, with Stalin as Chairman, Molotov as Vice-Chairman, and Voroshilov, Beria, and Malenkov as members. The Commissariats of Internal Affairs and National Security were merged into a united N.K.V.D. under Beria. Stalin spoke on July 3 in words of warning and of hope:

The enemy is cruel and implacable. He is out to seize our lands watered with our sweat, to seize our grain and soil secured by our labor. He is out to restore the rule of landlords, to restore Tsarism, to destroy national culture. . . . Thus the issue is one of life or death for the Soviet State, for the peoples of the U.S.S.R.: the issue is whether the peoples of the Soviet Union shall remain free or fall into slavery. The Soviet people must realize this and abandon all heedlessness, they must mobilize themselves and reorganize all their work on new, wartime lines, when there can be no mercy to the enemy. . . .

In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have loyal allies in the peoples of Europe and America, including German people who are enslaved by Hitlerite despots. . . . The State Committee of Defense has entered into its functions and calls upon all our people to rally around the

40 See pp. 851-852.
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Party of Lenin-Stalin and around the Soviet Government so as self-denyingly to support the Red Army and Navy, demolish the enemy and secure victory.

All our forces for the support of our heroic Red Army and our glorious Red Navy! All the forces of the people—for the demolition of the enemy! Forward, to our victory!

The "Second Patriotic War," so named by way of recalling victory over Napoleon in 1812, was the most gigantic, destructive, and murderous combat in the history of warfare. The new borderlands were lost in a fortnight, since the Red Army's High Command had decided that only "defense in depth" could avert defeat. In the north the armies of Mannerheim and Falkenhorst struck at Leningrad. In the south, Antonescu’s forces invaded the Ukraine. Between them, huge Nazi armies under Leeb, Bock, and Rundstedt aimed at Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov. Smolensk was lost in mid-July, though Timoshenko temporarily checked the invaders east of the city. Kiev, Odessa, and Kharkov were lost in October.

Early in October, as Nazi spokesmen announced that Russia was finished, the Wehrmacht moved on Moscow. Many Commissariats and the Diplomatic Corps were moved to Kuibyshev (Samara) on the Volga, but Stalin remained in the Kremlin. On the anniversary of the Revolution, he preached staunch resistance to the foe and sought to reassure those abroad who already were certain that a Nazi victory would yet be preferable to a Soviet victory:

German invaders want a war of extermination against the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Well then, if the Germans want a war of extermination, they shall have it. From now on our task, the task of the fighters, commanders and political instructors of our army and our navy will consist in the extermination to the last man of all Germans who have penetrated the territory of our native land as invaders. No mercy for the German invaders! Death to the German invaders! . . .

We have not and cannot have such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples—whether it be peoples and territories of Europe or peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran. Our first aim is to liberate our territories and our people from the German-Fascist yoke. We have not and cannot have such war aims as the imposition of our will and our regime on the Slavs and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are awaiting our aid. Our aid consists in assisting these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny, and then setting them free to rule their own land as they desire. No intervention whatever in the internal affairs of other nations! But to realize these aims it is necessary to crush the military might of the German invaders. . . . This is now our task. We can and must fulfill this task. Only by fulfilling this task and routing the German invaders can we achieve a lasting and just peace.

By late November, the Wehrmacht was within 13 miles of Moscow. When all seemed lost Gen. (later Marshal) Georgi K. Zhukov ordered and led the first major counterattack. Early in December, as Litvinov arrived in
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America and Japan blitzed Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Moscow was won by its defenders. The enemy reeled back, shivered in the Russian winter, and clung tenaciously to “hedgehog” positions from which the assault was to be renewed. Red Muscovy, alone among Hitler’s victims on the Continent, had defeated the legions of Fascism and thereby saved the cause of the United Nations. Said Gen. Douglas MacArthur on February 23, 1942:

The hopes of civilization rest on the worthy banners of the courageous Russian Army. During my lifetime I have participated in a number of wars and have witnessed others, as well as studying in great detail the campaigns of outstanding leaders of the past. In none have I observed such effective resistance to the heaviest blows of a hitherto undefeated enemy, followed by a smashing counter-attack which is driving the enemy back to his own land. The scale and grandeur of the effort mark it as the greatest military achievement in all history.

The Years of Blood. The fashioning of the Great Coalition has been reviewed above. What emerged was a “strange alliance,” marred by mutual suspicion, which in the end only Roosevelt managed to resolve—and then, as it turned out, only for the brief interval between the dawn and the sunrise of victory. Repeated postponements of a Western attack on the Reich generated bitterness among Russians, since, as Stalin declared in November, 1942, there were only 4 German and 11 Italian divisions fighting in North Africa while 240 Axis divisions were engaged in their second all-out attempt to smash the U.S.S.R. Churchill visited Moscow in August, 1942, but found the atmosphere chilly. Of his host he said that he is a man of massive outstanding personality, suited to the somber and stormy times in which his life has been cast; a man of inexhaustible courage and will-power and a man direct and even blunt in speech. . . . Stalin also left upon me the impression of a deep, cool wisdom and a complete absence of illusions of any kind. I believe I made him feel that we were good and faithful comrades in this war—but that, after all, is a matter which deeds not words will prove.

In the summer of 1942, the Fascist hosts, far larger and more formidably armed than they had been a year before, struck anew and in overwhelming force at the defenders of Sovietland. A crushing assault in the south aimed at reaching the Volga, seizing the Caucasian oil fields, and outflanking Moscow from the east. By late August the invaders were in Stalingrad. Here half a million troops, commanded by Gen. Friedrich von Paulus and abundantly supplied with all possible weapons, poured into a metropolis only a few miles wide and strung out over 50 miles along the high western bank of a broad river with no bridges. Reason dictated the withdrawal of Soviet forces to the eastern shore. But the defenders strove to resist the foe block

41 See pp. 218ff. and relevant portions of preceding sections.
by block, street by street, house by house, room by room in what soon became the most savage single combat and the greatest single epic of heroism in World War II. In the words of Konstantin Simonov:

Those who have been here will never forget it. When after the lapse of years we look back and recall the war, the very word will conjure up a vision of Stalingrad illuminated by the flare of rockets and the glow of fire; and once again the incessant thunder of bombardment from land and air will ring in our ears. Again we shall feel the suffocating stench of burning and hear the crackling of overheated sheet iron. . . . In the daytime houses flare up, now here, now there in the city; at night a smoke-bedimmed glow stretches along the horizon. The detonation of bombs and the rumbling of guns go on day and night, causing the very earth to tremble. . . .

The Germans are striving, might and main, to convert this city into an Inferno where it would be impossible to live. Yes, it is difficult to live here, for here the sky overhead is in flames and the earth trembles under one’s feet. The sight of the gaping walls and blackened window frames of what were but yesterday peaceful dwellings causes the muscles of one’s throat to contract in a spasm of hatred. The charred remains of women and children, burned alive by the Germans on one of the river steamers, strew the sandy beach of the Volga and cry aloud for vengeance. Yes, it is very difficult to live here. Even more: it is impossible to live here as a passive bystander. To live here to fight, to live here to kill Germans—only this is possible here. This we must and will do, staunchly defending the city enveloped in flames and smoke and drenched in blood. And although death hovers over us, glory, our sister, is by our side amidst the ruins and orphans’ tears. . . .

The city is fighting grimly, no matter what the cost; and if the price paid be dear, the feats the men accomplish rigorous and stern, and their sufferings almost incredible—these things cannot be helped, for the struggle being waged is for life or death. . . . After Stalingrad we shall give no quarter.

By September’s end Hitler could announce, not inaccurately: “We have taken Stalingrad.” Most of the city was in Nazi hands. All of it was in ruins. But the defenders refused to accept defeat. From piles of rubble and crumbling factories and apartments, they struck back to decimate the enemy in ferocious man hunts with rifles, grenades, machine guns, flame throwers, rockets, artillery—and knives. In New York, 20,000 Americans gathered on “Stalingrad Day” (November 8, 1942) to receive greetings from Roosevelt and Eisenhower, to hear Litvinov, and to applaud Henry A. Wallace’s plea for a new democracy. In the shadow of death, Americans and Russians were comrades in arms. Three years later they would be suspicious strangers. Four years later they would be potential enemies. But, in 1942, all people everywhere throughout the United States and the United Nations paid humble tribute to the warriors of Stalingrad, who, more than any other single group of Allied fighters, denied to the common foe his chance for victory.
On November 19, 1942, Stalin, Zhukov, Vatutin, Voronov, Yeremenko, and Rokossovsky, after meticulous planning, released the springs of a huge trap. New Soviet armies attacked north and south of Stalingrad, met at Kalach on November 23, and encircled the German Sixth Army west of the Volga. Hitler insisted that Paulus hold out, but all efforts to break the ring failed. After desperate resistance, 330,000 Nazi troops were cut to pieces. Paulus yielded on February 1, 1943, along with 24 other generals, 2,400 officers, 91,000 surviving soldiers, 750 airplanes, 1,550 tanks, 6,700 guns, 61,000 motor vehicles, and other equipment.

The Wehrmacht was never again able to mount an offensive promising total victory. Soviet forces drove 400 miles westward in the winter of 1942-43, liberated 200,000 square miles of Russian earth, captured a third of a million enemy troops, and slew almost 1,000,000. But Stalin’s words of February 23, 1943, were accurate:

Twenty months have passed since the Red Army began to wage its heroic struggle, unexampled in history, against the invasion of the German-Fascist hordes. In view of the absence of a second front in Europe the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war. Nevertheless the Red Army has not only stood firm against the onslaught, but has also become a menace to the Fascist Army.

The enemy has suffered defeat but he is not yet conquered. The Red Army has before it a severe struggle against the cunning, cruel and as yet strong enemy. Men, commanders and political workers should firmly remember the behest of our teacher, Lenin, that “the first thing is not to be carried away by victory or to swagger, the second thing is to consolidate victories, the third thing is to defeat the enemy completely.” Long live the Party of the Bolsheviks, inspirer and organizer of the Red Army’s victories! Death to the German invaders!

War and the Working Class. The impact of hostilities on Soviet society was far-reaching. A major change in constitutional structure was effected in the amendments of February 1, 1944, by which each Union Republic was authorized to maintain its own military formations and to enter into diplomatic relations with other States. This extension of the federal principle facilitated the later admission of the Ukraine and Byelorussia as separate members of U.N. A vast expansion of membership in the Communist Party also took place during the war. Members and candidates numbered 3,400,000 in 1941. By V-E Day they numbered 5,000,000, with another 1,000,000 added within the next two years. Casualties were heavy among Party members. By 1946 the great majority of members were young people admitted since 1941. Under the conditions of war the democratization of the Party machine, promised by the rules adopted at its Eighteenth Congress (March, 1939), did not materialize.
The composition of the new Soviet elite was not radically changed by the ordeal of battle. Successful commanders—Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky, Konev, Malinovsky, and others—acquired new honor and influence, but with peace sank again into relative obscurity. Unlike the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. did not entrust its postwar fortunes to military specialists. On the other hand, the growing differentiation in income between privates and officers and the growing deference to officers were matched by an increasing gap in living standards between industrial managers, intellectuals, and skilled workers on the one side and the unskilled mass of urban wage earners and collective farmers on the other. Yet there was little concrete evidence to support the view that Soviet society was becoming stratified into a closed ruling caste and an unprivileged multitude. This seldom occurs in a rapidly expanding economy. Despite grievous losses, Soviet economy continued to expand during and after the war. Able individuals, without regard to race, nationality, sex, or social origin, had ready access to posts of honor and increased income, thanks to a persistent quest for talent and an elaborate system of prizes, bonuses, and other rewards. If this fluidity had few aspects of a truly “classless society” in the original Marxist-Leninist sense, it still meant that the humblest child of the remotest villager, if he were good, could “make good” in the military, political, or managerial elite—on condition of strict conformity to current political orthodoxy.

A notable development of the war years was the resurgence of an ardent patriotism, which, albeit still universal in its anti-Fascist and Marxist symbolism, was increasingly concerned with glorifying the Rodina, or Fatherland, and recalling the Muscovite heroes of olden times. On December, 1943, the Sovnarkom formally replaced the International with the new Hymn of the Soviet Union as the national anthem. The most popular war heroes were the martyrs of the partisan forces behind Nazi lines. Initial hopes that German workers and peasants would somehow obstruct or resist their Nazi masters gave way, in the face of frightful atrocities, to a growing conviction that the only good Germans were dead Germans. The new patriotism revived mass reverence for Kutusov, Suvarov, Peter the Great, Dmitri Donskoii, Alexander Nevsky, and other giants of times gone by. It also found expression in epaulettes, honors, and innumerable medals as rewards for deeds of valor. Yet Soviet patriotism, while far removed from the revolutionary internationalism of the early days, had in it no elements of racial or linguistic conceit. It was rather the credo of a vast multinational community where, to a greater degree than anywhere else on earth, all people had equal status and equal opportunity (however low the status and dismal the opportunity, in the Western view) without regard to sex, race, nationality, color, culture, or ancestry.
Another phenomenon of the war years was the waning of militant atheism and the restoration to respectability of the Orthodox Church. This change began before the war. The “League of the Godless,” founded in 1925, had 10,000,000 members by 1932. The Stalin Constitution reenfranchised the clergy. By 1940, the League had only 3,000,000 members. With the invasion, it was dissolved, and its publishing facilities were turned over to the Church, which rallied wholeheartedly to the defense of Mother Russia. For the first time since the Revolution, theological institutes were established, and the publication of religious books and periodicals was permitted. A State Council on Church Affairs under Georgi Karpov was set up to promote “genuine religious freedom.” Metropolitan Sergei of Moscow was elected Patriarch by a new “Sobor,” or Church Assembly, in September, 1943. Upon his death in May, 1944, another Sobor in January, 1945, joined by representatives of Orthodox Churches abroad, chose Metropolitan Alexei as Patriarch. Communists were still irreligious. All churches were still disestablished and faced with many obstacles in the way of educational and proselytizing activities. Soviet society was still dedicated to philosophical materialism and the cult of science. But official persecution of, and discrimination against, believers was at an end.

Not least important among the changes wrought by the war was the self-dissolution of the Communist International on May 22, 1943. No Congress had met since 1935. Events had demonstrated (though reverence for the saviors, saints, and martyrs of Marxism precluded open admission of the fact) that Marx, Engels, and Lenin had been in error in their social prognoses for mature capitalist societies. The “proletariat,” far from becoming a majority of the population and suffering ever greater impoverishment with the enrichment of an ever smaller bourgeoisie, tends to enjoy rising living standards and to decline in numbers in relationship to the new middle class of technicians, managers, professional people, and small businessmen. Technological progress spells larger output with more machines, fewer workers, and a growing army of engineers, accountants, advertisers, salesmen, distributors, and members of the service trades. Politics reflects economic and social change. In this at least, Marx and Lenin were, on the whole, right. But their forecast of proletarian world revolution was wholly wrong. Everywhere in Atlantisa, wage earners became more and more “bourgeois” and were progressively outnumbered by a constantly increasing Kleinbürgerturn, which, by the Marxist prognosis, was scheduled to disappear. The result was the political impossibility of proletarian revolution, save in economically backward regions, and the translation of recurrent economic crises and prostrations into Fascism.
Such considerations contributed to the decision to dissolve the Comintern, as did the need of promoting inter-Allied unity and the plain fact that the German proletariat, with few exceptions, enthusiastically supported the Nazi crusade to conquer Europe, destroy Russia, and exterminate Jewry and Slavdom. The original “General Staff of World Revolution” thus came to an end. This decision, said Stalin, “exposes the lie of the Hitlerites that Moscow intends to intervene in the life of other nations and ‘Bolshevize’ them . . . thus clearing the way to the future organization of a fellowship of nations based on their equality.”

The Fruits of Victory. Meanwhile the desperate combat to drive the enemy from Soviet soil and bring him to final defeat went on relentlessly during 1943 and 1944. “The achievements represented by the victorious struggle of the Soviet Union,” wrote Sumner Welles, “have never been excelled by any other nation. They would not have been possible save through the efforts of a united and selflessly patriotic people.” Along a front of 2,000 miles, Soviet forces fought their way forward, at a rate of 40 miles a month, from the Volga to the Elbe. When the Wehrmacht opened its third summer offensive in July, 1943, around Kursk, Orel, and Belgorod, it lost 1,000 guns, 3,000 tanks, and 70,000 men in a few days of fierce fighting against a foe that now had superiority in arms, men, and generalship. Much of the Ukraine was liberated by autumn. In January the agony of Leningrad was ended with the smashing of the Nazi siege lines around the city. By summer, Soviet forces were invading Finland, Poland, and Rumania.

The Soviet drive timed to assist the Anglo-American invaders of France liberated Byelorussia and more of Poland. “It is the Russian Army,” said Churchill, August 2, 1944, “that has done the main work of tearing the guts out of the German Army.” Rumania, Finland, and Bulgaria capitulated in the autumn. After liberating the Baltic and reaching Budapest, the victors opened their final offensive in central Poland in mid-January, 1945. It ended in Berlin and on the Elbe, with the demise of the Nazi Reich. On Moscow’s V-E Day, Stalin declared:

... The age-long struggle of the Slav peoples for their existence and their independence has ended in victory over the German invaders and the German tyranny. Henceforth the great banner of freedom of nations and peace among nations will fly over Europe. ... Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the battles against the enemy and gave their lives for the freedom and happiness of our people!

The cost of victory was staggering. Among the citizens of the U.S.S.R., 38,000,000 were driven from their homes; 7,000,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, partisans, and civilians died in battle, succumbed from wounds, or
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perished from starvation, forced labor, torture, or mass extermination behind enemy lines; increased death rates and decreased birth rates attributable to the war probably meant the loss of another 8,000,000 lives at least. Soviet casualties were ten times those of all the other Western United Nations combined. Property damage was estimated at 679,000,000,000 rubles. The destruction included 6,000,000 buildings in 1,700 devastated cities and 70,000 ruined villages, including 84,000 schools, 43,000 libraries, 31,000 factories, 13,000 bridges, and 40,000 miles of railway track. Also lost were 7,000,000 horses, 17,000,000 cattle, 20,000,000 pigs, 27,000,000 sheep and goats, etc. The U.S.A. would have suffered a comparable disaster if 9,000,000 Americans had been slain, with 27,000,000 homeless and most of the area east of the Mississippi occupied and devastated.

It is arguable, but not demonstrable, that Moscow could have preserved amity with its allies had the Kremlin consented to restore the frontiers of 1939. Those frontiers, however, were the product of Russian defeat and weakness in 1904-05, 1915-16, and 1918-21. The Soviet definition of victory was of a different character. Moscow hoped for the destruction of Fascism everywhere and a reduction of the Reich to permanent military impotence. Moscow planned for a new Pan-Slavism, whereby a millennium of disunity in the face of aggression was to give way to Slavic solidarity under Soviet leadership, with Hungary and Rumania included perforce in the new constellation. Victory was to mean the recovery of territories lost in earlier disasters—viz., the Baltic, western Byelorussia and the western Ukraine, Bessarabia, northern Bucovina, southern Sakhalin, the Kurils, Port Arthur—plus, for good measure, Tannu Tuva, northern East Prussia, and Carpatho-Ukraine. The latter was ceded by Prague on June 29, 1945. The territories directly under Soviet sovereignty were larger in 1945, by almost 250,000 square miles, than they had been in 1939. They were nevertheless smaller by 60,000 square miles than the lands of Tsarist Russia in 1914. The gains were almost negligible compared with the costs of World War II. Yet they were purchased, along with Soviet protectorates in Balkania and Danubia, with fool’s gold—if the ultimate price was to be World War III. Of this, more presently.

New Times. The Soviet Union in the years following hostilities experienced no such striking change in political fortunes as took place in the U.K. and the U.S.A. The dictatorship of the Party was not relaxed. Internal democratization was deferred in the face of new threats from abroad. As always in Russia’s history, external danger spells internal unity in terms of unquestioning loyalty to leaders—and therefore despotism, rather than democracy. Insistence on ideological orthodoxy became ever more vehement. No Party Congress had met since 1939, nor had any been called by 1948.
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Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov, and the other members of the Politburo determined the policies of the Central Committee, which, in turn, ruled all the Russians through the Party hierarchy and the formal machinery of government. The result, in Western terms, was still a dictatorship of a self-perpetuating ruling group, justifying American indictments of Soviet totalitarianism.

The structure of government was little changed. National elections took place on February 10, 1946, for the first time since December, 1937. As before, many were called, but few were chosen. Numerous candidates were named for office, but in every case all but one withdrew in the course of campaign discussions. In an electorate of over 100,000,000 people, 98% voted. Of these, 99% cast their ballots for the official candidates of the “Bloc of Party and non-Party People”: 682 for the Soviet of the Union and 657 for the Soviet of Nationalities. Among the deputies elected, 1,085 were Communist Party members, 254 were “Non-Party,” 277 were women. In December, 1947, the procedure of electing deputies to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republic and to local Soviets was similar. Open competition among rival candidates for office was still no part of the Soviet political order.

The unanimity achieved in Soviet elections also continued to mark the work of Soviet lawmakers. The new Supreme Soviet met on March 12, 1946. It unanimously reelected the Soviet of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), changing its name however to “Council of Ministers.” Stalin remained Chairman and Molotov Vice-Chairman and Foreign Minister. Nikolai Shvernik became Chairman of the Presidium—i.e., “President” of the U.S.S.R.—as successor to the venerable Kalinin, who resigned in March and died in June, 1946. A new Five Year Plan contemplated restoration of production to prewar levels by 1950, with tentative goals of doubled production set for 1960. Demobilization was accomplished by stages until the Red Army (rechristened “Soviet Army,” September 20, 1946), was reduced to c. 3,000,000 men by 1948. While no concessions were made to Western precepts of freedom of criticism and discussion, the death penalty was abolished, May 26, 1947.

Economic reconstruction in the face of the vast wreckage of war was the main concern of leaders and people. Stalin on February 9, 1946, pledged abolition of rationing “in the very near future,” but a severe drought reduced food reserves. Not until the good harvest of 1947 was the deficiency made up. Collective farmers, moreover, had increased their personal holdings for garden produce, which sold at high prices in the “free markets,” to the detriment of the production of staple crops. Grave problems were also posed by the condition of industry, the maintenance of several different
price levels, and the inflationary accumulation of currency in the hands of those whose incomes rose during the war while stocks of consumers' goods declined. A federal decree of December 14, 1947, finally abolished all rationing, established a unified price scale for all goods, and revalued the ruble through the issue of new currency, which was exchanged in a ratio of 1:10 for cash in hand, and 1:1 for bank deposits up to 3,000 rubles, 2:3 for those from 3,000 to 10,000, and 1:2 for those over 10,000. With some exceptions, all outstanding State bonds were exchanged for new ones in a ratio of 1:3. All wages continued to be paid on the old scale in new rubles, with many new prices reduced below the old price level for rationed commodities.

This drastic readjustment was presented as the "last" sacrifice to be required by the war and as aimed primarily at "speculative elements." It was less an evidence of the weakness of the Soviet economy than of new strength and assurance of increased production and slowly rising living standards. The costs of revaluation fell most heavily on those who had accumulated most during the war in cash, bonds, and large bank deposits. Those with small earnings and few savings not only suffered no loss but gained from price reductions, coupled with the maintenance of wage and salary scales on the old level. If this was not a new "expropriation" of the new bourgeoisie, it was at least evidence that the Party leaders had no intention of increasing further the gap between poorly paid and well paid or of expanding the privileges of the Soviet intelligentsia at the expense of the "proletariat." By American standards, dire poverty was still the lot of the Soviet masses. But all citizens enjoyed social security, albeit on a low level and without freedom. All had opportunities for personal advancement through merit. All had assurance against mass unemployment in a completely socialized economy which, whatever its shortcomings, admitted of no violent fluctuations between prosperity and depression.

These phases of Soviet society were largely ignored by those in the West who denounced Soviet totalitarianism as "Red Fascism" and argued that the Communist despotism, like those of Mussolini, Hitler, and Hirohito, was inexorably militaristic, aggressive, and expansionist. The political apparatus of the modern totalitarian State did, in fact, originate in the Russian Revolution. The machinery was copied by Fascismo and the Nazis. But in Russia the tools of the new tyranny were employed to effect a social revolution, wherein the old elites of land and money were cast down and a "New Order" based upon socialized industry and collectivized agriculture was ultimately built, at great sacrifice, within a context of mass education, social progress, and racial and national equality. Under Fascism the weapons of power are used to protect aristocracy and plutocracy against mass unrest,
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with economic stability, full employment, and increased production achieved, not, as in the U.S.S.R., through planned public investment and planned expansion of mass purchasing power, but essentially through the spending of public funds on privately owned industry and agriculture to maximize profits and to stimulate heavy industry through armaments, war, and conquest.

It is accurate to say that a Fascist regime in a highly industrialized society has no means—acceptable to its moneyed supporters and major beneficiaries—of averting crises and economic breakdowns save militarization and imperialist expansion. Since this is in no sense the case under Soviet socialism, the familiar analogy must be deemed false. However much Fascism and Communism may resemble one another in the external structure of political power, they have nothing in common in their economic functioning, their inner dynamics, and their social purpose.42

Cold War. If the burghers of Atlantica who equated Soviet Communism with Fascism in the years of the great schism between the victors of 1945 will assuredly be judged by future chroniclers to have been victims of error, the same judgment will be passed on the comrades in Muscovy who equated American capitalist democracy with “Fascist imperialism.” The extensive use of these epithets on both sides as accurate descriptions of reality was the measure of the chasm which had opened and of the apparent impossibility of achieving even a modicum of mutual understanding and toleration. Soviet leaders, with no exception, held Anglo-American policies responsible for the rift. American leaders, with almost no exception, held Soviet policies responsible. If objective analysis and scholarship—both virtually nonexistent in the U.S.S.R. and under increasingly heavy attack in the U.S.A.—are still possible in days to come, their practitioners are likely to hold the policy makers of both Super-Powers responsible in almost equal measure. And they will almost surely reject both the official Soviet view that Truman’s America was dedicated to the enslavement and exploitation of the world as well as the official American view that Stalin’s Russia was embarked upon a program of Communizing or conquering all or most of the globe.

For reasons already suggested, proletarian revolutions and Communist regimes of the Soviet type are socially and politically impossible in highly industrialized nations—where economic breakdown often fosters Fascism but has never, to date, brought a Soviet regime into being. This fact is known to Communist leaders in the U.S.S.R. and throughout the world.

42 For a fuller discussion of these distinctions, see the author’s Soviet Politics and “Soviet Foreign Policy and Its Implication,” Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Oct. 3, 1947.
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National Communist Parties in such communities can be instruments of "proletarian dictatorship" only if they can function literally as a "Fifth Column," with at least four columns of the Soviet Army available to crush resistance. Even in eastern Europe and the Balkans, overrun by Soviet troops in pursuit of the Wehrmacht, the Communist-directed regimes of 1945-46, while a far cry from the Western pattern of democracy (save in Czechoslovakia), were not modeled upon the U.S.S.R. with its one-party dictatorship, suppression of all opposition, and collectivized agriculture as the base of the economy. All were coalitions, dedicated to agrarian reform, i.e., private peasant ownership of farms; to some semblance or pretense of political competition in a free market for talk; and, like the post-war governments of Italy, France, and Britain, devoted to programs of partial socialization of industry and finance which fell far short of the total socialism of the U.S.S.R. Anti-Communist political groups in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, while victims of force and fraud, were not suppressed until the Anglo-American campaign of promoting "democracy" assumed the form of anti-Soviet espionage and intrigue on the part of some of the Western-oriented politicians. To what extent the intrigue was a result of repression or the repression was a result of intrigue seemed unlikely to be determined in any fashion upon which Washington and Moscow, or political Right and Left on the Continent, could agree.

The Kremlin's objective was to maintain Soviet hegemony over Slavic Europe through local political pressure, trade accords (i.e., the "Molotov Plan" of 1947) with satellite governments, and military alliances with the States within the Soviet security zone—as with Czechoslovakia (December 12, 1943), Jugoslovakia (April 11, 1945), and Poland (April 21, 1945). These in turn later concluded alliances with one another and with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. Despite qualifications and ambiguities, this conception of Soviet safety was on the whole approved by Roosevelt and, originally, Churchill on condition of reciprocity elsewhere. It was later challenged by Byrnes, Bevin, Marshall, and Truman. The American objective was to put an end to Soviet power in eastern Europe and the Balkans by diplomatic action, political pressure, and propaganda in favor of "de-

43 The trials of persons accused of espionage and treason in Poland, Rumania, and Hungary in 1947 were denounced as "travesties" and examples of "police terror" by the State Department and the American press. They uncovered certain facts, however, which appeared to some observers, including American correspondents, to indicate that a few American and British agents and officers had in fact encouraged local opposition elements in courses of action calculated to discredit, undermine, or overthrow the existing Soviet-supported regimes. For accounts of these developments, see the articles in the New International Year Book, 1945 and thereafter, on the U.S.S.R. and its satellite States.

44 See pp. 227 ff. and 807 ff.
mocracy” and against “totalitarianism”; by outflanking operations, as in Greece, Turkey, and Iran; by rejecting the new German-Polish frontier and planning the restoration of the Reich; and by a general program of counter-pressure and “containment,” aimed ultimately at bringing about the “mel- lowering” or the downfall of the Soviet power in Russia itself.

In the complex thrust and parry of this global struggle, the Kremlin had important geographical and ideological advantages plus the benefit of a central, defensive position in the face of a remote rival committed to far-flung interventions in all the Rimlands around the periphery of the Eurasian Heartland. Moscow also had the support of Communist Parties throughout the world, estimated in 1947 to have a total membership of 20,000,000, with the largest units, outside of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, functioning in China, Italy, Germany, France, Cuba, and Brazil. The Soviet Union, however, suffered from technological and industrial inferiority of such proportions that it was obliged to do all in its power to delay any open trial by battle and hence could not promote its interests or press its demands to the point of a military showdown in any area where Washington seemed prepared to supplement threatened force with overt force. Soviet poverty, in contrast with American wealth, also required resort to force and fraud in winning and holding satellites, while the U.S.A. could rely on favors. The latter begets ingratitude, the former fear. For Great Powers, as for Princes, Machiavelli’s words are still true: it is better to be feared than to be loved. Yet, in the end, American power was more likely to be feared over the world than Soviet power.

Cast Accounts. As of 1948 the score of Soviet diplomacy in the “war after the war” was an uneven record of victories and defeats. Since all arenas of conflict were located near Soviet frontiers, with none close to the homeland of the American giant, the over-all verdict for Moscow was one of relative weakness, requiring the defense and, where possible, the local extension of bulwarks and bastions adjacent to Muscovy—and precluding effective sallies to seize strong points near the home bases of the foe. The line of “battle” extended in an immense semicircle (or circle, if the Arctic ice pack be regarded as its northernmost segment) from Spitsbergen to Kamchatka. A survey, 1945-48, of the moves of the players on this gigantic chessboard, in a game by no means finished as these pages went to press, reveals the following pattern:

Soviet proposals for bases on Spitsbergen were rejected by Norway, March 3, 1947. Scandinavia became a buffer between East and West, rather than a puppet of either. Finland’s new rulers conducted themselves with circumspection. Despite American protests, Social Democratic Sweden signed a trade accord with Moscow, October 8, 1946, extending credits of
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$280,000,000 over five years and providing for an exchange of goods to the annual value of $28,000,000. Denmark and Norway, while unwilling to cooperate with the Power of the East against the Power of the West, were equally unwilling, although they adhered to the Marshall Plan, to do the reverse—a circumstance to be chalked up as a negative victory for the Kremlin. To the south, the struggle for Germany was a stalemate. American efforts to “liberate” Danubia and Balkania from “Communist enslavement” failed completely. The pro-Soviet regimes of Josef Cyranciewicz in Poland, Klement Gottwald in Czechoslovakia, Dinnyes in Hungary, Grozu in Rumania, Dimitrov in Bulgaria, Tito in Jugoslavia, and Hoxha in Albania were all firmly aligned with Muscovy—with most anti-Soviet leaders dead, in jail, in hiding, or in exile. The contest for Austria was stalemate. Switzerland, along with Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Britain, was with the West against the East. In France and Italy, powerful Communist Parties were ousted from the Cabinets in the spring of 1947 but were in a position to embarrass the new pro-American regimes. Fascist Spain and Portugal were plainly in the Anglo-American camp with no prospect of change so long as Downing Street and the State Department, while actively championing democracy along the Vistula and the Danube, displayed little concern over its restoration in Iberia.

Red Muscovy suffered its worst defeats in the Near and Middle East. The contest of wills first assumed acute form in Iran, where the retention of Soviet troops early in 1946 caused the U.S. and U.K. to mobilize the U.N. against the U.S.S.R. Soviet withdrawal in May, in exchange for an agreement on oil, proved an empty victory. By the close of 1947 the Iranian Parliament had rejected the oil agreement, Premier Ahmed Ghavam was out, and Anglophile Premier Ibrahim Hakimi had made his land a military protectorate of the U.S.A. In Turkey and Greece the implementation of the Truman Doctrine meant a major reverse for Moscow. However inadequate was the American action in terms of promoting democracy or frightening the U.S.S.R. into a more submissive mood, the fact remained that American armed forces had installed themselves in bases from which they could, if need be, menace Albania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Soviet littoral of the Black Sea.

This threat was enhanced by the bitterly anti-Soviet orientation of the ruling groups in Athens and Ankara, caused in part by the exigencies of internal politics and in part by Balkan threats to Greece and by Soviet designs on Kars, Ardahan, and the Straits. Archbishop Damaskinos, who as Regent paved the way for the return of George II, demanded the cession to Greece of Albanian and Bulgarian territories (February 28, 1946), as his Royalist audience shouted “On to Sofia! Sofia for 50 years!” No Soviet
citizen was allowed to forget that British troops from Iran occupied Baku and the Soviet oil fields in September, 1918, and brought about the butchery of all local Soviet officials or that the Turkish troops who came in their wake massacred 30,000 Soviet citizens of Armenian origin. Tanin, Turkish Government paper, wrote on August 25, 1946: “It is indispensable for the peace and safety of humanity that the claws and teeth of the Russian bear be rendered harmless. The world is well on its way to achieving this end. Turkey is ready to accept the sacrifice that will devolve upon her in this common task of humanity.” During 1947-48 the Turkish press looked forward with enthusiasm to the prospects of war to destroy the Muscovite menace.

The scope of the defeat here suffered by the Soviet Union can best be imagined by Americans in terms of a state of affairs in which Washington would be unable to prevent the establishment of “protectorates” over Bermuda, Cuba, and Mexico by a Soviet Union having a monopoly of atomic bombs and the largest navy and strategic air fleet in the world and therefore able from its new bases to menace the major cities and oil fields of the U.S.A. In the event of open war, American forces would overrun and occupy the new enemy bases in a matter of weeks, but only after frightful damage and casualties had been inflicted on the American homeland. By the same logic the U.S.S.R., if cold war became hot, could be grievously injured by American bombing squadrons operating from Greece, Turkey, and Iran, even though all three countries would soon be seized by Soviet armored divisions. On balance, the risks run by the U.S.S.R. in acquiescing in the development of American strategic plans in the Near East were very grave risks indeed. But since they could be averted only by measures which would have led to open war—a contingency which the Kremlin, in view of its weakness, hoped to prevent or postpone to a distant future—no alternative was available.

The scores of the contestants elsewhere were less one-sided. United States domination of the Arab States was weakened by the fact that Washington felt obliged, for reasons of domestic politics, to support the partition of Palestine—a proposal which the U.S.S.R. supported with alacrity. Afghanistan remained a buffer. The devil’s broth brewed by independence for India offered opportunities, rather than dangers, for the Kremlin. The gravitational pull of the Moslem Republics of the U.S.S.R. offered further opportunities in the Middle East and Sinkiang. The bitter conflicts in Indo-China and Indonesia between imperial aspirations and colonial rebellion were also not disadvantageous to Soviet purposes. In China the Sino-Soviet Alliance Pacts of August 14, 1945, gave the U.S.S.R. a privileged position in Manchuria (which was soon controlled by Chinese Marxists) and renounced
China’s claims to Outer Mongolia, which was Moscow’s ally. American policy, moreover, was nicely, if unwittingly, calculated to play into the hands of the Chinese Communists. The contest for Korea was deadlocked. Japan was under American control. But the Kurils and southern Sakhalin were under Soviet rule. As of 1948, Moscow’s prospects in Asia were by no means dismal.

The U.N. and international Communism were less tangible factors in the struggle between the titans. At Lake Success, Washington was successful in mobilizing vote after vote against the U.S.S.R. and provoking veto after veto by Andrei Gromyko. At only one point, aside from the Palestine issue, did Moscow score a limited victory. On September 18, 1947, Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered before the Assembly a formidable oratorical assault against American “warmongers.” His indictment was ridiculed as “demagoguery” and dismissed as “slander” by U.S. spokesmen and pressmen. Yet its documented impact, marred only by minor inaccuracies, was considerable. His proposals for U.N. condemnation of war propaganda were, at first, fought tooth and nail by the State Department but were finally accepted, in qualified form, in resolutions condemning inciters of war.

As regards the power of global Communism, 18 delegates from various parties—including Zhdanov and Malenkov of the Politburo, Edvard Kardelj of Yugoslavia, Josef Refai of Hungary, Anna Pauker of Rumania (soon to become Foreign Minister), Vice-Premier Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland, Jacques Duclos of France, R. Slansky of Czechoslovakia, and Luigi Longo of Italy—met secretly in Poland in late September, 1947. On October 5, Warsaw and Moscow announced the results of their deliberations. A “Communist Information Bureau” (Cominform) would be set up in Belgrade, to consist of representatives of Communist Party Central Committees of nine countries. It would publish a magazine and coordinate Communist activities on the basis of common agreement. A long manifesto asserted, *inter alia:*

Two opposite political lines have crystallized: on the one extreme the U.S.S.R. and the democratic countries aim at whittling down imperialism and the strengthening of democracy. On the other side the U.S.A. and England aim at the strengthening of imperialism and choking democracy. Because the U.S.S.R. and the democratic countries stand in the way of fulfilling imperialistic plans aiming at world domination and crushing democratic movements, a campaign against the Soviet Union and the countries of the new democracy was undertaken, a campaign fed also by a threat of a new war on the part of the most sanguine imperialistic politicians of the U.S.A. and England.

... The Truman-Marshall Plan is only a farce, a European branch of the general world plan of political expansion being realized by the U.S.A. in all
parts of the world. The plan of the economic and political subjugation of Europe through American imperialism is complemented by plans for the economic and political subjugation of China, Indonesia and South America. The aggressors of yesterday—the capitalist tycoons of Germany and Japan—are being prepared by the U.S.A. for a new role—as tools of the imperialistic police of Europe and Asia of the United States of America.

In this situation the Communist Parties are faced with a particularly important problem. They must grasp in their hands the banner of national independence and sovereignty in their own countries. If the Communist Parties stand fast on their outposts, if they refuse to be intimidated and blackmailed, if they courageously guard over the democracy, national sovereignty, independence and self-determination of their countries, if they know how to fight against attempts at the economic and political subjugation of their countries and place themselves at the head of all the forces ready to defend the cause of national honor and independence, then and then only no plans to subjugate the countries of Europe and Asia can succeed.

A separate place in this arsenal is reserved for the treasonable policy of the Rightist Socialists of the kind of [Léon] Blum in France, [Prime Minister] Attlee and [Foreign Secretary] Bevin in Britain, [Socialist Leader Dr. Kurt] Schumacher in Germany, [President Dr. Karl] Renner and [Vice-Premier Adolf] Scharf in Austria, [Giuseppe] Saragat in Italy, and so on, who aim at hiding the true face of imperialism behind the mask of democracy and Socialist phraseology while in reality they serve as faithful toadies of the imperialists, bringing within the ranks of labor dissension and disruption and poisoning its conscience. It is not an accident that the imperialistic British foreign policy has found in the person of Bevin its most consistent and arduous spokesman.

In these conditions the anti-imperialistic democratic camp has to close its ranks and draw up and agree on a common platform to work out its tactics against the chief forces of the imperialist camp, against the American imperialism, against its English and French allies, against the right-wing Socialists above all in England and France.

To frustrate those imperialistic plans of aggression we need the efforts of all democratic and anti-imperialistic forces in Europe.

This new “Communist Manifesto,” reminiscent of the pronouncements of 1848 and 1919, was regarded in the West as a revival of the Comintern—an interpretation fortified by Mao Tse-tung’s proposals, early in 1948, that an Asiatic “Cominform” be created. Yet there were significant differences, reflecting the actual power position, if not the ultimate aspirations, of the U.S.S.R. and the world Communist movement. The flaming defiance of 1848 and the confident optimism of 1919 were here replaced by a defensive temper, despite bitter denunciation of British Laborites, French Socialists, and Italian Right Socialists. The pristine vision of proletarian world revolution here found no echo. Communists preferred to identify themselves with “democracy,” “anti-imperialism,” “independence,” and “sovereignty”—all of which sounded remote from the original Marxist-Leninist exuberance for the universal overthrow of the “bourgeoisie” by the “proletariat.” The
Cominform was less a weapon of world revolution than an instrument of Soviet foreign policy in its struggle with the U.S.A. Whether this fact would make it innocuous or efficacious depended less on Communist decisions than on the content, direction, and implications of American policy in 1948 and thereafter.

The Dialectics of Destiny. As these words were written, all prognoses of the ultimate outcome of American-Soviet rivalry for global power were necessarily speculative. Soviet and American assumptions that “virtue” would inevitably triumph over “vice” (both having diametrically opposite definitions in Washington and Moscow) were alike fatuous. The verdict would depend on the final balance of forces between the giants. That balance was contingent upon psychological as well as upon material factors.

In the event of open recourse to military violence before 1950, it could be taken for granted that American atomic missiles would vaporize many Soviet cities and incinerate millions of Soviet citizens. It could also be taken for granted that Soviet armies, beating down all local resistance, would occupy Continental Europe, all of Korea, most of China, and substantial areas of the Near and Middle East. World War III would thereafter become a prolonged struggle of attrition, in which Soviet spies and Communist agents would vaporize as many American cities as possible, while the vast might of America would organize expeditionary forces to invade and liberate Europe and Asia. A Soviet invasion of America was inconceivable. Effective American conquest of all of Eurasia was improbable.

Should the test of force be long deferred, the outcome of the contest of wills would depend less on technology and geography than on the capacity of the antagonists to capture popular imaginations in western Europe, Islam, and the Orient. On the most hopeful assumption, the exigencies of this competition might be expected to drive American diplomacy away from the tactics of relying chiefly on landowners, bankers, merchants, and reactionary politicians, whose only merit, frequently, was their anti-Communism. These tactics in the end would fail to meet the Communist challenge effectively. They might be replaced by a new (actually old) American championship of republicanism, agrarian reform, popular liberties, human equality, and social progressivism, all of which would pose difficult problems to Moscow. By the same logic the Kremlin might be expected, under sufficient stimulation, to abandon the strategy of relying for support exclusively on Communists or their allies, with all other political elements discouraged, repressed, or liquidated. This procedure would in the end fail of its purpose, particularly if the diplomacy and strategy of American democracy were so conducted as to persuade skeptics that democracy, in some sense, actually meant the rule of the people instead of the rule of the rich. In this event
Muscovy would be obliged to broaden its bases of support in the borderlands by minimizing force and fraud and adopting a more generous attitude toward doubters and dissenters.

Such possible developments as are here suggested would tend, if long continued, to synthesize opposites into a unity. A Soviet Union seriously concerned, for reasons of expediency, with property rights and democratic processes (in the Western sense) would ultimately confront an America seriously concerned, for reasons of expediency, with racial and national equality, economic security, and mass aspirations toward a more dignified and abundant life. Such a contest could eventuate only in a happy stalemate with Europeans, Asiatics, Africans, and Latin Americans finding much in both camps worthy of their admiration, and with Americans and Russians finally perceiving that their values and purposes were more in harmony than in conflict and that competition for global power had become senseless as well as suicidal.

Such a fortunate evolution of American-Soviet rivalry would have domestic repercussions. For all its ideological intolerance and despotism, its use of political police and labor camps, and its other denials of the worth of the individual, Soviet society—both in its hopes and its accomplishments—had “democratic” and “liberal” potentialities (again in the Western sense) which could reasonably be expected to mature and flower in a peaceful world in which the rivalry of the colossi was not a race to prepare for war but an amicable competition to promote the good life in the good society. In an atmosphere of tolerance and collaboration the American community, in turn, might well give fuller meaning to its ideals of equality and brotherhood and evolve programs of social security and full employment through public economic planning which would preserve and enrich, rather than weaken and destroy, the American heritage of individual liberty, economic progress, and freedom of enterprise.

Two such Super-Powers, each capable of commanding the respect of half the globe, could together, as united nations, work toward global federalism. To the mutual advantage of their peoples and of all peoples, they could together plan and administer programs of trade and investment in the lost hinterlands of the world, designed to lift forgotten men and women out of poverty and ignorance into a new life, and at the same time add to the incomes and to the sense of service of all people everywhere. De Tocqueville’s vision of a century ago would then be realized in a fashion heartening to all mankind.45

45 “There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and while the attention of
To the careful observer of the world scene in 1948 the vision here suggested seemed "visionary" in the extreme. So, in truth, it was. In a world in which men, whether "Marxists" or "Democrats," revere their tribal gods more than their devotion to human unity and One World, no such progress toward the realization of an ancient dream is possible. Once the heady wine of pride and power inflames men's minds, their acts are shaped, not by their professed loyalty to the humanistic faith of Ikhnaton, Moses, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, or Dante, but by the motives and calculations so well described by Plutarch, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, and Hitler—to say nothing of Engels and Lenin, or of Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt—all alike disciples of the cult of force. A wholly different destiny loomed before Soviet Muscovy and the American commonwealth in the middle years of the 20th century.

Any effort to forecast that destiny in detail would be a work of presumption and supererogation. It is enough to say that continuation and embitterment of the cold war promised to achieve a synthesis of another kind between the Powers of Atlantica and Eurasia. With all energies concentrated on preparations for a combat of annihilation, the fruits of freedom in America would wither, and the seeds of freedom in Russia would die. Both communities would become "garrison-states," ruled by specialists in the arts of violence and constrained by fear and hate to transmute economies capable of promoting welfare into economies dedicated to the production of the tools of force. Soviet totalitarianism would be narrowed and sharpened, with the Party becoming more and more a despotic hierarchy of command, and with the structure of government remaining no more than a vehicle for the execution of the will of the leaders. American democracy would be more and more militarized. American capitalism would survive mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly placed themselves in the front rank among the nations, and the world learned their existence and their greatness at almost the same time. All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and they have only to maintain their power; but these are still in the act of growth. All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which no limit can be perceived. The American struggles against the obstacles that nature opposes to him; the adversaries of the Russian are men. The former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter civilization with all its arms. The conquests of the American are therefore gained by the plowshare; those of the Russian by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half a globe" [Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1839, edited by Phillips Bradley (New York, Knopf, 1945), Vol. I, p. 434].

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and flourish by feeding the insatiable appetites of the devotees of Mars. During the years of probing, preparing, and testing, clashes among diplomats would be accompanied by contests among strategists in localized areas of violence, with each contestant employing and arming his mercenaries to see, without risking too much, what increments of future fighting capacity could be gained or preserved or snatched from the foe. Finally, as always since the beginning of States and State Systems, one or the other antagonist would put forward demands for particular components of power which could not be had by mere threats because they could not be yielded by the enemy without diminishing, fatally, his chances of successful resistance or effective attack in the expected test of force. At this point, war would begin.

For reasons set forth in the next, and concluding, chapter of this volume, there is no valid ground for supposing that either side would "win" in any such contest of wills by violence. Without doubt, Muscovite legions will overrun and temporarily unite, under Communist rule, most of Europe and Asia in the early phases of such a struggle. Without doubt, American fliers will lay waste many or most of the urban centers of the U.S.S.R. at the same time. Without doubt, America's formidable might will ultimately find means of invading the Continent and the Orient, with doubters and dissenters at home suffering a fate not different from that of their counterparts in Soviet-occupied areas. And also, almost without doubt, the final outcome will not be one Rome but two Carthages. Such impoverished and demented survivors as will still live amid the wreckage will, almost certainly, renounce or forget all they ever knew of the visions of yesterday, which assumed the possibility—on the one side voiced in terms of Soviet socialism and, on the other, in terms of democratic capitalism—of men united in the service of mankind. Such visions are meaningless to those who live only for war. They are even more meaningless to those who survive the victories of nihilism.

To consign, thus miserably, to the chronicles of wasted time the high resolves which found verbal expression and concrete human meaning in both the Russian Revolution and the American Dream may seem, as of 1948, at once premature and a reflection of despair. Yet allegiance to hope must ever give way in the minds of honest commentators to loyalty to truth and to the prospects which awareness of truth suggests. Almost nothing in the mood and direction of the Soviet and American communities indicated any final outcome of their rivalry other than the one here suggested. The paradox and tragedy of our time were voiced in the comment once made, during civil war, to Maxim Gorky by Vladimir Ilich Ulianov (Lenin), founder of the Soviet State—after listening to Beethoven's Appassionata:
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I know nothing greater . . . it is marvelous, superhuman music. I always think proudly—perhaps I am naïve—what marvelous things human beings can do! . . . But I can't listen to music too often. It affects your nerves, makes you want to say stupid nice things and stroke the heads of people who could create such beauty while living in this vile hell. And now you mustn't stroke anyone's head—you might get your hand bitten off. You have to hit them on the head, without any mercy, although our ideal is not to use force against anyone. Hm . . . Our duty is infernally hard. . . .

In the atomic age such duties, whether performed in the name of Soviet socialism or American democracy, spell death to all concerned. Americans and Russians could save themselves from death only if Russians and Americans together could find means of leading mankind to the reaffirmation and the salvation of life.

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CHAPTER XII
THE PROBLEM OF THE 20TH CENTURY

1. E PLURIBUS UNUM

The long-run trend from the Middle Ages to the 20th century has been, on the whole, towards social and political and economic adjustments in line with the long-run pressure of technology. But in the last few years a sharp reversal of that trend has seemed to be dominant. No one can yet tell whether the march towards world integration will be resumed ... or whether the course of the world is really set, and has been since 1914, towards a new localism. A clear view of the situation cannot give hope that a permanent reversal towards localism will be a successful adjustment, unless it succeeds by destroying or severely limiting a technology that still presses in the opposite direction. The conflict between technology and politics is already producing symptoms of strain that are only too evident to all.—EUGENE STALEY, World Economy in Transition, 1939.

ONE peculiarity of this age,” writes a famous British essayist, “is the sudden acquisition of much physical knowledge. There is scarcely a department of science or art which is the same, or at all the same, as it was 50 years ago. A new world of inventions ... has grown up around us which we cannot help seeing; a new world of ideas is in the air and affects us, though we do not see it. ... If we wanted to describe one of the most marked results—perhaps the most marked result—of late thought, we should say that by it everything is made ‘an antiquity.’ ... Man himself to the eye of science has become ‘an antiquity.’”

Thus begins a well-known book entitled Physics and Politics by Walter Bagehot, written, strangely enough, not in 1945 but in 1869. Its author perceived the early impact, since multiplied a thousandfold, of the new science on modern civilization. He hoped that scientific method, applied to the study of human relations, would give mankind a new measure of self-understanding and self-control. During the ensuing century it has become clear that science alone is not enough to justify this expectation. Death rather than life for contemporary culture may be the most probable consequence of man’s mastery of the powers of heaven and the fires of hell, snatched
from nature's gods and devils by modern Fausts, whose new alchemy makes mockery of the old.

The roots of this paradox may lie, as Spengler and Toynbee suggest, in the very character of civilization itself. In a more immediate sense, the curious consequences of science for our own civilization are intelligible in terms of Plato's ancient lament. The great decisions in human communities are made not by philosophers or scientists but by the holders of economic and political power who, usually, are neither scientists nor philosophers. The social purposes to which new knowledge and new power are put are defined not by scholars and technicians, most of whom would shrink from the task, but by the blind and confused interplay of nations, classes, and interest groups and by traditional conceptions of the good, the true, and the beautiful.

In most of the Western nation-states, effective influence over social decisions has rested for centuries with priesthoods, nobilities, and plutocracies whose rule has been tempered by conflicts between competing elites and by pressures from the substrata. Clergymen, as custodians of the Christian gospel, have suffered a diminution of prestige in an increasingly secular world and have, more often than not, been indifferent or hostile toward science. Men of title and men of money, conversely, have for the most part been eager to employ scientific knowledge, but they have largely been disciples of the peculiarly Western or Faustian cults of power and wealth. Science, like art, has had its private or public patrons. By them its uses have been largely shaped. Science has thus served modern mankind most conspicuously by aiding entrepreneurs in their quest for profits and by assisting patriots, diplomats, and strategists in their search for new increments of national fighting capacity.

If, as many now suspect, the ultimate effects of this process appear to be divisive and destructive of the Great Society, the immediate effects have been of a different order. "World trade" and "world politics" both became possible by virtue of the revolutions in production, distribution, travel, transport, and communication wrought by the application of science to business and to government. The Great Society itself is the product of an emerging global economy and a nascent global polity. If the rich became richer, the poor became less poor, contrary to the Marxist prognosis. Vast populations flourished on both shores of the Atlantic and came to enjoy higher standards of health and comfort than any dreamed of in olden times. Colonial multitudes suffered conquest and exploitation but, in due course, also came to share in a modest way in the material benefits flowing from the new dispensation. Wars became more murderous and destructive, but the vastly enhanced productivity and reproductivity of the populations of the Great
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Powers more than compensated (until recently) for the high cost of conflict. All the peoples of the planet were, willy-nilly, knit ever more closely together into a fabric of many hues and patterns which, for all its diversity, was yet a unity, woven ever more tightly into one grand design with each passing generation.

It has long since become a truism, among philosophers if not among kings, that the continued political fragmentation of humanity into rival sovereignties is incompatible with the new unity of the world fashioned by science, technology, and business. Man’s fate seldom poses sharp alternatives of “either,” “or”—for cultural opposites often mingle and blur and emerge anew in strange shapes not foreseen by earlier commentators on initial contradictions. Yet there is much reason to believe that the Western State System and the global civilization of which it is a part have reached, or are about to reach, an irrevocable parting of the ways.

Men may preserve and improve further the fruits of a world economy and a world community, made one by the labors of scientists, engineers, and vendors of goods and services in a world market. Or men may return to their ancient ways of international anarchy, power politics, economic nationalism, and war—which, indeed, they have never abandoned. It is scarcely probable that they can long succeed in doing both. An effective choice of either would seem to involve, somehow, the sacrifice of the other. To pursue both at once is to invite failure and frustration, begetting aggression and promoting such paroxysms of mass madness and violence as seem likely to be fatal to civilization itself.

The considerations to be adduced in support of this view have been dealt with, in their manifold aspects, in the preceding pages. The latest development in the impact of science upon the Western State System remains to be considered. Yet the problem is not new. It has merely been posed in its sharpest form to date. In its contemporary guise it does, in fact, suggest that a final choice must presently be made—if it has not already been made.

2. $E = MC^2$

I believe if the statesmen of the world will understand what is at stake, they will not ask if it is possible to form a world government. They will realize that it is absolutely necessary, or a great part of humanity will be killed.—ALBERT EINSTEIN, October 26, 1945.

I am a frightened man. All the scientists I know are frightened—frightened for their lives and frightened for your life. . . . Now, in Washington, we have learned a new fear: we are afraid of what politicians and diplomats may do with the atomic bomb. . . . I hear people
talking about the possible use of the atomic bomb in war. As a scientist
I tell you: there must never be another war. . . . The bomb is fused.
The time is short. You must think fast. You must think straight.—
HAROLD C. UREY, Collier’s, January 5, 1946.

Retaliation is the only way of gaining the decision over our opponent.
. . . The [first] attack will come . . . across the North Polar Basin. . . .
The result may be a casualty list of 25,000,000 men, women and children
in the first 24 hours. . . . To stop our enemy from continuing his assa ult,
we must be prepared to carry the war to him. . . . Accordingly,
the long-range striking force composed of long-range, heavy-load-carrying
bombers and long-range fighters to protect them is a must item [in
national defense] . . . for it furnishes the best guarantee that the battle
for the air will be won and that the final phase, the actual invasion
and occupation of the enemy country by our surface forces can get
under way.—GEN. GEORGE C. KENNEY, U.S. Strategic Air Command,
to the 21st Women’s Patriotic Conference on National Defense, Wash-
ington, D. C., January 26, 1947.

On December 2, 1942, a notable nonathletic event occurred in the squash
courts at the west end of Stagg Field at the University of Chicago. It marked
a halfway point in an ultrasecret project which began in the fall of 1939
when Alexander Sachs, bearing a letter from Einstein, persuaded President
Roosevelt to encourage a strange quest. The enterprise was disguised as
“Development of Substitute Materials,” operating through the “Manhattan
District” of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Its cost was $2,000,000,000.
Its director was Brig. Gen. Leslie R. Groves. Its personnel consisted at first
of nuclear physicists and chemists and later of engineers, corporation execu-
tives, and thousands of workers, all sworn to secrecy and (save for a few)
all ignorant of the import of their endeavor.

The event at Stagg Field, arranged by Enrico Fermi of the “Metallurgical
Laboratory,” took place in an oblate spheroid, or “pile,” of graphite, inter-
spersed with a lattice of uranium and movable strips of cadmium as “con-
trols.” When the pile reached the requisite size through the addition of
further units, it produced heat—and slowly converted uranium into a new
element, named “plutonium,” with the process continuing at a steady rate.
This, weird realization of ancient hopes of transmuting elements was the
result of the successful attainment, for the first time on earth, of a self-
sustaining nuclear chain reaction. Its aftermath promised to carry mankind
into a wholly new age—which might resemble (depending on men’s wishes)
either a Paradise or an Inferno.

To describe any discovery or invention as the “most momentous of all
time” is to perpetuate the naïve exuberance of earlier generations, impressed
as they were with the revolutionary import of steam power, telegraphy,
photography, gas engines, electronics, plastics, and other wonders. In one respect, however, the advent of nuclear fission represents the culmination of the new science. For it places at man’s disposal the most formidable form of energy he has ever held in his apelike hands. This source of power is so far beyond all its predecessors as to constitute a wholly new dimension of force. In mastering fire, *Homo sapiens* learned to use the power released through the rearrangement of molecules in organic compounds, effected through rapid oxidation or combustion. In discovering electricity, he learned to use the power released through the transposition of the electrons surrounding the nuclei of atoms. In achieving nuclear fission, he learned to use the powers locked in the core of the atom itself. That this power should be vastly greater than all other powers combined is at once the brightest hope and the most deadly danger of our time.

The natural phenomenon of nuclear disintegration was first recognized in the 1890’s by H. Becquerel and Pierre and Marie Curie in their studies of the rare metal, radium. The mind which first perceived that matter and energy were but different forms of a basic unity, and first stated the relationship between them, was that of Albert Einstein. Working purely in terms of mathematical deduction, he wrote in 1905 that when matter is converted into energy the result can be expressed in the equation $E = mc^2$, in which $E$ means energy, $m$ mass, and $c$ the velocity of light (187,000 miles per second).

The meaning of this formulation, and even of the much smaller quantities involved in the processes of nuclear fission as now known, is beyond ordinary comprehension. Suffice it to say that the burning of 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds) of coal produces 8.5 kilowatt-hours of heat energy. If 1 kilogram of coal could be converted *in toto* into energy in accordance with Einstein’s formula, the resulting heat energy would approximate 25,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours—*i.e.*, 2 months’ output of the entire electric power industry of the U.S.A. In fact, no such complete transformation or “annihilation reaction” ever occurs. In the sun and stars the atomic disintegration of elements low in the periodic scale (*e.g.*, hydrogen) into other elements (*e.g.*, helium) leaves a fraction of the mass (1 per cent) unconverted into different matter and changed by the reaction into heat and light. In an atomic-fission chain reaction of elements high in the periodic scale (*e.g.*, uranium 235 or 233, thorium, or plutonium), a heavy nucleus, bombarded with neutrons, splits into two parts of roughly equal mass, with an accompanying release of other neutrons, which in turn split other nuclei, the neutrons of which repeat the process in geometrical progression—provided that the neutrons are prevented from escaping or from being absorbed beyond their reproduction rate by impurities or by isotopes not producing a chain reac-
The resulting fission products weigh slightly less than the original mass. Only 1/1100 of the mass is converted into energy. But so tremendous is the energy in relationship to the mass, that the complete fission of 1 pound of U-235 or plutonium produces an effect equivalent to the combustion of 1,800,000 pounds of gasoline or 2,800,000 pounds of coal or to the explosion of 26,000,000 pounds of TNT.

A small piece of pure U-235 or plutonium will not produce a chain reaction, since the neutrons lost through the surface of the metal exceed the number produced through the fission of nuclei. A large piece—i.e., one beyond the “critical size” and having no “retarders” or “controls” enmeshed in the mass—will produce a quick and massive chain reaction, since the production rate of neutrons in the interior is greater than the number lost on the surface. But the energy released by the reaction will shatter the piece into small bits, in which the reaction abruptly stops. If two or more small pieces of optimum shape are fired into one another at great velocity within a heavy covering (“tamper”) of material which reduces absorption or escape of neutrons to a minimum, the resulting chain reaction will penetrate much of the combined lump before the remainder is blown apart into nonfissionable pieces. The reaction, it is estimated, will be over in one-millionth of a second. The fission fragments have speeds corresponding to 1 trillion degrees of temperature. Thirty new elements are produced, many of them radioactive, along with sundry radiations of varying speeds and intensities. In the quantity and quality of the energies liberated, the “explosion” thus effected is so far beyond all other combustions or explosions produced by man on earth as to bear no resemblance to any previous accomplishments in the arts of destruction.

Despite widespread illusions to the contrary, the “secret” of the atomic bomb became common knowledge among nuclear physicists everywhere as soon as experiment in the U.S.A. demonstrated that a nuclear chain reaction could be produced in explosive form. Such “secrets” as existed after August, 1945, had to do, not with the mechanics of the bomb, but with the complex industrial processes for mass production of fissionable material from uranium ore. In natural uranium, the isotope U-235 exists in only 1 part in 140 of the isotope U-238. The latter in a slow reactor is transformed into plutonium, but the rate of transformation is so slow as to make bomb production by this method quite impossible. The problem of 1942-43 was to find means of separating U-235 from U-238 in sufficient quantities to make a uranium bomb. While plutonium can be separated from uranium by chemical means, no such means are available to separate U-235 and U-238, for both are different forms of the same element. The problem was finally solved in the gigantic plants at Oak Ridge, Tenn., and Hanford, Wash.

\[ E = MC^2 \]
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These processes are described in general terms in the official report by Henry DeWolf Smyth. When metallic uranium is chemically combined with fluorine into the gas, uranium hexafluoride, the isotopes of uranium can be separated and concentrated through gaseous diffusion, centrifugation, or thermodiffusion. Through these fantastically elaborate and difficult procedures, enough U-235 was obtained to make several uranium bombs. But the process itself made possible the production of ever larger amounts of plutonium from U-238—so that, so far as is now known, all atomic bombs beyond the first two exploded have been plutonium bombs.

Three observations are in order, all of fateful import for the future: (1) The continued operation of American separation plants and reactors is producing an ever greater quantity of explosively fissionable material, probably quite sufficient by 1948 to destroy most of the major cities of the world. (2) The production processes involved are capable of being mastered by any Great Power possessed of uranium ore and of the skills and materials employed in large-scale heavy industry. (3) The efficiency of atomic bombs had already been improved by 1948 to a point at which explosions 10 to 50 times more potent than the original detonations could be achieved—with bombs 1,000 times more powerful in prospect if, as, and when methods are found of producing a hydrogen-helium reaction.¹

Up to the time of writing, eight atomic bombs had been exploded, including secret experiments at Eniwetok. The circumstances and results in each instance are worthy of summary.

1. JULY 16, 1945, Alamagordo Air Base, 120 miles southeast of Albuquerque, N. M. First test of a uranium bomb, mounted on a steel tower. Operation directed by Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer. A flash brighter than the sun is followed by a tremendous blast and pressure. A globe of fire dissolves into a multicolored, mushrooming column of boiling fumes, ascending 40,000 feet into the substratosphere. Tower vaporized. Desert floor of vast crater fused into radioactive volcanic glass.

2. AUGUST 6, 1945, Hiroshima, Japan, population c. 300,000. Superfortress Enola Gay, flying at 30,000 feet, releases over the city, 8:15 A.M., the first atomic bomb used in warfare, weighing 4,000 pounds and containing 125 pounds of U-235. Explosion estimated to equal 20,000 tons of TNT. A blinding flash several hundred feet above the center of the city is followed by a vast cloud of smoke, ascending 40,000 feet. Flash burns, blast, falling debris, and conflagrations kill 78,150 people, with 13,983 missing, 37,425 injured, of whom many die later of radiation sickness, and 176,987

rendered ill, homeless, hungry, or indigent. Almost 5 square miles of the city are leveled by blast and by the subsequent "fire storm." Out of 90,000 buildings, 62,000 are destroyed and 6,000 severely damaged. All transport and power lines paralyzed. Of 200 doctors in the city, 180 are casualties. Of 1,780 nurses, 1,654 are killed or injured. Of 45 hospitals, only 3 remain usable. Flight of survivors and death of victims reduces population to 137,000 by November 1, 1945.

3. August 9, 1945, Nagasaki, Japan, population c. 253,000. Superfortress Grande Artiste releases over the city at 11:02 A.M. a bomb weighing 11,000 pounds, containing 12 pounds of plutonium. Effects comparable to Hiroshima. Explosion more powerful, though configuration of city amid hills reduces casualties. Results: 35,000 killed, 40,000 injured, 14,000 out of 52,000 buildings destroyed, and 80 per cent of the city's hospitals demolished.

4. July 1, 1946, Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands. U. S. Navy test ("Operation Crossroads"), under Vice-Admiral William H. E. Blandy. A Nagasaki-type bomb is dropped by airplane over a concentrated target fleet of 73 ships, of which 5 are sunk, 9 severely damaged, and 45 damaged in lesser degree, although only 1 ship was within 1,000 feet of the point over which the bomb exploded. Measurements of heat, blast, gamma rays, and neutrons indicate that all personnel aboard ships within a mile of the explosion would have suffered heavy casualties. All within a radius of half a mile would have been killed or fatally injured.

5. July 25, 1946, Bikini Atoll. A Nagasaki-type bomb is exploded under water at moderate depth amid the remainder of the target fleet. In a column half a mile wide and a mile high, 10,000,000 tons of water are hurled into the air and fall back into the lagoon, producing waves 30 to 100 feet high and spraying all the target vessels. Sunk: battleships Arkansas and Nagato, carrier Saratoga, a landing ship, a landing craft, an oiler, several submarines. Numerous other vessels severely damaged. Almost all vessels drenched with radioactive sea water, sufficiently poisonous to be ultimately fatal to all personnel. Lagoon waters and salvaged vessels, despite decontamination measures, remain dangerously radioactive for many months.

6, 7, 8. April, 1948, Eniwetok, Marshall Islands. Three "atomic weapons" are tested, under conditions of strictest secrecy. Purposes and effects unannounced, but results are described as "successful" and "highly encouraging."

That atomic bombs could destroy fleets as well as cities was known before these tests were made. What was not fully appreciated was that the radioactive poisons released by nuclear fission constitute the most lethal aspect of the new weapon, particularly when mixed with water. The bomb is at least three weapons in one, each destructive of life and property beyond
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the wildest dreams of a Tamerlane or a Himmler. The initial flash of cosmic heat sets fire in a matter of seconds to all combustible materials within its range, cremates all living things directly exposed to it, and inflicts deep flash burns on unprotected skin even at great distances from the center. The ensuing shock wave levels all but the sturdiest structures and buries in the debris such victims as are not killed outright by air pressure. While thousands of trapped or injured survivors are burned to death in the ensuing conflagration, a large area is permeated with fission products, causing radiation sickness. Such products and their attendant rays are like X rays in that they penetrate protoplasm and affect first those tissues which grow most rapidly—i.e., cancer cells, bone marrow, white blood cells, hair, and sex glands. The symptoms include nausea, nosebleed, bleeding through the skin, anemia, and incapacity to resist infections. The results for victims who survive the explosion are baldness, sterility, general weakness, and, for those severely poisoned, lingering illness and death. No antidote or cure is known.

In the event of atomic war, it may be anticipated that wise strategists will not content themselves with the crude technique of mass devastation employed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Urban centers can be rendered uninhabitable by spraying them with atomic poisons. This can be accomplished either through aerial dissemination of the poisons themselves or through detonating bombs in reservoirs, lakes, rivers, or harbors, thereby (under favorable wind conditions) spreading a deadly mist over an entire metropolitan region—with all water, food, clothing, buildings, and indeed the air itself impregnated with invisible but certain doom. Although flight is futile, it may be surmised that most of the survivors in a city so attacked would flee in wild panic, only to die weeks or months later, meanwhile imposing wholly impossible burdens on available medical facilities in suburbs and neighboring towns. It may also be surmised that decontamination corps, equipped with protective garments and Geiger counters, would discover that large areas of such a city could not safely be entered for many weeks or months. Urban life in the target area would therefore cease, with little possibility of replacing the dead by the living even if all homes, offices, factories, and transport facilities were still physically intact. In the event of a combined operation, involving one fire blast over the city, one detonation on the ground, and one explosion in a near-by body of water, most of the population of a major metropolis would be annihilated. . . . There is no defense.

A further possibility in the tactics of atomic warfare looms as a virtual certainty. Atomic bombs need not be carried in airplanes or rockets. Enemy agents or native traitors can secretly carry the necessary components in
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ordinary packing boxes, pianos, refrigerators, food crates, or what not. The parts can be transported in small vessels, trucks, or freight cars. They can be assembled in any cellar, garage, or back room. Such bombs can be equipped with time fuses or electronic triggers sprung by radio from remote points. In this fashion, inland cities which are thousands of miles away from enemy airdromes, rocket bases, or naval units can be instantly converted into pillars of fire, with none but the perpetrators knowing when or how the blow will fall, nor whence it came, nor why. . . . There is no defense.²

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We in America are living among madmen. Madmen govern our affairs in the name of order and security. The chief madmen claim the titles of general, admiral, senator, scientist, administrator, Secretary of State, even President. And the fatal symptom of their madness is this: they have been carrying through a series of acts which may lead eventually to the destruction of mankind, under the solemn conviction that they are normal, responsible people, living sane lives, and working for reasonable ends. Soberly, day after day, the madmen continue to go through the undeviating motions of madness: motions so stereotyped, so commonplace, that they seem the normal motions of normal men, not the mass compulsions of people bent on total death. . . . These madmen have a comet by the tail, but they think to prove their sanity by treating it as if it were a child's sky-rocket. They play with it; they experiment with it; they dream of swifter and bigger comets. Their teachers have handed them down no rules for controlling comets; so they take only the usual precautions of children permitted to set off fire crackers. . . . Why do we let the madmen go on with their game without raising our voices? . . . There is a reason: we are madmen, too. We view the madness of our leaders as if it expressed a traditional wisdom and a common sense; we view them placidly, as a doped policeman might view with a blank, tolerant leer the robbery of a bank or the bare-handed killing of a child or the setting of an infernal machine in a railroad station. Our failure to act is the measure of our madness. We look at the madmen and pass by . . . unmoved by the horror that moves swiftly toward us. . . . Once our rivals enter the atomic armament race there will be no drawing back this side of total catastrophe. . . . When atomic war finally breaks out, the planet will become our extermination camp, and the cities will be our incinerators. This will be the madmen's final homage to the Mad Leader of all Madmen, who, dying, has scattered about this dust of madness which blinds our eyes and numbs our senses.—LEWIS MUMFORD, "Gentlemen: You Are Mad!" Saturday Review of Literature, March 2, 1946.

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A survey of the initial efforts of governments to apply the ancient ways of diplomacy to the new problems and perils of the atomic age recalls a familiar phenomenon of all dying civilizations—i.e., an appalling disparity between what is done (or what it is proposed to do) and the actual exigencies of the times. In such periods, salvation and survival are possible only if citizens and statesmen can somehow transcend tradition and re-fashion the future boldly by the guidance of an imagination which is at once revolutionary, realistic, and creative. But, in precisely such periods, citizens and statesmen, confronted with unprecedented challenges of unparalleled magnitude and complexity, often take refuge from fear and from the need of new thought by reverting to the habits of a dead past. They thereby preclude any hope of a living future. In the present case, the final event should obviously not be prejudged. But the record of 1945-48 justifies the conclusion that the chasm between what was politically possible and what was imperatively necessary to save mankind from atomic suicide was so wide as to leave small hope that it could ever be bridged.

On August 6, 1945, Anglo-American officialdom announced the destruction of Hiroshima, the result of the test of July 16, and the advent of the atomic epoch. President Truman's statement spoke of "a harnessing of the basic power of the universe." Secretary Stimson reviewed the history of the enterprise. Churchill reported to Commons. All emphasized, in the interests of "security," the need of secrecy regarding details of production and use. Chancellor Hutchins opined that world government was now essential and that fear of the bomb might move mankind into taking steps toward the goal. General Groves, however, insisted (September 21) that "this weapon must be kept under the control of the U.S. until all the other nations of the world are as anxious for peace as we are." Press reports that Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace had urged the "sharing of the secret" with Russia were denied by President Truman, who said that he alone would decide what Administration policy should be. In mid-October Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, supported by Drs. Robert Wilson and H. J. Curtis, warned that the "secret" was "no secret at all"; that no nation could "win" an atomic-arms race, since only a few bombs would be necessary to put an enemy "out of action," regardless of the size of his own stock pile; and that nothing short of effective international control could meet the issue. The Association of Los Alamos Scientists asserted at the same time that secrecy was fatuous, that an American monopoly of atomic weapons was impossible, and that indecision in establishing international controls promptly "will be preparing the world for unprecedented destruction, not only of other countries but of our own as well." Einstein urged (October 26) that America
and Britain invite Russia to join them in establishing a World Government, to which all information regarding the bomb should be transmitted.

Politicians were less impressed than physicists with the urgent need of daring new departures. Public opinion in the Atlantic communities appeared to be first amazed, then bewildered, later frustrated to the point of boredom, and finally distracted from the problem of preventing the atomic immolation of civilization by the more immediately fascinating spectacle of the Allies of yesterday moving toward a new war against one another tomorrow. Throughout the developments and decisions which ensued, the issue of international control of atomic energy was dealt with on all sides as if it were unrelated to the problems of power posed by Anglo-American-Soviet relations. The serious deterioration of these relations began with the Byrnes-Bevin Doctrine of August, 1945, which led promptly to deadlock at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September. Growing friction begot fear on both sides. Fear begot American official determination to retain, and if possible perpetuate, a monopoly of the bomb. Fear begot Soviet determination to nullify America’s strategic advantage by developing promptly Soviet atomic plants and by proposing international arrangements which would appear to equalize the position of the giants. Since both fears echoed, as of yore, “ancestral voices, prophesying war,” they frustrated all efforts to work together toward a viable system of global control of atomic energy in the service of the peaceful pursuits of men.

The problem of international control could not be divorced, nor can it ever be, from the problem of the abolition of war itself. This, in the final analysis, is quite impossible save through some generally acceptable program of world government which, in turn, presupposes concord, not conflict, among the major Powers. This presupposition was the premise of the U.N. Charter. Nothing short of its realization and its progressive enhancement in ever-widening areas of cooperative endeavor could render the U.N. effective and promote its evolution in the direction of an effective global federation. And, for reasons to be noted presently, nothing short of such an institutional context could reasonably be expected to make possible any solution of the problem of international control of atomic energy.

The wisdom of hindsight suggests that, if first things had been put first, the statesmen of Anglo-Saxony and Muscovy in 1945-46 would have subordinated all other considerations to the promotion of such a sequence of developments as has been suggested. They chose instead—on grounds which seemed to them not only valid but inescapable—to prepare for war in the conventional arena of power politics even as they pursued the will-o’-the-wisp of peace on the strange stage of atomic energy. The latter enterprise
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was inevitably defeated by the former. The anatomy of failure must be briefly outlined.

Not until mid-November, 1945, were any steps taken at top level to evolve an international program for coping with the menace of the bomb. On November 10, Prime Ministers Attlee and Mackenzie King began a series of conferences with President Truman in Washington. Attlee was reported to have urged the "sharing of the secret" (subject to satisfactory assurances of good intent from Russia) with the members of the Security Council, which should devise and administer a system of controls. The Joint Declaration issued on November 15 recognized that the bomb constituted "a means of destruction hitherto unknown, against which there can be no adequate military defense, and in the employment of which no single nation can in fact have a monopoly. . . . We are aware that the only complete protection for the civilized world from the destructive use of scientific knowledge lies in the prevention of war." Exchange of scientific information "for peaceful purposes" was espoused, but "the spreading of specialized information regarding the practical application of atomic energy, before it is possible to devise effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations," was eschewed as not constituting a contribution "to a constructive solution of the problem of the atomic bomb." A reciprocal exchange of information "concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy" was favored "just as soon as effective, enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised." Despite this ambiguous and evasive phraseology, the declaration concluded hopefully with a proposal that the U.N. should set up a Commission to make recommendations:

The Commission should be instructed to proceed with the utmost dispatch and should be authorized to submit recommendations from time to time dealing with separate phases of its work.

In particular the Commission should make specific proposals:

(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends,

(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes,

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction,

(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken. Specifically it is considered that the Commission might well devote its attention first to the wide exchange of scientists and scientific information, and as a second stage to the development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials.

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Faced with the terrible realities of the application of science to destruction, every nation will realize more urgently than before the overwhelming need to maintain the rule of law among nations and to banish the scourge of war from the earth. This can only be brought about by giving whole-hearted support to the United Nations Organization, and by consolidating and extending its authority, thus creating conditions of mutual trust in which all peoples will be free to devote themselves to the arts of peace. It is our firm resolve to work without reservation to achieve these ends.

This formula solved no problems but opened a way toward a solution. That no solution had been arrived at, or was in prospect, by 1948 was a consequence of circumstances generally deemed extraneous to the problem but actually inseparable from it. Prospects were not unfavorable in the fall of 1945. In his Charleston address of November 16, Byrnes was forthright: "The civilized world cannot survive an atomic war. This is the challenge to our generation. To meet it we must let our minds be bold. . . . Until effective safeguards can be developed [however] in the form of international inspection or otherwise, the secrets of production or know-how must be held, in the words of the President, as a sacred trust. . . . [Yet] we must banish war. To that great goal of humanity we must ever rededicate our hearts and strength." In Commons (November 22) Attlee sagely observed that "where there is no mutual confidence, no system will be effective. . . . We wish to establish between all nations just such confidence." Commented Eden: "For the life of me, I am unable to see any final solution that will make the world safe from atomic power other than that we all abate our present ideas of sovereignty. . . . The San Francisco Charter should be reviewed particularly with respect to the veto, which is an anachronism in the modern world." The first aspiration was to be negated by the second, although Eden showed no awareness of the contradiction. "Hope is stronger than fear," declared Secretary Wallace on December 5. "The expectation of a new age of abundance for all will do more to prevent war than the fear of being blown to bits. . . . We have been given the unique opportunity to build one single human community, on the highest spiritual level, accompanied by unlimited material facilities. . . ."

At Moscow in December, 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the "Big Three" achieved agreement on preparation of peace treaties with Italy and the lesser enemy States; on the administration of Japan; on Korea, China, Rumania, and Bulgaria; and, as a result, on a procedure for dealing with atomic energy. The communiqué of December 26 proposed a resolution, to be submitted to the General Assembly, for the establishment of a U.N. Commission on Atomic Energy to make proposals for the four purposes quoted above. It was stipulated that the Commission should consist of delegates of
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the States on the Security Council, plus Canada, and should "submit its reports and recommendations to," and "be accountable for its work to," the Security Council, which should "issue directives to the Commission in matters affecting security."  3

Truman and Byrnes were obliged to assure Vandenberg and other worried members of Congress that no "secrets" would be revealed to Russia until Congress was satisfied regarding the efficacy of a system of inspection and control. On January 24, the Assembly adopted a resolution reiterating the language of the Moscow declaration. Despite the U.N. injunction to "proceed with the utmost urgency," the Commission did not meet for another six months. On March 18, 1946, President Truman named multimillionaire Bernard M. Baruch as U.S. representative, to be assisted by John Hancock (Wall Street banker), Ferdinand Eberstadt (Wall Street banker), Herbert Bayard Swope (publisher), and Fred Searles (mining engineer and businessman). Whether a group so constituted was best calculated to promote a viable Soviet-American accord and to deal boldly with a challenge having no precedents in the vocational experience of bankers and stock speculators remained to be demonstrated. 4

A bright hope dawned on March 16, 1946, with the release of the Lilienthal-Acheson proposals: "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy" (Department of State Document 2498), prepared by Chester I. Barnard, J. R. Oppenheimer, Charles A. Thomas, Harry A. Winne, and David E. Lilienthal (Chairman), as consultants to the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy, consisting of Undersecretary Dean Acheson,

4 Bernard Baruch, born in 1870 in a family of modest means, symbolized in his career one version of the "American dream"—i.e., poor boy makes good by shrewdness and hard work, amasses millions, and lives happily ever afterward on unearned income. Before a Congressional committee on one occasion, he answered candidly a question as to his profession: "Speculator." Early in the century he accumulated a vast fortune from speculation in securities, making profit in every panic and depression as well as in boom periods. In a single day (December 18, 1916) he netted half a million dollars through short selling amid a sharp decline in the market resulting from rumors of peace negotiations in Europe. His annual income in 1916 was $2,301,000. Baruch's later interests were horse racing, philanthropy, sitting on park benches, enjoying his 23,000-acre estate, "Hobcaw Barony," in South Carolina, and cultivating a reputation as "elder statesman." He served as chairman of the War Industries Board in World War I and acted as adviser to Presidents Wilson, Hoover, Roosevelt, and Truman. See his "profile" by John Hersey, The New Yorker, Jan. 3, 1948ff., and Carter Field, Bernard Baruch, Park Bench Statesman (Whittlesey, 1944). His role in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission won him numerous honors, medals, prizes, academic degrees, and all but universal praise in top business and political circles in the U.S.A. The ultimate verdict of history may very well be a different one as the consequences of Baruch's policies become more clearly apparent.

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Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, Leslie R. Groves, and John D. McCloy. This masterpiece of unanswerable logic admits of no brief summary. It should be read and reread by all who are seriously concerned with the fate of civilization. It distinguishes between "safe" and "dangerous" operations in the use of atomic power. The mining of uranium and thorium, the maintenance of reactors for making and separating plutonium, and all research and production in atomic explosives are designated as "dangerous" under all conditions when left to exclusively national exploitation. The "solution" proposed is a U.N. Atomic Development Authority, which, under the direction of the Security Council, will own and operate all uranium and thorium mines throughout the world, as well as all laboratories and plants using fissionable materials in their dangerous form, and will conduct all activities all over the earth in atomic research, inspection, licensing, and leasing—for the double purpose of making impossible the production of atomic bombs and making available atomic power and its by-products for the good of mankind.

This program was modeled, wisely, on the Tennessee Valley Authority. It contemplated an international public corporation (the ADA), which would possess the minimum power needed to fulfill its function without unduly restricting local autonomy and national sovereignty. What the Report did not make clear, but what was implicit in its reasoning, was that the ADA would, of necessity, become a limited "world government" within the sphere of its delegated powers. It would operate on the federal principle of enforcing law (here, atomic law) on individuals through investigation, local police action, indictment, and adjudication. It would not operate (since, plainly, it could not in the nature of its duties) on the unworkable principle of the coercion of States by other States or by any international agency. There are no solid grounds for supposing that the problem could have been solved, or can ever be solved, in any other way. It could be solved in this way only if the Great Powers in U.N. were willing and eager to establish an ADA with requisite authority. Such a decision, in turn, presupposed that Washington, London, and Moscow were united in the pursuit of common objectives rather than divided as rivals and potential enemies in a new struggle for global hegemony.

The tragic fact of the matter was that the presupposition was already in process of destruction before the enterprise of reaching a joint decision regarding atomic energy was actually launched. The mounting enmity between the Super-Powers was less a consequence than a cause of failure to agree about the bomb. Assessment of responsibility for lack of concord is almost academic in the light of the appalling fact of discord. Soviet policy
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in Iran and in the Balkans in the winter of 1945-46 evoked fear in London and Washington. The Byrnes-Bevin Doctrine evoked fear in Moscow. The U.S.S.R. and its satellites had already been placed in the position of an obnoxious minority in U.N. On March 5, 1946, in Fulton, Mo., Churchill, applauded by Truman, called for an Anglo-American alliance against Russia. President Truman, apparently astonished that this spectacle should have provoked acute anxiety and anger in the Soviet Union, sought to mend matters (April 5) by inviting Stalin to cross the sea aboard the U.S.S. Missouri and to deliver an address, in Truman’s presence, in Columbia, Mo. Stalin politely declined, as any Chief Executive of a Great Power would necessarily have declined so naïve and humiliating a proposal.\(^5\)

In this context, all hope of an accord was foredoomed. The U.S.A. continued to produce atomic bombs at the wartime rate. Moscow accused America of “brandishing the atomic weapon for purposes which have little in common with the peace and security of nations” (New Times, Moscow, March 20, 1946). The result, willfully or unwittingly, was that the U.S.A. proposed a plan for control of atomic energy which its leaders knew the U.S.S.R. would never accept, while the U.S.S.R. proposed a plan which its leaders knew the U.S.A. would never accept. When the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission finally met on June 14, 1946, Bernard Baruch put forward the American proposals:

> We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business. Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: We must elect world peace or world destruction. . . .

Mr. Baruch went on to endorse the goal of a global ADA. But he offered no assurance that his Government would discontinue the manufacture and stock piling of atomic bombs or share relevant information with others, until it should be satisfied, at some remote and unspecified date, that the successive stages of international control were operating effectively—during which indeterminate interval other nations (i.e., the U.S.S.R.) would, by implication, be precluded from producing atomic bombs. His major motif, however, was a reversion to an irrelevant, obsolete, and utterly feckless conception of sanctions. Despite his comment (later negated) that “our solution lies in the elimination of war,” he proposed that atomic obligations should be enforced through the threat of war—i.e., the coercion of States

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by States. He demanded that in all atomic matters the Great Powers must renounce the central principle of the U.N. Charter and agree to abolition of the "veto" on coercion, thereby presumably agreeing in advance that others might legitimately wage war upon them if a simple majority in the Security Council should hold an accused State guilty of violating its obligations.

We must provide immediate, swift and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations. Penalization is essential. . . . Con dign punishments [must be] set up for violations of the rules of control, which are to be stigmatized as international crimes. . . . It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you, and to all peoples, that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the U.N. so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. . . . There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements. 6

On June 19, 1946, without referring to Baruch’s proposal, Andrei Gromyko for the U.S.S.R. proposed a wholly different procedure: All States should agree by treaty to forbid the production and use of atomic weapons and to destroy all stock piles within three months. They should further agree to set up a U.N. committee for the exchange of scientific information and another committee to propose measures of inspection and control. “Efforts made to undermine the activity of the Security Council, including efforts directed toward undermining the unanimity of the members upon questions of substance, are incompatible with the interests of the United Nations. . . . Such attempts should be resisted.” Gromyko later indicated that the U.S.S.R. would never accept the Baruch proposal in whole or in part.

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In these doubtful and anxious days, when all the world is at unrest and, look which way you will, the road ahead seems darkened by shadows which portend dangers of many kinds, it is only common prudence that we should look about us and attempt to assess the causes of distress and the most likely means of removing them. . . . Democracy has not yet made the world safe against irrational revolution.

6 See Walter Lippmann’s comments in the Washington Post, June 20, 1946, pointing out that the Charter, like the U.S. Constitution, does not “protect” States violating agreements but is silent on the point “for the very good reason that the only thing that can be done is to make war. . . . I cannot see what Mr. Baruch thinks he can gain by binding the U.S. now to fight, not necessarily with its own consent, in the future. What is more, I do not think that he and our Senate today can under our Constitution legally commit a future Congress to war. . . .”

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That supreme task, which is nothing less than the salvation of civilization, now faces democracy, insistent, imperative. There is no escaping it, unless everything we have built up is presently to fall in ruins about us. . . . The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed spiritually. It can be saved only by becoming permeated with the spirit of Christ and being made free and happy by the practices which spring out of that spirit.—WOODROW WILSON, "The Road Away from Revolution," Atlantic Monthly, August, 1923.

The deadlock recorded in June, 1946, in the first sessions of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission was never broken. The Soviet proposal for "outlawing the bomb" could not reasonably be expected to meet the exigencies of the problem unless accompanied by a program for global legislation in the field of atomic energy capable of being enforced effectively on individuals. Without this the treaty urged by Moscow would become another scrap of paper. Since Washington also rejected any federalist solution and relied for safety upon arrangements for war by States against States, the American proposals were also tragically irrelevant to the needs of a new time. Each Government, moreover, knew that its program had no chance of acceptance by the other. In both capitals, therefore, some policy makers may be presumed to have reconciled themselves from the outset to an atomic-arms race, doubtless on the assumption that "our" side could win. "I pray God," said Senator MacKellar on February 17, 1947, "we will never have an agreement."

None was reached, nor was any in prospect in 1948, chiefly because of the question of the "veto." Other issues gave rise to sharp differences in the committees which wrestled with technical aspects of the problem during 1947. The U.S.S.R., with its completely socialized economy, its announced intention of developing atomic energy as rapidly as possible for civilian use, and its profound suspicion of all agents of international bodies dominated by hostile States, disputed the proposal that the ADA should own and operate atomic-energy plants throughout the world. Gromyko argued for limited control and periodical inspections, the inadequacy of which had been demonstrated in the Lilienthal-Acheson Report. But these issues could conceivably have been resolved had it not been for the inflexible and irreconcilable positions of the two Super-Powers on voting procedure in the Security Council.

Prior to his statement of June 14, 1946, Bernard Baruch was vainly urged by David E. Lilienthal and Chester I. Barnard not to introduce the "veto" question on the ground that it was meaningless and would lead into a "blind
After the predicted impasse was reached, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, in a letter to the President of July 23 and in his public address of September 12, declared the veto question to be "entirely irrelevant" and accused Baruch of promoting an atomic-armament race by ignoring the legitimate anxieties and security needs of the U.S.S.R. The ensuing exchange of public recriminations early in October produced more heat than light. Harold E. Stassen (November 8, 1945) urged U.N. outlawry of national production or possession of atomic bombs.

The core of the problem was never reached or even clearly seen by those officially responsible for dealing with it. A world community had come into being with each of its parts so articulated and interdependent as to make armed violence among sovereignties ruinous to all. The advent of a lethal weapon of diabolical power threatened to make war among States potentially fatal to much of mankind and utterly disruptive of the social metabolism upon which civilization depends for its life. Nothing short of world government, with power to enforce law on individuals, could reasonably be expected by reasonable men and women to meet this challenge in any fashion conducive to survival and salvation. But when the collective wisdom and statesmanship of the human race were put to the test, they proved to be inadequate to meet the issue.

A solution required unity among the Super-Powers in the service of purposes transcending completely any conception of "national interests" or "manifest destiny" derived from the tribalism of olden times. Such unity could be fruitful only in so far as it promoted world government in place of the anarchy of rival sovereignties. Such a goal could be furthered only through an accord to vest in an international agency limited power to enact a body of atomic law which would, by common consent, be deemed the "supreme law of the land" in all the lands of men, to be enforced on individual citizens through local, district, national, and international judicial tribunals. Nothing more than this was needed at the beginning. Nothing less than this would serve.

Soviet statesmen, blinded by prejudice and pride, took refuge in an obsolete formula for contracts among sovereignties to renounce the bomb. American statesmen, equally blind to realities, took refuge in an obsolete formula for contracts among sovereignties to wage war against any sovereignty which should be deemed by rival sovereignties to have violated its contracts with respect to the bomb. Both sets of statesmen, moreover, resolved not to make peace in other areas of controversy but to wage war.


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upon one another. No demon bent upon the demise of man could have hit upon a more perfect design for frustration and death. The rest of the tale of atomic diplomacy is all of a piece.  

On October 8, 1946, Bernard Baruch was honored with the annual Freedom House award for distinguished service in the cause of peace. It was presented by Mrs. Roosevelt and consisted of a plaque bearing the words: "There Must Be No Veto for Those Who Violate Their Solemn Engagements." Cordial greetings came from Truman, Byrnes, Eisenhower, Marshall, and Churchill. The former Prime Minister declared: "There is no man in whose hands I would rather see these awful problems placed than Bernard Baruch." In his address the famous elder statesman argued anew that America must continue to make and store atomic bombs until fully satisfied that international control, minus the veto and put into operation through successive stages, was working satisfactorily. "America asks nothing she is not willing to give. . . . But I would be recreant in my trust if I dared to recommend abandonment of a major weapon in our arsenal—the bomb. How can anyone ask destruction of existing bombs unless their further manufacture is effectively prohibited?" Five days later he opined: "Peace seems beautiful during the savagery of war, but it becomes almost hateful when war is over. . . . There are some things more precious even than peace, and the greatest of these is freedom. . . . Freedom from Fear [however] is a philosophical abstraction rather than a natural right. . . . Fear is frequently a constructive force. . . ."

In this context, the diplomacy of nuclear fission stumbled dolefully toward its doom. Within the U.S.A., control of bomb making was taken out of military hands and placed in those of a civilian Atomic Energy Commission headed by Lilienthal—in the face of stout and almost successful Senatorial opposition. But in the U.N. the principles championed by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. admitted of no compromise. On December 27, Baruch asserted: "It has been said that . . . if a great nation does not have the right to release itself from its obligations by veto the result will be war. I agree. I believe that a clear realization of this would be the greatest step toward peace that has been taken in history. . . . Gentlemen, it is either . . . or."

On December 30, the UNAEC voted approval of a program based on the Baruch approach. Poland and the U.S.S.R. abstained. Baruch resigned on

January 4, 1947. Warren R. Austin and Frederick H. Osborn carried on, with no change of U.S. policy. Gromyko continued to restate Soviet policy, also without change.

By June, 1947, Osborn was calling the Soviet proposals "a fraud on the people of the world," while Gromyko insisted anew on outlawry of atomic weapons and immediate establishment of a limited inspection and control system on this premise. At June's end the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists issued a solemn warning: "The American people should understand that... the creation of a supra-national government, with powers adequate to the responsibility of maintaining the peace, is necessary. Is this realistic? We believe that nothing less is realistic. ... Men must understand that the times demand a higher realism."

All in vain. By August, Osborn was declaring new Soviet proposals "wholly unacceptable." Gromyko replied that the American proposals were designed to secure for the U.S.A. "a position of monopoly in the field of atomic energy. The Soviet Union cannot agree to accept such proposals." Efforts by other governments (most of which, for obvious reasons, sided with the U.S.A.) to promote a change in the American or Soviet position, or to achieve a compromise between them, all failed. Efforts by physicists and other anxious observers to impress politicians and public opinion with the desperate urgency of a solution were also without result. On April 5, 1948, the Working Committee of the UNAEC reported that the Soviet proposals for limited international control were inadequate, unworkable, and unacceptable. In May, 1948, the Commission announced that it had "reached an impasse" and, on the initiative of the U.S.A., Britain, and France, suspended further discussion in an admission of complete failure.

Meanwhile, preparations for atomic war went forward at top speed, with Soviet publicists ridiculing American "secrets" and American experts making variable estimates of the time required by the U.S.S.R. to begin producing atomic bombs in quantity. American output continued at wartime tempo, with available stores of fissible materials for bomb making growing at a constantly accelerated rate by virtue of the nature of the transmutation of elements involved in nuclear reactors. U.S. Army authorities experimented with "radioactive clouds," capable of killing all living things over areas larger than those affected by atomic explosions. They also pushed surveys of available caves in which war plants might be safely established. A National Speleological Society came into being to promote explorations of caves, since it was reasonable to assume that the survivors of the atomic war in the days to come would, of necessity, be troglodytes.
Panslavism is a movement which endeavors to undo what a thousand year old history has created. It cannot achieve its aim without sweeping Turkey, Hungary and half of Germany off the map of Europe. Should this result ever be accomplished, it could be made to last by no other means than the subjugation of Europe. Panslavism has now transformed itself from an article of faith into a political program. By now, it is no longer only Russia, but the whole panslavistic plot which threatens to found its realm on the ruins of Europe. This leaves Europe only one alternative—subjugation through slavery or the lasting destruction of the center of its offensive strength.—KARL MARX, *Neu Oderzeitung*, April, 1855.

Our greatest error would be to fashion our foreign policy merely in terms of anti-Communism. We will fail miserably if we do no more than that. For then we will end by railing and ranting at the spectre of Communism but do nothing to eliminate the conditions on which Communism thrives. If we follow that course, war will soon appear as the only alternative. And this time war could well be an Armageddon. —WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, March 22, 1948.

On January 30, 1948, Mohandas Gandhi left Birla House to go to prayer in a near-by pavilion. He was old and weakened by recent fasting in protest against the murderous rage which Hindu and Moslem fanatics had unleashed against one another. On the steps of the pavilion he was greeted by a young man, Nathu Ram Vinayak Godse, a member of the extremist Hindu Mahasabha which accused the Mahatma of “appeasing” Islam. Godse pulled out an automatic and fired three shots into the frail body before him. Gandhi died within the half hour. “Friends and comrades,” said Nehru in a broken-voiced announcement, “the light has gone out of our lives. . . .”

The rising smoke of the funeral pyre of sandalwood was for many a sign that much more was lost than a holy man of India. Above all other political leaders of the 20th century, Gandhi had renounced fear and hate and preached love and brotherhood. His weapon against injustice had been nonviolent civil disobedience. His creed had been pacifism. His sorrow had been the inability of men to refrain from violence against one another. His death by violence was a victory of hate and fear over love.

A reenactment of this dark triumph on a world scale was threatened by events elsewhere during the early months of 1948—with endless and irreparable evil menacing all mankind in the aftermath. The year was the three-hundredth after the Peace of Westphalia and the two-hundredth after the Peace of Aix. One hundred years previously the U.S.A. had imposed a conqueror’s peace on Mexico; Continental liberals and patriots had unleashed
revolution against the citadels of tyranny; and Marx and Engels had thundered condemnation of economic exploitation and social injustice. The year 1948 was also to be a time of choosing between alternatives now so starkly posed as to leave no middle course. Men differed as to the nature of the choice. But all agreed that the choice was all but final and that it would spell new life or swift death for the World Society. And almost all brought to the task not unity but discord, not love but hate, not faith but fear, not fraternity but force, amid feverish preparations for a vaster violence to come.

On January 22, Bevin in Commons again accused Moscow of seeking the Communist enslavement of all Europe. To save the West, the East must be rescued: "The issue is not simply the organization of Poland or any other country, but the control of Eastern Europe by Soviet Russia." Churchill agreed on the morrow that the Soviet grip must be broken: "Who can ever believe that there will be permanent peace in Europe or in the world while the frontiers of Asia rest upon the Elbe?" For both sides, attack was the best defense, with self-defense by attack on each side leaving the other in no doubt but that it must attack in self-defense. Washington had already made clear that the ultimate American purpose was to "liberate" the East as well as "save" the West from the Red menace. Moscow had made equally clear that the Soviet purpose was to consolidate Communist power in the East and, if possible, extend it to the West. Since Communists everywhere were viewed by Washington as enemy agents, the U.S.A. bent its efforts toward their exclusion from all governments west of the "Iron Curtain" and, where possible, east of it as well. Since anti-Communists everywhere were viewed by Moscow as enemy agents, the U.S.S.R. sought to exclude them from all governments east of the "Iron Curtain" and, where possible, west of it as well.

Heartbreak in Praha. Czechoslovakia's new tragedy was the result of this clash of the giants. President Beneš and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, like most of their countrymen, had been irrevocably committed since Munich to reliance in foreign policy on the U.S.S.R. But they had staked their hope on the premise of peace between the titans and on the possibility of compromise and collaboration between Communists and non-Communists at home. Such hopes waxed in the coalition Cabinet of Communist Premier Klement Gottwald, named in July, 1946, after the Communists had emerged as the largest party, with 38 per cent of the vote, in the free elections of

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9 The opening lines of the original Communist Manifesto were, curiously, more accurate in 1948 than in 1848: "A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre. . . . Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communist by its opponents in power?"
the previous May. Such hopes waned as the American-Soviet "cold war" grew hotter. Communist charges of U.S. intrigue to promote a non-Communist Cabinet were matched by American charges of Communist intrigue to establish a Police State. Regardless of the validity of such accusations, Washington would obviously have preferred a Cabinet in Prague (as in Paris and Rome) without Communists, while Moscow would have preferred a Cabinet in Prague (as in Warsaw and Budapest) without anti-Communists.

On February 13, 1948, Parliament called upon the Communist Minister of the Interior for a report of alleged political misuse of the police forces. On February 20, as Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt arrived from Washington and Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin arrived from Moscow, 11 non-Communist Ministers resigned their posts in protest at Communist tactics. Gottwald, supported by left-wing Social Democrats, asked Beneš to replace them with "loyal" representatives of their parties. As "plots" for a Putsch were uncovered or invented by Communist officials, Communist-controlled "action committees" of workers assumed authority and threatened a general strike. On February 25, Beneš yielded. Two days later he swore in a new Cabinet which was still, in form, a coalition but was, in fact, under full Communist control. The sequels were familiar in Eastern Europe: arrests, treason trials, flights of refugees, restrictions on civil rights, purges of "unreliable" elements, preparation of single lists of "coalition" candidates for future election, further nationalization of industry, and acceleration of agrarian reform.

Washington, London, and Paris jointly denounced the coup on February 26, asserting that "a disguised dictatorship of a single party under the cloak of a government of national union" had been established "by means of a crisis artificially and deliberately instigated" with "disastrous" results jeopardizing "the very existence of the principles of liberty to which all democratic nations are attached." Jan Masaryk asserted on February 29: "There were some people who thought that it was possible to govern here without the Communists or against the Communists. This was the cause of the crisis. . . ." But Masaryk took his own life on March 10. Marshall attributed his suicide to a "reign of terror," Attlee to the "stifling atmosphere of the new totalitarianism," Gottwald to Western denunciations and betrayals, others to an incurable illness. Vladimir Clementis, Communist, became Foreign Minister.

These events provoked furious efforts in Muscovy and Atlantica to mobilize power for a future test of force. Moscow's problem was simpler than Washington's. The Kremlin and its agents fiercely denounced "American imperialism," "capitalist greed," and "Fascist intrigue" and strove to consolidate Communist influence throughout the Soviet sphere to the end of
organizing the East against the West. The network of treaties with and among the Soviet satellites was extended, most notably by the conclusion on April 6 of a Finnish-Soviet Pact of Alliance. Washington hotly condemned Communist tyranny and sought to buttress Western Europe, increase American arms, and organize a coalition capable of challenging the Soviet bloc.

**Western Union.** On March 12, 1948, Chile demanded that the U.N. Security Council investigate Moscow's part in the Prague Putsch and met with support from the U.S.A., the U.K., and other States within the American orbit. On the same day AMG in Germany announced that the dissolution of industrial monopolies was being halted, except in the field of consumers' goods. On March 17, two momentous steps were taken toward organizing the West for defense against the East.

One was the signature at Brussels of a 50-year alliance treaty among Britain, France, and the Benelux States, providing for mutual military aid, under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, against any "armed attack in Europe." ¹⁰ These arrangements were presented, somewhat vaguely, as fore-

¹⁰ His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent of Belgium; the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union; Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British dominions beyond the seas

Resolved:
To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;
To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law which are their common heritage;
To strengthen, with those aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;
To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;
To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;
To take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression;
To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;
Desiring for these purposes to conclude a Treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defense, have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:
His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Belgium: Paul-Henri Spaak;
The President of the French Republic, President of the French Union: Georges Bidault;
Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg: Joseph Bech;
Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands: Baron van Boetzelaer;
His Majesty, King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British dominions beyond the seas, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Ernest Bevin;
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shadowing a broader Western European alliance, customs union, or federation, of which the U.S.A. would, presumably, be a member or guarantor. But the shape of this alignment remained shadowy.

The other notable event of St. Patrick's Day was a message to Congress by President Truman in which he accused the U.S.S.R. of violating its engagements, preventing a "just and honorable peace," obstructing the work of U.N. "by constant abuse of the veto," and aiming at the subjugation of all the free nations of Europe. Since economic rehabilitation was "not enough," he affirmed that the Brussels alliance deserved "our full support"

Who, having exhibited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the high contracting parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, co-ordination of production and development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Consultative Council referred to in Article VII as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of or prejudice to the work of other economic organizations in which the high contracting parties are or may be represented, but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organizations.

ARTICLE II

The high contracting parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialized agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries. The high contracting parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of the recommendations of immediate practical interest relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialized agencies. They will endeavor to conclude as soon as possible conventions with others in the sphere of social security.

ARTICLE III

The high contracting parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization, and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

ARTICLE IV

If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all military and other aid and assistance in their power.

ARTICLE V

All measures taken as a result of the preceding article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has
and should be granted American aid "by appropriate means." He also urged "prompt passage" of the ERP; "prompt enactment of universal training legislation" and "temporary reenactment of selective service legislation." Unity of purpose, unity of effort, and unity of spirit are essential to accomplish the task before us. . . With God's help, we shall succeed."

Mighty measures were taken in Washington in the spring of 1948 to carry out these high resolves, with intensity of conviction proportionate to confusion of object. Congress declined to commit the U.S.A. to $17,000,000,000 in aid to Europe over 4 years and voted instead $6,098,000,000 for

taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the high contracting parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

**ARTICLE VI**

The high contracting parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other high contracting party or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty. None of the high contracting parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the high contracting parties.

**ARTICLE VII**

For the purpose of consulting together on all questions dealt with in the present Treaty, the high contracting parties will create a Consultative Council which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit. At the request of any of the high contracting parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the high contracting parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in the case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy, or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.

**ARTICLE VIII**

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the high contracting parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions:

The high contracting parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the statute of the International Court of Justice by referring them to the Court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the high contracting parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the statute of the International Court of Justice. In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation
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the first 15 months. This commitment, which became law on April 3, included half a billion dollars for economic and military aid to Kuomintang China and provided for an Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), of which industrialist Paul H. Hoffman was appointed director—to be assisted by W. Averell Harriman as “roving Ambassador.” The House of Representatives made Franco’s Spain eligible for aid, to the horror of European liberals. But this provision was omitted from the final bill, while Myron Taylor negotiated obscurely with Franco and the Pretender for the apparent purpose of restoring a “liberal” monarchy and thereby making aid to Spain more palatable. Although East-West trade in Europe was not precluded by the terms of the program, restrictions were imposed on U.S. exports to the Soviet sphere and, prospectively, upon Western European exports to the East. By virtue of Soviet defiance and American resolve, the “Marshall Plan” thus seemed likely to become an instrument of economic warfare rather than of economic recovery.

is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

ARTICLE IX

The high contracting parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government. The Belgian Government will inform each of the high contracting parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

ARTICLE X

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

It shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification, and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the high contracting parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto, provided that he shall have previously given one year’s notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government shall inform the Governments of the other high contracting parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Brussels this 17th day of March, 1948, in English and French, each text being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other signatories.

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War and Peace. A note of comic relief was provided early in May. Hoffman and Harriman perceived that the ECA could not achieve its objective without an increase in East-West trade. Certain military figures feared that Soviet forces might move against Western Europe before it could be adequately rearmed. Sundry political and diplomatic advisers of the Administration were anxious lest constant talk of war might create panic in Western Europe and win votes at home for the new Wallace-Taylor Progressive Party. These mixed motives produced a curious result. On May 4, Ambassador Smith presented a statement to Molotov, reiterating the familiar American indictment of Soviet policies, challenging Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and warning that American policy would not be changed by the exigencies of the political campaign, but asserting that his Government wished to “make it unmistakably clear that [it] has no hostile or aggressive designs whatever with respect to the Soviet Union. . . . As far as the U.S. is concerned, the door is always wide open for full discussion and the composing of our differences. My Government earnestly hopes that the members of the Soviet Government will not take lightly the position of the U.S. Government as here expressed. . . . It is our earnest hope that they will take advantage [of their opportunities to alleviate tension]. If they do, they will not find us lacking in readiness and eagerness to make our own contributions to a stabilization of world conditions entirely compatible with the security of the Soviet peoples.”

This statement, paradoxically, was intended, not to initiate negotiations (Ambassador Smith at once left Moscow to go fishing in Normandy), but to persuade public opinion that the Administration, far from being bellicose, was open-minded and conciliatory, albeit firm in its policy and inflexible in its “principles.” Yet the statement was not made public, or communicated to Bevin and Bidault, or even hinted at to Ambassadors Caffery and Lewis Douglas. On May 11, Tass released it, along with Molotov’s reply, which reiterated the familiar Soviet indictment of U.S. policies, denied charges, made countercharges, and warned that the U.S.S.R. would not yield to pressure. But “the Soviet Government views favorably the desire of the Government of the United States to improve these relations as expressed in said statement, and agrees to the proposal to proceed, with this end in view, to a discussion and settlement of the differences existing between us. . . . The Soviet Government can only welcome this statement of the Government of the U.S., for, as is known, it has always pursued the policy of peaceableness and cooperation in regard to the U.S., and this policy always has met with unanimous approval and support on the part of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Government of the U.S.S.R. declares that it intends to pursue this policy with perfect consistency in the future as well.”
American diplomatic ineptitude enabled Moscow to score a propaganda triumph of impressive, although temporary, scope. In Paris and London, officials expressed alarm lest Washington by-pass them in direct parleys with Moscow, while press and public rejoiced in what was misinterpreted as a step toward an American-Soviet settlement. In the U.S.A. the Soviet revelation evoked astonishment and new hopes for peace. For a day, millions throughout the world hailed the sunshine breaking through gathering storm clouds. Their joy was brief. An embarrassed President and a confused Secretary of State immediately announced that American policy was unchanged and would "continue to be firmly and vigorously prosecuted," that "Gen. Smith did not ask for any general discussion or negotiation," that "this Government had no intention of entering into bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Government on matters relating to the interests of other Governments," and that unsuccessful discussions "would be very unfortunate and do the world great harm." This apparent volte face left the impression that Washington had made a gesture, either insincere or incredibly clumsy, toward a negotiated settlement of the "cold war," that the Kremlin had responded favorably, and that Washington had then denied any such intention and reaffirmed that no compromise was possible. U.S.S.R. had scored a Pyrrhic victory in the battle of words. The U.S.A. had demonstrated anew that diplomacy conducted by generals brings not peace but a sword.11

U.S. military policies were shaped amid comparable confusion. On January 13, 1948, the President’s Air Policy Commission, headed by Thomas K. Finletter, recommended a 70-group air force in place of the existing 55-group, involving an increase of expenditures from $2,850,000,000 to $4,150,000,000 for 1948, $5,450,000,000 in 1949, and more thereafter. When the joint armed services, eager for "balance" among all branches, proposed that annual appropriations for armament be increased by $29,000,000,000 above the $11,000,000,000 already being spent, the President asked a reconsideration, was presented with a "compromise" of $9,500,000,000, and finally decided

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11 Marshall’s press interview of May 12, 1948, as reported in The New York Times of May 13 (with “he” ordinarily referring to the Secretary of State) contained the following questions and answers: "Q. Was this a note or aide-memoire? A. That is getting very technical. He was not enough of a diplomat to answer that. Neither Gen. Smith nor he are diplomats. Does the questioner mean this piece of paper? Q. Did Mr. Smith leave a piece of paper with Mr. Molotov for the one he sent us? A. He thought afterwards he sent it. Q. Was it marked ‘Confidential’? A. He has not seen it. Mr. Molotov did the same with Mr. Smith after the interview was over in sending a copy of the substance of his remarks. . . . He has not talked to Gen. Smith. He is fishing in Normandy. He really doesn’t know exactly what he said at the time. . . . He [Smith] has been talking about this fishing trip for two months and one of the most earnest debates here was whether he would talk to Molotov before or after. He [Marshall] indicated that if he had very poor results on the trip, that might react to the disadvantage of his statement and he better make it first, before his fishing trip."
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on a “peace” program of $3,500,000,000 in additional military appropriations. During Congressional hearings, Secretary of Defense Forrestal urged a 66-group air force on an economy basis, but his subordinate, Air Secretary Stuart Symington, made eloquent pleas for the 70-group program, thus indicating that the “unification” of the defense services achieved in 1947 was more formal than substantive. Both houses of Congress, by almost unanimous vote, approved a 70-group air force, despite the opposition of an obviously divided Administration. Conscription and UMT, however, were politically embarrassing. The only certainties in the situation were that Congress would overwhelmingly approve increased expenditures on armaments in the name of anti-Communism but would shrink from measures which might cause voters to take a dim view of Congressional solicitude for the comforts of constituents.

Red Menace. An indecisive interlude in the spring crisis season of 1948 was furnished by the Italian elections of April 18. Togliatti’s Communists and Nenni’s Left Socialists formed a “Popular Front” to challenge the forces of capitalism, feudalism, clericalism, and liberalism. The State Department and the Vatican, fearful lest the Left win a majority, intervened actively in the campaign in support of Premier de Gasperi’s Christian Democrats. Washington, brandishing a carrot and a stick, warned that all aid to Italy would be cut off if the Left won the election and proposed, jointly with Paris and London, that Trieste be restored to Italy through a revision of the Peace Treaty. Ambassador James C. Dunn, along with the entire Catholic hierarchy, campaigned openly for the Right in the name of “democracy” and “Christianity” against “totalitarianism” and “atheism.” The cause of virtue vs. sin, and of God vs. Satan, thus had powerful support. In the final result the Left bloc won 31 per cent of the popular vote and elected 182 deputies, thus suffering no absolute loss of popular support as compared with the election of 1946. The verdict was nevertheless a Left defeat and a Right triumph, since many Italians previously indifferent cast their ballots against Communism. The Christian Democrats won 49 per cent of the popular votes and 307 deputies (a majority of the Assembly), as compared with 35 per cent and 207 seats in 1946. Saragat’s Right Socialists obtained only 7 per cent and 33 seats; all other parties combined, 13.5 per cent and 52 seats.

Italy was thus saved and wedded firmly to the Western bloc. A customs union with France was projected. Membership in a Western Union was taken for granted. Rearmament and restoration of colonies seemed possible. But here as elsewhere the ultimate success of America’s anti-Communist crusade seemed likely to require more than money, guns, and eulogies of liberty. De Gasperi’s party now included most ultrareactionaries, all
clericalists, and many neo-Fascists. Millions of peasants, workers, and lower-middle-class Italians continued to resent bitterly the perpetuation of feudal agriculture in the south and plutocratic industrialism in the north, the shadow of poverty and exploitation, the greed of black marketeers, the pride of part of the priesthood, and the postponement of reforms to the Greek kalends.

To the desperately poor, the disinherited, and the outcasts, Communism continued to make an effective, even if spurious, appeal. *Les misérables* all over the globe value social security and economic opportunity above civil rights and procedural democracy. Wrongly or rightly, many of the impoverished in many lands equate the latter blessings (to them, empty of content) with American capitalism and the former advantages with Socialism or Communism. In the face of this fact, the global crusade to defend freedom against totalitarianism seemed likely to be effective (as of 1948) only to the degree to which its commanders and missionaries could convince masses of men and women everywhere, by action as well as by words, that the U.S.A. and its friends had more to offer toward personal self-fulfillment than the U.S.S.R. and its Communist apostles. This task of conversion was not rendered easier by the disposition of policy makers in Washington to support all groups anywhere dedicated to anti-Communism, regardless of their desire or ability to meet popular aspirations for a better life. Anti-Communism not only is an article of faith among all true liberals but is also the refuge everywhere of those who are bent upon keeping the poor in poverty, making the wealthy richer, and suppressing all demands for social justice and economic reform.

This dilemma of American world leadership had not been resolved during the early months of 1948. The consequences of failure to face it were painful. The most reactionary recipients of American aid assumed, correctly, that they need not yield to unwelcome advice, since the U.S.A.—so long as it made anti-Communism the basis of its policy—could not refuse assistance to any anti-Communist regime, however disreputable, without exposing itself to a major diplomatic and propagandistic defeat. Thus in Greece the Sophoulis-Tsaldaris coalition of “Liberals” (i.e., reactionaries) and “Populists” (i.e., Monarchists) welcomed new subsidies and ignored all appeals to change its course. Following the assassination of Minister of Justice Christos Lados, who had sanctioned the execution of 125 “Leftist” prisoners, the American-supported Athens regime early in May, 1948, ordered the immediate shooting of many hundreds of oppositionists. All had been in jail since 1944-45, accused of crimes against Nazi agents and collaborationists. All had relatives, friends, and neighbors. The first year of the Truman Doctrine doubled the ranks of the guerrillas fighting the Athens Government,
with little prospect, despite increased economic and military aid for the Monarchy, that the "bandit" insurrection could be speedily suppressed. The British Government and press protested the mass executions. But Washington was silent. To criticize "anti-Communists" for shooting "Communists" was unthinkable. That this process fostered ever more ambitious ventures in blackmail by "anti-Communists" and constantly increased the number of "Communists" seemed not to be fully appreciated.

Similar dilemmas manifested themselves in other arenas of American-Soviet rivalry. At Nuremberg, the German industrialists who had subsidized Hitler and profited from the work of the Wehrmacht were held "not guilty" of plotting an aggressive war. Preparations continued for setting up an anti-Soviet German "government" at Frankfort. On American initiative, negotiations for an Austrian peace treaty were broken off early in May, 1948—evidently because Soviet concessions suggested that an agreement might be arrived at. In Korea, the U.S. enlisted the aid of the U.N. to arrange an election (May 10, 1948), despite Soviet opposition, a boycott by "Left" groups, and ample evidence that Communist duplicity had persuaded many Koreans that economic reform and the partition of estates in the Soviet zone were preferable to civil liberties in the U.S. zone. In China a comparable design for chaos led to consistent Kuomintang defeats and Communist victories—which included Red recapture of Yenan, occupation of Kirin, Szepingkai, Ichuan, Honanfu, and other cities, and the imposition of Communist rule on more and more provinces. Much of the benighted peasantry, in its abysmal ignorance, preferred Communist "tyranny" to Kuomintang "freedom," despite American efforts to demonstrate the falsity of this view. In MacArthur's Japan, Socialist Premier Tecsu Katayama resigned on February 10, 1948, and was succeeded on March 9 by Democrat Hitoshi Ashida as head of a new coalition Cabinet. If Japan, like other communities around the Rimlands of Eurasia, was to be envisaged in Washington as another anti-Communist stronghold, then all citizens of high and low estate would be obliged to draw the necessary conclusion... 

Grapes of Gall. In this context, all U.S. efforts to promote "international collaboration" were interpreted by friends and foes alike as part of the anti-Soviet crusade. Regardless of the justice of this judgment, it fostered endless confusions and misunderstandings during 1948. On March 30, the Ninth International Conference of American States opened at Bogotá, Colombia. When Marshall explained that European needs must have priority and that only half a billion dollars would be available in U.S. aid to the other Republics, the Latin delegates sat in stony silence. On April 9, Jorge E. Gaitán, leader of the Liberal Party, was assassinated in Bogotá. His followers had sought to combat Communism with tangible social reforms. They were em-
bittered by political quarrels with the ruling Conservatives (who tended to label all critics as “Reds”) and by an inflation which reduced lower income groups to semistarvation. News of Gaitán’s death touched off immediate mob violence against the Government. An orgy of popular fury and despair reduced Colombia’s capital to a shambles, forced the Conference to seek safety in the suburbs, and took the lives of 1,500 victims amid general looting, arson, and murder. Communists capitalized upon the crisis. But its source lay less in “Red conspiracies” than in the miseries, frustrations, and aggressions of the great mass of the poor.

The Bogotá Conference, interrupted in this unseemly fashion, resumed and concluded its work. Marshall opined that the disorders were a result of a “Communist plot” to discredit Pan-Americanism. The delegates carried on as best they could and emerged at April’s end with various new accords. One document contemplated measures to terminate the sovereignty of non-American States over colonial territories on the American continent. Another, in “Defense of Democracy,” was, in effect and intent, a new Anti-Comintern Pact, directed toward crushing “subversive” activities. Still another established the “Organization of American States” (OAS), embellished with all the rhetoric and moral abstractions characteristic of inter-American agreements. By the terms of this Charter of 112 articles, all previous commitments of cooperation and mutual defense were reaffirmed and all signatories solemnly bound themselves in the event of aggression to “apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject” (Article 25 of the Act of Bogotá). An elaborate machinery of consultation included a Conference, Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a Council, and an Inter-American Economic and Social Council, an Inter-American Council of Jurists, an Inter-American Cultural Council, the Pan-American Union (Secretariat of OAS), special conferences and organizations, etc. None of these could reasonably be regarded as adding very much of a substantive character to the profusion of inter-American accords already on file.

Another laborious effort at international concord, happily uninterrupted by bloodshed, reached its culmination in the same season. At Havana on March 24, 1948, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment approved a Charter of an International Trade Organization (ITO), after prolonged negotiations marked by many compromises. The objective was to pledge all signatories to standards of fairness and equality and to promote a progressive reduction of trade barriers in the interests of raising real income, effective demand, production, consumption, and exchange. The result marked

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the culmination of discussions initiated by the U.S.A. in December, 1945, and pursued at London, Lake Success, and Geneva—where a whole series of reciprocal trade agreements were signed in November, 1947. The pressures of economic nationalism upon the 53 delegations at Havana were so potent as to require the inclusion of numerous “escape clauses” and exceptions to the broad principles of nondiscriminatory treatment and freer trades. Members of the ITO were granted the right, subject to approval by the Organization, to employ import quotas and other quantitative restrictions under special circumstances, to grant export subsidies, to withdraw tariff concessions, to limit imports in the interests of public health, morals, safety, etc. Whether so qualified an accord, even if generally ratified, would in practice foster freer international trade depended primarily on the U.S. Congress. Without an extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, much of the Act of Havana would be meaningless.

If the steps taken at Brussels, Bogotá, and Havana early in 1948 could fairly be regarded by optimists as evidence of an emerging pattern of fruitful collaboration among sovereignties, a similar verdict could scarcely be rendered on the developments at Lake Success. On January 17, 1948, on board the U.S.S. Reville, a truce was signed between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, putting an end (at least temporarily) to the hostilities in Java initiated by Dutch forces in July, 1947. Its terms were sponsored by the U.S.A. and arranged by a Committee of Good Offices of the U.N. Security Council. They acknowledged Dutch victory over colonial rebellion by accepting Dutch military occupation of much of the territory claimed and originally held by the Republicans. In Indo-China savage guerrilla warfare continued between French forces and Viet Nam, with no action by U.N. The new organization to keep the peace reached the lowest point in its brief history in connection with Palestine.

Under pressure from military circles and the oil companies, the State Department abruptly abandoned the plan for partitioning the Holy Land which it had sponsored and put through the U.N. Assembly in November, 1947. On March 19, 1948, Warren Austin proposed to the Security Council that it call another special session of the Assembly to consider placing Palestine under a temporary U.N. trusteeship, with all efforts at implementing partition to be suspended in the interim. The U.N. Palestine Commission had reported in February that the partition plan could not be realized without an adequate military force to keep order. Austin argued that the Security Council had no obligation to use force to carry out Assembly recommendations and announced that the U.S.A. would supply no force for such a purpose.
Arab defiance and British noncooperation had produced a situation in which nothing save a vigorous American policy of fulfilling the partition proposal of 1947 offered hope of avoiding large-scale bloodshed. While the Government in Washington eagerly appropriated billions for defense and for aid to other States all over the globe in the name of anti-Communism, it was unwilling to spend any money or run any risks to fulfill the program which it had persuaded the U.N. to accept six months previously.

No Peace in Zion. This extraordinary and pathetic spectacle unfolded in a drama of frustration and futility which all but reduced the U.N. to the condition of the League of Nations after 1936. The special session of the Assembly met on April 16, 1948. Amid interminable equivocation, the delegates failed to support the U.S. proposal for a trusteeship, failed to approve British suggestions for a "neutral" interim regime, failed to arrange a truce in Palestine, failed to accept a belated U.S. proposal for a U.N. Commissioner (with no powers), failed in everything proposed and discussed. Failure flowed from the circumstance that the U.S. had no policy, the Great Powers were at odds, and the U.N. had no efficacy in the absence of a concert of power among the giants. By May 15, the Organization, in its agonized grappling with the puzzle of Palestine, was reduced to a condition of impotence, hypocrisy, and utter helplessness having no precedent save that furnished by its predecessor at Geneva a dozen years before when the statesmen of the Western democracies abandoned the dusky kingdom of the "Conquering Lion of Judah" to the imperial ambitions of Benito Mussolini.

The outcome in the Holy Land, however, promised to be different. Some at least among the diplomats and military authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. evidently assumed that the problem would be "solved" by the subjugation of the Jewish community in Palestine at the hands of the Arab States—enriched by the oil companies, armed by Britain, and advised by Anglo-American experts and concessionaires. In reality, these ramshackle feudal kingdoms, despite their powerful allies, had no means of accomplishing their announced purposes. Guerrilla warfare between November and May, 1947-48, took several thousand lives. But the determined, disciplined forces of the Zionists defeated the Arab partisans and occupied all the areas assigned to the Jewish State by the partition plan of 1947. On May 14, 1948, the independence of "Israel" was officially proclaimed and at once recognized by the U.S.A. For the first time in 2,000 years an independent Jewish

18 London announced firmly that it would terminate the mandate on May 15, 1948, and complete the evacuation of all British troops by August 1. For documentary evidence of subsequent collusion between British authorities in Palestine and the organizers of Arab violence against the Jewish community, see "The British Record in Palestine," The Nation Associates, New York, April, 1948.
nation was restored in the land of its origin. The States of the Arab League formally declared war and moved to invade Israel. But the military verdict seemed likely to be more disastrous to the invaders than to their victims. The power of a creative idea supported by money and guns was superior to the power of guns and money, supported by no idea other than blind hatred and intolerance.

The age-old tragedy of Palestine had reached no end in mid-May of 1948, but the plot of the drama had reached a point at which alternatives were starkly posed. Israel would survive and be welcomed into the family of nations. Or Israel would be overwhelmed and destroyed by violence. Which outcome was to be realized depended primarily on the policies of Britain and America. London and Washington might continue to base their policies on fear of Russia, the interests of the oil companies, sympathy for Arab feudalism as a bulwark against the Red menace, and strategic calculations relevant to World War III. Such a course might spell the destruction of Israel. It would assuredly spell the end of the United Nations and constitute a convincing demonstration that the avowed defenders of “Western” or “Christian” Civilization were wholly incapable of organizing the world in terms of the precepts of the Prince of Peace and giving new meaning to the timeless dream of human universalism preached by the Prophets and the Carpenter of Nazareth. Or—London and Washington could halt Arab aggression, enforce peace, and embark upon a creative program of economic development and social reform throughout the Levant in which Jews and Arabs alike would share.

The choice was still in doubt as these words were written. But the voice of Jeremiah is worthy of recall (Chapter VIII): “... my people know not the judgment of the Lord. ... The wise men are ashamed, they are dismayed and taken: Io, they have rejected the word of the Lord; and what wisdom is in them? ... For they have healed the daughter of my people slightly, saying, Peace, peace; when there is no peace. ... Behold the voice of the cry of the daughter of my people because of them that dwell in a far country: Is not the Lord in Zion? ... Is there no balm in Gilead; is there no physician there? why then is not the health of the daughter of my people recovered?”

6. EPILOGUE

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The Problem of the 20th Century

The best lack of all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

Surely some revelation is at hand; . . .
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs. . . .

—W. B. Yeats, The Second Coming.

Ours is essentially a tragic age, so we refuse to take it tragically. The cataclysm has happened, we are among the ruins, we start to build up new little habitats, to have new little hopes. It is rather hard work: there is now no smooth road into the future: but we go round, or scramble over the obstacles. We've got to live, no matter how many skies have fallen.—D. H. Lawrence, Lady Chatterley's Lover.

The crowded events reviewed in the preceding pages will soon be lost in the torrent of events to come. Their content and contour are certain to be blurred and presently erased from memory, save among archivists, bibliophiles, historiographers, and keepers of accounts. This is a surety, for human recollection of things past is always evanescent, except when they are vividly known from immediate personal experience. "Times of troubles" in all cultures, moreover, are so rich in recurring crises of all kinds—wars and rumors of war, revolutions, fanaticisms, reformations, and flaming paroxysms of fear and hate—that last week's headlines are almost as dull and meaningless as last year's almanac or a past-century chronicle.

But those who flee from the task of trying to comprehend the fortunes of yesterday out of a conviction that today is more urgent and tomorrow more significant are self-defeated. Time is a river, not a chain of lakes and ponds. The research magnificent of human self-fulfillment flows through it in a constant stream from a remote source to a distant delta, regardless of the vicissitudes of storm and tide, the ever-changing configuration of the stream bed, and the influence of many tributaries on the moving waters. If human destiny be pictured not as the waterway itself but as a vessel moving over its waves, then the pilot, while controlling the course of his craft, can succeed in completing the voyage without shipwreck only as he knows the rocks and shoals and eddies both upstream and downstream and is familiar with landing places, channels, and reports of expected weather.

Contemporary mankind in its long voyage from early Israel, Athens, and Rome toward a future which may be one of world unity or world chaos finds itself beset by violent tempests, menaced by hidden dangers, and tossed wildly about among rapids and whirlpools. Given the obvious incompetence of the pilots, the reluctance of the crew to obey orders, and the manifold uncertainties of the course, all analyses and prognoses of the destiny of the
Western State System, and of the world community which has grown up within its confines, deserve to be approached with doubt and humility. Yet the question is inescapable: what can be said concerning the prospects of men at the mid-point of the 20th century after Christ?

From the perspective of generations dead and generations yet unborn, the most striking fact regarding the Great Society in our time is that its members are united in their professions of purpose but are divided among themselves in apparently irreconcilable cleavages in their diverse conceptions of means toward the ends which all alike say they accept. All men everywhere of almost all faiths proclaim the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God. Almost all men preach liberty, equality, fraternity, personal dignity, social justice, freedom under law, and the desirability and necessity of One World. But the same men are so entangled in the loves and hates of particular nationalisms, imperialisms, ideologies, group interests, and sectarian solidarities that they seem quite unable to practice what they assert they believe. In a maladjusted global economy and an anarchic world polity, moreover, recurrent experiences of frustration, fear, and misery so shape motives that many men are moved to serve the interests of all men, as they see them, by directing their worry and rage against other men who are odious because their ways are different, disturbing, or heretical.

Most of those emotionally involved and politically active in the larger public controversies of our years are disposed to envisage these schisms in simple terms of black and white. On the lowest level of response to socially significant symbols, the issue tends to be viewed as one of good vs. evil, virtue vs. vice, truth vs. falsehood. At the next level of awareness, crises are comprehended in sharp and conflicting dichotomies of beliefs and acts. Each of the major patterns of dualism is for the most part restricted to definable geographical areas. One such area, as of 1948, embraced the Rimlands of Eurasia, the adjacent islands, and the Continents of the Americas. Here most of those most influential in forming public attitudes and policies envisaged the current choices of mankind in terms of freedom vs. despotism, liberty vs. totalitarianism, capitalism vs. collectivism (with local variants of social democracy vs. economic or political monopoly), liberalism vs. Communism, a world of peace-loving and cooperating sovereignties vs. a world of Police States subservient to a central autocracy. Another major area embraced the Heartlands of Eurasia, along with a vaguely defined fringe of dependencies and marchlands. Here those most influential in shaping policies and attitudes pictured the choices of men in terms of egalitarianism vs. discrimination, social justice vs. exploitation, collectivism vs. capitalism, Communism vs. reaction, a world of "democratic" sovereignties vs. a world of bourgeois imperialism and renascent Fascism. Although these two patterns of symbols
and preferences tended to impinge upon all people everywhere throughout
the Great Society, many millions in lower Asia and throughout Africa, other
millions in the Levant, and still others in significant numbers within each
of the major camps were unwilling or unable to accept either set of alterna-
tives and were clinging to older creeds or groping blindly for some new
formula for the good life.

A hasty view of man's hope and man's fate might suggest that the form
of the future is to be found in the conversion of the doubtful to one or the
other of the great competing faiths, and in the ultimate and definitive
triumph of one over the other, with victors converting penitent survivors
among the vanquished to the ways of rectitude. Such an anticipation is rein-
forced by a backward glance at the destiny of earlier State Systems, in
most of which one Power finally subdued all rivals and, by diplomacy and
by arms, built a Universal State. By this logic, either the U.S.A. or the
U.S.S.R. is inexorably fated to overthrow the other and to unify all mankind
and refashion the world in its own image.

But this prognosis is of dubious validity by virtue of two sets of consid-
erations seldom publicized on either side of the line of conflict: (1) In each
Super-Power, with its allies, puppets, and satellites, the discrepancies be-
tween verbal statements of purpose and living realities of experience are
so wide as to raise grave doubts as to the eagerness or capacity of masses of
men to risk their fortunes and their lives to effective purpose in any global
crusade to crush the foe. (2) Because of the inescapable facts of geography,
strategy, and geopolitics, neither coalition can reasonably be expected, under
any presently imaginable circumstances, to "conquer" the other.

In sober reality, the U.S.A., as the professed champion of liberty against
tyranny and free enterprise against State-ism, remained a community char-
acterized in the eyes of much of the outer world, and of many of its own
people, by plutocracy, economic oligarchy, racial discrimination and in-
tolerance, widespread avarice and corruption, strong trends toward a mili-
tary bureaucracy and a Garrison State, and singular obtuseness and hostility
on the part of its leaders in politics, business, labor, and agriculture toward
the aspirations of other men elsewhere traveling toward their goals by other
roads. Such a Power, however formidable its assembly lines and its amassed
hoards of wealth, had few of the mental and moral qualifications requisite
for defeating its rival and uniting the world community through its words
or its arms. The U.S.S.R., conversely, as a land whose rulers were the pro-
fessed champions of social justice against economic exploitation, remained
a community characterized in the eyes of many elsewhere, and of many of
its own members, by a structure of power accurately to be described as the
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despotism of a self-perpetuating oligarchy—intolerant of dissent, pitiless toward critics, fanatic in its narrow orthodoxy, and ruthless in denying human dignity, crushing human freedom, and expunging human life whenever and wherever the power or purposes of its masters were thwarted. Such a Power, however impressive its social ideals, its spatial majesty, and its material and psychological resources, also had few of the qualities needed to destroy its rival and unify the world by pen or sword. Which Power was least well fitted to undertake the millennial mission which most of its leaders assumed it was divinely ordained to undertake need not here be discussed. It suffices to observe, subject always to the correction of later events, that, while each had means of defending itself effectively against the other, neither showed promise at the mid-point of the century of any collective genius adequate to the task of conquering, uniting, and ruling all the earth.

This conclusion is reinforced by the second consideration adduced above. The strategic problem confronting both Muscovy and America in a world headed toward a war for global hegemony is, in military terms, an insoluble problem. For another generation at least, the U.S.A. will remain the wealthier, more productive, and more formidable of the antagonists in all the physical components of fighting capacity. In the event of hostilities in the near years to come, American air forces can unquestionably destroy most of the larger cities of the U.S.S.R. and bring death to scores of millions of Soviet citizens. But the facts of space are such that the armed hosts of America, however mobilized and directed in the game of war, cannot conceivably prevent the subjugation of all of Continental Europe and most of Asia by Soviet armies and their local Communist allies. In the atomic era a protracted campaign of “liberation” as a means toward establishing adequate bastions from which to invade and strike down the U.S.S.R. can have no result other than the reduction of all the Eurasian Rimlands to utter ruin and barbarism. That such a condition of affairs would permit of the mounting of a successful assault on the Heartland Power is altogether improbable. Should this miracle nevertheless be achieved, it is still inconceivable that American forces could actually occupy and administer the “liberated” regions, presumably embracing most of Europe and Asia, in the face of social dissolution, economic prostration, famine, pestilence, demoralization, and savage guerrilla resistance on the part of the desperate and demented survivors among the vanquished. Failure or prolonged reverses at any stage of the endeavor would mean, almost certainly, the atomic vaporization of many American cities and the cremation of millions of American citizens through long-range raiders by air and sea, aided by saboteurs, enemy agents, and native traitors.

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The problem of unifying the world via Soviet-Communist conquest also admits of no solution. The U.S.S.R. and its allies constitute an impressive power bloc, rich in territory, resources, and military man power, and possibly superior to the enemy in many of the political and psychological components of fighting capacity. In the event of open war, Soviet armies, as already suggested, could and would occupy all of Europe, thereby compelling British neutrality, along with most of the Orient and Near East. Yet this "victory," facilitated by indigenous Communists in all the areas thus subjugated, could not possibly prevent the atomic annihilation of most centers of Soviet population and industry by enemy bombers, nor could it conceivably furnish any adequate bases for a successful invasion and occupation of the Americas.

These calculations of grand strategy and Realpolitik offer no assurance whatever that the two Super-Powers will not, in fact, arrive at a clash in arms in the years to come. Despite democracy, the rulers of America have need of foreign devils to serve their own purposes. Because of totalitarianism, the rulers of Russia have need of foreign devils to perpetuate themselves in power. Such needs may well spell war. Men always act together, not in terms of what is rationally best in the end, but in terms of what is emotionally most satisfying at the moment in a context of immediate economic and political expectations. If World War III is permitted to come, and if it is waged as a "total war" of atomic annihilation (as will almost inevitably be the case), there will be no victors. Much of the human community will in the end experience doom and death for countless millions, followed by a condition of human fortunes indistinguishable from primitive savagery for many of those so unfortunate as to survive. This prospect has been vividly depicted, with the anguish of guilt and the urgency of despair, by most atomic physicists since 1945. It was anticipated by others before the dawn of the atomic age. But such forecasts have made little impression on public opinion or politicians. They do not in any sense preclude the possible advent of a final and fatal catastrophe for Western culture.

The only viable alternative to this dismal prospect is the voluntary establishment of a World Federal Republic, brought into being through

14 See H. G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come, and James Hilton, Lost Horizon. From the latter novel, President Roosevelt, in his Chicago address of Oct. 5, 1937, quoted the following passage which is far more relevant now than then: "Men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, every book and picture and harmony, every treasure garnered through two millennia, the small, the delicate, the defenseless—all will be lost or wrecked or utterly destroyed... There will be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage until every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled in a vast chaos."
agreement among governments and peoples regarding the minimum essentials of central power to serve the common defense and the general welfare of all men and women everywhere. Progress toward this goal presupposes that those possessed of decisive influence in the major sovereign centers can and will transcend somehow the violent ways of ancient days and arrive at a redefinition of values and purposes making possible the unity of mankind. Failure in the enterprise seems likely to mean the doom of man, or at least the descent of the Great Society into the fires of chaos and the gloom of night. Success in the enterprise appears to require a determined and rational effort on the part of policy makers in Washington, Moscow, Paris, London, Rome, and elsewhere to bring about a sequence of events which seems improbable as these words are written: a *modus vivendi* and a peace settlement between the Super-Powers; a resurrection of the United Nations; a cooperative and undeviating endeavor to transform the U.N. into a limited but adequate federation, capable of keeping the peace through the making and enforcement of law on individuals; a global synthesis of the most hopeful purposes and practices of capitalist democracy, liberal socialism, and Soviet Communism; and a united and purposeful effort by the political leaders of all mankind to fashion a world economy, a world polity, and a world society conducive, amid innumerable cultural diversities, to a tolerable minimum of freedom from fear, want, exploitation, and oppression for all peoples. To expect the salvation or survival of contemporary civilization in the atomic age on any terms short of these is wholly unrealistic.  

15 See “Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution” (Robert M. Hutchins, G. A. Borgese, Mortimer J. Adler, Stringfellow Barr, Albert Guerard, Harold A. Innis, Erich Kahler, Wilber G. Katz, Charles H. McIlwain, Robert Redfield, Rexford G. Tugwell) in *Common Cause*, March, 1948. This remarkable document cannot here be summarized or evaluated. It deserves to be read and pondered by all who are seriously concerned with the survival of man. It is appropriately dedicated to Gandhi:

“The martyrdom itself left him the gainer; relieved him of extreme old age; transferred the plenitude of his light where no storms can dim it. The killers whom he forgave will be forgotten. The distance between them and him is too vast for memory to comprehend.

“The honorable men who killed Caesar learned soon that they had laid down the flesh and raised to perpetuity the spirit. Through two thousand years whoever aspired for good or evil to world rulership called himself a Caesar.

“The model left by Gandhi is better. It is the power of justice as manifest in peace. Whoever will deserve to be World President will be an heir to Gandhi, a Mahatma, which means the magnanimous, august.

“It is fit that a preliminary draft of a world constitution be dedicated to the Precursor.”

The authors comment, with a wisdom rare in our time:

“A constitution is a proposal to history in the sense that it designs a tentative pattern of social and political behavior along whose lines the society of man, if it chooses to survive and grow, can be expected to meet conditions favorable to survival
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No past civilization has been confronted with a comparable challenge. None has ever succeeded in meeting successfully the lesser challenges with which it was faced in its twilight time. That modern man can rise above precedent and transcend his legacies of fear and hate and greed through a spiritual rebirth and a renaissance of creative statesmanship is by no means certain. If he cannot, his frustration will almost surely mean, in more than a symbolic sense, the breaking of the nations and the immolation of much of humanity in a new Armageddon. Should he succeed in saving his future, he faces a bright vista of hope and promise.

Which choice is to be made is a question currently unanswerable. But the blinding light of atomic dawn made it dazzlingly clear to all with eyes to see that the choice was now imminent and unavoidable. The destiny of the Western State System is still subject to control and direction by its people and their leaders. Their acts will be relevant and fruitful to the degree to which they understand that they must now choose between two roads. One leads to anarchy, to violence, and to death. The other leads to government, to peace, and to life.

SUGGESTED READINGS


and growth. A constitution proposed to a political organism not yet in being is a myth, in the sense that a myth, incorporating the faith and hope of its age, mediates between the ideal and the real and calls the mind to action.

"A constitution is a descriptive summary of possible good works, which cannot possibly operate outside the frame of a saving will. It is not salvation and safety by itself. If the human race decides to constitute itself in a society governed under justice and peace, its constitution will register that decision and make its fulfillment progressive and steadier. If mankind has made up its mind for self-destruction, any written Law, and were it descended from heaven, will leave it lawless.

"The rope itself thrown to the man in peril as a lift to life can be used by him if he so wishes as a noose for his neck; and the very presence of God did not halt Cain."
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CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the City of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

1 Department of State Publication 2353, Conference Series 74.
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3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II: MEMBERSHIP

Article 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

Article 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter, and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.
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Article 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III: ORGANS

Article 7

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

CHAPTER IV: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Composition

Article 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.
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Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
   a. promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;
   b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions, and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

Article 16

The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.

Article 17

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.

2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.
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Voting

Article 18
1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Article 19
A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall not vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

Procedure

Article 20
The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Article 21
The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session.

Article 22
The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Composition

Article 23
1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security.
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and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Procedure

Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.
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3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29
The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30
The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
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Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties, with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or
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land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security...
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Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII: REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.
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Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57

1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

Article 58

The Organization shall make recommendations for the coordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.
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Article 59

The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the power set forth in Chapter X.

CHAPTER X: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Composition

Article 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of eighteen Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, six members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. At the first election, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be chosen. The term of office of six members so chosen shall expire at the end of one year, and six other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 62

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.

4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

Article 63

1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

2. It may coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.
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Article 64

1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.

2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Article 66

1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.

3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Voting

Article 67

1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 68

The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.

Article 69

The Economic and Social Council shall invite any Member of the United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that Member.

Article 70

The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies.

Article 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where ap...
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propriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

Article 72

1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

CHAPTER XI: DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

CHAPTER XII: INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

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Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of
the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned,
and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the
interdependence of the peoples of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all
Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the
latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the fore-
going objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories
as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. territories now held under mandate;
b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second
World War; and

c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their ad-
ministration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the fore-
going categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of
the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle
of sovereign equality.

Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system,
including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly con-
cerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate
by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles
83 and 85.

Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under
Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until
such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in
or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples
or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United
Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay
or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated
and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.
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Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.
   2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.
   3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.
   2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII: THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Composition

Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:
   a. those Members administering trust territories;
   b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and
   c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council

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is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

**Functions and Powers**

**Article 87**

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;

b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and

d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

**Article 88**

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

**Voting**

**Article 89**

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

**Procedure**

**Article 90**

1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

**Article 91**

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

**CHAPTER XIV: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE**

**Article 92**

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

**Article 93**

1. All Members of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
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2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94

1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

Article 95

Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96

1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XV: THE SECRETARIAT

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
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Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.
2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.
3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

CHAPTER XVI: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 102

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

Article 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Article 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.

Article 105

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.
3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.

CHAPTER XVII: TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Article 106

Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
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Article 107

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

CHAPTER XVIII: AMENDMENTS

Article 108

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 109

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

CHAPTER XIX: RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE

Article 110

1. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

2. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the Organization when he has been appointed.

3. The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the ratifications deposited shall thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of America which shall communicate copies thereof to all the signatory states.

4. The states signatory to the present Charter which ratify it after it has come into force will become original Members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective ratifications.

Article 111

The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government
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of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatory states.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the Governments of the United Nations have signed the present Charter.

DONE at the City of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.
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COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

With Amendments in Force, June 26, 1945

The High Contracting Parties,

In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and

by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another,

agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 1

Membership and Withdrawal

1. The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accessions shall be effected by a declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

2. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guaranties of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

3. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

1 Entered into force on January 10, 1920. The texts printed in italics indicate the amendments. Article 6 as amended has been in force since August 13, 1924, Articles 12, 13 and 15 as amended since September 26, 1924, and Article 4 as amended since July 29, 1926.
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Article 2

Executive Organs

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

Article 3

Assembly

1. The Assembly shall consist of representatives of the Members of the League.
2. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time, as occasion may require, at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.
3. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
4. At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote and may have not more than three Representatives.

Article 4

Council

1. The Council shall consist of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers [the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan], together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain shall be Members of the Council.
2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League, whose Representatives shall always be Members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.
3. bis. The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds’ majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of re-eligibility.
4. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.
5. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
6. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.
7. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.

Article 5

Voting and Procedure

1. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.
2. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.
3. The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.
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Article 6

Secretariat and Expenses

1. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

2. The first Secretary-General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

3. The secretaries and the staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council.

4. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

5. The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the League in the proportion decided by the Assembly.

Article 7

Seat, Qualifications of Officials, Immunities

1. The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.

2. The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

3. All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

4. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

5. The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

Article 8

Reduction of Armaments

1. The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every 10 years.

4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programs and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

Article 9

Permanent Military, Naval and Air Commission

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.
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Article 10
Guaranties against Aggression

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 11
Action in Case of War or Threat of War

1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article 12
Disputes to Be Submitted for Settlement

1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council.

2. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article 13
Arbitration or Judicial Settlement

1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which can not be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.

2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.

3. For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry
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out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

Article 14
Permanent Court of International Justice

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

Article 15
Disputes Not Submitted to Arbitration or Judicial Settlement

1. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

3. The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute, and, if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

5. Any member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the Members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within 14 days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the
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Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

Article 16
Sanctions of Pacific Settlement

1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League.

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other members of the League represented thereon.

Article 17
Disputes Involving Non-Members

1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16, inclusive, shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

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Article 18
Registration and Publication of Treaties

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

Article 19
Review of Treaties

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

Article 20
Abrogation of Inconsistent Obligations

1. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

Article 21
Engagements That Remain Valid

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

Article 22
Mandatory System

1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Manda-
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tory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications of military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

6. There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

8. The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

Article 23

Social and Other Activities

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:

a. will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations;

b. undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;

c. will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;

d. will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;

e. will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind;

f. will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

Article 24

International Bureaus

1. There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaus already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such
international bureaus and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

2. In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaus or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

3. The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

Article 25
Promotion of Red Cross and Health

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and cooperation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

Article 26
Amendments

1. Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.

2. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.
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The following guide has been prepared by F.L.S., recorded by K.A.S. and Ann Wilcox Jones, assembled by K.A.S., D.R.S., and L.A.S., and typed by Virginia S. Rutter and Jane D. Thomason, to all of whom the author is most grateful. All errors and omissions are his responsibility alone. This will be found to be a fair index of places, a good index of subjects, and an excellent index of persons, including all writers quoted or cited. This is as it should be, since politics—as a social science, a practical art, and an area of pedagogy—ought to be concerned less with pale abstractions and bloodless principles than with people.

Entries under major countries are largely limited to principal treaties and wars. Areas, populations, and capitals will be found on pages 130ff. In general, conferences, treaties, and wars are not separately indexed but are listed chronologically under these headings. Symbols: B. = battle; C. = conference; T. = treaty or other agreement; W. = war; W.W. = world war; q. = quoted; c. = cited or referred to; n. = footnote; d. = death of.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

C.N.L. Committee of National Liberation (France, Italy)
E.C.A. Economic Cooperation Administration (U.S.A.)
E.R.P. European Recovery Program (U.S.A.)
P.A.O. Food and Agriculture Organization
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ILO International Labor Organization
IRO International Refugee Organization
ITO International Trade Organization
M.R.P. Mouvement Républicain Populaire (France)
N.M.C.B. National Munitions Control Board (U.S.A.)
OAS Organization of American States
O.M.G.U.S. Office of Military Government, United States
PMC Permanent Mandates Commission, League of Nations
SCAP Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (Japan)
U.N.A.D.A. United Nations Atomic Development Authority
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNSCOP United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

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