THE PHILEBUS

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES.

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PREFACE.

No edition of the works of Plato quite calculated to meet the wants of the student has as yet appeared. This deficiency it is proposed to supply by the joint labours of some members of the University of Oxford. The present edition of the Philebus is therefore to be regarded as one of a series.

The whole series is intended to follow a uniform plan: as, however, each dialogue will be entrusted to a single editor, differences of individual taste or opinion may possibly appear in the execution.

An introduction, indicating the general scope and character of each dialogue, will be prefixed.

Many difficulties in the interpretation of Plato vanish before an insight into the arrangement of parts, or plan of structure, of a dialogue. This arrangement, though always artistic, is often intricate. A running analysis will, therefore, be given in the margin, sufficient, it is hoped, to furnish a clue to the course of the argument through its occasional mazes.
As scholars are generally agreed to refer to the edition of Stephanus in their references to the writings of Plato, the corresponding pages of that edition will be indicated in the margin.

The conceptions unfolded or made the subject of passing allusion in the Philebus have been chiefly elucidated in the notes by a comparison of Plato's with previous or subsequent speculations. Where it was necessary to examine any point at greater length, longer notes, or rather essays, have been appended at the end of the volume.

An English translation, intended to be sufficiently close to perform the office of a philological commentary, is published separately for the use of the English reader, or of such students as may require any further assistance in comprehending the original.
INTRODUCTION.

THOUGH Socrates directed speculation to moral problems, he did not himself construct any definite moral creed. After his death two opposite ethical schools arose. The form that the fundamental problem of morality assumed was: What is the Highest Good, or, the End of life? This the Megarians maintained to be Knowledge, the Cyrenaics Pleasure. In the PHILEBUS these rival doctrines are proposed and examined, and contrasted with Plato's own more comprehensive theory.

It is first inquired whether either Pleasure or Knowledge is the Absolute Good, and fit to be proposed as the End of life.

This question is soon determined. Our preconception of the Highest Good involves three characters. It must be Desirable, Adequate, and Perfect. Neither Pleasure nor Knowledge satisfies these conditions. They are each of them but partial Ends, and a combination of them is clearly a more Perfect Good.

A second problem is next proposed: Which of the two, Pleasure or Knowledge, approaches more nearly to whatever is the Perfect Good.

This problem, like the former, is easily determined by the consideration of three characters assumed to belong to the Perfect Good. These are Truth, Measure, and Beauty, and it is decided with-
out much difficulty that these conditions are satisfied in a higher degree by Knowledge than by Pleasure. This is the whole substance of the dialogue if we only consider the inquiries originally proposed.

Another question, however, though not expressly stated, receives at least a partial solution: What is the exact composition of that Highest Good of which Pleasure and Knowledge are but fractional ingredients? and what kinds of Pleasure and Knowledge are its components?

This question is approached more methodically than the others. At the commencement of the dialogue it is stated, with the solemnity befitting the inauguration of a new Method, that no question can be treated Scientifically without Generalization and Division. To answer, then, the question just proposed we must ascertain the Genera and Species of Pleasure and Knowledge. Accordingly both Pleasures and Sciences are Classified, and this broad distinction is found to run through the species of both, that some are Pure, others Mixed. It is first agreed that the Purest portions of each have the best title to be considered as components of the Highest Good. Besides these, however, all the Mixed kinds of Knowledge, and, even of the Pleasures Mixed with Pain, those that are necessary to life and in allegiance to the virtues, are admitted as elements. The Greatest, however, and the Vicious Pleasures are pronounced to be the Greatest, are thus excluded. So the third ethical problem is solved.

But it is the characteristic of Plato's philosophic
treatment of any subject that it presents the three branches of speculation, Ethical, Logical, Physical inquiries in intimate and organic combination.

The Ethical element we have found in the subject of the problems.

The Dialectical element forms the vestibule of the dialogue, where the doctrine of Method is enunciated in somewhat mystic tones, but with unrivalled impressiveness. The Dialectical Method is afterwards partly exemplified in the Classification of Pleasure and Knowledge.

The Physical or Metaphysical element is introduced by a further application of the Method, the reference of Pleasure and Knowledge to higher Genera. This involves a systematic exposition, with more or less elucidation, of the four great Principles, the Limit, the Infinite, the Product, and the Cause: a list that resumes the highest philosophic abstractions of Plato's predecessors, and was not much varied in subsequent Greek philosophy.

The final comparison, too, of Pleasure and Knowledge assumes a Metaphysical character, as it determines not only their position in respect of the Ethical Good, but, partially at least, in relation to this catholic system of Principles. The highest place in this more general arrangement of things placed in their order of excellence, belongs to nothing within the worldly sphere, but to the Absolute Cause, the Divinity, the Eternal Good and Measure of all perfection. Second is the Perfect Derivative Good, Physical or Moral, the latter of which, the highest End of created life, was the subject of the Ethical problems. The third rank
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belongs to the highest kind of Knowledge, Wisdom, or Reason in its apprehension of the highest truth. The fourth rank is assigned to the lower kinds of Knowledge, the Scientific comprehension of truths of a less exalted order. The fifth to the Pure Pleasures. The sixth to such of those Mixed with Pains as are necessary to man's physical existence, and sanctioned by the moral law.

From the wealth of thought which Plato has lavished on this, as indeed on every other subject that he handled, it has been disputed what is the leading idea of the Philebus.

It is obvious that the fundamental problem is Ethical, the character of the highest attainable Good. The most distinctive feature of the dialogue, however, is perhaps, not the subject, but the mode of handling the question, the instrument employed for its solution, Classification and Division of the Pleasures and Sciences. That Plato intended to direct the attention to this, we may infer from the emphatic manner in which this is indicated as the true philosophic Method at the commencement of the dialogue. This Classification then, eclipsed as it became in the execution by more striking features, seems to have been the germinal idea of the Philebus. It is the portion earliest in development, about which the other members of the organism grow and cluster; the mass in the picture which, though somewhat pale in colour, dominates the composition, as the centre to which the other masses converge or from which they radiate. It is the key applied to determine, partly at least, the elements in the Platonic definition of the Highest Good, or what we
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have called, the third Ethical problem. And this again is introduced by a collision of the narrower views of the Cyrenaic and Megarian schools; a collision which assumes the form of the first and second Ethical problems. And the treatment is so broad as to involve a sketch, sufficiently definite to disclose Pythagorean features, of the outlines of a Metaphysical system.

To inquire into the chronology of the Philebus, and its connexion with the other dialogues, belongs to a more general consideration of the consecution and relation of Plato's writings. We may observe here that the maturity of views presented by the Philebus proves that it is among the latest. Speculations on the End of life, on the Method of Science, on the laws of the Universe, in which we may trace the impulsion of Socrates, of the Megarians, and of the Pythagoreans, are all fused into one philosophic system, and presented in an harmonious artistic form. And, as has been observed, this triple thread of speculation, Ethical, Logical, and Physical, is the badge of Plato's most perfect dialogues. In this respect the Philebus may claim to be classed with the Republic and Timæus. Of this trilogy, however, it is doubtless the least. This is probably due to the subordination in Plato's mind of Ethical to Political philosophy. At all events there is not so full a presentation of Ethical ideas in the Philebus, as of Political in the Republic, or of Physical in the Timæus.
Works by the same Author.

PHILEBUS, a Dialogue of Plato on Pleasure and Knowledge and their relations to the Highest Good, translated into English.

LONDON: J. W. PARKER AND SON, West Strand.

THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE, a translation of the Later Analytics of Aristotle, with an Introduction and Notes.

LONDON: FRANCIS MACPHERSON, King William Street.
4. λόγον...δέχεσθαι] This phrase became a sort of technical term of Dialectic. It appears to have been a custom for one disputant to hand on a thesis to another, who had to defend it, not on his own principles, but on those of the disputant whom he succeeded. ἄν δ' ἐτέρου δόξαν διαφανέστηκε ὁ ἀποκριμένος, δήλων ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἐκέινον διάσωσιν ἀποβλέποντα θετέον ἐκαστα καὶ ἀρνητέον. Ποιοῦν δὲ τούτο καὶ οἱ παρ' ἄλλῃν δεχόμενοι τὰς θέσεις' στοχάζονται γὰρ ὅσ ἂν εἴποι ὁ δέμενος. Aristot. Topic. 8, 5. "If the Respondent is defending the opinion of another person, of course he must be guided by the views of that person in the premisses he concedes or denies to the Opponent. And in practice even those who follow another in the defence of a thesis observe this rule, for they are guided by what they imagine its original advocate would have said.

9. Instead of ἄγαθον we should have expected ἀματόν, or τὸ ἄγαθον. That a Greek might overlook the difference of meaning produced by the article we learn from Aristotle, who thinks it necessary to remind us of the distinction: ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταῦτα ἐστι τὸ εἰναι τὴν ἣδον ἄγαθον καὶ τὸ εἰναι τὴν ἣδον τὸ ἄγαθον, οὐχ ὀμολογεῖν θετέον τὸν ὅρον. Anal. Prior. 1. 40. "To say that Pleasure is a Good and to say that it is The Good are two different propositions, and so must the terms be into which we resolve them." The Stoics, however, would have defended the expression in the text, as they made all Good homogeneous and equal in degree, and recognized no difference between Good and Best or The Good. This view they seem to have
adopted from the Megaric school, whose ethical doctrine is represented by Socrates at the opening of the dialogue. We read in Diogenes Laertius, ὁσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημα ἐστὶ μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνήσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐτ ἐν γενη, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμοὺς, τῆς γε ἱδονῆς ἀμείνοι καὶ λόγῳ γίγνεσθαι ξύμπασιν, ὀσαποτε καὶ ἰτοὺν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν, δυνατοῖς δὲ μετασχεῖν ὲθελιμωτατον ἀπάντων εἰναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὐσί τε καὶ ἐσομένοις. Μῶν οὐχ οὐτω πως λέγομεν, ὥ Φιληθε, ΕΚΑΤΕΡΟΙ.

ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὥ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δέχει δὴ τούτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὥ Πρόταρχε, λόγον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι: Φιληθεσ γὰρ ἡμῖν ὑς καὶ αἰθρηκεν.

ΣΩ. Δεὶ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τάληθ᾽ πη περαινθήναι;

ΠΡΩ. Δεὶ γὰρ οὖν.

Π. ΣΩ. Ἡθι δὴ, πρὸς τούτους διομολογησόμεθα καὶ τὸδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

(2) If some other Good excels both Pleasure and Know-

would use Good as synonymous with The Good. Possibly, therefore, in omitting the article in the present passage Plato has followed a mode of speaking habitual to the two schools whose opinions are contrasted in the present dialogue with his own.

8. ὲθελιμωτατον] i. e. not only Better in comparison with Pleasure, but absolutely Best, or the Sovereign Good. This latter proposition is afterwards abandoned.
p. 11. ΣΩ. Ὄς νῦν ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἐξίσως ψυχής καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνει τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώπους πάσι τὸν βίον εὐδαιμονα παρέχειν. ἀρ' οὐχ οὖτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἴμεῖς δ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἄν ἄλλη τις κρατήσως τοῦτον φανή; μόνον οὖκ, ἂν μὲν ἴδονή μᾶλλον φαίνηται ἐνγγενῆς, εἶτε ἴττώμεθα μὲν ἀμφότεροι τοῦ ταῦτα ἑξοντος βεβαιῶς

p. 12. Βίον, κρατεῖ δὲ τὴν ἴδονής τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. 'Αν δὲ γε φρονήσει, νικᾶ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἴδονήν, ἢ δὲ ἴτταται; ταὐθ' οὖτως ὁμολογούμενά χαίρει, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. 'Εμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' Ἰλήβος; τί φῆς;

ΠΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἴδονή δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει, σὺ δέ, Πρόταρχε, αὐτὸς γνῶσει.

ΠΡΩ. Παραδούσι, ὥς Ἰλήβε, ἵμων τὸν λόγον οὖκ ἀν ἐτὶ κύριος εἰσὶ τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τοῦναντίον.

b ΠΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιώμαι καὶ μαρτύρομαι νῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θέου.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἴμεῖς σοι τοῦτον ὑπαυχων συμμάρ-

3. εὐδαιμονα] i.e. the question relates to the theory of Happiness; an intimation that the ensuing dialogue is of an Ethical character.

11. τοῦ ταῦτα ἑξοντος βεβαιῶς] “That perfectly has this power (of producing happiness).”

20. αὐτὸς γνῶσει] “must decide, determine, for yourself;” “must take your own course.”

So in the Gorgias, with the same expression of impatience: τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων καταλογοῦμεν; —αὐτὸς γνῶσει. Gorgias, p. 505 C.
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turpes ἂν εἴμεν, ὡς ταῦτα ἔλεγες ἀ λέγεις. Ἀλλὰ δὴρ. 12.
tὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔξής, ὁ Ἐὼκρατες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ
Φιλήμβον ἐκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ πειρώμεθα πε-
-raίνειν.

III. ΣΩ. Πειρατέου, ἀπ' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς θεοῦ, ἢν
 öde Ἀφροδῖτην μὲν λέγεσθαι φησι, τὸ δ' ἀληθέστα-
tον αὐτῆς ὄνομα ἥδονην εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὁ Πρῶταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ ε ἱ
τὸν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἀνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ
πέρα τοῦ μεγίστον φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδῖ-
tην, ὅπη ἐκείνη φίλον, ταῦτη προσαγορεύω τήν δὲ
ηδονήν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ ὅπερ ἔστων, ἀπ'
ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοτείν

15 ἡμῖνα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως
ἀπλῶς, ἐν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δήπου παντοτις εἰληφε καὶ
twin trópōn ἀνομοίους ἀλλήλαις. ἰδε γάρ, ἥδεσθαι
μὲν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀνθρωπον, ἥδεσθαι δὲ δ'
καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονείν ἥδεσθαι
20 δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνορταίνοντα καὶ ἀνόητων δοξῶν καὶ ἑλπί-
δων μεστῶν, ἥδεσθαι δ' αὖ τὸν φρονοὺντα αὐτῷ τῷ
φρονείν καὶ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκατέρας πῶς ἂν
τις ὀμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἰναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητον φαῖ-
νοντο ἐνδίκος;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἑναντίων, ὁ Ἐὼκρατες,

15. ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἀπλῶς]
"to judge primâ facie from the
singleness of her name." The
meaning of the phrase appears
from Demosth. Lept., quoted
by Stahlbaum: ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο οὐ-
tοσί μὲν ἀκούει λόγον τινὰ ἔχων
εἰ δὲ τὰς ἀκριβῶς ἔξετάσεις, ψεῦδος
ἀν ὦν φανεῖν. A parallel passage

in the Symposium shows that
οὕτως ἀπλῶς must be taken to-
gether: οὐ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖ προ-
βεβληθαι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, τὸ ἀπλῶς
οὕτω παρηγγέλθαι ἐγκωμίζεων �深刻
εἰς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἣν ὁ Ἐρως, κα-
λῶς ἄν εἰχε, νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν
eis. p. 180 C.
p. 12. αὐται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντιόν. πῶς γὰρ ἤδονη γε ἤδουνη μὴ οὐχ ὤμοιότατον ἄν εἴη, τούτο αὐτό ἕαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων;

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρώμα, ὡ διαμόνιε, χρώματι· κατὰ γε αὐτὸ τοῦτ' οὖθεν διοίσει, τὸ χρώμα εἶναι πάν, τὸ δ' εἰς μὴν μέλαιν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγανώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιότατον ὁν τυγχάνει; καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχῆματι κατὰ ταὐτόν· γένει μὲν ἐστὶ πάν ἐν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιότατα, τὰ δὲ διαφορώτητα ἐξούστα μυρίαν ποιοτὰ τυγχάνεται. καὶ πόλλ' ἐτερα ὦτως ἐχουθ' εὐρήσομεν, ὡστε τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πιστεύει, τῷ πάντα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἐν πιστεύει. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μὴ τινα ἢδονας ἢδοναῖς εὐρήσομεν ἐναντιότατα.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡσώς· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθ' ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον; 15

ΣΩ. Ὄτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια οὐτα ἐτέρον

12. λόγος] “mode, method, of reasoning,” i.e. only regarding the generic element in pleasures. Λόγος is sometimes used for the form, principle, or artifice of an argument, or objection to an argument, abstracted from the particular matter. In this sense all arguments that are the application of the same logical canons, that fall under the same head or locus communis, are one and the same λόγος. Immediately below λόγος seems to mean thesis or original proposition (that all Pleasures are Good). It may however have the same sense as before: “proof,” “argument,” “syllogism,” or rather, “defence” or “enstasis;” (that Pleasures may have a common property, Good, as they have a common genus. Pleasure.) The Metaphysical principle upon which this Logical method is based is presently discussed, and is also called λόγος. See p. 14 c.

17. Ὄτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια οὐτα ἐτέρον, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι] “because the predicate (ὄνομα) you apply to them, dissimilar as they are, is distinct (ἐτέρον) from the subject.” If Pleasures are opposite species of one genus, we can say all Pleasures are Pleasure, i.e. predicate one genus of all of them; but we have a slight presumption against any other general proposition of the form all Pleasures are X; because if X is connected with the specific difference of one Pleasure it will be excluded by the specific difference of another. The question accordingly will be, in the language of Logicians, whether
rho, φήσομεν, όνόματι. Λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντα εἶναι π. 13.
tὰ ἴδεα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ όιχ ἴδεα εἶναι τὰ ἴδεα λόγος
οὐδεὶς ἀμφιβατεῖ: κακὰ δὲ ὅντ’ αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὁ
ἀγαθὰ δὲ, ὡς ἴμεῖς φαμέν, ὥμοις [πάντα] σὺ προσ-
σαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὁμολογῶν ἀνόμοια εἶναι τῷ
λόγῳ, εἰ τίς σε προσαναγκάζῃ. τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτ’
ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς εὖν πάσας
ηδοναὶ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Ἀγαθότητας; οὔει γὰρ τινα
συγχωρῆσεσθαι, θέμενοι ἴδιον οὐ εἶναι τἀγαθόν, εἶτα
ἀνεξεσθαί σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινας ἀγαθὰς καὶ
ηδοναὶ, τὰς δὲ τινας ἐτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς;

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ’ οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλή-
λας εἶναι καὶ τινὰς ἐναντίας.

15 ΠΡΩ. Οὕτι καθ’ ὅσον γε ἴδοναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὁ
Πρωτάρχης. οὔδ’ ἄρα ἴδιον ἴδιον διάφορον, ἀλλὰ
πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα
ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα οὐδὲν τιτρώσκει, πεισο-
μεθα δὲ καὶ ἑροῦμεν ἀπερ οἱ πάντων παυλότατοι τε δ
καὶ περὶ λόγους ἀμα νέοι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὄτι σὲ μιμοῦμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν
τολμῶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοίοτατον ἐστὶ τῷ ἀνομοιο-
20 τάτῳ πάντων ὁμοίοτατον, ἐξω τὰ αὐτὰ σοὶ λέγειν,

Χ is the specific property of
one special Pleasure or the ge-
neric property of all Pleasures.
Protarchus of course must
maintain that Goodness is con-
nected with the generic ele-
ment in Pleasures. In inviting
Protarchus to point out this,
Socrates, to try his acuteness,
attempts what was afterwards
called the fallacy Plurimum In-
terrogationum, i. e. so frames
his question that Protarchus
cannot answer it simply with-
out conceding the point in de-
bate.

19. πεισόμεθα] A happy emen-
dation of Badham for the πειρά-
σόμεθα of the Zurich edition.
The Bodleian MS. gives πειρόμεθα.
π. 13. καὶ φανοῦμεθα γε νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦμιν ἐκπεσὸν οἰχήσεται. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρονώ- 
μεθα, καὶ τἀχ' ἀνώντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ὅσως ἀν πῶς ἀλλήλους συγχωρήσαμεν.

**ΠΡΩ.** Λέγε πῶς;

ΙV. ΣΩ. Ἐμε βές ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, 

ο Πρώταρχε. 

**ΠΡΩ.** Το ποῖον δή; 

ΣΩ. Φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοὺς καὶ πάνθ' 

ὁπόσα δή κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἶπον ἀγαθόν, διε-10 

ῥωτώμενος ὁ τί ποτὲ ἐστὶ τάγαθον, ἀρ' οὐ ταῦτ' 

πεῖσονται τούτῳ ὅπερ ὁ σῶς λόγος; 

**ΠΡΩ.** Πῶς; 

ΣΩ. Πολλαί τε αἱ ἐνάπασαι ἐπιστήμημα δόξουσιν 

εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοι τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλως. εἰ δὲ καὶ15 

π. 14. ἐναντία πῃ γίγνονται τινες, ἀρα ἄξιος ἄν εἰην 

τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηθεμέναν 

ἀνόμοιον φαίνῃ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμη γίγνεσθαι, κα- 

πεθ' ἦμιν οὖτος ὁ λόγος ὅστερ μῦθος ἀπολομένου 

οἴχοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σωκόμεθα ἐπὶ τινος ἀλογίας; 

**ΠΡΩ.** Ἀλλ' οὖ μὴν δεῖ τούτῳ γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ 

σωθῆναι. τὸ γε μὴν μοι ἱσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοὶ 

λόγου ἀρέσκει· πολλαί μὲν ἥδονα καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γι- 

γνέσθων, πολλαὶ δὲ ἐπιστήμημα καὶ διάφοροι.

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20. ἀλογίας] The "breach of the laws of disputation" which Socrates here deprecates, i.e. refusing to admit an evident truth, bore in the Dialectical code the name of Δυσκολία. εἰ 

οὖν μήτε ἀντεπιχειρεῖν ἔχων μήτε ἐναστάθαι οὐ τίθησι, δήλον ὦτι 

dυσκολάινει. ἔστι γὰρ ἐν λόγοις 

dυσκολία ἀπόκρυσις παρὰ τοῖς εἰ- 

ρημένοις τρόποιν συλλογισμοῦ 

φθαρτή. Arist. Topic. 8. 7. “A 

Respondent who refuses to ad-

mit an Opponent’s premiss, 

though he can neither meet it 

by an adverse Syllogism nor by 

an adverse Instance, inures 

the reproach of Perversity. For 

Perversity in Dialectic is an 

answer preventing an adverse 

syllogism by any but these two 

methods.”
8

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Την τοίνυν διαφορώτητα, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τοῦρ. 14. ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, ἃ κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον, τολμώμεν ἃν τῇ ἐλεγ- χομένῳ μηνύσωσι, πότερον ἤδουν τὰ γαθὸν δεὶ λέ- γειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ [τι] τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι. νῦν γὰρ
οὐ δήπον πρός γε αὐτὸ τούτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὡπος
ἀγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτ' ἐσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθ' ἃ σῦ,
τῷ δ' ἀλήθεστάτῳ δεὶ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἁμφώ.

ΠΡΩ. Δεὶ γὰρ οὖν.

V. ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῦν τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἐτι μᾶλλον δὲ c
ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοίνυν δή;

ΣΩ. Τὸν τᾶςι παρέχοντα ἀνθρώπως πράγματα
ἐκούσὶ τε καὶ ἀκούσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἔνιοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως
περικότα θαναμαστὸν. ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ
τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαναμαστὸν λεχθὲν, καὶ ράδιον ἀμφισβη-
τήσαι τῷ τοῦτῳ ὁποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρόταρ-
χον, ἐνα γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς ἐνιαὶ πάλιν, τοὺς
ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίοις ἄλληλοις μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέ-
δο μενός, καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἀλλὰ
μυρία;

ΣΩ. Σὺ μὲν, ὡς Πρῶταρχε, ἔφηκας τὰ δεδημευ-
μένα τῶν θαναμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, συγκε-
χωρημένα δὲ ὡς ἐποτο εἰπτεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἡδη, μὴ
deĩν τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥάδια

3. ἐλεγχομένω (sub. τὸ ἀγαθὸ) on account of the plural μηνύ
was probably altered by the
transcriber into ἐλεγχόμενον, the
reading of the MSS. and re-
tained in the Zurich edition,

20. Ἀρ' οὖν λέγεις, κ.ν. See
Appendix A.
p. 14. καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβανόντων εἶναι γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις ἐκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἄμα μέρη διελθὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτά τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελῶν ὅτι τέρατα διαμάγκασαι φάναι, τὸ τε ἐν ὦς πολλὰ ἐστὶ καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὦς ἐν μοῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ δὲ ἡ ποίᾳ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔτερα λέγεις, ἀ μήτω συγκεκαρμένα δεδήμενται περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοιῶν λόγον;

p. 15. ΣΩ. Ὅποτέν, ὁ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μη τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθήται, καθάπερ ἄρτιώς ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν. ἐνταυθῷ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν νῦν δὴ, συγκεκῳρηταί τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν ὅταν δὲ τις ἐνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῆ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἐνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν καὶ τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἐν, περὶ τοῦ των τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἡ πολλῇ σπουδῇ μετὰ διαφόρεσις ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.

b ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἰ τινας δεῖ τοιαῦτας εἶναι μονά—

10. Ὅποτέν ὁ παῖ, κ.π.λ.] The Zenonian identity of unity and multiplicity is involved in all Proposition, whether scientific or unscientific, and is the identification of the one individual Subject with its many Predicates. That which forms the motto of Plato’s dialectic implies Classification, that is to say, the commencement of science, and is the identity of the one Species with the many Individuals which it comprehends. In Zeno’s view Socrates is one as a subject, and at the same time manythings—Wise, Brave, Athenian, &c.—in respect of his attributes. In Plato’s view Socrates, Callias, Coriscus are many as individuals, and at the same time one in respect of Man, their common species. In Zeno’s paradox the unity is the individual, Protarchus; in Plato’s, Protarchus the individual is part of the multiplicity, and the unity is Man, the universal. Ἐνα ἄνθρωπον therefore is opposed to ἐνα Πρῶτορχας above. Διαίρεσις, logical division, the cause of multiplicity, is the opposite of συναγωγή, generalization, the process which terminates in unity.

18. Πρῶτον μὲν...γίγνεσθαι] This embarrassing passage is satisfactorily explained by Bad-
The discovery of Unity in Multiplicity, and Multiplicity in Unity, and the reduction of Multiplicity to Number, is the true process of Science.

There are not three problems proposed, as might appear at first sight, but only two. "Ομος refers to nothing in its own clause but to the next, and gives μετά δὲ τούτο the force of, and yet. The first problem, then, is, Have the ideas a real existence? The second, How are we to reconcile their unity with their apparent division or multiplication in the world of sense? 17. μὴ κινέω Φιλήβον εὖ κεί-μενον] is an allusion to the proverb μὴ κινέω κακῶν εὖ κεί-μενον, "leaves not a syllogism unturned," is an allusion to the phrase πάντα κινεῖ λόγον, “dialectical identifications of Unity and Plurality.” “Conversions by lo-
p. 15. γιγνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντη καθ' ἐκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεὶ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τούτο οὕτε μὴ παύσηται ποτε οὕτε ἦρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὥς ἔμοι φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν. ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γενομένος ἐκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἠσθείς ὡς τινα σοφίας εὐρηκὼς θησαυρόν, ύφ' ἣδονής ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινεὶ λόγον ἁσμενος, τοτε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς ἐν, τοτε δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίπτων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐτῶν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων, δεύτερον δ' ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἃν τε νεώτερος ἄν τε πρεσβύτερος ἄν τε ἤλιξ ὁ ὁ τυχανή,

p. 16. φειδομένος οὕτε πατρὸς οὕτε μητρὸς οὕτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκούοντων οὐδενός, ὁλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενός ἃν φείσατο, εἴπερ μόνον ἐρμηνεύσα τοθέν ἔχοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ', ὡς ὅκρατες, οὐχ ὅρας ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὧτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν; καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μὴ σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου ἐξυπερθόμεθα, εὰν ἡμᾶς λυδιορήσ; ὁμοὶ δὲ, μανθάνομεν γὰρ ὁ λέγεις, εἴ τις πρόπος ἔστι 30 καὶ μηχανῇ τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου ἐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, ὅδον δὲ τινα καλλίω ταυτῆς ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνευρέων, σὺ τε προθυμοῦ τοῦτο
gie of Unity into Plurality, and Plurality into Unity." Perhaps ὑπὸ λόγων alludes to the "magic words" by which the sorcerers of epic fable effect their transformations. As Plato has already dismissed the Eleatics and Megarici, he seems here to be ridiculing his own disciples for trifling with his Dialectical paradox. 4. τῶν λόγων...πάθος] "an incident of reason." Plato explains in the Sophista that Zeno's paradox is an incident of all reasoning: his own being based on the relation of Universal to Particular belongs chiefly to scientific reasoning. See Appendix A.

22. εἰμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν] as if it were an ἰδάστωρ.
καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ p.16. 
σμικρὸς ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ ὄν, ὁ παῖς, ὃς φησὶν ὑμᾶς προσ-

αγορεύον Φιλήσσος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' 
ἀν γένοιτο, ἢς ἐγὼ ἐραστῆς μέν εἰμι ἄει, πολλάκις δὲ 
μὲ ἡδι διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς αὕτη; λεγέσθω μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἡν δηλώσαι μὲν οὐ πάνω χαλεπόν, χρήσθαι γ 

ὁ παγχάλεπον. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα 

ἀνευρέθη πώποτε, διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει 

δὲ ἦν λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὃς γε κατα-

φαίνεται ἐμοὶ, ποθέν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διὰ τινος Προμη-


15θέως ἀμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί. καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ, 

κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην 

φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς εξ ἐνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν 

ὁντων τῶν ἀει λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν 

ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔμφυτου ἔχοντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων 

σοῦτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς 

δικαστοτεθεμένους ἕπειτα εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. 

ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἰ πως εἰσὶ, 

σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, τρεῖς ἢ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ 

τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἑκαστον πάλιν ὀσαυτῶς, μέχριτερ ἄν 

16. ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες] a fragment of the Niobe of 
what this means appears from ΛEschylus:

Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίστοροι, 
οἱ Ζηνὸς ἔγγει, ὃν κατ' Ἰδαίων πάγον 
Διὸς πατρίων βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι, 
κούσαν σφιν ἐξίτηλον αἴμα δαιμόνων.

24. τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἑκαστον] This ἐκείνων (τῶν ἰδεῶν) ἑκάστη (ἀριθ-

is ungrammatical. The sense ἐκείνων (τῶν ἰδεῶν) ἑκάστη (ἀριθ-

μῶν) or, τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ (τό ἀριθμό) 

requires something like τῶν ἐν 

ἀριθμῶν) ἑκαστον.
The theory of Music furnishes an example how Scientific knowledge implies a certain power of Numeration, and a gradual progress by successive Division from Unity through definite Number to Infinity.

9. ἐν μὲν ὅπως ἐν τίχωσι] ἐν καὶ πολλά seems equivalent to ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, and to express a single idea, "the Manifold One." See below, περὶ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ πολλῶν. To generalize too rapidly is to suppose what is heterogeneous to be homogeneous; to generalize too slowly to suppose what is homogeneous to be heterogeneous.

25. Καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν ἑτέρῳ γέ τούτῳ ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, So the Bodleian MS. For the use of ἐν compare ἐν τούτῳ (τῷ παιδείᾳ καὶ δικαίωσιν πως ἐχεῖν) ἡ πάσα εἰδαμονία ἐστίν. Gorgias, p. 470. The Zurich editors read καὶ οὐδέν, κ. τ. λ.
νουθ’ ὅτι τὸ ἀπειρον αὐτῆς ἵσμεν νουθ’ ὅτι τὸ ἐν’ ἀλλ’. 17. ὅτι πόσα τέ ἐστι καὶ ὀποία: τοῦτ’ ἐστι τὸ γραμματικὸν ἐκαστον ποιοῦν ἡμῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλγβέστατα.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὁ τυγχάνει ποιοῦν, τοῦτ’ ἐστι ταυτόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνῆ μὲν που κατ’ ἐκεῖνην τήν τέχνην ἐστὶ καὶ μία ἐν αὐτῇ.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὗ;

ΣΩ. Δῦν δὲ θῶμεν, βαρῦ καὶ ὅξυ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμότονον. ἦ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὗτῳ σοφὸς ἀν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδῶς ὅς γ’ ἐπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ὅξιος ἐσει.

9. μία ἐν αὐτῇ] This seems corrupt. The context requires something equivalent to καὶ ἀπειρον αὐτ’ πληθει.

12. Pitch (τάσις) is the degree of acuteness or gravity of a sound. Perhaps to make ὅξυ and βαρῦ correspond to ὁμότονον, “of the same pitch,” we should translate them as if they were comparatives, as Acuter and Graver. Interval (διάστημα) is the distance between two sounds of different pitch. "Ορος seems to mean the extreme limits of pitch within which the whole scale of sounds is included. Τόνος, tone, is an interval of a certain length, that through which the voice is naturally raised at one effort. Σύστημα, system, e.g. the Tetrachord or Octachord, is a series or scale of sounds separated from one another by various intervals. The Genus of a system depends on the magnitude of the intervals between the sounds, e.g. in the Diatonic genus the three intervals between the sounds of the Tetrachord were a semitone, a tone, a tone. In the Chromatic a semitone, a semitone, a tone and a half: in the Enharmonic a quartetone, a quartetone, a double tone. The Species of a genus is the order in which these intervals occur: e.g. in the Diatonic genus of the Tetrachord the order might be semitone, tone, tone: or tone, semitone, tone: or tone, tone, semitone. The Species were also called Modes, or Harmonies, and were named Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Ionic, &c. Plato here uses System as equivalent to Species.
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.  15

p. 17.  ΠΡΩ.  Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ.  Ἀλλ’, ὥς φίλε, ἐπειδὰν λάβης τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῆς φωνῆς ὑφόπτος τε πέρι ἰ καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ ὅπως, καὶ τοὺς ὀροὺς τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὡσα συντήματα γέγονεν, ἀρ κατειδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδοσαν ἦμιν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἀρμονίας, ἐν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὐ τὸ σώματος ἑτέρα τοιαῦτα ἐνότα, πάθη, γεγομένα, ὁ δὲ δὴ ἀριθμὸν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὐτὶ ῥυβμοὺς καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἀμα ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὖν ἔδει περὶ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν· ὅταν γὰρ ταύτα τε ο λάβης οὖτω, τότε ἐγένον σοφὸς, ὅταν τε ἄλλο τῶν ὠντων ἐν ὑπόθεν ταύτῃ σκοπούμενος ἐλήμ., οὕτως ἐμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονεν. τὸ δ’ ἀπειρόν σε ἐκάστος καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις πλήθος ἀπειρόν ἐκάστοτε ποιεὶ τοῦ ἰ 5 φρονείν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ’ ἐναρίθμον, ἅτ’ οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδεὶς πάσητε ἀπιδόντα.

VIII. ΠΡΩ.  Κάλλιστα, ὁ Φιλήβης, ἐμοιγε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα εἰρήκεναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.

p. 18.  ΦΙ.  Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταύτα γε αὐτά. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος οὕτος νῦν ἐρήται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενοι;

ΣΩ.  Ὄρθως μέντοι ταὐθ’ ἡμᾶς, ὁ Πρώταρχε, ἦροτηκε Φιλήθος.

ΠΡΩ.  Πάνω μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ. 25

ΣΩ.  Δράσις ταύτα διελθῶν σμικρὸν ἐτί περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων.  ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ὑπόθεν εἴ τίς ποτε

8. ἐνότα, πάθη, γεγομένα] An asyndeton. The Zurich editors read without interpunctuation: ΣΩ. ἐνότα πάθη γεγομένα. Perhaps the true reading is, ἐνότα μᾶθης ὑμεῖς δ’ ὁ Μεγαρείς οὔτε τρῖτοι οὔτε τέταρτοι οὔτε διαδέκατοι, οὔτ’ ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ’ ἐν ἀριθμῷ.
λάβοι, τούτον, ὃς φαμεν, οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀπείρου φύσιν δεὶ π. 18.
βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τινα ἀριθμὸν, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ

ναυτίων ὅταν τις τὸ ἀπείρου ἀναγκασθῆ πρῶτον λαμ-

βάνειν, μή ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἀριθμὸν αὐ τινά 2

5 πλήθος ἐκαστὸν ἐξοντά τι κατανοεῖν, τελευτᾷ τε ἐκ

πάντων εἰς ἐν. πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τὸ νῦ

ν λεγόμενου λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἀπειροῦ κατενόησεν εἰτε τις

10 θεῶς εἴτε καὶ θείος ἀνθρωπος, ὃς λόγος ἐν Ἀιγύπτῳ

Θεύθ τινα τούτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ

φωνῆμα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἐν ὄντα ἀλλὰ

πλεῖον, καὶ πάλιν ἔτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὐ, φθόγγον δὲ

μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δὲ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι' ε

15 τρίτον δὲ εἴδως γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγό-

μενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν. τὸ μετὰ τούτο διήρει τά τῇ ἄφθογγα

καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἐνὸς ἐκαστοῦν, καὶ τὰ φωνῆματα καὶ

τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν πρότων, ἐως ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν

4. μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἀριθμῶν αὐ τινά πλήθος ἐκαστὸν

ἐξοντά τι κατανοεῖν.] "Ékōnta is equivalent to βλέποντα, and the

construction is μὴ ἐκόντα ε. τ. ε. ε. ἀ. ἀ. τ. η. κ. η. τ. τ. " looking

not at first for unity, but for some number, detect each sepa-

rate multitude, (i. e. each unit of this number.)." Thus in the

Alphabetic generalization, the number of species is (say) 24,

and each of these 24 is a mul-

titude or infinity of individual

sounds.

9. Plato makes a similar

division of the Letters in the

Cratylus: ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω

δεὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνῆμα διε-

λέσθαι ἐπιτά τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ εἰδη

τὰ τῇ ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα: οὐτωσι

γὰρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ

τούτων’ καὶ τὰ αὐτοί φωνητα μὲν οὐ

οὐ μεντοι γε ἄφθογγα, p. 421 C. In

the Theaetetus he uses ψόφας

for ϕθόγγος. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ σῖγμα

τῶν ἄφωνων ἐστὶ, ψόφοι τις μόνον

οῖον συριτούσης τῆς γλῶττης τοῦ

δ’ αὐτή ὁμοιωμένοι φωνή όυτε ψόφος,

οὐδὲ τῶν πλειστῶν στοιχείων, p. 203 B. What Plato calls ἄφωνα,

later Grammarians called σύμ-

φωνα (consonants) reserving the

name ἄφωνα (mutes) to those

which he calls ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα,

(π, β, φ, κ, χ, χ, τ, δ, θ.) What

he calls μεσά, or, φωνητα μὲν

οὐ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα, they
called ἡμίφωνα, (semivowels, i. e.

the liquids λ, μ, ν, ρ, and the

sibilant θ.)
5. μίαν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὦς ἀνθικαργαμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπαφθέγγατο προσεπτών] “assuming there was only one over them he called it by name the Grammatical art.” Voltaire complains that no language has a single term to denote the theory of the Alphabet. In Plato’s time we see it was called γραμματική. In the time of Aristotle γραμματικὴ signified the art of Reading and Writing: ἔτι, εἰ πρὸς πλεῖον λεγομένῳ τοῦ ὁρίζομένῳ μή πρὸς πάντα ἀπεδωκέν ὁδόν ἐν τῇ γραμματικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τοῦ γράφει τὸ ὑπαγορευθὲν προσδείται γάρ, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ἀναγρώματος ὀδόν γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦ γράφει ἢ τοῦ ἀναγρώματι ὁ ἀπόδος ὀρίσεται· διὸν ὀδὸτερος, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἄρμιον ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν, ἐπειδὴ πλείους ὕπκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁρισμοῦ εἶναι, Τόμικ. 6, 5. "A definition is incorrect if the thing defined relates to several points, and only some of them are mentioned: e.g. if a man defines Grammar to be the art of Writing from dictation; for 'and of Reading' requires to be added. For he no more defines it who calls it the art of Writing, than he who calls it the art of Reading. Therefore neither of the two have defined it, but he who mentions both. For the same thing cannot have more than one definition.” When however the professors of the art of Reading and Writing began to teach the rules of speaking and composing correctly, the name Grammar was consecrated to this latter part of their instruction, thus acquiring its modern signification, while the art of Reading and Writing was designated by the humbler title of Grammaticista. When afterwards the Grammaticista began to teach the rules of Grammar, the Grammatici undertook the interpretation and criticism of the classical literature, and thus Grammatica came to denote a higher kind of science than we now ascribe to the mere Grammariam.

8. The impatience of Logical discussions expressed by Philoebus is not without its significance. Aristippus, whose views he represents, rejected Logie and Physics from Philosophy: διόκοις δὲ κατὰ τινας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης μόνον ἀπίστευται τὸ ἥλικον μέρος, παραπέμπει δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὡς μιθὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονίας βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 7, 11.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Μῶν, ὁ Φιλήβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτ᾽ p. 18. ἐστίν ᾗ.

ΦΙ. Ναί, τούτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ πάλαι ξητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρῶταρχος.

5 ΣΩ. Ἡ μὴν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ γε ἡδη γεγονότες ξητεῖτε, ὡς φής, πάλαι ᾗ.

ΦΙ. Πῶς ὦ.

IX. ΣΩ. Ἄρ᾽ οὖ περὶ φρονήσεως ἢν καὶ ἴδουν ἡμῖν εἴς ἄρχης ὁ λόγος, ὀπότερον αὐτῶν αἴρετέον ᾗ.

ΦΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι φαμεν ᾗ.

ΦΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ᾗ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, πῶς ἐστίν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον καὶ πῶς μὴ p. 19. ἅπειρα εὐθύς ἀλλὰ τινά ποτὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐκάτερον ἐμπροσθεν κέκτηται τοῦ ἅπειρα αὐτῶν ἐκαστα γεγονέναι ᾗ.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ έις φαύλον γε ἐρώτημα, ὁ Φιλήβε, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὄντων τρόπον κύκλῳ πως περιαγαγῶν ἡμᾶς ἐμβεβληκε Σωκράτης καὶ σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτάμενον ᾗς δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμὲ τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθέν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάττεν γελοῖοτερον δ᾽ οἴμαι πολὺ τὸ μηδέτερον ἡμῶν δύνασθαι σκόπει δὴ τὶ δράσομεν ᾗ.

25 ἐδὴ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἴδουης ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης, εἴπ᾽ ἐστὶν εἶτε μή, καὶ ὅπωσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποια τῆς τ᾽ αὐ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταῦτα ὀσαύτως ᾗ.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὁ παῖ Καλλίου μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταύτον δρὴν καὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ, ὥς ὁ παρέλθων λόγος ἐμήνυσεν, οὔδεις εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἢν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε γένοιτο αξίος ᾗ.

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν ἐοίκεν οὕτως, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐχειν ᾗ.
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 19. ἀλλὰ καλὸν μὲν τὸ ἔμπαντα γλυκώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δὲ εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ. τί δὴ μοι τοῦτο ἐιρηταί τὰ νῦν, ἐγὼ σοι φράσω. σὺ τῆς ἡμῶν τῆς συννοσίας, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι καὶ σαυτῶν πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἁριστοῦ. Φιλήθου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονῆς καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθ' ὀπόσα τοιαύτ' ἐστι, σὺ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντεῖπες ὡς οὐ ταύτα ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ἐστιν, ἢ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναμμηνήσκομεν ἐκόντες, ὅρθος δρῶντες, ἵν' ἐν μνήμης παρακείμενα ἐκάτερα βασανίζηται. φίλος δ' ὃς εἰσὶ σὺ τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὅρθος ἁμαίνειν ἡδονῆς γε ἁγαθὸν εἶναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὐτὰ τοῦτον ξυγγενῆ, ἢ κτάσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα. τοῦτων δὴ μετ' ἀμφισβητήσεως ἐκατέρω λεχθέντων ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδίας ἡπειλήσαμεν ὡς ὅκι ἀφίσομεν οὐκαδέ σε, πρὶν ἀν τοῦτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἱκανὸν γένηται τι διορισθέντων. σὺ δὴ συνεχόρησας καὶ ἐδώκας εἰς ταῦθ' ἡμῖν σαυτοῦ. ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν, καθὰπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὅρθος δοθέντων ἀφαιρέσις ὁμίχλι ἐστι. παῦσαι δὴ τῶν τρόπων ἡμῶν ἀπαντῶν τούτων ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Τίνα λέγεις;

p. 20. ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλον καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὅν μὴ δυναίμεθ' ἂν ἱκανὴ ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δι- ὅναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰόμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τῆς πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' εἰ δρὰν τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοι δραστέων ὑπέσχον γὰρ. βουλεύον δὴ πρὸς ταύτα αὐτὸς, πότερον ἡδονῆς εἶδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαρετεῖν ἡ καὶ ἑατέον, εἰ πη καθ' ἐτερον τινα τρόπων οἶος τ' εἰ καὶ βουλεί δηλώσαι πως ἄλλωσ τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐτὶ προσδοκὰίν οὐδὲν δεῖ.
It may be solved, however, without employing the scientific method, by the consideration that the Highest Good has three attributes: it is Perfect, Sufficient, and Desirable: and that nei-

5 X. ΣΩ. Λόγων ποτὲ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ ἢ καὶ ἔγρηγορῶς νῦν ἐννοῶ περὶ τε ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ὡς οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τάγαθον, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἔτερον μὲν τούτων, ἢμείνων δὲ ἢμφοῖν. καὶ τοιοῦτό γε ἄν ἐναργῶς ἡμῖν φανῇ νῦν, ἀπῆλλακται ἢ μὲν ἡδονή τοῦ νικάν, τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἄν ἐτί ταύτων αὐτῆ γέγονοτο. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τῶν δὲ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἐτί προσδεισομέθα κατ᾿ ἐμὴν δόξαν. προῶν δ᾿ ἐτί σαφεστέρον δείξει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα εἰτῶν οὖτω καὶ διαπέρανε.

1. τὸν ἐμὲ] Plato is fond of joining the article to a pronoun as if it were a noun, e. g. ἐδοξέ ποι, φησι, τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἢ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ δὲ εἰπέ, τὸν ἑαυτῶν δὴ λέγων μαλὰ σφηνός. Phaedrus. The effect can hardly be reproduced in another language. In the present instance Socrates speaks of himself as a third person: “An intimidated individual here need no longer fear any danger.”

5. λόγων ποτὲ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ] The conceptions of the highest Good, and other anticipations of reason that cannot be drawn from experience, Plato sometimes, as in the present passage, in accordance with his doctrine of preexistence and innate ideas, treats as reminiscences (ἀμάμησις). At other times he speaks of them as prophecies or divinations, e. g. (τάγαθων) δῆ διώκει μὲν ἀπάσα ψυχῇ καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντεομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἰκανόν ἡ ποτ’ ἐστίν οὖν οὐδὲ πάστε χρὴ σασθαι μονίμῳ. Repub. p. 515, e. See also p. 44, c and 67, e of this dialogue. Even Aristotle sometimes makes the divinations of the heart or feelings (μαντεῖα) grounds of ethical and theological reasoning, e. g. τάγαθον δὲ οἰκεῖον τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντενόμεθα. Eth. Nich. i, 5. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴ μαντεία τῇ περὶ τῶν βεβοὶ μόνοις ἄν ἔχουσιν οὖτως ὁμολογουμένοι ἀποφαινεθαὶ συμφῶνοι λόγους. De Caelo, 2, 1. This μαντεία was that the Gods live a blessed life not devoid of wise repose, ζωήν ἄλματον καὶ μακαρίαν ἂν ἄγουλον καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένην μαρτυρίας ἐμφύρον. How this appeal to μαντεία can be reconciled with Anal. Post. 2, 19, which seems to refer all knowledge to sensation, becomes a question.
Germane [This verb implies αἰρετῶν, which is presently used to denote the third preconception. The three ideas τέλεος, ἰκανόν (= αὐταρκεῖς, see section 42) αἰρετῶν, are nearly the same, and only one of them, αἰρετῶν, is used as the middle term of the syllogism that excludes Pleasure and Wisdom from the rank of supreme Good. Τέλειον, αὐταρκεῖς, αἰρετῶτατον, are three terms selected by Aristotle at the commencement of his ethical inquiry to characterize the highest Good.

(1) Τέλειον he thus defines; τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δὲ ἐτέρων καὶ τὸ μηδὲντε δὲ ἄλλο αἰρετῶν τῶν καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ αἰρετῶν καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν ἢ καὶ μηδέντε δὲ ἄλλο. Eth. Nich. 1, 7. “What is desired for itself is more final than what is desired as a means, and what is never desired as a means than what is desired both as a means and as an end. That is absolutely final which is always desired as an end and never as a means.” Perhaps, however, Plato uses τέλεον in the ordinary sense of Perfect rather than in the more technical sense of Final.

(2) Τὸ δ’ αὐταρκεῖς τίδειμον ὁ μονοίμενον αἰρετῶν ποιεῖ τῶν βίων καὶ μηθείς ἐνδείκτα. Ibid. “That is Selfsufficing which by itself alone makes life desirable and free from want.”

(3) Ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην (τῶν εὐδαμοιών οἰόμεθα εἰναι) μὴ συναρμομεῖν. συναρμομεῖν δὲ δηλοῦ ὁ αἰρετωτάτην μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ibid. μὴ συναρμομεῖν = μονομεῖν, or, in the language of the Philebus, χορῆς, or ἀμικτῶν ὀυγίους] “Happiness is most to be chosen of all single goods: still more to be chosen, of course, when in combination with even the least other good.” [Aristotle, unlike the Stoics, made human happiness affected to a certain extent by good and ill fortune, and consequently a variable quantity. When therefore, in consequence of the frowns of fortune, it is at its minimum, or at any degree short of its maximum, of course it is susceptible
of augmentation from a return of her favour.] Aírétov, we have seen, enters into the definition both of the Final and of the Suffering; but it also has a distinctive technical meaning which may be easily overlooked. In its distinctive sense it expresses what is relatively, rather than what is absolutely, good: what is indispensable at the moment, under the circumstances, or to the individual, rather than what is abstractedly desirable. In the following passage it is opposed to τὸ ἐκ περιουσίας: τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βελτιώ, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ αἰρετότερα...ἐνίοτε δὲ τὰ βελτίω, ὁὐχί καὶ αἴρετότερα, τὸ γὰρ Φιλοσοφεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ χρηστικεύσαθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὁὐχ αἰρετότερον τὸ ἐνέδει τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ περιουσίας ἦστω ὅταν ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα τω προσπαθεικευόμενα τῶν καλῶν. σχεδον δὲ ἵνα αἰρετότερον τὸ ἀναγκαίον ἦστι, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἐκ περιουσίας. Arist. Top. 3, 2. "Superfluities are better and sometimes more to be chosen than necessaries. For what is better is not always to be preferred. So philosophic thought is better than money making but not more to be chosen by a man in want of the necessaries of life. Superfluities are graces of life over and above and additional to its necessaries, and generally the necessary is more to be chosen, though the superfluous is better." We must not however suppose that τὸ αἱρετῶν always means material goods; for in the next passage τὰ αἱρέτα, as implied in αἱρείονθαι, are opposed to τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, i.e. material prosperity: ὁ ἄκικος περὶ τὰ ἀγαθά ἦσται, οὐ̃ τάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὀσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀυτικαί: ἡ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἰδί τοι τοῖς ἰδί τοῖς ἰδί...οἱ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ταύτα εὑχόνται καὶ διώκοντι, δεῖ δ᾽ οὗ, ἀλλ᾽ εὐχέσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἰναί, αἰρεῖονθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά. Eth. Nich. 5, 1. "The goods at which the unjust grasp are those in fortune's power, which though always absolutely good (good, that is, to those who have the virtue to make the right use of them) are not always good relatively to the individual. Men pray for these and choose these, though they ought not, but ought to pray that what is absolutely good may be good relatively to them, and choose the relatively good."
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 21.  ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα;
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνων δή.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.
ΣΩ. Δέξαιον ἂν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ἦν τὸν βίον ἀπαν-
tα ἡδομένος ἡδονᾶς τὰς μεγίστας;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;
ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἂν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῖο, εἰ
tοῦτ' ἐχοις παντελῶς;
ΠΡΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩ. ὁρα δή, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογι-
ζοσθαί τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ὥστε τοῦτον ἀδελφά, μῶν μὴ
dεοί ἂν τί;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἐχοιμ' ἂν ποι τὸ χαί-15
ρεῖν ἐχων.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὖτω ἢων ἂει μὲν διὰ βίοι ταῖς μεγί-
στας ἡδονᾶς χαίροις ἂν;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;
ΣΩ. Νοῦν δὲ γε καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ20
dόξαν μὴ κεκτημένος ἀληθῆ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο αὐτό,
eἰ ἡ χαίρεις ἡ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δὴ ποῦ σε ἀγνοεῖν,
κενὸν γε οὖντα πάσης φρονήσεως.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.
c ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὡσάυτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον25
ἀνάγκη δὴ που μηδ' ὅτι ποτὲ ἐχαίρεις μεμνησθαι, τής
tε ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μηδ' ἡμι-
τινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν' δόξαν δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτη-
mένου ἀληθῆ μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ
δὲ στερόμενον μηδ' εἰς τοῦ ἐπείτα χρόνου ὡς χαίρη-30

13. μῶν μὴ δεοῖ ἂν τί] This is Badham's emendation of μηδ' ὃ ῥαν, the reading of the MSS.
σεις δύνατον εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ędzi δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπον p. 21.
βίον ἀλλὰ τινος πλεύμων ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττα μετ' ὅ ὡστρέιων ἔμψυχα ἐστὶ σωμάτων. ἐστί ταῦτα, ἡ
παρὰ ταῦτα ἔχομεν ἄλλως πῶς διανοηθήναι;
5  ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;
ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν αἵρετός ἦμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;
ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὁ Σώκρατες,
οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐμβεβληκε τὰ νῦν.
ΣΩ. Μήτω τοίνυν μαθακιζόμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ
μεταλαβόμεν αὐθίνῳ ἵδωμεν.
XI. ΠΡΩ. Ποίων δὴ λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Εἰ τις δὲξαίτ' ἄν αὖ edriver ἠμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν
καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων
κεκτημένος, ἢδονής δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμι-
15 κρόνι, μηδ' αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθῆς πάν-
των τῶν τοιοῦτων.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τού-
των αἵρετός, οὔτ' ἄλλῳ μὴ ποτε, ὡς ἐγώμαι, φαινή.  p. 22.
ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὁ ξυναμφότερος, ὃ Πρώταρχε, εἷς ἀμ-
20 φοῖν συμμιθείς κοινὸς γενόμενος;
ΠΡΩ. 'Ἡδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως;
ΣΩ. Οὔτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἐγώγε.
ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δὴπου τούτον γε αἱρήσει αὐτόπτερον
ἡ ἑκεῖνων ὀποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε, οὐχ ὁ
25 μὲν ὁ δ' οὖ.
ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὁ τι νῦν ἠμῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ἔμψ-
βαπών ἐν τοῖς παρούσι λόγοις;
ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προντεθή- b
σαν, τοῦ δυνοῦν δ' οὐδέτερος ἰκανὸς οὐδὲ αἵρετος οὔτ'
30 ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ἐκὼν οὐδενί.
ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἠδή τούτων γε πέρι δήλον ὡς
οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν εἰχὲ τάγαθόν; ἢν γὰρ ἂν ἰκανὸς καὶ

The second problem is restated:
Is Pleasure or Knowledge more nearly allied to the principle of
Goodness in the Perfect life?
3. 

A wrong choice may be regarded as involuntary when it proceeds from the blindness (ἀγνοία) of a depraved will (πονηρία) or the violence (ἀνάγκη) of passions overpowering the control of reason (ἀκρασία). To apply the term ἀκοόνιον (involuntary) to this class of actions is a peculiarity of Plato.

7. Aristotel alludes to this argument in the following terms: πάν γάρ μεθ’ ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετότερον ἢ μονού-μενον. τοιούτω δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναφερέτω ὃτι οὐκ ἔστω ἡδονὴ τάγαθον ἀἱρετότερον γάρ εἶναι μετὰ φρονή-σεως τὸν ἢδον βιον ἢ χαρίς· εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρειττον, οὐκ εἰναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθον, οὐδένοις γάρ προσ-τεθέντοι αὐτῷ τάγαθον αἱρετότερον γίνεσθαι, Eth. Nich. 10. 2.

"Every Good is better in combination with others than alone, which indeed is the very argument by which Plato proves Pleasure not to be the highest Good. For the Pleasant life is more desirable with Wisdom than without. But, if the combination is better, Pleasure is not The Good, for no addition can improve The Good." It may be observed that the proposition, οὐδένοις προστεθέστοι αὐτῷ τάγαθον αἱρετότερον γίνεσθαι, is not to be found in the Philebus, and does not even belong to the train of thought in which the argument proceeds. For the preconception which forms the middle term whereby Socrates proves Pleasure not to be The Good is αἱρετῶν: τέλεων was prepared for use but was not actually used. The proposition given by Aristotle could only have been a premiss, if τέλεων had been the middle term. Perhaps, however, it is implied in section 37, where the argument is recapitulated.

12. οὐ μέντοι τῶν γε ἀληθινῶν ἁμα καὶ θείων οἴμαι νοῦν] The explanation of this short allusion to the result of much speculation can be merely sketched in the brief space of a note. Plato generally distinguishes Reason from the Ideas or eter-
nal Realities which it apprehends, and which in the Phaedrus are represented as objects of beaotic contemplation to the Gods. As the Supreme Good is an Idea, how can it, as is intimated in this passage, be identical with Reason? The answer is that there are two kinds even of the divine Reason, one distinct from the other identical with, eternal Being. We read in the Sophista: τι δέ, πρὸς Διός, ὡς ἄληθος κίνησιν καὶ ζωήν καὶ ψυχήν καὶ φρώνισιν ἡ βαρίως πεισθήσομεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὅπτι μὴ παρέίναι ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἄγνον νοῦν οὐκ ἔχων ἀκίνηστον έστος εἶναι; Δεικνύν μὲν τ’ ἀν λόγον συγχωροίµεν, p. 248 E. “Shall we be easily convinced that the Absolute Being has neither motion, nor life, nor soul, nor wisdom, but stands, majestic and holy as it is, reasonless and motionless? It cannot be thought.” As there is no ground to suppose that Aristotle differed from Plato as to the relation of the divine and human Reason, and as the statements of the former are more explicit, we will avail ourselves of them to solve the difficulty we have proposed. One Reason is Passive, the other Active, and the latter is identical with eternal Being. The Passive Reason is so called not as being devoid of activity or spontaneous power, but as being, like physical causes, a secondary force, dependent for its powers on the Active Reason. Επεὶ δ’ ὀστερ ἐν ἀπάνῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστι τι τὸ μὲν ἄλη ἐκάστῳ γένει (τούτο δὲ τὸ πάντα δυνάμει έκεινα) ἔτερον δὲ τὸ άτιόν καὶ ποιητικὸν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἶνον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὑλὴν πέποιθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρξειν ταύτα τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τὸ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν ὡς ἐξίς τις, οἶνον τὸ φῶς’ τρόπον γὰρ τιμα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τά δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα, De Anima, 3. 5. “As in the rest of nature we everywhere find in every class both a material, which is the class potentially, and a causative and creative agent, which is the class creatively, related to the former as art to what it works upon, so in the mental world analogous elements must exist; the Psychical Reason is manifested by becoming all things, the other by creating them, being itself an actuality, analogous to light in its conversion of potential colours into actual colours.” The Passive intellect he calls in another passage more expressly the Psychical intellect. ὁ ἀρα καθούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς, λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή, οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἐνεργεία τῶν ὄντων πρῶς νοεῖν, ib. 3, 4. “The Psychical intellect, I mean the thinking and apprehending power of the Soul, is nothing actually till it thinks.” We see then that Aristotle would have objected to the expression of the Sophista so far as it attributes Movement (κίνησις) and Soul to the Absolute, as there is an element higher than the Soul and Psychical Reason. It is this latter that we must ascribe to the gods of the Phaedrus and
The will is moved by the (Passive) Reason; the (Passive) Reason is moved by the object of Reason; the object of Reason is the (Active) Reason." Thus, as Socrates suggests in the Philebus, Reason in the sense of the νοητόν, or the νοῦς ποιητικός, may be identified with the ἄν καλόν, or Supreme Good. However, after this passing allusion to his philosophic doctrine, Plato in the remainder of the dialogue treats of the Reason in its usual sense of the Psychical, Subjective, Passive, or Human intellect.
28

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερεῖον στερηθέεισα ἣδονὴ παντά- p. 23. πασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη πρὸς τῶν αὐτῆς ἔραστῶν' οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἔτι ἂν ὁμοίως φαίνοιτο καλή.

5 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀμεινον αὐτὴν ἔιν ὡδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτὴ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ὥστε τὸ ἀδύνατον ἐπιτο, λυπεῖν ἠδονήν; b

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλ' ὥστε καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς οὖνδεις πώ σε ἥμοιο μεθήσει, πρὶν ἂν εἰς τέλος ἐπε-

έξελθης τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.

ΣΩ. Βασικὰ ᾄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συγχων μὲν λόγον τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ὑδίδιον πάνυ τι νῦν. καὶ

15 γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μιχανῆς ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἔτερα τῶν ἐμπροσθεν λόγον ἄτι δὲ ἵσως ένα καὶ ταυτά. οὐκ

οὖν χρή ᾤ.

17. ἦστι δ' ἵσως ἐνα καὶ ταυτά] As "weapons serviceable in both contests" Socrates seems to refer to the proposition that all being is a union of Unity and Multiplicity as well as to the method of generalization and division. We may observe (1) that though this proposition and this method have been mentioned, they were really not the weapons by which the former contest was decided, for that was settled by reference to our preconceptions of The Good.

(2) Though Plato invites us to connect the Unity and Infinity of the beginning of the dialogue with the Limit and Infinite that he is going to introduce, and though perhaps they are really connected, yet they are certainly distinct, and must not be immediately identified. They are attributes of different subjects. For the sake of distinction we may call the infinity of Particulars as opposed to the unity of the Genus a Logical infinity; and the lawlessness of Matter as opposed to the circumscription of the Form, a Physical infinity, though it extends also to the aesthetic and moral worlds and to every sphere of Being. The Logical infinity is only found within a genus, and belongs to the individuals which it comprehends: the Physical infinity is found in an individual, and belongs to the material elements of which
it is composed. The Physical infinity, as we shall presently see, may be treated as a Logical unity, or summum genus, comprehending a multiplicity of individual infinities.

5. πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα κ.τ.λ.] This division of Things is really a division of First Principles: ὁμοίως δὲ ζητοῦσι καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦντες πόσα' ἐξ δω γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἑστὶ ζητοῦσι πρῶτων, ταῦτα πότερον ἐν ἡ πολλά, καὶ, εἰ πολλά, εἰ πεπερασμένα ἢ ἀπειρά· ὧστε τὴν ἄρχην καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον ζητοῦσι πότερον ἐν ἡ πολλά, Phys. Ausc. i, 2. "It is a similar problem to inquire into the number of Things. Are the primal Elements, it is really asked, one or more, and if more than one, finite or infinite? So that it is the Principle and Element which is the subject of inquiry."

10. τὸ μὲν ἀπειρὸν δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων τὸ δὲ πέρας] For an examination of the meaning of ἀπειρόν see Appendix B. The result of this examination is briefly as follows: independently of its analysis into ἀλη and στέρησις, (τὸ ἀπειρὸν and ἡ ἀπειρία) ἀπειρὸν has two or even three meanings that require to be carefully distinguished.

(i) Its obvious and ordinary meaning, which it would have first suggested to any Greek, is Infinity, i. e. quantity without end: the negation of all quantitative limit. To make τὸ μᾶλλον and τὸ ἤτοι imply this, we must supply a very considerable ellipsis: that which is greater or less (than any finite quantity; or, than any quantity however great or small that can be named or conceived). But, if we except Infinity of number, Infinity of space, or Immensity, and Infinity of time, or Eternity, the existence of Infinity in the world of nature in this sense is perhaps untenable; and this meaning of ἀπειρόν, though essential to the early philosophies to which nature is the immeasurable and unfathomable, perhaps does not belong to later speculation.

(ii) A more Platonic meaning of ἀπειρόν, and perfectly war-
ranted by its etymology, is, the Indefinite or Indeterminate. Indeterminateness is the negation, not of all determination, [Infinity] but, of a single determination. The Indeterminate is that which admits of a plurality or multiplicity of determinations, or even an infinity, between, however, certain definite limits. Τὸ μᾶλλον and τὸ ἴστον can express this, i.e. excess or defect above or below a certain single finite quantity, multiplicity of gradation, or divisibility of extension, without any violent ellipsis. This is the ἀπειρον that we find in nature. There are many gradations of colour; but we cannot get beyond pure blue, pure red, pure yellow. Nothing is whiter than pure white, nor blacker than pure black. There are many gradations in the pitch of sounds, but a few octaves bring us to the extremes.

(3) Why does Indeterminateness, as we find it does in the Philebus, imply Imperfection? Because, if we assume with Plato that Perfection is a Mean, i.e. some single quantitatively determination, even if some one gradation of the ἀπειρον coincides with this, all the remainder must be either excessive or defective. Τὸ ἀπειρον in this sense is that which violates a Standard: that which falls on this side or that side of the line traced by the Right: the elements, or their state, before they are arranged by the organizing Law, or after they have broken from its control. The Limit (πέρας) of which it is the violation, is τὸ μέτρον, Due Measure, Due Proportion, the condition of goodness and beauty. Τὸ μᾶλλον and τὸ ἴστον now signify Exorbitance and Inadequacy, and may be translated, the Too Much, and the Too Little.

12. Μῶν οὖν σοι κ. τ. λ.] The readiness with which Protarchus proposes to add to the list of principles an agent of decom-
position, besides the agent of combination, may be attributed to his familiarity with the poem of Empedocles, where all phenomena are explained by two antagonistic forces, Love, the cause of union, and Hate, the cause of separation:

Socrates rejects it as unnecessary, because the Cause (αἰτία) of which he speaks is not a blind elementary principle with a single necessary operation, but of an intelligent, artistic, nature, and therefore possesses both powers, that of separation as well as that of combination. In the Timeæus Causation (αἰτία) is only ascribed to rational agents.

5. Πρωτον μὲν κ. τ. λ.] The reason of this separation first of three, then of two, from the list of principles seems to be this: the Cause is especially characterized by its ultimate unity, and therefore is not divided into species. The Limit again has but few divisions as compared with the other two, the Infinite and the Generated class. It therefore is principally the latter that need division and generalization. Accordingly τὸ πέρας ἔχον will denote not τὸ πέρας, but τὸ μικτὸν; for it is said to have many species (πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον), which suits the μικτὸν, (τὸ πληθὺς τὸ εξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γενεσίως), but not the πέρας, (τὸ γε πέρας οὐ πολλὰ εἶχεν.) The only objection is, that τῶν πέρας ἔχοντων is presently used in a different sense, as equivalent to τῶν περιτῶν. See below: τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἔχοντων συμμετέχοντων: and, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἔχοντων ἔδεστο. In § 6, however, πέρας ἔχοντων was used of τὰ μικτά.
οτι δε τρόπον τινα το άπειρον πολλα εστι πειρασμαί p. 24.
φράζειν' το δε πέρασ εχον ήμας περιμενετω.
ΠΡΩ. Μένει.
ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δη. χαλεπον μεν γαρ και ἀμφισβη-
τήσιμον δ' κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὁμως δε σκόπει. θερ-
μοτέρου και ψυχροτέρου πέρι πρώτον ορα πέρας ει
ποτε τι νοήσασ αν, ἣ το μᾶλλον τε και ἠττον εν
αυτοις οικούντε τοις γένεσιν, έωσπερ ἀν ένοικητον,
tέλος ουκ ἀν επιτρεψαίτην γίγνεσθαι' γενομένης γαρ ἱ
10 τελευτής καὶ αυτῷ τετελευτήκατον.
ΠΡΩ. 'Αληθέστατα λέγεις.
ΣΩ. 'Αει δε γε, φαμέν, εν τε τῳ θερμοτέρῳ και τῳ
ψυχροτέρῳ το μᾶλλον τε και ἠττον ειν.
ΠΡΩ. Και μάλα.
15 ΣΩ. 'Αει τοίνυν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τούτῳ μη τέλος
ἐχειν' ἀτελῆ δ' οντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρῳ γί-
γνεσθον.
ΠΡΩ. Και σφόδρα γε ὁ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ευ γε, ὁ φίλε Πρώταρχε, ὕπελαβες,
20 καὶ ἀνέμυνας οτι καὶ το σφόδρα τούτο ὁ σου νῦν ε
έφθηκεν το γε ἥρεμα την αυτην δύναμιν ἐχετο
τῳ μᾶλλον τε και ἠττον. ὅπου γαρ ἄν ἐνητον, οὐκ
ἐάτον εἰναι ποσόν ἔκαστον, ἀλλ' αει σφοδρότερον
ησυχαστερον και τούναντιον ἐκάστας πράξεσιν ἐμπο-
25 ούντε το πλέον και το έλαπτον ἀπεργάζεσθον, το δε
ποσόν αφανίζειν. ὁ γαρ ἐλέξηθη νῦν δή, μη ἀφανί-
ζαντε το ποσόν, ἀλλ' εάσαντε αυτό τε και το μέτρον
ἐν τη τοῦ μᾶλλον και ἠττον και σφόδρα και ἥρεμα d
ἔδρα ἐγγενέσθαι, αυτα ἐρρει ταυτα ἐκ τῆς αυτῶν
30 χώρας ἐν ἦ ἐνυν. οὐ γαρ ἐτι θερμότερου ουδὲ ψυχρό-
tερον είτην ἀν λαβῶντε το ποσόν' προχορεῖ γαρ καί
οὐ μένει το τε θερμότερον αει καὶ το ψυχρότερον
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 24. ὠσαίτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προὶ ἐπαύσατο. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τῶν λόγων ἀπειρον γίγνοιτ' ἀν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τούναντίον ἁμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν, ὡ Σώκρατες· ἔστι δ', ὅπερ εἶπες, οὐ ράδια ταύτα ἤυπνέσθαι. τὸ δὲ ἐσταύθης τε 5 καὶ ἀδίκως ἱστος λεχθέντα τῶν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτάμενον ἰκανῶς ἀν ἐνυμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήνειν.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ' εὖ μὲν λέγεις, καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν νῦν μὲντοι ἀδρεῖ τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τούτῳ δεξίομεθα σημειῶν, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξίοντες 10 μηκύνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποσὸν δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. 'Ὅτεσ' ἀν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα p. 25. καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὡσα τοιαύτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου 15 γένος ὡς εἰς ἐν δεὶ πάντα ταύτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν ἐμπροσθεν λόγον, ὅν ἔφαμεν, ὡσα διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρήναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τινα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταύτα, τοῦτον δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πάν ὁ τί περ ἀν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἤ μέτρον ἤ πρὸς μέ- b τρον, ταύτα ἤξυμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι 25 καλῶς ἀν δοκοίμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο, ἢ πῶς σὺ φήσι;' 20

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γε, ὡΣώκρατες.

ΧΙΙΙ. ΣΩ. Εἴπερ τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μικτὸν ἐκ τοῦ- των ἀμφοῦ τίνα ἱδέαν φύσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.

ΣΩ. Θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἀν πέρ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπή- κοος γίγνεται τις θεῶν.
ΠΡΩ. Εὖχου δή καὶ σκόπει.
ΣΩ. Σκοπῶ, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὁ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν ὁ 5 φίλος ἡμῶν νῦν δὴ γεγονέναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς λέγεις τούτο; καὶ τινι τεκμηρίω χρῆ; ε 10 ΣΩ. Φράσω δὴλον ὅτι. σὺ δὲ μοι συνακολούθησον τῷ λόγῳ.
ΠΡΩ. Δέγε μούνον.
ΣΩ. Θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νῦν δὴ ποῦ τι καὶ ψυχρότερον. ἡ γάρ;
ΠΡΩ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Πρόσθες δὴ ἔχροτερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς καὶ πλέον καὶ ἐλαττον, καὶ θάττον καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μείζον καὶ σμικρότερον, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤπτον δεχομένης ἐπίθεμεν εἰς ἐν 15 φύσεως.
ΠΡΩ. Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Ναί. συμμίγνυ δὲ γε εἰς αὐτήν τὸ μετὰ ταύτα τῆν αὐτὸ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.
ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;
ΣΩ. Ἡν καὶ νῦν δὴ δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἐν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατειδοὺς συγκαγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλ' ἵσως καὶ νῦν ταύτων δράσει τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὴς κάκειν γενήσεται.
ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Τῆν τοῦ ἱσοῦ καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση πανέ 20 πρὸς ἀλληλα τάναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα ο δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεία ἄριθμον ἀπεργάζεται.

27. The idea of συμμετρία is well developed by Paley under the name of Relation: "When several different parts contribute to one effect; or, which is the same thing, when an effect is produced by the joint action of different instruments; the fitness of such parts or instruments to one another, for the purpose of producing, by their united action, the effect,
p. 25. Ἐλθων ἡ γάρ μοι λέγειν, μυγνύσι τῶν, γενέσεις τινὰς ἀφ' ἕκαστον συμβαίνειν.

is what I call Relation: and wherever this is observed in the works of nature or of man, it appears to me to carry along with it decisive evidence of understanding, intelligence, art."

—Natural Theology, chap. 15.

The word συμμετρία will belong to the category of Quantity: e. g., "Throughout the universe there is a wonderful proportioning of one thing to another; the size of animals, of the human animal especially, when considered with respect to other animals, or to the plants which grow around him, is such as a regard to his convenience would have pointed out. A giant or a pigmy could not have milked goats, reaped corn, or mowed grass; we may add, could not have rode a horse, trained a vine, shorn a sheep, with the same bodily ease as we do, if at all. A pigmy would have been lost among rushes, or carried off by birds of prey," ib. chap. 17.

Τὸ σύμμετρον is defined by τὸ μέτον in the following passage, where the perfection of natural and artificial products is said to depend on the due proportion (συμμετρία) of their efficient and material causes: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δεὶ συμμετρίας πρὸς ἀλληλα· πάντα γὰρ τὰ γεγραμμενα κατὰ τέχνην ἢ φύσιν λόγον τυφεί ἐστι· τὸ δὲ θερμοῖν λίαν· μὲν κρατοῦν ἐπηραίει τὰ ὑγρα, πολὺ δὲ ἐλλείπον οὐλοὶ συνιστέαν· ἀλλὰ δει πρὸς τὸ δημιουργοῦμεν ἔχειν τὸν τοῦ μέσου λόγον. De Gen. An. 4. 2. "The forces of the efficient and material causes should be proportionate. For the goodness of every product of Art or Nature depends on a ratio between these terms. Too powerful a heat solidifies entirely where too weak a heat produces no condensation. The efficient therefore ought to bear a Mean proportion to the material on which it operates."

Συμμετρία, like μεσότης, is opposed to excess and defect. Η δὲ θερμοῖτς ἐνυπάρχει τοσαύτην καὶ τοιαύτην ἔχοσα τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὅτι σύμμετρος εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, καθ' ἄσον δ' ἰν ἐκλείπῃ ἤ ὑπερβάλλῃ ἢ χεῖρον ποιεῖ ἢ ἀνάπηρον τὸ γεγραμμενον. Ib. 2. 6. "The heat is provided by nature in quality and quantity duly proportioned to the organs that have to be formed. Excess or defect mars the product or makes a monstrous birth." Γιγνεται δ’ ἀτέλεια δ’ ἐνδειαν τοῦ φυσικοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ἀσυμμετρίαν πρὸς τὸ ὑγρόν τὸ πεπαινόμενον. Meteor. 3. 3. "The fruit is imperfectly matured from the deficiency of the natural heat and its want of proportion to the juices to be ripened." The moral mean is always determined by some given term to which our act or emotion stands in relation: it is therefore always a symmetry or proportion. It seems therefore to have been chiefly a desire to have a term distinctive of his own philosophy that made Aristotle prefer μεσότης to the more concrete and intelligible συμμετρία in his definitions of moral and physical goodness.

1. μυγνύσι. So Klitsch reads μυγνύσι, which is retained by the Zurich editors.
While the text appears to be a transcription of a Latin or Greek document, the natural text seems to be a translation or exposition of Aristotelian philosophy regarding the concepts of "εἴσοδος" (entry) and "προσωποποίησις" (representation). The text discusses the relationship between these concepts and the entities they pertain to, possibly focusing on the nature of change and representation within the cosmos. The text delves into the idea that privation and matter are fundamental elements that underpin the structure of all things.

12. τὸ μὲν πολὺ λιαν καὶ ἁπειρὸν ἀφείλετο] The Aristotelian analysis of τὸ ἁπειρὸν into Matter (ὑπὸ) and Privation (στέρησις) is here necessary to prevent confusion. How can the ἁπειρὸν be an element in all things that exist if it is destroyed before they come into being? The answer is, that the word ἁπειρὸν denotes two objects, the Elements or Matter, and the negation of Law, or Privation. The Privation is the true opposite of Limit. Matter is not the opposite of either Limit or Privation, but is indifferently receptive of either. It is the Privation or disorder that is exterminated; the Matter remains as an element of the Cosmos.

19. νόμον καὶ τάξις] This is the reading of the Bodleian MS.
p. 26. ἔθετο· καὶ οὐ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φης αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τούναντίων ἀποσωσάι λέγω. Σοὶ δὲ, ὦ Πρῶταρχε, πῶς φαίνεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα, ὥ Σῶκρατες, ἐμοίγε κατὰ νοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτα εἴρηκα, εἰ ἐξουννοεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οἴμαι κατανοεῖν· ἐν μὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ ἀπειρον λέγειν, ἐν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὐσί. τρίτον δὲ οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ πληθὸς σε, ὅ θαυμάσσει, ἔξεπληξε τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γενέσεως. καὶ τού πολλά γε καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον παρέσχετο γένη, οὕμως δ' ἐπισφραγισθέντα τοῦ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου γένει ἐν ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε πέρας οὔτε πολλὰ ἐίχεν, οὔτ' ἐδυσκολαίνωμεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἐν φύσει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἐν

Badham inserts ἔχοντων after αὐτοῖς and omits it after πέρας. Other MSS. read πέρας ἔχον ἔθετο.

10. τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν τοῦ τῶν ἐκχονον ἀπαν] In the Timaeus we have the Limit, Product (γε-γενεμένη ὁυσία) and Infinite, under the names of παράδειγμα, μίμημα, and ὑπόδοχη. Τότε μὲν γὰρ δύο εἰδὴ διειλόμεθα, νῦν δὲ τρίτον ἀλλο γένος ἢ μὲν δηλοτέου. τά μὲν γὰρ δύο ἰκανή ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λεχθέσαι, ἐν μὲν ὡς παραδείγματος εἶδος ὑποτεθεῖν, νοη-τών καὶ ἀλλα κατὰ ταῦτα δι', μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος δεύτερον, γένεσιν ἦχον καὶ ὁρατόν, τρίτον δὲ τότε μὲν οὐ διειλόμεθα, νομίζατε τά δύο ἐξειν ικανόν, νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐοίκεν εἰσαναγκάσει χαλεπῶν καὶ ἀμυδρῶν εἴδος ἐπιχειρεῖν λόγους ἐμβασιαί-τίνα οὖν ἦχον δύναμιν κατά φύσιν αὐτὸ ὑποληπτέον; τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον, πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχῆς αὐτὸ οἴον τιθήην, p. 48 E. "We first divided things into two classes, now we must point out a third. Two were enough on the former occasion; first a pattern, the object of reason and possessed of eternal being; second a copy of the pattern, generated and the object of sense. No third was then added because we thought that two would suffice, but now the investigation forces us to try to show a sort
of thing hard to explain and dim. What is its natural function? This: of all generation to be the receptacle and nurse.” Afterwards the term ἐκγόνον, as in the present passage, is applied to the sensible world. Ἐν δ’ οὖν τῷ πάροντι χρή γένη διανοήθην τριτά, τὸ μὲν γενόμενον, τὸ δ’ ἐν δ’ γίγνεται, τὸ δ’ οἴδαι ἄφομαιούμενον φύεται λεγόμενον. καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεκάσατο πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρὶ, τὸ δ’ ὑπὲρ πατρὶ, τὴν δὲ μεταξύ τῶν φύσιν ἐκγόνον.

p. 50 c. “Now we must assume three classes, first a product, next a material, thirdly an archetype in whose image the product is; and we may liken the recipient material to a mother, the archetypal cause to a father, and the intermediate nature to their progeny.”

1. γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν] We should have expected γεγενημένην οὐσίαν which occurs afterwards. The expression however is not accidental, nor merely an inaccuracy, but is a mode of speaking of temporal or phænomenal existence borrowed from the Megarians, an idealistic school, congenial to Plato. Their controversy with Democritus and the Materialists is alluded to in the Sophista. Τοιοῦτον οἶ πρὸς αἰτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντες μᾶλα ἑλαζός ἀνωθέν ἢ ἄνωτὸν ποθὲν ἀμελοῦντα, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἰδὴ βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἀλῆθειαν κατὰ συμικρὰ διαβραίοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, γένεσιν ἀντὶ οὐσίας φερομένην τιμὰ προσγορεύσαν...Γένεσιν τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρὶς ποιν διελόμενοι λέγετε; —ναὶ.—καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δὲ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνίαν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῆι πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν οὐσίαν, ἢ ὅτι κατὰ ταῦτα ὀσταῖος ἐχεῖν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἀλλοτρ ἀλλος.

p. 246 B. “Their opponents defend themselves with very cautious tactics from a sort of invisible citadel, containing that real Being is certain conceived and bodiless Ideas, and breaking to pieces by their logic the Body and so called reality of the others, instead of Being, they call it a rapid stream of Becoming...You distinguish Being and Becoming?

—Yes.—And you say we apprehend Becoming with the body by the faculty of sensation, Being with the soul by the faculty of Reason, and that the one is unchanging, the other unresting.”

7. πάντα τὰ γεγομένα διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν γένεσθαι] Plato confines Causation to intelligent, voluntary agents. Blind, elementary,
material principles he calls συνάτια. 

These are the Necessary Conditions (secondary causes) that minister to the divine power when it produces the Best that is possible under given circumstances. Most people think them to be not Conditions but Causes, heating and cooling, contracting and expanding, and the like, without plan or reason... Whosoever loves reason and knowledge must first investigate the rational causes, afterwards the necessary chain of those that are both cause and effect. So we must do now. We must indicate both kinds of cause but distinguish the intelligent cause of what is fair and good from the unintelligent and planless.” When the Efficient cause is assumed to be intelligent, of course it is intimately connected with what Aristotle called the Final cause. For an intelligence always acts with the design of accomplishing some End.
of which a thing is made; in which sense brass is cause of a statue, or silver of a cup, or the genera of brass and silver. Another is the Form and pattern, or definition, and its genera; in which sense the double number of vibrations in an equal time is the cause of an octave, and, generically, number or the elements of the definition. Another is the Origin of motion or rest; in which sense health is the cause of a man’s walking. Why does he walk? For the sake of health, we answer; and consider we have assigned the cause.”

The three first of these are clearly identical with three on Plato’s list. The μικρὸν may seem to be rather Aristotle’s σῶν or οὖν τῇ ὄλῃ συνειλημ-
μένος λόγος. Metaph. 6. 15. (the concretion of matter and form,) that is, the καθ ἐκαστον or Individual of the sensible world, than the τέλος or Final cause. The living and acting Individual, however, is the Final cause of the elementary matter and the efficient processes. The close connexion of the End with an intelligent Efficient cause was perhaps the reason why Plato does not mention it here more distinctly as a separate principle, for he has fully developed the conception in the Phaedo. Indeed the whole of the Philebus, as discussing the highest Good, may be regarded as an investigation of the Final cause of human life. In the Timæus it is contrasted with the Material cause in nearly the same manner as we saw the Efficient cause contrasted in the preceding note. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα τοῦτο ταύτη τεφυκότα εξ ἀνάγκης ὡ τοῦ καλλίστου τε καὶ ἀριστοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐν τοῖς γανομένους παρελαμβανεν ἠρίκα τῶν αὐτάρηκη τε καὶ τοῦ τελεωτιστοῦ θεον ἐγέννα, χρώμενος μὲν ταῖς περὶ ταῦτα αἰτίαις ὑπηρετούσαις, τὸ δὲ εὖ τεκτανοῦμενον ἐν πάσι τοῖς γανομένοις αἰτίοις. διό δὴ χρὴ δυ" αἰτίας εἴδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ θεῖον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἐν ἀπασι ζητεῖν κτήσεως ἐνεκα εὐθαμομόνοις βίον καθ ὧν ἤμων ἡ φύσις ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐκεῖνοις χώρι, λογιζομένους ὡς ἀνευ τοῦτον αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα εὖ οἷς σπουδάζομεν μόνα κανανεῖν οὐδ': αὐτ' αὐτ' λαβένι οὐθ' ἄλλος πῶς μετασχέων. p. 68 e. "The artist of the best and fairest work pressed into service all these elements with their necessary laws at his creation of the absolute and most perfect God, using their subservient agencies but himself contriving the good. Wherefore two kinds of cause are to be distinguished, the Necessary (Material) and the Divine (Final), and we must seek the divine cause in order to attain to happiness so far as our nature allows; and the necessary cause as a means; regarding it as indispensable towards contemplating, grasping, or in any other way attaining, that other object that we prize."
πλατώνος

κάλλιον ἄν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσάμεθα πρῶτου π. 27. πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περί ὄν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμιφισβητή-
σαμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

5 ἜΩ. Ἡθι δή, νικῶντα μὲν ἑθεμέν ποι τὸν μικτὸν ἄ
βιον ἔδονης τε καὶ φρονήτευς. ἢν οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡ ἢν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὀρθῶν ποι τὶς
tέ ἐστι καὶ ὑπόλοι γένους;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μέρος γ’ αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου,
οἶμαι, γένους. οὐ γάρ δυὸν τινοὶ ἐστὶ μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος,
ἀλλὰ ἐγγίζοντων τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δε-
δεμένων, ὅστε ὀρθῶς ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος

15 ἐκείνου γίγνετ’ ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰς. Τί δὲ ὁ σός, ὁ Φίληβε, ἢδος καὶ
καὶ ἅμκτος ὄν ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος
ὁρθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο; ὅδε δ’ ἀπόκριναι μοι πρὶν

20 ἀποφήμασθαι.

ΦΙ. Δέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονή καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετος, ἃ τῶν τὸ
μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἢττον δεχομένων ἐστόν;

ΦΙ. Ναι, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες οὔ γάρ ἄν

25 ἡδονή πάν ἁγαθόν ἢν, εἰ μὴ ἀπειρον ἐνγάξα ση πεθυ-
κός καὶ πλήθει καὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐδεὶ ἄν, ὁ Φίληβε, λύπη πάν κακῶν’ ὡστ’ π. 28.

30 ἄλλο τι νέον σκεπτέων ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν, ὁ
παρέχεται τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναίς ἁγαθοῖ. τούτο δὴ

σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γεγονός ἐστω. φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ
ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῶν εἰσ τὸ ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὁ
p. 28. Πρώταρχε τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν θέντες οὐκ ἂν ἀσεβδομεν; οὐ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσασί καὶ μή περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

b. ΦΙ. Σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαυτοῦ θεόν. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ σὺ, ὃ ἐταύρε, τὴν σεαυτοῦ τὸ δ’ ἐρωτώμενον ὃμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐρήσω τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτῷ πειστέον.

ΦΙ. Οὐκὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σὺ, Πρώταρχε, προῆρησαι λέγειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε' νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορῶ, καὶ δεόμαι γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, αὐτὸν σὲ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτην, ἵνα μηδὲν ἡμῖν σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνισθῆν ἔξα-μαρτάνουτες παρὰ μέλος φθεγξόμεθά τι.

c. ΣΩ. Πειστέον, ὃ Πρώταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπῶν οὐδὲν ἐπιτάττεις. ἀλλ’ ὀντως σὲ ἐγὼ, καθάπερ εἶπε Φίληβος, σεμνύνων ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἑθορύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενον ὑποίον γένους ἐδεν;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι γε, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ράδιον. πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σοφοὶ, ἐαυτοῦς ὀντωσ σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοου ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν ύπαρνο τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἴσως εἰ θέγουσι. διὰ μακροτέρων δ’ εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησόμεθα.

d. ΠΡΩ. Λέγ’ ὑπόσ βούλει, μηδὲν μὴκος ἡμῖν ὑπο- λογιζόμενος, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὃς οὐκ ἀπεχθησόμενος.

ΧΩ. ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξόμεθα δέ πως ὄδε ἐπανερωτώντες.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πότερον, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ἐξιμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλοὺμενον ὅλον ἐπιτρεπεῖν ϕόμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῆ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὑπ’ ἐτυχεῖν. ἦ τάναν-

Reason is akin to the Spirit that animates the Universe, and belongs to family of Cause.
τία καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον νοῦν καὶ φρό- p. 28. νησίν τινα θαυμαστήν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν;
ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, οἱ θαυμάστε Σῶκρατες. ὥστεν γὰρ σὺ νῦν δὴ λέγεις, οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι μοι φαί- snetai· τὸ δὲ νῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ τῆς ὁψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἡδίων, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἐγὼ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴπομι οὐδ' ἂν δο- χάσαμι.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δὴτά τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἐμπρόσθεν ὁμο- λογούμενοι ἐξιμφήσωμεν, ὡς ταῦθ' οὗτος ἔχει, καὶ μὴ p. 29. μόνον οἰώμεθα δεῖν ταλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκινδυνεύσωμεν καὶ μετέχομεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φή ταῦτα μὴ οὗτος ἄλλ' ἀπάκτως

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην;
ΣΩ. Ἡθι δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν λόγου αἴθρει.
ΠΡΩ. Δέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἀπάντων τῶν ζώων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα, καθορωμέν ποιν, καὶ γῆν, καθάπερ οἱ χειμαζόμενοι φασίν, ἐνότα ἐν τῇ b συντάσσει.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ οὗτος ὑπ' ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.
ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λαβέ τὸ τοιόνδε.

3. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν] The same phrase occurs in the epistles of Plato. "Ὑστερον δε καὶ ἀκούον γε- γραφέναι αὐτῶν περὶ δω τότε ἤκουσε, συνυδέντα ὡς αὐτῶν τέχνην, οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν δὲν ἄκουοι. p. 341 b. It therefore seems to mean, "We will not merely re-echo what others have said:"—"We will not rest on authority:"—"Without iteration:"—"On our own responsibility."
ΠΡΩ. Ποίον;
ΣΩ. "Ωστόσο σμικρόν τε τούτων ἐκαστὸν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἔνεστι καὶ φαύλον καὶ οὐδαμὴ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὑπὲρ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἄξιαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν εὐνοίᾳ ὑμᾶς λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταύτων. οἴον πῦρ μὲν ἐστὶ που παρ’ ἡμῖν, ἔστι δ’ ἐν τῷ παντί.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μὴν;
ΣΩ. Οὐκόν σμικρὸν μὲν τι τὸ παρ’ ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ φαύλον, τὸ δ’ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε βαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάση δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ ὑστηρήσει.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα ἁληθὲς ὁ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Τι δεῦ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἀρχεῖ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν πυρὸς, ἡ τοιούτων ὑπὸ ἐκείνου τὸ τ’ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἄλλων ἀπαντῆσει τάστικα;
ΠΡΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν οὐδ’ ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾶτο.
ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς. ταύτα γὰρ ἐρείς, οἴμαι, περὶ τῇς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλως γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων ὄσων ἡρότητα ὁλίγου ἐμπρόσθεν, οὕτως ἀποκρινεῖ.
ΠΡΩ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑμιαίνων ἂν ποτε φανείη;
ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδ’ ὡστισοῦν. ἄλλα τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐξῆς ἔπου. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταύτα τὰ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγεν ἑκατέρους ἐν συγκείμενα ἴδοντες ἐπωνομάζεσαμεν σῶμα;
ΠΡΩ. Τι μὴν;
ΣΩ. Ταυτὸν δὴ λαβεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτῳ ὑπὸ κόσμου λέγομεν. διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν ἐγένετο σῶμα, πρὸς τῶν σώματος ἐν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.
ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθότατα λέγεις.
ΟΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σῶματος ὀλως π. 29.
tὸ παρ’ ἥμιν σῶμα ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ’ ἥμιν τούτῳ τρέφεται
τε καὶ ὅσα νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν εἴπομεν, εἴληφέ τε καὶ
ίσχει;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦθ’ ἔτερον, ὡς Σῶκρατες, ὦκ ἄξιον
ἐρωτήσεως.
ΟΩ. Τί δὲ; τόδε ἄρα ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς;
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τὸ ποιόν.
ΟΩ. Τὸ παρ’ ἥμιν σῶμα ἢρ’ οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν
10 ἐχειν;
ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.
ΟΩ. Πόθεν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, λαβὼν, εἶπερ μὴ
tὸ γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἐμψυχοῦ ὄν ἐτύγχανε, ταῦτα
γε ἔχων τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντη καλλίωνα;
ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὦς οὐδαμῶθεν ἀλλοθεν, ὡς Σῶ-
κρατες.
ΟΩ. Οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦν δοκοῦμεν γε, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τὰ
tέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἀπειρον καὶ κουλὸν καὶ τὸ
tῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἀπασὶ τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτο ἐν b
20 μὲν τοῖς παρ’ ἥμιν ψυχὴν τε παρέχον καὶ σωμασκίαν

20. ψυχήν τε παρέχον] In the
Timeæus the Soul is composed of
three elements corresponding
to the πέρας, ἀπειρον, and μικτὸν
of the Philebus. Τῆς ἀμερίστου
καὶ αὐτα ταῦτα ἐξουσίας σωμάτοις
καὶ τῆς ἀπο τα σώματα συγγε-
μένης μεριστῇς τρίτων ἐξ ἀμφων ἐν
μέσῳ συνεκράσατον οὐσίας εἴδους, τῆς
tε ταύτων φύσεως ἀπο ταυτό καὶ τῆς
βάτερου, καὶ ταῦτα συνέστησαν
ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμερίοις αὐτῶν καὶ
τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. καὶ
tρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκράσατο
εἰς μίαν πάντα ἑδέαν, τὴν βατέρου
φύσιν διὰ μεσίκτων οὕσαν εἰς ταύτων
συναρμόττων βία. μεγάς δὲ μετὰ
τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος
ἐν, πάλιν τὸ ὄλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὅσα
προσήκεν διένεμε. p. 34 c. “Bet-
tween Indivisible and immut-
able substance and what is Di-
visible among bodies the divine
power made a third kind of sub-
stance composed of Identity and
Diversity and set it between the
Indivisible and the Divisible.
He then took the three and
moulded them into one, forcing
reluctant Diversity into har-
mony with Identity. And when
he had mixed them with the
other substance and wrought
the three into one he divided
the whole into such parts as behaved.” Here the Indivisible, Divisible and Compound clearly correspond to the ρέας, ἀπειρον and μικτὸν of the Philebus; though it is not quite clear whether the elements of the Compound substance, Identity and Diversity, should be regarded as the same with the Indivisible and Divisible. Whether these elements of the Soul, the Indivisible and Divisible, or Identity and Diversity, are the same with the elements of the Material world, the ρέας and ἀπειρον of the Philebus, or with the elements of the Ideal world, the One and the Infinite Dyad, of which we hear elsewhere, Plato does not intimate. If we trust Aristotle, they are to be regarded as the same; for he even assigns as a reason why they must be the same the necessity that a cognizant power should be identical with the objects of cognition. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐν τῷ Τεμαῖῳ Πλάτων τῷ ψυχήν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ γνῶσκεθαι γάρ ὁμοίω ὁμοιω, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. De Anima, i. 2. “So Plato in the Timeaëus composes the soul of the elements because the cognizant faculty must resemble the objects of cognition, and these are composed of the elements.”

5. ἐν δὲ τούτων ὦκ ἁρα μεμηχανήσθαι...φύσιν] It is difficult to trace the reasoning in this passage. Plato perhaps is intentionally obscure because he meant to excite a curiosity, the satisfaction of which he reserved for another dialogue. However, even with the clue furnished by the Timeus it is not easy to thread our way.

μεμηχανήσθαι is active and emphatic: “is an intelligent designer:”—“has contrived in the form of Art—in the guise of an Artist.”

τὴν τῶν καλλιστῶν...φύσιν, governed by μεμηχανήσθαι, is not the Soul, for that is first introduced presently, but the Cosmos or visible World. Thus μεμηχανήσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλιστῶν καὶ τιμωτῶν φύσιν may be paraphrased in the words of the next sentence, κεκοσμήκειν τε καὶ συντεταξεῖν ἑναντίον τε καὶ ὁρασ καὶ μήρας, σοφίαν καὶ νοῦν λεγόμενον δικαίωτα' ἄν.

The result of the whole passage is that the Human Reason, as derived from the Soul of the Universe, is akin to that supra-mundane Cause to which the Soul of the Universe is akin. There is an obscurity in the train of thought, because it seems all along assumed [τούτο (τὸ αἰτίον) ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν...πᾶσαν
ΠΡΩ. Ὅµοιον εἴ µὴ τούτο μετ’ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἄν ἐπόµενοι βέλτιον λέγομεν, ὡς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰ- ρήκαμεν, ἀπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολὺ καὶ πέρας ἐκα-
τον, καὶ τις ἐπ’ αὐτῶις αἰτία ὦφαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνιαύτους τε καὶ ὀρας καὶ μὴνας,
σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγοµένη δικαιώτατ’ ἂν.
ΠΡΩ. Δικαιώτατα δήτα.
ΣΩ. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἀνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε
gενοῖσθην.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. Ὅµοιον ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἔρεις φύσει βασι-
λικὴν μὲν ψυχῆν, βασιλικῶν δὲ νοῶν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλά,
καὶ ὁ φίλον ἐκάστως λέγεσθαι.

καὶ παντοτάν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι] that the Human Reason belongs to the Causative class, so that we seem to have made no ad-
vance when we make the pro-
position stated above. An ad-
vance, however, has been made, as the Cause is invested with a
new and grander character so
soon as it appears as the origin of the Soul of the Universe.

In the words μεµηχανησθαί την
tῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιµωτάτων φύ-
σιν, the supramundane Cause is
said to perform what is imme-
diately the function of Zeus, or
the Soul of the World. Simi-
larly above (ἐν δὲ ἄλλως ἄλλα ἔξυ-
tιθεν καὶ ἀκούµενοι... σοφίαν ἐπι-
καλεῖσθαι) artificial constructions
and reparations are attributed
to the Cause which are properly
the functions of the Human
Soul when created by the Cause.
This confusion of the physical
agent with the extramundane
Cause to which it owes its being
is characteristic of the Ideal
theory which leaves undeter-
mined the amount of identity
between the Idea and that which
derives its existence from the
Idea.

9. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἀνευ ψυ-
χῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοῖσθην] From
this and a similar passage in
the Timaeus it might be inferred
that Plato denies the existence
of Reason apart from the Soul.

Δοµισάµενος οὖν εὐφαγεῖν (ὁ θεὸς)
ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπατῶν οὐδὲν
ἀκόµητον τῶν νοῶν ἔχουσοι ἄλοι ἄλοι
καλλίων ἐσεθαί ποτ’ ἔργον, νοῦν δ’
ἀδ χωρίς ψυχῆς ἀδυνάτον παραγενε-
σθαί τῷ. p. 30 Λ. It may be
observed however in both these
passages that the terms em-
ployed (γενοῖσθην, παραγενεσθαί
tῷ) exclude from consideration
the Eternal Reason, or extra-
mundane Cause.
ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον δὴ τῶν λόγων ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην δόξης, ὁ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφημαμένοι ός ἄεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἀρχεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ γε ἐμῇ ἡγήσει πεπορικὸς ἀπόκρισιν, ὕπνος ἄπτοθα γενοῦστι τοῦ πάντων αὐτοῦ λεχθέντος τῶν τεταρτῶν, ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τούτῳ. ἔχεις γὰρ δῆπον νῦν ἡμῶν ὑδὴ τῆς ἀπόκρισιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐχὼ καὶ μάλα ἰκανῶς καὶ τοῖς με ἀποκρινόμενοι ἐλαθὲς.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάπαυλα γὰρ, ὁ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδία.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς ἐπήσε.

p. 31.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ νοὺς, ὁ ἐταῖρε, οὗ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν δεδήλωται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἡδονῆς γε ὡσαύτως πάλαι τὸ γένος ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Μεμνώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι νοὺς μὲν αὐτίας ἦν ἔγγενης καὶ τοῦτον σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἡδονή δὲ ἀπειρὸς τε αὐτῆ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχῆν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν έαυτῷ ἄφ' ἕαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἐξουσίον ποτε γένους.

b ΠΡΩ. Μεμνησόμεθα πῶς γὰρ οὖ;  

ΧVII. ΣΩ. Δεὶ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν οἷς τε ἐστιν ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος, γίγνεσθαιν, 30 

9. τῶν τεταρτῶν, ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς. For this, which is unintelligible, Stallbaum proposes:

D. Division of (a) Pleasure, and (b) Science, into various
kinds or classes.

(5) Pleasures may be divided into two great classes, the Mixed and the Unmixed. The former are subdivided into three subordinate kinds.

One kind of Mixed Pleasure is the Restoration of violated Limit to its ascendency in the animal world. 5

ΠΡΩ. 'Αλλ' εἶ ταύτη χρή πορεύεσθαι, ταύτη πορεώμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρι;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιοῦ;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἁμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἱδονή γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινὸν δὲ γε, ὃ φίλε Σῶκρατες, ὑπομιμητηγήμνης ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δήλον;

ΣΩ. Ἐσται ταύτη εἰς δύναμιν, ὃ θαυμάσιε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινὸν τοῖνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁ μετὰ τὸ ἁπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες; ἐν ὃ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δὲ τι μάλιστ' ἀδιάσημη πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Δέχε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Δέχω τοῖνυν τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυμένης ἡμᾶς

22. τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυμένης, &c.] This definition of Pleasure may be illustrated by what is said on the same subject in the Timæus. Τὸ δ' ἡ τῆς ἱδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὅτε δὲ διανοεῖσθαι, τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βιάνον γεγονόμενον ἄδρον παρ' ἡμᾶς πάθως ἀλγενὸν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπὸν πάλιν ἄδρον ἡμᾶς, τὸ δ' ἡ ἱδονῆς καὶ κατὰ συμκρόνων ἀναίσθητον, τὸ δ' ἐνακτών τούτως ἐνακτώς, τὸ δ' ἐνεπτείασα γεγονόμενον ἀπαν ἀισθήτων μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα, λυπής δὲ καὶ ἱδονῆς οὐ μέτεχον, οἴνων τὰ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτὴν παθήματα, ἦ δὲ σάμα ἐν τούς πρόσθεν ἐφεδρή καθ' ἡμέραν συμφωνεῖ ἡμῶν γίγνεσθαι. ταύτη γὰρ τοιαύτα μὲν καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἄλλα ὁσα σά-

σχεῖ λύπας οὐκ ἐμποιοῦσιν οὐδε ἱδονῶς πάλιν ἐπὶ ταύτων ἀποικίας εἰδώς, μέγιστοι δὲ αἰσθήσεις καὶ συμφέρατα καθ' ὅτι τ' ἄν πάθῃ καὶ ὀσῶν ἂν αἰτή τη προσβαλούσα ἐφάπτεται. βία γὰρ τὸ πάμπαν οὐκ ἐν τῇ διακρίσει τε αὐτής καὶ συγ-
there.

And despite the shock and wide, produce pleasure and pain, the latter from the disturbance, the former from the reestablishment of the natural state. When the decrements and perdition of the organ are gradual, and its renovation sudden and by great increments, it will be insensitive to the process of inanition but sensible of the renovation, and impart to the mortal part of the soul no pains but much pleasure. This is instanced in fragrant smells. But when an organ is deranged suddenly and returns to its former condition gradually and slowly, it presents the opposite phenomena. This is instanced in burns and wounds." The particular senses are afterwards examined in detail, and the pleasant to Taste is thus defined: ξύμπαι δε τοις περι ταύτα εἰρήμενοι πάθος ἐναντίον ἀπ᾿ ἐναντίον ἐστί προφάσεως, ὅπως ἡ τῶν εἰσαγωγών ξύστασιν ἐν ὑγρῶι ὀικείᾳ τῇ τῆς γλώττης ἐξει πεφυκία λειαίνει μέν ἐπαλείάσουσα τὰ πραγματευόμενα παρὰ φύσιν ἔνστωσα ἢ κεχυμένα τὰ μὲν ἐναντίον τὰ δὲ χαλάκτωσιν πάντως ὅτι μάλιστα ἱθὺ διὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἢ δὲ καὶ προσβείσει παρεὶ πάντως τὸ ποιόν ἵππον καὶ παραδότῳ τῶν βιαίων παθημάτων γεγραμένων καθισταὶ γλυκά. p. 66 B. "There is an opposite feeling produced by an opposite cause. When the entering liquids are congenial to the constitution of the tongue, and smooth with oily influence its corrugations, and separate what has been unnaturally joined, or join what has been unnaturally se-
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω λέγεις εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοτομεύνης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀπιούσης ἠδονῆς γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεὶ δὲ ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὦ τι τάχιστα ῥήθημαν.

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν σε ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ε ἐμφανέστερον δὲ ἔτι ταύτα ταύτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ δημοσίᾳ που καὶ περιφανῆ ῥήστοι συννοεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ποία;

ΣΩ. Πείνη μὲν ποὺ λύσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἕδωδη δὲ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἠδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δύψος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἢ δὲ τοῦ ὠργοῦ πάλιν τὸ ἔρρημα πληροῦσα δύνα-μες ἠδονή. διάκρισις δὲ γ' αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἢ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη; κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἢ πάλιν ἀπόδοσις τε καὶ ψυξίς ἠδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

parated, and re-establish the normal disposition of the organ, this medicinal counteraction of violent affections is always pleasant and welcome, and is called by the name of Sweetness.’ Similarly what is pleasant to the other senses is shown to attend the restoration of φύσις or τὸ μέτρων, which are equivalent to τὸ πέρας, and are different names for the normal condition of the sensitive organ.

12. Ἕδωδη δὲ πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν ἠδονή] The inaccuracy of this expression is pointed out by Aristotle: Καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἐνδεικτικῶς εἶναι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τὴν δ’ ἠδονήν ἀναπλήρωσιν ταύτα δὲ σωματικὰ ἐστὶ πιθή: εἰ δὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἠδονή, ἐν δ’ ἢ ἀναπλήρωσις τοῦτ’ ἂν καὶ ἠδονή τὸ σῶμα ἀρα’ διὸ δοκεῖ δὲ: οὐκ ἔστων ἂρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἢ ἠδονή; ἀλλὰ γιγνομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἠδονή ἂν τις καὶ τεμνόμενος λυπώτα. Eth. Nic. 10. 3: "They say Pain is the want of the normal quantity of elements, and Pleasure the supply. But these are bodily affections. If then Pleasure is the completion of the normal quantity, the recipient of the completion, that is, the Body, will be the recipient of Pleasure; which all deny. Replenishment, then, is not Pleasure, though it may be an antecedent condition of Pleasure, as incision is of Pain.”
ΣΩ. Καὶ ρίγιος ἢ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζῶου τῆς ύγρότητος πῆξις λύπη, πάλιν δ᾽ εἰς ταύτων ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἱδονή. καὶ εὖ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος, ὃς ἂν φη τῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἐμψυχον γεγονοῦς εἴδος, ὅπερ ἐλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τούτῳ φθείρηται, τῆν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τῇ δ᾽ εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδὸν, ταύτην δ᾽ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἱδονῆς.

ΠΡΩ. 'Εστοι: δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν. ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν τοῖνυν ἐν εἴδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἱδονῆς ἐν τούτως τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐκατέρως;

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

11. Τούτῳ μὲν τοῖνυν ἐν εἴδος, τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἱδονῆς] This definition only professes to apply to one kind of Pleasure. In the Republic however an equivalent definition is extended to all kinds of Pleasure, including intellectual. Οὐκοῦν ὅλου τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γείνῃ τῶν γενών αὐ τῶν περὶ τῆς τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἢττων ἁληθείας τε καὶ οὕσιας μετέχει;—πολύ γε.—Σομα δέ αὐτό ψυχῆς οὐκ αἰει οὕτως;—ἔγωγε.—Οὐκοῦν τὸ τῶν μάλλον ὄντων πληρούμενος, καὶ αὕτῳ μᾶλλον ὄν, ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ τὸ τῶν ἢττων ὄντως καὶ αὐτῷ ἢττον ὄν;—πῶς γάρ ὁ;—εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκότων ἢδον ἐστὶ, τὸ τῷ ἢττῳ καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενων μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρει ἄν ποιώ ἢδονὴ ἀληθεῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἢττων μεταλαμβάνων ἢττων τε ἀν ἄληθὸς καὶ βεβαιῶς πληροῦται καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἢ ἱδονῆς καὶ ἢττων ἄληθος μεταλαμβάνω, 9. p. 583. "Has not the aliment of the body compared with the aliment of the soul less truth and reality? By far. And has not the body itself compared with the soul likewise? It has. Is not that which more real things fill and which itself is more real, more really filled than that which less real things fill, and which itself is less real? It must be. If therefore to be filled with things requisite for our nature is pleasant, that which is more really filled, and with more real things will more really and truly cause us to be delighted with true pleasure, and that which is filled by less real things will be less really and substantially filled, and receive less solid and true Pleasure." If we did not suppose the definition had been thus extended, we could hardly understand statements like the following: ὅλως οὐκ ἄρα ἄληθὸς φαινικὴ τῆς ἱδονῆς, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ ῥοὴ γένεσις ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθήσιν, οὐδέμια δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσι, Eth. Nic. 7, 11.
ΧVIII. ΣΩ. Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτὴς τῆς ψυχῆς p.32.
κατὰ τὸ τοῦτον τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν ε
πρὸ τῶν ἰδέων ἐλπιδομένου ἤδυ καὶ θαρραλέουν, τὸ δὲ
πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦτθ ἰδονήκα καὶ λύπης
ἐτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴς τῆς ψυχῆς
diὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἷμαι, κατὰ
γε τὴν ἑμῖν δόξαν, εἰλικρινές τε έκατέρως γιγνο-
μένους, ὡς δοκεὶ, καὶ ἀμίκτως λύπης τε καὶ ἰδονής,
ἐμφανές ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἰδονήν, πότερον ὅλον
ἔστι τὸ γένος ἀσπαστῶν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἐτέρῳ τῶν ἀ
προειρήμενων δοτέων ἢμῖν γενόν, ἰδονῆ δὲ καὶ λύπης,
καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις,
τὸτε μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτὰ, τοτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀσπαστέον, ὡς
ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ὄντα, ἔνιοτε δὲ καὶ ἐνιὰ δεχόμενα τὴν
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὑπὲρ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθωτατα λέγεις ὃτι ταύτῃ τῇ δεὶ διαπο-
ρευθήναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τούτων τὸ ἐξουσιώμεν, ὡς εἴπερ
όντως ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομένων μὲν αὐτῶν ο
ἀλγηδῶν, ἀνασωζόμενων δὲ ἰδονῆς, τῶν μὴς διαφ-
θειρομένων μήτὲ ἀνασωζόμενων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι,
τίνα ποτὲ ἔξιν δεὶ τότε ἐν ἐκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζῶοις,
ὡταν οὔτως ἵσχυς σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν
εἰπὲ· ἀρ' οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ
ζῶον μήτε τι λυπεῖσθαι, μήτε ἰδεσθαι, μήτε μέγα
μήτε σμικρόν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκῃ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τοῖς τριτῆς ἡμῶν ἢ τοιαύτῃ διά-
θεσις παρά τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ
λυπουμένου;
Pleasure is said to be a reflex of the Divine activity: éκ τοι-ἀυτής ἀρα ἀρχῆς ἄρτηται ὁ οὐ-ρανός καὶ ἡ φύσις. Διαγωγὴ δὲ ἐστὶν οίᾳ τῷ ἀριστῇ μικρῶν χρόνων ἡμῖν...ἐπεὶ καὶ ἦδον ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦτο, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγγίγοροις ἀσάθεσις νόσις ἡδίουν, 11, 7.

"Such then is the principle on which hang the heavens and earth. Its life is like the best of ours momentarily. Pleasure is its activity, and hence consciousness, sensation, intellection, are the highest Pleasures."
ΧΙΧ. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε ἐτερον εἴδος τῶν p. 33. ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἐφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης τῶν ἐστὶ γεγονός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστι, πρότερον ἀναληπτέον. καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἐτι πρότερον ἀφε- θησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦτ' ἦμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερὰ τῇ γενήσεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς φῆς;

ΣΩ. Θέσ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθη- μάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβευνόμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθὴ ἐκεῖνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἀμφοῖν ἓόντα καὶ τινα ὀσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἵδιον τε καὶ κοινὸν ἐκατέρφ.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τα μὲν δὴ μὴ δὲ ἀμφοῖν ἓόντα εὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φοίμεν λαυθάειν, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἀμφοῖν μὴ λαυθάειν, ἃρ' ὀρθότατα ἐροῦμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιῶν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβης ὡς λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθα ποὺ γένεσιν, ἐστὶ γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἐξοδος· ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν ὡς τοῦ δὴ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πω γίνε- σθαι φάναι τινα ἀποβολῆν ἀτοπον. ἡ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τοιῶν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅταν ἀπαθῆς αὐτῇ γίγνεται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ὡς νῦν λήθην καλεῖς, ἀνασβηθῆσαι ἐπονόμασον. Π. 34.

ΠΡΩ. Ἕμαθον.

24. πῶ] So Stallbaum reads instead of πῶς which is retained in the Zurich edition.
p. 34. ΣΩ. Τὸ δ’ ἐν ἐνὶ πᾶθει τὴν ψυχῆν καὶ τὸ σώμα κοινῆ γιγνόμενον κοινῆ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ’ αὖ τὴν κώμησιν ὅνομάξουν αἰσθησιν ὅλον ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι’ ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢδη μανθάνομεν ὅ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἰσθήσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Σωτηρίαν τοῖνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὅρθως ἂν τις λέγοι κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἢρ’ οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἠσώς.

ΣΩ. Ἱρ’ οὖν οὐ τόδε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

12. Μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἢρ’ οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν] The two cases of Reminiscence that follow are not very distinctly contrasted. In the Phaedo, however, we have the same division: εἷς τις τὸ ἐτέρου ἢ ἴδων ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσιν λαβὼν μή μόνον ἐκείνῳ γνῷ ἄλλα καὶ ἐτέρου ἐννοήσῃ οὐ μή ἢ αὐτή ἐπιστήμη ἄλλη ἄλλη, ἢρ’ οὐχὶ τούτῳ δικαίως λέγομεν ότι ἀνεμνήσθη οὐ τὴν ἐννοιαν ἔλαβεν; —πῶς λέγεις; —οἷον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλην ποι ἐπιστήμην ἀνθρώπον καὶ λύρας—πῶς γὰρ οὐ; —οὐκοῦν οὔσα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταὶ ὅταν ἱδονει σύγχριν ἢ μάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν ἐσθίσαν πάσχοισι τοῦτο, ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ ἑιδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὐ ἢν ἢ λύρα τοῦτο δ’ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις…μάλιστα μεντοὶ ὅταν τὸ τοῦτο πάθη περὶ ἔκεινα ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μή ἐπισκόπεσθαι ἐπιλέξασθαι. “When the sight or hearing, or any other sensation of an object, besides giving a perception of that, awakens the thought of something else which is the object of a different perception, is not the thought of the second object a reminiscence? Explain your meaning. Are not a man and a lyre objects of different perceptions? True. When a lover sees the lyre or garment, or any thing else that the person he loves is wont to use, this happens: he no sooner sees the lyre than his fancy presents to him the form of the person to whom it belonged, and this is Reminiscence…Particularly if the object which thus recurs is one which time or inattention had effaced from memory.” See Appendix C.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄ μετὰ τοῦ σῶματος ἔπασχε πάθη ἢ p. 34. ψυχή, ταῦτ' ἀνευ τοῦ σῶματος αὐτῆ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνῃ τότε ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι που λέγομεν. ἢ γάρ;

5 ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἶτε αἰσθήσεως εἶτ' αὖ μαθήματος ἀδής ταῦτην ἀναπολήσῃ πάλιν αὐτῇ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξύμπαντα ἀναμμηνήσεις καὶ μνήμας που λέγομεν.

10 ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὅδ' ἥραν ἀπαντ' εἰρηται ταῦτα, ἐστι τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΣΩ. Ἡν δὴ τῆν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονήν χωρὶς σῶματος ὁ τι μάλιστα καὶ ἑναργέστατα λάβομεν, καὶ ἀμα ἐπιθυμίαν διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἔοικε δηλοῦσθαι.

XX. ΠΡΩ. Λέγομεν τοίνυν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἢδη τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν τῆν μορφὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγοντας ἄ σκοπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρῶτον ἕτει φαίνεται ληπτέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ ποὺ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτα γε, ὡς Πρώ·

25 ταρχεῖ, εὐρόντες ὧν ζητοῦμεν· ἀπολοῦμεν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως ήμύνω· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτως πειρώ

μεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῶν δὴ πεινὴν τε καὶ δίψας καὶ πόλλα·

30 ἄτερα τοιαῦτα ἐφαμεν εἶναι τίνας ἐπιθυμίας; e

29. τῶν δὴ ἐφαμεν] Nothing of the kind has as yet been said. This is one of the passages that strengthen the hypothesis sug-

suggested in the note on §§ 33, p. 53 c.
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 34.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τὶ ποτὲ ἄρα ταῦτ' ἄρα βλέψαντες οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθ' ἐν προσαγορεύομεν ὄνοματι;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δἰ' οὖ ράδιον ἵσως εἰπεῖν, ὁ Σῶκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅμοι λεκτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἕκείθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν δή;

ΣΩ. Διψὴ γέ ποι λέγομεν ἐκάστοτέ τι;

ΠΡΩ. Πὸς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ γ' ἐστὶ κενοῦται;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ δίφος ἐστίν ἐπιθυμία;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, πῶματος γε.

p. 35.

ΣΩ. Πῶματος, ἢ πληρώσεως πῶματος;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.

ΣΩ. Ὅ κενοῦμενος ἤμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυμ- μεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ πάσχει. κενοῦμενος γὰρ ἐρὰ πλη- ρώσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενοῦμενος ἐστὶν ὑπό- θεν εἰτ' αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως εφάπτοτι ἂν εἰτε μνήμη,

τοῦτον ὁ μήτ' ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήτ' ἐν τῷ

πρῶτῳ πάσχει ἐπαθεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

b ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γ' ἐπιθυμιῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν.

8. Διψὴ ζὸν λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε τί. "You know the meaning of the word Thirst":"—"You use the word Thirst with a definite signification." So in the Meno: ἀλλὰ σὐ γέ ποι καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέα; τὸ τοιὸν ἃ βοῦ- λομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικιλον. ——— ἀλλὰ καλῶ καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὁ λέγεις. p. 75 D. "You, no doubt, use the words Termination and End in a certain ac- ceptation. That is the sort of thing I mean—nothing recon- dite.——I attach a sense to the terms, and I think I know what you mean by them."
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂρα ὦ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψὴ
gάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὁ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Πληρώσεως γ’ ἂρα πῇ τὶ τῶν τού δυσώντος
ἀν ἐφάπτοιτο.
ΠΡΩ. 'Αναγκαῖον.
ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἁδύνατον· κενοῦται γάρ
ποι.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἂρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι
λοιπὸν, τῇ μυήμη δήλον ὄτι· τῷ γάρ ἀν ἐτ' ἄλλῳ ὦ
ἐφάψαιτο;
ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν οὖδεν.
ΧΧΙ. ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηκ' ἡμῖν
ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων;
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΣΩ. Σῶματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὗ φησιν ἡμῖν οὕτως ὦ
λόγος γίγνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Ὁτί τοῖς ἐκεῖνοι παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἂε
παντὸς ζῶου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. Ἡ δ’ ὀρμὴ γε ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἁγουσά ἢ τὰ
παθήματα δηλοὶ ποὺ μνήμην οὕσαν τῶν τοῖς παθή-
μασιν ἐναντίων.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνου γε.
ΣΩ. Τὴν ἂρα ἐπάγονσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμοῦμενα ἄ
ἀποδείξας μνήμην ὦ λόγος ψυχῆς ξύμπασαν τὴν τε
ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῶου παντὸς
ἀπέφηνεν.
ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθότατα.
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ. 61

p. 35. ΣΩ. Διψήν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆν ἢ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμὴ ὁ λόγος αἴρει.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.
ΣΩ. Ἐτι δὲ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν. βίων γὰρ εἶδός τί μοι φαίνεται βουλευθαίς δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἰ τις τούτων ἐν ἕκατέρῳ γιγανόμενος ἡμῶν ἁλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς.
ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι τάυτα.
ΣΩ. Τί δ’ ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τοιούτων γίγνηται;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;
ΣΩ. Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἁλγῇ, μεμυθῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδεῶν ὁν γενομένων παῦσθ᾽ ἀν τῆς ἁλγηδόνος, πληροῦσθαι δὲ μὕπω: τί τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν

p. 36. ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἁλγοῦθ᾽ ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα;
ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δἀ, ἀλλὰ διπλὴ τινὶ λύτῃ λυποῦμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθο.
ΣΩ. Πόσις, ὅ Πρῶταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἶπες; ἄρ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενοῦμενος ἐν ἐσπίδι φανερά τοῦ πληρωθῆσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ
b δὲ τούναιτιον ἀνελπίστως ἔχει;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε.
ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθῆσεσθαι τῷ μεμυθῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἀμα δὲ κενοῦμενος ἐν τούτως τοῖς χρόνοις ἁλγεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τότ' ἀρα ἄνθρωπος καὶ τάλλα ζωα λυπείται π. 36. τε ἀμα καὶ χαίρει.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τι δ' ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχη κενοῦμενος τεῦ-́ς ἕσσθαι πληρώσεως; ἄρ' οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτ' ἂν περὶ τὰς λύπας πάθος, ὁ σὺ νῦν δὴ κατιδὼν φήθης ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;

ΠΡΩ. 'Αληθεύσατα, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τὸδε χρησάμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιόν;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταῦτα τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἴδονᾶς ὅ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν; ἦ τὰς μὲν τινὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δ' οὐ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἂν εἰπεν ψευδεῖς ἴδοναι ἦ λύπαι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δὲ, ὦ Πρόταρχε, φόβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἦ ψευδεῖς, ἦ προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἦ μὴ, ἦ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἦ ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Δόξας μὲν ἐγώγ' ἂν ποι συγχωροῦν, τὰ δὲ ἐτερά ταῦτ' οὔκ ἂν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φύς; λόγου μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὸν ἐπιγείρειν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις.

12. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς, &c.] The inquiry into the truth or falseness of Pleasure is necessary for the solution of two problems. First, we have to ascertain whether Pleasure or Reason is more akin to the cause of goodness in the chief Good. Three attributes of the chief Good, Truth, Beauty, and Symmetry will be indicated; and we must see whether they are more to be found in Pleasure or Reason. Secondly, we have to determine the composition of the mixed life and the Pleasures that involve most falsehood will be excluded. This second problem has not yet been expressly proposed, but it is in the solution of this that the distinction of Pleasures, as true and false, has its chief application.
p. 36. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρελημνθότα, ὃ παῖ' κείνου τάνδρός, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρειν τοίνυν δεὶ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μῆκεσιν ἃ καὶ ὅταν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσήκον λεγομένων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὄρθως.

ε. ΣΩ. Λέγει δὴ μοι' θαῦμα γὰρ ἐμὲ γ' ἔχει διὰ τέλους ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἃ νῦν δὴ προϋπέμεθα ἀπορήματα.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ φής;

ΣΩ. Ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὔτε δὴ ὅναρ οὔθ ὕπαρ, ὡς φής, ἐστιν οὔτ' ἐν μανίαις οὔτ' ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδείς ἔσθ' ὃς τίς ποτε δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὔθ' αὖ ὃς δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δ' οὖ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνθ' οὗτο ταῦτ', ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες ὑπειλήφαμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ὁρθῶς, ἡ σκεπτέον εἰτ' ὁρθῶς εἶτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται;

p. 37. XXII. ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον, ὡς ἐγώ φαίνω ἄν.

ΣΩ. Διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἐτὶ τὸ νῦν δὴ Pleasures may at least be

1. ὃ παῖ' κείνου τάνδρός] An allusion to the title Philebus usually gave his companions, and to his queries as to the relevancy of part of the discussion. See §§ 6 and 8. If any allusion to the character of the natural father of Protarchus had preceded or immediately followed, as in Rep. 2. p. 368 A, the words might have applied to him; but they have no point here, unless they apply to Philebus. Plato appears to have been censured by contemporary critics for the wearisome length of some of his discussions. He answers in the Politicus, p. 286, that his Dialogues are not intended to amuse, or to charm by their artistic form, but to teach the art of reasoning. To justify the whole of the following discussion perhaps we ought to have before us the writings of Aristippus, to which it is an answer.
λεγόμενον ἰδονής τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστι γὰρ ποὺ πρ. 37.
δοξάζεων ἡμῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἰδεσθαι;
ΠΡΩ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἐστὶ τι;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὲ υὐ;
ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ γε ὅ τὸ ἰδομενον ἰδεται;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἀν τε ὀρθῶς ἀν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς δοξάσῃ, τὸ γε δοξάζειν οὕτως οὐδέποτε ἀπόλει.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἀν;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἰδομενον, ἀν τε ὀρθῶς ἀν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς ἰδηται, τὸ γε οὕτως ἰδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε ἀπολεῖ.
ΠΡΩ. Ναἰ, καὶ τοῦθεν οὕτως ἔχει.
ΣΩ. Τῷ ποτὲ οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθῆς ἡμῖν φιλεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἰδομῆς μόνου ἀληθές, δοξάζειν δὲ οὕτως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἰληχεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον.
ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὅτι δόξη μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθαι ψευδὸς τε καὶ ἀληθῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταύτα οὐ ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιὰ τὶς ἐκατέρα, σκεπτέον φης τοῦτ ἐιναι;
ΠΡΩ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Πρὸς δὲ γε τοῦτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ ποι' ἄττα, ἰδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἀπερ

28. ἰδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἀπερ ἐστι', &c.] This is an allusion to the doctrine of Antisthenes and the Megarians, who seem to have denied the possibility of synthetical propositions. See Appendix A.
ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ. 65

p. 37. ἐστὶ, ποιῶ τινε ἰ ὑ ἱσ νεσθο, καὶ ταὐθ ἡ μὴ διομο-

λογιτεύον.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔθεν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ

ποιῶ τινε. πάλαι γὰρ εἶπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαὶ τε καὶ ἵ

σμικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα ἐκάτερα γίγνονται, λύπαὶ τε καὶ

ἡδοναί.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀν δὲ γε ποιηρίᾳ τούτων, ὁ Πρώταρχε,

προσγίγνηται τινι, ποιηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγνο-

νεσθαι δόξαν, ποιηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἱδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὶ μὴν, ὁ Σόκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν ὀρθότης  ἢ τοὐναντίον ὀρθότητι τυί

τούτων προσγίγνηται; μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν

ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ὀρθότητα ἰσχύ; ταύτων δὲ ἱδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαίον.

c ΣΩ. Ἀν δὲ γε ἀμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἢ,

τὴν δόξαν τόσε ἀμαρτάνουσαν γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολο-

γητέον οὐδ' ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσαν;

18. τὴν δόξαν τόσε ἀμαρτάνου-

σαν γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολογητέον] ἀμαρτάνουσαν, though without as

part of the subject, not the predicate. Ὄρθη and ἀμαρτά-

νουσα, or ἀμαρτανομένη, are con-

trasted in Greek as Right and

Wrong. Ἀλλ' ἐπεῖ ο μὲν κακῶς

βουλευόμενος ἀμαρτᾶνει ᶜ δὲ εὖ

ὀρθῶς βουλεῦεται δήλων ὅτι ὀρθότης

τις ἑπιβολὰ ἐστίν' οὐτ' ἐπι-

στήμης δὲ οὕτε δόξης. ἐπιστήμης μὲν

γὰρ οὐκ ἐστίν ὀρθότης, οὔτε γὰρ ἀμαρτία,

δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἢ ἀλη-

θεία, Eth. Nicom. 6. 9. Ἡ δὲ

ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεως ἐστὶν

ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτᾶνεται

καὶ ἡ ἐλλεψις φέγγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον

ἐπανείπται καὶ καταρθοῦται· ταῦτα

δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐστὶν· ἐτί τὸ μὲν

ἀμαρτάναι σωλήνα ἐστί... τὸ δὲ

καταρθοῦν μοιχῶς: διὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν

ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν μάθειαν μὲν

τὸ ἀπωτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν

δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν, ib. 2. 6. We see

that ἀμαρτία and ὀρθότης have a

generic meaning, and as applied

to the intellect, express truth or
falseness, as applied to ac-
tions or feelings express con-
formity or nonconformity to the
moral law. The last passage
shows the image that they con-
veyed to the fancy. It would
therefore be a fallacy to infer
falseness from ἀμαρτία, as So-

ocrates seems to propose.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Τί δ’, ἂν αὐτὸ τῆς ἥδουν ἤ τις ἑδονή περὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ὡς λυπεῖται ἣ τοῦν αὑτὸν ἀμαρτάνουσαν ἑφορῶμεν, ὁρθὴν ἥ γνώσις ἢ τί τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ 5 προσθῆσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἰπερ ἀμαρτήσεται γε ἡδονή.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐνικέ γε ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὁρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεῦδους ἤμιν γίγνεσθαι.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ οὗ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν ψευδῆς, π. 38. τὴν δ’ ἡδονήν αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἄπαντες ἄν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὡς Πρόταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.

15 ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ’ ἀπερ ἄκοινο λέγω.

ΣΩ. Διαφέρει δ’ ἤμιν οὐδέν, ὡς ἐταῖρε, ἡ μετὰ δόξης τε ὁρθῆς καὶ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ἡδονή τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψευδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἐκάστοις ἤμιον ἐγγιγνομείης;

20 ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν XXIII. ΣΩ. Τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐτῶν ἑπὶ θεωρίαν ἐλθομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγε ὡς τοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τῆς δ’ ἄγω ἃ

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Δόξα, φαμέν, ἤμιν ἐστὶ μὲν ψευδῆς, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπεταὶ μὴν ταῦτας, δ’ νῦν δ’ ἐλέγομεν,

15. ἀπερ ἄκοινο λέγω] “I assert that this is the ordinary use of language.” This is per- haps better than, “I speak as I am prompted by my compa- nions.”
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ. 67

p. 38. ἰδονή καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεὶ καὶ ψευδεὶ δόξη λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα
c ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθ' ἐκάστοτε; 5

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἡρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς ὡδὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον
ηγούμεθα ἵσχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρῳ ἔσεν μὴ πάνυ ἱ
σαφῶς τὰ καθορόμενα ἕμμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν
φαίης ἄν ταῦθ' ἀπερ ὅρα;

ΠΡΩ. Φαίην ἃν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ὦτος
ἀνέροιτ' ἃν ὡδὲ.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Τῇ ποτὲ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ'
δ' ἐστάναι φανταξόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν δένδρων; Ταῦτ' εἰπέων
ἀν τις πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα κατιδών
φαντασθέντα εἰαυτῷ ποτὲ;

ΠΡΩ. Τῇ μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἡρ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος ως ἀποκρινό-
μενος ἃν πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴποι ὡς ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος, ἐπι-
τυχῶς εἰπὼν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παρενεχθεῖσι γ' αὐ τάχ' ἄν ὡς ἔστι τινῶν
ποιμένων ἔργον τὸ καθορόμενον ἁγαλμα προσεῖποι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

5. διαδοξάζειν only occurs in this passage. It seems to be formed on the analogy of διαλέγεσθαι, or διανοεῖσθαι, and expresses either the dialogue with one's self that is presently described, or syllogism from probable premisses.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τὶς γ’ αὐτῷ παρῆ, τά τε πρὸς αὐτὸν π. 38.

ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ εὐταύτ’ ἀν πάλιν βρέχειατο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄν δ’ ἄρα μόνος ἤ τούτῳ ταύτῳ πρὸς αὐτὸν διανοούμενος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλεῖον χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τούτων
gιγνόμενον ὅπερ ἐμοί;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσευκέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεις ἡμιπτῶσα εἰς π. 39.
tαύτῳν, κάκεινα ἀ περὶ ταύτα ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα,

φαίνονται μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαῖς τότε λόγοις· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράψῃ

tοῦτο τὸ πάθημα, δόξα τε ἀληθῆς καὶ λόγοι ἀπ’

αὐτοῦ ἡμιπτῶσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι·

ψευδῇ δ’ ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ’ ἡμῖν γραμματεύς
gράψῃ, τάναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ἰ

ρηθέντα οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχομαι δὴ καὶ ἔτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν
tαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

17. κάκεινα ἀ περὶ ταύτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα] i.e. τὸ δοξαστικὸν, the judgment as concerned with sensuous perceptions. Below, because of its association with sense, it is called τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα. See Appendix D.
ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, διε μετὰ τῶν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.  
ΠΡΩ. Πώς ὅτι τούτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;  
ΣΩ. "Οταν ἀπ᾽ ὄψεως ἡ τινος ἀλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγόν τις τὰς c τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῶ ὀρῇ πως. ἦ τούτο οὐκ ἐστὶ γιγνόμενον παρ’ ἡμῖν;  
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.  
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες ἀληθείς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδείς;  
ΠΡΩ. Παυτάπασιν.  
ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτ’ ὀρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἕτι καὶ τὸδε ἐπὶ τούτως σκεψόμεθα.  
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῦν;  
ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων τὰ θ’ ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελ- λόντων οὐ;  
ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἀπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὠσαύτως.

σ Ἡμεῖς ὡμοίδαι ήδοναὶ ἴσον καὶ λύπαι ἐλέξθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ήδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προνίγουντ’ ἂν, ὡσθ’ ἡμῖν ἐμβαίνει τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ τὸ προλυμπεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον;  
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.  

1. Ζωγράφον κ. τ. λ.] As every act of the intellect is accompanied by Imagination, if Opinion is compared to Writing it must be to Picture-writing.  
16. ταῦθ’ οὕτω πάσχειν] This must refer to ξυμβαίνει βούλεσθαι κρίνειν above, not to the γράμματα and ζωγραφήματα, which will be mentioned presently; or else the same question would be asked twice. Ἐλέξθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, refers to τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδεῶν ἐπιξομένου ἡδῶ, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ἀλγειῶν, §. 18.
As the Hopes of the vicious, i.e. their Imagination and Opinions of future Pleasures, are Real but False, by parity of reason the present Pleasures that those hopes occasion may be False though Real.

25 ΣΩ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἕξωγραφημένα, καὶ τις ὀρᾶ πολλάκις ἐαυτῷ χρυσὸν γενόμενον ἀφθονον καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνε-
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p.40. ζωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφ’ αὐτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα

καθορᾶ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ’ οὖ;  

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἁγαθοῖς

ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ

θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ τὸ πολὺ τού-

ναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα φατέον.  

ΣΩ. Οὔκοιν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἱδοναί γε οὐδὲν ἢττον

πάρεισιν ἐξωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δὲ αὐταί που.  

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

o ΣΩ. Ψευδεῖαν ἁρα ἱδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ

χαίρουσιν, οἱ δ’ ἁγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαίωτατα λέγεις.  

ΣΩ. Εἰσ’ δὴ κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς

τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἱδοναί, μεμμημέναι

μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα· καὶ λῦται δὲ

ἀσαντῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσίν.  

ΣΩ. Οὔκοιν ήν δοξάζειν μὲν οἴτως ἢ ἐκ τὸ τὸ

παραπαν δοξάζωτι, μὴ ἐπ’ οὐσί δὲ μῆδε ἐπὶ γεγονόσι

μηδ’ ἐπὶ ἐσομένοις ἐνίοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.  

d ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα γε ἢν, οἴμαι, τὰ ἄπεργαζομένα

δοξάν ψευδὴ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε

12. The falsely anticipated Pleasure in mistaken Hope may

be called, as here, False Pleasure. This is, however, an

inaccurate expression. It is not the Pleasure, but the anti-

cipation of it, i.e. the Imagi-

nation or Opinion, that is False. Socrates therefore does not

dwell upon this point, although Protarchus allows the expres-

sion to pass.

27. οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύ-

παις τε καὶ ἱδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀν-
καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔξων ἐν ἑκεῖνοις; p. 40.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὡσ ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὀπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῇ χαίροντι, μημὲντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὕσιν μηδὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίστε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἱσως πλευστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι. εἰ

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοίν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἦν εἰπ' περὶ φόβον τε καὶ θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐστιν καὶ ψευδή πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα ἐνίστε; 

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τι δὲ; πονηρᾶς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως ἡ ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἡδονᾶς γ', οἴμαι, κατανοοῦμεν ὡς p. 41. ἄλλως τινὰ τρόπον εἰσὶ πονηραὶ πλὴν τῷ ψευδεις εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν τούναντίοιν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐξηκασ. σχεδον γὰρ τῷ ψευδεί μὲν οὐ πάνω πονηρᾶς ἂν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονᾶς θείη, μεγάλη δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπτιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρᾶς ἡδονᾶς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὕσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον ὑστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ἐτί δοκῇ μῷν τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλου τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούομας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνο-

tίστροφον ἔξων ἐν ἑκεῖνοις;) Comparing ἐν ἑκεῖνοις with εν τοιούτως τιει in the next section, we must suppose that it refers to: ἄντως μὲν, μημὲν ἐπὶ οὐδὲ μηδὲ ἐπὶ γεγονόσιν μηδὲ ἐπὶ ἔσομένοις (not merely to τοῖς μηδὲ οὐσι κ.τ.λ.) and translate: “in respect of those predicates,” i. e. reality and groundlessness. The ἀντίστροφος ἔξω, corresponding condition, will be, that Pleasure and Pain, as well as Opinions, (τοιοῦτον) are susceptible of these predicates.
π. 41. μένας λεκτέων. τούτῳ γὰρ ἵσως χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὰς
κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; εἴπερ γε εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλα, ὃ Πρώταρχε, εἰσὶ κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν.
τούτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα ἐως ἀν κέπται παρ’ ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον 5
ἀνέλεγκτον δήποτε γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

XXV. ΣΩ. Προσιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ
πρὸς τούτον αὖ τὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἱωμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ὅλιγον
c εὐ τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὡς ὅταν αὐτῇ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμία εἰς
ἡμῶν ὀσὶ, δίχα ἅρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς
ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι δειληπταὶ.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προερήθη ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ῥύκον τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἣν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν
tοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἔξων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδονά ἡ
των διὰ πάθος ἠδονήν τὸ σῶμα ἢν τὸ παρεχόμενον ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡ ἡ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

ΣΩ. Γίγνεται τοῦν, ὡπόταν ὧ ταῦτα, ἀμα παρα-
κεῖσθαι λύπασ τε καὶ ἠδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθῆσεις
ἀμα παρ’ ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὁ καὶ
νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν.

5. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα κ.τ.λ.]

"As long as I hold this opinion
(or, you hold the opposite opi-
nion) of course it has a claim
to be examined:" or, giving
with Badham a different sense
to ἐως, "Until this question is
settled, of course it must not
cease to be examined."

25. ὁ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη] i. e. in
§ 21, when Hope or the second
kind of Pleasure was discussed.
ΣΩ. Ούκοιν καὶ τὸδε εἰρήται καὶ συνωμολογή- p. 41. μένον ἡμῖν ἐμπροσθε κείται;
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. Ὁς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἦττον ἁμφω τούτω δέχεσθον, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἶτην.
ΠΡΩ. Εἰρήται τί μήν;
ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν μηχανή ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι;
ΠΡΩ. Πὴ δὴ καὶ πῶς;
ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ βουλήμα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις ταῖς διαγράφοναι βούλεται ἐκάστοτε, τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφοδροτέρα, λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονῆν καὶ λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἡδονή πρὸς ἡδονῆν.
ΠΡΩ. ἈΛΛ' ἔστι ταὐτά τε τοιαύτα καὶ ἡ βουλήσεις τῆς κρίσεως αὐτῆ.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὤψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύ-θεν ὀρᾶν τα μεγέθη τῆν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδή p. 42. ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, ἐν λύπαις δ' ἁρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι ταύτων τούτω γιγνόμενον;
ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὡς Σωκρατεῖς.
ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σμικρῶν ἐμπροσθὲ γέγονεν.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν αἱ δοξαὶ ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὐταὶ γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀμα τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν.
The absence of both Pleasure and Pain, a state which the disciples of Heracleitus may admit to be possible, is allowed that a False pleasure may be Real. In the sentence above, τὸ φανόμενον ἄλλο οὖν ὄν referred to an imagined future or past pleasure which had never been enjoyed or never would be, and therefore was Unreal as well as False.
tau'thν αὐ τήν κατάστασιν ἣδονήν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' p. 42. ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγ-

νόμενον ἡμῶν ἦ;  

ΠΡΩ. Πότε δὲ τοῦτ' ἄν γένοιτο, ὁ Σώκρατες; 

ΣΩ. Ουδὲν πρὸς λόγον εἰσίν, ὁ Πρώταρχε, ὦ σὺ ε

νῦν ἦρου τὸ ἐρωτήμα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διότι τήν ἐμὴν ἐρωτησίν οὐ κωλύει ἐμὲ διερέ-

σθαι σε πάλιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Εἴ δ' οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὁ Πρώταρχε, φήσω,

τὸ τοιούτον, τι ποτε ἀναγκαῖον εῖς αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν

1: ἡμῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἐκάτερα

φής;

ΣΩ. Οὔτως.

ΠΡΩ. Δὴλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὔτε

2ο ἡδονή γίγνοιτ' ἄν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτὲ οὔτ' ἄν τις

λύπη.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἴπεις. ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἴμαι, τόδε p. 43.

λέγεις, ὡς αἱ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἐμμβαίνειν, ὡς

οἱ σοφοὶ φασίν· αἱ γὰρ ἀπαντά άνω τε καὶ κάτω μεί.

1. κατάστασιν] This term is used by Aristotle to define Plea-

sure in his treatise on Rhetoric: ὦποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς ἐνδο-

νής κίνησιν τις ψυχής καὶ κατάστασιν ἀδρόν καὶ ἀληθὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπά-

χουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοιχασίαν. I. XI. He defines it differently

in his Ethics and Psychology.

24. αἱ γὰρ ἀπαντά άνω τε καὶ κάτω μεί] Heraclitus taught

that nature is perpetually changing in a recurrent cycle, all things gradually passing

into their opposites and being reproduced in turn from their decay. If we imagine the

plane of the circle of revolution to be perpendicular, we shall understand why the change is

spoken of as an ascending and descending, or movement up

and down (᾿ιὸδος άνω κάτω). That this was the image we
may gather from the following passage of Diogenes Laertius, from whence we may also learn that the transmutation of elements, which we find in the physical theories of Plato and Aristotle, was originally an idea of Heraclitus. 

"Change he called a road upwards and downwards, and Nature a movement along such a path. Fire liquefies by condensation and compression into Water, and Water solidifies into Earth; and this is the downward road. Earth dissolves into Water, and from Water the rest is reproduced, evaporation from the ocean being the process by which the reproduction is explained; and this is the upward road." Air is not mentioned here, but we find it in another passage, from whence we may infer that the Heraclitean elements were the four afterwards received. "The death of Air is the birth of Water, the death of Water the birth of Earth, the death of Earth the birth of Water, the death of Water the birth of Air."
ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;  
ΣΩ. 'Ωδ' ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀμπεληπτότερον τὸ καὶ λεγόμενον.  
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;  

5 ΣΩ. Ὅς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δ' αὖ μέτριαι τε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ παράπαυσιν οὐδέτερα τούτων.  
ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότερον οὖτος ἡ 'κείνως, ὃ Ὡκρατεῖς.  
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὖτω, πάλιν ὁ νῦν δὴ ῥηθεὶς  

10 βίος ἂν ἦκοι.  
ΠΡΩ. Ποῖος;  
ΣΩ. Ὅν ἄλοπόν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.  
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύσατα λέγεις.  

15 ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθομεν τριττοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἔνα μὲν ἡδίν, τὸν δ' αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δ' ἐνα μηδέτερα. δ' ἡ πῶς ἂν φαίης σὺ περί τούτων;  
ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως ἐγώγη ταύτη, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.  

20 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτὲ ταῦταν τῷ χαίρειν;  
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;  
ΣΩ. Ὄπωταν οὖν ἄκούσῃς ὡς ἠδιστὸν πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἀπαντά, τί τὸ β' ὑπο-  

25 λαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;  
ΠΡΩ. Ἡδὺ λέγειν φαίνεσται ἐμοίγε οὖτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.  
ΣΩ. Τριῶν οὖν ἄντων ἡμῖν, ἄντων βούλει, τίθει, καλλίστων ἴνα ὁνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσὸν, τὸ δ' ἐ  

30 ἂργυρον, τρίτων δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων.  

5. αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι, &c. See the passage from the Timeæus quoted in the note, p. 31, d.
p. 43. ***PRΩ.*** Κείται.

***ΣΩ.*** Τὸ δὲ µηδέτερα τούτων ἐσθ’ ἡµῖν ὀπως θάτερα γένοιτ’ ἄν, χρυσὸς ἡ ἄργυρος;

***PRΩ.*** Καὶ πῶς ἄν;

***ΣΩ.*** Οὐδ’ ἀρα ὁ µέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἡ λυπηρὸς λεγό-ς µενος ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε οὔτ’ εἰ δοξάζοι tis, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτ’ εἰ λέγοι, λεχθείη, κατά γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

***PRΩ.*** Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

***ΣΩ.*** Ἀλλὰ µὴν, ὡς ἑταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῖτα καὶ

p. 44. δοξάζοντων αἰσθανόµεθα.

***PRΩ.*** Καὶ µάλα.

***ΣΩ.*** Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴνοται τότε, ὅταν µὴ λυπῶνται;

7. κατά γε τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων] ὀρθῶς λόγος generally means “right reason,” but here, as there is an evident allusion to the antithesis established above between λόγος and δόξα, it is used by a sort of play upon words for “right speech.” The thought that the absence of Pain is mistaken for Pleasure, and that which is expressed below, that the intensest Pleasures are alloyed with Pain, and, in general, the Falseness of these Pleasures, is developed in the Republic, the same definition of Pleasure being assumed as was given above. The intermediate state, the absence of Pleasure and Pain, is compared to a middle point, the ascending from which is true Pleasure, and descending true Pain: but the rising to the middle from a lower point, or the renovation of the impaired bodily frame, is not genuine or true, but only apparent Pleasure. “Ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθὴς ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἱδώνη πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου, οὐδὲ καθαρά ἀλλ’ ἐσκιγμαφηµένη τις, ὥς ἐγὼ δοκό µοι τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηκοέναι, ἀλλὰ µέντοι, εἰπὼν, αἶ γε διὰ τοῦ σώµατος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσα καὶ λεγόμεναι ἠδοναί, σχεδὸν αἰ πλείστα τε καὶ µέγι- στα, τούτοι τοῦ εἰδους εἰσι, λυπῶν τινές ἀπαλλαγαί... ἀρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγ- κη καὶ ἠδοναίς συνεύομες μεµγυµέναις λύπαις, εἰδῶλως τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἠδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιγμαφηµέναις, ἵπτο τῆς παρ’ ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχραµανµέναις ὥστε σφοδρῶς ἐκατέρας φαίνεσθαι; 9, p. 583. “No Pleasures but those of the wise are quite true or pure, but painted imitations, as I think I have heard from some Philosopher... For the Pleasures, so called, that come to the soul from the body, the most numerous and greatest, are of this sort, deliverances from Pain...Does it not follow that they are mixed with Pain, and merely phantoms of Pleasure, and painted copies exaggerated by juxtaposition?”
The same school that has defined Pleasure to be the assuagement of Pain, has directed our attention to the fact that the Greatest Pleasures are those which are Morbid and Indecorous. Now we are expressly told that Antisthenes abstained from Physical speculation: 'Αρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς (τοῖς Κυνικοῖς) τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περι- αρείν...μόνο δὲ προσέχειν τῷ θικῷ. Diog. L. 6, 103: and the affinity of the Megarians to the Eleatics, with their logical subtleties, which procured them the name of Sophists, 'Ερεστικοί, makes it improbable that they were addicted even to abstract Physical speculations.
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 44. ΠΡΩ. Τούτοις οὐν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ξυμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὁ Σῶκρατες;

δ ΣΩ. Οὐκέ, ἀλλ' ὀσπέρ μάντεσθι προσχρησθαι τισι, μαντευομένους οὐ τέχνη ἀλλά τινι δυσχερεία φύσεως οὐκ ἄγεννοις, λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἱδονῆς δυ-5 ναμὶ καὶ νεομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγίες, ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν, γοήτευμα, οὐχ ἱδονῆν, εἰναι.

d τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταύτα ἄν προσχρήσασθι, σκεφάμενος ἐτί καὶ τὰλλα αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα αἴ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἱδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰναι, πεύσει, ἵνα 10 ἔξ ἀμφότεροι τῶν λόγων σκεφάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραβώμεθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτοις ὀσπέρ ξυμμάχους, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἱχνος. οἶμαι γὰρ τοι-15 ὀνδὲ τι λέγειν αὐτοὺς, ἄρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς εἰ βουληθείμεν ὡσον έιδοὺς τὴν φύσιν ιδεῖν, οἴον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀπο-βλέποντεσ οὕτως ἄν μᾶλλον συνυφάσαμεν ἡ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι; δεὶ δὴ σε, ὁ Πρώταρχε, 20 καθάπερ ἐμοὶ, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχεράινουσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γε αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.

6. νεομικότων οὐδέν ὑγίες] ὑγίες does not mean "salubrious" or "salutary," but "genuine," "solid," "real," as opposed to "hollow," "counterfeit," "illusory."

24. This postulate, as immediately interpreted, is inconsistent with one presently made, p. 53, a, b, c, which must be regarded as Plato’s own opinion: that, to discover the true character of any element, we must examine it, not in its greatest masses, which may possibly be impure, but, in its state of purity, and when all foreign elements have been completely eliminated. This axiom, indeed, is the basis both of induction and of scientific deduction, the one isolating the phenomenon, the other the idea or law.
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ΣΩ. Οὕκον εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱδονῆς γένος ἴδειν p. 44. ἦπινα ποτὲ ἔχει φύσιν βουληθείμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολ- λοστὰς ἱδονᾶς ἀποβλεπτέον ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας p. 45. καὶ σφοδροτάτας λεγομένας.

5 ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς ἂν σοι ταύτη συγχωροῖν τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροι αὕτερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν ἱδονῶν, ὁ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν αὕται;

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς γὰρ οὐ;

10 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν μείζους εἰσὶ καὶ γίγνονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας εὖ ταῖς νόσοις ἡ περὶ ἱγαίνοντας; εὐλαβηθώμεν δὲ μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταῖσω- μένη πη. τάχα γὰρ ἵσως φαίμεν οὖν περὶ ἱγαίνοντας.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκὸς γε.

15 ΣΩ. Τί δ'; οὐχ αὕται τῶν ἱδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, δὲν ἂν καὶ ἐπιθυμιάμεν μέγιστα προγίγνονται;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασι εἴχομεν μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ ῥέγουσι, καὶ

20 πάντα ὅπόσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλον τ' ἐνδείᾳ ξυγγίγνονται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων μείζους ἱδονᾶς ἱσχοῦσιν; ἡ τούτο οὐ φήσομεν ἀλη- θῆς εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν νῦν ῥήθην φαίνεται.

25 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅρθως ἂν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες ὡς εἰς τὸς τῆς μεγίστας ἱδονᾶς ἴδειν βούλοιτο, οὖν εἰς υγίειν ἀλλ' εἰς νόσον ἱούτας δεὶ σκοπεῖν; ὡρὰ δὲ, μὴ με ἡγη διανοούμενον ἐρωτᾶν σε ἐς πλεῖω χαίροντιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν ἱγαίνοντων, ἀλλ' οἶνον μέγεθος με

30 ζητεῖν ἱδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ ποτὲ γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε. νοῦσαι γὰρ δεῖν φαμὲν ἤμνων φύσιν ἔχει καὶ τίνα λέγοντιν οἱ φάσκοντες μὴ εἶναι δ ἐδ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὴν.
p. 45. ΠΡΩ. Ἐναλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐπομαύ τῷ λόγῳ σου.

XXVIII. ΣΩ. Τάχα, ὁ Πρῶταρχε, οὐχ ἢπτων δείξεις. ἀποκρινεῖ γάρ ἐν ὑβρεὶ μείζους ἠδονάς, οὐ πλείους λέγω, τῷ σφόδρα δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας ὀργῆ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ; λέγε δὲ προσέ-χων τὸν νοῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐναλλῇ ἔμαθον οἱ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον ὑπὼν. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονας ποὺ καὶ ὁ παρου- ε μιαζόμενος ἔπισχε λόγον ἐκάστοτε, ὁ τὸ μηδὲν ἂγαν παρακελευόμενος, ὃ πείθονται· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων ἀπεκδοσύνη καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἡ σφοδρὰ ἠδονὴ κατεχοῦσα περιβούτοις ἀπεργάζεται.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· καὶ εἰ γε ταῦθ᾽ οὔτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἐν ταῖς ποιηρίας ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ′ οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ μέγισται μὲν ἠδονάς, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦται

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅμως, οὐχόν τούτων τινὰς προελόμενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐχούσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

p. 46. ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶν νοσημάτων ἠδονάς, τίνα ποτὲ ἔχοσι τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποία φέρει;

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ὅσι ὡσ καὶ ἀεί περιφέρεις παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποία φέρει;

If we consider any instance of these we shall see how dependent the Pleasure is upon an antecedent and concomitant Pain, and how Mixed the resultant sensation is.

Theognis has expressed the same:

5. ὁ παρουμαζόμενος λόγος

뎨 Ἀκαδημάμονος Χιλίων σοφός, ὅ τὸς ἐλέσει,

μηδὲν ἄγαν, καίρῳ πάντα προσέστι καλά.

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ΣΩ. Οἴον τὰς τῆς ψώρας ιάσεις τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ π. 46. οὕτα τουάτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάθος ἦμῖν, ὃ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φῶμεν ἔγγυνεσθαι; πότερον ἠδονήν ἡ λύπην;

ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τούτο γ’ ἀρ’, ὃ Σῶκρατες, έοικε γίγνεσθαι τι κακόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ Φιλήβου γε ένεκα παρεθέμην τοῦ ἐλάντων' ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων, ὁ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἠδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύτας ἐπομένων, ἄν μὴ κατοφθόσι, σχέδον

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἰτέον ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων ἐγγυγεῖς.

ΣΩ. Τὰς ἐν τῇ μίξει κοινωνοῦσας λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ τούνων μίξεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δ' αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τὰς δ' αὐ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρή- ε σομεν ὠίπα ἠδοναῖς μιχθείσας, τοτε μὲν ἠδονὰς τὰ ἐξαιμφότερα τοτε ἐδ λύπας ἐπικαλομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὁπόταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις τῇ διαφθορᾷ τάναντι ἀμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ ριγῶν θέρηται καὶ θερμαίωμενος ἐνίοτε ψυχήται, ξητῶν, οἴμαι, τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικροὶ

γυλυκοὶ μεμυγμένοι, μετὰ δυσπαπαλλακτίας παρὼν, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὅστερον ἐξύντασιν ἀγριῶν ποιεῖ.
8. γαρ

internal throbbing or irritation. It is described in the next sentence, but it is not obvious what ailment is meant.

10. κυψεί] Heusde's conjecture for the κυψεί of the MSS.

11. τότε φέροντες—παρέσχοντο] "then, by exposing the external parts to fire, or rushing back for the chance of relief to the extreme of cold, the sufferer occasions to the inner parts excessive pleasure, and sometimes the reverse, mixed with pain or pleasure of the outer parts as the balance may incline." Πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας, ἡδονᾶς, is an asyndeton for πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας ἡ ἡδονᾶς, of which εἰς ὅποτε' ἄν βέβηγη is an epexegeesis. Of course λύπας corresponds to the preceding ἡδονᾶς, and the second ἡδονᾶς to τούναυτίον, ἕξεγερσεις agrees with the first ἡδονᾶς.
παντοῖα δὲ σχῆματα, παντοῖα δὲ πνεύματα ἀπεργαζό- p. 47. μενον πᾶσαν ἐκπληξὶν καὶ ὑοίς μετ᾽ ἀφροσύνης ἐνεργαζέται.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγεις γε, ὦ ἔταιρε, αὐτὸν τε περὶ ἑαυ-
τοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου, ὃς ταύτας ταῖς ἡδοναῖς
tερπόμενος οἰον ἀποθνησκεῖ· καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ παν-
tάπασιν αἰὲ μεταδιώκει τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ ἄν ἀκολαστότερος τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος οὖν τυγχάνῃ.

10 καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν ταύτας ὃ
tι μάλιστ' αἰὲ ἤστα ηὐδαμονέστατον καταραθμεῖται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὦ Σόκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς
tῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέρανας.

ΣΩ. Περὶ γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν
15 τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπι-
πολῆς τε καὶ ἐντὸς κερασθέντων· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν
ψυχῇ σώματι τάναντια ξυμβάλλεται, λύπην τε ἄμα
πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην, ὡστ' εἰς μίαν
ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν ἴσην, ταῦτα ἐμπροσθε μὲν δήλ-
20 θομεῖ, ὡς ὅπωταν αὖ κενωτάι πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμεῖ,
καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενοῦμενος δὲ ἀλγεῖ, ταῦτα
dὲ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐμαρτυράμεθα, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν, ὅσ δ
ψυχῆς πρὸς τῷ σῶμα διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πλή-

25 θεὶς ἀμηχανίοις οὕσι μίξεων μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύεις ὀρθότατα λέγειν.

XXIX. ΣΩ. Ἐτι τούνῳ ἦμιν τῶν μίξεων λύπης
tε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπῇ μία.

We have now examined two kinds of
p. 47. ΠΡΩ. Πολυν, φήσι;  
ΣΩ. Ἡν αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σύγκρασιν ἐφαμεν.  
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ τούτ’ αὐτὸ λέγομεν;  
ΣΩ. Ὁργῆν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρήνον καὶ έρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὁσα τοιαῦτα, ἃρ’ οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύτας τινάς;  
ΠΡΩ. Ἕγογε.  
ΣΩ. Οὐκόνων αὐτὰς ἴδονών μεστὰς εὑρίσκομεν αμηχάνον; ἢ δεόμεθα ὑπομμηνήκεσθαι τὸ ὁς τ’ ἐφένεκε πολύφρονα περ χαλεπθῆναι, ὦς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μελίτως καταλείβομενοι,  
p. 48. καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἴδονάς ἐν λύτας οὐσας ἀναμεμφιομένας;  
ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ’ οὕτω ταύτα γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν ἔμμεθανοι γιγνόμενα.  
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἄμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησαι;  
ΠΡΩ. Τι δ’ οὐ;  
ΣΩ. Τὴν δ’ ἐν ταῖς κομῳδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἃρ’ οὐσθ’ ὡς ἐστὶ κἀν τούτως μίξεις λύπης τε καὶ ἴδουης;  
ΠΡΩ. Οὐ πάνυ κατανοῶ.  
b ΣΩ. Παντάπασι γὰρ οὖν ῥάδιον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐν τούτῳ ξυννυεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε πάθος.  
ΠΡΩ. Οὐκούν ὡς γ’ ἐοίκεν ἐμοὶ.  
ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσοῦτο τὰλλον, ὡς σκοτεινότερον ἔστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλως ῥάδον καταμαθεῖν τις αἰδός τ’ ἣ μίξειν λύπης τε καὶ ἴδουης.  
ΠΡΩ. Λέγοις ἄν.

Mixed Pleasures: those in which both the Pleasure and the Pain are Corporeal, and those in which one sensation is Corporeal, the other Mental; a third kind of Mixed sensations remains, namely, those which are purely Mental. If we examine as an instance of these the emotion that attends the perception of the Ludicrous we shall find that it always contains a Mixture of contrary feelings.
ΣΩ. Τό τοι νῦν δή ῥηθέν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα p. 48. λύτην τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς;
ΠΡΩ. Οὗτός.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν 5πέλας ἱδόμενος ἀναφανὴσεται.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Κακῶν μὴν ἀγνοια καὶ ἢν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέ- 
ραν ἐξιν.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
10 ΣΩ. 'Εκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἡμτινα φύσιν 
ἐχει.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.
ΣΩ. 'Εστι δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον 
ἐξεὼς τινὸς ἐπίκλην λεγομένη· τῆς δ' αὖ πάσης ποιη- 
15ρίας ἐστὶ τοῦνατίον πάθος ἐχου ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ύπὸ 
tῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμµάτων.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ γνώθι σαυτόν λέγεις, ὥ Σῶκρατες;
ΣΩ. 'Εγώγε. τοῦνατίον μὴν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἀ 
μηδαµῇ γιγνώσκειν αὐτόν [λεγόμενον ύπὸ τοῦ γράμ- 
20ματος] ἀν εἴη.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. 'Ο Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὴ αὐτὸ τούτο τριχῇ 
tέμνειν.

13. "Εστι δὴ πονηρία, &c. Πο- 
νηρία τις ἐξεὼς τινός, is used for 
eίδος τις πονηρώς ἐξεὼς τινός, "a 
subdivision of a species of vice." 
See below : ἢ μὴ φῶμεν τὴν τῶν 
φίλων ἐξιν ταύτην οταν ἐχὴ τις τὴν 
ἀθλαζῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις γελοῖοι εἶναι;
Mischievous self-delusions are 
objects of Fear or Hate, harm-
less of Laughter.
'Επίκλην expresses a specific 
name that distinguishes one 
species from another. So in 
the Timaeus: ἀέρος τὸ μὲν εὐα-
γέστατον ἐπίκλην αἰθήρ καλούμενος 
ὧ δὲ θυλερότατος ὁμίληκ τε καὶ 
σκότος, ἔτερά τε ἀνώνυμα εἴδη; p. 
76. Compare below: καὶ ὅσοι 
mὲν αὐτῶν μὲτ' ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι 
γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τά-
ληθη φθέγξει: τους δὲ δινατοὺς 
tιμωρεῖσθαι φοβεροῖς καὶ ἐχθροῖς 
προσαγορεύων ὁρθότατον τοῦτον 
σαυτῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις.
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 48. ΠΡΩ. Πῇ φῆς; οὖ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὁ.
ΣΩ. Λέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τούτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν;
ΠΡΩ. Λέγω, καὶ δεῦμαι ἵνα πρὸς τῷ λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τῶν ἁγινουόμενων αὐτοὺς κατὰ τρία ἀνάγχη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχει ἐκαστὸν;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρῆματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι ε ἀπολυσίατορον ἣ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν.
ΠΡΩ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰςὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες.
ΣΩ. Πλείουσι δὲ γε, οἷς μεῖξοι καὶ καλλίους αὐτοὺς δοξάζομεν, καὶ πάντα ὡστα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι διαφερόμενος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.
ΣΩ. Πολὺ δὲ πλεῖστοι γε, οἷμαι περὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐδῶς τοῦτον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς δημαρτήκασιν, ἀρετὴν δοξάζομεν διελεύομεν έαυτοὺς, οὐκ ὄντες.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

p. 49. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἀρ' οὐ σοφίας περὶ τὸ πλῆθος πάντως ἀντεχόμενου μεστῶν ἔριδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ σειευόνυς;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖν;
ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἀν τίς τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀρθῶς ἄν εἰποί πάθος.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοῖς ἐτὶ διαιρετέου, ὁ Προτάρχη, δίκα, εἰ μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἱδόντες φθόνον ἀτοπον ἕδονης καὶ λύτης ὑψεσθαι μίξιν.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν τέμνομεν δίκα, λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Πάντες ὡστοὺς ταῦτην τὴν ψευδή δόξαν περὶ ἐαυτῶν ἀνοῆτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἀπαντῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἐπεσθαί τοῖς μὲν
ρόμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δὲ, ὡμια, τοῦ- p. 49. ναυτίον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη τοιών δέλε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσὶ 5 μετ' ᾠσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελάμενοι τιμορείσθαι, γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τάληθη φθέγξει· τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμορεῖσθαι φοβεροὺς καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἐχθροὺς προσαγορεύων ὀρθότατον τοῦ- e των σαυτῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. ἀγνοια γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἀισχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά· βλαβερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλαγι αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσίν· ἡ δ' ἀσθενὴς ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἰλήχε τάξεων τε καὶ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὡρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἡδο-
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ. 91

p. 49. νῦν καὶ λυπῶν μίξις εἰν τούτοις οὖπω μοι κατα-φανῆς.
ΣΩ. Τήν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνων.
ΣΩ. Λύπη τις ἀδικὸς ἐστὶ που καὶ Ὕδωνή; 5
ΠΡΩ. Τούτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἔχθρών κακοῖς οὐτ ἀδικοῦν οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστὶ τὸ χαίρειν;
ΠΡΩ. Τὶ μὴν;
ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ γε τῶν φίλων ὀρὼντας ἐστὶν ὦτε κακὰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δὲ ἄρ’ οὐκ ἀδικὸν ἐστὶν;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὔ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν ἁγνοίαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πάσιν;
ΠΡΩ. ὂρϑός.
ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσφίαν καὶ δοξο- ο καλίαν καὶ ὅσα νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶ λέγοντες εἴσει γίγνεσθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὁπόσ’ ἄσθενη, μισητὰ δ’ ὁπόσα ἐρρωμένα. ἣ μὴ φῶμεν ὀπερ ἔπον ἀρτὶ, τὴν τῶν φίλων ἔξιν ταῦτην, ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν ἀβλαβὴ 20 τοῖς ἅλλοις, γελοίαν εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Κακὸν δ’ οὐχ ὀμολογοῦμεν αὐτῆ, ἁγνοίαν οὔσαν, εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Χαίρομεν δὲ ἣ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ’ αὐτῇ γελῶμεν;
p. 50. ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.
ΣΩ. Ἡδονήν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἐφαμέν εἶναι τὸν τούτο ἁπεργαζόμενον;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Γελῶντας ἅρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων
N 2
We have now examined the three kinds of Mixed Pleasures, and investigating their attributes have found them to be False, Superlatively Great, (Unmeasured) and Morbid or Vicious, (Unbeautiful).
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 50. ΠΡΩ. Και πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Διὰ δὴ τῷ μάλιστ' ὑπολαμβάνεις με δείξαι σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μίξιν; ἃρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν ὅτι τὴν γε ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ράδιοι κράσωσ ἐπιδείξαι; λαβώντα δὲ τούτῳ παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφεῖναι με μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἱόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σώμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχῇ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κουνή μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἱδονῆς λύπας; νῦν οὖν λέγει, πότερα ἀφίης ἰο με ἡ μέσας ποιήσεις νῦκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαι σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναι με τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων ἐαυτοῦ ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἦν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει.

ΠΡΩ. Καλὸς εἶπες, ὁ Σῶκρατες· ἀλλ' ὡσα λοιπὰ ἴμῖν διέξελθε ὅπῃ σοι φίλον.

XXXI. ΣΩ. Κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μυκ-

θείας ἱδονὰς ὑπὸ δὴ τῖνος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμίκτους πορευόμεθ' ἀν ἐν τῷ μέρει.

p. 51. ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες.

ΣΩ. 'Εγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταβαλῶν σημαίνειν ὑμῖν αὐτάς. τοῖς γὰρ φάσκοντι λυπῶν ἐικὼν παύλαν πάσας τὰς ἱδονὰς οὐ πάνυ πῶς πείθομαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐπον, μάρτυς καταχρώμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἱδονὰς

3. ἃρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν] There is a conversational carelessness here: πίστεως χάριν followed by ὅτι ράδιον, must be translated "to convince," by ἀφείναι, "to induce:" unless we govern ἀφεί-

ναι by δεῖν, as Badham proposes.

11. μέσας ποιήσεις νῦκτας] "argue till midnight." Stall-

baum quotes from the Antho-

logy: νῦκτα μέσην ἐποίησε τρέχων ποτὲ Μάρκος ὀπλίτης, "ran till midnight."

25. πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἱδονὰς] "that some apparent but un-

real pleasures, and others seem-

ingly great and numerous are, for all their appearance, mix-

tures, &c." Πρὸς τὸ must ap-

parently be joined with εἶναι δ'
εἶναι δοκούσας, οὕτως δ’ οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἐτέρας π. 51. τίνας ἀμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, εἶναι δ’ αὐτὰς συμπεριφυμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τοι σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς 5 ἀπορίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεῖς δ’ αὖ τίνας, ὥ Σόκρατες, ὑπολαμ- βάνων ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτ’ ἄν; 

ΣΩ. Τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας, καὶ ὁτάς τῶν φθόγγων, καὶ ὅσα τὰ ἐνδείας ἀναστήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἄλυτους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδουσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ ταύτα, ὥ Σόκρατες, αὖ λέγομεν οὕτως ; 

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς δηλὰ ἐστιν ἄ λέγω, πειρατέον μὴν δηλοῦν. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ε

aὐτὰς, though it is an inaccuracy to say that the first set of pleasures, i.e. the relief of pain (λυπῶν ἀποφυγαὶ) are mixed with the relief of pain (ἀναπαύσεων ὀδυνῶν). In εἶναι δ’ aὐτὰς, δὲ marks the apodosis, and aὐτὰς may be translated “nevertheless,” “all the while.” Ὑπολαμβάνω must be taken not with ἐτέρας, as part of the subject, but with μεγάλας, as part of the predicate. Τὸ πολὺ is an element of the ἀπειρόν, to which class Pleasure has been referred. The number, quantity (πλῆθος) of the pleasures of sense was insisted on by Philebus above, p. 27 e. See also below: τὰ ποτὲ χρή φάναι πρῶς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ εἰλικρινές, ἢ τὸ πολὺ ; and: πῶς οὖν ἄν λευκὸν καὶ τὸς καθιστής ἢμῖν εἶν; πότερα τὸ... πλεῖστον, ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον. 

15. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος κ. τ. λ.] The Beauty of the sphere is referred in the Timæus to its equality and similarity, species of Unity: which in the discussion of the Limit (πέρας) we have already found identified with Goodness. Διό καὶ σφαίρας ἐκ Μέσου πάντῃ πρὸς τὰς τελευταῖς ἰσόν ἀπέχουν, κυκλοτερῆς αὐτὸ ἐτορεύσατο, πάντων τελεώτατον ἀνοικτῶς τὲ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν σχημάτων, νομίσας μυρίω κάλλιον ὀμοίων ἀνομίων, p. 52 D. "He gave the universe a spherical form, having a middle point equidistant from every part of the circumference, and perfectly round as if produced by the turning lathe, of all figures the most perfect and self-similar, because he deemed there is ten thousand times more beauty in similarity than in dissimilarity."
The emendation of Heusde for κυήσεων.

This is Stallbaum’s conjecture. The MSS. give λέγω δή τῶν φωνών, which is unmeaning. It is difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of words which express sensations. A smooth sound (λεία opposed to τραχεία) is said in the Timeus to be óμοια καὶ ὀμαλὴ, i.e. produced by a succession of regular and equable pulsations. This is properly the definition of a sweet or musical sound. Λαμπρὰ φωνή, a clear, brilliant, voice, is said by Aristotle, de Audibilibus, to be pure, full, and piercing. Λαμπραί δέ εἶσιν ἀι σαφεῖς καὶ πυκναί καὶ καθαραί καὶ πόρρω δυναμεῖαι διατείνειν. He opposes it to τυφλή, a muffled, and κωφή, a dying sound.

The cause of painlessness in these cases is said in the Timeus to be the gradual and insensible degradation of the organ. See note p. 31, d.
4. "Ετι δὴ τοίνυν] So we read in the N. Ethics. Καὶ ἄκει λυπής καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἤδονας, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργεια τῆς φύ- σεως οὐκ ἐνδόεισιν. 7, 12. "Distress and craving do not prece- de all pleasures, not intellec- tual activities for instance, as the natural state is not de- fective." In another passage Aristotle alludes to the other classes of Unmixed Pleasures: ἡ δόξα δ’ αὐτή δοκεῖ γεγενήσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν λυπῶν καὶ ἤδονων. ἐνδεῖς γὰρ γεγομένους καὶ προκυπτῆσαι ἠδεσθαι τῇ ἀνα- πληρώσει, τούτῳ δ’ οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἤδονας. Ἀλλού γὰρ εἶσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὁσ- φρήσεως, καὶ ἀκρόφιστα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα, πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὐτὰ γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδένος γὰρ ἐνεία γεγέ- νηται οὐ γένοτ’ ἀν ἀναπληρώσεις. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. "The opin- ion that Pleasure is a process of Becoming seems based on the nutritive Pleasures and Pains, where want and Pain precede, and Pleasure attends the supply. But it is not al- ways so. There is no Pain in intellectual Pleasures; nor, among the Pleasures of sense, in those of smell, hearing, or vision; nor in a great number of memories and hopes. How then can these be processes of Becoming, or where is there a want to be supplied?" Indeed the whole division of Pleasures given in this dialogue is adopted by Aristotle, and may be traced in the arrangement of his Ethics. In Book 3. c. 10, he divides Pleasures into Bodily or Sensational (σωματικαί) and Mental (ψυχικαί). He separates from the Sensational those belonging to Touch and Taste, and makes them subjects of Temperance and Intemperance, (and Book 7. c. 4.) of the principal form of Continece and Incontinence. Here we have Plato's two first classes of Mixed Pleasures. He divides the Mental into Intel- lectual and Emotional, instanced by the Pleasures of Knowledge (φιλομαθεία) and Ambition (φιλο- τιμία); and makes the latter the subjects of the other Vir- tues and Vices, and of the se- condary forms of Continece and Incontinence. These cor- respond to Plato's third class of Mixed Pleasures. The In- tellectual and remaining Sensational Pleasures correspond to Plato's three classes of Un- mixed Pleasures.
13. οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων] This is said because the abundance (πληθος, i. e. ἀπερία) of sensual Pleasures was insisted on by Philebus.

18. προσθῶμεν . . . ἐμετρίαν] Here too Aristotle follows closely the doctrine of the Philebus, using the terms capability or incapability of Excess, instead of the Platonic Measure or want of Measure. Thus of the Unmixed Pleasures he says: αἱ ἄνευ λύπης (ἥδονας) οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολὴν. Nic. Eth. 7, 14. Though he seems to say in another place that the Unmixed Sensational Pleasures are susceptible of Excess though it does not amount to Vice. Οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὧψεως, οἷον χρώματι καὶ σχήματι καὶ γραφῇ, οὐτε σῶφρονες οὐτε ἀκολαστοὶ λέγονται: καὶ τὰ δόξειν αὐτὲν εἶναι καὶ ὡς ἐγείρειν καὶ τοῦτος καὶ θυρίδα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆν ἀκόην τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένους χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ἐποκρίσει οὐδεὶς ἀκολαστοὺς λέγει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σῶφρονας, οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὑσμήν. ib. 3, 10. "Delight in objects of vision, colours, forms, paintings, is not called Temperance or Intemperance. Yet here too apparently there is a right degree and excess and defect. And so with the objects of hearing. Excessive delight in music or eloquence is never called Intem-
perance, nor the right degree of Temperance. And so of the pleasures of smell." All the Mixed Pleasures on the contrary are susceptible of Excess. Of those of touch and taste he says: "Γάρ οἱ ἐξεῖς καὶ κυνήγεσιν ὅσων μή ἐστί τοῦ βελτίωνος ὑπερβολῆς, οὐδὲ τῆς ἱδονῆς, ὅσῳ δ' ἐστὶν, καὶ τῆς ἱδονῆς ἐστὶν: τῶν δὲ οἰκοματικῶν ἁγίων ἐστίν ὑπερβολῆ, καὶ ὁ φαινόμεν τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὕς τὰς ἀναγκαίας."

ib. 7, 14. "If a moral state or course of action cannot be increased beyond the limit of what is good, no more can the corresponding pleasure: but bodily goods are capable of Excess, and the vicious pursue the Excess instead of the necessary degree." The Emotional Pleasures are susceptible of Excess, but not of so immoral an Excess as the former. "Επεί δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαία τῶν ποιοῦντων ἱδονῆς τὰ δ' ἀρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἐχοῦσα δ' ὑπερβολῆ... λέγω δὲ οἷον νῖκην, τιμῆν, πλούτον καὶ τὰ ταυτά τῶν ἁγίων καὶ ἱδέων τῶν μὲν οὕς πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ἁρδεὺν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄπλος μὲν οὐ λέγωμεν ἄκρατεσ προσπιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἄκρατεσ καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ."

ib. 7, 4. "Sometimes the causes of pleasure are necessary of life, at others things essentially desirable but capable of Excess, as superiority, honour, riches, and this class of things good and pleasant. In the latter case when right reason is exceeded in spite of her monitions, the word Incontinence cannot be applied without qualification, but the subject must be added, as Incontinence of anger, of the desire of riches, of gain, of honour." And again: "Επεί δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ τῶν ἱδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τῷ γενέσθαι καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων, τῶν ἴματων ἕνας φύσει ἀρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ... πρὸς ἀπαντα δή καὶ τὰ ταυτά (τὰ φύσει ἀρετά) καὶ τὰ μεταξύ οὗ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέχονται ἀλλ' τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν."

ib. "As the causes of appetite and pleasure are sometimes 'essentially beautiful and good, and naturally desirable, at other times the reverse (the objects of brutal or diseased appetite, θρησκεία) at others again intermediate (the subjects of temperance, above called the necessaries of life); in the first and third class it is not the emotion or desire or love that is to blame, but the degree of these affections when they are excessive.'"

6. If, as Badham proposes, we read γενεάς for γένους, the reading of the MSS., no other alteration is necessary. Τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν is equivalent to
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 52.  ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθότατα λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. 'Επὶ τούτων πρὸς τούτων μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ δὲ αὐτῶν διαθεσάτεν,

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χρῆ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τὸς καθαρόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινές, ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ ἑκατόν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί ποτ' ἀρα, ὧν Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾶσ βουλό-

μενος;

ΣΩ. Μηδέν, ὥς Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχον ἐθεδουνῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀρ' αὐτῶν ἐκα-

tέρον καθαρὸν ἐστι, τὸ δ' οὐ καθαρὸν, ἢν καθαρὸν ἐκάτερον ἵνα εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν ἔμοι καὶ σοί καὶ ἐξυνάπτασι

tοῖσδε ρᾶω παρέχῃ τὴν κράσιν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθότατα.

ΣΩ. Ἡθι δή, περὶ πάντων, ὡσα καθαρὰ γένη

λέγομεν, οὔτωσι διανοηθόμεν ἀρχοντικόμενοι πρῶτον

Ρ. 53. ἐν τι διασκοπῶμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν προελόμεθα;

ΣΩ. Τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι, εἰ βούλει, θεασώ-

μεθα γένος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν λευκὸ καὶ τὶς καθαρότης ἡμῶν

eἰῃ; πότερα τὸ μέγιστον τε καὶ πλεῖστον ἡ τὸ ἀκρα-

tᾶς μεγαλὰς καὶ τὰς σφοδρὰς, and

aιτίας will refer to the whole
genus of Pleasure. Socrates
thus corrects the statement of
Philebus § xv, that the whole
genus of Pleasure belongs to the
class of Infinites and says that
only those which admit of ex-
cess belong to this class. This
reference to Philebus explains
the force of ge after ἀπείρον.

16. κρᾶσιν] This is Badham's
proposal for the κρίσις of the
MSS. The diversities of purity
are forgotten when we come to
the κρίσις (which thus, indeed,
becomes less satisfactory) but
are made of great importance
in the κρᾶσις.

20. διανοηθόμεν] "inquire,"
"investigate."
πλατωνος

téstata, ἐν δ' χρώματος μηδεμία μοῖρα ἄλλη μηδε- p. 53. νὸς ἐνείη;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστ' εἰλικρινές ὄν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο ἀληθεστατον, ὥς Πρῶταρχε, καὶ ἄμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων θήσομεν, ἀλλ' οὖ τὸ πλείστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον;

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθοτατά γε.

ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμιγμένου πολλοῦ λευκοῦ λευκότερον ἄμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον εὰν φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν Ὅρθως.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθοτατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐ δὴ τοὺς πολλὰς δεισόμεθα παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ἱδονῆς πέρι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἄρκει νοεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ξύμπασα ἱδονή σμικρὰ μεγάλης καὶ ὀλίγη πολλῆς καὶ καθαρὰ λύπης ἡδίων καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων γίγνοιτ' οὖ τινιν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τὸ γε παράδειγμα ἰκανῶν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸ τοιώδε; ἄρα περὶ ἱδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς αἰ γένεσις ἐστιν, οὔσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἱδονῆς; κοµψοί γὰρ δὴ τινές αὐτὸ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἰς δὲι χάριν ἔχειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Διαπερανοῦμαι σοι τούτ' αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτῶν, ὥς Πρῶταρχε φίλε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον.

23. κοµψοί γὰρ δὴ κ. τ. λ. ] The person alluded to is Aristippus: we are told he defined Pleasure to be a smooth movement, Pain a rough movement (in the sense of tient organ): τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἱδονήν τῶν δὲ πόνου τραχείαν κίνησιν. Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. 14, 18. γένεσις is a species of κίνησις.
If we now, by way of parenthesis, reconsider our first problem, we may infer from the Cyrenaic definition of Pleasure, which makes it a certain Process of Becoming, that no Pleasure can be an absolute End, or what is synonymous, a Good.

12. ἀν ἄν ἔννεπεν ἄλλα, ἂν ἐν ἔννεπεν ἄν ἔννεπεν. Badham's emendation of the MSS. reading: ΣΩ. Τούτοις τοῖς... ὡσα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἔτέρω. ΠΡΩ. Δέγει σαφέστερον. This might be translated: "Look for two other things related like these two wherever one thing is said to be a third to a second," i.e. "a means to a second," or, "an end to a second." But this would suppose Protarchus already in explicit possession of the conception of Means and End, the very conception which Socrates wishes to enable him to form by generalization. With κατὰ πάντα ὡσα λέγομεν εἶναι compare: ὡς ἐξ ἔννεπεν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὅντων τῶν ἀεί λεγομένων εἶναι § ν.
ΠΡΩ. Δύο ἀποδεχόμαι σοι ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ π. 54. γένεσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀφόδιατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέ-ρου, τῇ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν ἣ τῇ οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἕνεκα;

ΠΡΩ. Τούτῳ δὲ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία, εἰ γενέσεως ἕνεκα τούτῳ ἐστιν ὑπερ ἀστιν, νῦν πυνθάνει;

ΣΩ. Φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πρὸς θεῶν ἄρ’ ἄν ἐπανερωτᾶς με; b 15 ΣΩ. Τοιόνυν τι λέγω, ὃ Πρώτορχε μοι, πότερα πλοίων ναυτηγίαι ἕνεκα φης γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοία ἕνεκα ναυτηγίας; καὶ πάνθ’ ὀπόσα τοιαύτῃ ἐστὶν, λέγω τούτῳ αὐτῷ, ὃ Πρώτορχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαντῷ, ὅσον τι λέγω μένοι; 20 ΣΩ. Ὁδέν ὃ τι οὖν σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμ-μετέχει.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακα τε καὶ πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὅλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, καὶ ἐκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἀλλήν ἄλλης οὐσίας τῶν ἐκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν ήδονή γε, εἰπὲρ γένεσις ἐστιν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ’ ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ γε μήν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἄεὶ γίγνοιτ’ ἂν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖρα ἐκεῖνο ἐστιν.

9. Πρὸς θεῶν κ.τ.λ.] ἑπανερωτᾶς: "Will you repeat the question?"
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

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p. 54. τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἔνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἀλλήν, ὃ ἀριστε, μοῦραν θετέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαίωτατον.

d ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσις ἑστιν, εἰς ἀλλὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ μοῦραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ορθῶς θῆσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὠκοῦν, ὧπερ ἄρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μὲν, οὕσιαν δὲ μηδ' ἦντινοιν αὐτής εἶναι, χάριν ἐξεινι δει. 10 δήλον γὰρ ὅτι οὕτω τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονῆν ἁγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελά.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

e ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἑκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάστεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖον λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῶν οσοὶ ἔξωμενοι ἡ πείνην ἡ δίψαν ἡ τι τῶν τοιουτών, ὡσα γένεσις ἐξεῖται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἀτε ἡδονῆς οὕσης αὐτῆς, καὶ φασι θην οὐκ ἂν ἐξεσθηθαί μη δυσώντες τε καὶ πεινάσθατε καὶ τάλλα, ἂ 20 τις ἂν εἴποι, πάντα τὰ ἐπόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθῆ-μασι μὴ πᾶσχοντες.

p. 55. ΠΡΩ. Ἐοίκασι γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ὠκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαί γε τούναντίον ἀπαντεῖ τὸ φθείρεσθαι φαίμεν ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαίον.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἰροῦτ' ἂν τις

14. τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων] "Who find their τέλος in a productive process," "who adopt a process of Becoming for their End." This alludes perhaps to the Cyrenaic definition of the End: τέλος δ' ἀπέφαυν τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἰσθήσεις ἀναδιδομένην. The words, δήλον γὰρ ὅτι οὕτως τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονῆν ἁγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελα, are of course ironical.

23. Ἐοίκασι γοῦν] The text is probably corrupt.
4. Πολλή τις — τιθήται] As the question whether Pleasure is the supreme Good has been long dismissed and a very different problem is now being discussed, this argument about γένεσις and those which immediately follow seem to be misplaced here and we may suspect an interpolation of the whole passage from τί δὲ τὸ τούνδε down to ἀλογώτατα.

If we consider it comes from the hand of Plato we may suppose that an undercurrent of thought somewhat different to that which is expressed is intended to suggest itself to the reflecting reader. We may suppose its real drift is not to overthrow the thesis that Pleasure is the chief Good, but to suggest the narrowness of the Cyrenaic definition of Pleasure, and ridicule its inconsistency with the favourite tenet of the school. After discussing the lowest kinds of Pleasure which he agrees with the Cyrenaeics in defining to be γενέσις, and then enumerating a higher order of Pleasures, Plato might have added, and these require a different definition, for they are neither γενέσις, nor attended with γενέσις. Instead of this he prefers tacitly to ridicule Aristippus, for excluding even these by his faulty definition from the sphere of the Good. Plato himself may have agreed with Aristotle who says, referring perhaps to this passage:
the ultimate function is confounded by some thinkers with the process of production, widely as they differ."

However, even this interpretation does not account for the last words, πολλή επεί καὶ τῇ δὲ ἔτι λέγομεν. However, even this interpretation does not account for the last words, πολλή επεί καὶ τῇ δὲ ἔτι λέγομεν.

b ΣΩ. Πώς οὐκ ἂν ἂναθέν ἂναθόν εἶναι μηδέν ἂναθόν εἶναι μηδὲ καλὸν μήτε ἐν σώμασι μήτ' ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐν τῇ κύριᾳ ἓδονήν μόνον, ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἣ σοφροσύνην ἣ νοῦν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα ἂναθά εἰληθε ψυχῇ, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι; πρὸς τούτους δὲ

Falseness of the Mixed Pleasures; but some rather poetical logic is extemporized by Protarchus, who contributes much more to the reasoning on the first problems than to the other portions: and on the other hand no notice is taken of the fact that the Pure Pleasures were allowed, § 32, to possess Truth, Beauty, and Measure. No notice again is taken of the affinity of Reason to the divine Cause, § 16, though it tends to an immediate solution of the point in issue. Again, after Division and Generalization have been propounded as the only satisfactory method, it is somewhat strange that both the original problems are solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to classification. All this becomes intelligible if we assume the Philebus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two originally separate dialogues. It would be interesting to know what theory was advanced by Galen, in his lost work, περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ Φίληβοι μεταβίσεων, "On the abrupt transitions of the Philebus."

p.
Proceeding now to examine Science, we find that its first division is into Productive and Theoretical. The Productive Sciences are subdivided into two classes, differing like the Pleasures in Purity, and represented by Music and Architecture.

A four-fold division of Sciences is given. They are Productive or Practical (δημιουργικά, χειροτεχνικά) and Contemplative or Theoretical. These classes are again subdivided. The Productive are (1) Music with its group, and (2) Architecture with its group. The Contemplative are (3) Mathematics, subdivided into Pure and Applied, and (4) Dialectic or Speculative Philosophy. Physical Science would make a fifth class, unless it is to be grouped along with Applied Mathematics. If we merge both of them in the Architectural group, we get a division identical with that in the sixth book of the Republic. We there have four classes, 'Επιστήμη or Dialectic, Δύναμις or the Mathematical Sciences, and Πίστις and Εἰκασία. The two last are not exactly defined, but Πίστις appears to include, along with other members, Physical Science, and Εἰκασία the Mimetic arts.

19. διανοηθόμενον "Examine."
Theoretical Science is subdivided into Mathematics and Dialectic. The Mathematical sciences are further divided into two classes, the Popular and the Philosopher.

3. Oίων πασῶν κ.τ.λ.] So in the Republic: τών ἐπὶ πάντα τειχύτων τι λάβομεν...οίων τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ὃ πάσα προσχρονίζεται τέχνη τε καὶ διάνοια καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὃ καὶ παυτὶ ἐν πρώτως ἀνάγκη μανθάνει...λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἢ ἐν τάση τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι; 7. p. 522. “Take some of the sciences of universal application; the common element, for example, that is adopted into all arts, deductions, and sciences, and that must always be mastered first; I mean Arithmetic and the theory of Ratios. Is it not true that every art and science must borrow from these?”

12. εἰκάζει] This word seems to identify the group under discussion with the fourth class of sciences in the Republic which are called Eikasia.
εκάστης χορής τῷ στοχάζοντε σφετερικὴν θηρεύουσα, p. 56. ὃστε πολὺ μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέατα.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἰατρικὴν τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυ-βερνητικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὁσαύτως εὐρήσομεν ἐχούσας.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τεκτονικὴν δὲ γε, οἴμαι, πλείστοισι μέτροις ὑπὲρ ταῖς ὁργάνοις χρωμένην, τὰ πολλὰ ἄκριβείαν αὐτῇ πορίζοντα τεχνικοτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν παρέχεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Κατὰ τε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατ' ὀικοδομίαν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀλλοις τῆς ξυλουργικῆς. κανόνι γάρ, οἴμαι, καὶ τόρνυο χρῆται καὶ διαβήτη καὶ στάθμη καὶ των προσαγωγιῶν κεκομισμένω.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θῶμεν τοῖς διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν μουσικὴν ἐξενεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἑλάτ-

words Τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστης χόρδης τῷ στοχάζοντε σφετερικὴν θηρεύουσα compared with μυμήσεως, § 38 seem to show that wind instruments were regarded as subordinate to stringed instruments. Instead of αὐτητική, αὐτή πλητική has been proposed. Ἀρματοσονα would then refer to the tuning an instrument, as opposed to the playing upon it. Μέτρον here must mean pitch, not time or rhythm.

9. πλείστοισι μέτροις τε καὶ ὁργάνοις χρωμένην] If Plato had foreseen the apparatus of instruments for detecting and measuring phenomena that would be placed at the command of the student of nature, he must on his own principles have allowed that physical investigation might some day rise to the rank of a tolerably accurate science.

16. καὶ διαβήτη Κ.Τ.Λ.) διαβήτης is explained to mean καθεμένη μολύβδος, a plumm. Στάθμη is σκοινών λεπτῶν ἢ μέλαιν χρώματι κεχρησμένων, a red line, προσαγωγίων ἵ τῶν τεκτών ὁργάνων ἤ προσάγωντες εὐθύνουσι τὰ στρεβλὰ ξύλα.
φιλοσοφία.

Σ. Τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ἂς νῦν δὴ πρῶτας εἴπομεν. 5

ΠΡΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνει μοι λέγειν καὶ ὁσας μετὰ ταύτης τέχνας ἐφθέγξω νῦν δή.

Σ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἀλλ’, ὅ Πρῶταρχε, ἃρ’ οὔ διπτᾶς αὐ καὶ ταύτας λεκτέων; ἥ πώς;

ΠΡΩ. Ποίως δὴ λέγεις;

Σ. Αριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἃρ’ οὐκ ἄλλην μὲν τινα την τῶν πολλῶν φατέουν, ἄλλην δ’ αὐ την τῶν φιλοσοφόντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ ποτὲ διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, την δὲ ἄλλην θείη τις ἃν ἀριθμητικὴν;

Σ. Οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος, ὅ Πρῶταρχε. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ποι μονάδας ἀνύσουσ καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμ. ἥλιον, οἶον στρατῶπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἡ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἄν ποτὲ αὐτοῖς συνακολούθησειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος 20 ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλην διαφεροῦσαν της θήσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ’ εὖ λέγεις οὐ σμικραν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν τευταξίμτων, ὄστε λόγον ἐχει δὴ αὐτὰς εἶναι.

5. πρῶτας, i. c. ἱγμουνικάς] Mathematical truths are primary because they are presupposed by the Physical sciences as their logical basis; and the study of Mathematics therefore naturally precedes the study of Physical science. The chronological order in which nature develops the ideas is in harmony with their logical relation, if, at least, it is true that μαθηματικός μὲν παῖς γένοιτ’ ἂν, σόφος δὲ ἡ φυσικὸς οὖ. Nic. Eth. 6. 8. “A boy may be a Mathematician but is not fit for Speculation or Physical philosophy.”
The writer of the Epinomis after saying that man was divinely taught Arithmetic by the alternations of day and night, and periodic changes of the moon, proceeds apparently to refer to Logistic. And indeed, it is somewhat enigmatically contrasted with Arithmetic in the Gorgias. This is because the alternations of day and night, and the periodic changes of the moon, are considered as the special province of Logistic. The writer regards the relation of numbers (μήνας πρὸς τὸν ἐναυτὸν, ἀριθμοῖς πρὸς ἀριθμοῖς) as the special province of Logistic.

12. ταῖς ἑδοναῖς ἡμιλέοις ἀντίστροφον “to find something analogous to pleasures,” i.e. some division of the sciences
p. 57. ἑστὶ τις ἔτερας ἀλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονῆ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφές τούτο γε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἕνεκα τούτων ἐπικεχείρηκεν.

XXXV. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐπ' ἄλλους ἀλλὴν τέχνην οὕσαν ἀνευρίσκει σαφεστέραν καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἀλλην ἀλλης;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Εν τούτοις δὲ ἄρ' οὗ τινα τέχνην ὡς ὀμόνυμων φθεγξάμενοι, εἰς δοξαν καταστήσας τὸν μίας, ἐπ' πάλιν ὡς δυνοῖ ἐπανερτά τούτων αὐτὸι τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ ταύτα πότερον ἢ τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων ἡ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντων ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τούτο διερωτάν.

ΣΩ. Τίν' οὖν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῷ διδόμεν ἀπό- κρισιν;

analogous to the division of pleasures. Προβεβηκέναι is Schleiermacher’s emendation for προβεβηκέαι. It is required to form with ἐναίθα an antithesis to ἡτε ἡμιχώθεα.

9. ὀμόνυμον] “an individual,” or, “an indivisible species.” ὀμόνυμον in Plato is not equivalent either to ὀμῶνυμον, or συνῶνυμον, as defined by Aristotle. According to the latter ὀμόνυμον is a thing with an equivocal name, i.e. a name with two or more unconnected meanings: συνῶνυμαι, a thing with a generic name, i.e. a name denoting two or more things essentially related. ὀμόνυμα λέγεται ὡς ὀνόμα μόνον κοινὸν ὥς ἐν τούτῳ καὶ λόγος ἐτερος, οἷον ἔρως ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων...συνῶνυμα δὲ λέ-

getai ὡς τὸ τε ὄνομα κοινῶν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ἔρως ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπος καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Categ. p. 1. It happens that in speaking of the division of the sciences which Plato mentions in the text, Aristotle uses the word συνώνυμοι: σχεδὸν δὲ συνώνυμοι εἰσίν ἐν τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἀστρολογία ἢ τε μαθηματική καὶ ἡ ναυτική, καὶ ἀρμονική ἢ τε μαθηματική καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν. Anal. Post. 1. 13. “The same name in a nearly univocal sense is sometimes applied to both branches; as astronomy denotes the mathematical science and a branch of the art of navigation, and harmonies both the mathematical and the aesthetic science.” Here συνώνυμοι means just the opposite to ὀμό-

νυμοσ in our text.
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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΠΡΩ Ἡ Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστῶν διαφοράς μέγε- p. 57.
θος εἰς σαφήνειαν προεληφθαμεν ἑπιστημῶν.

ΣΩ. Ὑκοῖν ἀποκρυνόμεθα βάλον;

ΠΡΩ. Τι μήν; καὶ εἰρήσθω γε ὅτι πολὺ μὲν ἵ
αύτα τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσιν, τούτων δὲ ἀντών αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄντων φιλοσοφοῦντων ὁμίλην ἄ
ἀμήχανον ἀκριβεία τε καὶ ἀληθεία περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοι δὴ πιστεύ-
οντες θαρροῦντες ἀποκρυνόμεθα τοὺς δεινοῖς περὶ ἱ
λόγων ὄλκην,

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῦν;

ΣΩ. ᾿Ως εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαί καὶ δύο μετρητικαί

11. λόγων ὑλήν] seems to mean "misunderstanding," "misrepresentation," "misinterpretation of a doctrine to be refuted," "doing violence to the meaning of a formula." Compare: οὗ δυσμενοῦ σοῦ δια-
χητικὸς ἄλλ'...δος ἄληθες σκέψει τι ποιτε λέγομεν...καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει...ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐκ συνηθείας ἡμᾶτων τε καὶ ὑμβάτων, ἢ ὅ τι πολ-
λοι ὅτι δὲ τῦχον τὰ ἀκόντες ἀπο-
ρίας ἄλληλοις παραπόταμας παρ-
έχουσιν. Theaet. p. 168 c. Plato probably alludes to some of his own adversaries, perhaps the Megarian Eristici. Protagoras, however, appears to have written against the Mathematicians, asserting that nothing in nature corresponded to their definitions. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσθη-
των ἢ καὶ η ἑι μεγεθοῦσα ὑπὲρ τῶν σοφοῖν ἢ ἀστραλογία τῶν οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ αἰσθήται γραμμαί τοιαύτα ἐστιν οἷς λέγει ὁ ψευδής οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐιδὴ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὔτως οὐδὲ ἱ

στρογγυλῶν. ἰπτεταὶ γὰρ τοῦ κανο-

νοὺς οὗ κατὰ στεγήν ὁ κύκλος, ἀλλ' ὄντως Πρωταγόρας ἐλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας. Arist. Metaph. p. 998 Α. “On the other hand sensible magnitudes and the visible heavens can hardly be the subjects of astronomy. No sensible lines satisfy the geometrical definitions of straight-

ness or curvature, for a ruler touches a material circle at more points than one, as Pro-
tagoras said in his Confutation of Geometry.” This polemic may be alluded to here.

13. ᾿Ως εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαί κ. τ. Λ.] The division of the sci-
enes into two branches, one more practical, the other more theoretical, one dealing with
facts, the other with laws, one with rules, the other with principles, is again enforced in the
Republic, and appears to have been indicated here for the first time. It implies a consid-

ar
able progress of scientific inquiry, and in fact furnishes a principle for the systematic co-
ordination of the sciences. "Αλ-
λον δὲ τρόπον διαφέρει τὸ διότι τοῦ ὅτι τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἐπιστήμης ἐκατέρων διὰ
σωντίων. τοιαύτα δὲ ἐστὶν ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡς εἶναι βάτε-
ρον ὑπὸ βάτερον, οἷον τὰ ὀπτικὰ πρὸς
γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ μηχανικὰ πρὸς
στερεομετρίαν καὶ τὰ ἁρμονικὰ πρὸς
ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ τὰ φανώμενα πρὸς
ἀστρολογίκην... ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν
ὅτι τῶν αἰσθητικῶν εἰδεναι τὸ δὲ
dιότι τῶν μαθηματικῶν... ἔχει δὲ καὶ
πρὸς τὴν ὀπτικὴν ὡς αὐτὴ πρὸς τὴν
gεωμετρίαν ἄλλη πρὸς ταύτην, οἷον
tὸ περὶ τῆς ἱρίδος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι
φυσικὸν εἰδεναι τὸ δὲ διότι ὀπτικοῦ.
Aural. Post. 1. 13. "Another
contrast between law and fact
is that they may belong to diff-
tent sciences, which happens
when two classes (or sciences)
are related as species and genus.
as, for instance, Optics and Geo-
metry, Mechanics and Stereo-
metry, Harmonies and Arith-
metic, Celestial Phenomena and
Astronomy... Again the same
relation that Optics bears to
Geometry, another science bears
to Optics; as, for instance, the
theory of the rainbow. Here
the facts belong to Natural
Science, the explanation to Op-
tics." A similar division is
traceable in the truths of Poli-
tical philosophy. The Αἰσθη-
tics of Morality are most requi-
site for individual practice. 'Αρχὴ
gὰρ τὸ δὲ, καὶ εἰ τούτο φαινοντο ἁρ-
κούντωσι οἶδεν προσδέσθαι τοῦ διώτι.
Eth. Nic. 1. 4. "The first step in
moral knowledge is to recognise
a particular duty; and where
this is sufficiently evident to
sense, a man need not know the
law on which it depends." Even
in practice, however, we some-
times require the guidance of
general ideas: "Ὡςτε δὲ ἄμφω
ἔχειν (τὴν τε τῶν καθὸλου
φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν τῶν καθέκαστα)
ἡ ταύτην μᾶλλον. ib. 6. 7. "Both
Rational and Αἰσθητικαί moralit
site, though more especially the
latter." Ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθεῖν ἄν ἀρι-
στα τοῦ καθ' ἕνα καὶ ἱερὸς καὶ
gυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὅ τὸ καθό-
λου εἰδεύς ὅτι πάνω ἢ τοὺς τουίτους
ταχέα δ' ἀν καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίως ποιεῖν εἶτε πολ-
lούς εἶτε διάγνους νομοθετικῶς περι-
tέους γενέσθαι. ib. 10. 9. "If
rules for the government of an indi-
vidual would be best laid down
by the physician, gymnastic
teacher, or other artist who
knows the universal or special
law; and so a man who has to
educate whether many or few
should attempt to acquire the
general ideas of a legislator."
6. ἀκριβεῖας] The gradations of severity in method of the
different sciences, first indicated here, became an established doctrine of Logic, and is often insisted on by Aristotle. It may be interesting to cast a glance at his treatment of this subject. There are degrees of severity, he says, even in the Mathematical sciences. 'Ακριβέστερα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα ἡ τε οὗτι καὶ διατῆ ἦ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρεῖ τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διώτι καὶ ἢ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἀριθμητικῆς ἄραςαι καὶ ἢ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως αἰνῶ γεωμετρίας ἀρίθμητικής. Anal. Post. 1. 27. "Priority and a higher degree of exactitude belong to the science which deals with laws as well as facts compared with another which deals with facts alone: to the science whose subject is abstract compared with another whose subject is concrete, as to Arithmetic compared with Harmonies: and to the science whose subject is relatively incomplete compared with another whose subject is complex, as to Arithmetic compared with Geometry (whose subject combines Space with Quantity)." Less rigorous demonstration is to be expected from the Natural sciences than from the Mathematical. Τὴν δ' ἀκριβιστίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἀπανθη ἀπανθη τῶν ἄλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἕχοισιν ὅλην. δι- οπερ αὐτοὶ προσκοῦν ὁ τρόπος, ἀπανθα γὰρ ἢς ὧν ἠφίοις ἔχει ὅλην. Met. ἅ. p. 995. "The rigorous demonstration of the Mathematician is not always to be demanded, but only when the subject matter of a science is an abstraction. Therefore the Natural sciences have a different modality, for their subjects are always concrete." Again there is less exactitude in the Esthetic than in the Rational branch of Morality. 'Εκείνω δὲ προδιακολο- γίζομαι ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν λόγων τύπω καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβοῦς ἀδελφείς λέγεσθαι, ἀδέλπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἴσομεν, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὑλὴν αἱ λόγοι ἀπανηθέον ... τοῦτον δ' ὅσος τοῦ καθίσματος λόγον, ἐπὶ μάλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθεκάστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τάκριβες. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. "Let us first postulate that Moral laws are unsusceptible of precise codification, as we said above that the subject matter determines the amount of precision to be required in the propositions. And, vague as is the general theory, the details are still more indeterminate." The consideration of the different modality (τρό- πος) of the different sciences, sometimes said from a narrower definition of Logic to be extra-logical, was a principal function of the Aristotelian Logic. At least it is generally in reference to this office that he alludes to Logic, viewing it on this account as a general Propædeutic. ὡσπερ δ' ἐξευρέσθη τῶν λεγόντων τινας τοις τὰς ἀληθείας, ὁν τρόπον δει ἀποδεχεσθαι, δει ἀπαιδευσαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο ὃς ὃς δει γὰρ περὶ τούτων Ἱκεν προσπατα- μένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἢκοίσατες ἔτειν. Met. T. 3. p. 1005 b. "The discussions of some Meta-
p. 57. τού διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἰ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναμεν.

p. 58. ΠΡΩ. Τίνα δὲ ταυτὴν αὐτὲν λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Δὴλον ὅτι η λᾶς ἀν τὴν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνώιη. τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτῳ ἂεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἐγώγε ὁμια ἔγεισθαι ξύμπαντας, ὁσοὺς νῦν καὶ σμικρῶν προσήρτηται, μακρὸ ἀληθεστάτην εἰναι γνώσιν. σὺ δὲ τί πῶς τούτο, ὃ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνωι ἁν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦκονοι μὲν ἐγώγε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἑκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις, ός ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι ἐν πασῶν τεχνῶν πάντα γὰρ ύφ' αὐτῆς δούλα δὲ ἐκώντων ἀλλ' οὖ διὰ βίας ποιώτο, καὶ μακρὸ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἰς τῶν τεχνῶν. νῦν δ' οὐτε σοι οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἁν ἐναιτία τίθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τὰ ὅπλα μοι δοκεῖς βουληθεῖς εἰπεῖν αἰσχνθείς ἀπολιπεῖν.

physicians on the modality (degree of rigour) to be required in the proofs, are due to a want of previous training in Logic. For the investigator ought to come antecedently prepared with this knowledge, and not mix up two inquiries.”

Πεπαθευμένον γὰρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τάκριβες ἐπιζητεῖν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν γένος ἐφ’ ὅσον ἂ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις εἰπεδέχεται παραπληκήσων γὰρ φαινέται μαθηματικῷ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδείξεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικόν ἀποδείξεις ἀπατεῖν. Eth. Nic. 1. 3.

“He who has had the right preliminary training will measure his demands of exactitude in any province by the nature of the subject matter. For it is as illogical to demand demonstration from an Orator, as to accept probable reasoning from a Mathematician.”

Διὸ δεὶ πεπαθευμένον πῶς ἔκαστα ἀποδεκτῶν, ὡς ἀτοπον ἀμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης. Met. 2. 3. “A preparatory Education should instruct us in the right method of the various sciences, for it is out of place to inquire into the mode of investigation after we have begun to investigate.”

4. Δήλον ὅτι η λᾶς ἀν] Thompson’s emendation in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, No. XI. The reading of the MSS. is Δήλον ὅτι η πᾶσιν, κ.τ.λ.

16. Τὰ ὅπλα,κ.τ.λ.] The phrase of Protarchus is elliptical. He probably meant: ἐναιτία τίθεσθαι τὴν ψήφου, but Socrates suggests that he was going to say: ἐναιτία τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα (which
we may infer from this passage would have sounded more presump- tuous, but checked him- self. We may translate: "But now I should not like to break with either of you."—"Break a lance with either, you were going to say, I think, but a sud- den humility restrained you."

Badham proposes ὑπερέχειν for ὑπάρχειν and κρατεῖν δ' ὡς ἔποιην for κρατεῖν ὡς ἔποιην. Perhaps we should read ὑπερέχειν with Badham, and change κρατεῖν ὡς ἔποιην into πρὸς ἀκριβεῖαν δ' ὡς ἔποιην.
This is an obvious correction for ὅσα. Badham would also change ταῦτα into ταῦτα.

4. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ περὶ φύσεως, κ.τ.λ.] No place was expressly allotted to the Physical sciences. Unless we rank them with Practical Mathematics, we must invent a new class for them. We shall then have six altogether.

14. Τούτων οὖν τι σαφῶς ἄν φαίμεν τῇ ἄκρι-
We are now prepared to determine the Composition of the Perfect human life, and to solve our absolutely necessary. 

"Waving this we will say, that there is a difference between change of quantity and change of quality. Assume that the quantity is variable; it is always the Form that is the object of science. And there is another ground for censuring those who hold this view; for even among sensible objects it is the lesser number that suggest it, and yet all the movements of the celestial bodies are equally included in their ban of inconstancy."
59. περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἣ δευτέρους ἐκείνον ὃ τι μᾶλιστά ἐστι ἐξυγγενές: τὰ δ' ἀλλὰ πάντα δεύτερά τε καὶ ὑστερα λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ τῶν ὁνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλ- λιστα ἃρ' οὐ τοῖς καλλιστοῖς δικαιότατοι ἀπονέμειν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

d ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ φρόνησις ἃ γ' ἂν τις τιμήσειε μᾶλιστα ὄνοματα;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταὐτ' ἄρα ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὄντως ἐννοιαῖς ἐστίν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὁρθῶς κείμενα καλείσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν ὁν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἂ γε εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγὼ τότε παρε- σχόμην, οὐκ ἀλλ' ἐστίν ἦ ταύτα τὰ ὄνοματα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν, οἶ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἴην' τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονίσεως τε καὶ ἱδονῆς πέρι e πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μέξιν εἰ τις φαίνει καθαπερεί δημιο- υργοῖς ἡμῖν, ἐξ ὅν ἦ ἐν οἷς δεὶ δημιουργεῖν τι, παρα- κείσθαι, καλῶς ἀν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζου.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταύτα ἃρ' οὐ μηνύναι ἐπιχειρη- τέον;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁρθότερον ἂν ἔχοι;

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποία;

ΣΩ. "Α καὶ πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν" εἴ δ' ἦ παροιμία

12. ἀπηκριβωμένα] This word and is equivalent to πάνω or second problem. Recapitation: The original pretensions of Pleasure and Knowledge were over- thrown by the test of Suffici- ency.

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force of a superlative adverb, connected with ὁρθῶς has the
δοκεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δίς καὶ τρὶς τὸ γε καλῶς ἔχουν ἐπα- r.60.
vapoleîn τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός. οἴμαι γὰρ οὕτω πώς τὰ
tοτὲ λεχθέντα ῥηθῆναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Φίληθος φησι τήν ἡδονήν σκοποῦν ὀρθῶν πᾶσι
ζόοις γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτον στοχάζεσθαι,
καὶ δὴ καὶ τάγαθὸν τούτ’ αὐτὸ εἶναι ξύμπασι, καὶ δύο
ονόματα, τάγαθὸν καὶ ἴδιο, εἰνὶ τινὶ καὶ φύσει μιᾶ
τούτῳ ὀρθῶς τεθέντ’ ἔχειν. Σωκράτης δὲ πρῶτον μὲν
οὐ φησι τούτ’ εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ ὁνόματα, καὶ ἂ
τὸ τε ἁγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιο διὰφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν
ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ μοῖρας
τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταὐτ’ ἔστι τε καὶ ἢν
τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὥς Πρώταρχε;
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν
ξινομολογοῖτο;
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθον διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷ δὲ τῶν
ἀλλῶν.
ΠΡΩ. Τίνι;
ΣΩ. Ὁμι παρεῖ τούτ’ ἂν τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους
πάντως καὶ πάντη, μηδενῶς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖ-
σθαι, τὸ δὲ ἰκανὸν τελεῖστατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;
ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἑπειράθημεν χωρίς ἐκάτερον
ἐκάτερον θέντες εἰς τῶν βίων ἐκάστων, ἀμικτον μὲν
ηδονὴν φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ὀσταύτωσ ἡδονῆς μηδὲ
τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν;
16. ἡ πάσας ἡδονάς] This is not a mere repetition of the first question (ei τις ἂνευ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.) Socrates then asked whether Pleasure alone is even desirable (αἴρετον); now, whether it is perfect (τέλεον). See the note on the distinction of τέλεον, ἰκανόν, αἴρετον, p. 20, d.

23. ὁ ἁγάθων is henceforth used to signify the ideal or supramundane Good; and ὁ τέλεον, i. e. ὁ μυκτὸς βίος, the final cause of human life, only holds the second rank. The characteristics of this latter are deduced from the attributes of the ideal Good or the divine nature. In the present dialogue, which is of a somewhat popular character, this is done without much severity of argument: but Plato appears to have pursued the same method.
in his more scientific ethics. In thus basing his Political philosophy on theological or metaphysical considerations he differs from Aristotle. The latter makes conceptions of the end of practice and production the ultimate premisses of Practical and Productive sciences. The connection of the specific Goods proposed as ends by the practical and productive reason with the transcendent Good or with the general laws of Goodness he excepts from Art and Moral science and assigns to Speculative philosophy. One of his most tangible reasons for this is, that moral truths are more evident than truths of theology or philosophy, and therefore it would be illogical to base the former on the latter. "Ισως δὲ οὐδὲ δὲ βουλήμενον τι δεικνύει τοῖς μὴ φανεροῖς παραδείγματε χρησθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς σιδηροῖς, ταῦτα γὰρ φανερώτατα. Magn. Mor. i. 1.
p. 61. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καθάπερ ἤμων οἶνοχόιοι τισὶ παρεστάσι τρίτον, μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τῆν τῆς ἴδιονής, τῆν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως υφαντικήν καὶ άοιων αὐτηροῦ καὶ ἴγιεινοῦ τινὸς ὑδατος ἂς προδυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα συμμηγνύναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

d ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἀρα πάντων ἴδιονήν πᾶσιν φρονήσει μυγνύτες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοι-μεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσώς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀσφαλές. ἣ δὲ ἀκινδυνώτερον ἂν μυγνῦομεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τινὰ ἀποφήμασθαι ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνα.

ΣΩ. Ἡν ἤμων ἴδιονῆς ἂληθῶς, ὡς οἴομεθα, μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἂλλη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἄκριβεστέρα; 15

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

e ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἣ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἥ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μῆτε γιγνόμενα μῆτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταύτα δὲ καὶ ὀσαυτῶς ὄντα ἀεί. ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἄλθεσα ἐπισκόπουμεν ἡγησάμεθα ἐκείνης ἄλθεστέραν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ὅρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τάληθέστατα τμῆματα ἐκατέρας ἰδομεν πρῶτων ἐξυμμίζαστε, ἄρα ἱκανὰ ταύτα ἑγγα-κραμένα τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίων ἀπεργασάμενα παρέ-25 χεόν ἤμων, ἢ τινὸς ἐτὶ προσδέομεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοι-ούτων;

15. τέχνη] Here τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη are used in the Aristotelian sense, the one as ποιητική ἐπιστήμη, the other as θεωρητική. As ἡ ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα κ.τ.λ. refers to applied mathematics and physical science, it seems that these ought to be considered a third or third and fourth division of theoretical science, and placed between the arts and the other theoretical sciences, so as to make five or six divisions in all.
These alone are not Sufficient; we must therefore superadd the Mixed or Impure Sciences.

5. *diavnoi'menos* in the Republic is an epithet appropriated to the Mathematician. It appears used designedly here to express with *phron'w* the two first divisions of Science.

9. ταύτα] Ταύτα and τάδε are used in Plato like τα δείρο in Aristotle, to express the present, sensible world.

10. καὶ χρώμενοι ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ὁμοίως κανόνα καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις] "Who uses when he builds a house the other rules to the same extent that he uses the circles?" i. e. who, instead of material instruments and measures, has only the ideal or conceptional line, angle, square, &c. to guide his handiwork.

By the divine sphere and divine circle we must apparently understand, not ideas, but the intermediate world (τὰ μεταξύ) whose existence, as we learn from Aristotle, was maintained by Plato. As the Mathematical sciences intervene in his arrangement between Natural science and Philosophy, so he makes a corresponding set of objects, the Mathematical world (τὰ μαθηματικά) intervene between Nature and the world of Ideas. We learn this from Aristotle, for we should hardly have discovered it from the writings of Plato, though it harmonises with the following passage of the Republic: Ταύτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἔτει περ ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποίηκται, κἀλλιστα μὲν ἤγειον δεὶ καὶ ἀκριβείστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθῶν πολὺ ἐνδείχθέ το ὁ τάχος καὶ ἢ οὕτα βραδύτερα ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀρμσφίῳ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθείσι σχίσματο φομᾶς τε πρὸς ἀληθῆ φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνώτα φέρει. ἢ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοιαί ληστα, ὀψεὶ δ' οὐ. Z. p. 529. "This celestial mechanism, as after all its material is visible, is doubtless most beautiful and most exact of its kind, but falls far short of the true motions which real velocity and real slowness in true numbers and true configurations perform in due correspondence as they whirl round the veritable spheres: all which things
are an object of ratiocination and reflection, but not of sight." These true motions, &c. are δια-
νομία, not νοησία, i.e. mathematical, not ideal.

Aristotle himself admits the objective reality (ὅτι ἐστὶν ἄπλῶς) of the subjects of pure mathematics, but identifies them with the material world, abstraction being made (ἐξ ἀφαρέσεως) of its other physical properties (τὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως). Δήλων ὅτι ἐνδε-
χεται καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεγε-
θῶν εἰναι καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποδείξεις, μὴ ἢ δὲ αἰσθήτα ἄλλα ἢ τουαλ... ἡν ἐπὶ ἀπλῶς λέγειν ἀλήθεις μὴ ὁμόν τὸ χωριστὰ εἰναι ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἄ
χωρατα...καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἄπλῶς ἀλήθεις εἰπεῖν, καὶ τουαλτά γε οὐ λέγοντι...ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο ὁρᾶσι ὑπεμέτρα ἔγγοντι καὶ περὶ ὄντων διαλέγονται καὶ ὁντα ἐστὶν. Arist. Met. M. p. 1077 B. "Sensible quantities then may be subjects of reasoning and demonstration, not as sensible but as quantities...and as objective reality is truly ascribed not only to substances, but also to their attributes, the subjects of mathematics have objective reality and yet satisfy the sci-
entific definitions...So that the language of geometers is cor-
rect, and the subjects they reason about are existent real-
ities."

9. μιμήσεως] This seems to be an oversight of Plato’s, for there has been no mention of μιμήσει, unless, indeed, it is a synonym of στοχασμός. See p. 56, a.
We must also admit the Necessary and the Virtuous Pleasures; but the Greatest Pleasures must be excluded.

2. ἔχων τὰς πρῶτας] This expresses a condition. Socrates is made to say in the Republic: Ὅση μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήσθαι, οὐ γὰρ μου κατερίζει πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητάς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαρτάς τῶν μυθικῶν, λόγῳ ἐσθε ἐναὶ πάντα τὰ ταυτά (τῆς μουσικῆς ἄση μυθική) τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοιας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχονι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτά ὑπὸ τυγχάνει ὅντα. I. p. 595. “Between you and me, as you will not betray me to the tragic poets and other professors of the mimetic arts, serious injury is inflicted by all these imitations on the hearers’ souls, unless they possess an antidote in the knowledge of the reality.”

4. μυθαγορεῖας.] ὡς ὅτε χείμαρ-μοι ποταμοὶ κατ’ ὄρεσθι μέροτες ἐς μυθάγορειαν συμβάλλετον ὄξυμον ὑδώρ. Iliad. 4, 452.
Π. 63. πάσας ἴδονας ἡδεσθαί διὰ βίου συμφέρον τε ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄβλαβὲς ἀπασι, πάσας ξυγκρατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς οὖν δή περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ πῶς ποιώμεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὁ Πρώταρχε, διερωτᾷν χρῆ, τὰς ἴδονας δὲ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις, διαπυθανο- 

μένους τὸ τοιόνυμο ἀλλήλων πέρι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Ὁ φίλαι, εἶτε ἴδονας ὑμᾶς χρῆ προσαγορεύ- 

εῖν εἶτε ἄλλῳ ὅτῳ ὄνοματι, μοῦν οὐκ ἄν δέξισθε οἱ 

οίκείν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης ἡ χωρίς τοῦ φρονείν;

Οἴμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τὸν αὐτὰς ἀναγκαϊότατον 

eίνα λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Ὁτι καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρήμηθη, τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον εἰλικρινεῖ εἶναι τι γένος οὔτε πάνω τι 

c δυνατὸν οὐτ᾿ ὀφελίμοιν· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα 

gενῶν ἀριστοῦ ἐν ἀνθ’ ἐνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ 

γιγνώσκειν τᾶλλα τε πάντα καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτῶν ἡμῶν 

tελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἑκάστην.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ καλὸς γε εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν, φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. πάλιν τούννυν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν φρό- 

νησίν καὶ τὸν νῦν ἀνερωτητέον. Ἄρ’ ἴδονῶν τι 

προσδείσθε ἐν τῇ ξυγκράσει; φαίμεν ἄν αὕτ’ τὸν νῦν 

tε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτάντες. Ποίων, φαίνει ἄν ἔνες ἴσως, ἴδονῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός.

d ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ γ’ ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν 

ὅδε. Πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθείς ἐκείναις ἴδοναῖς, φήσομεν, 

ἀρ’ ἐτὶ προσδείσθ’ ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἴδονας ἐξοινο- 

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19. καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτῶν] Construct ἑκάστην with αὐτὴν. The MSS. 

read αὖ τὴν αὐτὴν.
κοινοι εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδροτάτας; Καὶ πῶς, ὃ Σώ- p. 63. κράτες; φαίην ἃν, αἱ γ' ἐμποδίσματα τε μυρία ἦμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἰσ ὁικούμενα ταράττουσι διὰ μανικάς ἱδινάς, καὶ γίγνεσθαι τε ἦμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν ὦκεῖσι τὰ τε γεγονόμενα ἦμῶν τέκνα ὡς τὸ πολὺ, δίε ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποδοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθείρουσιν; ἀλλας δὲ ἱδινὰς ἀλθείς καὶ καθαρὰς ἀσεῖτες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἦμῖν νόμις, καὶ πρὸς ταύτας τὰς μεθ' ὑγείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονείν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμ-πάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεού ὁπαδοὶ γιγνό-μεναι αὐτῇ ἕξυνακολουθοῦσι πάντη, ταῦτας μίγνυ-τὰς δ' αεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἀλλής κακίας ἐπο-μένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μιγνύται τὸν βουλό- μενον ὦ τι καλλίστην ἱδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην
15 μίξιν καὶ κράσιν ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι, τί ποτε π. 64. ἐν τε ἀνθρώποι καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτῇ ἐναι ποτε μαντευτέων. Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐμφρό-νος ταῦτα καὶ ἔχοντως ἐαυτῶν τῶν νόμων φήσομεν ὑπέρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀποκρί-20 νασθαι τά νῦν ῥήθεντα;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἀν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ' ἂν ἐν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον; b

25 ΣΩ. Ὡμη μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδ' ἂν γενόμενον εἰη.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

4. ἱδινὰς] For this Stallbaum proposes ἐπιθυμίας, and some such correction seems necessary. 8. οἰκείας seems equivalent to συγγενεῖς οὗ ὁμοιειδές: φανεῖν ἢ τούτῳ (τῷ εἰδεῖ διαφέρειν τὰς ἱδινάς) καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνφιλείδουσι τῶν ἱδινῶν ἔκάστην τῇ ἑνεργείᾳ ἦν τελειο...τοῖς ἐτέροις δὲ εἴει καὶ τά οἰκεία ἔτερα τῷ εἴει. Eth. Nic. 10. 5.

p. 64. XL. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἰ τινος ἐτί προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σὺ τε καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεί κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἀρξών καλῶς ἐμπύχων σώματος ὃ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόχθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ νῦν ἡδη προθύροι καὶ τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφεστάναι τῆς τοῦ τοιοῦτον λέγουσε ἴσως ὥρθος ἢν τινα τρόπον φαίμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γονὶ δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δὴ τα ἐν τῇ ξυμμίζει τιμώτατον ἄμα καὶ μάλιστ' αἰτίον εἶναι δόξειν ἢν ἕμων τοῦ πάση γεγο-

2. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ — φαίνεται| "An ordering law, unembodied, but fit to govern an embodied soul, seems to be traced in the outline we have drawn." Κόσμος and ἀρξών are both originally political terms, i.e. express a kind of efficient cause, but are here applied by a natural metaphor to the final cause, i.e. the End we propose and which governs our actions. Ἀρχή, however, was applied without a metaphor to signify the End, as soon as it came to mean properly a logical principle or first premise. Οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχῆς ἐξουσίες εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τούτῳ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἀριστον, ἀπειδήσε ὁ ν. Εθ. Nic. 6. 12. “Practical reasonings have for their ultimate premise some conception or definition of the End, whatever it may be.” The λόγος of which Socrates speaks is the definition of the τέλευν ἁγαθοῦ.

13. αἰτίον] This word was before used in reference to this point: Τίχα γὰρ ἀν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτίαμέν ἀν ἐκάτερος ὁ μὲν τοῖς αἰτίοις ὥς ὧ ἄνωθεν εἶναι. § 11. We must not confuse αἰτία in this sense with the αἰτία mentioned in chap. 14, as one of the four principles. There αἰτία signified the Efficient cause, here, to use Aristotelian terms, the Formal cause; i.e. the definition of an attribute, by which as a middle term its inherence in a given subject may be proved. These ideas are quite as distinct in Plato's Philosophy as in Aristotle's. Αἰτία as the Formal cause is identical with the πέρας of this dialogue. It is curious that in the Phaedo the same transition is made from the Efficient to the Formal cause; only there it is made avowedly, here tacitly. After mentioning that Anaxagoras had disappointed him by promising to explain the Efficient and Final

If we now inquire what is the element of Goodness in this Mixture, we shall find that Goodness always manifests itself in three great characters, Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth.
νέαι προσφιλή τὴν τουαύτην διάθεσιν; τούτο γὰρ p. 64. ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἰδ' ἢδονή εἰτε τῷ νῷ προσφινέστερον καὶ οἰκείότερον εν τῷ παντὶ ἐξενεστηκεν.

5 ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθῶς: τούτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῶν ἐστὶ ἐξουσιώδετάτον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐξουσίας γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπῶν ἵδει τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἄν ἢ παντὸς ἂξια γίγνεται ἡτίον· οὐν ἢ τὸ παράτατον οὐδενός.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὔδεὶς ποιον τούτῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ. ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. "Οτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς ἐξουσίας φύσεως μὴ τυχόνσα ἢτίον καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ἐξυγκρασία πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραυνύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὐτήν. οὔδὲ γὰρ κράσις, ἄλλα τις ἄκρατος, ἐξουσίων ημένης ἀληθῶς, ἢ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε ὁμόως τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἐξουσίων."

ΠΡΩ. 'Αληθεστάτα.

20 ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῶν ἢ τάγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετρήσης γὰρ καὶ ἐξουσίων causes of things, and then only indicating Material causes, Socrates is made to say that he then betook himself to the investigation of the Ideas or Formal causes. He then applies the word αἴτια to the Idea or Form: e. g. οὐκ οὔσα δὲ λαλώς πως ἐκάστον γεγονόμενον ὡς ἐκαστόν τῆς ἓδας οὔσιας ἐκάστον οὐ ἢ ἐκαστόχα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὐκ ἐχεις ἄλλην τινα αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς ὀνόματι συνάψεσον. p. 101.

3. ἐν τῷ παντὶ] = ἐν τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ.
16. οὔδὲ γὰρ κράσις—ἐξουσία] "for it is no composition, but a discordant jumble of elements in truly disastrous confusion."

"Ἀκρατος has a double meaning: as connected with ἐξουσία in its etymological sense of putting together, it means the negation of κράσις, and as connected with ἐξουσία in its ordinary sense of calamity, it means unmitigated."

21. μετρήσης γὰρ κ. τ. λ.] Beauty and Measure are identified in the Timeus: πᾶν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλὸν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὐκ ἀμετραν· καὶ ζωὴν οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐσόμενον ἐξουσίας ἐξουσίας θετον. p. 132. "The good is always beautiful, and
p. 64. μετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἄρετὴ πανταχῶ ἐξυμβαίνει γέγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀληθείαν γε ἐφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμίχθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μᾶ δυνάμεθα ἱδέα τὸ ἀγαθὸν p. 65. θηρεύσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβώντες, κάλλει καὶ ἐξυμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγομεν ὡς τοῦτο ὦν ἐν ὀρθότατ' ἀν αἰτιασαίμεθ' ἀν τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐξυμμίξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅς 10 ἄγαθον ὑπν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

XLI. ΣΩ. "Ηδή τοίνυν, ὥ Πρώταρχε, ἴκανος ἡμῖν γένοιτ' ἀν ὀστισοῦν κρίτης ἠδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ b φρονήσεως, ὅποτέρον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐξυγγε- 15 νέστερον τε καὶ τιμώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τε ἐστὶ καὶ θεοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον μέν, ὅμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἑπέξελθείων βέλτιον.

ΣΩ. Καθ' ἐν ἐκαστὸν τοῖνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν 20 ἠδονῆν καὶ τῶν νοῦν κρίνωμεν. δεὶ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρω μᾶλλον ἐξυγγενές ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἀπονεμούμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Ναί. πρώτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβόν, ὥ Πρὼ- 25 ταρχε' καὶ λαβόμενος, βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ e ἀληθείαν καὶ ἠδονήν, πολλῷ ἐπισχῶν χρόνων, ἀπό-

These are easily seen to be more akin to Reason than to Pleasure; and we are now in a position to establish a scale of the different gradations of Goodness. The first place belongs to the Eternal Archetype: the second to Derivative Perfection: the third to Reason and Wisdom: the fourth to Science.

the beautiful has measure: therefore an animal to be good and beautiful must have symmetry.” So in the Sophista: ἀλλ' αἴσχος ἄλλο τε πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσεἰδῆ ἐνὸν γένος; p. 228 a, “want of beauty is nothing but want of measure, which is unsightly wherever it is found.” So in Aristotle moral beauty is τὸ μέγαν, which is synonymous with τὸ μέτρων.
κριναὶ σαυτῷ πότερον ἡδονὴ ἕξυγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ρ. 65 ἀληθεία.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ; πολὺ γὰρ, οἴμαι, δια-φέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλογονιστατοῦ, ὃς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ ταῖροφροδίσια, ἀλλὰ μέγιστα δοκοῦσιν ἐἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγ-γνώμην εἴληψε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παῖδων τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ἀλογιστὸν κεκτημένων· νοῦς δὲ ἦτοι ταύτων καὶ ἀληθεῖα ἐστὶν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατον· τοι καὶ ἀληθεῖστατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὁσαύ-τως σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται.

ΠΡΩ. Εὐσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέ-βληκας. οἴμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρεῖας οὐδὲν

4. ἡδονή μὲν γὰρ] It must be confessed that at this point of the dialogue the argument drops a little of its severity. Violent Pleasures of sense were excluded from the best life, and ought to have been from the comparison with Knowledge: and yet it is to these kinds of Pleasure that the answer of Protarchus refers.

When Reason is said to be identical or nearly identical with Truth, we verge very closely upon a fallacy of equivocation. When Truth was adopted as one of the tests of the Highest Good, the word must have been taken in a general sense, including genuineness, reality, substantiality, attributes capable of application to Pleasure. At least if it was taken in the more limited sense in which it is a quality of propositions and thoughts and nearly identical with right Reason, a Cyrenaic might fairly contend that it was a petitio principii to make it one of the distinctive marks of the Good.

15. οἴμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς κ.τ.λ.] The same may be said about the criterions of Measure and Beauty that we observed about the criterion of Truth. Protarchus in his comparison only refers to the Pleasures that ought to have been excluded from the competition: and it was allowed, chapter 32, that the Pure Pleasures possess the attribute of Measure. Aristotle alludes to this distinction: λέ-γουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀρίστας τὴν ὑ' ἡδονὴν ἀριστον εἶναι, ὃτι δέχεται τὸ μάλλον καὶ τὸ ὑπτόων... μὴ πότε ὑ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἰτίον, ἐὰν δοσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμφεῖς αἱ δὲ μυκταί. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. “The Plato-
nists argue that the Good is determinate (measured) and Pleasure indeterminate, because susceptible of gradation. But do they not lay the want of determination (measure) at the wrong door, if (as they own) some Pleasures are mingled with Pain (which may account for the gradation)?" He also denies the tacit assumption of the Philebus that the Mean is a point, and that therefore whatever has extension or intension, even if it has a point of coincidence, must necessarily be excessive or defective in its other gradations. He regards the Mean or normal state as having a certain breadth of range. As the abnormal state is not infinite, but the abnormal variations from the mean have their limits or bounds of possibility; so the normal state is not a point, but there are normal variations within certain maxima and minima. 

It is true that Reason is exclusively related to the most important, dominant, or architectonic Measure (we may call it the moral law), whereas Pleasure, though related to this, is equally related to partial and subordinate laws. In virtue of this supremacy of a certain measure, wherever the inferior measures are in collision with it they cease to be measures. Pain, the violation of some physical law, may be demanded to restore the balance.
ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἰρήκας. ὅμως δὲ ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρότον. p. 65. νοῦς ἠμῶν κάλλους μετείληφε πλείον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὡστε εἰναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τούπαντιον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῶν, ὡ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲις πῶς τοῦτο ὑπαρ οὔτ' ὑπαρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτε ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμὴ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ὑπαρ οὔτε ἐσόμενον:

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονᾶς δὲ γε ποὺ, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγάλας, ὅταν ἰδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὑπενοίουν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ πάντων αἰσχυντι ἐσομενον ὀρώντες αὐτοὶ τε αἰσχυνώμεθα καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπ- p. 66. τομεν ο' τι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τουατα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὗ δέον ὅρᾶν αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ὑπὸ τε ἀγγέλων πέμπτων καὶ παροῦσι φράζον, ώς ἡδονή κτῆμα οὐκ ἐστὶ πρώτων οὔθ' αὖ δεύτερων, ἀλλὰ πρώτων μὲν πη περι μέτρων καὶ τὸ μέτρων καὶ καίριον καὶ

of the moral scales; and Pleasure, the indication of the Senses that an object presents the due proportions when tried by sensuous weights and standards, may be condemned on a moral mensuration, as violating a more imperative proportion. Reason, then, in virtue of its exclusive relation to the absolute and overruling law, may be said to have a greater affinity to law or Measure than any other faculty or element of the soul.

It may seem strange to apply a word like Measure, which essentially implies relation, to the Absolute Being. But Plato connects the idea of Measure with Perfection. Ἀλλὰ μὲτρον τῶν τουότων ἀπολείπον καὶ ὁποίον τοῦ ἄντος οὗ πάνι μέτρον γίγνεται: ἄτελες γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδένος μέτρον. Rep. 6. p. 504. "A measure of such inquiries that wants an iota of the truth is not a true measure: for imperfection is inconsistent with measure." And we must remember that in the Ideal theory the being and goodness of the phenome-
and dependent world consist in an approximation and assimilation to the eternal prototype of being and goodness, which thus acquires the relative character of a Standard or Measure. What is implied in our text is stated explicitly in the Laws. 'Ο δὲ θεὸς ἡμῶν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἐν ἐκαμίστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ποιί γιὰ φά-σιν ἀνήθρωπος. 4. p. 716. "The Divinity is everywhere the Measure, not, as some imagine, Man." Plato and the Pythagoreans said that though there is a vast interval between the Divinity and the universe, it is an exemplar which all things strive to imitate. It is difficult to distinguish καιρὸν from μέτρον. It can here express no relation of time. In Hesiod καιρὸς is coupled with μέτρον, and seems to express what was afterwards called the Golden Mean. Μέ-τρα φυλασσόμεναι καιρὸς δ'(ἐν πάσιν ἄριστοι. In the Politicus it is associated with τὸ μέτρον and τὸ μέσον. Δὴλον ὅτι δια-βροίμεν ἐν τῷ μετρητικῷ ταύτῃ δίχα τέμνομεν, ἐν μὲν τιθέμεν τῆς μόριον συμπάσας τέχνας ὑπόσα αὐτῷ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος καὶ παχύτητα πρὸς τούναυ-τίνος μετροῦσιν, τὸ δὲ ἐτέρον ὑπόσα πρὸς τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δεόν καὶ πάθος ὑπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀποκάθη τῶν ἐπικάτων. p. 384. It was after-
repeatedly applied, not only to the created universe, but to its ideal archetype. e. g. τῷ γὰρ τῶν νοουμένων καλλιστῷ καὶ κατὰ πάντα τελεφ μάλιστ' αὐτῶν ὁ θεὸς ὁριωθῶσαι βουληθείς, ξύον ἐν ὁράτου, πάνθ' ὥσα αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν συγγενῆ ξῶα ἐντὸς ἔχον ἐαυτοῦ. ἐπιστήμης. p. 30. "As that of the objects of reason which is most beautiful and all perfect (himself) was proposed by the Divinity as a pattern for his work, he formed the world a living being, single and visible, comprehending within it all living beings of a kindred nature." Of course the natural universe bears the same relation as the perfect human life to the Ideal Good: except that nature is an actual perfection, while the perfect life has to be actualized by the human will, allied in this respect to the divine Cause.

'Αλήθεια is passed over in this enumeration. Of course like τὸ μέτριον, τὸ καλὸν, and τὸ τέλευ, it has its place originally in the first rank, and derivatively in the second and others. In the Republic Truth is imparted by the Good to the other ideal existences. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τῆς ἀλήθειας παρέχου τοῖς γενειοσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γενειοσκομτὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τἀγαθοῦ ἱδέαν φαύλων εἶναι...οὗτο δὲ καλὸν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσιως τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἀλλὰ καὶ κάλλιον ἐτὶ τοῖνυν ἣγονομενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἱγγασε. Rep. 6. p. 508. "The source of truth to the objects of knowledge, and of knowledge to the soul, may be identified with the Ideal Good...and beautiful as both of these, truth and knowledge are, it is distinct from both, and still more beautiful."

4. Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον] The Reason here mentioned is the human Reason. We have seen before that it is akin to the divine Reason, as being creator or efficient Cause. The divine Reason is identical with the Ideal Good, and is not only the Efficient or transcendent, but the Essential or Formal, i. e. immanent, cause of being and goodness.
ΣΩ. Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, ἀλύτους ὀρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάζατε, τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμαις τὸς δὲ αἰσθήσεων ἐπομένας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. "Εκτη δ' ἐν γενεᾷ, φησιν Ὄρφεφ ς, καταπαύ-5 σατε κόσμου ἀοίδης. ἀτάρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἦμετερος λόγος ἐν ἑκτῇ καταπαύμενος εἶναι κρύσει. τὸ δ' ἤ ἤ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἠμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὀσπέρ κεφαλῆν ἀποδοῦναι τοὺς εἰρημένοις.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

XLII. ΣΩ. "Ἰθι δή, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτηρὶ τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. Φιλήβος τάγαθον ἔτιθετο ἵμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῇ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὃς έοικας, ἔλεγες ἄρτιός τὸν ἐς ἄρχης ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Ναί, τὸ δὲ γε μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούσωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἀπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσ-χεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὗ μόνον ἄλλα καὶ 20 ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴῃ μακρῷ βέλτιον τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. 'Ὑποπτεύων δὲ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλὰ 25

3. ἐπιστήμαις τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεων ἐπομένας] This is obviously the true reading. The MSS. give, ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς δὲ. It refers to chapter 31, where some pure Pleasures are said to be sensational, others intellectual.

25. 'Ὑποπτεύων δὲ γε κ. τ. λ.] In the Eudemian Ethics we have a recapitulation of the propositions discussed in the Philebus, and also an indication of the point which prevents it from being regarded as a systematic or exhaustive ethical treatise, viz. the omission of the claims of the active life (πράξεις, ἀρετή;) τὸ δ' εἴδαμονεὸν καὶ τὸ δὲν μακα-
εἶτον, ὡς εἰ φανείη τι τούτων ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ π. 66. τῶν δευτερείων νῦ̑ πρὸς ἕδονῇν ξυνδιαμαχοῖμην, ἕδονῇ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσωτο.  
ΠΡΩ. Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν. p. 67.  
5 ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γε πάντων ἰκανώτατον τοῦ- 
ton οὐδέτερον ἰκανὸν ἐφάνη.  
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.  
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ 
νοῦς ἀπῆλλακτο καὶ ἕδονῇ μὴ τοῦ τάγαθων γε αὐτὸ μηδ' ἔτερον αὐτῶιν εἶναι, στερόμενον αὐταρκείας καὶ 
τῆς τοῦ ἰκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως;  
ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.  
ΣΩ. Φανέντος δὲ γε ἅλλον τρίτον κρείττονος 
τούτων ἐκατέρω, μυρίῳ αὖ νοὺς ἕδονῆς οἰκεῖστερον 
καὶ προσφυέστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶτος ἰ 
ἰδέα.  
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;  
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἢν νῦν ὁ 
λόγος ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτ' ἃν ἡ τῆς ἕδονῆς δύναμις.  

riōs kai kalōs eip αν εν τρισι μα- 
lisata tois ειναι δοκουσων αἱρετω- 
tatous. ois meν γαρ την φρόνησιν 
μεγοτου ειναν φαιν αγαθων, ois de 
tην αρετην, ois de την ἕδονην. και 
προσ την ευδαιμονιαν ειναι περι του 
μεγεθους αυτων διαμφιαζητουσιν, 
sυμβάλλεται φάσκοντες βάτερον 
θατέρου μᾶλλον εις αυτην ois meν 
ως ουσαν μεζουν αγαθων την φρόνη- 
sin, ois de ταπητη την αρετην, ois de 
ἀμφοτέρων τούτων την ἕδονην, και 
tois meν οκ πάντων δοκει τούτων, 
tois δ' εκ δυον, τois δ' εν ει τη 
tούτων ειναι το δην ευδαιμωνους. t. i.  
"Happiness and a blest and 
beautiful life will depend on 
three things, which are held to 
be the highest objects of de- 
sire. For Wisdom, Virtuous 
Action, and Pleasure, are each 
maintained by different per- 
sons to be the greatest Good. 
And viewed as merely ingre- 
dients of happiness, their com- 
parative importance is some- 
times disputed, what they con- 
btribute to it being variously 
estimated; some attributing a 
superiority to Wisdom over 
Virtue, others to Virtue over 
Wisdom, others to Pleasure 
over both. For some think 
that all of them in conjunction, 
others that two of them, others 
that one alone constitutes a 
happy life."
ΠΡΩ. Ἐσείς ἔχεις ἐπὶ τοὺς πάντες βοῶς τε καὶ ἅπασιν καὶ τάλαξι τετραντά θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ καίρει διάκειον. οἰς πιστεύοντες, ὁσπέρ μάντεις ὀρνισίν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνοντι τὰς ἱδονὰς εἰς τὸ ξύνημεν εἴς κρατήστας εἴναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἐρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν Μοῦσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντεμένων ἐκάστοτε λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεστάτα, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰρήσθαι σοι νῦν ἑκατεῖν ἀπαντεῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίσετέ με;

ΠΡΩ. Σμικρόν ἔτι τὸ λοιπὸν, ὃ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτε σύ γε ἀπερεῖς πρῶτος ἡμῶν. ὑπομνήσησο δὲ σε τὰ λειτύμενα.
APPENDIX A.

"Εν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυμαστῶν λέχθεν.

§ 1. The paradox that the One is Many and the Many are One was very celebrated in early Greek philosophy, and is often mentioned in the works of Plato, who indeed in a modified sense adopted it as a principle. It was first expressed by Zeno the Eleatic in defence of the tenet of his school, that Being is One and immutable. Kant, in modern times, to demonstrate that the human intellect is only capable of reducing phenomena to their laws, and is utterly unable to comprehend real or spiritual existence, attempted to establish the Antinomies of reason; that is, to shew that whenever we attempt to reason on any thing but phenomena we are driven by an equal logical necessity to contradictory conclusions, which should be regarded as a symptom that we are attempting a problem beyond the reach of our understandings. Long before this, Zeno had employed a similar reductio ad impossibile to establish the opposite doctrine. He attempted to shew that if we believe in the reality of the changing world of nature we must admit that contradictory propositions can be true together: e. g. that what is One is Many and what is Many is One. But as it is the most deep-seated conviction of reason that contradictories cannot be true, he argued that the assumption we started from must have been erroneous, and that the phenomenal world must be an illusion. These seeming existences that involve us in so absurd conclusions are nothing; only the One and immutable is. In the words of Parmenides

τὸ πάντα ὁμοί ἐστίν
ὁσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
γίνεσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλαθεῖαι, εἶναι τε καὶ σιγῆ,
καὶ τόπων ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χρόνα φανῶν ἀμειβέν.

"Wherefore all are but a name
That mortals deem to be realities,
Birth and decay, to be and not to be,
And change of place and loss of brilliant hue."
The sort of coexistence of opposites that he succeeds in establishing is that which Plato here puts into the mouth of Protarchus. In the language of Platonism it arises from the "participation" of individuals of the sensible world in the Ideas. Eti μεν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια τις ἀπέφαίμεν ἄνωμοι γιγνύμενα ἢ τὰ ἄνωμοι ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν οἴμαι ἵναι ἐν ὑμῖν τὰ τούτων μετέχοινα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει τεπονυθότα, οὐδὲν ἐμοίγε, ὁ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδὲν γε ἐν ὑπαίτα ἀποφαίνεις τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῖς ἐνιοῖς, καὶ ταύτα ταύτα πολλὰ τῷ πλῆθους αὐτοὶ μετέχειν ἀλλ' ἐν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀπο- δείξει, τούτο ἥδη θαυμάσομαι. Parm. 129 b. "If a man proved likeness was unlikeness or unlikeness likeness, he would astonish me; but if he only proved that what participates in each of these Ideas has each of these attributes, I should not be astonished, Zeno. Nor should I, if he proved all things One by participation in Unity, and at the same time Many by participation in Multiplicity. But he would surprise me if he could prove Unity to be Multiplicity, or Multiplicity to be Unity."

§ 2. The Megarian school, who differed from the Eleatics so far as to allow a multiplicity of Beings or Ideas, seem to have been so far convinced by Zeno's arguments as to deny the power of distinct Ideas to be combined in propositions. They recognised identical propositions such as man is man, but not synthetical propositions, such as man is white. They seem to have thought that the latter would involve the Zononian absurdity that the Same is One and Many. They accordingly argued against their admis- sibility by deducing various contradictions from them in the manner of Zeno. They are alluded to in the Sophista.

Λέγομεν δὴ καθ' ὅν τινα ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὕπρωνοι ταύταν τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν...Λέγομεν ἀνθρώπων δήπον πόλλα ἄπτα ἐποιομάζοντες, τάτε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχή- ματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς: ἐν οἷς πάσι καὶ ἔτεροις μυρίων ὧν μένον ἀνθρωπον αὐτῶν εἶναι φαμέν ἄλλα καὶ ἄγαθον καὶ ἐπέρα ἄπειρα. καὶ τάλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἐν ἐκαστὸν ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὕπώμασι λέ- γομεν...οὗν γε οἴμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τοῖς γερότοις τοῖς ὑπομαθέσα τολίνη παρεικεκάκαμεν εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πράξειροι, ὅσ ἄδυναν τὰ τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι.
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καὶ δήποτε χαίροντων οὐκ ἔόντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἀνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ
tὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸν δὲ ἀνθρωπὸν ἀνθρωπὸν—ἐνυγχάνεις
γὰρ ὡς ἐγόμαι πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐποιουδακότων, ἐνοτε πρε-
σβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως
tὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαναμάκασι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσσοφοι οἰομένοι τούτο
αὐτὸ ἀνευρήκεναι. 251 A. "Let us indicate in what way this
Same has Many names given it. When we speak of man
we apply many epithets to him, attributing to him colours,
and shapes, and sizes, and virtues. and vices. Whereby,
and by ten thousand other words, we call him not only
man, but an infinite variety of other things. And other
objects in a similar manner we first suppose One, and
and afterwards call a Multitude of things by a Multitude
of names. Whereby no doubt we have prepared a banquet
for young philosophers and old men behindhand in their
studies. For it is at once easy for any one to object that
it is impossible for a Unit to be a Multitude, or a Multi-
tude a Unit. And they rejoice in requiring us not to say
a man is good, but a man is a man, and good is good.
I have no doubt you often meet with persons devoted to
these dogmas, old men sometimes, who from intellectual
poverty think these very valuable and profound discov-
eries." From the contempt expressed in the last words we
must suppose they apply not to Plato’s friend, Euclid of
Megara, but to an assailant of Plato, Antisthenes the
founder of Cynicism, who seems to have nearly agreed
with the Megarian school. In the same dialogue Socrates
asserts that this identity of the One and Many, so far from
being impossible, is the necessary condition of thought and
reasoning. Τὸ δὲ ταῦτα ἐτερω ἀποφαίνειν ἀμὴ γέ τη καὶ τὸ
θάτερον ταῦτα καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὀμοίων ἀνόμοιον, καὶ
χαίρειν οὕτω τάναντι ἄει προφέρομαι εἰ τοῖς λόγοισ, οὕτε τὶς
ἐλέγχοις οὕτος ἀληθινὸς, ἀρτὶ τε τῶν ὀντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένον
δῆλος νεοχενής ὅν... καὶ γὰρ τὸ γε πάν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν
ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελές, καὶ δὴ καὶ παντόπως ἀμοῦ-
σου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου. τί δὴ; τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων
ἐστιν ἀφάνεις τὸ διαλύειν ἔκαστον ἀπὸ πάντως, διὰ γὰρ τὴν
ἀλληλῶν τῶν εἰδών συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν. 259 e.
"To prove the Identical to be in some respect Diverse,
and the Diverse in some respect Identical, the great to
be little, and the like to be unlike, and to delight in thus
reducing an opponent to maintain the union of contraries, is no true refutation, and is clearly the birth of the immature mind of one beginning to philosophize. Such isolation of every idea from every other is not only false, but particularly unphilosophic and a sin against the Muses. For the isolation of the ideas is a complete annihilation of reasoning, as it is the combination of ideas that constitutes reasoning."

Aristotle alludes to the two Eleatic or Megaric arguments indicated in the Philebus, and informs us that the first was by some considered so formidable as to make it necessary to alter the form of synthetical propositions. The second argument, that from the Whole and its Parts, was considered to be unanswerable, and the paradox, that contradictories can be true, to be so far established. 'Ενθο-ρυβοθυτο δὲ καὶ οἱ ϊστεροι καθάπερ οἱ ἄρχαιοι, μήποτε συμβαλλὴ αὐτῶι ἄμα τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν εἶναι καὶ πολλαὶ. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἑστὶν ἀφέιλον ὁσπέρ Λυκόφρων, οἱ δὲ τίνα λέξιν μετεξαρθημένοι, ὅτι ο ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευκὸς ἑστὶν ἄλλα λελείκωται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἑστὶν ἄλλα βαδίζειν ὅνα μὴ τὸ ἑστὶ προσάπτοντες πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἑν, ὡς μοραχὸς λεγομένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἤ τοῦ ὄντος. πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ὦντα ἡ λόγος (οἴον ἄλλο τὸ λευκὸ εἶναι καὶ μουσικῷ, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἀμφω, πολλὰ ἁρὰ τὸ ἑν) ἡ διαφέρει, ὁσπέρ τὸ ὀλὸν καὶ τὰ μέρη. ἐνταῦθα δὴ διηπόρουν καὶ ἠμολογοῦν τὸ ὑπὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ὁσπέρ οὐκ ἐνδεχομένον τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, μὴ τὰ ἄντι-κειμένα δὲ· ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεπελεξεῖν. Physic. Ausc. 1. 2. "The later as well as the earlier opponents of the Eleatics were in fear of being reduced to the conclusion that the Same thing could be One and Many: so that some, as Lyceophron, omitted the copula of propositions; others altered the form of predication, and said a man walks or has whiteness, instead of is walking or is white, lest the word is should prove One Being to Be Many. As if Unity and Being had not various meanings. However, as not only One Subject is Many in respect of the definitions of its Attributes (as to be white and to be musical are, when defined, two different things, and the same man is both, One thing therefore is two), but also One Whole is Many, by division into its Parts; the second consideration perplexed them, and they confessed that Unity was Multiplicity, without seeing that these terms were not contra-
dictory, as the Multiplicity of the Parts is potential, the Unity of the Whole actual."

It is not clear in what way Lycophron and his contemporaries thought they mended the matter by the alterations they proposed. Perhaps they only refused to use εἶναι as the copula in synthetical propositions. In Zeno's argument there is obviously an equivocation or rather the logician's fallacia Secundum Quid. Unity in respect of the Subject is confused with Unity in respect of the Predicate. Unity in respect of the Subject and Multiplicity in respect of the Subject, or Unity in respect of the Predicate and Multiplicity in respect of the Predicate, are contradictory and cannot co-exist: but there is no contradiction between Unity in respect of the Subject, and Multiplicity in respect of the Predicate, and no reason why they should not co-exist. However, in consequence apparently of this class of fallacy, the principle of Contradiction and definition of Refutation (ἐλεγχος) were fenced about with various limitations and provisos. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ φιλοσόφου...καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἄρχων ἔστω ἐπισκέψασθαι δήλον...τίς δ' ἔστιν αὕτη μετὰ ταύτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἁμα ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα προσδιορισάμεθ' ἂν ἔστω προσδιορισμένα πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς διάχειρισι. αὕτη δ' ἀπασών ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἄρχων...διὸ πάντες ἀποδεικνύσσει εἰς ταύτην ἀνάγουσιν ἑσχάτην δόξαν. φύσει γὰρ ἄρχῃ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιωμάτων αὕτη πάντων. Μετ. 3.3. "It belongs to Philosophy to investigate the canons of syllogism. Such is the principle that the same predicate cannot be true and not true of the same subject, in the same respect, and with all the other limitations required to meet sophistical objections. This is the most evident principle there is, and is that to which all demonstration ultimately appeals, and is the natural foundation of all the other axioms." Plato seems to have been the author of these distinctions, for he says, describing the Elenchus: καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τὰς δόξας τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταύταν τιθέασι παρ' ἄλληλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύσσουν αὐτὰς αὐτάς ἁμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταύτα ἑναντίας. Soph. p. 230.

§ 3. The Unity of the Many and Multiplicity of the One was afterwards proposed by Plato, not as an absurd conclusion...
to which he reduced his opponents, but as the principle of his own Dialectics. The point of view, however, from which this Unity and Multiplicity are regarded differs from that of his predecessors. Their One that is Many was the One individual Subject with a Multiplicity of Predicates; Plato's is the One Species comprehending a Multiplicity of Individuals. Of course the Platonic point of view is the more important, as it involves Generalization and Specification, that is, Classification or scientific arrangement. Its meaning is sufficiently developed in the Philebus.

Participation here as before expresses the relation of the One and the Many. There the One Subject participated in the Many Predicates; here the Many Individuals participate in the One Species. Indeed in the Sophista all affirmative propositions are regarded as expressing a Participation of Ideas, so that as Aristotle defined them to be συνθέσεις νοήματων Plato might have defined them to be μετοχῇ νοήματων. As therefore the reference of an Individual to its Species is a particular kind of proposition, of course it expresses a particular kind of Participation.

Plato's identity of One and Many, though paradoxical in expression, does not pretend to contradict the canon of syllogism. He only considered paradoxes and apparent contradictions as stimulants to inquiry, as when the sensible faculties are perplexed, we are obliged to appeal to reason. 'Επεξεύρον ο λέγειν ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικά τῆς διανοίας ἔστι, τὰ δ' οὖν ἐὰ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἰσθήσιν ἄμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει παρακλητικά ὀριζόμενος, ὅσα δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἐγερτικά τῆς νοήσεως. Rep. 2. p. 344. "I meant to say that some sensations stimulate the intellect to inquiry, and others do not; pronouncing those that are attended with contradictory sensations to be stimulant, and those that are unattended to have no aptitude for awakening the reason."

§ 4. In modern times, however, Hegel has put forward as the motto of his philosophy the sameness of One and Many, or rather, in more general terms, the truth of contradictions, in the sense in which it contradicts the axiom that underlies syllogism. The principle of contradiction applied in the syllogism, and used as the organ of science, had developed the diversities of Being, and marked very
distinctly the limits between the different spheres of thought. In order to reestablish, as has ever been the aspiration of Philosophy, the Unity of thought and homogeneity of Being, Hegel boldly proposes to adopt as a regulative maxim, the opposite of the principle that had broken up Being and produced the divergence of the sciences: an antinomistic canon belonging to the Reason as the opposite principle belongs to the Understanding. He accordingly professes for his motto: Whatever is is not, or: Only contradictories are true. The function of this principle is to break down the barriers fixed by the Understanding. It is to become an antinomian Dialectic, or method of developing every elementary force or conception into its direct contrary, and of afterwards rising with them out of their hostile, onesided, chaotic condition, to a higher stage in the hierarchy of Being, where they conspire to form a balanced and beautiful Whole. No doubt, if there were such an axiom, and the intellect could use it as a canon of reasoning, as it uses the principle of contradiction, it would be very easy to obliterate the divisions traced by the latter and recognise a Unity of Being. As soon as the latter pronounced A is not B, the former would contradict it and pronounce A is B, and all Being would be seen to be homogeneous. The only wonder would be, if such a principle were within the reach of the human intellect, that there should seem to be such an impassable chasm between Spirit and Matter, the Ego and the Non Ego, Freedom and Necessity, and other opposites whose homogeneity is so difficult to recognise, and whose coexistence even is so difficult to adjust. The spear of Achilles could alone heal the wounds it caused, and probably, if the scattered members of truth and Being can ever be united, it must be by means of the ordinary principles of reasoning which caused their dispersion. This task belongs to Philosophy; and the Hegelian motto is not inaptly chosen, if it is only intended as a paradoxical indication of the end to be realized.

The paradox connected with classification introduced by Plato, the Unity of the Species in the Multiplicity of Individuals, furnished for centuries a topic of speculation to the Nominalists and Realists. The paradoxes that
APPENDIX A.

have been supposed to interfere with the principle of contradiction in modern times have a greater resemblance to those which were agitated before the time of Plato, and which depend on the relation of a Whole to its Parts. The Whole is a Unity and the Parts a Plurality, and yet the Whole and Parts are identical. Nay more: the Parts are not only different from one another, but perhaps essentially contraries (ἐξ ὑπὲρ δὲ δὲὶ ἐν γενέσθαι εἰδεὶ διαφέρει. Arist. Pol. 2. 2. "The elements of an organic unity must be contraries,"), and yet they not only unite in the Whole, but have some bond of identity in their own conceptions. The centre and circumference are Parts of a circle: it is One, they are Plural; they are contraries and yet are mutually implied. Kant had collected similar difficulties, or what he represented as difficulties, under the name of Amphibolies in the sphere of Judgment, and under the name of Paralogisms and Antinomies in the sphere of Reason. Hegel finds them in all the categories of Relation, such as Cause and Effect, Substance and Accident, but removes them from the sphere of Reason, and confines them to the sphere of Judgment or Reflexion. They are contradictions, he would have us believe, which violate the narrow canons of the Understanding, but, like discords in music, may be harmoniously resolved by the more powerful methods employed by Reason. They, however, seem to turn on principles frequently recognised by the Greek speculators who adopted the axioms of the Understanding and reduced them to formulas: e. g. ἡ ὑλὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. Met. 10. 4. "The same material is indifferently receptive of contrary forms."—'Αδύνατον τῷ ὑλῆς ἔχοντι μὴ ὑπάρχειν πῶς τὸ ἐναντίον. De Long. et Brev. Vitæ. "Wherever matter is governed by a form there must be a presence to a certain extent of the contrary form (i.e. merely potentially, or, in partial actuality)." Ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ ἐσχάτῃ ὑλῇ καὶ ἡ μορφῇ ταύτῳ. Met. 8. 6. "The proximate matter and the form are identical." Τὸ δύναμεν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ἐν πῶς ἐστὶν. ib. "The power and the realisation are in a sense but one." It is impossible, if we distinguish contradictories from contraries, and attend to the purport of the principle of contradiction, to find any thing here that really violates it, or that requires the admission of an antinomistic canon.
APPENDIX B.

To Péras and τὸ Ἀπειρον.

§ 1. The Antithesis of Limit and Infinity was borrowed by Plato from the Pythagoreans. We read in a fragment of Philolaus, Ἐκ περαιῶντων τε καὶ ἀπειρῶν ὁ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συνημόχθη. "Of Limitants and the Unlimited the world and all its parts are compacted." They considered these to be the elements of Number: Τὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα πάντων εἶναι ὑπέλαβον, τοῦ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ στοιχεῖα τὸ ἀρίτμον καὶ τὸ περιττόν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀπειρον τὸ δὲ πεπερασμένον, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἕξι ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τούτων, καὶ γὰρ ἄριτμον εἶναι καὶ περιττόν. Met. 1. 5. "They made the elements of Number the elements of all things else, and supposed the elements of Number were evenness and oddness, the first Unlimited, the second Limited, and Unity both even and odd." Instead of identifying the Infinite with the even, Plato made it a Duality, and called it the Infinitely Great and Infinitely Small. Οἱ μὲν Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ Ἀπειρον εἶναι τὸ Ἀριτμὸν φασί, Πλάτων δὲ δύο τὰ Ἀπειρα, τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρόν. Arist. Physic. Ause. 3. 4.

"The Pythagoreans make the Infinite the even, but Plato makes two Infinities, the Great and the Little." Again, while the Pythagoreans identified the world of Numbers and the world of sense, Plato supposed two worlds, a Natural and an Ideal, each resolvable into two elements, a Limit and an Unlimited, the Limiting element of the Natural world being the Ideas. Πλῆν οἱ μὲν Πυθαγόρειοι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τιθέσαι τὸ Ἀπειρον ὥστ' ἐορ χωριστῶν ποιοῦσι τῶν ἀριθμῶν. Πλάτων δὲ τὸ Ἀπειρον καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἱδέασι εἶναι. Physic. Ause. 3. 4. "The Pythagoreans confine the Infinite to the world of sense as they give no transcendent existence to Numbers, while Plato makes it an element both of the world of sense and of the Ideal world." Φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὡς θυσίων αἰτίαν ἐστὶ μόνον κεχρημένος, τῇ τε τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὑλὴν τὰ
γάρ εἴδη τοῦ τί ἐστὶν αὕτα τούς ἄλλους, τοὺς δ' εἴδεσι τὸ "Εὖν" καὶ τίς (for τίς read ὧς) ἡ ὕλη ἡ ύποκειμένη καθ' ἑστὶ τὰ εἴδη μὲν εἴπι τῶν ἀληθητῶν ἡ "Εὖν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι λέγεται ὧτι αὕτη (for ὧτι αὕτη read ἥ) Δυνάς ἐστι τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρὸν. Metaph. 1. b. "It is plain from the preceding that Plato has only operated with two causes, the formal and the material; for the Ideas are the formal cause to other things, and the One to the Ideas; and the subject matter, which in the sensible world is informed by the Ideas and in the Ideal world by the One, is the Dyad, the Great and the Little."

The Platonic school were not agreed as to the precise denomination of the triad of principles. Plato himself designated them the One and the Dyad of the Infinitely Great and Infinitely Little. He called this the indeterminate Dyad to distinguish it from the determinate Dyad, one of the ideal numbers which it generated. 'Ο γάρ ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ 'Εὖν καὶ τῆς Δυνάδος τῆς 'Αορίστου. Met. 13. 8. He also identified the One with the Equal, and accordingly named the Infinite the Inequality, or the Unequal Duality. Others headed by Spousesippus or Xenocrates made two principles, Unity and Plurality: a third section preferred Unity and Diversity, or Unity and Difference; a fourth in the place of the Great and the Little substituted the Many and the Few, as more akin to Number; a fifth employed the more comprehensive terms Excess and Defect. All these varieties are noticed in the following passages: Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἔτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποιοῦσιν ὅλην, οἱ μὲν τῷ 'Εὐν τῷ "Ισω τὸ "Ανίσου, οἱ δὲ τῷ 'Εὐν τὸ Πλῆθος: γεννώντας γάρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ 'Ανίσου δυνάδος τοῦ Μεγάλου καὶ Μικροῦ, τῷ δ' ἐκ τοῦ Πλῆθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ 'Εὖν δὲ οὐσίας ἄμφω...ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ στοιχεία καλοῦσιν οὐ καλῶς ἀποδιδόσαιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρὸν λέγοντες μετὰ τοῦ 'Εὖνς, τρία ταῖτα, στοιχεία τῶν ἀριθμῶν, τὰ μὲν δὲν ὅσον τὸ δὲ "Εὖν τὴν μορφὴν, οἱ δὲ τῷ Πολύ καὶ 'Ολίγον, ὅτι τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρὸν μεγέθους οἰκείστερα τῷ φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτων τῷ Τυπερέχον καὶ τῷ Τυπερεχομένῳ...οἱ δὲ τῷ "Ετερον καὶ τῷ "Αλλο πρὸς τῷ "Εὖν ἀντιτύθειαν: οἱ δὲ τὸ Πλῆθος καὶ τὸ "Εὖν. Met. 14. 1. "The Platonists (not perceiving the distinction between matter and privation, the opposite of form) suppose one of the contraries to be the material to the other,
making either Inequality or Plurality the material of Unity; and thus generating Numbers either from the Unequal Duality, the Great and Little, or from Plurality; in both cases by the active agency of Unity... They are not successful in stating the elementary principles, some associating with Unity the Great and Little, so as to make three elements of number, the two latter material, the Unity formal; others the Many and the Few, because the Great and Little are more allied to dimension than to number; others the broader genera of Excess and Defect; others making Diversity and Difference the antithesis of Unity; and others Plurality."

Aristotle considers the last antithesis the most accurate. El eis to, lobep xelvoujvta, ta oina eis enantlojv tio de 'Ei n outhe enantlou, eli aro mellee, to jplhjv, to o’ anwsoj tio isw kai to etepouj tio taivjw kai to alllo taivjw, malostaa mev oj to 'Ei tio. Plhdei enantlojvtes ehojtaij twos dojv, ousi muh ouj oinoi ikanos. ib. 14. 1. “Now if, as they all agree, the world is composed of contraries, and Inequality is the contrary of Equality, Diversity of Sameness and Identity, those who make Plurality the antithesis of Unity hold the most tenable position, though even they hardly make it good.”

Unity and Plurality are contraries and opposed as Positive and Privative. 'Antikeetai de to 'Ei kai to jplhjv os adiairetov kai diairetov... epi yovh, ai enantlojvtes terachos kai tovtov kath sterjnh v legetai thterov, enantlojv av elh kai ousi os antifasios ousi ws to proj ti leghmena. Met. 9. 3. “The opposition of Unity and Plurality is that of Indivisible and Divisible. Thus of the four kinds of Opposition they fall under the two of Privation and Contrariety, not of contradiction or Relation.” Again, the Plurality itself can be divided into two contrary extremes, the Many and the Few. "Osa diairetav, en tovtovs legetai ta polla elav is jplhjv, koj to eljvow osauteis plhjvos ehoj elassewv. ib. 9. 6. “In Plurality Many denotes a Plurality that exceeds, Few a Plurality that is exceeded.” To de eljwv enantlojv to poll av uperekouj plhjvos uperekomenv plhdei. ib. "Many and Few are contraries and express excess and defect of number.” In the other categories the Infinite was composed of analogous extremes, but
there was a diversity of opinion both as to this and the formal principle. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ποιοῦσι τὰ ὑστέρα γένη τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον ἐκ μακροῦ μὲν καὶ βραχεός τὰ μήκη, πλατέος δὲ καὶ στενοῦ τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ βαθέος δὲ καὶ ταπεινῶν τοὺς ὄγκους. ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἐδή τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἄρχην ἄλλοι ἄλλοι τιθέ-ασι τῶν τοιούτων. Met. 12. 9. “Some employ the species of the Great and Little to construct the categories subsequent to Number, making Length of Long and Short, Breadth of Wide and Narrow, Solidity of Thick and Thin, all subdivisions of Great and Little. As to the principle corresponding to Unity in these categories they are at variance.”

§ 2. We have seen that Plato constructs the natural world of two principles, the Idea and the Infinite. The main difference of Aristotle’s view is that he analyses the Infinite into two elements, Privation (στέρησις) the opposite of the Idea, and Matter (ὕλη) equally receptive of the Privation or the Idea. “Οὐτὸς γάρ τίνος θέλειν καὶ ἄγαθον καὶ ἐφευρακτεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ φαμέν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τὸ τέρματο τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀρχής φαμέν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τὸ τέρματο τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀρχής φαμέν εἶναι.” Phys. Ausc. 1, 9. “One element is divine and good and an object of desire, another is contrary to this, and the nature of a third is to love and desire the first.” Μία μὲν ὁμοίως ἄρχη ἡ ὕλη, μία δὲ ὁ λόγος, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τούτῳ ἡ στέρησις. ib. 17. “One principle is the Matter, a second the Spirit (Form), a third its contrary, Privation.” Γίγνεται ὁμοίως ἂπαν ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς⋯ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ὑποκειμένου ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἐν, εἰδεί δὲ δύο⋯ἐν δὲ τὸ εἶδος. ὥστε ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς δύο λεκτέων εἶναι τὰς ἄρχας, ἐστὶ δ’ ὁς τρεῖς. Phys. Ausc. 1, 7. “The principles of the natural world are Matter and Form, the Matter though numerically one having a twofold character, while the Form is simply one. So that in one sense there are two principles, and in another three.” ὥστε παντελῶς ἐτέρως ὁ τρόπος ὃτος τῆς τριάδος κἀκεῖνος. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ δεύρο προῆλθοιν, ὅτι δεῖ τινα ὑποκείσθαι φύσιν, ταῦτα μὲντοι μίᾶς ποιοῦσι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τις Διάδοσ ποιεῖ, λέγον Μέγα καὶ Μικρόν, οὔθεν ἤτοι ταῦτα ποιεῖ τῆν γὰρ ἑτέραν παρεῖδε, τῆν στερήσατε. Physic. Ausc. 1, 9. “So that ours is a very different triad of principles from that of the Plato-
nists. For they reached the point of perceiving the necessity of a material element, but made it simple in character; since though Plato makes it a Dyad, and calls it the Great and Little, he labours under the same error, for he overlooks the other principle, the Privation.” The antithesis of \( \sigma \tau \epsilon \rho \eta \sigma \rho i s \), which we have seen called \( \epsilon \iota \delta \sigma s, \lambda \gamma o s, \) and \( \mu \omicron \omicron \omicron \eta \), appears to be properly called \( \varepsilon \xi s. \ \pi \rho \omega \tau \gamma \ \delta e \ \epsilon \nu \alpha \nu \alpha \tau \iota \omega \sigma i s \varepsilon \xi s \ k a l \ \sigma \tau \epsilon \rho \eta \sigma \rho i s \ \epsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu . \) Met. 10. 4.

The reality of the distinction between the Material and the Privation in the Unlimited, is most important and manifest in the moral world. Here Aristotle adopts the Platonic doctrine in making a Balance of opposite principles, a Due Measure between an Excess and a Defect constitute moral goodness. The will and the affections are the material (\( \epsilon \lambda \eta \) of virtue. Unless we distinguished this element from the Privation (\( \sigma \tau \epsilon \rho \eta \sigma \rho i s \)) we should have to say that the vices are constituent elements of virtue.

It may be observed that in contrasting his own principles with those of Plato in the passages quoted above, Aristotle has made the difference appear to be greater than it really was by the incompleteness of his list. If, instead of comparing two triads of principles, he had compared two tetrads; if, that is, he had added to Plato’s Idea, Excess and Defect, the Recipient (\( \tau \omicron \ \delta \epsilon \kappa \tau \iota \kappa \omicron \omicron \)) of the Timæus, and to his own Matter, Positive determination, and Negative, the Mean or Form (\( \epsilon \iota \delta \sigma s \)) which occupies such a prominent position in his philosophy, it would have appeared that the two lists are substantially identical. He elsewhere contrasts Plato’s list with that of the old Physiologists. They agreed in constructing the world of a Unity and two antagonistic extremes, but differed inasmuch as in the physiological scheme the One was the passive material and the extremes the active and formative principles, in Plato’s system the One was active and the extremes passive. In truth, however, Plato as well as Aristotle employed the One in both of these relations; both as the primary Matter or passive substratum of the qualitative extremes, and as the Formative principle or active origin of motion and law. Aristotle seems to have justified himself in omitting this principle from his list,
because as an affirmative determination (ἐξεισ) it is analogous to the positive extreme of the elementary qualities, being a Form of a higher order, or, in the language of Schelling, of a higher power. Τὰ δὲ εἰδῆ καὶ τὰ τέλη ἐξεισ τινές.

De gen. et cor. 1. 7. "The formal and final causes are certain positive determinations."

A common feature of all these schemes is indicated by Aristotle: ὅτι μὲν ὁν τὰναυτία πῶς πάντες ποιοῦν τὰς ἀρχὰς ὄνλον...πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεία καὶ τὰς ὑπ αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχὰς καὶ περ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες ὁμοί τὰναυτία λέγοντων, ἄσπερ ὑπ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκαστέντες. Physic. Ausc. 1, 5. "All make Contraries first principles...though they assume their elements without proof, they agree as if constrained by the force of truth in making them opposites." This holds true if we extend our view to modern Philosophies. Schelling finds in the whole universe of matter and spirit the perpetual recurrence of opposite Polar forces with a centre of Indifference, and resumes these phenomena in a formula by proclaiming the universe and every portion of it to be a Magnet. Thus the Limit and the double Infinite of the Platonists are transformed in his system into the Centre of Equilibrium, with the Positive and Negative Poles. Hegel similarly finds the law of the universe to be the existence of opposite forces, first in isolation, then at war, and afterwards in reconciliation as positive and negative factors of a higher and more spiritual life.

§ 3. We have collected a statement, vague unfortunately, and unfortunately not in the words of Plato, of the doctrine of the πέρας and ἀπεφόρον, and have indicated its relation to Aristotle's system, with which the student is probably more familiar. We have still to inquire what was the precise meaning that Plato attached to these words.

The obvious meaning of ἀπεφόρον is Infinite, and this is unquestionably the meaning that Plato intended the word should first suggest. The successive Greek philosophies absorbed into their system their predecessors, and Plato's forerunners, the Physiologists, had adopted Infinity as a first principle and groundwork of Being. If we need any further proof that this is the prima facie meaning of the
word, we have a sufficient one in the fact that it is against ἄπειρον in this sense that Aristotle directs his polemic. Ἀλλ᾽ ἦσσι αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καθόλου ἡ ζήτησις μᾶλλον, εἰ εἰνέχεται τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς μηδὲν ἔχουσι μέγεθος. ἤμεῖς ὃ ἔπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ περὶ ὧν ποιοῦμεν τὴν μέθοδον, ἃρ' ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ οὐκ ἔστι σώμα ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν. Phys. Aus. 3, 5. "It is a wider question than we have now to discuss, whether there is Infinity in the mathematical field, or in thought, or in the spiritual world. We are now inquiring whether any mass is infinitely great in the sensuous and physical world." Then he distinguishes Plato's two kinds of Infinity, and admits the existence of the infinitely Small: τὸ ἄπειρον ἐστὶ μὲν προσθέσει ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἀφαιρέσει... ἄλλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτω δ' ἐστι τὸ ἄπειρον' ὅναμεν γὰρ, καὶ ἐπὶ καθαίρεσιν. ib. 3, 6. "Infinity is conceivable either in the line of augmentation or in that of diminution: but the only Infinity that exists is a potential Infinity in the line of diminution." and potential in the sense of never being actualized, but only perpetually approached. Finite magnitudes, he proceeds to say, may be regarded as infinite, if we adopt a mode of measuring them by which they can never be exhausted: e. g. by first taking half, then half the remainder, and so on; whereby the increment at last becomes infinitely small. This infinite subdivision can be presented in the form of an infinite addition: and this is the only sense in which he allows even a potential infinite in the line of augmentation. But the sum of this infinite series is finite, and this is really only another way of presenting the infinite in the line of diminution; καὶ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν δὴ οὕτως ἄπειρον δυνάμει ἔστιν ὁ ταῦτα λέγομεν τρόπον των ἐναι τῷ κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἅ ἔνδει γὰρ τι αὐτοῦ ἐξο ἔσται λαμβανεῖν, οὐ μεντοὶ ύπερβάλλει παντὸς ἀρισμένου μεγέθους, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν ύπερβάλλει παντὸς ἀρισμένου καὶ ἔσται ἔλαττον. ὡστε δὴ παντὸς ύπερβάλλει κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν...οὐδὲ δυνάμει ἄν εἴη, ἀλλ' ἡ, ὡσπερ εἰρηται, ἀντεστραμμένος τῇ διαίρεσι. ib. "The infinite of augmentation exists potentially so far as it is identical with the infinite of diminution, for there is perpetually something to be added: but it will not exceed all finite magnitude, as the
infinite of diminution exceeded every finite degree of smallness. So there is no infinite of augmentation even potential except as the converse of infinite diminution."

He accordingly proposes, if we assume the existence of τὸ ἄπειρον, to alter its definition, so that it shall only signify the Unfinished, Incomplete, or Indeterminate. Συμβαίνει δὲ τούναντιον εἶναι ἄπειρον ἂν λέγουσιν...οὐ γὰρ οὐ μὴθεν ἔξω, ἀλλ’ οὐ δεί τι ἔξω ἔστι, τούτῳ ἄπειρον ἔστιν...οὐ δὲ μὴθεν ἔξω, τοῦτ’ ἐστι Τέλεων καὶ "Ολον...Τέλεσαν ὅ’ οὕθεν μὴ ἔχον τελος τὸ δὲ τέλος πέρας...ἐπεί ἐντεύθεν γε λαμβάνονσι τὴν σεμνότητα κατὰ τοῦ ἄπειρον, τὸ πάντα περιέχον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχον, διὰ τὸ ἔχειν των ὁμοιότητα τῷ "Ολον’ ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἄπειρον τῇ στοι μεγεθοὺς τελειότητος ὑπη, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὅλον ἐντελεχεία δὲ οὐ. ib. "It results that the contrary to what they say is the ἄπειρον, and it is not that which is never transcended by any other magnitude, but that which is always transcended; that which is not transcended being the Perfect or Whole; and that is Perfect which has reached the Limit. And the majesty ascribed to the indeterminate (unterminated), "the all comprehending," "the all containing," is due to its proximity to the Perfect; for the indeterminate is the material of Perfect magnitude, or that which approaches, without ever reaching, Totality."

The last sentiments are very Platonic, and when we consider that in the Timeus the material universe is circumscribed and finite, Plato entertaining the grand conception, with which we are now hardly so familiar, that all that is forms a single perfect whole, [ἴνα ὅλον ὅτι μάλιστα ἔχον τέλεων ἐκ τελεών τῶν μερῶν εἰη...ἐν ὅλον ὅλων ἐξ ἀπάντων τέλεων αὐτῶν ἔστηκάντο] we are justified in assuming that they coincide with Plato’s views, and that the infinity, or quantity without end, of the material element is no essential part of his philosophy. Indeed, Aristotle himself informs us, that it did not reappear in the details of his doctrine: Ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτων διὰ τούτο ἄπειρα δύο ἔποιησεν ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὕξησιν δοκεῖ ὑπερβάλλειν παντὸς ὁρισμένου μεγέθους καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον λέναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαρέσεων ποιήσας μέντοι δύο οὐ χρήσαται. Phys. Ausc. 3. 7. “Plato assumed a double Infinity, because the elements seem to overpass all finite quantity, and to be infinite both in the line of augmenta-
tion and in that of diminution. But after asserting its existence, we do not find him making any use of it as a principle."

§ 4. We come to the same conclusion if we examine the other terms, τὸ μᾶλλον and τὸ ἤπτον, which Plato proposes as equivalent to ἀπειρον. Here again unfortunately we cannot quote from Plato himself, but must have recourse to Aristotle. He uses the words in his Ethical treatise (Eth. Nic. 10. 2.), referring to the doctrine of the Philebus; and he uses them again in the treatise on the Categories in reference to the same question that he discussed in the Ethics. In the Categories the words simply imply Gradation or Intensive quantity. "Substance," he says, "does not admit of a gradation: (δεικεί δὲ ἡ φύσις ἐπιθέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἤπτον) One man is not more or less a man either compared with himself at different times or with a different individual. Quantity does not admit of gradation: three is as much three as five is five; one minute is just as much time as another minute; one cubit length is just as much space as another cubit length. Some Relations admit of no gradation; equality and duplicity for instance; others do, as similarity and inequality. Some Qualities admit no gradation; figure, for instance. One circle is just as much a circle as another; and one triangle just as much a triangle as another. The majority of Qualities admit of gradation: white, hot, cold, &c. have different degrees of comparison. Whether abstract states, intellectual, moral, or corporeal, e. g. science, virtue, health, admit of degrees, is controverted: it is certain that the concrete qualities do; one man is more scientific, more virtuous, more healthy than another. Actions and passions, e. g. to heat, to cool, to please, to pain, admit of gradations." The question about the abstract states is in the Ethics answered in the affirmative, at least with respect to one of them, health. It is evident from the whole of this discussion that by things which admit of the More and the Less are denoted those that vary in degree or possess what is sometimes called quantity of intension. Intension, like extension, does not imply Infinity, except so far as even finite quan-
tity involves infinite divisibility. But in respect of the Multiplicity of gradations thus arising, whatever has in-
tension or extension may be called indefinite or indeterminate. In this view the ἀπειρον of Plato amounts to the συνεχὲς καὶ διαρρέτων of the Nicomachean Ethics. Ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεὶ καὶ διαρρέτῳ ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δὲ ἐλαττων τὸ δ' ἴσον τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τῷ ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἠλλ' ἐπεύθεσις. Eth. Nic. 2. 6. "Whatever is continuous or divisible presents a greater, a less, and an equal, the equal being a mean between excess and defect." Compare: Τὸ δ' ἀπειρον ἐμφανίσεται πρώτον ἐν τῷ συνεχεί: διὸ καὶ τῶν ὀριζόμενων τὸ συν-
εχὲς συμβαίνει προσχήσθαι πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπειρον, ὡς τὸ εἶς ἀπειρον διαρρέτων συνεχὲς ὑπ' Πhys. Lusc. 3. 1. "Infinity appears first in the continuous. Hence the definitions of continuity are made to contain Infinity, continuity being defined by infinite divisibility."

§ 5. Assuming, then, that τὸ ἀπειρον means only the variable or Indeterminate, we still have to inquire in what point of view the More and Less involve Evil or Imperfection, as they do in the Pythagorean and Platonic systems: (ἐτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἐν καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν τῶν στοιχείων ἀπεδώκειν ἐκατέρως ἐκατέρων. Met. 1. 6.) Plato himself will furnish the answer to this. Perfection always consists in a mean (τὸ μέτρον): the mean is a single determinate quantity: whatever therefore has a plurality of gradations, may happen in one of them to present the normal quantity, but in all the rest will be excessive or defective. It can only enter into the good and beautiful as a material which requires to have its law imposed from without. It cannot itself be an absolute good, or supply a law for action. In the Politicus we are told that the More and Less are all-important in philosophy and art, when the standard to which they are referred is the golden mean. Διάτιτα ἄρα ταῦτας οὐς οὐδέν καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ θετέον. τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν δ' αὖ πρὸς τὸ μέτρον... ἤγγισεν ἄρα ὁμοίως τὸς τέχνας πάσας εἶναι καὶ μεῖζὸν τι ἀμα καὶ ἐλαττὸν μετείσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἄλλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν... δῆλον ὅτι διαφόροις ἃν τὴν μετρήτικη γαίτη δίχα τέμνοντες, ἐν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῆς μόριον συμπάσας τέχνας ὀπό-
σαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθη καὶ πλάτη καὶ παχύτητας

(c) The elements regarded as susceptible, but not inherently possessed, of a Mean or quantitative Law.
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πρὸς τούναυτὰν μετρῶσι, τὸ δὲ ἐτέρων ὅπόσα πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καυρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' ὅπόσα εἰς τὸ μέτρον ἀπεκάθαρν τῶν ἐσχάτων...μετρήσεως γὰρ δὴ τινα τρόπον πάνθ' ὅπόσα ἐνέχυσα μετείληψε. p. 30د. "There are two kinds of More and Less, and two modes of appreciating them; one when we compare any greater with any lesser quantity, the other when we compare any quantity with Due Measure...We must consider that the existence of Art depends on the reality of a More and Less, referred not to each other, but to an absolute Right quantity. We must accordingly divide Mensuration into two branches, one embracing the sciences that refer the More or Less in number, length, breadth, depth, and thickness, to one another; the other those that refer them to Due Measure, the Seemly, the Proportionate, the Right, and whatever dwells in the Mean remote from extremes; for a kind of Mensuration is the essence of Art."

If we wave the question whether infinite quantities exist, and substitute for infinity excess over a certain mean, we may state the theory of Unity and Plurality in the terms of Aristotle: καὶ ἔσοχε παλαιὰ εἰσι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ δόξα ὅτι τὸ ἐν καὶ ὑπεροχῇ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὀντῶν εἰσὶ. Phys. Aus. 1. 6.

In the Philebus, besides the antithesis of Greater and Less, we are presented with a qualitative antithesis of positive and negative extremes, (θερμότερον, ψυχρότερον, ἕρμητερον, ὑγρότερον.) While these are in isolation they are but material elements, and belong to the first stage of Being. They must be gathered together in a certain proportion and measure before they can become the seat of the higher manifestations of nature and life. "Ἀπαντά δέοται τῆς ἐωιτίας ῥοπῆς ἴνα τυγχάνῃ τοῦ μετρίου καὶ μέσου" τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ τῶν λόγων, τῶν δ' ἀκρῶν ἐκάτερον οὖν ἔχει χωρίς. De Part. An. 2, 7. "Every force needs to be balanced by its opposite, in order to attain to the Moderate and the Mean; for these have the Form (Life) and Spirit, which do not dwell in the isolated extremes." Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οὕτω (εἰς ἄλληλα) τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἕκ δὲ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὕστα καὶ τὰ τοι-αὐτά, τὸ μὲν θερμοῦ γιγνομένου ψυχροῦ τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ,
“Nature’s first process is to subdue the elementary extremes by this partial transformation; the formation of flesh and bone, and other living tissues follows as soon as hot and cold have been tempered and reduced to a mean... Similarly, liquid and solid, and all other opposite conditions, must be reduced to a mean before they can compose the nobler realms of nature.” Thus in the relations of Limit and Infinity, or Unity and Plurality, we have two antitheses: one between Unity and Plurality; and a second between the elements of the Plurality; whether we regard the quantitative antithesis of Excess and Defect, or the qualitative antithesis of the positive and negative extremes. 

§ 6. In the Philebus the Limit is always quantitative. Quality, including all the elementary forces, is the substratum that has to receive the quantitative determination. Just, however, as quality underlies quantity, we can conceive a substratum underlying quality. This Plato in the Timaeus calls the Vehicle, or Receptacle, (τὸ δεκτικῶν,) and Aristotle in his writings the primary Matter, (πρῶτη ὑλή,) Quality is just as much a limitation or determination of the formless Matter, as specific quantity is of quality; and accordingly Aristotle gives it the same name (εἴδος) that he applies to the quantitative law or dominant Form.

The Philebus, however, does not carry the analysis of Being so far. It regards quality as the ultimate matter, the substratum to be moulded and measured out in due proportions by the quantitative limit. As existing in indeterminate quantity, i.e. as measurable but not yet measured, it is called Infinity: a name open to misconception, for, when subjected to mensuration, its possible maximum is found to be finite. The quantitative Limit is its Measure.

The following illustrations of the conception of Measure
in some of its aspects are taken from Whewell's Astronomy and General Physics.

The solar system might have been so adjusted, that the year should have been longer or shorter than it actually is. The earth might revolve round the sun at a distance greater or less than that which it actually has: the size or density of the central mass, the sun, might be increased or diminished in any proportion; and thus the time of the earth’s revolution might have been increased or diminished in any degree. By any such change the working of the botanical world would be thrown into utter disorder. Most of our fruit trees, for example, require the year to be of its present length. If the summer and the autumn were much shorter, the fruit would not ripen: if these seasons were much longer, the tree would put forth a fresh suit of blossoms to be cut down by the winter. Our forest trees need all the seasons of the present year for their perfection; the spring, summer, and autumn for the development of their leaves, and formation of their proper juice, and of wood from this, and the winter for hardening and solidifying the substance thus formed. The processes of the rising of the sap, of the formation of proper juices, of the unfolding of leaves, the opening of flowers, the fecundation of the fruit, the ripening of the seed, its proper deposition in order for the reproduction of a new plant; all these operations require a certain portion of time, and could not be compressed into a space less than a year, or at least could not be abbreviated in any very great degree.

Again: the force of gravity depends upon the mass of the earth, and is not determined by any cosmical necessity of which we are aware. If the intensity of gravity were to be much increased or much diminished, if every object were to become twice as heavy or only half as heavy as it now is, all the forces both of voluntary and involuntary motion, which produce the present orderly and suitable results by being properly proportioned to the resistance which they experience, would be thrown off their balance, and produce motions too quick or too slow, wrong posi-
tions, jerks and stops, instead of steady well-conducted movements. The force in plants which propels the sap, is part of the economy of the vegetable world, and it is clear that the due operation of this force depends upon its being rightly proportioned to the force of gravity. The weight of the fluid must be counterbalanced, and an excess of force must exist to produce the motion upwards. In the common course of vegetable life, the rate of ascent is regulated on the one hand by the upward pressure of the vegetable power, and on the other by the amount of the gravity of the fluid, along with the other resistances which are to be overcome. If, therefore, we suppose gravity to increase, the rapidity of the vegetable circulation will diminish, and the rate at which this function proceeds, will not correspond either to the course of the seasons, or to the other physiological processes with which this has to cooperate. We might conceive such an increase of gravity as would stop the vital movements of the plant in a short time. In like manner a diminution of the gravity of the vegetable juices would accelerate the rising of the sap, and would probably hurry and overload the leaves and other organs, so as to interfere with their due operation. There is no apparent connexion between the quantity of matter of the earth, and the force of imbibition of the roots of the vine, or the force of propulsion of the vessels of its branches. Yet these things have such a proportion as the well-being of the vine requires.

These are rather instances of symmetry than of Measure. The latter word seems more properly used when the related terms are direct contraries in a single organisation. In all the nobler forms of existence we find antagonistic forces coexisting in harmony. Simplicity of composition, the preponderance of single principles, mark the lower forms of nature and society. The ascending scale of excellence is an ascending scale of complication, the coordination of more and more numerous rival tendencies. The due bounds and limits which are set to the predominance of each force, which restrain it from destroying the rest by which it is checked and counterbalanced, and so far
becoming boundless and infinite, these limits to which the beauty, richness, and grandeur of the Whole are due, are in Plato’s language its Measure.

It is necessary to distinguish this from a different meaning of the same word.

Measure is defined by Aristotle as the unit of measurement; as a moment may be made the unit of time, a span the unit of length, a pound the unit of weight: and, generalizing this conception, he says, Measure is the unit of cognition, i.e. any elementary premise or atom of thought. Mάλιστα δέ τὸ ἐνιαὶ τὸ μέτρον ἐστὶν ἐναὶ πρῶτον ἐκάστου γένους καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις λέγεται μέτρον ὁ πρῶτος ἐκάστου γεγυωσκεται...ἐν πάσι δῆ τουτοις μέτρον καὶ ἄρχη ἐν τι καὶ ἀδιαφροσυν...τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἢ τῷ πολῷ ἢ τῷ ποσῷ...οὕτω δὴ πάντων μέτρον τὸ ἐν ὧτι γνωρίζομεν ήξ ὅν ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία διαιροῦσε ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἴδος. Met. 10. p. 1053. “To be One is properly to be the ultimate Measure of any genus, and principally of quantity...secondarily to be the ultimate instrument of cognition in other categories...In every instance the Measure and origin of knowledge is something One and indivisible...that is to say, simple in quantity or quality...The universal Measure, then, is Unity, because we know things by dividing their substances into their Units of quantity and quality.” It varies, he observes, with the object to be measured: in solid dimension it is a solid dimension, in musical sounds a quartertone, in articulate sounds a letter, in velocity a standard velocity. Measure or Unity in this sense is an ingredient or element of the Whole to be measured, and therefore falls under the conception of material cause. Accordingly Aristotle seems to identify it with the elementary extremes of Plato’s Infinite, or rather, as he attributes a priority to position over privation, with the positive factor alone. Ἄλλα μὴν ἐν γε χρώμασιν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν χρώμα, οἶον τὸ λευκόν, εἰ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τούτων καὶ τοῦ μέλανος φαίνεται γεγυώμενα, τὸ δὲ μέλαν στέρησις λευκόν...ὡστ’ εἰ τὰ ὑπάτα ἤν χρώματα, ἤν ἂν ἀριθμὸς τις τὰ ὑπάτα, ἄλλα τύων; ὄνομα δὴ ὧτι χρωμάτων καὶ τὸ ἐν ἤν ἂν τι ἐν, οἶον τὸ λευκόν... ὀρμώστε δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φθόγγων στοιχείων ἄν ἤν τὰ ὑπάτα ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ ἐν στοιχείων φωνῆς. ib. p. 1054. “In colours the
Unit is a colour, namely white, assuming that white and black are the elementary colours, and that black is the privation of white. So that if Being was colour, it would be a Number of something, namely of colours, and the Unit would be something specific, namely white. So if Being were articulate sound, it would be a Number of letters, and Unity a vowel.” In the same manner, speaking of the theory that the cognizant subject must be of the same substance as the objects of cognition, he says it need only be composed of the positive σωστοιχία, without the privative. Τούτο δὲ λέληθε τοὺς οὖτως ὑπειληφότας, εἶπερ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν δεῖν εἴσ ἀπαντῶν ἰκανῶν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἑαυτῷ τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθείᾳ καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ καμπύλων γνωσόκομεν κριτής γὰρ ἀμφοῦ ὁ καίνων τὸ δὲ καμπύλων οὐθ᾽ έαυτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ εὐθείας. De An. 1. 5. “They overlook the fact that, if the soul is to be composed of the elements of Being, it need not be of all, as the positive series reveals both itself and the negative. Straight, for instance, is a criterion or measure of its negative, as well as of itself, as both are equally ascertained by the ruler, though the crooked indicates neither itself nor its opposite.” (Straight and crooked are here given as the elementary antithesis in the category of figure: conf. εἰ δὲ τι σχῆματι ἡ λειτύρη καὶ τραχύτητι διαφέρει, πάντα εὐθεῖα καὶ καμπύλω. Met. 8. 2. “Differences of figure or smoothness and roughness are all reducible to the antithesis of straight and crooked.”)

Even in Plato we find Unity used in this sense of Material ingredient or element, instead of totality of Form. For it seems to be such elementary Unities, not the systematic or organic Unity, that we are directed to search for in the commencement of the Philebus. So, too, some of the expressions in Aristotle’s own Logic seem only to contemplate deduction from the Material cause. Χρή δὲ, ὅταν ὅλων τι πραγματευθαλί τις, διελεῖν τό γένος εἰς τά ἀτόμα τῷ εἴδει τὰ πρῶτα...μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ τὰ ἱδία πάθῃ θεωρεῖν...τοῖς γὰρ συνισταμένοις ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῶν ὁμοιῶν ἐσται δὴ, διὰ τό ἀρχήν εἶναι πάντων...τὸ ἀπλοῦν, καὶ τοῖς ἀπλοῦσι τὰ συμβαίνοντα ὑπάρχειν καθ’ αὐτὰ μόνοις, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις κατ’ ἐκείνα. An. Post. 2. 12. “In scientific investi-
igation we should divide the subject matter into its ultimate elementary species, and then trace their properties. And the laws of the Wholes composed of these atoms will be thus ascertained, because they originate in the simple elements, which are the primary subjects of the laws, whereas the compound Wholes are so only secondarily." There is no mention here of the Whole, as a Whole, having any attributes. It is true, that, as contrasted with the ultimate matter, these elementary qualities must be considered as belonging to the Form; still they will only be portions or ingredients of the Form, and, therefore, stand in the relation of materials to the total Form. It is obvious that Measure in this sense is almost the antithesis of the Measure we hear of in the Philebus, and that the two senses are not to be confounded. The method of reasoning from the elementary Measure, incapable of ever arriving at the most organic and dominant laws, seems to be what Hegel intends to designate, when he speaks of the method of Understanding as opposed to the Method of Reason.

If, however, we examine Aristotle's definition either of Measure (ἐὰν πρῶτο γνωρίζομεν τοῦτο πρῶτον μέτρου ἐκάστου γένους. Met. 4. 6.) or of Unity, (ἀρχὴ οὖν τοῦ γνωριστοῦ περὶ ἐκαστον γένους τὸ ἐν. ib.) we find they justify the Platonic acceptation of Measure, and that there is no reason for confining it to signify the Material cause. He himself recognises Form (εἴδος) and Totality as a species of Unity, namely, a systematic or organic Unity (ὡς οὐσία τῆς ὀλόσποντος ἐνότητος τῶν. ib. 26), and it is a leading idea of his Philosophy, that the Formal and Final cause is more truly the basis of cognition than the Material (ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν φύσις κυριωτέρα τῆς ύλικῆς φύσεως. De Part. An. i. 1.) The plan of the Whole furnishes the scale of the Parts in every work of nature or art: the End or ideal to be realized impresses a quantitative as well as qualitative law on the elements or means of its realization, and as determining their quantities and proportions may be said to be their Measure. And although the subjective or perceptive Measure of the objective antitheses, it was intimated above, might consist of the positive extreme or elementary Unity, yet beauty and excellence involve a syste-
matic Unity, positive, indeed, in character as opposed to its own negation, but combining both the elementary opposites, the negative as well as the positive. Accordingly Aristotle makes the sentient Measure of the ordered world itself a Mean or systematic Unity. 'Ως τῆς αἰσθήσεως οίων μεσότητός τινος υόσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητικῶς ἐναντιώσεως· καὶ διὰ τούτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά, τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικὸν γίγνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν ἑτέρον τῶν ἀκρῶν. De An. 2. 11.

While, however, illustrating the Platonic Measure by the conception of End, we must bear in mind that, whereas the Whole is inmanent in its Parts, and the End is realized in the completed circle of means, Plato does not stop here; his ultimate Measure is transcendent, and placed beyond the sphere of the Measurable world.

From Aristotle's criticisms we may gather that the three kinds of Unity or Measure, elementary Unity (στοιχεῖον), systematic Unity (τὸ μέσον, τὸ ὅλον), transcendent Unity (τὸ ἄξιον), were not always sufficiently distinguished in the Platonic theory of the One and the Infinite.
APPENDIX C.

Memory and Reminiscence.

§ 1. The theory of Memory and Reminiscence is more fully developed in Aristotle than in Plato. In every act of Memory an image presents itself to the consciousness. What distinguishes Memory from mere Fancy or Imagination is the accompanying belief of the previous existence of a corresponding perception; the recognition of the image as representing the object of former attention. "Εστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἰσθήσεως οὔτε ὑπόληψις ἀλλὰ τούτων τινῶς ἡ ἐξίς ἡ πάθος ὅταν γένηται χρόνος...ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ ὅτι εἰδὲ τούτο ἦ ἠκούσεν ἦ ἔμαθε, προσαναθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον, τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ...ὅταν οὖν ἄμα ἦ τε τοῦ πράγματος γένηται κίνησις καὶ ἦ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ. ib. "Memory is not the original sensation or intellection, but the retention or excitation of either after a lapse of time...In every act of remembering that we saw, heard, or learnt a thing, there is a concomitant sensation of priority. Now priority and posteriority are relations of time...There must therefore be a joint impression of the object and of time in an act of Memory." Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ μνήμη καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν έφηται, ὅτι φαντάσματος, ὃς εἰκονὸς σὺ φάντασμα, ἐξίς, καὶ τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ ὃ χρόνου αἰσθητομέθα. Arist. De Memoriâ. "We have intimated that Memory and Remembrance are the retention of an image as the copy of an original sensation of which it is the vestige, and that it is seated in the Primary Sense or the faculty whereby we have a sensation of Time." What is here called the Primary Sense is said to be the same as the Common Sense and the Imagination. All thought is the joint work of Intellect and Imagination, the latter supplying definite dimension, shape, and locality.
to all our conceptions. These Imaginative or Sensuous elements are the direct object of Memory, and they all belong to the same faculty as the Temporal sensation. 

Noeō oûk ēstiv ãneu φαντάσματος. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ διαγράφειν ἕκει τε γὰρ οὖν δὲν προσχρόμενοι τῷ τὸ ποσόν ὀρισμένον εἶναι τοῦ τριγώνου ὀμοιο γράφομεν ὀρισμένον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, καὶ ὁ νοῦν ὀσαύτους κἂν μὴ νοὴν ποσόν, τίθεται πρὸ ὀμάκτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἃ ποσόν...διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἐνδεχέται νοεῖν οὖν ἄνευ τοῦ συνεχοῦς οὖν ἄνευ χρόνου τὰ μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ ὡμα, ἀλλὸς λόγος· μέγεθος δ' ἀναγκαῖον γινωρίζειν καὶ κώσιον, ὥ καὶ χρόνον, καὶ τὸ φαντάσμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἔστιν· ὅστε φαίνεται ὅτι τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητικῷ τούτῳ ἡ γνώσις ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ μνήμη καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἔστιν· ὅστε τοῦ νοομένου κατὰ συμβεβήκος ἄν εἶπ, καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ...τίνος μὲν ὄν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἡ μνήμη, φανέρον, ὅτι οὕτε καὶ ἡ φαντασία, κατὰ συμβεβήκος δὲ ὡσα μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας. ib. "There is no Intellection without Imagination, for the internal process of thought resembles geometrical demonstration by diagrams. For though we ground nothing on the definite dimension of a triangle, yet our diagram gives it a definite dimension; so in thought when the object of conception has no dimension, the Imagination gives it one which the Reason disregards.

Why it is that nothing can be thought out of Space and Time, even though it may have no relation to them, we have not now to inquire. Magnitude and Change, however, are objects of the same faculty as Time, namely the Common or the Primary Sense. As the remembrance of objects of reason is always attended with images, the direct object of Memory is not the intellectual element, but the Images of the Primary Sense...Memory then is the same faculty as Imagination, and its direct objects are images, its indirect the concomitants of the images."

§ 2. Aristotle rejects the definition of Reminiscence given in the Philebus, μνήμης ἀνάληψις, but his own hardly differs. "Ὅταν ἀναλαμβάνῃ ἦν πρότερον ἐξεν ἐπιστήμην ἣ αἰσθήσει ὣδ ποτὲ τῆν ἐξίν ἐλέγομεν μνήμην...ἐνοίσης πλείονος ἀρχῆς ἢ ἐξ ἢ μανθάνονσιν, τούτο ἐστὶ τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι. τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν συμβαίνει καὶ μνήμη ἀκολούθει.
"The recovery of previously possessed knowledge, or sensation, or whatever it is of which Memory was said to be retentive, when the mind has more materials than it had at the period of original acquisition, is Reminiscence, and Memory and Remembrance are the result." Reminiscence depends on the association of ideas or the law that regulates the train or succession of thoughts and fancies in the mind. Συμβαίνουσι δ' αἱ ἀναμνήσεις ἐπεὶ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἡδὲ γίνεσθαι μετὰ τήνδε...:"The recovery of previously possessed knowledge, or sensation, or whatever it is of which Memory was said to be retentive, when the mind has more materials than it had at the period of original acquisition, is Reminiscence, and Memory and Remembrance are the result." Reminiscence depends on the association of ideas or the law that regulates the train or succession of thoughts and fancies in the mind. Συμβαίνουσι δ' αἱ ἀναμνήσεις ἐπεὶ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἡδὲ γί

"Reminiscence is produced by the natural sequence of mental impressions...In reminiscence we pass through a series of impressions till we come to the one which is usually followed by the image to be recollected, (for which purpose we try to link on our recollections without a gap from the present moment or any other starting point) the causes of transition being Resemblance, Contrast, and Vicinity."
Imagination.

§ 1. The relations of λόγος, διάνοια, δόξα, and φαντασία, terms which we find in juxtaposition in the Philebus, are touched upon by Plato in the Sophista.

λόγος, Speech, is a Proposition, that is, a spoken Opinion, or a combination of Propositions forming a syllogism or a chain of syllogisms. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὁνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἐστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὔτ' αὖ ῥημάτων χωρίς ὁνομάτων λεγόμενων...οὐδεμιάν γὰρ οὔτε οὔτως οὔτε ἐκείνως πράξειν οὔτ' ἀπραξίαν οὔτ' οὐσίαν οὔτος οὔδε μὴ οὖνς δήλοι τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἂν τις τοῖς ὁνομασίᾳ τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ. τότε δ' ἦρμοσέ τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἣ πρῶτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτος καὶ συμκρότατος—πῶς ἂρ' ὀδε λέγεις;—ὅταν εἶπη τις, ἄνθρωποι μανθάνει, λόγον εἶναι φῆς τούτων ἑλάχιστον τε καὶ πρῶτον;—ἐγώγε. —δηλοὶ γὰρ ἢὴ ποιν τότε περὶ τῶν οὖν ἢ γεγομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὁνομάζεις μόνων, ἀλλὰ τι περαινεῖ, συμπλέκοις τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὁνομάσι. διὸ λέγεις τε αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ μόνον ὁνομάζεις εἴπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὀνόμα ἐφθειεξάμεθα λόγον. p. 262, ἦ. "Nouns alone spoken in succession form no Speech, nor verbs without nouns. No act or inaction or existence of any reality or unreality is indicated by the words in either case; nor till we combine nouns and verbs; then they fit; and their primary combination at once forms a Speech—what we may call a primary or elementary Speech.—Give me an instance.—If anybody says, A man is learning, do you not call this a primary and elementary Speech?—Yes.—For he then indicates that something exists, or is doing, or was done, or will be; and besides naming, he operates on what he names, as soon as
he combines verbs and nouns; and we speak of him as saying and not as merely naming; and call such combination a Speech." A Proposition or elementary Speech is related to Opinion (δόξα) as a complex of Propositions is to Reflexion or Reasoning (διάνοια).

Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταύτων πλὴν ὅ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἀνευ φωνῆς γεγομένος τούτ’ αὐτὸ ἥμων ἐπωνομάσθη διάνοια, τὸ δὲ γ’ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης βεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ὥν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος.—ἀλήθη.—καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις αὐτὸ ὠςε μὴν ὁ.—τὸ ποῖον;—φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν. —ἐσμεν.—ὅταν οὖν τούτῳ ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ στιγμῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχειν ὅτι προσέπθησιν αὐτῷ;—καὶ πῶς;—τί δ’ ὅταν μὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ δ’ αἰσθήσεως παρῆ τινὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ πάθος, δρ’ αὖν τε ὁρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἐτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;—οὐδέν.—οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀλήθης ἦν καὶ ψευδῆς, τούτων δ’ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, φαίνεται δὲ δ’ λέγομεν σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τὸ λόγῳ συγγενῶν οὕτων ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν ἐνα καὶ ἐνώτε εἰσαι. p. 263. e. "Reflexion and Speech are the same; except that the mere internal dialogue of the soul with herself without voice is called Reflexion.—True.—And the sound that proceeds from her in a stream through the lips is called Speech.—True.—And these, too, are involved in Speech.—What? Affirmation and negation.—They are.—When they are internal and the result of silent Reflexion, what would you call them but Opinion?—Nothing else.—And when they are not produced by the soul alone but by Sensation, what else can we call them but Imagination?—Nothing.—Well, as we have agreed that Speech is susceptible of truth and falsehood, and that Reflexion is the soul’s interchange of Speech with herself, Opinion the conclusion of Reflexion, and what we denominate Imagination a synthesis of Sensation and Opinion, it follows that all of these, being kindred to Speech, are susceptible of falsehood."

The existence of Imagination as a separate critical faculty distinct from Intellect is insisted upon in the Republic. "Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ τὸ ἄρθρον καὶ ἰστάναι βοηθεῖαι χαρισταίσιν πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὡστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μείζον ἢ ἐλαττὸν ἢ πλεῦρῃ ἢ βαρύτερον ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ
metrήσαν ἦ καὶ στίξαν; — πῶς γὰρ οὕ; — ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἄν εἶη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον. — τοῦτον γὰρ οὖν. —
tοῦτο δὲ πολλάκις, μετρήσαντι καὶ στηρίζοντι μείζω ἤττα εἶη
ἡ ἐλάσσω ἔτερα ἐτέρων ἥ ἵσα. ταυτάτα φαίνεται ἄμα περὶ ταῦτα.
—ναί.—οὐκοῦν ἐφαμέν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄμα περὶ ταῦτα ἐναντία δοξά-
ζειν ἀδώνατον εἶη; — καὶ ὅρθως γε ἐφαμεν.—τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄμα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα ὅκ ἄν εἶη ταῦτον.—
οὐ γὰρ οὖν; p. 602. “Are not measuring and counting
and weighing used as excellent protections against these
sensuous illusions, whereby we are not guided by sensuous
appearances of size, or number, or weight, but by a faculty
that counts, measures, or weighs? — They are.—And it is
Intellect that performs this function.—It is.—Sometimes
when this has measured an object and pronounced it
greater, less, or equal to another, it is contradicted by a
simultaneous appearance about the same object.—It is.—
Did we not say that to the same faculty contradictory
judgments at the same time on the same object were im-
possible? — We did, and rightly.—That, then, which judges
contrary to the measures cannot be identical with that
which judges in accordance with the measures.—It
cannot.”

§ 2. We see that φαντασία is spoken of as a judgment,
susceptible of truth and falsehood. It would not be in
accordance with English idioms to call the judgments
spontaneously inspired by sensible appearances, Imagina-
tions. When we immerse a straight stick in water, we
say that, although we are convinced it is straight, it
“seems,” “appears,” to be bent. We cannot say we
“Fancy” or “Imagine” it bent, or use any term cognate
to Imagination, as φανέρας is to φαντασία. In this respect
the Greek language is more philosophic. Dreams and the
illusions of a disordered mind are attributed in the English
language to the Imagination. But though all optical illu-
sions, and even the soberest operations of the waking senses,
are the works of the same faculty, they are expressed in
English by terms that give no hint of their kindred to
the other phænomena.

All judgments by sensation, whether illusory or well
founded, are the work of the Imagination. Since Berkeley
wrote his Theory of Vision, they have been treated of by psychologists as the Secondary perceptions of Sense, though they refer to what are generally called the Primary properties of matter. The sensations received by one organ are regarded by the mind as signs of sensations that will presently be received by the same or another. When we were acquiring the use of our faculties, perhaps something in the nature of syllogism took place in these anticipations: but, after frequent verification of our reasonings, the law of suggestion now acts instantaneously and without our conscious reflexion. For instance, I see a mass of extended colour, which "seems" to me to be a globe: that is, from the visual sensation that I receive, I believe that, if I approach and handle the object, I shall receive certain other sensations of sight and touch and the Common Sense. In common language I am said to see the globular figure, solidity, &c., but in truth I only imagine them; they are only mediately and indirectly objects of sight. They are suggested by the immediate visual sensations, because experience has taught me the connexion of certain visual and tactual sensations. They are really images of the Fancy, awakened by sight, once, perhaps, by the intervention of syllogism, now according to the law of association. Hence we see there is a true instinctive psychology in the Greek idiom which applies the term φανερας to such perceptions. The English terms, "Seem," "Appear," give no such intimation of the mental process which takes place.

Dugald Stewart has expressed himself so well on this matter, that we cannot do better than quote his words. After defining Conception (by which he means what we have called Imagination) as "that power of the mind which enables it to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation which it has formerly felt:" he thus proceeds:

"From these principles it is an obvious consequence that the knowledge we obtain by the eye of the tangible qualities of bodies involves the exercise of Conception according to the definition of that power which has already been given. In ordinary discourse, indeed, we ascribe this knowledge, on account of the instantaneonsness with which
it is obtained, to the power of Perception; but if the common doctrine on the subject be just, it is the result of a complex operation of the mind; comprehending, first, the Perception of those qualities which are the proper and original objects of sight; and, secondly, the Conception of those tangible qualities of which the original Perceptions of sight are found from experience to be the signs. The notions therefore we form by means of the eye of the tangible qualities of bodies and of the distances of these objects from the organ are mere Conceptions; strongly, and indeed indissolubly, associated by early and constant habit with the original Perceptions of sight.

"When we open our eyes on a magnificent prospect, the various distances at which all its different parts are placed from the eye, and the immense extent of the whole scene before us, seem to be perceived as immediately and as instantaneously by the mind as the coloured surface which is painted on the retina. The truth, however, unquestionably is, that this variety of distance and this immensity of extent are not objects of Sense, but of Conception; and the notions we form of them when our eyes are open differ from those we should form of them with our eyes shut only in this, that they are kept steadily in the view of the mind by being strongly associated with the sensations of colour, and with the original Perceptions of sight. This observation will be the more readily admitted if it is considered, that by a skilful imitation of a natural landscape in a common show-box the mind may be led to form the same notions of variety, of distance, and even of immense extent, as if the original scene were presented to our senses: and that, although in this case we have a speculative conviction that the sphere of our vision only extends to a few inches; yet so strong is the association between the original Perceptions of sight and the Conceptions which they habitually produce, that it is not possible for us by any effort of our will to prevent these Conceptions from taking place."—Elements of the Philosophy of the human mind, chap. 3.

§ 3. We have made this digression to explain and justify the Greek idiom which uses φαίνεται where in English
by an imperfection of language we are obliged to use the words "seem" "appear" to express acts of the Imagination. The distinction between Imagination and Opinion, judgment being common to both, is well traced by Aristotle. It is clear that, after Plato's contradistinction of Imagination and Opinion, his definition of Imagination, as a synthesis of Sensation and Opinion, must be inaccurate. It accordingly is objected to by Aristotle. *Φανερῶν τοῖνυν ὅτι συν ἡ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δὲ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, φαντασία ἔν εἴῃ.* De Anima, 3. 3. “Neither Opinion and Sensation, nor Opinion from Sensation, nor a synthesis of Opinion and Sensation, are Imagination.” His reasons are, that Opinion implies a capacity of Persuasion (πίστις) and the faculty of Speech (λόγος), neither of which are necessary to Imagination. He then adds that Opinion and Imagination are often in direct antagonism. *Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδὴ περὶ ὧν ἀμα υπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδαῖος, πέπεισται δὲ εἶναι μεῖζων τῆς οἰκομένης.* “Imagination (Appearance) is sometimes false where intellectual apprehension (Opinion) is true; for instance, the apparent diameter of the sun is a foot in length, though we are convinced it is larger than the earth.” From this he infers, as Plato had done in the Republic, that there is in the mind a tribunal superior to the Imagination. *Αἵτων δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνει ταύτα τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δόναμιν κρύνει τὸ τε χύριον καὶ ἐν ὧ τὰ φαντάσματα γίνεται· τούτου δὲ σημείου ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδαῖος, ἀντιφησὶ δὲ πολλάκις ἑτερον τι πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν. καὶ τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἐν δύο φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ὠμοι οὐ φαμεν δύον· κυριωτέρα γὰρ τῆς ἄφθις ἡ ὑφις. εἰ δ' ἦν ἡ ἄφθις μόνῃ, κἂν ἐκρύνομεν τό ἐν δύο.* De Somniis 2. “The reason of our sometimes rejecting appearances is that the ultimate judgment does not belong to the faculty moved by sensuous appearances. For instance, the sun appears only a foot in diameter, but something else contradicts the appearance. And when we cross our fingers one object of touch seems two; yet we do not believe it is two, because sight is a better authority than touch. If the sense of touch was our only informant we should have believed that the object was two.” Every sensation induces the Imagination to
form a judgment, but the Imagination is often overruled by the Opinion. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείθεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὴν κώμον πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐγρηγορῶς ὄραν δοκεῖ καὶ ἀκούει καὶ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ὄραν ἐνύοτε κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖν ὡς κινοῦμένην ὡς (for ὃς ῥεῖ ὁμοίως) ὄραν φαμέν, καὶ τῷ τῇ ἀφὴν δύο κινήσεως εἰσαγγέλλει τὸ ἐν δύο δοκεῖ. ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἄφθαστης αἰσθήσεως φημίν ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐτέρα κυριοτέρα ἀντιφημί. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τὸ ἐπικρίνων κατέχηται ἣ μὴ κωπίται τὴν οἰκείαν κώμον. ib. 3. “The arrival of an impression from a particular organ to the central organ of sensation (the organ of the Primary Sense and Consciousness) is the cause that makes us when awake think we see, or hear, or have any other perception. And if we suppose the sight to be impressed when it is not, we believe we see when we do not; or if the touch informs us of two impulses we believe one object of touch to be two. For in general the information of every sense is accepted in the central sensation (Primary Sense, or Imagination) unless some other more credible witness contradicts. Or rather, it is always accepted by the Imagination, but not always by the Opinion, unless the higher tribunal is prevented from speaking, or does not perform its appropriate function.” The distinction between Imagination and Opinion appears in dreams, when the Intellect is not entirely inactive. "Ωσπερ οὖν εἰ τινα λανθάνει ύποβαλλόμενον ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὀρθαλμῷ οὐ μόνον φανεῖται ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξει εἰναι δύο τὸ ἐν, ἀν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ, φανεῖται μὲν, οὐ δόξει δὲ, θυμὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοις ἄν μὲν αἰσθάνεται ὅτι καθεδεὶ καὶ τοῦ παθοῦν ἐν ὑ ἀισθήσεις τοῦ ὑπνοτικοῦ, φανεῖται μὲν, λέγει δὲ τι ἐν αὐτῷ, ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν Κόρισκος οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὁ Κόρισκος. πολλάκις γὰρ καθεύθους τις λέγει τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅτι ἐνύπνων τὸ φαινόμενον, ἐὰν δὲ λανθάνῃ ὅτι καθεδεὶ, οὐδὲν ἀντικρίνει τῇ φαντασίᾳ. ib. “If a person is unconscious that a finger is pressing against his eyeball, a single object will not only “appear” to be two, but will be so judged by the intellect; if he is conscious, it will “seem” two, but not be pronounced two by Opinion. So in sleep, if a man is conscious of being asleep and of the general oppression of his faculties, an appearance may affect his Imagination, but something in him says, “It looks like Coriseus,
but is not really Coriscus. For often in sleep something in the soul pronounces an appearance to be a dream; but if one is unconscious of being asleep the appearance is uncontradicted."

§ 4. The imagined form (τὸ φαντασμον) is always the predicate of a proposition of which the subject is an immediate sensation, whether of a particular sense or of the common sense. When I see an object at a distance it has a certain visible magnitude and figure, which vary as I approach or recede. That is, the common sense (for magnitude and figure are objects of the common sense) acting through the organ of sight receives a varying impression. If I speak of the "apparent" height and figure of the object, and say it "seems" to be square and twenty foot high, I do not refer to its visible magnitude and shape, for these are perpetually varying, and I mean something invariable. Excited by sight and the common sense, Fancy has produced from her storehouse an imaginary height and figure, which she judges really and permanently belong to the object. So when Aristotle says the sun seems to be a foot broad, he means that the immediate sensation it produces excites the imaginative estimate, that if we approached and handled, or otherwise measured it, we should find it a foot in diameter. Berkeley supposes that the predicates in such visual judgments are always sensations of touch, because he considers that what we have called the common sense (the perception of magnitude, number, figure, &c.) resides mainly in the organ of touch. He says truly that the tangible properties of bodies are the most important to sentient beings, as capable of hurting or benefiting them, and causing them pleasure or pain: and that, therefore, in vision we hardly notice the visible qualities, colour, visible magnitude, and visible figure, but at once imagine the more interesting tangible magnitude and figure, power of resistance, &c. of which the visible qualities are the signs. The fact, however, seems to be, that touch, like the other senses, does not immediately reveal, but only indirectly suggests to the imagination, the qualities that form the predicates of our sensuous judgments: that tangible magnitude and figure, like the visible, are only regarded as
signs of the real magnitude and figure attributed by Imagination to the objects we touch.

Aristotle's definition of Imagination is contained in the following sentence; ἐπει δ' ἐστὶ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικὸν, τὸ δ' εἶναι φανταστικῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἔτερον, ἔστὶ δὲ φαντασία ἢ ύπὸ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γενομένη κύνης, τὸ δ' ἐνύπνιον φαντασμὰ τι φανεται εἰσα...φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνυπνιάζεων, τούτου δὲ ἢ τὸ φανταστικὸν. De Somniiis i. "Since Imagination and Sensation are different acts of the same faculty, Imagination being the Sensuous movement propagated from an actual Sensation; as dreams (which we said above belonged to the Sensuous faculty) are a kind of Imagination, it is clear that they belong to the Sensuous faculty so far as it is identical with the Imaginative." The word κύνης is probably used to show the homogeneousness of Imagination and Sensation; possibly also to exclude reflexion or ratiocination. The drift of the definition in other words appears to be: Imagination is the spontaneous interpretative movement of the soul occasioned by an actual immediate Sensation.

§ 5. The general state of the will, that is, its virtuous or vicious disposition and characteristic tone, it is generally allowed, affects the moral Sensations, or, as we have identified the faculty, the moral Imaginations. They are also tinted by the transient sway of any powerful passion, or even the predominance of the more tranquil moods of feeling. It is not so clear whether, besides these influences, the moral perceptions are ever affected by individual acts of rational volition, or whether they are entirely exempt from its control, and necessarily determined by the state of the will and feelings. It is the established doctrine that they are necessary and beyond our control: τῆς φαντασίας ἡμεῖς οὐ κύριοι. Eth. Nic. 3. 5: and there is no doubt that this is very near the truth. On the other hand, though teaching and advice have very little influence to change the character and moral perceptions, it is hardly true that they have none at all. Optical experiments have established that the geometrical Imagination, as we may call the sensuous estimate of figure, position, and dimen-
sion, under certain circumstances, where the faculty itself is in a state of indifference, may be determined by an act of volition. Under certain circumstances, for instance, it depends on an act of the will whether we shall seem to ourselves to be beholding the convex or concave side of a mask, and whether we shall seem to be looking obliquely at a regular cube in perspective, or directly at a solid of some different position and figure. So perhaps, occasionally, when the moral Imagination is in a state of indifference or oscillation between baser and nobler interpretations, it may depend on an act of the will prompted by the reason whether some action or course of conduct shall be regarded by it in its true moral colours.

But to return to the Philebus. We have seen that what the Imagination supplies in a judgment of sense is the predicate, the subject being some immediate sensation. Apparently Pleasure can never be such an imaginary predicate, but is always an immediate sensation. We can speak of τὸ φανόμενον ἄγαθον, or τὸ φανόμενον καλὸν, but no one, unless led to use such expressions in defence of a thesis, would speak of τὸ φανόμενον ἰδι. If so, in spite of the arguments of Socrates in this dialogue, Pleasures are not susceptible of distinction as true and false, real and imaginary.
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The times, it is readily allowed, have greatly changed since Sylvanus Urban first solicited public attention, but it may be fairly doubted whether the tastes and habits of thought of the educated classes to whom he addresses himself have changed in a like degree. Hence he does not fear that History and Antiquities, in their widest sense, can ever become unpalatable to them, but, on the contrary, he is glad to mark an increased avidity in pursuing such studies. This is a state of things that he thinks he may claim a considerable share in bringing about, and the steady progress of which he is desirous of forwarding by all available means. He alludes to the growing appreciation of the Past, as the key to the understanding of the Present, and (in a sense) of the Future, as testified by the formation of Archæological and Literary Societies, which have already achieved much good, and may do still more; and as a means to that end, he devotes a portion of his pages every month, under the title of "Antiquarian and Literary Intelligencer," to a record of their progress.

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All Communications to be addressed to Mr. Urban, 377, Strand, W.C.